Military Review

How the German army broke through to Stalingrad

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How the German army broke through to Stalingrad

Defining the tasks of the further offensive on the Stalingrad direction, the German High Command, in a directive from 23 on July 1942, ordered Army Group “B” to smash the Soviet forces covering Stalingrad with a swift blow, then take the city along the Volga to the south and seize the Astrakhan region to completely paralyze the Volga way. Take Stalingrad already planned 25 July.


Breaking through to Stalingrad, the German command planned to launch a sweeping attack on the flanks of the Soviet troops defending the approaches to the Don, to break through their positions and go into the area of ​​Kalach, to then seize the city on the Volga with a swift blow. To this end, the command of the 6 of the German army, without waiting for the full concentration of the troops, identified two strike groups: the northern, in the Perelazovsky area, the 14 tank and the 8 army corps (later the 17 corps), and southern, in the Oblivsk region, as part of the 51-th army and 24-th tank corps. “Both of these groups,” noted Hans Dörr, “had as their task to advance along the bank of the Don within its large bend to Kalach, and in this region to unite to force the Don and the attack on Stalingrad. Thus, the German command still hoped to surround the enemy’s forces in the great bend of the Don ”(G. Dörr. Hike to Stalingrad).

Breakthrough of the northern flank of the Soviet defense

At dawn on July 23, the northern group of the Wehrmacht launched an offensive with superior forces in the direction of Verkhne-Buzinovka, Manoilin, Kamensky. The Germans attacked the right-flank divisions of the 62nd Army — the 33rd Guards, 192nd and 184th Infantry Divisions. In the breakthrough sector, the Germans created a great advantage in manpower, artillery and tanks... Actively supported the advancing German troops aviation, which inflicted massive strikes on the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

The situation was hard. “The army continues the stubborn defense of the prepared line. The forward detachments, under the onslaught of superior forces, are moving beyond the front edge of the defensive line, ”the battle report from the 23 July army headquarters at 19 hour was reported. 30 min. On this day, especially stubborn battles were fought in the battle formations of the 33 Guards Rifle Division, which held the defenses south-west of Manoilip. On the right flank of the division, the 84 th Guards Rifle Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G. P. Barladyan fought. The enemy attacked the positions of the regiment with the forces of the 113 infantry and 16 tank divisions of the 14 tank corps. Attacks of infantry and tanks were actively supported by aviation. The enemy broke through the regiment's defenses, but the guards continued to fight. It was here that four armor-raisers made their legendary feat - Peter Boloto, Peter Samoilov, Konstantin Belikov, Ivan Aleinikov. Left alone on a skyscraper south of Kletskaya, armored rifles, armed with two anti-tank rifles, repulsed the attacks of German tanks. Fifteen tanks were destroyed by them, and the rest retreated. However, the Germans rushed forward. On July 23, the enemy broke through the defenses of the 192 th rifle division in the Kletskaya and Evstratovsky sector and reached the settlement of Platonov. In the 33-th Guards Rifle Division, the enemy advanced 15 km, penetrated Soviet defenses, and captured the state farm 1 May.

On the night of July 24, the enemy was pulling up forces, preparing to continue the offensive. In the morning the Germans went to Verkhne-Buzinovka, where the headquarters of the 192 and 184 rifle divisions were located. German tanks with troops landed there, leading fire on the way and cutting off the escape routes. Hurried evacuation of the wounded and communications began. Divisional headquarters entered the battle, fighting off the opposing enemy. The divisional commander of the 192 division, Colonel Athanasy Stepanovich Zakharchenko, died. On the same morning, the Nazis reached the Oskinsky farm, where a medical battalion was located at the height of "Mayak". Male doctors and cadets entered the battle with the enemy while the wounded were evacuated under fire. “But not all cars made their way through the German barrier. The fascists — tankmen and machine gunners — burned and killed the wounded and the paramedics ... ”


German flamethrower on the outskirts of Stalingrad

Thus, the situation was extremely difficult. Germans during the two days of fighting surrounded near Evstratovsky, Mayorovsky Kalmykov 192-yu, 184-th Infantry Division, 84-rd and 88-th Guards regiments 33-th Guards Rifle Division, 40-Tank Brigade, 644-Panzer Battalion and three artillery regiments and captured Verkhne-Buzinovka, Osinovka, Sukhanovsky. Part of the German 3-th and 60-th motorized divisions broke into the areas Skvorina and Golubinsky, coming to r. Don and bypassing the right-flank formations of the 62 Army. At the same time, the 16-I tank and 113-I infantry divisions broke through to the r. Liska near Kachalinsk. This led to the fact that the front of the 62-th army was broken. Parts of the right flank were surrounded. They were united in a task force led by Colonel KA Zhuravlev and waged heavy defensive battles. The left flank of the 62 Army was deeply engulfed from the north by German troops. The German command sought to completely encircle the 62 army and destroy it. The command of the 62 Army, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, to keep the crossing of the Don in the Kalach area, on July 25 brought the 196 Infantry Division into battle with the 649 Tank Battalion.



The offensive of the southern German group

The situation on the front of the 64 Army was also dangerous. The army came into contact with the enemy, not yet fully completed concentration. A large part of the rear areas of the army followed in echelons from Tula to Stalingrad, the supply of ammunition and food was not adjusted. The troops of the 64 Army deployed to the left of the 62 Army in the zone from Surovikino to Upper Kurmoyarsk. At the turn of the Surovkkino — Pristenovsky defense, the 229 and 214 rifle divisions were occupied by Colonel F. F. Sazhin and Major General N. I. Biryukov, to the south — by the 154 brigade of marines and other formations. The forward detachments of the army to 24 July came to the river. Zimle, where the next day they were attacked by the approaching units of the enemy's 51 Army Corps and began to retreat to the main line of defense. Our troops entrenched at the turn of the river. Cheer

“In the twentieth of July, enemy troops, pushing forward detachments, came to the front edge of our defense,” the division commander N. I. Biryukov recalled. “For almost three days the enemy tried to break it with bombings, artillery and tank strikes. None of the fascist tank failed to break into the depths of our defense. All enemy tanks that had advanced to the front line failed to return. The fierce bombing and shelling of the warriors of the division withstood steadfastly. This is reflected in the high quality of combat and political training. ” To the north, on the right flank of the army, the 229-Infantry Division held the defense, which came into contact with the enemy, while its artillery was still on the march. First, the division led small battles that did not threaten its positions, but soon the situation changed radically.

July 25 began the attack of the southern group of the 6 of the German army, striking from the Oblivskaya area, Verkhne-Aksenovskaya against Kalach against the 64 of the army. The enemy forces 51 th Army and 24 th tank corps sought to break through to the crossings over the river. Cheer The Germans attacked the superior forces of the 229 Infantry Division, delivering the main blow to the defensive orders of the 64 Army here, and the very next day German tanks broke through the defense of the division and rushed to the r. Chir, leaving the butt 62 th and 64 th armies. Colonel M. P. Smolyanov, the head of the political department of the 64 Army, recalling the events of this day, notes that this was “the most difficult moment of our first operation on the right bank of the Don, when the entire bulk of aviation, tanks came over”.

Thus, the German troops broke through the defenses of the 64 Army, which had not yet completed concentration. With heavy fighting, part of the army moved to the left bank of the Don. The commander of the 229 division, Colonel FF Sazhin, and other commanders, despite the fierce onslaught of the enemy, were able to maintain the combat capability of the division. The fighters of the 214 Division and the 154 Marine Brigade also distinguished themselves in fierce battles with the enemy. However, the situation was extremely difficult. The Germans attacked, our troops retreated beyond the Don, enemy aircraft bombed crowds at the crossing. The army’s artillery chief, Major-General Ya.I. Broad, the head of the operations department, Lieutenant-Colonel TM Sidorin, the head of the army engineering service, Colonel Burilov, and a number of other army staff officers, died here. By the evening of July 26, the railway bridge over the Don at Nizhne-Chirskoy was broken by German aircraft.

The Deputy Commander of the 64 Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Chuykov, who was in charge of the Commander, decided to withdraw the 214 Infantry Division and the 154 Maritime Brigade to the left bank of the Don. “To prepare for the crossing,” said Lieutenant-General N. I. Biryukov, “parts of the division at Nizhne-Chirskoy began a battle with the enemy. But the liaison officer delivered on the plane a new order from the army command that the division should be shipped to the south, in the area of ​​the rest home, as the crossing at Nizhny Chirskaya was blown up. In the area of ​​the holiday home there was no ready ferry, and the division, having secured a foothold, began to cross the Don using improvised means. For four days, there was a crossing at the intense work of all the personnel, in the struggle against the enemy who was pressing and with the water element breaking our rafts and ferries, under artillery-mortar shelling and bombing of enemy aircraft. All the difficulties were steadily overcome by the warriors of the division at the crossing. With only 122-millimeter howitzers and vehicles, the situation was hopeless - there was no reason to transport them across the river. It is difficult to say how it would end if a member of the Military Council of the Army comrade. KK Abramov did not send us a semi-pontoon. On it, howitzers and motor vehicles were transported to the left bank of the Don in one night ”(“ Battle of the Volga ”, Volgograd. 1962.). Crossing covered, leading a fierce battle on the right bank, one regiment of 214 th Infantry Division.

Thus, the Germans broke through the defense of the 64 Army. The right-flank formations of this army, with stubborn battles, went to the northeast in an organized manner, entrenched along the railway from Surovikino to Rychkov and further along the left bank of the Don. The Germans came to the Don in the region of Nizhne-Chirsk.



Soviet counter strike

As a result of the onset of two German shock groups, the defenses of the 62 and 64 of the Soviet armies were broken. The Germans came to the Don north of Kalach - in the area of ​​Kamensky, and south of Kalach - near Nizhne-Chirsk, created a threat to bypass Stalingrad from the west and south-west. There was a real threat to the encirclement of the 62 and 64 armies who were fighting in the large bend of the Don. The Germans planned to force the Don on the move and launch an attack on Stalingrad.

In this situation, the Soviet command decided to urgently organize counterattacks on the shock groups of the 6 of the German army by the forces of the 1 and 4 of the tank armies, which were in the formative stage. On July 23, Colonel-General A. M. Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, arrived at the Stalingrad Front as a representative of General Headquarters. He offered to strike at the enemy with the forces of the forming two tank armies. Another 22 July The headquarters transformed the control of the 38 and 28 armies into the control of the 1 tank and 4 armies. Major General of Artillery KS Moskalenko, who was summoned to the commander of the Stalingrad Front on the same day by the 38 Army, received the order to transfer all 38 Army divisions and 21 Army defense, and immediately proceed to the Kalach area. the formation of the 1-y tank army. The next morning, General K. S. Moskalenko was already at the new command post, and after them came the headquarters, led by Colonel S. P. Ivanov. The formation of the 1 Tank Army took place in the area of ​​Kachalin, Rychkovsky, Kalach. Initially, it consisted of the 13 and 28 tank corps, the 131 rifle division, two anti-aircraft artillery regiments and one anti-tank. The 158 heavy tank brigade was assigned to the army. The 4 tank army was led by Major General V. D. Kryuchenkin, Brigadier Commissioner F. P. Luchko (member of the Military Council), Colonel E. S. Polozov (Chief of Staff). The 22 Tank Corps, the 18 Rifle Division, the 133 Tank Brigade, the 5 Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, the Regiment of Rocket Artillery and two air defense regiments entered the army.

The situation was such that the Soviet mobile units had to attack without completing the formation. Thus, the units and units of the 1 tank army were scattered over a large area or not yet arrived. The 13 tank corps was already drawn into combat on the right flank of the 62 Army, in 60 km north-west of Kalach; The 131-th Infantry Division defended on the east bank of the Don, from Golubinskaya to Kalach, the 158-I tank brigade was still on the march. Parts of the gain have not yet arrived. The army had only about 40% of communications, there was not enough transport, the reconnaissance battalion did not arrive, etc. The 4 tank army was in a worse condition, so its offensive began later. Both tank armies did not have the mobility of full-fledged mechanized formations, combined-arms units did not have time for the tank crews, which sharply reduced the maneuverability and combat capability of the armies. In the 1 Tank Army there were about 160 tanks, in the 4 Army - around 80. Tank units did not have full support of artillery and aircraft. The formation of tank armies began only on July 22, they were not fully manned and equipped. In addition, the command and headquarters of the armies did not have the necessary experience in leading tank formations, since they were formed from the directorates of the combined-arms armies.

However, there was no choice but to throw into the battle the newly formed tank armies. As A.M. Vasilevsky: “We all were determined to defend the city on the Volga. A study of the prevailing situation on the front showed that the only way to eliminate the threat of the 62 army encirclement and the enemy's seizure of the Don crossing in the Kalach region and to the north of it was the immediate infliction of counter-attacks on the enemy with 1 and 4 tank armies, 4-I tank could do it only after two days, but it was not possible to wait for it, otherwise we would lose the crossing and the fascist troops would go to the rear of the 62 and 64 armies. Therefore, I had to go for an immediate strike of the 1 th tank army, and then the 4 th ”(A. M. Vasilevsky. A matter of a lifetime.).

By dawn 25 July German troops almost reached the crossing at Kalach. “The enemy had to overcome the last two or three kilometers. But he did not succeed, as it was at that moment that the 1 tank army launched a counterstrike on the advancing enemy. The oncoming battle with tanks and motorized infantry began ”(KS Moskalenko. In the South-West direction.). The situation was aggravated by the fact that German aircraft dominated the air, which only on that day made more than 1000 sorties on the military orders of the Moskalenko army. However, despite all the difficulties, the Soviet tankers were able to somewhat straighten the situation. The 28 troops of the tank corps under the command of Colonel G. S. Rodina, acting on the right flank of the 62 Army, threw the Germans into 6-8 km from Kalach in fierce battles. The 13 tank corps, advancing to the north, reached the approaches to Manoilin and broke through to the surrounded 192 and 184 rifle divisions. The 196 Rifle Division of the 62 Army, interacting with the troops of the 1 Panzer Army, also advanced.

On July 27, Kryuchenkin’s 4 Panzer Army from the region of Trekhostrovskaya struck the enemy in a westerly direction. The blow of Kryuchenkin’s army finally severed the encirclement ring around two divisions and other parts of the 62 Army. By July 31, the commander of the surrounded group, Colonel K.A. Zhuravlev, brought about five thousand people into the 4 armored army. Persistent battles in this direction continued until early August. The Germans continued to attack with the 14 tank and 8 army corps, supporting their actions with massive air strikes.

Thus, the Soviet troops managed to stop the enemy's movement to the south and along the right bank of the Don, disrupting the enemy’s plan to encircle and destroy the troops of the 62 and partially of the 64 armies. The surrounded troops of the right flank of the 62 Army in the area of ​​Verkhne-Buzinovka were unblocked. Further movement of the German troops was suspended. However, despite the massive heroism of the Soviet troops, it was not possible to completely defeat the German grouping that had broken through in the Verne-Buzinovka area, and to completely restore the position of the 62 Army. 1-I and 4-I tank armies simply did not have such an opportunity, since they were not full-fledged mobile units.

The hopes of the German command for the lightning takeover of Stalingrad were destroyed. Before the collision with the Soviet 1 tank and 4 tank armies of Paulus, other senior officers of the German 6 thought that the movement to Stalingrad would be non-stop and the city would be taken as easily as all other settlements on the way from Kharkov to Don The Germans again overestimated their capabilities and did not expect so much resistance. The German command began to take measures to regroup the troops in order to organize a new attack on the Stalingrad sector.


Soviet infantry in battle

The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the south-western approaches to the Don, which were the most vulnerable. A breakthrough of the southern enemy grouping could have led the latter to the front of the Stalingrad front. By order of the Supreme Command, by the 1 of August, the troops of the 57 Army under the command of Major-General F. I. Tolbukhin were deployed here from Red Don to Raigorod. The 31 Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front 51 in July from the North Caucasus Front. Subsequently, troops from the reserve continued to arrive for the defense of Stalingrad. As a result, the front line has increased to 700 km. It was hard to control the troops on such a front, therefore the August 5 Headquarters divided the Federation Council into two fronts: Stalingrad - under V.N. Gordov, and Southeast - under the command of A.I. Eremenko. In the SF front there were 63-I, 21-I, 4-I tank (without tanks) and 62-I armies. To support the front of the air was formed 16-I air army. The Southeastern Front included the 64, 57, 51, the 1 I Guards and 8 I air armies advanced to Stalingrad. The headquarters ordered the commanders of the two fronts to take the most drastic measures to keep the Stalingrad area.

The deep breakthrough of the German troops in the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions sharply worsened the situation at the front. The Wehrmacht broke through the defense of the Red Army in a broad band and quickly advanced to Stalingrad and Rostov. Soviet troops fought hard defensive battles and retreated under heavy blows of the enemy, leaving the rich and crowded industrial and agricultural areas. In this situation 28 appeared on July 1942, the famous order of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. V. Stalin No. 227. In it, the Soviet leader with the harsh directness described the brunt of the current situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The troops were ordered to increase resistance and stop the enemy - "Not one step back!"

The order said: “The enemy throws all new forces to the front and, regardless of the great losses for it, climbs forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizes new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population . ... Some stupid people at the front console themselves with the talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population and that we will always have plenty of bread. By this they want to justify their shameful behavior on the fronts. But such conversations are completely false and false, beneficial only to our enemies. Every commander, Red Army man and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people — workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy seized and seeks to seize, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, factories supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbas and other areas, we had much less territory, therefore, much less people, bread, metal, factories, and factories. We lost more than 70 millions of people, more than 800 million pounds of bread per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a predominance over the Germans either in human reserves or in bread stocks. To retreat further is to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our homeland. Each new patch of territory we left will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our homeland in every possible way. ... From this it follows that it is time to end the retreat. Not one step back! That should now be our main call. ”

To be continued ...

The application.

Order of the USSR NKO from 28.07.1942 No. 227. On measures to strengthen discipline and order in the Red Army and prohibit unauthorized withdrawal from combat positions.


The enemy throws to the front all the new forces and, regardless of the great losses for it, climbs forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizes new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. The fighting takes place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders rush to Stalingrad, to the Volga and want to seize the Kuban, the North Caucasus with their oil and bread riches at any price. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuyki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, half of Voronezh. Part of the troops of the Southern Front, going for alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without an order from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, with love and respect for the Red Army, begins to give up on it, loses faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army because it gives our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, while it flows away to the east.

Some stupid people at the front console themselves with the talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population and that we will always have plenty of bread.

By this they want to justify their shameful behavior on the fronts. But such conversations are completely false and false, beneficial only to our enemies.

Every commander, Red Army man and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people — workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy seized and seeks to seize, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, factories supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbas and other areas, we had much less territory, therefore, much less people, bread, metal, factories, and factories. We lost more than 70 millions of people, more than 800 million pounds of bread per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a predominance over the Germans either in human reserves or in bread stocks. To retreat further is to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our homeland. Each new patch of territory we left will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our homeland in every possible way.

Therefore, we must fundamentally stop talking about the fact that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be plenty of bread. Such conversations are deceitful and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, for if we do not stop retreat, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and plants, without railways.

From this it follows that it is time to end the retreat.

Not one step back! That should now be our main call.

We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last possible opportunity.

Our Motherland is going through difficult days. We must stop and then drop and defeat the enemy, no matter what we cost. The Germans are not as strong as it seems to alarmists. They strain the last forces. To sustain their strike now, in the next few months, is to ensure victory for us.

Can we withstand the blow, and then throw the enemy to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working fine, and our front is getting more and more aircraft, tanks, artillery, mortars.

What are we missing?

There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Homeland.

It is impossible to endure further commanders, commissioners, political workers, whose units and formations voluntarily leave combat positions. You can’t tolerate further when commanders, commissioners, political workers allow several alarmists to determine the position on the battlefield, to bring other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.

Alarmists and panties should be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army man, political worker should be a requirement — not a step back without an order from the highest command.

The commanders of the company, battalion, regiment, division, the corresponding commissioners and political workers, retreating from a military position without orders from above, are traitors to the Motherland. It is necessary to act with such commanders and political workers, as with traitors of the Motherland.

Such is the call of our Motherland.

To fulfill this call means to defend our land, save the Motherland, destroy and defeat the hated enemy.

After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline was shaken in the German troops, the Germans took some harsh measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 punitive companies from fighters who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, put them on dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. Further, they formed about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who had been guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, deprived of their orders, put them on even more dangerous sections of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. Finally, they formed special detachments of the barrier, placed them behind unstable divisions, and ordered them to shoot at the place of alarmists in the event of an attempt to arbitrarily leave their positions and in the case of an attempt to surrender. As you know, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And it turns out that German troops have good discipline, although they do not have an exalted goal of protecting their homeland, but there is only one predatory goal — to subdue a foreign country, and our troops, who have an elevated goal of protecting their degraded homeland, do not have such discipline and tolerate because of this defeat.

Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, how did our ancestors learn from our enemies in the past and then triumph over them?

I think that follows.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:

1. The military councils of the fronts and, above all, the commanders of the fronts:

a) to unconditionally eliminate the retreat in the army and with an iron hand to stop the propaganda that we can and must supposedly retreat further east, that there will be no harm from such a retreat;

b) unconditionally remove from office and send to the Headquarters to attract military court army commanders who allowed the unauthorized departure of troops from their positions without the order of the front command;

c) form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who have been guilty of violation of discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.

2. Military councils of armies and above all commanders of armies:

a) unconditionally remove corps and division commanders and commissioners who allowed unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without orders from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front for trial before a military court;

b) form 3 - 5 armored detachments (up to 200 people in each) within the army, put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and bind them in the event of panic and indiscriminate detachment of the division into alarmists and cowards and help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;

c) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) punitive companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who are guilty of breach of discipline for cowardice or instability, and put them on difficult areas army, to give them the opportunity to atone for the crime of their homeland.

3. Commanders and Commissars of Corps and Divisions:

a) unconditionally remove from the posts commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without an order from the corps or division commander, take orders and medals from them and send them to the military councils of the front [1] to bring them to the military court;

b) provide all kinds of help and support to the army defense units in strengthening order and discipline in the units.

The order to read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, staffs.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
I. Stalin.
Author:
Articles from this series:
1942 Campaign

The Third Reich again goes on the offensive.
"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction
Stalingrad Fortress
1942 year. "The operation in the south develops without stopping"
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  1. EvgNik
    EvgNik 23 March 2017 05: 32
    +6
    “For us, soldiers and commanders of the 62nd Army, there is no land beyond the Volga. We stood, and we will stand to the death! ”

    Vasily Zaitsev, a sniper who destroyed more than 300 fascists in the battles for Stalingrad.
    Only in the period from November 10 to December 17, 1942, in the battles for Stalingrad, V. G. Zaitsev destroyed 225 enemy soldiers and officers, including 11 snipers, and his comrade in arms in the 62nd Army - 6000.

  2. Orel
    Orel 23 March 2017 06: 24
    +12
    This period of the war is very interesting, since the war was fought in a very tank-accessible area, which can only be compared with the African theater of operations, however, the scale of tank battles in the Don steppes was much more intense. The Red Army already learned a lot tactically and the Germans were no longer able to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies. Of course, separate small environments took place, but this can not be compared with what was happening in 1941. Retreat is the most difficult type of battle and in the southern steppes the Red Army has shown it. The Germans repeatedly attacked the Soviet defense with tanks in order to encircle the main forces, however, the Red Army tank corps repeatedly moved forward to meet the enemy’s tanks. As a result, German tank wedges stopped, showered by the blows of Soviet tank corps, time was ticking, and the USSR field armies at that time get out of the attack. The enemy moved forward, but did not achieve their goal - there was no defeat of the USSR army, and the enemy suffered losses. So we exhausted the enemy. Of course, there were plenty of episodes of delusional and stupid use of tanks then and then, for example, night tank attacks, but nevertheless the skill of maneuvering with great forces and getting out of attack was worked out quite well. The army remained fighting and the front held.
    1. chenia
      chenia 23 March 2017 12: 17
      +1
      Quote: Orel
      The army remained fighting and the front held.


      And the Germans ended up with a freebie when they smashed the unstable formations of 1941. Since late fall, divisions with 2-3 months training began to appear in the Red Army.
      And even if they were surrounded, they did not crumble, and as a rule let the weakened but leave.
    2. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 24 March 2017 12: 19
      +1
      When the enemy concentrated three times as much force, the order would help little.
  3. Olgovich
    Olgovich 23 March 2017 07: 32
    +10
    The main reason for the Germans' breakthrough to Stalingrad, in my opinion, is the adventurous, absolutely not taking into account the forces and means of the parties, the May attack of Soviet troops on Kharkov, which ended in disaster.
    Losses of hundreds of thousands of people, a huge amount of equipment and mate. units opened the way for the Germans to the Don and Volga.

    Order 227 management should have written, first of all, in relation to himself, because it was his actions that led to such a situation.
    The troops fought no worse than in 1941 and did their duty.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2017 08: 20
      +12
      Quote: Olgovich
      The main reason for the Germans' breakthrough to Stalingrad, in my opinion, is the adventurous, absolutely not taking into account the forces and means of the parties, the May attack of Soviet troops on Kharkov ...

      This is now, when we have the entirety of the information, we can claim adventurism.
      Then neither the rate nor the general staff had such information. Moreover, having won the year, they did not fully represent the capabilities of the constantly reformed army.
      Quote: Olgovich
      Order 227 management should have written, first of all, in relation to himself, because it was his actions that led to such a situation.
      The troops fought no worse than in 1941 and did their duty.

      Regiment, divisional commanders, commanders, commanders - is it troops or leadership?
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 23 March 2017 08: 51
        +3
        Quote: BigRiver
        This is now, when we have the entirety of the information, we can claim adventurism.
        Then neither the rate nor the general staff had such information. Moreover, having won the year, they did not fully represent the capabilities of the constantly reformed army.

        Yes, the year of terrible defeats and encirclements of the main part of the Red Army in Belarus, Vyazma, Kiev and Leningrad did not give any information, knowledge or ideas about the strength and tactics of the enemy. This is sad.
        Quote: BigRiver
        Quote: Olgovich
        Order 227 management should have written, first of all, in relation to himself, because it was his actions that led to such a situation.
        The troops fought no worse than in 1941 and did their duty.
        Regiment, divisional commanders, commanders, commanders - is it troops or leadership?


        Remind Home cause of failure specified in Order 227
        Lacks order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our MAIN DISADVANTAGE

        The main drawback was the inept leadership, when, as a result of the encirclement near Kharkov and the hole formed as a result, the enemy rolled towards the Don and the Volga.

        The troops did not fight worse than in the 1941m. On the contrary, after the victory near Moscow they had the knowledge that the Germans could be beaten.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 23 March 2017 09: 06
          +5
          Quote: Olgovich
          Remind Home reason for failure specified in Order 227: Not enough order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our MAIN DISADVANTAGE

          Well, that is, in the troops.
          Quote: Olgovich
          The main one the flaw was mismanagement...

          But only?
          And what level of leadership? General staff level suits you? And what about the level of commanders and commanders?
          Quote: Olgovich
          The troops did not fight worse than in 1941 ...

          You somehow strangely divide: the troops fight on their own, and their command - on their own.winked
          So?
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 23 March 2017 09: 27
            +1
            Quote: BigRiver
            And what level of leadership? General staff level suits you?

            The offensive near Kharkov is a strategic operation carried out according to the directives of the Bet.
            1. chenia
              chenia 23 March 2017 11: 54
              +3
              It was mistakenly determined. the direction of the summer strategic offensive of the Germans (it was believed that they would fly to Moscow).

              This and the GRU and the General Staff and the entire military leadership thought so. Stalin only summed up.
              Zhukov, as always in his memoirs, proposed a wise decision on strategic defense.
              Tymoshenko was so sure of success and did not observe the strengthening of the southern direction.
              Well, where does Stalin have to do with it?
            2. Bigriver
              Bigriver 23 March 2017 11: 59
              +5
              Quote: Olgovich
              Quote: BigRiver
              And what level of leadership? General staff level suits you?

              The offensive near Kharkov is a strategic operation carried out according to the directives of the Bet.

              That is, the Headquarters - sucks, and the command staff from the front and below-rulez?
              I don’t understand what you want to say? recourse
              Sorry for importunity. wink
              1. Diana Ilyina
                Diana Ilyina 23 March 2017 12: 22
                +20
                BigRiver Today, 11:59 ↑ New
                I don’t understand what you want to say? recourse
                Sorry for importunity. wink
                And here there is nothing to understand. Someone Olgovich is an ardent anti-Stalinist, an art-baker, Russophobe and just a pro-Western troll. So do not argue with him, do not feed the troll. You still can’t convince him. These individuals firmly believe in the pro-Western nonsense about the worthlessness of the leadership of the USSR, that the people won the war contrary to the desire of their leadership. All normal people understand that this is nonsense, but for non-smart people, the laws of logic are not written. Something like this!
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 23 March 2017 13: 05
                  +6
                  Quote: Diana Ilyina
                  And here there is nothing to understand. Someone Olgovich is an ardent anti-Stalinist, an art-baker, Russophobe and just a pro-Western troll. !


                  Take care of the discussion of the ARTICLE, and not of my humble person. This, apparently, is not enough ....
                  VO rules:
                  g) comments on the site are intended only for readers to express their opinions regarding published articles.
                  not commentators
                  Quote: Diana Ilyina
                  All normal people understand that this is nonsense, but for non-smart people, the laws of logic are not written. Something like this!

                  Flud
                  VO rules
                  c) Flood, comments non-related articles
                  1. urman
                    urman 8 January 2019 05: 47
                    0
                    not really olgovich really went into bust
                2. Trapperxnumx
                  Trapperxnumx 23 March 2017 13: 24
                  +3
                  Oh, how many medals did you hang for Olgovich)))
                  And also awarded the title)))))
              2. Olgovich
                Olgovich 23 March 2017 12: 55
                +4
                Quote: BigRiver
                That is, the Headquarters - sucks, and the command staff from the front and below-rulez?
                I don’t understand what you want to say?
                Sorry for importunity


                What kind of expression is “suck”, “rulez” to evaluate those events? request

                The highest military leadership of the country made the wrong decisions on the Kharkov operation.
                The decisions were made on the basis of an erroneous assessment of the forces and means of their own and the enemy, an erroneous assessment of the enemy’s strategy.
                The Kharkov catastrophe in many ways led to the rapid attack of the enemy on the Don and Volga.

                My opinion is the tragic mistake of the country's top military leadership.
                1. Bigriver
                  Bigriver 23 March 2017 13: 23
                  +5
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  ... The country's highest military leadership made the wrong decisions to conduct the Kharkov operation.
                  The decisions were made on the basis of an erroneous assessment of the forces and means of their own and the enemy, an erroneous assessment of the enemy’s strategy.
                  My opinion is the tragic mistake of the country's top military leadership.

                  In general, I agree. But:
                  1. The headquarters made this decision, NOT CONSIDERING the opinion of either the General Staff or the leadership of the SW front. That is, it was legitimate. Like Comrade Vasilevsky with comrade Shtemenko did not distance themselves from him. feel
                  2. What I talked about above. The bet made a decision based on the information that it had, and not on the one that is known to us now. Do you feel the difference?
                  Yes, not all people are theurgs. We all go through our path of error. But some are getting smarter, gaining experience. Like for example our Bet. And others, like OKH and OKV, only get stupid, clinging to their well-established views and patterns.
                  1. Cartalon
                    Cartalon 23 March 2017 20: 52
                    +1
                    In general, it is believed that the General Staff was against the Kharkov operation, though I read about it well for a very long time, but I remember it like that.
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 23 March 2017 16: 35
      +5
      Quote: Olgovich
      the May offensive of Soviet troops on Kharkov, which ended in disaster.

      This is Stalin - a tambourine ... The marshals interpreted him, saying that there is no reason for the transition to a strategic offensive - the main reason is that industry, after evacuating to the east, began supplying weapons and even more valuable ammunition. But she could not provide enough for the offensive, this is the whole point and the troops did not accumulate and did not train properly.

      But Stalin, after the counterattack near Moscow, was dizzy with success, he did not want to prolong the war, hence the unjustified losses in the spring of the 42nd in the Moscow direction, especially in the army of Efremov .... there were a lot of reckless and fueled ammunition and proper fire and air support offensive operations, and after heavy losses are forced to re-form untrained and throw under German tanks. Be the People's Commissar Zhukov, Shaposhnikov or Vasilevsky company of the 42nd would not have been such ..... and the war would have ended by the 45th.
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 23 March 2017 20: 54
        0
        If on both sides the war was led by the military, the whole picture would be different.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 23 March 2017 07: 36
    +5
    Afanasy Stepanovich Zakharchenko
    On March 14, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko appointed Colonel A.S. Zakharchenko as commander of the 25th Chapaev Infantry Division on the recommendation of the command of the OdVO. June-July 1939 - in Bessarabian as part of the troops of the Southern Front, with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the division participated in the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol, where its battle path ended. Officially disbanded on July 1940, 30. The fate of this man is amazing. He was drafted into the army in 1942, after the February Revolution, during the Civil War he fought in the Shchors division, commanded the battalion. In October 1917 he entered the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze. By the way, in the certification in his personal file it is written: “The student of the academy, A. S. Zakharchenko, is easily versed in the situation, makes decisions quickly. He is gifted with a great will.” After graduating from the academy, A.S. Zakharchenko first served in the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, then as the chief of staff of the division, in November 1927 he was promoted to colonel, and from September next year commanded the 1935th separate regiment. In August 44, Zakharchenko with the wording “for dulling political vigilance” was expelled from the party, demoted, and in July 1937 he was dismissed from the army, then arrested. During the year, an investigation was conducted, but Zakharchenko pleaded not guilty and on August 1938, 17 he was released, then reinstated in the Red Army, in the party and sent as a teacher to the reconstituted Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. However, at the request of the military council of the Odessa Military District, formed on October 1939, 11, he was recalled from the academy and in November 1939 he was appointed head of the 1939nd department, and later - head of the combat training department of the district headquarters.
    1. Roman 11
      Roman 11 23 March 2017 16: 42
      +2
      Quote: parusnik
      In August 1937, Zakharchenko with the wording “for dulling political vigilance” was expelled from the party, demoted, and in July 1938 he was dismissed from the army, then arrested.

      Again the enemy of the people? winked The entire Red Army was dirtied from head to toe ..... pests. Tea now abruptly harms .... corrupt am
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 23 March 2017 20: 17
        +3
        Are you talking about the marshal who commanded the Victory Parade - K.K.Rokossovsky?
  5. antivirus
    antivirus 23 March 2017 07: 51
    +1
    how far to home, to the hut.
  6. avva2012
    avva2012 23 March 2017 08: 35
    +3
    If the Germans had broken through to Stalingrad, there would have been a catastrophe. That's just, it seems that the German General Staff, while creating a plan of operation did not take into account the capabilities and characteristics of the Eastern Front. Accordingly, reserves in their rear areas were not created in sufficient quantities. And they seemed to have fought and had to understand that the walk would not work, but no, at the most critical moment of the offensive, there were no additional forces. Although there was excellent industry, huge human resources, the soldiers were motivated, the "allies" had not landed anywhere. Fight, I do not want. What is the reason? Either European redneck, or something else, who knows.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2017 08: 58
      +5
      Quote: avva2012
      ... Just, it seems that the German General Staff, nevertheless creating an operation plan did not take into account the capabilities and features of the Eastern Front.

      Initially, a strike in the direction of Stalingrad was providing, for the main blow to the Caucasus.
      But, this direction became the 2nd most important in the second half of the summer, when it began to absorb part of the forces from 4TA going to the Caucasus. And later, and completely forced to deploy it to the north.
      They did not calculate a qualitatively stronger resistance to their advancement already at the approaches.
      Quote: avva2012
      ... Accordingly, reserves were not created in sufficient numbers in their rear ...

      And when did they have them? In sufficient quantity? winked
      Neither near Leningrad, nor near Rostov, nor near Moscow, etc. All on improvisations, regroupings.
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 23 March 2017 10: 30
        +1
        Quote: BigRiver But, this direction became the 2nd most important in the second half of the summer, when it began to absorb part of the forces from 4TA going to the Caucasus. And later, and completely forced to deploy it to the north.
        They did not calculate a qualitatively stronger resistance to their advancement already at the approaches.

        Here, here, then they have one main blow, then another, not GSH, but a flea on testicles. I sincerely admire our ancestors, but someone not stupid, said, "we are fighting, as the enemy allows us." Thank God that the gloomy Teutonic genius did not get the idea that one concentrated blow is better than two.
        1. EvgNik
          EvgNik 23 March 2017 11: 09
          +3
          Quote: BigRiver
          Initially, a strike in the direction of Stalingrad was a

          Quote: avva2012
          Here, here, then they have one main strike, then another

          Guys, both are right and at the same time wrong. It is not for us to judge how our ancestors fought.
          Won and point. Although the pluses to both.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 23 March 2017 11: 45
            +4
            Quote: EvgNik It is not for us to judge how our ancestors fought.

            How our ancestors fought and why they won, it is generally clear: a) Soviet industry and labor productivity were an order of magnitude higher than capitalist at that time; b) the Soviet people had something to lose and they knew what gains it was worth dying for. And, here, why and how the Germans fought this way, and not otherwise, is interesting. Such an enemy, smart, strong and motivated, in the history of our country, in general, did not exist.
            1. chenia
              chenia 23 March 2017 12: 27
              +3
              Quote: avva2012
              a) Soviet industry and labor productivity were an order of magnitude higher than capitalist at that time;


              A very important remark, As my godfather (the head of the workshop at the PPK factory) said, in many areas it was possible to have fewer people in SIX, So we also posted ads - REQUIRED).
              There was no unemployment, but there was hidden productivity.
              So in difficult moments, she showed herself.
              For nothing comes of nothing.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 23 March 2017 12: 37
                +1
                As my godfather said (the head of the workshop at the PPK plant)

                What time did Qum live? I, of course, about those pre-war and during the war. In my opinion, a person is so arranged that there are always few advanced workers, but many slobs. We need an incentive for a person to work hard. In contrast to egalitarianism in the late USSR, at that time it was really possible to live not badly if you work with your soul, and for completely irresponsible people (instead of throwing them out the gate), there were other educational measures.
                1. chenia
                  chenia 23 March 2017 12: 57
                  +1
                  Quote: avva2012
                  What time did Qum live? I, of course, about those pre-war and during the war.


                  It’s clear in the 70-80s (I have a military-industrial complex slip there), but even if unemployment ended in 1928, we must assume that there was a reserve of labor in the Second World War.
                  Well, as for the RFP, so in the late 80s. already decided to leave the ZP fund unchanged
                  regardless of the number of employees (as bonus).
                  1. 97110
                    97110 23 March 2017 16: 29
                    +1
                    Quote: chenia
                    Well, as for the RFP, so in the late 80s.

                    there appeared a standard for the formation of a wage fund. For the first time, a payroll and production plan were linked. Before that, complete at least two production plans, the labor plan will remain unchanged. In 1987, our Ministry gathered economists in Moscow to chew and introduce “new trends” into the brains. For the last time ... Later, recognition and understanding of new "new trends" became a problem for the production workers. And their mistakes are a way to fill the budget.
              2. EvgNik
                EvgNik 23 March 2017 12: 50
                +5
                Quote: chenia
                There was no unemployment, but there was hidden productivity.

                I agree, there’s nothing to argue about here. What now? Today I wrote:
                "A Nightmare on Elm Street..."
                Is this really a nightmare?
                Ugh, ugh ...
                In order not to jinx it,
                And do not miss the beat.

                A nightmare is what happened
                No, not with me, with the country.
                The infection settled in her,
                The country leads to slaughter.

                The oligarchs are robbing the country.
                Officials rob people.
                Wherever possible - they’ll shit everywhere.
                And we don’t understand the outcome.

                Homeless people, drug addicts, killers.
                Freedom, freedom in everything.
                The hotbed of everything is the capital,
                Stubbornly go to freedom.

                To freedom to live hungry
                And die like that.
                To freedom to be unemployed.
                Blind, dumb and deaf.
                1. 97110
                  97110 23 March 2017 16: 43
                  +1
                  Quote: EvgNik
                  To freedom to live hungry
                  And die like that.

                  Ek, what are your anti-government thoughts. The ruling class in the reporting 100 years should learn the lessons of 1917. Taking into account the more advanced economic basis (capitalist versus partially feudal, partially capitalist) of the sovereign administration compared to 1917, the greater technical equipment of the administration apparatus, the greater habit of the insignificance of the cost of life of the proletariat, I believe that there are no references to nature like the life of I.V. in Solvychegodsk will no longer be allowed. Learn, learn the bourgeoisie from the Communists to manage states. Nikolai Alexandrovich allowed disgrace on the Palace in 1905 - the feudal lords did not know how ... And the Chinese comrades did not allow on the square with a non-Russian name in Beijing. And silence in their comfortable state. So Zhvanetsky was not heard. And he used to say: "... you need to brush more ..."
                  1. EvgNik
                    EvgNik 23 March 2017 16: 54
                    +5
                    Quote: 97110
                    Learn, learn the bourgeois from the Communists to manage states

                    Until we learned how to destroy only. Today I looked through the search for "destroyed factories of Russia", I advise. You’ll come to horror.
                    1. 97110
                      97110 24 March 2017 13: 36
                      +2
                      Quote: EvgNik
                      You’ll come to horror.

                      I won’t come. Before our eyes, the industry disappeared, along with factories and steamboats. Ports remained for export. Is the concept of "northern delivery" somewhere else? I remember once in childhood, in the spring, the fleet began to breed couples, and the wind went to the village ... Coal smoke rolled down the streets in clubs! Now you will not see this.
                      1. EvgNik
                        EvgNik 24 March 2017 14: 32
                        +1
                        Quote: 97110
                        Before our eyes, the industry disappeared, along with factories and steamboats

                        The Urals is a forge of personnel, they used to say. Now this forge is gone. Yes, all over Russia.
        2. Bigriver
          Bigriver 23 March 2017 12: 02
          +4
          Quote: avva2012
          ... Thank God that the gloomy Teutonic genius did not come up with the idea that one concentrated blow is better than two.

          And they could not limit themselves to one blow to the Caucasus. The flank would be open.
          They simply set a goal with the Caucasus that was not adequate for the available forces.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 23 March 2017 12: 07
            +3
            Why do they need the Caucasus? Cut the Volga in several places and it’s done, oil will not get anywhere. It seems to me that they trampled on the Caucasus because of greed and the German order, "they say, there is no excess oil, but let's get it."
            1. chenia
              chenia 23 March 2017 12: 44
              +6
              Quote: avva2012
              Why do they need the Caucasus?


              The power of action. equal to the strength of the reaction.
              It is not strange at that time that we already had reserves of more Germans.
              And we did not deter the Germans from transferring reserves to the South, but they did.

              And do not be afraid for Moscow, those forces fighting for Rzhev could be thrown to the flank of the Germans,
              And if they had not flooded the Caucasus, they would have gotten on the second flank.

              They did everything right, but did not calculate the main thing - they DO NOT fight with THEM to win.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 23 March 2017 12: 59
                +1
                As I understand it, the Kharkiv catastrophe provoked a German strike in the south. Under Rzhev our stuck seriously and as it turned out for a long time. It is believed that this operation kept the Germans from moving troops south towards Stalingrad. Reserve rates in the form of the Don Front (divisions: 277, 62, 252, 212, 262, 331, 293 sd)., Still had to be assembled, staffed and delivered to the place. Where are the reserves which the German feared?
                1. chenia
                  chenia 23 March 2017 13: 23
                  +1
                  Quote: avva2012
                  As I understand it, the Kharkiv catastrophe provoked a German strike in the south.


                  No, she was only a catalyst and exacerbated our situation. The Germans initially planned (after winter) to launch an offensive in the southern strategic direction.

                  Quote: avva2012
                  There is an opinion


                  Only Zhukov used troops more than in the south.
                  1. avva2012
                    avva2012 23 March 2017 13: 36
                    +2
                    Do you think that the Rzhev operation was meaningless? I ask sincerely, I myself am lost in the answer.
            2. Bigriver
              Bigriver 23 March 2017 13: 09
              +3
              Quote: avva2012
              Why do they need the Caucasus? Cut the Volga in several places and it’s done, oil will not get anywhere. It seems to me that they trampled on the Caucasus because of greed and the German order, "they say, there is no excess oil, but let's get it."

              Strictly speaking, it was not brilliant with oil. The acute crisis with the provision of fuel to the Wehrmacht was, in particular, already in November-December of the 41st.
              Directive No. 41
              I. General concept.
              Adhering to the initial principles of the Eastern Campaign, it is necessary, without taking active steps in the central sector of the front, to achieve the fall of Leningrad in the north and establish contact with the Finns by land, and to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus region on the southern wing.
              Given the situation prevailing at the end of the winter battle, with available forces and means, as well as existing transport conditions This goal can only be achieved in stages.
              Initially, it is necessary to concentrate all available forces to carry out the main operation on the southern sector of the front in order to destroy the enemy west of the river. Don and subsequently capture the oil regions of the Caucasus and passes through the Caucasus ridge ....

              The plug, apparently, happened already at the first stage.
              The Red Army did not want to panic, disorganize, circle, run or give up. laughing
              In the 41st pace of progress was, on average, 30-35 km per day.
              And in the 42nd - 60-80 km in two weeks.
              All: http://vlastitel.com.ru/hitler/no41.htm
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 23 March 2017 13: 24
                +2
                Some directive laughing Well, Fritz was self-conscious. And Leningrad was going to capture in 42m. Their theses were a year earlier, the city was not taken by storm, but strangled by a blockade. What draggings did together with Mannerheim. Why is there such a radical change in plans? Kharkov, again? And not too little time to develop such a large-scale operation?
                1. chenia
                  chenia 23 March 2017 13: 57
                  +3
                  Quote: avva2012
                  Well, Fritz was self-conscious. And Leningrad was going to capture in 42m.


                  And they thought that they had dealt a mortal blow in 1941 and our reserves were running out), and the catastrophe near Moscow was an accident due to the weather factor (well, the generals justified themselves, well, they took off Fedya for prevention).

                  It’s more expensive to attack Moscow, an uncomfortable terrain for tanks (in summer, in the same uncomfortable Belarus, it was possible to drive masses of Russian troops who did not have sufficient combat coordination), and ours already won time for defense (we must know that we strengthened the defense areas of Moscow built until the fall of 1942).

                  Well, with Leningrad, we thought, well, another battalion and the city will fall. They hoped for Manshtein as having proved himself in Crimea.

                  And the understanding that the need for economic strangulation of the enemy, became the main idea, arose after the failure of the blitzkrieg.
                  By the way, our General Staff initially assumed that the main direction of the Germans in 1941 was southwest. And from the point of view of a shorter war, this is true.
                  1. avva2012
                    avva2012 23 March 2017 14: 37
                    +2
                    As for the weather, yes. At 42, the German had the same problem as at 41, winter had accidentally come, and again the valiant zoldats had to take off shawls from the peasant women. But what’s interesting, our General Staff thought, but as a result, what? In the south, a disaster, the order had to be issued. Colossal losses. It seems that the Germans had previously leaked, and through a serious source.
                    1. Bigriver
                      Bigriver 23 March 2017 14: 48
                      +2
                      Quote: avva2012
                      ... It seems that the Germans had previously leaked the disuse, moreover, through a serious source.

                      There was a set of activities.
                      Plan operations "Kremlin" It was envisaged to carry out a whole range of misinformation measures:
                      - make aerial reconnaissance of Moscow defensive positions, the outskirts of Moscow, Vladimir, Ivanov, the Tambov, Gorky, Rybinsk line, defensive positions passing from Penza through Alatyr to Kozmodemyansk, as well as fortifications on the Volga from Volsk to Kazan;
                      - organize radio disinformation;
                      - strengthen the transfer of agents through the Tula – Moscow – Kalinin line;
                      - to propagate plans for the city of Moscow and other large cities located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center and send them from June 10 up to the regimental headquarters;
                      - print in large numbers leaflets "in accordance with the intended operation", intended for scattering in the location of the Soviet troops, and distribute them after 10.6 to the regiment headquarters;
                      - prepare new road signs "up to the offensive goals";
                      - to carry out "regrouping and false troop transfers, the redeployment of headquarters and command posts, the transportation of crossing facilities to water barriers, etc.
                      The document - “Order on the attack on Moscow” dated May 29, 1942 defines the false goal of Operation Kremlin: “To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, to firmly seize the territory around Moscow, encircling the city, and thereby deprive the adversary the possibility of operational use of the area. "

                      True, Stavka’s opinion that the main goal of the summer company is Moscow was formed even before the Kremlin operation. And the concentration of considerable forces in the southwest was explained by a probable flank attack along the northeast line in the direction of Moscow.
                      1. avva2012
                        avva2012 23 March 2017 15: 08
                        +1
                        Wow belay Interesting. But, somehow the events are quite banal, or something. I then thought that through a trusted agent. Plus, everything you write about. The miscalculation was at the very top with us, otherwise it is not clear why after this !!!!, the heads did not fly. I am sincerely convinced that I.V. Stalin was a kind-hearted man, but the situation was comparable, if not worse, to 41m.
                  2. Bigriver
                    Bigriver 23 March 2017 15: 05
                    +2
                    Quote: chenia
                    ... the understanding that the need for economic strangulation of the enemy, became the main idea, arose after the failure of the blitzkrieg ...

                    The motivation for economic strangulation, of course, was. But, the emphasis, the priority of the goals were set somewhat differently.
                    In any case, according to the recollections of the Wehrmacht general.
                    ... Speaking on June 1, 1942, at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler said that if he did not receive Maikop and Grozny oil, he would have to end this war.

                    In addition, there was also a political moment - forcing Turkey to war.
                    1. voyaka uh
                      voyaka uh 23 March 2017 23: 34
                      +2
                      Nazis would take Baku more easily than Stalingrad. But the total failed result would not have been avoided:
                      the front line of the Wehrmacht was so long, and communications are so stretched that somewhere, yes, the Red Army would cut them without fail.
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht 24 March 2017 00: 38
                        +1
                        Why should the Germans take Baku? They would have had enough oil Maykop and Grozny. The breakthrough in Transcaucasia was not connected with the needs of Germany, but was aimed at depriving the USSR of Baku oil. With the interception of the transport artery at Stalingrad, this task was accomplished. True, there was still a roundabout way through Krasnovodsk and along the eastern coast of the Caspian, but this lengthened the path so much that it practically deprived the USSR of half of the oil. From Baku, oil tanks were simply towed by sea to Krasnovodsk and put back on the rails there. Ineffective and expensive. And for a long time. In the 42nd in Baku there was simply an overproduction of oil, but there was nowhere to ship it.
                        The exit to the Transcaucasus solved other problems. Involvement in the war in Turkey, a threat to the oil fields of Great Britain, a connection with Rommel (a kind of giant mites). There is an interesting alternative to Maxi's "Operation Orient" - a joint Axis strategy.
            3. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 27 March 2017 12: 14
              0
              Quote: avva2012
              Why do they need the Caucasus? Cut the Volga in several places and it’s done, oil will not get anywhere. It seems to me that they trampled on the Caucasus because of greed and the German order, "they say, there is no excess oil, but let's get it."


              In general, Hitler claimed that his generals did not know anything about the economics of war.
              The Caucasus - for Hitler, this is the path to Grozny and Baku oil, a springboard for a jump to the Iranian oil fields - the Caucasus is a bridgehead, a stepping stone to big oil.
  7. Bigriver
    Bigriver 23 March 2017 15: 38
    +2
    Quote: avva2012
    ... I then thought that through a trusted agent.

    Are you kidding me? Not? laughing
    It is not enough to report even a superfood of an important agent to analyze and evaluate the strategic situation.
    This is a breakthrough of information on a variety of channels
    Quote: avva2012
    The miscalculation was at the very top with us, otherwise it is not clear why after this !!!!, the heads did not fly.

    The assessment was based on the fact that Army Center was in its place with three tank armies. This GA was nowhere to jerk, and even vice versa - there was a feeling of its strengthening.
    Apparently, there were irrational motives in the assessment. The Wehrmacht in the summer campaign of the 41st showed a fantastic pace of advancement in its operations. And the Red Army in the winter and spring of the 42nd was not in very good condition. First of all, this concerns the presence of power supply, equipment and weapons. The evacuated plants then began to produce significant volumes only by the fall of the 42nd. And the spring of this year is the most terrible shell hunger.
    Nevertheless, the reserves were created and arranged in such a way that it was possible to work both along the West and the South-West lines.
    1. avva2012
      avva2012 23 March 2017 16: 12
      +2
      Well, that's what I write, "plus, everything you write about." That is, the secret of agentos and other activities for misinformation. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, in my opinion, is shown quite schematically. We missed the blow, the Kharkov catastrophe, then a heroic retreat, an equally heroic defense of the city itself, a counterattack, encirclement and liquidation of the 6th Wehrmacht army. It further turns out that the German had planned this offensive in advance and without Kharkov to capture the Caucasian oil, our miscalculations which are poorly explained somehow. The result, a fracture in the Second World War. There is a feeling that this battle is waiting for a more serious study. hi hi
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver 23 March 2017 16: 50
        +4
        Quote: avva2012
        ... our miscalculations that are poorly explained somehow.

        War is not Guess the Tune. lol
        Where one unique combination itself draws a logical continuation. War is the "path of deception."
        Near Kursk we had a comprehensive infa about the intentions of the Germans in the summer of the 43rd. And all the same, they were mistaken, both regarding the definition of the main strike of the operation (northern or southern face), and at the place of the main strike on the southern face. He came at the weakest point.
        And the German miscalculations after the blitzkrieg crash - this is finally a rule with very rare exceptions. winked
        The more we have objective information about past events, the less we understand the logic of decision-making of people who were in those conditions, in that time, who own the volume of information.
        I repeat. lol I started here in the first post.
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 23 March 2017 17: 15
          +2
          What happened in 44m? Brilliant operations, no miscalculations, everything as if by notes laughing German and at 45, was not in longing, sadness. Hope was nourished and sufficiently substantiated to stretch the "pleasure." So, no, they rolled it out under the most adverse natural and weather conditions. Explanation that they learned to fight, by whom the boys? Or so sharply our commanders grew wiser. What hindered before? Riddles in the dark.
          1. Bigriver
            Bigriver 23 March 2017 17: 55
            +1
            Quote: avva2012
            What happened in 44m? Brilliant operations, no miscalculations, everything as if by notes laughing

            The initiative passed to the Red Army and it was time to guess the direction of our strikes.
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 23 March 2017 18: 15
              +1
              “The initiative passed to the Red Army”, it’s almost like Gumilyov’s drive with a passion. Pleasant for pride, but difficult to understand. With the history of the Second World War, everything is ambiguous, but it seems that all these events have occurred recently. Perhaps the archives will open in our lifetime. A very interesting topic and useful, not that the "Slavic Empire." Unfortunately, tomorrow to work. hi
          2. chenia
            chenia 23 March 2017 18: 30
            +2
            Quote: avva2012
            What happened in 44m? Brilliant operations, no miscalculations, everything, like German notes at 45, was not in melancholy, sadness.


            To be honest, then mysticism. Well, we can talk about the increased skill of our commanders and commanders, and the experience of our fighters.
            But the German did not become worse. And his generals. Their defense worked as never before, and their weapons were in bulk.
            Yes, we had superiority, yes, but not in such proportions that everything would creep away among the Germans.
            The Germans felt inner doom, no matter how much Hitler shouted about super weapons.
            1. Cartalon
              Cartalon 23 March 2017 21: 04
              0
              The German defense may have worked like clockwork, but you can’t say the same with Romanians, Italians and Hungarians, the Germans had enough weapons but only for inflammation of losses, and there were few infantry.
            2. voyaka uh
              voyaka uh 24 March 2017 00: 56
              +1
              "Well, we can talk about the increased skill of our commanders and commanders, and the experience of our fighters." ////

              This time. From the middle of 43rd to the beginning of 44th, regular Lendlis was established. They began to feed the army, supply everything from ammunition to buttons - in bulk. These are two.
              The Germans ran out of mobilization reserves (and the USSR had enough, albeit with a stroke, up to 45 years). These are three.
  8. Roman 11
    Roman 11 23 March 2017 16: 53
    0
    At one time, there was a rumor that the entire militia division was missing on the Stalingrad direction - it fell under a tank rink ..... but there is still no information.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2017 17: 20
      +3
      Quote: Novel 11
      At one time, there was a rumor that the entire militia division was missing on the Stalingrad direction - it fell under a tank rink ..... but there is still no information.

      There would be a desire wink
      Wiki: Tank brigade named after the Stalingrad proletariat http://wp.wiki-wiki.ru/wp/index.php/%D0%A2%D0%B0%
      D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B1%D1%80%
      D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0_%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%
      D0%BD%D0%B8_%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%
      D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D
      0%BE_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0%D
      1%80%D0%B8%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0
      Thesis: Militia of Stalingrad July 1941 - February 1943 http://detsky-lektory.ru/work/863845/Narodnoe-opo
      lchenie-stalingrada-iyul
      BOOK: Militias in battles for their hometown http://www.prlib.ru/Lib/pages/item.aspx?itemid=14
      646
  9. Bakht
    Bakht 23 March 2017 17: 12
    +2
    Everything is interesting. If you also recall some details.
    The attack on the Caucasus was planned before the war. It was planned for the 42nd year. So everything is according to plan. The Soviet General Staff had a plan of operation Blau almost in the original. For the loss of the most important documents in the German army, more than one head rolled. But Moscow considered him a deso and did not believe.
    The attack on the Caucasus and on Stalingrad simultaneously became a forced reality. Initially, Stalingrad for the Germans was just a point on the map. But as the front stretched, it became clear that the Italians, Hungarians and Romanians would not keep the flank. And it was necessary from the Caucasian direction to redirect the tank army of Goth to Stalingrad.
    And the most basic. Both in the 41st and in the 42nd Germans had reserves. In Europe, more than one division hung around on the Atlantic coast. The reserve army was almost a million people (these were both wounded and recovering and new divisions, for example, the SS tank corps was formed in the 42nd). But Hitler believed that the available forces were enough. Well, he did not study military affairs.
    After Sevastopol, Manstein offered to throw the entire 11th army to Stalingrad. But Hitler dragged her along the entire Eastern Front. In general, there are many nuances and one article does not cover everything.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2017 18: 06
      +2
      Quote: Bakht
      ... as the front stretched, it became clear that Italians, Hungarians and Romanians would not keep the flank. And it was necessary from the Caucasian direction to redirect the tank army of Goth to Stalingrad.

      Goth's retargeting was explained by stubborn defense against the northern and southern groups of Paulus. Moreover, these Russians also counterattacked constantly. lol And moving towards Stalingrad became increasingly difficult, the operation began to “freeze”.
      And the turn of Goth hit the underbelly, and increased the scope of the “ticks” for the environment. The task for the Germans was not to enter the city, but to destroy all the forces of the Red Army in the region of Stalingrad in a large cauldron.
      But, 4TA almost halved. One building was given to GA "A" (Caucasus), one building went to 6A to Paulus, and the "Grossdeutchland" finally left under Rzhev.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht 23 March 2017 21: 26
        0
        So what is the contradiction? The Russians constantly attacked from the north. The Allies could not hold the front. It is urgent to take Stalingrad and liberate the 6th Army to ensure the main direction. The main thing has always been the Caucasian direction.
        So the German strategy is quite obvious. Stalingrad is an auxiliary direction. Goth said so. Until August 1942, for him, Stalingrad was just a point on the map. The stubborn defense of the Soviet troops made it a dividing point. And most importantly - a constant threat from the north.
        Well, the game does not work in one goal. The Soviets imposed their game on the Germans.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 24 March 2017 06: 57
          +1
          Quote: Bakht
          So what is the contradiction? The Russians constantly attacked from the north. The Allies could not hold the front ...

          It was not a question of HOLDING a front. He was not there yet, there was a maneuvering phase of the operation. And about FORWARDING forward and closing of "ticks".
    2. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 27 March 2017 12: 26
      0
      Quote: Bakht
      After Sevastopol, Manstein offered to throw the entire 11th army to Stalingrad. But Hitler dragged her along the entire Eastern Front. In general, there are many nuances and one article does not cover everything.


      Part of the troops near Leningrad, participated in the defeat of the second shock army of Vlasov - do not send part of the forces of Manstein there - perhaps the second army managed to release Leningrad in 1942 ...
      1. Bakht
        Bakht 27 March 2017 12: 30
        0
        Sevastopol was taken on July 4, 1942. 2nd Shock was surrounded in June 1942. Or did Manstein have a time machine?
  10. Cartalon
    Cartalon 23 March 2017 20: 59
    0
    Quote: BigRiver
    Quote: avva2012
    ... Just, it seems that the German General Staff, nevertheless creating an operation plan did not take into account the capabilities and features of the Eastern Front.

    Initially, a strike in the direction of Stalingrad was providing, for the main blow to the Caucasus.
    But, this direction became the 2nd most important in the second half of the summer, when it began to absorb part of the forces from 4TA going to the Caucasus. And later, and completely forced to deploy it to the north.
    Not calculated qualitatively stronger
    Quote: avva2012
    ... Accordingly, reserves were not created in sufficient numbers in their rear ...

    And when did they have them? In sufficient quantity? winked
    Neither near Leningrad, nor near Rostov, nor near Moscow, etc. All on improvisations, regroupings.

    The 11th army was sent to Leningrad, and there were no reserves, and this decision is no less stupid than our offensive near Kharkov from the operational bag, thanks to the corporal.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 24 March 2017 01: 04
      +1
      It is impossible to keep a front length from Leningrad to the Caucasus. Somewhere, let it tear.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht 24 March 2017 09: 21
        0
        Why is it impossible? Static defense always breaks through. What about active defense? Didn’t they hear anything about Manstein’s plan for the defense of Ukraine in the year 43? Manstein just dreamed of a Soviet breakthrough to Kiev. Hitler insisted on a tough defense. And lost.
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 24 March 2017 09: 55
          0
          Didn’t they hear anything about Manstein’s plan for the defense of Ukraine in the year 43?

          As I understand it, this information is from the memoirs of Field Marshal? I didn’t read it, could you, or briefly describe the essence, or reset the link?
          1. Bakht
            Bakht 24 March 2017 10: 10
            +1
            Repeat Kharkov in March 1943. To allow a breakthrough of the front to Kiev and then with one blow to the Black Sea surround the erupted troops. To do this, focus the tank divisions north of Kiev in readiness to strike southward.
            This is instead of forehead hitting the Kursk ledge. But for Hitler, this plan was too bold.
            By the way, both Goth and Manstein did not believe in cutting off the Kursk ledge. Therefore, the epic battle at Prokhorovka was planned by Goth in May 1943. The main task of both Goth and Manstein was seen in the destruction of the reserves of the Red Army. So in memoirs Manstein does not dissemble. In his view, Operation Citadel was a success. Not for nothing that Stalin wanted to give Rotmistrov to the tribunal.
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 24 March 2017 10: 20
              0
              Thank. Indeed, situevina could be interesting. Well, just buy ours? "From his point of view, the operation of the Citadel was successful," but the Red Army had enough reserves for the completion of the 43rd company, and for the remaining two years. So that the general is cunning, he justifies himself. Shifts all responsibility for losing the war to Hitler. Apparently, it was customary for some generals, out there, Georgy Konstantinovich, not to mind the chief commander to kick in his “Memoirs ...”, since he already can’t answer.
              1. Bakht
                Bakht 24 March 2017 10: 29
                0
                Addition. It’s to blame for a little misleading. He wrote from memory. Now I looked in more detail. The idea was expressed BEFORE the Citadel
                The General Staff of the German Army did not have a place for a new offensive - it was formed during the spring
                The fighting ledge in the Kursk region, which received the unofficial name of the Oryol-Kursk arc. However, the Fuhrer’s headquarters also considered other offensive options. The idea of ​​the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, looked most radical. He proposed to leave the so-called “balcony”, which passed along the Mius and Seversky Donets rivers, passing the advancing Soviet troops in the Donbass and the lower reaches of the Dnieper, and then with a powerful blow from the north press them to the shore of the Azov and Black Seas and destroy

                The reserves are not endless. Manstein offered active defense, giving up the territory to destroy the erupted troops with counterattacks. Several such successful operations and the advance of the Soviet troops can be stopped before winter.
                1. avva2012
                  avva2012 24 March 2017 12: 21
                  0
                  Several such successful operations and the advance of the Soviet troops can be stopped before winter.

                  Anyhow yes. Or else, would have been a grandmother ... It is necessary to fight with what is in reality. And, then, if he had a galactic imperial fleet, then the Russians would definitely not be good. As I understand it, alozych, possessed more information about real possibilities. It’s a pity, of course, that this genius for war crimes, including for the use of OM, didn’t get a loop, oh sorry.
                  1. Bakht
                    Bakht 24 March 2017 14: 54
                    0
                    The fact of the matter is that there was something to fight. Instead of piercing the defense near Kursk with his forehead, Manstein suggested using these same reserves for counterattacks. Soviet troops Mius Front long pierced. So a trap could have worked.
                    Aloizych said a lot. And about the oil of the Caucasus and about the coal of Donbass. And nickel and what else. But in real life, he reached the 45th without all this. So his reasoning is worth little. Corporal is forever.
                    1. avva2012
                      avva2012 24 March 2017 15: 24
                      0
                      Corporal is forever.

                      Well and good, and that flawless evil, this is too much, however.
                      The fact of the matter is that there was something to fight.

                      The pendant of ferdinands and tigers is no good, were they planning to engage in a maneuvering war with this? laughing But, garbage, the military said and made tiger 2! And then the mouse on top. It seems to me that the German leadership mowed schizophrenia. With wonderful piston fighters, they were engaged in the invention of jet. It’s fine, of course, the allies said thanks to them, I don’t know, but what were they going to refuel them by the year 44? Having invented a Faustpatron (or rather borrowing it from the Americans), they continued stupidly making thicker the armor of the tanks, which as a result was burned by their own Faust, not to mention the fact that the armor of the second tiger was chopped due to the lack of necessary components. This is where the systemic reason for their loss, and not what Manstein writes about.
                      ps by the way, Manstein, Einstein, there were no Semitic roots there by chance? laughing
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht 24 March 2017 16: 31
                        0
                        These are all contentious issues. Jet aviation was just what was needed. But ... fighters. And the corporal ordered to make a fighter-bomber. Make them Germans in 42nd and they would clear the sky over Germany. In any case, the Allies thought so.
                        The tanks are even more interesting. There were few tigers and they entered heavy battalions. The bulk - these were the same fours. The Germans focused on the Panthers. Mantoifel generally considered Panther to be the best tank. Panthers released more than the Tigers. Of course gigantomania took place. But some tank commanders considered the Tiger to be a tank destroyer. In general, the concept of the Tiger did not fit into the ideas of Guderian.
                        The system error is still different, it seems to me. I must admit that twice in the 20th century the Germans fought against almost the whole world and both times touched victory. But it didn’t work out.
                        Manstein’s real name is Lewinsky. The son of the Prussian general von Lewinsky. Adopted by von Manstein. Also a Prussian general. Given the prefixes von - it is unlikely to be related to the chosen ones.
  11. avva2012
    avva2012 24 March 2017 16: 49
    0
    Bakht,
    Manstein’s real name is Lewinsky. The son of the Prussian general von Lewinsky. Adopted by von Manstein. Also a Prussian general. Given the prefixes von - it is unlikely to be related to the chosen ones.

    I know this was a joke. You know, Panther, also not a fountain. Skating rinks in a checkerboard pattern, there were other problems. I read "battles of tank experts", some of them for panthers, others for T-34. Not a specialist, but our tank was simple, cheap, and yet it more fully met the criteria for maneuver warfare. T-4, but not bad, but how many do not modify the tank designed for one weight initially, it will retain the same childhood problems with the chassis. And as for “with the whole world,” nevertheless the Hitler army is the whole European Union, and much more. I think the main problem of the Reich is ideology. Delusions have never led to anything good.
    1. Bakht
      Bakht 24 March 2017 17: 10
      +1
      I agree. This was the "system error". Well, a step below - not always adequate solutions. This is what strikes me most when reading Guderin - the complete absence of the notorious German order. At least Manstein did not suffer from this. But the smaller generals, such as Guderian, Goth apparently did not know the word "discipline" at all.
      By the way, "plates in a checkerboard pattern" is a specific German bzik. Even on the T-1 you can sometimes see
      http://vspomniv.ru/T1.htm
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 24 March 2017 17: 24
        0
        But the smaller generals, such as Guderian, Goth apparently did not know the word "discipline" at all.

        My last hair on my head stood on end when I read that for an encircled German group near Stalingrad they parachuted or drove airplanes such things as condoms, leaflets with Führer speeches or red French wine for Christmas at that moment! German quartermasters, this is generally the fifth column of the Red Army. laughing But laughter, laughter, beat off of course by a miracle. Although impromptu happens to be good, only when it is prepared in advance, so is a miracle man-made. Nevertheless, no matter what, the sites in the Urals and Siberia for the evacuated factories, apparently, were prepared in advance.
        1. Bakht
          Bakht 24 March 2017 17: 48
          0
          It's nice to chat with a person who knows the subject. This I always set as an example to "experts" and suggested moving the toilet a couple of meters in the apartment. Water, light, sewage. And in the USSR, machines were transported to the Urals and Kazakhstan, and there are still no walls and roofs, and the foundations for the machines, light, and water have all been supplied. Of course, this was preparation for war.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 24 March 2017 18: 01
            0
            Mutually, nice hi It’s just that you don’t need to be an expert sometimes, just a little, a little imagination. How long does concrete harden in frost or slush and how to put it, and how much can it serve then? And if you do not make a concrete base, then how will a serious machine work, say a press? And I remember the situation with the toilet. laughing The New Russians had a joke in the 90s, buy Khrushchev on the whole floor, and then redo it. There were cases, there were times when such a pepper, along with a jacuzzi, suddenly appeared below the floor.