The territory of the northern and central parts of the city was also in the hands of the German army: Yermansky, Dzerzhinsky, Krasnooktyabrsky, Barrikadnogo and Traktorozavodsky districts. In the course of the battles for the northern part of Stalingrad, which had unfolded since the end of September, the enemy cut off the Oryol ledge and captured Orlovka. German troops also approached the outskirts of Rynka and Spartanovka, but could not capture these villages. From the first days of October, battles began for the Red October, Barricades and STZ factories located north of Mamayev Kurgan. However, during the second assault the Germans could not take Stalingrad.
Completion of the second assault
The main strike of the enemy was the area of the Tractor Plant. Back in the afternoon of September 29, the enemy threw considerable forces into the Traktorozavodsky district aviation. Soon, the entire vast territory of the plant was covered by fires. Continuing to strike from the air, the German command, tightening up reserves, intensified the attacks of its ground troops on the Traktorozavodsky district. On October 3, fascist German forces made great efforts to break through to the STZ, but each time they met a rebuff from our troops. From the north and northwest he was firmly defended by a group of Colonel S.F. Gorokhov, consisting of the 124th, 149th Rifle Brigades and the 282nd Rifle Regiment of the 10th Division. From the west, the approaches to the Tractor Plant were defended by the 112th Infantry Division, weakened in previous heavy battles. However, the enemy failed to crush the resistance of Soviet soldiers with one blow. In the area of the village. The barricades and the Silikat factory, Colonel Gurtiev’s 308th Infantry Division, reflecting the enemy’s attacks, restrained his advance until 18 p.m. By the end of the day the division was forced to retreat beyond the railway, south of Nizhneudinskaya street, and on the left flank - to Vinnitsa street.
193-Infantry Division throughout the day 3 October fought in the village. Red October. Particularly fierce battles followed the buildings of the bath and the kitchen factories. On the shelves of the division there were only 100-150 fighters. 39-I Guards Rifle Division, commanded by Major General Guriev, continued to repel enemy attacks on the Red October plant.
It is worth noting that the strongholds on the territory of the STZ plant, the Barricades and the Red October were of great importance in creating a stable defense of the Soviet army. Here, factory buildings, production equipment (large machine tools, open-hearth furnaces, gas tanks) and underground utilities were adapted to the defense. Barricades and anti-tank barriers were also arranged. Large workshops of factories with powerful metal, reinforced concrete structures of coatings and crane runways, sophisticated equipment and a developed network of underground communications provided good opportunities for organizing a long and solid defense. The fighting inside such strong points went on for days. To smoke machine gunners and machine-gunners seated in metal structures and in production equipment (for example, in open-hearth furnaces) was a very difficult matter. It was also found out during the battles that even intensive and multi-day bombardment of such workshops from the air did not cause their serious destruction, which was explained by the design features of industrial buildings.
Another feature of the fighting in Stalingrad was the shallow depth of the 62 Army’s defense: from the Volga coast to the front edge, it was 200-250 meters in the defense section of the 13 Guards Division, to 1,5 km in the 284 Rifle Defense Division. This led to great difficulties in locating the headquarters of units, formations and the army. Experience soon showed that dug-outs of a pit type are well hit by air bombs and all people in the shelter die. As a result, command posts were erected on the slopes of the right bank of the Volga and numerous ravines and beams crossing it. They were erected in a "mine" way. The height and steepness of the slopes in the presence of dense, in places of rocky soil made it possible to build dugouts with the presence of a large thickness of virgin land above them (up to 10-12 m). A protective earthen bank was set up against the exit, frames were placed in the inner part. Such a dugout was a reliable shelter from shells, mines and aerial bombs. Sappers quickly mastered the mine method of building dugouts. In this case, the shelters were supplied with emergency exits, in case of blockage during the main bombing, and equipped with pipes to supply clean air. During the period from October to November 20, only four main and one spare command posts were built for the 62 Army headquarters, each of which consisted of dugouts 15-20.

Soldiers of the 577 Infantry Regiment of the 305 Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht in the position of the shop number 5 factory "Barricades" in Stalingrad. On the photo to the right - a fragment of the German self-propelled assault gun StuG III

Wehrmacht infantry at the destroyed factory "Barricades" in Stalingrad

Wehrmacht infantry in the destroyed factory "Barricades"

Soldiers of the Wehrmacht 389 Infantry Division hiding in the ruins of the Red October plant
The Soviet command, seeing that the enemy was delivering the main blow to the factories, decided to quickly transfer the 37th Guards Rifle Division under the command of Major General V. G. Zheludev across the Volga to Stalingrad and place it behind the right flank of the 308th Rifle Division - on the defense of Tractor factory. At the same time, the 62th was transferred to the 84nd Army tank Brigade Colonel D.N. Bely. Regiments of the 37th Guards Rifle Division crossed the Volga on the night of October 4, but without anti-tank artillery, since there were not enough crossing facilities. The guards immediately entered battle with the German infantry and tanks, breaking through the battle formations of the bloodless 112th and 308th rifle divisions. Moving forward from building to building, the guards squeezed the enemy.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command 5 of October indicated A. I. Eremenko, commander of the Stalingrad Front, that the enemy, taking the center of the city and advancing to the Volga north of Stalingrad, plans to capture the crossings, surround and capture the troops of 62, 64 and other armies. The headquarters demanded: “... push the enemy back from the Volga and re-seize those streets and houses of Stalingrad that the enemy has taken from you. For this, it is necessary to turn every house and every street of Stalingrad into a fortress. ” And further: “... I demand that you take all measures to protect Stalingrad. Stalingrad should not be surrendered to the enemy, and that part of Stalingrad, which is occupied by the enemy, should be released. " The commander of the Stalingrad Front demanded to launch a counter-attack of the 62 Army in the morning of October 5.
In order to carry out this order and retain the rest of the city, new reinforcements were needed. It was necessary to put in order the remaining troops, to bring artillery and ammunition. As Chuikov himself noted: “... the army was not able to do this: we ran out of ammunition” (V. I. Chuikov, “Beginning of the Way.”). On the night of October 5, the 62 I tank brigade began to be transported to the aid of the 84 Army. But its material part — artillery and tanks — still remained on the left bank. At first, only light tanks, which were used in the 37-th Guards and 308-th rifle divisions as firing points, were successfully transported.
To strengthen the defense of the Red October, Barricades and STZ factories, the Military Council of the 62 Army decided to include armed detachments of workers from the Stalingrad factories, who had previously acted as independent units, in the army. The divisions included the workers' armed units of the Krasnooktyabrsky, Barrikadniy and Traktorozavodsky districts, the Special armed detachment of the workers of the FCZ and the Fighter squad of the Traktorozavodsky district.
All day October 5 German troops continued to attack the position of the army Chuikov near the village of STZ. The offensive actions of the enemy were accompanied by almost continuous bombardment of aircraft. Only on the battle formations of the 37 Guards Rifle Division for October 5, the enemy made up to 700 sorties. Guardsmen with firmness reflected all blows of the enemy. Guards Division even continued to crowd the enemy. In general, however, the Germans retained the initiative and continued to advance. So, fierce battles with the enemy went on the outskirts and some streets of the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and the Barricades. The enemy pushed 42, 92-rifle, 6-th Guards tank brigade and occupied the plant "Silikat", in the area fought battles of 339-rifle regiment of 308-rifle division. In other areas, the Germans repulsed the attack.

Soldiers of the 9 Company under the command of Lieutenant Klaus Vogt of the 578 Infantry Regiment of the 305 Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht at the ruins of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant

German self-propelled guns StuG III at the ruins of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant

View of the destroyed shop of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant

Soldiers of the German 389 Infantry Division among the ruins of the factory "Red October"
To contain the onslaught of the enemy 5 October artillery preparation was organized. The artillery of five rifle divisions and two rifle brigades of the 62 Army, as well as the northern subgroup of the front artillery group (more than 300 guns and mortars) were involved in it. Artillery counterpreparation was carried out on the site in 3 km duration 40 minutes. The enemy, who was preparing a breakthrough to the Volga between the Tractor and the Barricades factories, suffered serious losses and stopped offensive actions in this sector for five days.
Artillery was of great importance in the defense of the city. The front artillery group was divided into four subgroups, altogether there were 250 guns and mortars in it. Driven from one center, she was able to quickly concentrate her fire force, in whole or in part, on any part of the front within the range of the guns. In some areas of the 62 Army’s defense, the artillery density was reduced to 110 guns per kilometer of the front. The effectiveness of the Stalingrad front artillery, consisting mainly of heavy howitzer and cannon regiments, was recognized by the Germans themselves. They noted that "the Russians on the eastern bank of the Volga suddenly had a mass of heavy artillery that delayed the final capture of Stalingrad." In mid-October, new heavy artillery regiments arrived on the east bank. This made it possible to form, in addition to front artillery, also army groups of the 62 and 64 armies, with the inclusion of Guards mortar units in their composition.
Small and medium-caliber guns operated in the infantry combat formations, destroying enemy strongholds, their firing positions, and destroying tanks during street battles. Artillery, starting with 82-mm mortars to 122-mm howitzers, was used depending on the situation centrally or decentralized. Artillery regiments in some cases were distributed by divisions, making up infantry support groups. Due to the shallow depth of the defense, the regimental battery was often used for firing from closed positions. But part of the guns was directly at the forward edge, firing direct fire to destroy buildings captured by the enemy, suppress fire weapons and defeat German infantry. 45-mm guns were used mainly as anti-tank weapons and, together with anti-tank weapons, were anti-tank areas. So, in the area 13-th Guards Rifle Division of such areas was 7. When creating anti-tank areas, much attention was paid to the disguise and thoroughness of the equipment positions. The positions of individual guns were equipped in stone and brick buildings, the guns were part of the garrison of strong points. Each gun had 2-3 spare positions, which made it possible to maneuver. The guns opened fire on enemy tanks with 300-400 m, in order not to detect themselves prematurely and to ensure a sudden strike.
October 6 operated mainly German aircraft, which throughout the day bombed the battle formations of the Chuikov army. October 7 at 11 hour. 20 min. the German army resumed the offensive by large forces. The Nazis attacked the Soviet fortifications in the STZ village with the help of two infantry divisions and an armored group. Fighters 37-th Guards Rifle Division fought off the first attacks. However, the Germans, bringing up reserves, continued to pressure, organizing one attack after another. By the end of the day, after stubborn fighting, the enemy wedged into the battle formations of the Soviet troops. He managed to capture one quarter of the working camp of the STZ and come close to the stadium. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In the village. Red October especially fierce battles were fought over the building of the bath, which several times passed from hand to hand.
As a result, 37-I Guards, 308, 95, 193-rifle divisions, as well as a group of Colonel Gorokhov stopped the attacking German troops near the walls of the Tractor Factory, in the villages of Red October and the Barricades, which allowed the 62-th army to put in order their forces and prepare for further fight.


Militias of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant go past the half-ruined workshop to the battlefield
Results
Thus, the German army was unable to take the city during the second assault. The army of Chuikov continued to hold the line: the market - the village. The tractor plant - the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr plants - the north-eastern slopes of Mamayev Kurgan - the station. The army of Paulus had only local successes, occupying the ruins of the city with heavy and bloody battles. And in some places the fierce battles with varying success went beyond the meters of the territory. Soviet troops constantly counterattacked. The Wehrmacht was completely stuck in heavy fighting on the streets of Stalingrad and in the surrounding areas. The losses of the 6 Army took on a catastrophic dimension: the 94 man remained in the 535 Infantry Division, the 76 Division was almost completely knocked out. The attacks of the German troops weakened for a while.
The German army lost its maneuverability, stopped the attack on other sectors of the Soviet-German front, fully concentrating on Stalingrad. The massacre in the city absorbed the German reserves. Only in October, about 200 thousand trained reinforcements arrived here, as well as 90 artillery battalions (50 thousand men, more than 1000 guns) and redeployed 40 air battalions specially trained for the assault on the city (30 thousand people). At the same time, the enemy made a significant rearrangement of his forces and brought a number of connections to the operational reserve. This indicated that Paulus and his headquarters were alarmed by the situation on the flanks and the overall operational position of their main group. 29-I motorized and 14-I tank German divisions were withdrawn in reserve. However, the German High Command, despite all the sacrifices and the deterioration of the general situation, continued to demand that Stalingrad be taken. A new decisive assault was scheduled for October 14 1942.
The remaining population in Stalingrad experienced its hell. In the ruined city there were more than 200 thousand people. In the captured areas, the Germans organized two commandant's offices and began a mass eviction of civilians from Stalingrad to Kalach, Gumrak and the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. About 60 thousand people, according to Soviet data, were taken out for forced labor in the Third Reich and to Ukraine, more than 3 thousand were executed. Approximately 12-15 thousand people remained in the occupied territory to serve the needs of the German army.
In addition, thousands of old men, women and children hid in the ruins of houses, basements, in the sewage system, in dugouts excavated on the Volga slopes. For example, in the basements of the famous "Pavlov's house" there lived around 35 local residents who helped the garrison to strengthen the defense, and sometimes they themselves fought. Getting food and drinking water was almost impossible. At night, the children, who became the main breadwinners, made their way to the river for water or to burned granaries, where they could get burnt grain. Many of them became victims of German sentries, snipers, or were blown up by mines. “The main food of the population robbed to the limit during this period was the meat and skin of dead and fallen animals,” says a report addressed to L. Beria, “which led to mass deaths, diseases and swelling on the basis of hunger and exhaustion.” It is clear that in such an environment, people died by the hundreds.

German soldiers at the masked 50-mm anti-tank gun PaK 38 in Stalingrad

G.S. Barennik and J.V. Sheptytsky, armored carriers, with a single-shot anti-tank gun, model 1941, of the Degtyarev system (ПТРД-41) in a fighting position in a trench during the battle for Stalingrad