Stalingrad Fortress

39
On the outskirts of the Volga

With the advance of the advanced units of the Wehrmacht into the great bend of the Don, there was a real threat of an enemy breaking through to the region of Stalingrad, seizing of this large industrial center and transport hub. The troops of the South-Western Front, weakened in previous heavy battles, were unable to stop the enemy on their own.



During the years of Soviet power, Stalingrad became one of the largest industrial centers of the USSR. On the eve of the war, more than 445 thousand people lived in it and there were 126 industrial enterprises, including 29 enterprises of union and two republican significance. The Stalingrad Tractor Works, the pride of the Soviet industry, gave the Soviet country more than 50% of the then existing tractors (300 thousand). Another giant of Soviet industry, the Red October plant, produced annually 775,8 thousand tons of steel and 584,3 thousand tons of rolled products. Also large enterprises were the Barrikady plant, the shipyard and the StalGRES. In Stalingrad and the region worked more than 325 thousand workers and employees. Stalingrad was a major transportation hub with highways to Central Asia and the Urals. Of particular importance was the communication that linked Central Russia with the Caucasus, through which oil was transported. As a result, the city in a war was of great strategic importance.

The Soviet high command, correctly assessing the importance of the Stalingrad sector, in the first half of July, 1942, took measures to strengthen the troops on this line. The reserve armies were deployed and deployed in the 500-kilometer strip from Pavlovsk to the Upper Kurmoyarsk to the distant approaches to Stalingrad, to the line of the Don. 4 July 1942 d. The rate in the directive addressed to A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the 5 reserve army ordered: “Immediately push the main forces of the army onto the east bank of the r. Don with the task of firmly defending the eastern bank of the river. Don and in no case prevent the enemy from crossing the river. Don".

On July 11, a directive was issued on the name of the commander of the 62 Army, General V. Ya. Kolpakchi, requesting to immediately advance the rifle divisions of the army located in the Stalingrad region and take them to the line of defense on the outskirts of the city. On July 12, the Stalingrad Front (SF) was created on the basis of the field administration and the troops of the South-Western Front, which united the reserve 63, 62 and 64 armies, as well as the 21 th army and the 8 air army Southwestern front. Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko was appointed Commander of the Stalingrad Front, N. S. Khrushchev was appointed a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant-General P.I. Boldin was appointed Chief of Staff. Since July 23, the front was headed by Lieutenant-General V.N. Gordov, and Major-General D.N. Nikishev became the Chief of Staff.

The Federation Council was tasked with stopping the enemy and preventing him from reaching the Volga. Since the Germans had already launched an offensive in the great bend of the Don, the troops of the front had to take a solid defense along the Don River: from Pavlovsk to Kletskaya and further south, from Kletskaya and Surovikino, Suvorovsky, Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya. The headquarters continued to strengthen the Stalingrad direction. In the second half of July, the retreating and weakened troops of the 28th, 38th and 57th armies, as well as the Volzhskaya Front, were included in the Stalingrad Front flotilla... The 38th Army took up defenses on the left bank of the Don, between the 63rd and 62nd armies, the 28th Army, retreating beyond the Don, was concentrated southwest of Kruglovsky. The 28th, 38th and 57th armies were drained of blood in heavy battles, and it was planned to replenish them with personnel and equipment in the Stalingrad region. Mobile units retreated to the zone of the Stalingrad Front and were also included in its composition. They crossed the Don and concentrated to the north and south of Kalach, behind the 63rd Army, the remnants of the 22nd and 23rd tank and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Parts of the 13th Panzer Corps were concentrated northeast of Surovikino, in the defense zone of the 62nd Army.

The German command transferred the 4 th tank army to Army Group “A” and by mid-July its units reached the Don at the turn of Tsimlyanskaya - Konstantinovskaya. Having no doubt that the troops of the 6 th field army would quickly take Stalingrad, the German command transferred a number of formations of this army to troops that operated in other directions, or brought them to the reserve. As a result, in the first half of July, the 6 divisions were part of the 14 of the German army. However, in general, the balance of power in the Stalingrad sector was still in favor of the Wehrmacht. There were about 6 thousand people, 270 thousand guns and mortars, 3 tanks as part of the upcoming 500 Army of Friedrich Paulus. From the air, Paulus's army was supported by 1200 aircraft of the 4 air fleet. In mid-July, Soviet troops could oppose the enemy only with forces of the 63 and 62 armies, in which there were 12 divisions: about 160 thousand men, 220 guns and mortars, to 400 tanks. From the air, our troops supported the 454 of the 8 Air Force. 64-I army was just beginning to concentrate on the line indicated to it.

The troops of the Soviet reserve armies, which advanced from the depths, fell on the march on German march aviation and mobile units, defended at insufficiently or completely unprepared lines. As a rule, the personnel of the Soviet units did not have combat experience. Equipment anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons was low, and the German air force almost with impunity bombed the concentrations of our troops, causing serious damage and undermining the morale of the constant threat from the air. It was noted that “In some areas, the movement of troops and the transport of goods to the front edge in the daytime were literally paralyzed due to the strong impact of enemy aircraft. The lack of forests and shelters made it difficult to camouflage troops. ” German troops attacked, owned the initiative, had a great combat experience. German aircraft had full air superiority. 6 th German army was considered one of the best in the Wehrmacht, and its soldiers were inspired by new successes on the Russian front. Thus, at the beginning of the Stalingrad battle, the enemy had a great advantage both in the number of troops and in their quality.



In the next Caucasian direction, the situation in July was also difficult. All this created an overall extremely dangerous situation for the USSR throughout the entire southern sector of the front. The Soviet General Headquarters and the General Staff tried to organize a strategic defense and thwart a new general offensive by the German army. The command of the Stalingrad Front, not yet possessing all the forces allocated to it, was to ensure with a decisive and urgent action the disruption of the plans of the enemy. It was necessary to prevent the enemy from dissecting strategic defense, to keep Stalingrad and the Volga, to ensure continuous communication of the Center with the southern regions of the country. In addition, Stalingrad was supposed to provide the flank and rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops, which covered Moscow and the Central Industrial District of the USSR. Thus, the struggle for Stalingrad acquired enormous military-strategic importance.



Organization of the Defense of Stalingrad

October 23 1941 was created by the Stalingrad city defense committee composed of A. S. Chuyanov (chairman), I. F. Zimenkova, A. I. Voronin, G. M. Kobyzeva (commandant of the city). The committee carried out work on the construction of defenses, the production of military products in the city’s enterprises, the preparation of reserves for the army, the maintenance of public order, etc.

During the winter 1941-942. Only single enemy aircraft made raids on the city. The first massive German air raid on Stalingrad, which lasted 3 hours 23 minutes, was made on the night from 22 to 23 on April 1942. About 50 aircraft took part in the raid. As the summer of 1942 approached, the aerial threat increased. At the beginning of the German air strikes were concentrated on the approaches to Stalingrad, communications, in areas of the area where there were battles. However, for the city itself, the aerial threat quickly increased. 4 July 1942 The City Defense Committee decided “On measures to strengthen the fire protection of Stalingrad”. There was a mobilization of people for the fire service, for self-defense of residential buildings, etc. The telephone and radio communications lines for antiaircraft artillery and searchlight stations were improved. Increased demands for compliance with blackout. Residents of the city built shelters and gaps for shelter during raids.

Stalingrad Fortress

City Committee for the Defense of Stalingrad: A. I. Voronin, A. S. Chuyanov, I. F. Zimenkov

11 July The Stalingrad Defense Committee adopted a decree “On the state and measures to strengthen the units of the national militia”. It was decided to form a tank battalion of the people's militia in the Kirov region and additionally, in addition to the organized earlier, two battalions at the Tractor Factory. 14 July 1942 The city of Stalingrad was declared martial law. Stalingrad became a frontline city.

Since the autumn of 1941, great work has been done to prepare the city for defense. 13 October 1941 g. The State Defense Committee decided to build defensive lines on the approaches to Stalingrad. At that time, as German troops broke through in the Donbas, in the Stalingrad region, work was carried out on the construction of fortifications. They were conducted by the 5-th sapper army, the 5-m and 19-m directorates of the defenses of the NPO of the USSR with the involvement of the local population and the construction organizations of the region. The construction took place in a tense military situation and under adverse natural conditions of autumn and winter (rains, blizzards and severe frosts). About 200 thousand people took part in the works that continued in the winter. In January, 1942, the defensive lines of the Stalingrad and Astrakhan contours were transferred to the Military Council of the Stalingrad Military District by the 5 th sapper army. Stalingrad outer contour passed along the river. Ilovlya, north of Stalingrad, then along the left bank of the Don, along the r. Myshkov and to the Volga near Raygorod. Internal and middle contours were also built, but their readiness was no more than 40-50%.


The construction of the trenches in the area of ​​the river Don

In the spring of 1942, the lines that had not yet been completely constructed were flooded with water, and their condition was extremely unsatisfactory. Anti-tank ditches flooded everywhere and they collapsed, the upper layer of the earth washed away from the firing points, in many places the water carried off the overlapping logs. It also turned out that many of the firing points turned out to be unsuitable or unsuitable for use due to the lack of shelling space or its extreme limitation. Many embrasures were made too low or, conversely, high, there were other drawbacks. Thus, a major overhaul and improvement of the defensive line was required. The General Staff of the Red Army instructed the Stalingrad military district to restore the defensive lines. 13 June 24-th defensive construction department of the NKO of the USSR arrived in the Stalingrad region with construction battalions consisting of about 10 thousand people.

15 July 1942, the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), in coordination with the Military Council of the Front, decided to urgently build a fourth defensive bypass, which was built on the outskirts of the city by citizens. Many thousands of Stalingrad workers went out on its construction every day. All work, often under the blows of enemy aircraft, was carried out by people with great patriotic enthusiasm. Many institutions, whose work could be stopped without damage to the front, were temporarily closed, and the whole team went to the construction of fortifications. Other institutions and enterprises allocated part of their employees. At the end of July and the first half of August, more than 57 thousand people went out for the construction of the city bypass. Everything needed for construction was sought on the ground. There was a mobilization of tools, equipment, building materials, horse-drawn and motor vehicles. Workers made metal hedgehogs, armored towers, reinforced concrete caps, precast pillboxes, etc. in factories and enterprises.

At the last stage of the construction of defensive fortifications, the leadership and control of the work were assigned to the headquarters of the 57 Army (from July 17). The headquarters of the army noted that the readiness of the lines in the fire system by this time reached only 5%. The main efforts of the 57 Army Headquarters were directed at eliminating this shortcoming. At the same time, the engineering units of the army began to mine the front edge. Also part of the army carried out work on disguise. In total, 2750 km of trenches and communication lines, up to 1860 km of anti-tank ditches and up to 85 thousands of different platforms and positions for fire weapons were built at the far and near approaches to Stalingrad. These were field-type facilities, which were not yet completely completed. But in general, during the Battle of Stalingrad, these fortifications, upgraded during the battles with the Germans, played an important role in the defense of the city.

Increased activity of German aviation. In May, 1942, the air defense service of the city and region, marked 297 airborne raids. On the night of July 23 Stalingrad suffered a strong air strike. In the following days, the raids systematically repeated. Under the air strikes were railway and water communications leading to Stalingrad, which greatly hampered the supply of troops and the population. The railway lines leading to the city were under the constant influence of enemy aircraft, and were largely incapacitated. The transport network in this area was poorly developed; there were no hard-surface roads here at all. As a result, the remaining iron lines of the Volga region worked with a huge overload and the role of the Volga waterway dramatically increased. All the growing cargo transportation for military factories and ammunition was assigned to the river transport of the Volga. In Volsk, Saratov, Kamyshin and Stalingrad, front supply bases were created, in Kazan, Syzran and Ulyanovsk, points of transshipment of goods from railways to water transport and back were urgently strengthened.

At the same time, the movement along the Volga waterway in the area of ​​Stalingrad also sharply complicated. The German command sought to block the Volga fairway, block approaches to the city from both the upper and lower reaches of the river. In May, German planes dropped 212 magnetic-acoustic mines to the Volga water area, from 25 to 31 in July - 231 mine. By the end of July, the Volga was mined throughout the 400 km - from Kamyshin to Nikolsky. Since July 25, German aviation has fiercely bombed Volga ports and ships. All this led to serious losses. The mine blew up and the Smolensk steamer sank, the Kondom barge being towed by it was burned down. Killed 28 people. On July 26, the passenger ship Alexander Nevsky, three tugboats, four dry cargo ships and two oil barges were killed. A total of 25 July to 9 August from bombing and detonation of mines sank 25 self-propelled and 42 non-propelled vessel. However, despite the difficult conditions, active shipping on the Lower Volga was preserved. The movement of ships in the Stalingrad area did not stop either: from July 23 to August 23, Volga ships transported 40 thousand military cargoes, not counting economic transportation.

In conditions when communications leading to Stalingrad were under the blows of enemy aircraft, local enterprises played a special role in the defense of the city. The tractor plant produced tanks, tractors, diesel engines, repaired tanks. The plant "Red October" gave armor steel for tanks and other military products. The plant of the USSR People's Commissariat for Armaments produced high-speed weapons, mortars and ammunition. Ship repair enterprises built pontoons for ferries, re-equipped passenger boats to minesweepers, the ship repair plant in Krasnoarmeysky district began to produce armored boats. The hard work went on in the port.



Fire in Stalingrad after a German air raid

To be continued ...
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  1. +7
    9 February 2017 05: 00
    The first massive German air raid on Stalingrad, which lasted 3 hours 23 minutes, was carried out on the night of April 22-23, 1942.

    Thousands and thousands of civilians were killed during this raid.
    The evacuation of the civilian population was not carried out and a lot of them died in subsequent battles ... there was a hard time for the people.
    1. +10
      9 February 2017 07: 33
      Quote: The same Lech
      FirstThe first massive German air raid on Stalingrad, which lasted 3 hours 23 minutes, was carried out on the night of April 22-23, 1942 Mr.

      Thousands and thousands of civilians were killed during this raid.
      The evacuation of the civilian population was not carried out and a lot of them died in subsequent battles ... there was a hard time for the people.


      According to the latest data, as a result of that raid, about 70 thousand residents and evacuated people died, a "fiery storm" raged on the streets, burning people without a trace. A tragedy no less than Dresden.
      But everything is known and terrified of Dreadnian, and only with us about Stalingrad, and even not all .......
    2. +5
      9 February 2017 10: 52
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Thousands and thousands of civilians were killed during this raid.
      The evacuation of the civilian population was not carried out and a lot of them died in subsequent battles ... there was a hard time for the people.

      You do not confuse April with August?
      VIII air corps demolished the city 23 August 1942. A 22-23 April 1942, only 50 Heinkels participated in the raid on Stalingrad:
      in 1942, on the night of April 22, 1942, "He-111" from the 3rd detachment of the 27th Belke squadron appeared over Stalingrad. During this period, the city was still in the rear. The purpose of the raid was the Stalingrad Tractor and Artillery Plant Barricades. In domestic sources, this raid is referred to as the first massive blow to the city. According to the MPVO, 2 high-explosive and about a thousand incendiary bombs were dropped on the tractor plant, Barricades, Red October, the Stalingrad-11 railway station and the river port.
      1. 0
        9 February 2017 11: 40
        You do not confuse April with August?

        Glad you noticed hi I did not focus on this.
  2. +6
    9 February 2017 06: 04
    Fire in Stalingrad after a German air raid
    a photo from Donetsk today, it’s impossible to distinguish ... Grandfather recalled Stalingrad and Königsberg, two places when he did not hope to survive.
    1. Ham
      +2
      9 February 2017 13: 17
      the only difference being that Koenigsberg smashed our ...
      1. +9
        9 February 2017 14: 10
        Quote: Ham
        the only difference being that Koenigsberg smashed our ...

        there is the concept of “military necessity”, in Königsberg - it was turned by the Germans into a fortified city,
        By the way, I remind you that the Nazis at the end of the war and the tactics were the same city-fortress, and therefore bombed
        Stalingrad was not a fortress, it was a simple city with a large number of civilians to which the front approached,
        in fact, the bombing of Stalingrad is part of the genocide carried by the "European liberators" under the leadership of German fascists.
  3. +2
    9 February 2017 07: 45
    The correct title ... you can’t say otherwise ....
  4. +3
    9 February 2017 09: 09
    it’s good that the Germans stuck in a puddle on Stalingrad. the map clearly shows how their wedges center and south converge at one point. in the city .. and they grabbed the city from our north into the Volga and from the south you don’t especially see the city and then straight to the same result, most likely .. ours either in the Volga or a hasty retreat along towards Astrakhan. then dig batteries along the Volga and not a single barge with oil would pass and Stalingrad itself could, as a principle, make it destroy the aircraft blows .. but for our good luck Hitler rested .. the city is needed although there are only ruins from the city .. corporal ep in a word and pauls elk but it’s very good. and how good it is that this elk led the offensive and not manstein, for example, then sorrow that sipped .. there is still a god in the world
    1. +3
      9 February 2017 09: 53
      Quote: tiaman.76
      it’s good that the Germans were stuck in Stalingrad ..., ... but Hitler rested on our happiness.

      Unfortunately, "stubborn hitler" was a very smart person!
      (C) Stalingrad Tractor Plant, ... Krasny Oktyabr Plant, ... Barricades, Shipyard and StalGRES. Stalingrad was a major transport hub with highways to Central Asia and the Urals. Of particular importance was the communication that connected Central Russia with the Caucasus, oil transportation passed through it.

      Also, guess three times where the bulk of the T-34 tanks were produced after the loss of Kharkov ...
      Now, if there were bridges across the Volga above and below Stalingrad, then Hitler would probably accept your hint about the "girths".
      1. +1
        9 February 2017 10: 24
        hmm, all these plants and shipyards were destroyed by air raids and artillery bombardment and it was not necessary to get involved in battles among the ruins and the main highway went along the Volga and in the event of a seizure, control of the coastline along the Volga would be much more probably tens of kilometers measured easily it’s possible to shoot and to set the same mine barriers with the total advantage of German aviation with the help of their cover, it would be possible to throw torpedo boats from black all our barges would be sunk .. that's what I mean and not about bridges .. you can blow up bridges in general .. it is a political move that is needed in the first place, the fall of a large city with the name of Stalin. and the flanks remained essentially uncovered
        1. +5
          9 February 2017 11: 15
          Therefore, they say that taking Baku, and Stalingrad is just a bomb,
          Hitler would have won more.
          Although this would only delay his inevitable loss of the war as a whole.
          Keeping the front line from Leningrad to Baku is unrealistic.
          Somewhere yes it will tear, and then grandiose coppers are inevitable.
          1. +2
            9 February 2017 21: 19
            voyaka uh "It is unrealistic to keep the front line from Leningrad to Baku."
            Yes, and transport full ... sadness for them would be. And we Volga oil was at hand. Oil is still being extracted there.
        2. +4
          9 February 2017 11: 17
          Quote: tiaman.76
          all these factories and shipyards were destroyed air raids and art shelling

          "Production was finally stopped only on September 13, 1942, when the fighting was already on the territory of the plant. After this date, 40 tanks were released from the parts assembled in the shops. Between September 29 and October 4, 1942, as a result of shelling and bombing, the plant was completely disabled. "Http://www.pravda.info/national_news/149125.html
          Well, what do you say about 40 tanks produced at the "destroyed" plant?
        3. +4
          9 February 2017 11: 43
          Quote: tiaman.76
          and Hitler needs a political move in the first place, the fall of a large city with the name of Stalin. and the flanks remained essentially uncovered

          So in the event of an offensive north and south of Stalingrad, the flanks will stretch even more. Goth already in August, the right flank was for the most part Romanian.
          And most importantly - the Germans in real life just embraced Stalingrad. AND caught a bear - without the liquidation of the Stalingrad group, a further offensive was impossible. This is clearly seen in the example of the northern grouping: the Germans are trying to advance south - receive a blow from the north. The Germans are concentrating their forces for a counterattack against the northern group of the Red Army - they receive a strike from the south.
          ICHSH, Hitler had everything in mind - the Wehrmacht should have prevented the Soviet troops from moving to Stalingrad, surrounding them even before the Don. In Directive 41, Stalingrad was mentioned only as a designation of the area of ​​the Don, where the northern and southern "claws" of the German offensive were to meet. But Something went wrong: the Soviet units on the Don refused to encircle, and even the northern claw lost time and strength in battles with Soviet tank units at Voronezh (after which two of the most complete panzerdivis were taken from Paulus).
          1. +1
            9 February 2017 13: 36
            the answer is this .. how, according to the original “blau” plan, taking the Stalingrad forces at first was excessively practically the entire southern army group south was enough for the flanks and for the rear and the coverage and intercepts, so to speak, and only then having completed the task of moving through the growths to the Caucasus. Hitler usually intervened disunited forces and adopted a new plan. the Braunschweig plan, which simultaneously indicated an attack on both Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Well, Fedor von Bock, who was indignant at this adolf’s trick, was dismissed. Well, thank God that this happened from greed beyond measure and they choked
            1. +6
              9 February 2017 14: 44
              Quote: tiaman.76
              the answer is this .. how, according to the original “blau” plan, taking the Stalingrad forces at first was excessively practically the entire southern army group south was enough for the flanks and for the rear and the coverage and intercepts, so to speak, and only then having completed the task of moving through the growths to the Caucasus. Hitler usually intervened disunited forces and adopted a new plan. the Braunschweig plan, which simultaneously indicated an attack on both Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

              Hehehehe ... only in real life there was one problem: the Blau plan failed. Coverage of Soviet forces to the west of the Don was not successful: the northern wing of the GA South instead of a peppy march south and pulling the Soviet front engaged in fierce battles with Soviet tank formations. As a result, the planned "encirclement" managed to retreat - and Blau was irrelevant. I had to develop Braunschweig and Directive No. 45, which tried to take into account the new realities: the actual division of GA South after the Blau failure into 2 areas - the Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
              Quote: tiaman.76
              Well, Fedor von Bock, who was indignant at this trick of Adolf, was dismissed.

              Von Bock was fired for something else. Bok flew for the delay at Voronezh, which led to the failure of Blau. Adolf bluntly said:
              He loses 4-5 days because of this. And this is at a time when it is dear every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the Great Germany Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet resistance anywhere, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8-9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop.

              It’s just that the beaten German generals always have the same thing: how something went wrong - this is Hitler's fault. Even the Dunkirk stop order, actually issued by von Rundsted and managed by the time of Hitler's visit for a day, managed to write off Adolf. smile
    2. +4
      9 February 2017 11: 29
      Quote: tiaman.76
      and they grabbed the city from our north into the Volga and from the south you can see especially not turn off to the city and then straight to the same result most likely .. our either in the Volga or a hasty retreat along towards Astrakhan.

      Fine. That is, you offer the Germans to stretch 2 guts north and south of the city and substitute the flanks for the attacks of the Red Army?
      Look what happened to the north of the city - there the Germans tried to do exactly as you suggest. And what is the result? The Germans who came to the Volga were alternately attacked from the north and from Stalingrad itself (in which there were 2 tank corps, including the practically untouched 2nd mall). The situation for the Germans seemed critical:
      Stalingrad is in a very tense situation due to attacks from superior enemy forces. Our divisions are not that strong anymore. Command is too nervous. Wittersheim <14th Panzer Corps> wanted to pull back his finger extended to the Volga. Paulus prevented this
      © Halder
      As a result, the Paulus wedge is bogged down in Soviet defense. A further offensive was impossible without the elimination of at least one of the flanking threats. And Paulus chose the 62nd Army cut off by the Volga from the "Great Land" as a target.
      In the southern direction, the defenders were greatly helped by the terrain - a chain of lakes south of the city. As a result, Goth simply had no choice but to turn around on the city. And Paulus already needed help.
      Quote: tiaman.76
      then dig a battery along the Volga and not one barge with oil would pass

      Transit navigation on the Volga was stopped at the end of August 1942, when the Germans reached the river north of Stalingrad.
      1. 0
        9 February 2017 13: 38
        read above Yes
    3. +3
      9 February 2017 11: 36
      tiaman.76
      And the fact that the Germans did just that - is that nothing ?. The Wittersheim tank corps broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad in August 1942. And south of Stalingrad there was nowhere to deploy troops. There were practically no Soviet troops there in the summer. German patrols overlooked the Caspian Sea.
      And the Germans interrupted communications on the Volga at the same time. Back in August.
      The most interesting thing is that such corps commanders as Wittersheim and Schwedler suggested stopping the storming of Stalingrad. Both were removed from their posts by Hitler’s order. So neither Paulus nor Manstein decided anything.
      An interesting moment is the removal of Withersheim. After all, it was a military general who went through all the campaigns. Its removal is connected with criticism of the actions of the command. He argued that it was dangerous to keep the shock units on the edge of a choked offensive. And he suggested withdrawing tanks from the "northern balcony". The result - a general from information, the commander of the tank corps ended the war as an ordinary Volkssturm.
      1. +1
        9 February 2017 13: 42
        Thank you .. I agree with you .. Hitler immediately shot those generals who expressed opposite opinions .. by the way, about the withdrawal from Stalingrad in his memoirs, at least he spoke and manstein .. I just think that Erich is a combat officer, he’s more efficient and probably came up with something if he had been under the Stalingrad hmm, our head would not have stupidly been sitting still looking at the ruins and the pauls is rather a staff member and probably it was not enough combat experience. His fault is that they were choked with Stalingrad
        1. +2
          9 February 2017 14: 58
          Quote: tiaman.76
          I just think that Erich is a combat officer, he’s more efficient and probably would have come up with something if he had been under Stalingrad.

          Manstein is already came up with something near Leningrad. As a result, the Nordlicht went to pieces: not only were the forces intended to cover the city bogged down in the Sinyavinsky swamps, but Manstein also managed to squander almost the entire stock of ammunition intended to break through the defense of Leningraders - including large calibers. Siege calibers in the swamp ... smile
          Quote: tiaman.76
          on our head stupidly would not sit still looking at the ruins

          Yeah ... I would climb to force the Volga - and get a boiler on the other side. smile
          Of our seven armies near Stalingrad, the one sitting in the city 62A was the weakest - and simply asked for destruction.
        2. +1
          9 February 2017 18: 47
          tiaman.76

          In fact, the Germans were not like people. The fact is that Manstein, like Paulus, were typical staffers. But Guderian - a field commander.
          But in reality Paulus and Manstein commanded the troops, and the General Staff was entrusted to Guderian. By the way, in real life Paulus acted not so badly.
          1. +2
            10 February 2017 10: 24
            Quote: Bakht
            In fact, the Germans were not like people. The fact is that Manstein, like Paulus, were typical staffers. But Guderian - a field commander.

            Hehe hehe ... you might think we had better. Remember the wonderful quote from the description of the person appointed before the war as the chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft?
            He cannot be appointed to staff and teaching work - he organically hates her.

            And alright, it would have been a lack of personnel - but no. Was Vasilevsky, was Antonov.
            But commanders and technicians Pavlov and Kulik went into the field army. The end is a bit predictable ... ©
  5. +4
    9 February 2017 12: 09
    Quote: Olgovich
    But everything is known and terrified of Dreadnian, and only with us about Stalingrad, and even not all .......

    Because in Dresden the geyropeytsy suffered, and in Stalingrad, "some" Russians whom these same geyropeytsy came to exterminate. In America, about the Indians, too, no one sheds tears of a crocodile.
    I repeat once again - correctly my grandfather did that he did not take the Germans prisoner.
  6. +1
    9 February 2017 12: 22
    Alexey RA

    Nevertheless, the manic obsession with the city is not entirely clear.
    In August, the Germans solved the problem. Stalingrad factories, if they could work, then half-heartedly. After the Germans broke through on August 24 or 25, transport communication along the Volga was interrupted. The supply of Stalingrad was fraught with great difficulties for the Soviet troops. Leave the assault groups there, or even a strong cover, and withdraw the remaining troops into the reserve. But the Germans stubbornly wanted to take the whole city. Why did they need these 200 or 300 meters remaining to the Volga?
    1. +2
      9 February 2017 13: 36
      Quote: Bakht
      In August, the Germans solved the problem. Stalingrad factories, if they could work, then half-heartedly. After the Germans broke through on August 24 or 25, transport communication along the Volga was interrupted. The supply of Stalingrad was fraught with great difficulties for the Soviet troops. Leave the assault groups there, or even a strong cover, and withdraw the remaining troops into the reserve.

      Duc ... and when to do it? It was too early to withdraw forces until October 1942 - the Red Army regularly attacked the northern "wedge" both from the north and from the city. So it was necessary to squeeze the ring with all our might and prevent the Stalingrad Front from breaking through to 62A.
      And in October 1942, it was too late to withdraw to the reserve: the forces of Paulus and Goth were drained quite seriously, the Germans were tightly bogged down in urban battles - and in front of them there was a mirage of “last blow”. It seems that just about, a little more - and cut into pieces 62A will be dumped into the Volga. In such a situation of seemingly near victory, no one will simply give away the strength: Started to do - so do not get up! ©
      1. +1
        9 February 2017 18: 52
        Perhaps. But I meant precisely the attempts of an indispensable assault. Infantry divisions bled in Stalingrad. It was possible to strengthen the "northern balcony". What we had in Stalingrad could no longer advance. Even in November 42, it was unrealistic to create an attack force on patches of land.
        1. +2
          10 February 2017 10: 47
          Quote: Bakht
          Perhaps. But I meant precisely the attempts of an indispensable assault. Infantry divisions bled in Stalingrad.

          Here, the underestimation of the enemy also played a role. For example, according to the results of Weichs report 11.09.42 Halder wrote:
          The assault on the urban part of Stalingrad - 14 or 15.9 with good preparation. Calculation of time: for the assault on Stalingrad - 10 days. Then regrouping - 14 days. The ending is the earliest to 1.10.

          Paulus requested reinforcements for the speedy capture of the city. But the Germans did not have fresh parts. And at the suggestion of Halder, in 6A they transferred already “poyuzannye” parts of 4 TAs, which as a result were drawn into city battles.
          And most importantly - the first assault seemed to show that Halder was right - by the second day the Germans had broken through right up to the Mamaev Kurgan. Yes, the Russian counterattacks partially corrected the situation - but they are weak, just about a little more - and the city will fall.
          You are passionate, Paramosha ... That's what destroys you. ©
          When the fervor of the quick victory was a little dissipated, it turned out that the Russians had not been dumped into the Volga, there were no reserves at 6A, it was almost impossible to take them a level higher, and the existing units were reduced to “weak”. And it only remained to continue to slowly squeeze 62A into the Volga.
          Quote: Bakht
          What we had in Stalingrad could no longer advance.

          Somewhere until the end of the first ten days of September, it still could. Then - yes, that's all, just a counterattack.
          1. +1
            10 February 2017 11: 13
            I do not agree a bit. On September 13, the Germans practically captured the city. The situation was saved by the NKVD division. If they had not kept a narrow strip of the coast, Rodimtsev had nowhere to land. And then began a slow gnawing. The city already needed not tank divisions, but engineer units. All this was well understood by the Germans, but the transfer of combat engineer battalions took a long time.
            In general, according to memoirs, all generals understood the risk but continued the assault. It’s wrong to blame everything on Hitler. Paulus was promised Jodl's post, and the rest of the generals were supposed to get buns. And got a splash.
            And most importantly - already at the end of August, ours could not advance. Chuikov carried out private counterattacks. But all to no avail. And nothing about aviation and say nothing. It was not for nothing that Malenkov arranged the distribution to the flyers. Richthofen also did not eat bread for nothing.
  7. Ham
    +5
    9 February 2017 13: 35
    the Germans throughout the war were afraid of the “second Verdun” as hell incense ... but still got into Stalingrad
    The Wehrmacht’s 6th Army was considered to be selective: it almost entirely consisted of young people aged 23-27, every third soldier was a member of the Nazi party, the army was armed with the best weapons at that time, it was stable in defense and offensive and highly motivated, had a glorious military path and history , it was commanded by the best commanders who had already distinguished themselves on the Eastern Front ...
    the color of the German army and the German officer corps ...
    and they all perished there in the steppes between the Don and the Volga ...
    A handful of people (not including senior officers) survived from the entire 6th army. most of the 90000 captured soldiers died captive from illnesses and other irreversible consequences of the hunger strike
    1. +4
      9 February 2017 13: 57
      yes, by deed to them .. I’m never sorry for their place in hell. I have a grandfather of 19 years old who died there in the first battle
      1. +3
        9 February 2017 21: 56
        My uncle (there was 23 of the year) died there, the Red Army soldier, 19 of September, 1942 of the year, 2 river street.
  8. +2
    9 February 2017 20: 27
    The Germans mediocrely got involved in the battles for Stalingrad without calculating their strength.
    If they simply blocked the city (as originally planned), then the Stalingrad Tank Plant could have been paralyzed by air strikes. Instead of creating a solid defense, one of their best armies was sprayed, hence the consequences:
    1.) there were not enough reserves to strengthen the Caucasian direction.
    2.) lost time, and in the meantime, the actions of the Red Army changed the configuration of the front and the entire operation in the Caucasus was already in jeopardy.
    That’s what the impacts of splayed fingers lead to. There is no doubt that the Germans were still in a magical euphoria from past victories and poorly considered the Red Army’s ability to mobilize efforts.
    So long with impunity the Germans and their allies were not allowed to hang around (almost in the steppe) and logically managed to prepare a deep operation to break up the front.
    All these sad events for Hitler and his Headquarters already hinted that the time of offensives (even in one strategic direction) had irrevocably gone, but the events on the Kursk Bulge showed that they were based in their strategy not only on purely military circumstances, but also on political conjuncture, which, as if by inertia, drove and drove the Wehrmacht to the East (its destruction).
  9. 0
    10 February 2017 11: 06
    Alexey RA

    Nevertheless, there is a difference. We had it at the beginning of the war. and in the end everything settled down. But the Germans in the beginning was fine, but in the end everything turned upside down. Paulus, Manstein and Halder were initially at headquarters.
    The end is a little predictable (quote)
    1. +1
      10 February 2017 13: 43
      Quote: Bakht
      Nevertheless, there is a difference. We had it at the beginning of the war. and in the end everything settled down. But the Germans in the beginning was fine, but in the end everything turned upside down. Paulus, Manstein and Halder were initially at headquarters.

      Hmmm ... on the one hand - retreat at the front, on the other - a mess with the appointment of officers ...
      1. +1
        10 February 2017 15: 19
        And no one knows who the spark of talent will flash. As Napoleon Murat said, he became a marshal, but remained a simple cavalryman.
        1. +2
          10 February 2017 15: 23
          Quote: Bakht
          And no one knows who the spark of talent will flash. As Napoleon Murat said, he became a marshal, but remained a simple cavalryman.

          It certainly is so ... but this is not a reason to select the chief of the General Staff by simple brute force. Especially before the war. Especially considering the fact that for each of the commanders there is a whole bunch of characteristics that, in the same GKZh, explicitly states that he is a "field commander" and not a staff worker.
  10. +1
    27 September 2017 08: 07
    glory to the heroes

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