Breakthrough of the 6 of the German army to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad

41
Preparing for the new phase of the Battle of Stalingrad

After Stalingrad could not be taken in stride, the German command again changed the plan of the offensive of its troops in the city, pulled in fresh troops and regrouped. The Germans planned to deliver simultaneously two blows in convergent directions - from the northwest and southwest from Stalingrad. The northern group (6th Army) was supposed to seize the bridgeheads in the small bend of the Don in the area of ​​Vertyachy and advance in the direction of Stalingrad from the north-west. Southern Group (4th tank army) struck from the region of Plodovitoye, Abganerovo along the railway to the north, where the troops of the 64th and 57th armies held the defense on the enemy’s path to Stalingrad. To ensure the junction between the two advancing strike groups, the German command also planned to strike east from Kalach. In total, up to 20 divisions were involved for the attack on Stalingrad.



The left flank of the German 4 tank army was provided by two Romanian divisions. The 12 Tank and 24 Infantry Divisions from the 297 Army were transferred to the 6 August Army. The southern strike force consisted of 6 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions. The German command also strengthened the northern grouping at the expense of the 8 of the Italian army that had arrived in the Stalingrad sector. Italian troops moved to the Don on the area from Pavlovsk to the mouth of the river. Hopper, replacing the divisions of the 29 Army Corps that were here. However, not very much believing in the combat capability of their allies, the German command of the two divisions of the 29 Army Corps two included in the Italian army (62 and 294 infantry divisions) and one (336 infantry division) transferred to 2 Hungarian Army The 6 Army Strike Force now consisted of 6 infantry, 2 motorized and 1 tank divisions.

Tippelskirch noted: “During August, the 8-I Italian army, consisting of six infantry and one cavalry division, approached the Don and replaced the German troops on the front between the western flank of the 6-th army and New Kalitva. The Italians sided with the 2 of the Hungarian army, which was located upstream of the Don to the 2 of the German field army. ”

The order of the commander of 6 of the German army said: "... 6-I army has the task to seize the isthmus between the Volga and the Don to the north of the Kalach railway, Stalingrad ... For this, the army forces the Don on the front of Peskovatka, Trekhostrovskaya, having main forces on both sides of the Vertyachi . Later, securing herself from counterattacks from the north, she strikes with the main forces through a chain of hills between r. Rossoshka and runoff p. B. Root and goes to the area north of Stalingrad, and part of the forces penetrates into the city from the north-west and seizes it ”. South-west of Stalingrad they planned to "unite with the mobile units of the neighboring army advancing from the south," that is, the 4 tank army.

Breakthrough of the 6 of the German army to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad

Officers of the German 6-th army confer at the motorcycle NSU 601 OSL at the intersection of field roads during the attack on Stalingrad

Soldiers of the 578 Infantry Regiment of the Wehrmacht on a halt during the attack on Stalingrad. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

Thus, the enemy carried out a new regrouping of forces, pulled up new troops and prepared for a new offensive. The Wehrmacht’s attack forces, which were concentrated in narrow sections on the flanks of the front, were very strong. They numbered about 210 thousand soldiers, more 2700 guns and mortars and more 600 tanks. On the direction of the main blow, the Germans had almost one-and-a-half superiority in manpower, double - in the guns and mortars, and multiple - in the tanks. To support the advance of the ground forces, the 4 th air fleet was recruited, including more than 1000 aircraft. Total 6-I field and 4-I tank German army, 8-I Italian army numbered about 39 divisions (more than 585 thousand people), 7400 guns and mortars, more than 1000 tanks and they supported about 1200 aircraft.

Interestingly, in West German historiography, the plan for mastering Stalingrad, set forth in the order of Paulus, is assessed as vicious in its operational basis. So, Hans Dörr considers his main disadvantage to be planning two hits at the same time. Like, it was necessary to deliver one powerful blow. In reality, the main miscalculation of the German plans is the underestimation of the enemy and the overestimation of their strength.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front deployed in the 480-kilometer strip (from Grandma to Lyapichev) were seriously weakened in the last battles. Only the 63, 21 and 1 Guards armies were satisfactorily staffed. The 33-I Guards and 96-rifle divisions that had left the encirclement were undergoing a re-formation, the 23-i tank corps in Stalingrad was completed. The operational density of the defense in the armies was insufficient - from 15 to 40 km per division. The troops of the Southeastern Front, defending the strip (320 km along the front) from Logovskoye to Lake. Sarpa also had insufficient strength and resources. A particularly large shortage of personnel and weapons was in the 64 and 51 armies, which were heavily damaged in previous battles. The operational density of defense in armies ranged from 20 to 50 km per division, which did not allow for the creation of a dense defense. In manpower, the forces were approximately equal (Soviet troops numbered 580 thous. Soldiers and officers), but a serious advantage in favor of the enemy was in guns and mortars (2,2: 1), tanks (4: 1), airplanes (2: 1).



German offensive

19 August 1942 The assault groups of the 6 and 4 tank armies of the enemy (18 divisions) launched an attack on Stalingrad at the same time. In the YuVF zone, the 64 Army reflected the attack of the German 4 Panzer Army in the battles of August and 18. Only in some areas did the enemy press the units of the 19 and 204 divisions. But in general, the defense of the army withstood the blow. Unable to break through the Abganerovo-Stalingrad railway, the enemy moved the direction of the main attack eastward, trying to reach Stalingrad through Krasnoarmeysk, along the Volga. By the end of August 38, the Germans had broken through the defenses on the right flank of the 21 Army, at the sites of the 57 Guards and 15 Rifle Divisions. Here the enemy penetrated into the location of the Soviet troops on 422-10 km.

The army commander, General F. I. Tolbukhin, immediately threw reinforcements at a dangerous area. Then the Germans attacked the 24 and 14 with tank divisions on the left flank of the 64 army. However, our intelligence discovered the enemy maneuver in a timely manner. The 20-I fighter anti-tank artillery brigade, the 186-th and 665-th fighter anti-tank artillery regiments, the 133-I heavy tank brigade were deployed towards the German strike armored group. The enemy failed to break into the southern outskirts of Stalingrad.

The troops of 6 of the German army from 17 of August were engaged in expanding the occupied bridgehead in the area of ​​Vertyachy and Peskovatka. The Germans crushed the forces of the 14 tank corps, followed by infantry divisions. Opponents in this sector were opposed by units of the 98 Infantry Division of Colonel I.F. Barinov, one regiment of the 87 Infantry Division, students of the Ordzhonikidze School, and the artillery group of Major General N. M. Pozharsky. They fought stubbornly, but were not able to eliminate the enemy bridgehead. For several days the Germans concentrated large forces on the bridgehead. The Germans broke through the outer defensive line. Fighting began on the defensive lines of the nearest approaches to the city. By the end of August 22, the bridgehead was extended to 45 km along the front.

The command of the Stalingrad Front attempted to change the situation by counterattacks on the flanks of the 6 of the German army, which was bursting towards Stalingrad. On August 20, the troops of the 63 and 21 armies partly launched an offensive. Having forced the Don, they entered into a fierce struggle with the enemy, trying to expand the occupied bridgehead. By the end of 22 in August, the 197-th, 14-th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 63 Army and the 304-Rifle Division of the 21 Army broke through the enemy's defensive line on the right bank of the Don and forced the Germans to move somewhat away. The second echelon of the 63 Army - the 203 Rifle Division crossed the river by the end of August 24. However, the advancing Soviet troops did not have the strength (powerful mobile units) for the development of success and, having met the stubborn resistance of the enemy, stopped. In addition, there was a shortage of ammunition that had to be shipped across the Don in difficult conditions. The 3 th Guards Cavalry Corps was transferred to the right bank of the Don, but this did not change the situation.

In the center of the Stalingrad front, 22 August launched the attack of the 1-I Guards Army. Three guards divisions — 38, 41, and 40 — were struck in the northern part of the small bend of the Don. But the guard also lacked the strength and resources to break through the enemy defenses. Guards army promised tanks and rocket launchers, but they did not arrive at the beginning of the offensive. Opponent forces 11 th German army corps, 22-th tank division and other parts put up stubborn resistance, put counter-strikes. Guardsmen were able to expand the bridgehead. German troops on this site went on the defensive. Subsequently, the front line at the site of the 1 Guards Army did not change until the Soviet forces launched a counteroffensive in November 1942.


The calculation of the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K changes its position during the battles on the approaches to Stalingrad

Breakthrough of the 6 Army to Stalingrad

The command of the Northern Fleet decided to introduce the main forces of the 87th division into battles on the outer contour in order to destroy the enemy bridgehead. The site, previously occupied by parts of the 87th division on the middle contour, was ordered to occupy the 35th Guards Division. However, the divisions did not manage to arrive at their destination. On the morning of August 23, 1942, German troops launched a powerful offensive. The enemy delivered his main blow back-to-back with the 4th Panzer and 62nd Armies, developing an offensive in the general direction of the Market. “The enemy accompanied the powerful blow of his troops with monstrous blows aviation and artillery. We had neither the strength nor the means to parry the ramming blow of the enemy ”(A. I. Eremenko. Battle of Stalingrad.).

Having broken the resistance of the 98-th division of I. F. Barinov and other troops that were holding up defenses in the area of ​​the bridgehead, the German troops rushed from the Don to the Volga. The regiments of the 87 division of Colonel A. I. Kazartsev moving on the march were on the way to the breakthrough. At first they came under the powerful blow of German aircraft, then the tanks fell upon them. The battle began outside of any defensive line, in open areas. “On the corridor, punched by fascist tanks, motorized infantry moved. The enemy cut Kazartsev’s division in two. How many of his people are on the other side of the corridor, how many fell in battle, the divisional commander did not know. But it was already known that the division no longer had artillery or 120-millimeter mortars, as well as the battalion of communication with all its walkie-talkies. Heavy losses suffered rifle regiments and attached cadets. And if it were not for the march in dismembered order, the losses would probably have been even greater. ”

As a result, the troops of the German shock group crossed all the interfluvial areas and by 16 23 August watches broke out to the Volga near the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, near the villages Latoshinka, Akatovka, Rynok. Following the 16 Panzer Division of the 14 Corps of Gustav von Wietersheim, the enemy’s motorized troops also entered the Volga. German tanks appeared in the area of ​​the Tractor Plant, in 1-1,5 km from factory workshops, and began to bombard it methodically. Following the tanks in the 8-kilometer-long breach, the enemy introduced motorized and several infantry divisions. In the city, alarm battalions and part of the people's militia were raised in alarm.

Thus, the 6-I German army broke through the Soviet defense on the external contour, quickly overcame 60 km and drove a wedge into the battle formations of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, cutting it into two parts. The 63-th, 21-th and 1-th Guards armies were cut off from the 62-th army and the front headquarters, which were located in the area of ​​Stalingrad. The troops operating north of the city (part of the Stalingrad Front) were cut off from the city and the other forces of the Northern Fleet defending Stalingrad and parts of the Southeastern Front. The movement of river vessels on the Volga was paralyzed. The railway lines approaching Stalingrad from the north and northwest were intercepted by the enemy.


Wehrmacht infantry and self-propelled guns StuG III are moving through the Soviet countryside soon after the Don crossing

Air strike on Stalingrad. City Defense Organization

At the same time, German aviation dealt a powerful blow to Stalingrad. The German command planned to cause panic among the civilian population, to disorganize the defense, and then easily seize the city. The raid of hundreds of aircraft lasted several hours. German bombers flew echelon after echelon, dropping thousands of high-explosive and incendiary bombs. 24 August the Germans continued the bombing of the city. During the day, the German pilots flew around 2 thousands of sorties to Stalingrad. Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft artillery tried to repel the enemy strike. The air attack was repelled by Soviet fighters 105. For one day only 23 August in air battles and anti-aircraft artillery was shot down in the area of ​​Stalingrad 120 enemy aircraft. Residents of the city selflessly tried to save the city from fire.

Industrial enterprises, a river port, oil storages, residential quarters, hospitals and other social infrastructure facilities were destroyed. In the city began strong fires. The flames, which were blown by a strong wind, swept the houses, moving from street to street. Burning oil spilled on the river. The marinas were burning, fire destroyed ships on the Stalingrad roads. The power supply system and city transport were partially damaged. At night, Stalingrad resembled a giant bonfire, the glow of which was visible for many kilometers. A huge blooming city, in which about 600 thousand people lived before the war, was turned into ruins. Thousands of people died and were injured, remained under the rubble, tens of thousands lost their homes. Enemy raids on the city were repeated in the following days unceasingly, completing the destruction of the city. Stalingrad became advanced.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky recalled: “The morning of the unforgettable tragic of August 23 found me in the troops of the 62nd Army. On this day, the Nazi forces managed to reach the Volga with their tank units and cut off the 62nd Army from the main forces of the Stalingrad Front. Simultaneously with the breakthrough of our defense, the enemy launched a fierce mass bombardment of the city on August 23 and 24, for which almost all the forces of his 4th air force fleet. The city turned into ruins. Telephone and telegraph communications were disrupted, and during August 23 I had to conduct short negotiations twice with the Supreme Commander-in-chief openly on the radio. I could make a detailed report to him about the situation and about our requests late at night on August 24, after the HF telephone connection through the Volga was restored. ”


Stalingrad on fire in the area of ​​the station, in the foreground a fountain "Children's dance". In the sky aerostat air barriers

Stalingrad after the German bombing of the city. View from the Volga River

There was a real possibility of the fall of the city. Most of the 62 Army was linked by fighting on the left bank of the Don, a few dozen kilometers from the city. The troops of the 62 Army needed to regroup and occupy new defensive lines in harsh combat conditions. The reserves of the front near the city were few in number: the rifle division, the tank and motorized rifle brigades. But the city was lucky, it was located part of the 23-th and 2-th tank corps under the command of generals A. M. Hasin and A. G. Kravchenko. The 23 Corps was being rebuilt in Stalingrad. Echelons of the 2 tank corps (26-I, 27-I, 148-I tank and 2-I motorized rifle brigades) arrived just before the German breakthrough and were hit by enemy aircraft. The 23 Tank Corps (137, 189, 6 and 6 Guards Tank Brigades) defended the city from the northwest. This made it possible to restrain the fierce onslaught of the enemy and hold out until the time when rifle divisions approached because of the Volga.

To prevent the fall of the city and to organize defense from the west and northwest, the front command mobilized all available forces and means. The city’s defensive line was taken by the soldiers of the 10 division of the NKVD commanded by Colonel A. A. Saraev (the NKVD division had no artillery at all; it was supported by the air defense divisions), cadets of the military-political school, air defense units, the combined marines and other parts of the front line . The division of the NKVD kept the defense on the western outskirts of the city. At the mouth of the river Akhtuba took up the position of a gunboat and an armored boat of the Volga Flotilla.

A particularly dangerous situation was on the northern outskirts of the city, in the area of ​​the Tractor Plant, where the German troops went. Here, the first strike of the enemy was met by units of the 23 tank corps in conjunction with the 2 battalion of the 1077 anti-aircraft artillery regiment, which was in firing positions for air cover of the Tractor Plant. They not only repelled the attacks of the German ground forces, but also were subject to attacks by the Luftwaffe. The 738 th anti-tank artillery regiment, shot from the front of the 57 army, and the consolidated battalion of marines of the Volga military flotilla were transferred here. The city defense committee dispatched parts of the training center for the armored troops troops, the fighter and tank battalions of the militia of the Tractor Plant to the plant area. Turning around on the river Sukhoi Mecheka, these forces covered the northern outskirts of Stalingrad and were the first to fight the enemy that had broken through. The workers of the Tractor Plant supported their 50-60 tanks. Then came part of the national militia and fighter battalions of other areas of the city. By order of the front commander at the Tractor Plant, a combat sector was established under the command of Major General N. V. Fecklenko (Head of the Training and Armored Center of Stalingrad). On the night of August 25 at the turn of the river. The 282 th rifle regiment of the 10 th division of the NKVD troops arrived, which significantly strengthened the forces of the defenders.

At this time, the command took urgent measures to restore the military order. 24 in August north-west of Stalingrad concentrated troops sent from other fronts or from the reserve of the Supreme Command: in the area of ​​Bol. Ivanovki - 16-y tank corps, in the area of ​​Zavarykina - 4-y tank corps and in the area of ​​Mal. Ivanovki - 64-I Rifle Division. At st. Arched, unloaded 173-I, 221-I, 116-I, 24-I and 308-I infantry divisions.

Thus, the threat of the rapid fall of Stalingrad was averted. The German tanks and motorized infantry that had broken through were met by our tankmen, cadets, sailors, NKVD fighters who were supported by the armed militia of the workers of Stalingrad. At this time, the front command and headquarters deployed troops to the Stalingrad area, sent from other fronts or from the reserve of the Supreme Command.



Militias of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant go past the half-ruined workshop to the battlefield

To be continued ...
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  1. +20
    28 March 2017 07: 29
    1077th anti-aircraft artillery regiment

    It was an air defense regiment, the regiment consisted practically of some women.
    They did not expect tank attacks, but didn’t go anywhere, they took the battle and almost all died under the tracks.
    Even the Germans were astounded by their courage.

    For me, these anti-aircraft gunners are the personification of the feat of Stalingrad.
    1. +2
      29 March 2017 22: 09
      Listened to the memories of a German tankman. He said that anti-aircraft calculations on the outskirts of Stalingrad consisted of women.
      In his opinion, they were not taught to fight tanks at all, so they were simply crushed ...
    2. 0
      18 June 2017 00: 32
      Somewhere I read the recollections of a front-line soldier who stopped tanks of the Manstetsna, eager to release the pauls. Remind please.
  2. +2
    28 March 2017 07: 50
    Thank. Photos are interesting, rare. Did not met.
    In the photo "Officers of the German 6 Army are conferring near the NSU 601 OSL motorcycle at the intersection of field roads during the attack on Stalingrad," on the right, an interesting wagon.
  3. +6
    28 March 2017 07: 53
    In March 1942, A.I.Kazartsev was appointed to the post of commander of the 87th Infantry Division, formed in the Far East. On the fronts of World War II from July 1942. The wars of the 87th division were particularly distinguished in the defensive battles of July - August 1942 during the Battle of Stalingrad. As commander of the 126th Rifle Division from March 1943 to June 1944. In October 1943, Major General Kazartsev skillfully led the assault forces of the 126th Rifle Division on the streets in the city of Melitopol. When the city was liberated by a division, more than 5000 Nazis, about 80 tanks of self-propelled guns were captured, large trophies were captured. Title of Hero of the Soviet Union Awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to Alexander Ignatievich Kazartsev on November 1, 1943.
  4. +5
    28 March 2017 08: 19
    I read that when the militia, the workers entered the battle, there was a slight panic among the Germans, because, due to their black overalls, they were mistaken for a "black death", i.e. for the marines.
  5. +6
    28 March 2017 08: 58
    “The bombing of Stalingrad is one of the largest in the history of the bombing of peaceful cities. However, it is much less known than the raids on the same Dresden, Hiroshima or Nagasaki. On August 23, 1942, the forces of the 4th Air Fleet carried out the longest and most devastating bombing of the city. Stalingrad in that day still lived the rear life of the front-line city. Shops and institutions were working, the children had been taken to kindergartens the day before. No one had thought about evacuation. The bombing of Stalingrad began at 18 o’clock. Enemy aircraft destroyed the city, killed more than 40 thousand people, destroyed more than half of the housing stock "pre-war Stalingrad, thereby turning the city into a vast territory, covered with burning ruins."

    The commander of the 4th air fleet, Freicher Manfred von Richthofen, in terrible agony, died of brain cancer on July 12, 1945 in American captivity. By his order, as a result of massive air strikes, the city of Stalingrad was destroyed to the ground.
    1. +2
      28 March 2017 11: 21
      Quote: avva2012
      . The bombing of Stalingrad began at 18 p.m. Enemy aircraft destroyed the city, killed more 40 thousand people

      According to the latest data, about 70 thousand 23 people died
      August 1942 ...
      1. +6
        28 March 2017 12: 02
        "According to the latest data". This figure has a right to exist if supported by scientific research. If they are, it would be interesting to read. Perhaps these studies reflect not only the loss of civilian population, but also describe some new facts that were not known to the official history of the Soviet era?
        1. +9
          28 March 2017 16: 43
          "Olgovich" and others like him usually consider the Soviet loss figures to be obviously wrong, and by eye multiply them by 1,5-3 times, to whom as far as enough * talent * and conscience, only agreeing to take into account such "latest data" of their pseudo-historians.

          According to their "authoritative" and "enlightened" opinion, all Soviet archives and all Soviet historians are lying - but such "research" taken from the ceiling is absolutely true.

          But for absolute truth in the last resort, they reckon Russian reports of the time of the RJAV and PMV, full of obvious (and more than 100 years old as exposed) lies, like Takachikho, who was famous for his rudimentary “sinking” of Rudnev, who won the entire RJV and took part in the sinking of “Rurik” , and died 10 years later near Qingdao; as well as “heavy injuries and huge sacrifices” on Asam BrKr, which as if nothing had happened after several. days after Chemulpo already fought near Port Arthur, not accepting replenishment and not getting up for repairs.

          It is strictly classified for them that it was a total mobilization in Hitlerite Germany from 16 to 60 years, and in the USSR the draft age did not change during the war.
          1. +1
            28 March 2017 19: 59
            Quote: murriou
            lies Russian reports from the time of the REV

            Again the Undefeated Unified State Examination REV!

            ARTICLE READhow much can flood?
            1. +5
              28 March 2017 21: 13
              Well, you, "Olgovich", still share, for a change, the source of your "latest data", absolutely accurate, or as always? lol
          2. +1
            28 March 2017 20: 02
            murriou your comment sheer rudeness
            1. +5
              29 March 2017 05: 35
              Quote: Cartalon
              murriou your comment sheer rudeness

              Well, at least not dirty laughing
              What did you see rudeness? How can you object?
        2. +1
          28 March 2017 19: 57
          Quote: avva2012
          According to the latest data. "This figure has a right to exist if supported by scientific research.

          This figure was voiced by Volgograd historians. They wrote about a firestorm.
          1. +6
            29 March 2017 06: 55
            Quote: Olgovich This figure was voiced by Volgograd historians. They wrote about a firestorm.

            I can’t say for sure, I wasn’t looking, laziness, but the information / stuffing for the first time passed through the central district on the Rossiya channel in early February 2013. Voiced by her famous "historian" Svanidze.
            There are facts about the evacuation: “Report I.Yu. Yunyushkina school number 25 Volzhsky
            Scientific adviser L.N. Loshkova Reviewer N.V. Kuznetsova
            (STALINGRAD BATTLE IN THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA. FIFTH YOUTH READINGS. Collection of reports): During the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), several major evacuations can be noted. One of these occurred during the Battle of Stalingrad. The scale of the war, the evacuation in Stalingrad is no less a major event than the military operation to defeat the Nazi group near the Volga. Evacuation to the left bank of the Volga was complicated by the fact that until the beginning of the defense of the city, the evacuated population, equipment of plants, collective farm property from other parts of the country were concentrated in the Stalingrad region and Stalingrad itself. Only from June 29, 1941 to March 1942, 441 thousand people, including 45 thousand Leningraders, proceeded through the Stalingrad evacuation center. On June 1942, 9, 400 thousand people from the Smolensk region moved to the Stalingrad region. The bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the executive committee of the regional council decided to send them to rural areas. And by the beginning of the defense, the city was crowded with people, wounded and vehicles with various cargoes, which later complicated the evacuation. By the beginning of the defense, 15 thousand inhabitants remained in the city. At enterprises, in building trusts, institutes, and institutions, military headquarters were created to help evacuate the population of the city. The headquarters sent communists and Komsomol members to gather people at crossing points in the conditions of the besieged city. Crossing points were created in every district of Stalingrad. ” In accordance with the instructions of the chairman of the Committee on Evacuation of the SNK of the USSR N. M. Shvernik, on August 17 the bureau of the Stalingrad regional committee of the CPSU (b), together with the executive committee of the regional Council of Workers' Deputies, issued a resolution "On the partial unloading of the city of Stalingrad." On August 1942, 62, a resolution was adopted "On the evacuation of civilians from the areas of operations of the Red Army." The first paragraph of this document said: “On the basis of the decision of the Military Council of the 22nd Army until August XNUMX, p. d. evacuate the entire civilian population from the settlements of the war zones in the strip from the villages of Panshino, Dmitrievka, Marinovka, Sr.-Tsaritsynsky, N.-Tsaritsynsky and the left bank of the Don. ”
            On August 18, the bureau of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, together with the executive committee of the regional council of workers' deputies, adopted a resolution in accordance with the order of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the evacuation of orphanages outside the Stalingrad Region.
            1. +3
              29 March 2017 07: 07
              “The greatest disagreements in historiography arise over the population evacuated after August 23. In his memoirs, M. A. Vodolagin noted that 150 thousand people were removed from the Traktorozavodsky, Barrikadny and Krasnooktyabrsky districts from the end of August to October. 20 thousand inhabitants were evacuated on September 30. In total, according to M. A. Vodolagin, 250 thousand people were transported at the Volga crossings. A. M. Samsonov believed that from the end of August until the first days of October only from the Voroshilov district were removed 65 thousand people, from Krasnooktyabrsky - 60 thousand people.
              I.A. Piksin, Secretary of the Stalingrad Civil Code of the CPSU (B.), Noted that 24 people were evacuated from the Volga from August 14 to September 300.
              B. S. Abalikhin believed that from August 23 to October 14, about 400 thousand people were evacuated from the city. "In Stalingrad, about 100 thousand people civilians, for various reasons not evacuated beyond the Volga. The vast majority of the population remaining in the city began to live in basements and bomb shelters.
              According to incomplete data, in Stalingrad from bombing of enemy aircraft, artillery and mortar attacks died 42 754 person. Severely wounded among the civilian population of the city were several tens of thousands of people. See: Partarchive of the Volgograd Regional Committee of the CPSU. F. 113. He. 14. D. On. L. 3. More sources: 1 Isaev, Alexey Valerievich “Stalingrad. There is no land beyond the Volga for us. ” 2 M. V. Skvortsov. Problems of the history of evacuation of the population from Stalingrad in August-September 1942. 3 "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 4. Volume 3. A radical change during the Great Patriotic War (November 1942 - December 1943)."
              Why am I writing, specifically, about evacuation. Throwing about 70 thousand killedfrom only one raid and one day only, appeared in connection with a lie about I.V. Stalin, forbade the evacuation of city residents. Further, the idea of ​​a "criminal regime" follows logically. So, the next Goebbels propaganda and nothing more.
              1. +1
                30 March 2017 00: 36
                Have you noticed that they write about evacuation after August 23? Until August 23, the civilian population was not evacuated very actively. It was not possible. Sad but true
                1. 0
                  30 March 2017 05: 02
                  I noticed. And so much information, so I did not cite the facts that before the 23rd, there was also evacuation, and there was a stream of refugees through the city.
                  1. 0
                    30 March 2017 08: 38
                    I still think that a little bit wrong.
                    Until June 1942, Stalingrad was a rear city. The front passed hundreds of kilometers to the west. Therefore, not a stream of refugees was going through Stalingrad, but refugees were sent there.
                    Now we take a transport network. Were there bridges across the Volga? Or maybe they are now ?. Refugees could only be sent by rail to the north. Or cross the Volga to the steppe. And what is the transport network on the eastern bank of the Volga? And how to feed them there, where to send next?
                    The ban on the evacuation of civilians really was. And he was called not by the "criminal regime", but by cruel necessity. Stalin was not only the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but also the leader of the country. And he had to deal with economic issues, in addition to military issues.
                    In general, I consider his two decisions to be the most difficult and difficult for any person. God forbid any of us be faced with such a choice. And both of his decisions concerned evacuation. In 1941 and in 1942.
                    So if you search the Internet and put yourself in his place, then the ban on evacuating people was justified. A cruel decision, but well-founded.
                    1. 0
                      30 March 2017 08: 50
                      The ban on the evacuation of civilians really was. And he was called not by the "criminal regime", but by cruel necessity.

                      There are no written orders or oral ones about this either. I think if not, then it didn’t.
                      1. +1
                        30 March 2017 09: 05
                        The fate of the population of Stalingrad evolved in August 1942 according to one of the worst options. The city stood on the banks of the Volga, and any cargo needed to be transported in one way or another to the left bank of the river. However, the immediate organization of crossings and evacuation were impossible. In July and early August, the country's leadership was puzzled by the question of what the population of the USSR would eat after the enemy occupied the agricultural south of Russia. Accordingly, through Stalingrad there was a continuous stream of transportation into the interior of the country, livestock and machinery were distilled (to sow and plow in a new place). As of August 4, on the right bank of the Volga, in the Dubovka area, there were 50 thousand head of cattle, 18 MTS with machines and 500 tractors, in the Gorny Balykley area - 25 thousand head of cattle, 10 MTS with agricultural machines and 350 tractors, in the Kamenny Yar area - 60 thousand heads of cattle, 14 machine-tractor stations with machines and 400 tractors, in the Kamyshin area on the way there were 60 thousand heads of cattle, 11 machine-tractor stations and 400 tractors. In the coming days, about 1400 thousand head of cattle were expected to be transported. The problem of evacuating strategically important reserves was largely solved. On the Volga crossings on the Astrakhan - Kamyshin section during the navigation of 1942, the following were transported: cattle - 1560,6 thousand heads, including large ones - 338 thousand heads, carts - 6,7 thousand units, tractors - 996. Evacuations population of Stalingrad in August was conducted at a low rate, apparently, the Soviet leadership considered itself in a position [151] to keep the situation under control. By August 23, about 400 thousand people were evacuated from the total population of the 100-thousand city. The bulk of the inhabitants of Stalingrad remained in the city. On August 24, the City Defense Committee adopted a decree on the evacuation of women, children and the wounded to the left bank of the Volga, but the time had already been hopelessly lost.

                        A. Isaev "There is no land beyond the Volga"
        3. +1
          28 March 2017 20: 01
          Where do any numbers come from? How, in principle, could be considered dead precisely on August 23?
        4. +3
          29 March 2017 22: 12
          The exact number of civilians who died during the bombing of Stalingrad on August 23, 1942 cannot be established, because the city was packed with refugees who could not cross the Volga and whom no one counted.
    2. +3
      28 March 2017 19: 36
      On the issue of starched shirts and honor.
      Yakov Mikhailovich Glazunov, captain of the Volga Shipping Company, brother-in-law of my acquaintance, b.
      “They call him, in the summer, to the shipping company’s department, to Gorky (perhaps Kuibyshev?), They say:
      - "go to Stalingrad, everyone who can be evacuated there"
      Loaded at the pier. A raid began, they were quickly kicked out of the pier.
      He went along the shore.
      - "If you get, then swim to the shore, and others who survive"
      And the second ship went in the middle and drowned,
      children injured.
      They laid out white sheets with red crosses on the deck.
      "The fascist threw, threw, but missed. I kept dodging, and left."
      "Every time I spoke with a cry"
  6. +7
    28 March 2017 16: 19
    You read and marvel at the courage of our fathers. Great glory to them. How many conquerors destroyed our people in the Russian green. Is it not enough for you? Not enough have you received? Why are you climbing again? After all, Bismarck taught you.
    Personally, I worship the heroes of Stalingrad. Likely, my father also fearlessly defended Leningrad, he died on December 27, 1941 on the Leningrad Front. There was a major who created heavy railway artillery. it will soon be warm I will go to his grave. He was buried by his subordinates in a separate grave at the Theological Cemetery. I have the honor.
  7. +3
    28 March 2017 18: 28
    Quote from the article:
    However, the advancing Soviet troops did not have the strength (powerful movable joints) to develop success and, having met stubborn resistance of the enemy, stopped. Besides, there was a shortage of ammunitionthat had to be transported through the Don in difficult conditions.


    After all, our generals knew in advance that they did not have powerful mobile units, and besides, there was a shortage of ammunition, and even that would have to be transported through the Don in difficult conditions. So what can be a counterattack in such conditions. Is that extra people ditch.
    In the absence of mobile units, lack of ammunition, only defense is the most rational type of military operations, and not counter-attacks.
    You read the article and you see that our generals fought according to the method - war plan will show, they say we will give a command for a counterattack, and then we'll see if something works out, and if it doesn’t work out, we’ll get off somehow.
    All such counterattacks on self-sacrifice, on a hunchback, on blood, on the deaths of ordinary soldiers, cadets, and militias.
    But generals cannot move their brains or do not want to.
    1. +5
      29 March 2017 12: 28
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      In the absence of mobile units, lack of ammunition, only defense is the most rational type of military operations, and not counter-attacks.

      Quite the contrary: in the absence of mobile connections, the static defense of death is similar. If we give the initiative to the enemy, then, taking advantage of the passivity of our units, the enemy calmly concentrates superior forces - and just as calmly breaks through the defense. And we can’t do anything - even with intelligence on the concentration of enemy forces, our reserves, due to low mobility, simply will not be in time for the place of future breakthrough. EMNIP, 1 TGR of Kleist before Kiev excavation reached its initial level in a couple of days.
      In the case of active defense, our strike has every chance of disrupting the concentration of enemy forces and drawing back the very mobile units that we could not catch in a static defense.
      So either we are sitting infantry on the defensive - and we are guaranteed to get a breakthrough of the front, or we strike with rifle units - and we have some chance that the Germans will be forced to stitch their mobile units about us and postpone their strike.
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      All such counterattacks on self-sacrifice, on a hunchback, on blood, on the deaths of ordinary soldiers, cadets, and militias.
      But generals cannot move their brains or do not want to.

      And the generals develop strike plans based on the fact that the units involved in the operation will act according to the Charter. But in fact ... tankers with tenacity worthy of better use, time after time, instead of going around the heights, twist through its crest - right at the position of the anti-terrorist operation. The infantry throws mortar slabs on the march, and in the attack lies down immediately upon exiting the trenches. And if she manages to break into enemy trenches, then she does not take any measures to consolidate - and at the slightest resistance of the Germans leaves her position. For a day of battle, the infantryman makes 3-4 rifle shots - and that’s it. Artillery and mortars below the division are practically not used - the only machine gun can delay the advance of the whole battalion while its commander tries to contact the division and request fire support from there. The interaction between the types and kinds of troops is not that there is - it is negative: the infantry commander, under the threat of execution, prohibits tankers from going out at night for repairs and refueling - and throws tanks in the open field, relegating their infantry into trenches.
      As a result, the generals are forced to inform the Charter in the form of orders to their subordinates. Judging by the SBD, in the overwhelming majority of orders of 1941-1943, the part “what needs to be done to rectify the situation” is actually an arrangement of articles of the Charter and instruction.
      1. +1
        29 March 2017 18: 30
        Quote from Alexey RA:
        “Quite the contrary: in the absence of mobile connections, the static defense of death is similar.”


        Well, we developed a plan, gave the command to counterattack our "wise" generals Gordov, Kuznetsov, Danilov armed with your theory, and the result is negative.
        According to your theory, the counterattack was to disrupt the concentration of enemy forces, but he did not disrupt. On the contrary, the Germans were more actively engaged in expanding the Peskovatka-Vertyachy bridgehead and concentrating forces on it, and according to Samsonov’s article, they expanded the bridgehead to 45 km.
        Also according to your theory, the counterattack carried out by the 63rd and 21st armies was supposed to delay “those same mobile formations that we could not catch in a static defense”. And nothing like that happened either, as was the 14th Wehrmacht tank corps on the Peskovatka-Vertyachy bridgehead and in the area of ​​the bridgehead, it still stood there, or rather didn’t, but fought and broke through the Soviet front, and was already in the north on August 23 the outskirts of Stalingrad, almost off the coast of the Volga, and put our troops in an even worse position. And our 63rd and 21st armies, according to the "wise" instructions of our generals, meanwhile continued to counter-attack the Italians until August 28. They ruined ordinary people, cadets, militias, junior command personnel.
        So what is the use of the “wise” plans that the generals develop based on the fact that the units involved in the operation will act according to the Charter.
        Only harm, in particular at this stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.
  8. 0
    28 March 2017 22: 17
    No one has yet given a clear answer - why the civilian population was left in the city, having subjected it to destruction. But evacuate on time, would save not only him, but also thousands of soldiers, who then ensured, under shelling and bombing, the evacuation of people!
    1. 0
      28 March 2017 23: 46
      Based on the assumption that the troops will be better standing when there is a large city full of civilians behind them. An example of this is Moscow and Leningrad.
      1. +1
        29 March 2017 12: 45
        Quote: 19481970
        No one has yet given a clear answer - why the civilian population was left in the city, having subjected it to destruction. But evacuate on time, would save not only him, but also thousands of soldiers, who then ensured, under shelling and bombing, the evacuation of people!

        The evacuation of the population of Stalingrad was before the Germans went to the city. Until August 23, approximately 100 thousand people were evacuated.
        With the increased threat to Stalingrad, a partial evacuation of its civilian population began. In accordance with the instructions of the chairman of the Committee on Evacuation of the SNK of the USSR, N. M. Shvernik, on August 15, the bureau of the Stalingrad regional committee of the CPSU (b), together with the executive committee of the regional Council of Workers' Deputies, issued a resolution “On the partial unloading of the city of Stalingrad”. By this decree, it was planned to remove from Stalingrad to the Kuibyshev region 15 thousand unemployed women with children and 8-10 thousand to place in the Volga regions. The next day, a resolution was adopted “On the evacuation of civilians from the areas of operations of the Red Army”. The first paragraph of this document said: “On the basis of the decision of the Military Council of the 62nd Army until August 22, p. d. evacuate the entire civilian population from the settlements of the war zones in the strip from the villages of Panshino, Dmitrievka, Marinovka, Sr.-Tsaritsinsky, N.-Tsaritsinsky and the left bank of the Don. ” On August 18, the bureau of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, together with the executive committee of the regional council of working people's deputies, adopted a resolution in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the evacuation of orphanages outside the Stalingrad Region.

        Evacuation was complicated by the fact that, firstly, a stream of evacuated from the Don and Kuban passed through Stalingrad, and secondly, until the summer of 1942, Stalingrad itself was one of the centers for receiving evacuees.
        Evacuation to the left bank of the Volga was complicated by the fact that until the beginning of the defense of the city, the evacuated population, equipment of plants, collective farm property from other parts of the country were concentrated in the Stalingrad region and Stalingrad itself. Only from June 29, 1941 to March 1942, 441 thousand people, including 45 thousand Leningraders, proceeded through the Stalingrad evacuation center. On June 1942, 9, XNUMX thousand people from the Smolensk region moved to the Stalingrad region.

        Civil and military authorities tried to break the bottleneck of the evacuation - crossing the Volga - at the expense of local forces, but to no avail.
        November 20.08.1942, XNUMX
        CHAIRMAN OF STALINGRAD
        OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES OF WORKERS.
        I inform you that I checked the implementation of the resolution of the Stalingrad GOKO and the Military Council of the Front on the construction of crossings by enterprises and institutions of the city of Stalingrad.
        The audit showed that most enterprises and organizations underestimate this event and do not deal with the construction of crossings.
        On the right bank, the berths started with construction, but were not completed, and plant No. 264 did not start. There is not a single pier on the left bank.
        Deputy The Logistics Commander of the Southeast Front requested you to take measures to eliminate complacency among enterprises and organizations for the construction of ferries and to inform the enterprises and organizations responsible for the construction of crossings that, if necessary, military crossings will not be presented for the evacuation of civilians.
        I ask you to give instructions to allocate a responsible person to whom to instruct to engage in construction having a close relationship with the Department of Motor Transport and Road Service of the UVF.

        Stalin’s instructions on the ban on evacuation, which they often like to refer to, did not refer to the city’s population, but to senior employees who were obliged to remain in their places.
      2. +2
        30 March 2017 09: 39
        zulusuluz

        Just do not write nonsense. All so bloodthirsty ....
        Factories worked in Stalingrad. What it is? The tank corps of Tanfchishin was defeated several times. And every time he was reborn from the ashes. Every 2-3 days, equipment from the Stalingrad was approached for the 1st tank brigade - 54 tanks. Stalingrad constantly supported the 13th TC with materiel. Workers continued to work. And for the factories to work, you need infrastructure. We need power plants, water supply, management. We need utilities and trams. It is clear that children and the unemployed had to be evacuated. This was done. But evacuation opportunities were limited.
        The Germans twice in the war faced with the "charms" of attacking industrial centers. In September 1941, the Headquarters allowed to leave all the products of the plants in Leningrad. And the troops near Leningrad received HF. And in the summer of 42, the Stalingrad factories delivered to the T-34 troops. I repeat - 54 tanks every two days.
    2. 0
      30 March 2017 00: 34
      The answer was given and given quite justified. The delay in the evacuation of the civilian population was caused by quite significant reasons. It was a tough and cruel decision. But there was no other way.
  9. v34
    +3
    29 March 2017 06: 13
    About the militias.
    In the late 80s, a friend, with my participation, bought a German motorcycle from his grandfather from Tractor.
    Grandfather said that in the fall of 42 he went with the same hard workers home for lunch. Militias with weapons.
    "A motorcycle with two Hans jumped out, we shot them, one killed immediately, the second ran into a ravine.
    I drove a broken motorcycle to my home and hid it in a shed ... "
    Apparently vagrant Germans somehow leaked, or there was no solid front line at that time.
    (They did the motorcycle, he drove, but failed to legalize and register the device.)

    About quilted jackets on the militia - in August, and in early September, in Volgograd it is still very hot, running, crawling, actively moving in such clothes is not only uncomfortable, but impossible. Therefore, I think these are later photos.
  10. 0
    29 March 2017 18: 26
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Quote: Ivan Tartugay
    In the absence of mobile units, lack of ammunition, only defense is the most rational type of military operations, and not counter-attacks.

    Quite the contrary: in the absence of mobile connections, the static defense of death is similar. If we give the initiative to the enemy, then, taking advantage of the passivity of our units, the enemy calmly concentrates superior forces - and just as calmly breaks through the defense. And we can’t do anything - even with intelligence on the concentration of enemy forces, our reserves, due to low mobility, simply will not be in time for the place of future breakthrough. EMNIP, 1 TGR of Kleist before Kiev excavation reached its initial level in a couple of days.
    In the case of active defense, our strike has every chance of disrupting the concentration of enemy forces and drawing back the very mobile units that we could not catch in a static defense.
    So either we are sitting infantry on the defensive - and we are guaranteed to get a breakthrough of the front, or we strike with rifle units - and we have some chance that the Germans will be forced to stitch their mobile units about us and postpone their strike.
    Quote: Ivan Tartugay
    All such counterattacks on self-sacrifice, on a hunchback, on blood, on the deaths of ordinary soldiers, cadets, and militias.
    But generals cannot move their brains or do not want to.

    And the generals develop strike plans based on the fact that the units involved in the operation will act according to the Charter. But in fact ... tankers with tenacity worthy of better use, time after time, instead of going around the heights, twist through its crest - right at the position of the anti-terrorist operation. The infantry throws mortar slabs on the march, and in the attack lies down immediately upon exiting the trenches. And if she manages to break into enemy trenches, then she does not take any measures to consolidate - and at the slightest resistance of the Germans leaves her position. For a day of battle, the infantryman makes 3-4 rifle shots - and that’s it. Artillery and mortars below the division are practically not used - the only machine gun can delay the advance of the whole battalion while its commander tries to contact the division and request fire support from there. The interaction between the types and kinds of troops is not that there is - it is negative: the infantry commander, under the threat of execution, prohibits tankers from going out at night for repairs and refueling - and throws tanks in the open field, relegating their infantry into trenches.
    As a result, the generals are forced to inform the Charter in the form of orders to their subordinates. Judging by the SBD, in the overwhelming majority of orders of 1941-1943, the part “what needs to be done to rectify the situation” is actually an arrangement of articles of the Charter and instruction.

    Strange, but they say differently about the Battle of Kursk. You will come to one denominator. And then how convenient the generals for excuses, this version is accepted.
  11. +1
    30 March 2017 09: 10
    Alternative. Or to save the civilian population, which will have nothing to feed in the 43rd, or to save grain, livestock and tractors. When they write about Lend-Lease, they operate with the numbers of tanks and aircraft. And no one will remember the egg powder and stew. And steam locomotives. And thousands more items. People need to be fed. Stalin knew history too well. What caused the February coup? Due to shortages of bread to Petersburg. What was brought to Leningrad along the Road of Life? And what was evacuated from Stalingrad in the summer of 1942
  12. 0
    30 March 2017 11: 08
    Bakht,
    This is all clear, I’m not talking about this, but about this: “if you search on the Internet and put yourself in his place, the ban on evacuating people was justified". The circumstances were such that they could not, as they did not try. Ban did not have. The difference is significant, right?
    1. 0
      30 March 2017 12: 34
      Yes, of course, there is a difference. And in principle, the evacuation was still going on. 100 thousand still evacuated. The question is what was the priority. So I think that there was still a ban. Local leaders knew what they would answer with their heads. Perhaps there were no official documents.
      I came to the shift and saw on the board a list of tasks to be performed. My first question was always: "What is the main task?"
      1. 0
        30 March 2017 14: 44
        I came to the shift and saw on the board a list of tasks to be performed.

        The task was one, to win, but in what ways, it also mattered. No one, never, could forbid evacuation. I.V. Stalin, the wrong person was, apparently. Otherwise, the Bandera, and most importantly, the Germans did not seem enough.
        1. +1
          30 March 2017 14: 59
          Stalin never forbade evacuation. But he could set priorities. This is what I am talking about. In any case, huge values ​​were taken out, but people remained. It is a fact. So in fact, and not according to documents, material values ​​were exported first of all.