Military Review

Stalingrad "boiler"

45
23 November 1942 of the year, on the fifth day after the start of the counteroffensive in the Kalach region - the farm of the Soviet troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts closed the encirclement around the Stalingrad enemy group. Paulus offered Hitler to withdraw the troops of the 6 Army from the positions on the Volga, there were still chances for a part of the group to break through, until the ring of Soviet troops was sealed. However, the supreme German command, not wanting to retreat, left the army of Paulus in the "boiler", promising to unblock surrounded troops.


22 November

On November 22, the columns of the headquarters of the 6th German army arrived in Nizhne-Chirskaya, where Paulus and the chief of staff of the army Schmidt were. There was also Colonel General Goth, commander of the 4th tank the army. At this time, a radiogram was received from Hitler. Goth and his headquarters responded to other tasks. Paulus and Schmidt were ordered to immediately fly out of the formed “cauldron” and to place an army command post near the Gumrak station. It also became known that the 14th Panzer Corps of General Hube, which was supposed to suspend the advance of the Russian troops by attacking them from the flank, was pushed east of the Don, as was the 11th Army Corps. The strategically important bridge across the Don at Kalach was given without a fight. The south path — the retreat of the 6th Army — was largely cut. The advance detachments of the Russians went out to Kalach.

Soviet troops continued to develop the offensive. To connect with the troops of the Stalingrad Front, moving from the southeast, mobile units of the South-Western Front were to force the r. Don. The only bridge crossing over the Don in the offensive zone of the 26 and 4 tanks was at the village of Berezovsky in the area of ​​Kalach. The Germans also understood perfectly the meaning of this item. To cover the approaches to the bridge in the Kalach area, the Germans occupied a bridgehead on the western, high bank of the Don, facing the front to the rear, since it was believed that Soviet troops would try to occupy Kalach. The bridge was prepared for destruction. However, the enemy failed to hold the bridge in his hands, nor to blow it up.

Stalingrad "boiler"

Soviet T-34 tanks with soldiers on armor on the march in the snow-covered steppe during the Stalingrad operation. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

On the night from 21 to 22 in November, the 26 tank Corps occupied the settlements of Dobrinka and Ostrov. Corps commander Rodin decided to take advantage of the darkness for the sudden capture of a bridge crossing over the Don. This task was assigned to the forward detachment under the command of the commander of the 14 motorized rifle brigade, Lieutenant Colonel G. N. Filippov. The advanced detachment included: two motorized rifle companies of the 14 th motorized rifle brigade, five tanks of the 157 th tank brigade and an armored vehicle of the 15 th separate reconnaissance battalion. In the 3 o'clock in the morning on November 22, the forward detachment began to move at high speed along the Ostrov-Kalach road. Lt. Col. Filippov led a detachment of cars and tanks with headlights on to deceive the enemy. Indeed, the Germans took the column for their own (the German training unit, equipped with captured Russian tanks) and the enemy defense was passed without a single shot. In the rear of the enemy, a detachment met a local resident's wagon, who showed the way to the crossing and spoke about the German defense system. In 6 hours, calmly approaching the crossing, a part of the detachment passed by car across the bridge to the left bank of the Don and gave the rocket a sign to the others. In a short, sudden battle for the enemy, the guard of the bridge was interrupted. The detachment occupied the bridge, and then even made an attempt to seize the town of Kalach on the move. The enemy had organized resistance and tried to repel the crossing. Filippov's squad took all-round defense and steadfastly fought off all attacks of the superior forces of the enemy, holding the bridge until the approach of his corps.

On this day, the main forces of the 26 Corps were engaged in serious battles at the turn of the state farm "Victory of October" (15 km west of Kalach) and "10 of October years". Here the enemy, relying on a previously prepared anti-tank area, stubbornly resisted the advancement of body parts to the crossing. The Germans used previously damaged tanks, which were turned into fixed firing points. Only by the 14 clock, having made a roundabout maneuver, did the 157-I tank brigade take the heights 162,9 and 159,2. The enemy suffered heavy losses and retreated. 19-I tank brigade of Colonel N. M. Filippenko, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, to the 17 hour. part of the forces went to the crossing of the river. Don, which kept the vanguard of the corps. K 20 hour. the whole team crossed the Don River and concentrated in the northeastern Kalacha forest. The 1 tank corps also advanced successfully. The tank brigades of the 4 tank corps crossed the Don across the captured bridge from the Berezovsky farm and entrenched on the east bank. In the meantime, cavalry and infantry units of the South-Western Front consolidated the successes achieved. Part of the forces of the front led the fighting to destroy the enemy's forces, which were in the rear of the rapidly advancing Soviet mobile units.



23 November. Stalingrad "boiler"

On this day, the enemy grouping was completely blocked in the area of ​​Bazkovsky, Raspopinskaya, Belosoin. The divisions of the 21 and 5 of the Romanian corps (4, 5, 5, 6 and 13-I infantry divisions) were in the rifle ring of the 14 and 15 tank armies. Romanians still fought back, hoping for help from the outside. However, these hopes were not justified. Back in the night from 22 to 23 in November to the south of Golovskiy, some of the forces from the surrounded group capitulated. Among the captured Romanians captured by the Soviet troops were the commander of the 5 infantry division, General Mazarini, the commander of the 6 infantry division, General Lascar, the chief of staff of the 6 infantry division, Lieutenant Colonel Cambre and other commanders. The remaining Romanian troops fought back at Raspopinskaya. By the end of the day, Brigadier General Traian Stanescu, who commanded the surrounded Romanian troops, sent envoys to negotiate for surrender.

The Romanians outlined the conditions for surrender: all soldiers and officers who surrendered were guaranteed life, good treatment and the safety of personal belongings at each. All weapons, as well as horse, train and other military property were subject to surrender to Soviet troops. On the night of 23 on November 24, and then the whole day of November 24, the Romanians laid down weapon and surrendered. Then the columns of prisoners moved to the rear. In total, around 27, thousands of enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner in the Raspopinskaya district, and a significant amount of weapons and other military trophies were captured. The infantry units of the 21 and 5 tank armies, which had been liberated after the liquidation of the Raspopinsky group, continued to move in a southeastern direction, reinforcing the front of troops on the west bank of the Don.


Tankers 24 of the Soviet tank corps on the armor T-34

On the same day, Soviet troops liberated Kalach. At 7 in the morning the 19-I tank tank brigade of the 26 tank corps launched an attack on the enemy’s garrison in Kalach. By 10 hours Soviet tanks broke into the city, but the Germans stubbornly resisted. They stopped the advance of our troops in the north-western outskirts of the city. Then, the attackers came to the aid of the attacking units of the 157 Tank Brigade, which by this time had advanced to the right bank of the Don. Motorized rifle units of the brigade began to cross the Don across the ice and then attacked the enemy from the southwestern outskirts of Kalach. At the same time, tanks pulled up to the high right bank of the Don opened fire on enemy firing points and a cluster of his vehicles. The enemy did not expect a strike from this side and flinch. Our troops attacked again in the north-western outskirts of the city. By 14 watch, Kalach was released.

The remaining mobile units of the front also successfully attacked, breaking the resistance of the enemy and freeing settlements. “All attempts by the enemy to prevent the encirclement were overdue,” noted K. K. Rokossovsky. - The Nazi units, tank and motorized, being transferred from the area of ​​Stalingrad to the place of the resulting breakthrough, were introduced into the battle piecemeal and, falling under the blows of our superior forces, were defeated. They produced the same picture as with the units of the Red Army in the battles in the great bend of the Don. By not taking a cardinal decision to retreat in time, the fascist German command, like ours at one time, tried to impose small “patches” on the ever-widening huge gap in the Stalingrad direction. ”

The 65 Army of the Don Front during 20 - 23 in November, together with the 3 Guards Corps of the 21 Army of the Southwestern Front, took control of the settlements Tsimlovskiy, Platonov, Orekhov, Logovskiy, Upper Buzinovka, and the Vegekovsky, Ugov, Orekhov, Logovsky, Upper Buzinovka, and the Vegekovsky, Nogov, Orekhov, Logovsky, Upper Buzinovka. Broken German troops, including the 14 Tank Division, retreated to Stalingrad. 24-I army, leading the offensive along the left bank of the Don, came across a strong defense of the enemy, so did not have much success.

The troops of the shock group of the Stalingrad Front solved their main task. Having broken through the front on the left flank of the 4 of the Romanian army, the rifle formations of the 57 and 51 of the armies moved in the wake of their mobile formations — the 13 tank and the 4 mechanized and 4 cavalry corps. The Germans, trying to keep the 57 army offensive, threw units of the 29 motorized division into battle. They had little success, but in battles 21 - November 22 were defeated. By the end of November 22, connections of the 64 and 57 armies covered the Stalingrad enemy grouping from the south and south-west. All the routes of the Germans to the south and south-west were closed.

In the offensive zone of the 51 Army, on the left wing of the front attack force, the 4 Mechanic Corps of General Volsky moved ahead of the other attacking forces. November 20 was still occupied by prolific parts, November November 21 - art. Abganerovo and Art. Tinguta. As a result, our troops cut the Stalingrad-Salsk railway line and interrupted telegraph and telephone communication. The work of the main highway was violated, on which the Stalingrad Wehrmacht group received reinforcements, equipment and ammunition. The 4 th cavalcourse, which entered the breakthrough after Volsky's connection, made an 65-kilometer-long march-maneuver with the task of cutting off the enemy's escape routes to Abganerovo. The 13 tank corps of Colonel Tanaschishin continued to move to the north-west, interacting with the compound of General Volsky.


Infantry 4 of the Romanian army on vacation at ACS StuG III Ausf. F on the road near Stalingrad

In the afternoon of November 22, units of the Volsky mekhkorpus, breaking through to meet the troops of General Romanenko's 5 tank army, captured the Soviet farm. At this time, the formations of the 51 Army and the 4 Corps, advancing on the outer flank of the encirclement of the enemy group, were moving in the direction of Kotelnikovo. The troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts separated the distance of just 10 - 15 km after the 26-th and 4-th tank corps reached the Kalach area, and the 4-th mechanized corps - to the Soviet area. The German command, trying to keep the path of retreat, threw out of Stalingrad to Kalach and the Soviet 24 and 16 tank divisions. However, our troops repelled all enemy counterattacks. November 23 16-X and 45-I tank brigades of the 69-x tank corps and 4-I mechanized brigade of the 36-mechanized corps united in the Soviet farm in the 4 watch.

Thus, on the fifth day after the start of the counteroffensive in the Kalach area, the Soviet farm of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed the operational circle around the Stalingrad enemy grouping.


Calculation of the Soviet gun ZiS-3 at the factory "Red October" in Stalingrad

Soviet machine gunner with DP-27 in one of the destroyed houses of Stalingrad

Attempt to go to destroy the German group

A large grouping of the enemy — the 6 and part of the 4 th tank armies of the German armies — was included in the 22 divisions, totaling about 330 thousand people. In addition, during the offensive, the Soviet troops defeated the 3 Rumanian army, five divisions of which were destroyed or taken prisoner, and inflicted a serious defeat on the units of the 4 Rumanian army. The enemy’s 48 tank corps, which made up its operational reserve, was also defeated.

At the same time there was no solid front. The total length of the external front was over 450 km. However, the troops actually covered only about 270 km. The minimum distance of the external front from the internal one was only 15 - 20 km (Soviet - Lower-Chirskaya and Soviet - Aksai). It was on the most dangerous areas, where the enemy could put a deblocking counterstrike. The Germans did not have a solid line of defense either. At the front of the enemy, a huge gap wider than 300 km (from Bokovskaya to Lake Sarpa) was punched.

23 November, Paulus, not yet knowing that the ring of the environment had closed, in the radiogram of Hitler raised the question of withdrawing from the Volga positions. “The army will soon be on the brink of destruction, if it is not possible, having concentrated all forces, to defeat the enemy troops advancing from the south and west,” the German commander reported. - For this, it is necessary to immediately remove all divisions from Stalingrad and significant forces from the northern sector of the front. The inevitable consequence of this should be a breakthrough in the south-west direction, since it is impossible to organize the defense of the eastern and northern parts of the front with such insignificant forces ... Considering the current situation, I ask you once again to give me freedom of action ... ”.

November 24 Hitler gave the order to keep: “The troops of the 6 Army are temporarily surrounded by Russians ... Army personnel can be sure that I will do everything to ensure the normal supply of the army and timely release it from the environment. I know the brave personnel of the 6 Army and its commander and I am sure that you all do your duty. ” At this time, part of the Stalingrad group could still break through from the weak ring of the environment. However, the high command, not wanting to withdraw troops from the Volga, left the army of Paulus in the "boiler", finding a complete misunderstanding of the disaster that occurred near Stalingrad and condemning the 6 army to death. The German command was preparing for the deblocking of the 6 army. To solve this problem, they began to form a group of armies "Don".

Strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Soviet command. Colonel-General A. M. Vasilevsky, as a representative of Headquarters, was in the evening of November 23 in the troops of the South-Western Front. He discussed with his commanders the operational situation, and then spoke by telephone with the commanders of the Stalingrad and Don fronts. Realizing that the enemy would try to help out his troops, surrounded in the area of ​​Stalingrad, they decided to eliminate the Wehrmacht encircled grouping as soon as possible. The Supreme Commander approved the assessment of the situation and the proposal of the Chief of General Staff.

On the night of November 24, the troops received a directive by striking the converging lines on Gumrak to dismember the surrounded group and destroy it in parts. At the same time, the 21 Army of the South-Western Front, reinforced by the 26 and 4 tank corps, was to operate from west to east; from the north - 65-I, 24-I and 66-I armies of the Don Front; from the east and south - 62-I, 64-I and 57-I armies of the Stalingrad front. The operation was carried out on the external front by the troops of the 1 Guards and 5 Tank armies of the Southwestern Front: they were to consolidate their positions on the occupied lines along the Krivaya and Chir rivers, blocking the path to the enemy from the south-west. From the south along Gromoslavka, Aksai, Umantsevo lines, the operation was assigned to the 4 Cavalry Corps and rifle divisions of the 51 Army of the Stalingrad Front.

On the morning of November 24, the troops of three fronts attacked the enemy. The 65-I and 24-I armies of the Don Front fought to surround the Zadonsk group of the enemy. The 65 Army of P.I. Batov launched an offensive in the direction of the Vertyachiy and Peskovatka. The Germans fought back fiercely, went into counterattacks, relying on well-prepared defense. Having advanced four days offensive on 25 - 40 km, the troops of General Batov cleared the territory of the small bend of the Don from the enemy. The main forces of the army on the night of November 28 forced the Don.


The troops of the 24 Army were to go to the area of ​​the Vertyachy, Peskovatka and, together with the 65 Army, complete the encirclement of the Zadonsk grouping of the enemy. However, despite the heavy fighting, the troops of this army could not solve this problem. The German command was able, in the course of an intense struggle against 24 through 27 in November, to withdraw its grouping from the Don small bend to the main forces surrounded at Stalingrad. The assault of the 66 Army of the Don Front, which had launched the main attack from the Yerzovka area in the direction of Orlovka, also did not lead to success. Her troops managed to connect in the area of ​​the village. Market with a group of Colonel Gorokhov, but to unite with the main forces of the 62-th army did not work. The enemy was well established in the area of ​​Orlovka and actively fought back. The Germans redeployed 16 and 24 tank divisions to the northern sector from Marinovka. 28 - 30 November heavy fighting continued. The war of the Soviet 21, 65 and 24 armies was able to take the strong strongholds of the enemy - Peskovatku and Woolly. In other areas, the Germans held out.

Thus, attempts to cut and destroy the encircled grouping on the move did not bring the expected results. The Germans fought fiercely and repulsed the Soviet attacks. It turned out that a serious miscalculation was made in estimating the numerical composition of the German grouping that turned out to be in the “cauldron”. Initially, it was thought that around 85 were surrounded - 90 thousand people, and in fact there were more than 300 thousand people. Therefore, the elimination of the powerful Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht demanded more thorough preparation and exhaustion of the forces of the enemy. In addition, it was necessary to strengthen the outer ring of the environment and repel the blows of the enemy in order to free the army of Paulus.



Soviet mechanized unit during the offensive at Stalingrad
Author:
Articles from this series:
1942 Campaign

The Third Reich again goes on the offensive.
"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction
Stalingrad Fortress
1942 year. "The operation in the south develops without stopping"
How the German army broke through to Stalingrad
Expectations to take Stalingrad a sudden blow failed
Breakthrough of the 6 of the German army to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad
Defeat of the Crimean Front
"The spirit of optimism ... vital at the command post of the front." Kharkov disaster of the Red Army
Khrushchev dumped all the blame for the Kharkov catastrophe on Stalin
How the Wehrmacht stormed the Caucasus
Battle for the Caucasus: no invasions from land
The battle for the "black gold" of the Caucasus
How failed operation "Edelweiss"
"Soviet troops fought for every inch of land ..."
"Verdun of World War II ..."
"It truly was hell." How to reflect the first blow to Stalingrad
"We will storm Stalingrad and take it ...". Second storming of the stronghold on the Volga
The second assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
The third assault on Stalingrad
"Tanks drive through people like wood." The third assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
“We are fighting as if we are possessed, but we cannot make our way to the river ...”
Battle of Stalingrad changed the course of the “Big Game”
The German command is focused on "extremely active" defense and "a sense of superiority of the German soldier over the Russians"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus". H. 2
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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 22 November 2017 07: 13 New
    +4
    However, the supreme German command, not wanting to retreat, left Paulus' army in the "cauldron", promising to release the encircled troops.

    Yes, the successful experience of defense and supply of the Demyansk boiler played a bad joke with the Nazis.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 22 November 2017 10: 21 New
      +2
      Soviet mechanized unit during the offensive at Stalingrad

      In the picture in the article (the very last one), one can clearly see how attempts to copy the troop-building system - I mean reconnaissance on Wehrmacht motorcycles, the first to appear in the sights of Red Army fighters made for defense - led to bizarre results - in the steppe, in the wind at - 20 frost riding a motorcycle ....
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 22 November 2017 12: 03 New
        +2
        Motorcycle regiments began to form even before the war. For our intelligence reported that the Germans had many thousands of motorcyclists who were successfully used during the French campaign. smile
        1. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 22 November 2017 17: 42 New
          +2
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Motorcycle regiments began to form even before the war.

          And was the lope formed?
          Our pre-war plans were not bad. But impossible then ....
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 22 November 2017 19: 39 New
            +1
            Quote: stalkerwalker
            And was the lope formed?

            Judging by the Tank Front - 32 pieces. Each of the pre-war mechanized corps received one mtsp.
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 22 November 2017 16: 07 New
      +1
      for some reason I remembered from the 80s - they saved the Caucasian direction - to Baku and Grozny; to withdraw from there for a long time, but it’s better not to twitch — to restore the situation in Stalingrad, for example, and then continue to climb into the Caucasus. The greed for oil killed the Aryans. + the entry of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the collapse of the Soviets in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.
      OR THEY OR WE.
      EAST IS A DELICATE MATTER. We climbed onto a thin one.
      1 \ 3 THE BALKAN WAS ALREADY RESERVED BY THE VICTORY UNDER STALINGRAD (spheres of influence in the satellites who left the war)
    3. avva2012
      avva2012 22 November 2017 16: 23 New
      +6
      Summer morning
      A grenade fell into the grass
      Near Lviv
      The outpost lay in the ditch.
      Messerschmitts splashed gasoline
      in the blue -
      And do not stand under fire at the sixth stake.

      Burned bridges
      On the roads from Brest to Moscow.
      There were soldiers
      Looking away from the refugees.
      And on the towers
      Buried in the arable land "KB",
      Heavy raindrops were drying.

      And without a casing
      From Stalingrad apartments
      Bill Maxim
      And Rodimtsev felt the ice.
      And then
      barely audible
      сказал
      commander:
      - Communists, go ahead! Communists, go ahead!

      We broke the standards
      Fascist Powers
      Kissed silk guard divisions
      And, the shaft
      With knotted fingers,
      Near Lenin
      In May
      We went by the pole ...

      Under the February clouds
      Wind and snow
      But the earth smells iron unshaky.
      The day is approaching.
      A century goes on.
      The bayonets on the guard of the Kremlin are turning dark ...

      Everywhere
      Where the lead tracks are crossed
      Where selfless labor is a great deal,
      Through the ages
      for centuries,
      forever and ever,
      to end:
      - Communists, go ahead! Communists, go ahead!
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 22 November 2017 07: 25 New
    +2
    ... The personnel of the army can be sure that I will do everything in order to ensure the normal supply of the army and timely release it from the environment.
    ... But it did not grow together .... words down the drain ...
    1. novel66
      novel66 22 November 2017 11: 45 New
      +6
      no, well, he undertook something, he could, and that’s all, only that was not enough. .... the caricature was: Hitler was crying, singing "I lost a ring, .... and in a ring of 22 divisions .."
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 22 November 2017 13: 33 New
        +4
        I remember, I remember ... My neighbor had a book with drawings by the Kukryniksov .. When I came to visit, I liked to look at it .. Hitler on the background of a map of the Soviet-German front, on his head a scarf in a brown cage and the designation of Stalingrad .. and the phrase you mentioned. .
        1. novel66
          novel66 22 November 2017 14: 28 New
          +7
          in, found, were able
  3. avva2012
    avva2012 22 November 2017 07: 56 New
    +7
    Freeing the Soviet land from invaders, our soldiers faced the atrocities of the invaders on Stalingrad land.
    ACT (1) about the monstrous crimes of the Nazis in the village of Vertyach
    We, the undersigned, have compiled this act about the following: after the Red Army units liberated the farm of Vertyachy, Stalingrad Region, we examined the German camp of Soviet prisoners of war. Under the straw in the hut, as well as in other places of the camp, we discovered 87 corpses of Red Army soldiers and commanders. More than ten corpses are so disfigured that they lost their human appearance. Many Germans tortured by the Germans have stomach tights, their eyes are gouged out, their ears and noses are cut off. We found that the Germans forced the prisoners to work 14 hours a day on the construction of defensive structures. During the day they were given half a liter of boiling water, in the evening 3-4 spoons of steamed rye and a piece of dead horse meat. Food was not given out to the wounded and sick at all. Almost all prisoners suffered from dysentery. Exhausted and sick Germans were beaten with sticks. A few days before the start of the Soviet offensive, the Germans completely stopped feeding all the prisoners and condemned them to starvation. Of the 89 Soviet prisoners of war who were in the camp on the Vertyach hamlet, 87 people died of starvation, 30 were tortured and shot. What they sign: senior military assistant Ryabov, captain Roshchin, captain Kalashnikov, senior lieutenant Shtapoprud, lieutenant Nelin, foreman Baranov, second-rank quartermaster technician Kaplun, Red Army soldier Andreev, residents of the village of Vertyachy Plotnikov, Kanzhigolev, Stari. 1942 November XNUMX g., Vertyachy farm.
    "The atrocities of the Nazi invaders in the areas of the Stalingrad region. Documents." Under the general editorship of A.S. Chuyanov, chairman of the Stalingrad Regional Commission for promoting the work of the Extraordinary State Commission for identifying and investigating the atrocities of Nazi invaders and their accomplices and causing them harm to citizens, collective farms, public organizations, state enterprises and institutions of the USSR.
    1. Severomor
      Severomor 22 November 2017 10: 46 New
      +8
      Quote: avva2012
      the present act of the following

      It is a pity the boy from Novy Urengoy did not read this. But this is the future victim of the exam, repent, repent, repent .....
      If the country had the right policy, the film "Ordinary Fascism" is a must-see!
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 22 November 2017 10: 49 New
        +7
        There was also a film, in my opinion, mandatory to watch: "Go and see."
        1. badens1111
          badens1111 22 November 2017 10: 53 New
          +7
          Quote: avva2012
          There was also a film, in my opinion, mandatory to watch: "Go and see."

          This film is truly scary .. by the demonstration of the atrocities of the Nazis and their servants, collaborators in the police, here such children like Kolya and his girlfriends should be shown sweat three times a day.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 22 November 2017 11: 01 New
            +3
            It is necessary to show who organized this provocation. Moreover, for now, their zenki frostbite on the forehead will not climb.
            1. parusnik
              parusnik 22 November 2017 13: 39 New
              +5
              Oh well, you won’t show this now .. Remember, after August 1991, on St. Petersburg television, when it was television, not a channel ... for several years in a row by November 7 they regularly showed the film "Kill the Dragon" .. .And then they realized that the film was, in general, about the "new democratic" government, removed from the viewing ... Go and see, it is necessary annually on 22.06. to show on the first federal channel ... that they would know and not forget ... and the next day, that schoolchildren would write an essay ... on this subject ...
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 22 November 2017 14: 04 New
                +1
                That's the way to do it. Only a teacher can already tell about exactly who burned the Russian, Belarusian villages (knowledge gap, I don’t remember about Ukrainian).
          2. Hantengri
            Hantengri 22 November 2017 20: 12 New
            +2
            Quote: badens1111
            his children such as Kolya and his girlfriends should show sweat three times a day.

            This is no longer useful. It had to "show sweat three times a day." to their fathers and mothers, and at the same time, the measure of the city, history teachers, creators of the "Predstoyaniye" and also "Tom-Who-Can't-Call" (c). At the same time, it is popularly explaining that the million-thousand victims of the bloody NKVD in the 37-38m are mainly not about "innocent victims", but about cleaning the USSR from people like them in anticipation of the upcoming war.
      2. Aviator_
        Aviator_ 22 November 2017 21: 55 New
        +3
        "Ordinary Fascism" - basically that the Nazis killed Jews. Perhaps, “Go and see” is more suitable in this regard. And “Mine Kampf” should be reissued so that everyone on the territory of the USSR would know what it would shine in the event of a Nazi victory. In 1990, the Military History Magazine began publishing Mine Kampf, but after a couple of issues the chief editor Filatov was removed and everything stopped.
    2. urman
      urman 22 November 2017 16: 56 New
      +2
      Quote: avva2012
      Exhausted and sick Germans were beaten with sticks

      And then this beast, died innocently in Soviet captivity.
      Damn it is necessary for children to study it in history lessons.
      Although
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 22 November 2017 17: 38 New
        +4
        Yes, as we were told in lessons what they did to the guys from the Young Guard. How to get the corpse of Tyulenin and tried to bring it into a divine form. Remained in memory as an imprint for life.
  4. andrewkor
    andrewkor 22 November 2017 08: 07 New
    +4
    I’m reading an article and vividly presenting the grandiose epic that our grandfathers and fathers could have done! And Kolya, who suddenly became famous, probably doesn’t read this! And then for the Germans only agony, hunger, cold, lice and captivity! The "living and dead" part two!
    1. avva2012
      avva2012 22 November 2017 08: 23 New
      +8
      I think that the significant losses among German prisoners of war after the Battle of Stalingrad were not only because of their poor physical condition, but also because our soldiers saw in the camps for our prisoners. The boy Kolya, who is eating from a belly, delves into clothes and, in general, has not seen grief, will never understand how our soldiers felt.
      1. BAI
        BAI 22 November 2017 10: 13 New
        +1
        I think that the significant losses among German prisoners of war after the Battle of Stalingrad were not only because of their poor physical condition, but also because our soldiers saw in the camps for our prisoners.


        This was before and after Stalingrad.

        From the memoirs of Hans Prudhoff, a serviceman of the 110-th tank and grenadier regiment of the 11-th tank division: “On the way I saw captured Russian soldiers who were beaten with rifle butts for taking water from the local population ... German officers beat Russian women with sticks driving out to street work. The children of these women were locked in a hut for the duration of their work. The last thing that remained for the population was destroyed, and people were simply driven out of their own homes, because the German "cultural traders" could not live under the same roof with the Russian subhuman. In the winter from 1942 to 1943, I saw hundreds of captured Russian soldiers shot along the roads. The Russian nurses lay shot with their bare breasts, their clothes ripped off, their lower body exposed ... I can add the curses that these female bodies covered with German culture media: “You are not at all exciting! - No, they have cooled down. - Then you need to give in to the light, and this case will again heat up “...”
    2. urman
      urman 22 November 2017 21: 24 New
      +2
      Quote: andrewkor
      And Kolya, who suddenly became famous, probably doesn’t read this!

      And the boy, Kolya, does not read, but considers and calculates.
      Parents taught, apparently also those.
      Then, dad will provide study abroad and a warm place in some sort of mining company.
      If anyone is aware, then back in the 70s, the north of the Tyumen region was called the second .... guess for yourself. And in that N Urengoy there are a lot of PEOPLE WHOSE HOUSES with cherry orchards in the rear.
  5. BAI
    BAI 22 November 2017 10: 08 New
    +2
    At the same time there was no solid front. The total length of the external front was over 450 km. However, the troops actually covered only about 270 km. The minimum distance of the external front from the internal one was only 15 - 20 km (Soviet - Lower-Chirskaya and Soviet - Aksai). It was on the most dangerous areas, where the enemy could put a deblocking counterstrike. The Germans did not have a solid line of defense either. At the front of the enemy, a huge gap wider than 300 km (from Bokovskaya to Lake Sarpa) was punched.

    Manstein wrote in his memoirs about this moment - the Russians could have been captured there too ... and there if they had gone somewhere where there were no troops and the Germans would have come to an end, but had not done so, etc. But there was simply no strength. In general, during an offensive it is very important to stop and gain a foothold on the achieved frontiers, so as not to lose everything later.
    And in 41, 42 and at the beginning of 43 the Germans often recouped on counterattacks.
  6. avva2012
    avva2012 22 November 2017 10: 31 New
    +3
    Ours used on Germans in an environment, one more "weapon". Loudspeakers from which played popular German songs of that time were placed on the front line, at some point the songs were interrupted by messages about the victories of the Red Army in the sections of the Stalingrad Front, wildly annoying German listeners.
    The most effective tool was ... the monotonous knock of the metronome, which was interrupted through 7 strokes with a comment in German: "Every German soldier 7 seconds perishes." At the end of the 10-20 series of “timer reports”, tango swept from the speakers.
    1. igordok
      igordok 22 November 2017 12: 16 New
      +2
      Quote: avva2012
      Ours used on Germans in an environment, one more "weapon". Loudspeakers from which played popular German songs of that time were placed on the front line, at some point the songs were interrupted by messages about the victories of the Red Army in the sections of the Stalingrad Front, wildly annoying German listeners.

    2. Severomor
      Severomor 23 November 2017 00: 38 New
      +2
      Quote: avva2012
      ...... the monotonous knock of the metronome, which was interrupted after 7 beats by a comment in German: "Every 7 seconds a German soldier dies at the front."

      Just like a balm for the soul, he imagined ... it seems he’s not a cruel person, but when the enemies are reduced - what a pleasure it is, and "they" continue to talk about innocently tortured mortally frozen creatures
      Threat I would be very happy for one hit of the metronome - seven subhuman ....... oh they seem superhuman, well, that doesn’t matter)))
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 23 November 2017 02: 32 New
        +2
        Seven supermen, this is important! How many, then, ordinary ones would be chopped up?))) "Remember, brother, how they crushed the elven Mr. .... b"
  7. avva2012
    avva2012 22 November 2017 10: 46 New
    +2
    Newspaper clippings of those days.
  8. polpot
    polpot 22 November 2017 11: 47 New
    +3
    Thank you for the article Eternal memory of fallen fighters.
  9. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 22 November 2017 15: 58 New
    0
    Quote from the article:
    It was originally believed to have surrounded 85 - 90 thousand. man, but actually was more than 300 thousand. person.

    Surprising is such a big mistake in determining the number of opposing troops, they were 3-4 times mistaken, moreover, the large masses of enemy troops.
    After all, the troops were in direct contact for more than one month. It is clear that the command of the fronts could not determine the total number of enemy troops. The fronts saw only the troops with which they directly fought, fought. However, for this there was the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by Colonel General Vasilevsky, and also the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army subordinate to it, headed by generals Panfilov AP, and then Ilyichev II. They would have to systematically collect enemy data on the fronts, clarify, analyze. Of course, the exact determination of the number of enemy troops is difficult, errors are possible - 20%, maybe 50%, maybe twice, but the error is 3-4 times, i.e. did not take into account, did not see more than 200 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, says that The General Staff of the Red Army, headed by Colonel General Vasilevsky, simply did not work in this direction.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 22 November 2017 17: 27 New
      +2
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      Surprising is such a big mistake in determining the number of opposing troops, they were 3-4 times mistaken, moreover, the large masses of enemy troops.
      Of course, accurate determination of the number of enemy troops is difficult, errors are possible - 20%, maybe 50%, maybe twice, but the error is 3-4 times, i.e. they didn’t take into account, did not see more than 200 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, says that the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by Colonel General Vasilevsky, simply did not work in this direction.

      Worked. But the problem is that it was the primary data that were wrong: the intelligence regularly underestimated the number of enemy formations.
      Here is what Isaev writes about this:
      ... it is interesting to compare intelligence report No. 033a (final) of the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front of November 2 with data on the number of infantry divisions of November 1 in the military register of the 6th Army. Opposing enemy divisions were well studied and correctly listed during the defensive operation. However, the estimate of the number of enemy compounds was greatly underestimated. So, according to Soviet intelligence, the 94th Infantry Division totaled 1700, the 389th Infantry Division - 3000, the 305th Infantry Division - 1800, the 79th Infantry Division - 3500, and the 76th Infantry Division - 2000 people, the 100th light infantry division - 2200 people. According to the data given in the journal of military operations of the 6th Army, the number of these divisions was much higher. As of November 1, 1942, the 94th Infantry Division numbered 7002, the 389th Infantry Division - 6556, the 305th Infantry Division - 5644, the 79th Infantry Division - 6324, and the 76th Infantry Division - 6765 , 100th light infantry division - 5705 people. The difference, as we see, is more than twice. Therefore, the estimate of the total number of the 6th army in the Soviet intelligence report was greatly underestimated. It was assumed that enemy troops totaled 78 people, 800 field guns, 790 anti-tank guns and 430 tanks. The number of tanks was traditionally greatly bullied, and the number of personnel was underestimated. The Soviet intelligence officers received such a large number of tanks in the 540th Army, counting one and a half hundred tanks as part of the tank divisions.
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 22 November 2017 19: 32 New
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        ... it is interesting to compare intelligence report No. 033a (final) of the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front of November 2 with data on the number of infantry divisions of November 1 in the military register of the 6th Army.

        At this time, the chief of staff of the Stalingrad Front was General IS Varennikov, later he will become a victim of the “Stalinist” repressions and will be amnestied, rehabilitated and set free by the Khrushchev team immediately after the death of IS Stalin. By the way, the famous enemy of the USSR Khrushchev, at the same time was the PMC of the Stalingrad Front.
        Varennikov has long had such a manner of overly underestimating the capabilities of the Wehrmacht. So General Ryabyshev writes in his memoirs:
        “Having completed the reconnaissance (by the evening of June 21, 1941, a few hours before the Wehrmacht attack to the Soviet Union)), I decided, without stopping in Drohobych, to go to Sambir to the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, to share my thoughts and report on the results of reconnaissance. But in Sambir I was disappointed. The commander was not in the headquarters, he was in the army. I was received by the chief of staff of the army, Colonel I. S. Varennikov. My report on border anxiety he was not impressed. Arguments of a looming military threat, I don't know sincerely or not, he rejected.
        - Your fears are more than untenable- said Varennikov. - If the matter went to war, then we would be officially informed of this. Leave to commanders and the withdrawal of artillery to landfills would be prohibited. The troops would be on high alert. But there are no orders about it. As for the fascist aircraft, they flew before. Perhaps this is done by irresponsible pilots. So, shoot at them? Let diplomats regulate such matters.

        Therefore, intelligence from Varennikov is not an indicator of system error. Varenniki has long deliberately underestimated the danger from the Wehrmacht.
        But even with such deliberately false data from the front headquarters, the General Staff of the Red Army, if its GRU worked, would not be able to make such a mistake as viewing more than 200 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht with military equipment, transport, convoys, with infrastructure and moreover, open steppe spaces concentrated on a relatively small territory. After all, the GRU of the General Staff relies not only on data received from the headquarters of the fronts. The GRU also has its own sources of information, including undercover intelligence.
        Therefore, in general, the General Staff with its GRU, under the command of the generals Vasilevsky, Panfilov AP, Ilyichev, were not engaged. At least at that moment.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 22 November 2017 19: 49 New
          +1
          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          But even with such deliberately false data from the front headquarters, the General Staff of the Red Army, if its GRU had worked, could not have made such a mistake as viewing over 200 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and officers with military equipment, transport, convoys, with infrastructure and, moreover, concentrated in a relatively small area of ​​open steppe expanses.

          Our intelligence in the fall of 1941 managed to lose two tank groups! One to the south of Kiev, and the second - near Moscow.
          In the summer of 1942, our reconnaissance near Leningrad did not notice the arrival of the Manstein army - and our Sinyavinsky operation from all over the run flew into the German Nordlicht.
          Moreover, as Isaev writes:
          Perhaps the Soviet intelligence officers were forced to confirm the troops' requests for thousands of destroyed enemy soldiers and officers with a corresponding reduction in the number of their formations. If with regard to tanks it was possible to talk about the high efficiency of repair services that restore damaged equipment, then with regard to personnel this explanation did not work. The wounded and killed, of course, left the ranks of combat units.
          It is hard to say what conclusions Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Eremenko and Stalin himself would have come to if they had known the actual strength of the 6th Army. The calculations for the success of Uranus were based, inter alia, on the balance of forces between the enemy forces on the Don, in Stalingrad and the Kalmyk steppes and the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts. Would Headquarters decide to give the order to go on the counterattack? Would you scale down the environment? The latter was perhaps the most dangerous, because led the tip of the main blow from the pliable front of the 3rd Romanian army.

          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          After all, the GRU of the General Staff relies not only on data received from the headquarters of the fronts. The GRU also has its own sources of information, including undercover intelligence.

          You remind about the data issued by the GRU General Staff before the war? About the hordes of German motorcyclists who played a significant role in the victory of the Reich over France? About thousands of German parachute assault forces in the French campaign? About the German heavy tank divisions with serial heavy tanks? In general, the whole history of the creation of Soviet pre-war monstrous mechanized corps is an attempt to shift into the domestic spirit the German tank formations already tested in the OSh battles - but not real ones, but those reported by intelligence.
          1. Ivan Tartugai
            Ivan Tartugai 23 November 2017 06: 55 New
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Our intelligence in the fall of 1941 managed to lose two tank groups! One to the south of Kiev, and the second - near Moscow.

            Quote: Alexey RA
            You remind about the data issued by the GRU General Staff before the war?

            So I write in my comments:
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            Therefore, in general, the General Staff with its GRU, under the command of the generals Vasilevsky, Panfilov AP, Ilyichev, were not engaged. At least at that moment.

            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            The General Staff of the Red Army, headed by Colonel General Vasilevsky just didn't work in this direction (intelligence, information gathering).

            You write:
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Have worked. But the problem is that it was the primary data that were wrong

            Where did he work?
  10. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 22 November 2017 17: 29 New
    0
    Quote from the article:
    Lt. Col. Filippov led detachment of cars and tanks with headlights onto trick the enemy. Indeed, the Germans took the convoy for their own (the German training unit, equipped with captured Russian tanks) and the enemy defense was passed without a single shot.

    Exceptional luck.
    On the front line, since "... the main forces of the 26th Corps were engaged in serious battles at the turn of the Victory of October state farm (15 km west of Kalach)." a column of an armored car, maybe a BA, and even 5 T-34 tanks, and even a dozen GAZ trucks (one and a half) or ZIS-5 with motorized infantry, three hundred fighters, with lighted headlights.
    Motorized riflemen in quilted jackets or in Soviet overcoats, short fur coats, which are very unlike the overcoats and jackets of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht; and in their hands trilines or PPSh, which are also not very similar to Mausers and MP; on the heads of our motorized rifle hats with earflaps or helmets SSH-40which are also very unlike the Stahlhelm M1935 helmets of the Wehrmacht soldiers; and even on our feet boots or tarpaulin boots.
    And not one of the Nazis guessed. Everyone thought, probably this is a German educational part, equipped captured Russian tanks, captured Russian armored vehicles, captured Soviet cars one-and-a-half and ZIS-5, armed with captured Soviet three-rulers, PPSh, soldaten dressed in captured Soviet padded jackets, overcoats, short fur coats, earflaps, helmets SSH-40, shod boots in trophy tarpaulin boots. Missed without firing a shot.
    Exceptional luck.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 22 November 2017 18: 12 New
      +4
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      Motorized rifles in quilted jackets or in Soviet overcoats, short fur coats, which are very unlike the overcoats and jackets of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht; and in their hands they have three-rulers or PPSh, which are also not very similar to Mausers and MP; on the heads of our motorized rifle caps with earflaps or helmets SSH-40, which are also very different from the Stahlhelm M1935 helmets of soldiers of the Wehrmacht; and even on our feet with felt boots or tarpaulin boots.

      6 o’clock in the morning, frost, snowfall. From the rear, a column approaches at high speed, shining headlights on the face. Not cavalry. Not reconnaissance on BA or T-60/70. A simple convoy of trucks and tanks.
      If you let the cars go head-on, the convoy will definitely not arouse suspicion - the Wehrmacht had a wild zoo in the auto parts.
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 23 November 2017 07: 23 New
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        6 o’clock in the morning, frost, snowfall. From the rear to high speed the column comes up, shining headlights in the face. Not cavalry. Not reconnaissance on BA or T-60/70. A simple convoy of trucks and tanks.

        Not so much speed with a "simple" column. We left the Island at 3 a.m. and arrived at the ferry at 6 a.m., i.e. covered less than 20 km in three hours, i.e. speed is just over 6 km / h.
        What a simple column it is. Ahead are scouts in an armored car from the 15th separate reconnaissance battalion, then five T-34 tanks and then a dozen lorry and a half or ZIS-5 with motorized infantry, three hundred fighters.
        A very steep column passed the German defenses without firing a shot.
        No, don’t write, they say, at 6 a.m., and frost, and snowfall, exceptional luck, fantastic luck. Yes, and a local resident on a cart in the night, like a white piano in the desert.
        And the German fools are watching and everyone thinks that this is their educational part that comes with lighted headlights, on trophy equipment, armed with trophy rifles and PPSh, equipped with trophy caps with earflaps, padded coats, felt boots, boots.
        A miracle and nothing more.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 24 November 2017 10: 00 New
          +1
          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          What a simple column it is. Ahead are scouts in an armored car from the 15th separate reconnaissance battalion, then five T-34 tanks and then a dozen lorry and a half or ZIS-5 with motorized infantry, three hundred fighters.

          Heh heh heh ... I looked yesterday at Bivor's "Stalingrad" - so this slanderer and slander writes that in the head of Filippov’s convoy there were trophy cars, and the entire crossing guards consisted of 25 feljandarmerias.
  11. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 22 November 2017 18: 02 New
    +1
    Quote from the article:
    Behind enemy lines detachment met a local wagonthat showed the way to the crossing and spoke about the protection system Germans.

    Again exceptional luck.
    At 4-5 o’clock in the night to meet by chance a local resident's cart, an amazing event. In the front line, locals were afraid during the day to leave their houses or basements, not to drive around on wagons at night. In the front line, the locals were robbed by the Germans and Romanians to the skin. They took everything and everything, and animals - horses for work, the rest from cows to hens for food to the Wehrmacht soldiers, all products were taken away, all clothes, especially warm ones, carts were also selected for the needs of the Wehrmacht.
    Therefore, to meet in the middle of the night a local resident’s cart, exceptional luck, fantastic luck.
    Yes, and the local resident is not simple, he knew the system of protecting the bridge by the Germans, i.e. at least the local resident knew: how many soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht guard the bridge; what are they armed with? how the bridge is mined; where are the cables from the bookmark.
    Far not simple this localis not even a simple local. And at night he drove along the front lane in a wagon, and he knew the Germans' defense system of an important bridge for them.
    And for the detachment, great luck.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 22 November 2017 19: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      Therefore, to meet in the middle of the night a local resident’s cart, exceptional luck, fantastic luck.
      Yes, and the local resident is not simple, he knew the system of protecting the bridge by the Germans, i.e. at least the local resident knew: how many soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht guard the bridge; what are they armed with? how the bridge is mined; where are the cables from the bookmark.
      Far from simple this local resident, not even a simple local resident. And at night he drove along the front lane in a wagon, and he knew the Germans' defense system of an important bridge for them.

      According to your description, this local is very similar to Hilfswilliger. That is - heavy. smile
      Since even the local Hilfspolizei would hardly have known the bridge security system.
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 23 November 2017 08: 02 New
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        According to your description, this local is very similar to Hilfswilliger. That is - Khivi

        The article says:
        A detachment met a wagon behind enemy lines local resident, who showed the way to the crossing and spoke about the German defense system.

        Those. it is the local resident, not the Hilfswilliger. That is - Khivi and not from the local Hilfspolizei. However, a very knowledgeable local. So informed that when he saw in the steppe a convoy with lighted headlights from an armored vehicle of a reconnaissance patrol, from a 15th separate reconnaissance battalion, from five T-34 tanks, as well as a dozen lorry and a half truck or ZIS-5 with motorized infantry, there were not three hundred fighters began to hide.
        Unlike the Germans, a local resident immediately realized that this is not a German training unit that comes with lighted headlights, and our advanced squad. Therefore, he did not rush to hide somewhere in a ravine or funnel, but waited for the detachment to approach and informed them of important information about the protection of the bridge.
        And no less important, that Lieutenant Colonel Filippov immediately believed the information from an unfamiliar local resident traveling around at night on a wagon. Lieutenant Colonel Filippov immediately realized that the information from an unfamiliar local resident was true, reliable.
        Well isn't that a miracle.