"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction

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Breakthrough of the enemy in the southern strategic direction

The disaster near Kharkov had far-reaching consequences. The troops of the Soviet South-Western and Southern fronts were greatly weakened, and strategic reserves were concentrated in the central direction. Having liquidated the Barvenkovsky protrusion of the Soviet troops, the enemy took advantageous starting positions for the deployment of a further offensive. Developing success, the German troops 10 — 26 June conducted two private offensive operations — on the Lupus and Kupian sectors, forcing the Soviet troops to retreat beyond the Oskol River.



Thus, the Wehrmacht was able to achieve a change in the balance of power on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The Commander-in-Chief, JV Stalin, in his address to the Military Council of the South-Western Front 26 in June 1942, noted that the Kharkiv operation ended in a catastrophe in the entire South-West Front. By its negative results, he compared this catastrophe with the tragedy of Samsonov’s army in the First World War (East Prussian operation 1914). Stressing responsibility for the mistakes of Tymoshenko, Khrushchev and Baghramian, all members of the Military Council, the Supreme noted: “If we told the country in its entirety about that catastrophe - with the loss of the 18-20 divisions that the front survived and continues to experience, I’m afraid that you would be very cool. Therefore, you should take into account the mistakes you have made and take all measures to ensure that they will not take place in the future. ”

Major defeats in the Crimea and near Kharkov contributed to the further success of the German troops and their breakthrough to the Volga at Stalingrad and the invasion of the Caucasus. The reasons for this tragedy were as objective (the preservation of the Wehrmacht’s overall advantage in combat), as well as subjective (the Soviet General Headquarters and the General Staff erred in the direction of the main attack of the enemy, the command of the southern wing of the Soviet front made a number of major mistakes and miscalculations). The Germans then had the most efficient army on the planet and did not forgive mistakes. The severe and cruel experience of the war helped the Red Army to master the art of war, raising its level to an amazing height. This complex process encompassed all links of command cadres.

Former German general and military historian Kurt Tippelskirkh, about the operation near Kharkov and its influence on further events at the front, wrote: “For the planned German offensive, the attempt of the Russians to prevent him was only a welcome start. The weakening of the defensive power of the Russians, which was not so easy to achieve, was to make the first operations much easier. But additional preparations were needed, which took almost a whole month before the German armies, having regrouped and filled everything they needed, were able to launch an offensive. ”

"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction

June 1942 g. Headquarters Army Group "South" in Poltava

Army Group Commander Yug Fedor von Bock

In early June, the German command developed plans for offensive operations in the Voronezh and Kantemirov directions. With these operations, the planned decisive offensive of the 1942 summer campaign was to begin. The Wehrmacht was preparing a breakthrough to Voronezh by delivering two blows in converging directions: from the region northeast of Kursk to Voronezh, from the Volchansk region to Ostrogozhsk. In the course of this offensive operation, the enemy was going to destroy the Soviet troops defending in the Voronezh area, reach the Don from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva, and seize the bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. After entering the Voronezh region, the German mobile units were to turn south along the Don, striking in the direction of Kantemirovka to the rear of the troops of the South-Western Front. At the same time, the German grouping concentrated around Slavyansk, Artyomovsk, Kramatorsk, had to make a breakthrough at the junction of the South-Western and Southern Fronts and, developing a strike on Kantemirovka, complete the encirclement of the main forces of the South-Western Front, developing success in the direction of Stalingrad and the North Caucasus .

Preparing the offensive in a southwestern direction, the German high command divided Army Group South into Army Group A under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List as part of the 1st tank, 17th and 11th field and 8th Italian armies (these troops were supposed to strike in the Caucasus), and Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal von Bock as part of the 4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th 2nd field and 1942nd Hungarian armies. By the end of June 900, the Germans concentrated in the strip from Kursk to Taganrog about 1260 thousand soldiers, 17 tanks, over 1640 thousand guns and mortars, 37 aircraft. This group included up to 50% of infantry and cavalry, more than XNUMX% of the armored forces of the German army, which were on the Eastern Front. Strong Wehrmacht strike groups were concentrated east of Kursk, northeast of Kharkov and the Donbass. Hitler’s headquarters from East Prussia was moved to Little Russia (Ukraine), in the Vinnitsa region.

The troops of the three Soviet fronts — Bryansk, South-Western and Southern (lieutenant-general F.I. Golikov, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and lieutenant-general R. Ya. Malinovsky) defended against the enemy troops. Our troops were not inferior to the enemy in manpower and tanks, but were weaker in aircraft and artillery. In addition, the Soviet troops after heavy losses in the Crimea and in the Kharkiv region have not yet managed to recover, put themselves in order and gain a foothold in the new defensive lines. There were no large reserves. Those reserves that were in this area were mainly used during the heavy May and June battles. Especially a great advantage the enemy has created on the direction of the main attacks.



The Germans failed to complete the concentration of forces of the shock groups precisely at the scheduled time. The offensive in the Voronezh direction, originally scheduled for June 15, was postponed to 18, then to June 27, and then another day. On June 28, 1942, large enemy forces (2nd Field and 4th Tank German and 2nd Hungarian Army), combined into the Weichs army group, after the artillery and aviation preparations, went on the offensive against the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front. The main forces of the German strike group struck north of the Kursk-Voronezh railway. In the first echelon, 7 infantry, 3 tank, and 3 motorized divisions advanced. Ground forces supported aircraft of the 4th Air fleet.

In the direction of the main attack, two rifle divisions of the 13 Army, Major General N. P. Pukhov, and one division of the 40 Army, Lieutenant General M. A. Parsegov, defended themselves in the first echelon. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, our troops could not stand it, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses and by the end of 2, the enemy’s tanks reached the Kastornoye - Stary Oskol railway line. To the south, German troops also achieved success. June 30, the shock group of the 6 of the German army, launched an offensive from the Volchansk area on Ostrogozhsk, and broke through the defenses of the 21 army by Major General V. N. Gordov and the 28 Army DI Ryabyshev of the right wing of the South-Western Front . Thus, taking advantage of the forces, especially in tanks, artillery and aircraft, the Germans broke through the defenses, both on the left wing of the Bryansk Front and on the right wing of the South-Western Front. German troops moved in the general direction of Voronezh and Stary Oskol.

“By the end of 2 July, the situation in the Voronezh direction had deteriorated sharply. The defense at the junction of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts was broken through to a depth of 80 km. The reserves of the front, available in this direction, were drawn into battle. There was a clear threat of a breakthrough of the enemy’s attack force to the Don River and the seizure of Voronezh by it, - wrote A. M. Vasilevsky. - In order to prevent the enemy from forcing the Don and to stop further advancement of his troops, the General Headquarters transferred two combined-arms armies to the commander of the Bryansk Front from its reserve, ordering them to deploy on the right bank of the Don in the Zadonsk, Pavlovsk sector. At the same time, the 5-I tank army was handed over to the front for it to inflict a counterstrike along the flank and rear of the group of German fascist troops, attacking Voronezh, along with the tank formations. ”

On the night of July 3, the corps of the 5 Tank Army commanded by A.I. Lizyukov concentrated in the area south of Yelets. The immediate tank attack on the flank and rear of the German mobile units could change the situation in our favor, especially since the Germans had already suffered losses, were tied up by battles and their troops were stretched at a considerable distance. However, during the 3 July, the Soviet Panzer Army received no tasks from the front command. The next day, A. M. Vasilevsky personally did it. The army received an order to intercept the communications of the enemy’s tank group that had broken through to the Don River to Voronezh by a strike in the general direction of Zemlyansk, Khokhol (35 km south-west of Voronezh); actions on the rear of this group to disrupt its crossing over the Don. " However, the 5-I tank army did not fulfill the task assigned to it.

As A. M. Vasilevsky wrote: “The reasons for this were the unsatisfactory organization of the army entering the battle from the army command and the lack of necessary assistance to it from the front means of reinforcement: artillery and aircraft; poor control of tank corps; the extremely weak help and unsatisfactory command and control of the army by the front staff ”.

Modern researchers note that there was little time to prepare and organize a counterattack. Lizyukov was a brave commander who had previously been noted in a number of battles, but did not have enough experience in commanding a large tank group, so the army could not achieve a simultaneous powerful attack by all units. By the time the operation began, only the 7 tank corps of P. A. Rotmistrov assigned to Lizyukov was located from the entire army near the area of ​​forthcoming actions, and he did not have time to concentrate in the source area on time. As a result, the 7 tank corps entered the battle, unable to reconnoiter and concentrate fully. In addition, the entire counterstrike of the 5 Tank Army was based on the initially incorrect assumption that the advancing German tank corps would continue to move east through the Don and Voronezh. However, on July 5, the Army Group Weichs was ordered to release the mobile units of the German 4 Tank Army in the Voronezh region and move them south according to the Blau plan. And 24-th German tank corps was deployed by the command of the army group "Weichs" to the north to cover the main grouping of the 4-th tank army from the north, and so he entered into a counter battle with advancing to the south by the advanced parts of the Soviet 5-th tank army , timely revealing the intentions and anticipating them on the march.

As a result, the Soviet 5-I tank army was advancing "blindly" without intelligence, and, running into the large forces of the enemy, suffered heavy losses. 9, the German division of this kind, met the enemy and, receiving reinforcements from part of the 11 armored division, retorted the Soviet counterstrike. Then the infantry came to replace the German tank divisions and the Soviet offensive was finally stopped. 5-I tank army did not come to the operating room to develop an offensive on Zemlyansk. On July 12, the German mobile units themselves launched a counterattack, and our heavy 11 and 7 tank corps suffered heavy losses during heavy fighting.

The commander Alexander Lizyukov himself fell in battle. In his memoirs, K. K. Rokossovsky wrote about the death of A. I. Lizyukov: “In these battles, the commander of the 5 Tank Army, General Lizyukov, was killed. He moved in the battle formations of one of his units. To inspire the tankers, the general rushed forward on his HF tank, broke into the enemy's position and laid down his head. I was genuinely sorry for him. ”


Padded KV-1

Major General A.I. Lizyukov (center) at a meeting with the officers. Bolshaya Vereika Village, July 1942

Thus, a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the advancing enemy with the aim of disrupting a decisive offensive failed. Due to heavy losses and loss of combat capability, the 5-I tank army was disbanded. However, the 5-I tank army in heavy fighting diverted considerable enemy forces. These few days facilitated the organization of the defense of Voronezh by the forces of the Bryansk Front. The 159-Infantry Division was redeployed near Voronezh. In order to stabilize the situation in the Voronezh direction, the Headquarters decided to divide the Bryansk Front into two separate fronts. Lieutenant-General N. F. Vatutin, deputy chief of the General Staff, became the commander of the troops of the new Voronezh Front. General N. Ye. Chibisov was temporarily appointed commander of the Bryansk Front, then General KK Rokossovsky replaced him.

The troops of the 4 th German tank army of G. Goth advancing on the Voronezh direction reached the headwaters of the Don and broke through to the Voronezh area. Violent battles began outside the city. Halder wrote in his diary from 5 July: “Although at the 3.7 meeting the Führer himself stressed that he didn’t attach any importance to Voronezh and gave the army group the right to refuse to take possession of the city if this could lead to excessive losses, von Bock not only allowed Gota to climb stubbornly to Voronezh, but also supported him in this. " He also noted that the forces of the 24 Tank Division and the Great Germany Division could be seriously depleted when attacking Voronezh, which is well prepared for defense.

The Germans were able to break into the city and capture half of it, but could not build on success. On the bank of the Don, in the area from Zadonsk to Pavlovsk, the defense was occupied by two fresh armies from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (SVG). At the same time, mobile units of the Bryansk Front, redeployed from the right wing of the front to the area south of Yelets, launched a counterattack on the flank and rear of the German group advancing on the Voronezh direction. The German command was forced to remove the 24 tank corps and three infantry divisions from the direction of the main attack, which turned to the north against the counterattacking Soviet forces. The Soviet troops under the command of Vatutin with stubborn defense and strong counterattacks kept the enemy offensive further. Over the next 10 days, fierce fighting continued in the Voronezh region, but the Germans did not break through any further. In general, the confrontation in the Voronezh region lasted until January 1943. Soviet troops performed an important strategic task: they covered Moscow from the south and held down the forces of the Hungarian army, which replaced the German units. 26 January 1943, the day after the liberation of Voronezh, the following lines appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda: “Some day many pages will be written about street fighting in Voronezh. This city fought on its squares and streets for months. The city fought for every quarter, a quarter for every home. ”


German soldiers force Don near Voronezh. End of June 1942

Wehrmacht soldiers in positions near Voronezh


Soviet machine gunners are fighting from the window of a house in Voronezh

Anti-tank crews armed with self-loading anti-tank guns arr. 1941 of the Simonov system (PTRS-41), in a combat position in a destroyed building, under the cover of machine gunners, during the fighting on the southern outskirts of Voronezh

Thus, in the battle for Voronezh, the German troops could not take up. Meanwhile, the capture of this area was an important part of the overall strategic plan of the Wehrmacht offensive in the 1942 summer campaign. The Germans could not reliably cover the northern flank of the whole Army Group South. Overall, however, the success of the German offensive was obvious. The defense of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts was broken through up to 300 km and to a depth of 150-170 km. The Wehrmacht reached the Don, forced it west of Voronezh and captured a large part of the city. The German command launched an operation on the encirclement of Soviet troops west of the Don, in front of the front of the 6 Army. Its strike force, coming out on July 5 in the area of ​​Ostrogozhsk, turned south along the right bank of the Don, making a deep detour from the north of the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front. A blow from the area south of Voronezh was inflicted by the 4-I tank army of Goth.

The enemy command, leaving its 2 Army near Voronezh, turned the 4 Tank Army in the south-east direction to Kantemirovka. At the same time, the 1 Panzer Army of von Kleist from Army Group A, 8, launched an offensive from Slavyansk, Artyomovsk and Starobelsk, and Kantemirovka in July, delivering a second butt against the South-Western and Southern fronts. By the middle of July, the troops of the 6 and 4 tank armies reached the great bend of the Don and occupied Bokovskaya, Morozovsk, Millerovo, Kantemirovka, and the units of the 1 tank armies reached the Kamensk region. “The battle is unfolding in the south ...” General Halder noted in his diary. - on the western sector (Ruoff of the 17 army) the enemy is still holding, there is little success ... The troops of the 1 and 4 tank armies moving from the north reached the Donets near Kamensk. To the north, the enemy is divided into small groups, which are being destroyed by mobile units advancing from the north in cooperation with infantry divisions. ”

The Germans sought to surround and destroy the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts. However, they could not. The Soviet Stavka, having unraveled the plans of the enemy, took measures to withdraw the troops from the threat of encirclement. The troops of the South-Western Front, captured by the Germans from the northeast and east, with heavy fighting retreated over the Don to Stalingrad. The troops of the Southern Front retreated from the Donbass to the lower reaches of the Don in order to occupy a defense along its left bank from Upper Kurmoyarsk to Rostov. It was necessary to save the troops in order to organize the defense on the new frontiers. For this it was necessary to gain time by sacrificing the territory.

It was an expedient decision from a military strategic point of view. Russian warriors traditionally, from the time of the Scythian kingdom, skillfully used huge spaces to stretch enemy communications, prevent the enemy from crushing our troops in the first decisive battles, gaining time to regroup, pull up reserves and at the same time exhausting the enemy's forces with rearguard battles. The enemies understood this. K. Tippelskirch noted: “... the new tactics of the Russians, of course, contributed more to the preservation of their forces than the attempt to defend the vast open area between the Sev rivers, as if specially created for tanks. Donets and Don. "



The Germans continued to develop the offensive and achieved great success. Kleist's 1-I tank army from the Millerovo region turned south - towards Novocherkassk. The 17 Army, having launched an offensive from the Stalino area (Donetsk), July 20 occupied Voroshilovgrad with the left flank, and with the center and the right flank it reached the Don on both sides of Rostov. German troops on the broad front forced the Don in its lower reaches and captured Rostov on July 25. “The whole Russian front was falling apart ...”, - this is how the Swedish journalist Arvid Fredborg, who was in Berlin during the war in Berlin, estimated the situation. Victory mood again captured the German elite. It was then that the German High Command decided that the time had come to seize the Caucasus.

23 July 1942, Adolf Hitler signed directive No. 45 on the continuation of the operation, codenamed "Braunschweig." Army Group "A" received the task of attacking the Caucasus, and the entire 4-I tank army was transferred to its structure. Army Group "B" forces 6-th army had to take Stalingrad. The Directive, in more detail than before, defined the task of seizing Stalingrad and the Caucasus. On the other hand, it was obvious that the German command, after overestimating the successes achieved, believed that favorable conditions had appeared for a simultaneous attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

The German headquarters attached great importance to actions in the Caucasus, a breakthrough to Baku. September 18 1942. Hitler told General Field Marshal Keitel: “The breakthrough to Tuapse and then the blocking of the Georgian Military Highway and the breakthrough to the Caspian Sea are crucial,” he said. Thus, the German High Command decided to advance in two directions: at Stalingrad-Astrakhan and the Caucasus. The main forces were aimed at the Caucasus. To solve the problem of conquering the Caucasus, the 1 and 4 tank, 17 and part of the forces of the 11 field armies were distinguished. The Germans believed that Stalingrad and Astrakhan would be captured by the forces of the same 6 Army even before the withdrawal of the Army Group A troops to the Main Caucasian Ridge. The operations to seize Stalingrad initially attached auxiliary importance; the 6 Army was to provide the northern flank of the attack force, which was advancing on the Caucasus. As a result, the enemy once again underestimated the power of the Red Army and the USSR.

The commander of Army Group South, and then Group B, Fyodor von Bock criticized the fragmentation of Army Group South to the Stalingrad and Caucasus sectors during the summer offensive. 15 July 1942 Field Marshal von Bock was removed from command of Army Group South (the official wording was due to illness) and sent to the Fuhrer reserve. As a result, one of the leading commanders of the Third Reich remained inactive until the end of the war.

True, simultaneously with the development of the offensive on Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the German command decided to tie down Soviet troops in other sectors of the front, to deprive the Red Army of the possibility of maneuvering reserves. To this end, it was planned to conduct a series of offensive operations by part of the forces of the Army Groups North and Center. Army Group "North" in September was to conduct an operation to capture Leningrad. To reinforce this group of troops, it was decided to transfer the main forces of the 11 Army from the Crimea, although they had previously planned to use them in the Caucasus. The general leadership of the operation to seize Leningrad was entrusted to the commander of the German army 11, Manstein. 24 August 1942, at a special meeting with Hitler, he received an order: "The immediate task is to surround Leningrad and establish contact with the Finns, the next task is to seize Leningrad and level it to the ground." Also planned to seize the Murmansk railway.


Germans are ferried across the Don in the center of the occupied Rostov-on-Don

German-induced pontoon ferry in the center of Rostov-on-Don

Tank KV-1 on the market square of Rostov-on-Don. The 1941 model car of the year has a reinforced welded turret of late production series with the 76,2-mm ZIS-5 gun

Results

In the spring and early summer of 1942, the martial law of the USSR deteriorated sharply again. An attempt to break through the blockade of Leningrad with the joint efforts of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts ended in failure. In the course of the Luban operation, surrounded by the main forces of the 2 th shock army. Our troops suffered heavy casualties, many soldiers died, went missing or were captured. Leningrad still remained in the blockade ring. The second capital of the USSR was bombed, shelled, people were dying of hunger and cold. Demyanskaya operation of the North-Western Front also did not lead to success. In the Moscow sector, an important operational strategic base (Vyazma region) was lost in the rear of Army Group Center.

But the most dangerous situation was on the southern flank of the front. German troops seized a strategic initiative. At the front in 600-650 km between Taganrog and Kursk, the Wehrmacht broke through the Soviet front and quickly developed the offensive, trying to surround and destroy the Soviet troops in parts. Under the powerful onslaught of the enemy, who had a great advantage in tanks, aircraft and artillery in the direction of the main attacks, and still maintained superiority in combat skills, the troops of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts retreated from 28 June to 24 July to 150-400 km. However, the German troops could not surround and destroy the Soviet troops west of the Don. The Red Army conducted heavy defensive battles, counterattacked, was forced to retreat, and with its stubborn resistance disrupted the plans of the enemy.

The German stake once again overestimated its strength and underestimated the enemy. Hitler believed that the main tasks of defeating the southern wing of the Red Army were resolved, that only small Soviet forces were able to escape from the encirclement, so you can throw the main forces on the storming of the Caucasus. The cruel enemy attacked, seized vast territories with a large population and material resources. In the USSR, the second wave of evacuation took place: millions of people, huge material assets moved to the east of the country. However, the Soviet Union had a moral and material advantage over a strong enemy, and it gradually began to affect the course of the war.

In such a difficult situation, two great battles of the Great War began: the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus. They largely predetermined the entire subsequent course of the Second World War.

To be continued ...



Application. Directive No. 45. On the continuation of the operation "Braunschweig"

During the campaign, which lasted less than three weeks, the big tasks that I set for the southern wing of the Eastern Front were mostly fulfilled. Only small forces of Tymoshenko’s armies managed to escape from encirclement and reach the southern coast of the r. Don. It should be borne in mind that they will be strengthened by the troops stationed in the Caucasus.

There is a concentration of another enemy grouping in the area of ​​Stalingrad, which he, apparently, is going to defend.

Ii. Tasks for further operations

A. Ground Forces

1. The immediate task of Army Group "A" is to encircle and destroy the enemy forces that left the river. Don, in the area to the south and south-east of Rostov.

To do this, launch large forces of tank and motorized troops from bridgeheads in the Konstantinovskaya and Tsimlyanskaya areas, which must be captured by our troops in advance, in the general direction to the south-west, approximately at Tikhoretsk, and force infantry, chasseurs and mountain divisions to force the Don in the area Rostov

Along with this, the task of the advanced units to straddle the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway remains in force.

Two tank units of Army Group A (including 23 and 24 tank divisions) should be transferred to Army Group B to continue operations in the southeast direction.

The "Great Germany" infantry division should be left in the OKH reserve in the area north of the Don. Prepare to send it to the Western Front.

2. After the destruction of the enemy groupings south of the river. The most important task of Army Group A is to capture the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, as a result of which the enemy will lose the Black Sea ports and the Black Sea Fleet.

To do this, transfer the 11 Army units (the Romanian mountain corps) intended for this task through the Kerch Strait, as soon as the advancement of the main forces of Army Group A is indicated, in order to then strike along the road running along the Black Sea coast to the southeast .

The other group, which will include all the other mountain divisions and chasseurs divisions, has the task to force the r. Kuban and seize the sublime terrain in the area of ​​Maikop and Armavir.

In the course of further advancement of this grouping, which must be promptly strengthened by mountain parts, all its passes will be used in the direction of the Caucasus and through its western part. The task is to engage the forces of the 11 Army in order to capture the Black Sea coast.

3. At the same time, the grouping, which mainly includes tank and motorized formations, singling out part of the forces to secure the flank and pushing them eastward, should seize the Grozny region and part of the forces to cut the Military Ossetian and Georgian Military roads as far as possible on the passes. In conclusion, take a blow along the Caspian Sea to seize the Baku area.

Army Group "A" will be given the Italian Alpine Corps. For these operations, Army Group "A" introduces the coded name "Edelweiss". Security level: Top secret. Only for command.

4. The group of armies "B", as was ordered earlier, falls to the task, along with the equipment of defensive positions on the r. Don strike at Stalingrad and defeat the enemy grouping that was concentrated there, seize the city, and also cut the isthmus between the Don and the Volga and disrupt transportation along the river.

Following this, tank and motorized troops must strike along the Volga with the task of reaching Astrakhan and there also paralyze traffic on the main riverbed of the Volga.

These operations of Army Group B are coded with the name “Fishreier.” Security level: Top secret. Only for command.

B. Aviation

The task of aviation is to first provide large forces with a ferry across the Don, then provide support to the eastern group advancing along the railroad to Tikhoretsk. After that, its main forces should be concentrated to destroy the armies of Tymoshenko. Along with this, it is necessary to render assistance to the offensive of Army Group “B” on Stalingrad and Astrakhan. Of particular importance is the timely destruction of the city of Stalingrad. In addition, one should occasionally raid Astrakhan; the movement of vessels in the lower Volga should be paralyzed by dropping mines.

During the further deployment of operations, the main task of aviation is to interact with troops advancing to the ports of the Black Sea, and, in addition to directly supporting ground forces, it is necessary to prevent the influence of the naval forces of the enemy on the advancing troops, while interacting with the navy.

Further, it is necessary to allocate a sufficient number of forces to interact with the troops striking through Grozny on Baku.

In connection with the decisive importance that the oil industry of the Caucasus has to continue the war, aviation attacks on oil fields and large oil storages, as well as transshipment ports on the Black Sea, are allowed only when it is absolutely necessary for land forces operations. However, in order to deprive the enemy of the possibility of delivering oil from the Caucasus in the near future, it is necessary to destroy the railways used for this purpose, as well as to paralyze transportation through the Caspian Sea.

B. Navy

The task of the Navy, along with the direct support of the ground forces when crossing the Kerch Strait with the forces available in the Black Sea, prevents the enemy from affecting the troops operating on the Black Sea coast from the sea.

To facilitate the supply of ground forces, as soon as possible, transfer several sea ferries across the Strait of Kerch to the Don River.

The headquarters of the naval forces, in addition, take the necessary measures to use light ships of the naval forces in the Caspian Sea to act on the enemy’s sea lanes (transports with oil and communication with the Anglo-Saxons in Iran).

III.

The operations, to which preparations are now being conducted on sections of the front of the Army Groups Center and North, must be carried out quickly one after another. In this way, the dismemberment of the enemy forces and the fall in the morale of its commanding staff and troops will be largely ensured.

Army Group North to the beginning of September to prepare the seizure of Leningrad. The operation receives the code name "Foyertsauber." To do this, transfer to the army group five divisions of the 11 Army, along with heavy artillery and special power artillery, as well as other necessary units of the reserve of the main command.

Two German and two Romanian divisions temporarily remain in the Crimea; The 22 Division, as previously ordered, is sent to the commander of the forces of the south-east.

IV.

When developing plans on the basis of this directive and its transfer to other instances, as well as issuing orders and instructions related to it, follow my order from 12.7 on keeping secrets.

Adolf Gitler
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  1. +4
    6 February 2017 06: 05
    After the defeat of the Germans near MOSCOW in 1941, Stalin sought to accelerate the defeat of the Germans in an orderly manner, not taking into account the condition of the Red Army and the German troops ... the enemy was still very strong and could not be taken abruptly.
    Under RZHEV our troops were bogged down tightly and for a long time and here Stalin's hasty plans to capture KHARKOV ... still the Supreme was mistaken, sometimes with tragic consequences for hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army
    1. +2
      6 February 2017 09: 41
      and then Stalin’s hasty plans to capture KHARKOV are the memory of the loss of Poland in 15g (and the fate of the Romanov dynasty) —– to return the Ukrainian SSR government to its capital.
      1. +4
        6 February 2017 10: 27
        In 1942, the UN and the participation in its establishment of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR were not yet discussed. The capital of the Ukrainian SSR since 1934 was Kiev. Although de facto Kharkov also performed the capital's functions.
        1. 0
          6 February 2017 12: 53
          Everything was. When did Hitler put Bandera to the camp? before that, the Kochlak card also played out! Now, now 25 years have lived peacefully and raised "friends." and then they all the more understood the purpose of Ukrainian nationalism. They hurried in the struggle for the minds of Ukrainians to occupy territory.
    2. +1
      6 February 2017 10: 13
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      .. all the same, the Supreme sometimes erred with tragic consequences for hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army

      What are you? Some hard-faced comrades will trample you here, proving that only Marshals generals were mistaken, and not the Supreme ....
      1. +11
        6 February 2017 12: 11
        1. The author of the article (?) Raised too many questions for coverage in ONE article.
        2. At times, events are evaluated superficially.
        3. The successes and failures of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army are considered "from the words" of the authors "memoirs smoothed after the war."
        4. The tragedy of the 5th tank Lizyukova is shown without detailed analysis - emotions prevail.
        Hack and predictor Aviator : Too much, too lame.
        1. +6
          6 February 2017 20: 14
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          At times, events are evaluated superficially.

          But literally intelligible and exciting. For the bulk and children above the roof, but for specialists there are other sources. The Samsonov’s case does the right thing - it interests the masses.
          P.S. Hi Ilyich! hi
          1. +3
            6 February 2017 21: 19
            Quote: Ingvar 72
            Hi Ilyich!

            Hi, Igor!
            hi
            For children's stories and horror stories like "... drunk Hitler machine gunners with their sleeves rolled up went on the attack to their full height ..." there are other sites, publications.
            Yes. The author is trying. But this article can be safely divided into 2 or 3 parts to study the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht, at least on a temporary basis.
            And in conclusion, the author (Samsonov) sheds avaricious male tears about the 2nd Shock, recalls the failure of Leningrad and others.
            "Impossible to embrace the immensity" - author unknown... laughing
            1. 0
              7 February 2017 12: 28
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Quote: Ingvar 72
              Hi Ilyich!

              Hi, Igor!
              hi
              For children's stories and horror stories like "... drunk Hitler machine gunners with their sleeves rolled up went on the attack to their full height ..." there are other sites, publications.
              Yes. The author is trying. But this article can be safely divided into 2 or 3 parts to study the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht, at least on a temporary basis.
              And in conclusion, the author (Samsonov) sheds avaricious male tears about the 2nd Shock, recalls the failure of Leningrad and others.
              "Impossible to embrace the immensity" - author unknown... laughing

              But you can try to shove the inedible! wassat
            2. +2
              10 February 2017 21: 24
              The author of the aphorism is Kozma Prutkov.
              1. 0
                11 February 2017 10: 48
                Quote: zenion
                Kozma Prutkov
                This is a collective image.
      2. +5
        6 February 2017 23: 43
        And what, Stalin was a superman, could be everywhere at once and know everything about everything? Did he make decisions on the basis of reports and reports from officials and intelligence services, or was it that all your generals and marshals were against the operation near Kharkov in the spring of 42, and he alone rested and insisted on carrying it out contrary to the opinion of the "unmistakable" generals and marshals?
    3. 0
      10 February 2017 21: 23
      Childhood. Stalin, and generally any commander, acts according to reports received from the fronts.
  2. +3
    6 February 2017 07: 29
    S. Shtemenko recalls that during the war the front commander Golikov often reported distorted information to the Headquarters. “In these days of the most acute development of events on the Voronezh Front, it turned out to be impossible to compose an objective picture based on the reports of Golikov” (S. Shtemenko, General Staff during the war. M., 1968. P. 109).
  3. +8
    6 February 2017 07: 38
    Interesting photo (6th photo), German armor-piercer with PTR Panzerbüchse Modell 1938 PzВ 38/39.
    1. +1
      6 February 2017 08: 11
      Yes, the Germans are well armed ... a group based on the light machine gun, armor, and infantryman.
      1. +4
        6 February 2017 10: 15
        The anti-tank rifle in the rifle company was one to platoon - in the middle of 42 - mainly for psychological support. Against the KV and T-34, it, with its caliber of -7,92, practically "did not work."
        This is the position of the department -11 people + armor-piercing.
        On the left - most likely the commander in the rank of sergeant-major - just his position.
        1. +4
          7 February 2017 04: 59
          funny, but light Soviet tanks in the middle of the 42 year somewhere already evaporated? in 42 year there were more than 34ok and KV combined ...
  4. +12
    6 February 2017 08: 58
    1942 is the most difficult year for the USSR, it is harder than 1941, as it was already “sudden” that it was impossible to explain something. Our command overestimated our strengths, abilities and capabilities, as a result of which the COUNTRY found itself on the very edge of the CATASTROPHE ... How our people were able to turn the tide ... This is not explainable. May God grant us to preserve this property of a national character and not exchange it for "money"
    1. +6
      6 February 2017 12: 16
      Quote: svp67
      Our command overestimated our strengths, abilities and capabilities

      The successes or failures of one of the howling parties depend on the amount of information received and analyzed about the state of affairs in the enemy camp.
      Debriefing should begin with the data of ALL types of intelligence of the General Staff.
      Personally, I am not inclined to criticize whole general of the Red Army. The Red Army fought as the Wehrmacht, OKH allowed it. And vice versa.
      1. +2
        6 February 2017 12: 22
        Quote: stalkerwalker
        Personally, I am not inclined to criticize the entire generals of the Red Army. The Red Army fought as the Wehrmacht, OKH allowed it. And vice versa.

        There is already a question? If you fight as your opponent allows you, and not as you need, then what STRATEGIC OPERATIONS can we talk about? The trouble is that our High Command did not understand this. And those who understood, could not convey their "concepts" and when planning and conducting this operation did not think about how to act if "something went wrong." Or rather, our command did not have enough knowledge and understanding, how MUCH it can go WRONG.
        1. +4
          6 February 2017 12: 38
          Quote: svp67
          There is already a question? If you fight as your opponent allows you, and not as you need, then what STRATEGIC OPERATIONS can we talk about? The trouble is that our High Command did not understand this. And those who understood, could not convey their "concepts" and when planning and conducting this operation did not think about how to act if "something went wrong" ...

          The generals of the Red Army during the war practically did not change. There were only castling.
          As an exception, the fate of Commander Pavlov. In the future, commanders of this level were not scattered.
          Well .... If the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow in December of the 41st is difficult to attribute to strategic operations, then the battle at the approaches to Stalingrad, in the streets of Stalingrad, and most importantly - the often overlooked continuous attacks on the "ground bridge" of the 6th Army Paulus troops of the Don Front, with subsequent operations "Uranus" and "Small Saturn", have every right to be called that because carried out in parallel with the operation "Mars".
          Quote: svp67
          Or rather, our command lacked knowledge and understanding

          A strategic initiative - the key to dominance on the Eastern Front, was in German hands until mid-1943.
          1. 0
            6 February 2017 12: 50
            the fate of Commander Pavlov.
            and Vlasov
          2. +8
            6 February 2017 19: 02
            "The generals of the Red Army during the war practically did not change. There were only castling" ///

            The General Staff has changed. The stupid Zhukov was finally expelled at the end of 1942. The talented, calm Vasilevsky scored sensible people. Antonov, others. And strategic planning began, and not frontal attacks "to the last soldier" ...
            1. +6
              6 February 2017 21: 23
              Quote: voyaka uh
              The stupid Zhukov was finally expelled at the end of 1942

              How cleverly to criticize K. Zhukov after more than 70 years ....
              The career of Komkor Zhukov may not be liked by anyone.
              But many victories of the Red Army are associated with his name.
              And it was not for nothing that the IVF entrusted him with an advance payment in November 1944 to the 1st Belorussian.
              The same Konev next to Zhukov looks pale.
              1. +5
                6 February 2017 22: 50
                Zhukov received the nickname “Butcher” from soldiers, not from Internet readers, and not 70 years later, but right in 42 after the “Rzhevskaya massacre”.
                1. +4
                  7 February 2017 00: 16
                  What, personally communicated with the soldiers who were sitting in the trenches near Rzhev? Probably for every soldier who fell into the midst of a bloody battle, and from whom he was lucky to get out alive among the few, the big bosses are "butchers."
                  1. +3
                    7 February 2017 11: 05
                    "Probably for every soldier who fell into the heat of a bloody battle, and from whom
                    he was lucky to get out alive among the few, the big bosses are “butchers." ////

                    No. Of the generals, only Zhukov earned such a nickname, although there were many bloody battles. Rokossovsky, on the contrary, was called "caring," although he gave orders for offensives no less than Zhukov.
                    1. +3
                      8 February 2017 17: 43
                      voyaka uh that would not be soft to say a dreamer, can you facts about the nickname Zhukov? Or will you jump as always! lol
                      1. 0
                        28 March 2017 15: 36
                        can the facts about the nickname Zhukov?


                        In my youth I heard from then still living people who had fought on the front and remained alive. It was almost none of them in the 70s, and in the 80s only with stripes or in popes.
                2. +5
                  7 February 2017 10: 32
                  Quote: voyaka uh
                  Zhukov received the nickname “Butcher” from soldiers, not from Internet readers, and not 70 years later, but right in 42 after the “Rzhevskaya massacre”.

                  Lesha .....
                  Do not disappoint .....
                  And do not read in the morning rezun, Beshanov and other pharmacists ....
            2. +2
              7 February 2017 12: 25
              Quote: voyaka uh
              The stupid Zhukov was finally expelled at the end of 1942

              Well, yes, you, the strategic genius, know better how dumb he is. Have you even reached the rank of corporal, strategist?
              Zhukov was the chief of the General Staff from January to July 1941.
              You cannot issue a single message without intestinal-acoustic phenomena.
            3. +1
              14 February 2017 14: 42
              Quote: voyaka uh
              The General Staff has changed. The stupid Zhukov was finally expelled at the end of 1942. The talented, calm Vasilevsky scored sensible people.


              The beginning of the headquarters gene should not only have an academic background and experience in commanding troops, but also a talented strategist and administrator. Well, Zhukov did not have the necessary academic knowledge, and as an organizer and leader, he did not fit the position of Nach General Staff.
              1. 0
                28 March 2017 15: 38
                Well, Zhukov did not have the necessary academic knowledge, and as an organizer and leader, he did not fit the position of Nach General Staff.


                If you are interested in googling someone and find the characteristic that Rukosovsky gave Zhukov (he was then subordinate to him), the official characteristic being a personal matter, with a conclusion to the headquarters, it’s not suitable for work.
                To be precise, here is an excerpt, otherwise they’ll accuse the devil of what
                Here is the characteristic that G. Zhukov gave to his immediate superior K. Rokossovsky on November 8, 1930:

                “Certification of the commander of the 2nd cavalry brigade of the 7th Samara cavalry division Zhukov PK.
                Strong will. Resolute. It has a rich initiative and skillfully applies it in practice. Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in their requirements. By nature, a little dry and not sensitive enough. It has a significant share of stubbornness. Painfully proud. Militarily prepared well. Has a great practical team experience. He loves and constantly improves military affairs. The presence of abilities for further growth is noticeable. It’s authoritative ... It can be used to advantage for the post of pomkomdiv or commander of a mechanical connection ... It cannot be appointed to staff and teaching work - it organically hates it. "
    2. +2
      6 February 2017 17: 07
      Quote: svp67
      ... How our people were able to turn the tide ...

      - it’s known how - planting a beachhead-bridgehead in Stalingrad to a rifle division every day, thus increasing the remnants of the army daily to an incomplete battalion per night, and already biting into broken brick by incomplete assault groups, expanding the bridgehead ...
      1. +6
        6 February 2017 17: 23
        Quote: lubesky
        known as - landing on a piece of coast-bridgehead in Stalingrad to the infantry division every day,

        Can you confirm this or acknowledge that this is your fantasy?
        1. +2
          7 February 2017 02: 02
          Quote: svp67
          Quote: lubesky
          known as - landing on a piece of coast-bridgehead in Stalingrad to the infantry division every day,

          Can you confirm this or acknowledge that this is your fantasy?

          I do not get tired of being amazed by people like you. They take the phrase out of context and get clever - prove it, a dreamer. And to read what exactly I give comments poorly? It is clear that no one drove into the city every day a division of the whole. A man writes - how our people broke the Stalingrad battle, which was so unfortunate for us. I’m talking about the crucial end of September, when Chuikov’s army was divided into two. Teach the materiel - on a narrow bridgehead, coastline, under the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in aviation and constant fire for a week, the divisions of Rodimtsev, Batyuk, Gorishny, General Smekhotovoy, the Batrakov brigade, several thousand infantrymen to replenish Chuyenko, and part of Andryus, were planted with battle replenishment of support units - and all this in the period from September 21 to 29, for 8 days under hurricane fire of the enemy on the water, on the shore and in ruins !!!
          Here at the cost of such losses and broke! If people like you do not snatch phrases out of context. These are not my fantasies, but the bloody and heroic pages of the history of my homeland. And your imagination has probably led you to the idea that in a few months half of the Red Army was landed in the city ???)))
          1. +1
            7 February 2017 07: 02
            lubesky and give specific numbers about half the composition of the Red Army landed on the bridgehead! belay fantasize not tossing bags! laughing
            1. 0
              7 February 2017 16: 22
              I didn’t say this - read it again
              1. +1
                8 February 2017 17: 46
                my friend voyaka uh copied from your post “Here, at the cost of such losses, they turned it over! If people like you don’t snatch phrases out of context. These are not my fantasies, but bloody and heroic pages of the history of my Motherland. for several months in the city landed half of the Red Army ???))) "lodges do not decorate a man!
                1. +1
                  9 February 2017 19: 40
                  Quote: Uncle Murzik
                  And your imagination has probably led you to the idea that in a few months half of the Red Army’s composition was landed in the city ???))) "lodges do not decorate a man!

                  Read the proposal again, in this proposal I do not approve the transfer of half the composition of the Red Army, on the contrary, I call it fantasy in the logic of man.
                  You are not the ability to understand what you read in your native language does not decorate ...
                  1. 0
                    9 February 2017 20: 31
                    lubesky I'm sorry, I did not understand! hi
          2. +3
            8 February 2017 14: 56
            Quote: lubesky
            I do not get tired of being amazed by people like you.

            By me, his words have not been taken out of some sort of “context”. This is a fully formulated FALSE idea, which I asked to either CONFIRM with figures, facts, that is, on which his statements are based or admit that he LIED, or at least got excited.
            You can’t just turn history around and consider yourself offended, because you were not understood.
            Well, let's figure it out ....
            Quote: lubesky
            in the period from September 21 to 29, for 8 days

            Let's start in order
            Quote: lubesky
            divisions of Rodimtsev
            This is the 13th Guards Rifle Division. And the interesting is already beginning. We read about her BATTLE WAY:
            in the evening on September 14 The 13th Guards Rifle Division, the day before this had been urgently transferred to the area of ​​Central Akhtuba, concentrated in the area of ​​the Krasnaya Sloboda marinas.
            [/ i] ALREADY WEEK BEFORE your specified date
            [i] Towards midnight, the 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment of Colonel Ivan Petrovich Elin began to cross.

            During the night from September 14 to 15, in addition to the 42nd Guards.SP, the 34th Guards.SP of Rodimtsev’s division (commander Lt. Col. Dmitry Panikhin) managed to cross .... At 10:00 the division’s headquarters and its division commander , on the way the Germans fired at an armored car from the seized building of the State Bank, injured a division engineer.

            On September 16, the 39th Guards Regiment of S. S. Dolgov crossed over in the factory part of Stalingrad

            So, since September 15, this division has actively participated in battles ... YOU ALREADY LIED.
            Quote: lubesky
            Father

            This is the 284th Infantry Division, indeed on the night of September 21, began the transfer to the Stalingrad bridgehead ....
            Quote: lubesky
            Horishny
            This is the 95th rifle division ... Again LIES
            At night September 18-19 in the city of Stalingrad the 90th and 161st rifle regiments, the 97th OIPTD, the 96th combat engineer battalion and the division headquarters crossed over.

            Quote: lubesky
            Ludicrous
            This is the 193rd Infantry Division. Yes, indeed, she was transferred to the Stalingrad bridgehead on September 26 and 27, 1942.
            Quote: lubesky
            Batrakov team
            This is the 92nd rifle brigade. Lying again. The brigade is already on September 18 fought in Stalingrad ...

            And you again say that I TAKE it out of some context that is known only to you. Lying is not necessary. You see.
            1. 0
              9 February 2017 19: 37
              How does your thoughtless copying from Wikipedia convict me of a lie? And what is such a lie?
              The difference in Wikipedia in two three days somehow changes the essence of my post, which you accused of lying? Or maybe you will deny the landing of two more guard divisions in early October? daily landing of such forces on a small bridgehead does not affect my first post ??? You are lying, not me. Unlike you, I do not use Wikipedia, but for example the memoirs of General Chuikov, but it seems to you very difficult, it is easier to google Wikipedia.

              Quote: svp67
              This is the 95th rifle division ... Again LIES
              On the night of September 18-19, the 90th and 161st rifle regiments, the 97th Special Operations Regiment, the 96th combat engineer battalion, and the division headquarters crossed into Stalingrad.

              copy the wiki well, at least bother to read it to the end - the remainder of the division crossed later)))
              Here is a simple example of your lies. Well, you didn’t find other parts on Wikipedia and didn’t even dispute
            2. 0
              9 February 2017 19: 42
              Quote: svp67
              And you again say that I TAKE it out of some context that is known only to you. Lying is not necessary. You see.

              Of course, they snatched it out - taking phrases out of context, like you, also parasitize on the forum.
              1. 0
                10 February 2017 16: 34
                Quote: lubesky
                Of course, they snatched it out - taking phrases out of context, like you, also parasitize on the forum.

                And that's all you can justify YOUR LIES ...?
                1. 0
                  10 February 2017 16: 53
                  Quote: svp67
                  And that's all you can justify YOUR LIES ...?

                  I didn’t lie, you even partially confirmed the rate of landing in the period I indicated, well, because of your ability to copy Wikipedia. Learn the mate part and gradually you will no longer want to argue with people out of the blue.
                  Well, do you feel ashamed at least for Wikipedia or do you continue to persist in your “deep” knowledge of the military paths of divisions on Wikipedia?
                  1. 0
                    10 February 2017 19: 30
                    Quote: lubesky
                    I didn’t lie, you even partially confirmed the rate of landing in the period I indicated, well, because of your ability to copy Wikipedia.

                    Dear, you only know how to blame others for your sins ...
                    Quote: lubesky
                    Learn the mate part and gradually you will no longer want to argue with people out of the blue.

                    With people who know the material well, it’s YES, but with people like you who just know how to “pull facts by the ears”, I don’t even want to.
                    Quote: lubesky
                    Well, do you feel ashamed at least for Wikipedia or do you continue to persist in your “deep” knowledge of the military paths of divisions on Wikipedia?

                    Then you prove to me what and where I said wrong. Work a little bit with the materials ....
                  2. 0
                    10 February 2017 20: 32
                    Quote: lubesky
                    I didn’t lie, you even partially confirmed the rate of disembarkation during the period indicated by me,

                    Here the keyword is PARTLY. You grabbed some kind of information and did not go deep.
                    At this, as you say, the pace of ANYTHING supernatural. German troops did not just find themselves in Stalingrad. After the defeat of the Southwestern Front, in our STRATEGIC battle formations, that is, at the front level there was a "hole." Where the German troops and "surged". And we just had nothing to close it. An incomplete division was put up against a couple of German divisions at best, which immediately broke up. And it turned out that not only could they not saturate the defense, the question also arose of how to replace the destroyed division. Slightly the situation was discharged when the main directions of the German offensives became clear. The main reserves went there.
                    As for Stalingrad. So this transfer was caused by the need to repel the next German assault, when it became clear that the city could not be held. As a result, some of the troops that began to be assembled for a counterattack had to be urgently transferred to the city, and then transported to our bridgeheads.
                    But such build-ups were not daily.
                    1. +1
                      12 February 2017 00: 26
                      Quote: svp67
                      At this, as you say, the pace of ANYTHING supernatural.

                      Then read my very first post again - the man said how our people. with such leadership errors in this battle I was able to turn the tide - I wrote about the rate of landing - the moment and method of turning.
                      Thoroughly read the first post and your last comment and it may come to you that they just “got to the bottom” of me and there was no outright lies from me. From September 21 to October 1, the rate of crossing in the aggregate of transported units and replenishment troops REALLY amounted in number to the infantry DIVISION every night on AVERAGE. There were nights and days when the enemy’s aviation and artillery simply arranged a boiling cauldron from the Volga, it was not always possible to physically redirect refill but count on average and get about those numbers. And if you consider DIVISIONS, and not the number BEFORE SHOOT DIVISION in the indicated period - you simply belittle the PRICE that we paid for the fracture in those days, consequently, to prove our case to me - we belittle the feat of thousands and thousands of our grandfathers who gave their lives in those days, on the Volga and on its shore, up to 3 km in the depths of the city ... Your persistence is precisely in the number of divisions as units - so count, even the sub-sectional rate for such a period turns out to be slow, do not you think ??? I have nothing more to tell you, I’m tired of responding to your provocations.
                      1. 0
                        12 February 2017 08: 43
                        Quote: lubesky
                        I have nothing more to tell you, I’m tired of responding to your provocations.

                        You are a strange person. You have something, to put it mildly, "blindness."
                        Are you tired"? I understand you, every time getting a "rake on the head", this is not nice. Can you stop stepping on them?
                        Take your last comment. You again, with enviable persistence "on the same rake, but with a run"
                        Quote: lubesky
                        From September 21 to October 1

                        I just proved to you, on the basis of historical references from Soviet divisions, that this period is GREATER. The transfer of troops to repel a German attack on the city began on the night of September 14-15. The 13th Guards began its operations. You came up against the date of September 21 ... Already, it shows that you poorly evaluate the material. Further. If you carefully read in what TIMELS our divisions were transferred, it turns out that this happened in two stages. Simply put, in TWO nights and more than two regiments per night were not transferred. Again, NOT DIVISION FOR NIGHT, but only part of it. Not only that, if you read carefully about that battle, you should have known that the divisions were not completely redeployed. Artillery remained on the "mainland". It means already, even in two nights the incomplete division was transferred.
                        Quote: lubesky
                        Your perseverance is precisely in the number of divisions as formations - so count, even the sub-divisionally fast pace for such a period does not seem to you ???

                        It’s quite ordinary. The Germans removed part of their troops from the flanks and, building up their strength, threw them to capture the city. And their success was clearly evident; in some places they went out to the river. Accordingly, our command was forced to respond. After all, most of the deployed divisions were not originally planned for fighting there. They began to accumulate for counterattack. But the situation has changed and had to act on the situation.
    3. +3
      7 February 2017 11: 31
      Our command overestimated our strengths, abilities and capabilities, as a result of which the COUNTRY found itself on the very edge of the CATASTROPHE ...


      Yes, my grandfather fought in 121 TBR, so when I decided to look all the way for this TBR (my grandfather died on 27.10.42) from the Kharkov operation, I turned over a lot of documents before the death. So I learned the most terrible information from the front-line reports to the front headquarters (by the way they are freely available) which were submitted once a week. There, without comment, the actions of the brigade were revealed and who commanded how and where and the results of the action. Attacks without concentration of the main forces, attacks on the enemy’s anti-tank units on the forehead without the support of infantry and artillery (and in summer the Germans concentrated the most powerful anti-tank artillery on this front, reinforced by battles of 41 years) were a common occurrence, due to the lack of infantry and attempts to stop the enemy that had broken through .
      So I got the opinion (possibly controversial) that the command staff (and the higher one) just didn’t learn to fight then. And hang everything on Stalin, so Sorry, I didn’t give these orders for such attacks, well, except for order No. 227.
  5. +3
    6 February 2017 09: 10
    Thanks so much for the article. It seems to be known, but interesting.
    Somewhat off topic.
    This Saturday, National Geographic caught the film "The Strange Second World War. Hitler's Mad Men" about the massive use by the Nazis of pervitin (methamphetamine) at the beginning of World War II. It is clear that this is a search for excuses about failures in 1939-40, but it also projects some information about the successes of the Nazis at the beginning of the Second World War. It costs a lot to defeat an enemy pumped with methamphetamine.

    On 20: 10 an interesting interview with a German pilot.
  6. +7
    6 February 2017 09: 47
    JV Stalin in his address to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front on June 26, 1942 noted that the Kharkov operation ended in disaster throughout the Southwestern Front. He compared this catastrophe by its negative results with the tragedy of Samsonov’s army in the First World War

    What Samsonov’s army is there! And losses by an order of magnitude are large and a strategic catastrophe with a retreat to the Volga and the Caucasus is not comparable in the East Prutskii retreat.
    The Supreme noted: “If we informed the country in its entirety about that disaster - with the loss of 18-20 divisions that the front survived and continues to experience, I’m afraid that with you would have done very cool.

    But the country was presented with another document, Order 227, and completely different culprits of the catastrophe were named there:
    What are we missing?
    Not enough order and discipline in companies, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our homeland.
    You can’t tolerate further commanders, commissars, political workers whose units and formations arbitrarily leave combat positions. You can’t tolerate further when commanders, commissars, political workers allow several alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, to drag other fighters into the retreat and open the front to the enemy.


    And not a word about the true culprits of the disaster. The soldiers, on the other hand, did not fight worse than at the end of 1941, and they were not to blame for the Kharkov disaster and the retreat to the Volga.
    1. +2
      6 February 2017 17: 15
      [quote = Olgovich] [quote]
      But the country was presented with another document, Order 227, and completely different culprits of the disaster were named there: [/ quote]
      Well, you give, but certainly not "dear comrades" from the top and from the inner circle of the "great strategist" to blame. They should understand that ordinary soldiers are to blame. You for such reflections before the war as "not oriented in the situation" would have pinned)))
    2. +4
      6 February 2017 20: 28
      "And not a word about the true culprits of the disaster." ///

      Well ... Stalin could not say: "I am guilty, I will resign. Let the other leadership wage war" ...
    3. +3
      6 February 2017 21: 37
      Quote: Olgovich
      And not a word about the true culprits of the disaster


      You think that the kind, soft-bodied Stalin laughing pity them? Just by that time, Stalin already knew perfectly well that he had no other marshals and generals (and if he did, it was no better than these)!
      Although, of course, it’s a pity that Khrushchev am then they didn’t shoot ...
    4. +2
      7 February 2017 07: 11
      my friend Olgovich, and the intensity of the war was greater than in the First World War, the eastern front was secondary! even one fact speaks about this during the entire PM war captured two German generals! if in the first world war the armies had the same equipment as in the second, the German armies would probably have stopped behind the Urals, and in principle the Germans would not have gone far from Petersburg! The USSR fought against almost all of Europe almost alone until 1944, and won!
  7. 0
    6 February 2017 11: 38
    If the turn of tank armies is a mistake that the Germans, in principle, could correct, then sending the 11th army to Leningrad is incredible stupidity, for which the Germans paid in full
  8. +13
    6 February 2017 12: 29
    shells from the first photo seemed to burst shells - the “apple” of the machine gun fell out. And my great-grandfather died in the 42nd near Voronezh. A blessed memory to him and to all of them, those who died for our Motherland. soldier
  9. +1
    6 February 2017 17: 42
    it was interesting to read the article, and the photos are interesting ...
  10. +6
    6 February 2017 17: 57
    Apparently, the whole elite of military science has gathered here, who can only glance at the globe and accurately and skillfully plan at least a strategic, at least an operational-strategic company (operation). It is a pity that many of the experts present here were not next to Stalin. You would have looked and in 42 won the war
    1. +3
      6 February 2017 20: 45
      Quote: Just a human
      Apparently, the whole elite of military science has gathered here, who can only glance at the globe and accurately and skillfully plan at least a strategic, at least an operational-strategic company (operation). It is a pity that many of the experts present here were not next to Stalin. You would have looked and in 42 won the war

      True comrade. Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side. We know this today, where, which army turned, where the main blow was aimed. And try to make a decision in the face of uncertainty. With such a pressure from the German troops, battalion or regimental reconnaissance could not help much, and the "shtirlits" appeared only in post-war cinema.
    2. MrK
      +2
      6 February 2017 23: 35
      Quote: Just a human
      You’d already look and in 42, we won the war

      Thank you colleague. And not one of the couch marshals, especially from Israel, remembered that the Kharkov operation had begun after Khrushchev and the famous marshal convinced Stalin that they would be there for the Germans to shine for two times.
  11. +1
    6 February 2017 18: 46
    With the death of General Lizyukov, it is incomprehensible: in the 90s, information flashed in the media that he realized about the defeat of the army and was afraid of Stalin who was looking for death.
    In childhood, I heard the hints of the elders that all these failures were the betrayal of someone from the headquarters of the SWF. But Khrushchev after the Second World War it was profitable to hide everything in the far corner: cast a shadow on the party
    1. +4
      6 February 2017 21: 31
      Quote: Monarchist
      With the death of General Lizyukov, it is incomprehensible: in the 90s, information flashed in the media that he realized about the defeat of the army and was afraid of Stalin who was looking for death.

      If without details, then the 5th Tank ran into the same "surprise" as the 5th Guards Tank Tank a year later near Prokhorovka.
      Panzerwaffen aerial reconnaissance (and the Wehrmacht as a whole) worked well. So the 5th Tank was burned up in fruitless attempts to knock down the German anti-tank missile from positions without air support and artillery fire from enemy artillery.
  12. +5
    6 February 2017 19: 06
    Alexander, usually your articles cheer you up and good events are immediately recalled. After reading the article, it becomes sad. It would be possible to show the stable position of the Karelian Front., The successful defense of Leningrad and even the introduction of a radio station in the city of Far East, which began to broadcast fair news on Berlin. From this news, Hitler nearly had paralysis. Moreover, after your article, we added news about the Bandera Center, in which everyone lies to our children.
    Next to my laboratory at NII-33 was a laboratory for landing systems. One very talented engineer worked there (he forgot his name, and his name was Alexei Ivanovich). He told us to young boys how they got out of the encirclement near Kharkov in 1942. There was a head wound, hero. We respected him. I have the honor.
    1. +2
      7 February 2017 11: 21
      "It would be possible to show the stable position of the Karelian front., Successful defense of Leningrad" ////

      Karelsky - of course, stable. The Finns reached their 1940 border and stopped.

      And near Leningrad was the Nevsky Piglet - 100,000 corpses for a useless piece of land that had no strategic value, an example of hopeless dullness of command. And the "death fields" on the Volkhov front with mountains of corpses above human height (at the same time
      with zero result). .... 1942 sad
      1. +4
        7 February 2017 12: 15
        Again you are in a puddle. You sit on the net, well, look at least at the tops of the history of the issue, so that it is not so fluid.
        In 1940, the border was established beyond Vyborg, approximately where it is now; and never the border with Finland passed through Svir.
        The Finns stopped because there was nobody and nothing to go on with - ambitions were big, the country was small, which they showed later, cutting off what was needed and taking indemnities.
  13. +1
    6 February 2017 20: 10
    we were lucky at 42 again "corporal" intervened in the command and control of the troops .. again, the offensive was led by the offensive .. sided fired .. it’s scary to imagine that if the troops of Group A hadn’t stomped into the Caucasus mountains and turned along the plains of the middle Volga. the Volga could easily be cut .. from the tank the oil would not have passed ..
    1. +3
      6 February 2017 23: 52
      Quote: tiaman.76
      Corporal "intervened in the command and control ..

      Yes, he pushed von Bock on time. The Ordnung is not an Ordnung, but there was no consensus as such in the German generals. Yes, and the undercover fight was waged with might and main, and there was enough intrigue. Since 1942, many "conquerors of Europe", the authors of the early victories of the Wehrmacht, began to "go into circulation" ... Until the "solstice" was half a year ...
  14. +2
    6 February 2017 21: 03
    The Kingdom of heaven! To those who perished ... NATO is on our borders ... and we are not (dumb word) ... unprepared for war ...
  15. +2
    7 February 2017 00: 07
    Quote: tiaman.76
    we were lucky at 42 again "corporal" intervened in the command and control of the troops .. again, the offensive was led by the offensive .. sided fired .. it’s scary to imagine that if the troops of Group A hadn’t stomped into the Caucasus mountains and turned along the plains of the middle Volga. the Volga could easily be cut .. from the tank the oil would not have passed ..

    “Yes, if only,” but what, only Soviet generals had the right to make mistakes, but not the German command? But what would happen if the Soviet command did not make so many tragic mistakes, which were sometimes worse than crimes, in border battles in the summer of 41? Probably, it would have been necessary to retreat anyway, the superiority of experience would have made itself felt, but not with such losses and not to Moscow, and there would definitely not have been a battle of Stalingrad.
    1. +1
      7 February 2017 00: 20
      we had tragic mistakes, and strategic Hitler made Stalin, at least he didn’t push the generals yet, but he listened
    2. +6
      7 February 2017 10: 38
      Quote: Svidetel 45
      But what would happen if the Soviet command did not make so many tragic mistakes, which were sometimes worse than crimes, in border battles in the summer of 41?

      In order not to be unfounded, I advise you to read a very good book by A. Isaev, "The Great Patriotic Alternative."
      There, the author popularly explains that the USSR had no chance of conducting a border battle with a better result. And as a conclusion - the Red Army fought with dignity and courage. And all this with the underdevelopment of armies and non-mobilization.
      1. +3
        7 February 2017 22: 27
        Quote: stalkerwalker
        Quote: Svidetel 45
        But what would happen if the Soviet command did not make so many tragic mistakes, which were sometimes worse than crimes, in border battles in the summer of 41?

        In order not to be unfounded, I advise you to read a very good book by A. Isaev, "The Great Patriotic Alternative."
        There, the author popularly explains that the USSR had no chance of conducting a border battle with a better result. And as a conclusion - the Red Army fought with dignity and courage. And all this with the underdevelopment of armies and non-mobilization.

        "... he clarifies popularly ...", this is only one of many opinions, Isaev, with all due respect to him, is still not a true last resort, many opinions can be cited that confirm the opposite, as an example, relatively successful actions Red Army in the southern and northern sectors of the front, and the point is not only that. that these were secondary directions for the German command. It was the catastrophe in Belarus that led to such tragic, disastrous consequences for the entire further course of the war of the period 41-42, and it was precisely the miscalculations or criminal negligence of the district command that were the basis of this tragedy, there is a lot of reasoned evidence for it, the requirements of the directives were practically not fulfilled GS from June 18, and even more so from June 22. Requirements not to succumb to provocations, did not mean not to be ready to repel an attack, meant that it was necessary to leave aviation under attack at airfields, not to withdraw units and formations from permanent deployment points, not to increase the reliability of communications and control, not to disperse material supplies and much other that was provided for by the directives and that could be displayed on their own initiative. Where the command was thinking primarily about its duty, and not about its career, as Admiral Kuznetsov, there, units and subunits quite successfully and worthily met the enemy.

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