"The spirit of optimism ... vital at the command post of the front." Kharkov disaster of the Red Army

75 years ago, in May 1942 of the year, almost simultaneously with the battles in the Crimea, active hostilities unfolded in the Kharkiv region, which also ended in a massive military catastrophe. The Red Army began the Second Battle of Kharkov, which ended with the encirclement and the almost complete destruction of the advancing Soviet armies. Because of the catastrophe near Kharkov, the Wehrmacht’s rapid advance in the southern strategic direction to Voronezh and Rostov-on-Don was possible, followed by access to the Volga and advance to the Caucasus.

Among the causes of the catastrophe near Kharkov, two main ones can be singled out: 1) is objective - both sides were preparing for an offensive, and the Germans had powerful mobile units in the area of ​​the Red Army offensive, which they used to counterattack and defeat the Soviet troops. The Germans were still objectively stronger, better fought; 2) subjective - the mistakes of the Soviet command, first of all the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tymoshenko, Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General I. Kh. Bagramyan, a member of the Military Council N. Khrushchev. The command of the South-West direction underestimated the enemy, and when it became clear that it was necessary to go on the defensive and withdraw the troops, she persisted in her mistake.

Soviet fighters of the Southwestern Front attack with support tank BT-7. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

Before the battle

After the winter campaign 1941-1942. the Wehrmacht as a whole regained its strength and planned to end the war during the 1942 campaign of the year. The German military and political elite still maintained confidence in the superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army. Adolf Hitler 15 March declared that during the summer of 1942, the Russian army would be completely destroyed. However, Hitler’s headquarters saw the impossibility of repeating the 1941 campaign of the year - with a simultaneous attack on the whole Russian front. It was decided to attack in one strategic direction - the south. Hitler ordered the main efforts of the German troops to direct south to capture the Caucasus and break through to the Volga. The Germans planned in successive operations in parts to defeat the enemy.

The winter offensive of the Soviet troops in March 1942 stalled, the Red Army went on the defensive. The Soviet high command predicted that the enemy would launch a new strategic offensive in the summer of 1942. The Soviet Headquarters and the General Staff, proceeding from the fact that the most powerful Wehrmacht grouping of 70 divisions were still located in the Moscow (central) strategic direction, came to the conclusion that the main struggle with the onset of summer will unfold again in the Moscow region. Here the main decisive blow of the enemy was expected and reserves were concentrated. It was also taken into account that with a lack of well-prepared reserves and aviation, large offensive operations of the Red Army are impractical. By the middle of March 1942, the General Staff had prepared a plan of operation for the spring and early summer of 1942. “The main idea of ​​the plan: active strategic defense, the accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. “In my presence,” wrote A. M. Vasilevsky, “B. M. Shaposhnikov reported the plan to the Supreme Commander, then work on the plan continued.”

Thus, the General Staff put forward a proposal to organize temporary strategic defense, and to move to large scale offensive actions only after exhausting the enemy forces. This installation was generally approved by the Supreme. At the end of March 1942, the Headquarters made a decision on the strategic plan for the summer of 1942, agreeing with the conclusions and opinion of the Chief of the General Staff. At the same time, the decision provided for the simultaneous conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas: near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in Smolensk, Lgov-Kursk and Kharkov directions, in the Crimea. Private operations were supposed to “consolidate the success of the winter campaign, improve the operational situation of our troops, retain the strategic initiative and thwart the measures taken by the Hitlerites to prepare for the offensive in the summer of 1942. It was assumed that all of this would create favorable conditions for the deployment of even more significant offensive operations on to all the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea ”(A. M. Vasilevsky. A Matter of Life).

One of the private operations was to be Kharkov. In the second half of March, the 1942 Military Council of the South-Western Directorate - Commander Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, Emergency Situations Commission N. S. Khrushchev, Head of the Task Force, General I. Kh. Bagramyan - addressed the Supreme Commander with a proposal to conduct an offensive operation with the forces of Bryansk , The South-Western and Southern fronts with the aim of defeating the opposing enemy groups and entering the line Gomel - Kiev - Cherkasy - Pervomaisk - Nikolaev. As a result of the Barvenkovo-Lozovsky operation (January 1942), at the junction of the South-Western and Southern fronts, the Soviet troops managed to penetrate deep into the enemy's position. To the south of Kharkov, a so-called Barvenkovsky (or Izyum) bulge to a depth of 90-100 km was formed, from which a direct threat was created to the flank and deep rear of the main German group that occupied the Donbas and the coast of the Azov Sea.

The offensive was proposed to attract troops of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts, significantly strengthening them with the headquarters reserves. It was planned to carry out two private operations: one - by the forces of the South-Western Front to defeat the German grouping in the Chuguev-Balakley area; the other - by the forces of the Southern Front in order to destroy the enemy troops in the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk area. These operations were to strengthen the flanks of the Soviet troops, located on the Barvenkovsky ledge, and create favorable conditions for the liberation of Kharkov. To achieve its goals, Tymoshenko’s headquarters requested 500, in addition, thousands of soldiers and 1500 tanks. Tymoshenko mistakenly believed that the Germans in the South-Western direction suffered serious losses in manpower, weapons and military equipment and that without a sufficiently long respite and receiving major reinforcements from the deep rear, they are not able to proceed to decisive actions. Considering these circumstances, the marshal believed that if the Headquarters substantially supported his direction with reserves and equipment, then, having undertaken a number of interrelated offensive operations, he would free Kharkov and Donbass from the enemy.

The Stavka considered the considerations of the Military Council of the South-Western direction at the end of March. The bid rejected a proposal for a major offensive in the south. The requested Tymoshenko large reserves, Stalin did not give. The Southwestern Command was instructed to develop a plan to crush only the Kharkov enemy group and liberate Kharkov. The successful implementation of this operation made it possible to create conditions for an attack on Dnepropetrovsk. In general, the fact that hundreds of thousands of new soldiers did not give direction to the Southwestern command was a blessing, they would also be put into the ground, or they would be taken prisoner, which led to an even bigger catastrophe in the southern strategic direction.

Columns of the German 6 Army in the village in the Kharkiv region

The German 150-mm field howitzer sIG 33 is firing in the village during the battle for Kharkov. The photo was taken in the operational sector of the 6 of the German army

Plans Forces of the parties

Red Army. The Southwestern Command developed a plan for the Kharkov operation, which was approved by the General Headquarters. The operation was planned to be carried out by the forces of the South-Western Front by delivering two converging blows: one from the Volchansk area, and the second from the Barvenkovsky protrusion in the general direction to Kharkov. The first stage of the operation involved a breakthrough by the Soviet troops of the first two defense lines, the defeat of the enemy’s tactical reserves and the introduction of mobile groups into the breakthrough. The total depth of the offensive is 20-30 km, the duration of the stage is three days. The second stage was planned to be carried out within 3-4 days with the advance of the advancing troops to a depth of 24-35 km. In the course of it it was planned to crush the operational reserves of the enemy, to withdraw by the main forces of the front strike forces directly to the nearest approaches to Kharkov, and to complete the encirclement and rout of the Kharkov enemy group with mobile units.

The main blow from Barvenkovsky ledge was to be inflicted on the troops of the 6 Army under the command of Lieutenant-General A. M. Gorodnyansky (8 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades), and the army group under the command of Major-General L. V. Bobkin (2 rifle division, 6 th cavalry corps and tank brigade). 6-I army had to break through the enemy defenses and develop an offensive on Kharkov from the south. The army group was to develop an attack on Krasnograd, and thus ensure the actions of the 6 Army from the southwest. In order to develop success in the second stage, the 6 and 21 tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough in the 23 Army, striking in the general direction against Lyubotin. In cooperation with the 3 cavalry corps from the northern strike group, they were to complete the encirclement of the Kharkov enemy group. At the same time, the 21 Tank Corps of General GI Kuzmin — the 198, the 199, the 64 — and the 4 — motorized rifle brigade — had to develop an attack on the Serpents and on Lyvotin on the fifth or sixth day. By this time, the 23 Tank Corps of General E.G. Pushkin - 6-I, 130-I, 131-I tank, 23-I motorized rifle brigade - had to go to the area of ​​Valkov. The overall composition of the forces of the southern shock group: 10 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 11 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades. The 5 and 55 regiments of rocket artillery were also under the operational control of General Gorodnyansky.

From the Volchansk area, another assault group attacked — the 28-I army of Lieutenant-General DI Ryabyshev and the flanking formations of the 21-th and 38-th armies of Major-General V.N. Gordov and Major-General K.S. Moskalenko. As a mobile group, Ryabyshev was given the 3 Guards Cavalry Corps of Major-General VD Kryuchenkin. The troops of this group were to develop an offensive on Kharkov from the north-east towards the main attack force advancing from the south. The Northern group consisted of 13 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 8 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades.

Thus, the two strike groups of the South-Western Front included 23 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry (6 divisions) and 2 tank corps. Most tank brigades (560 tanks) were attached to rifle divisions and should have been used to directly support infantry in the first echelon. The breakthrough of German defense and the development of success was supported by the entire front-line and army aviation of the Southwestern Front - 656 aircraft. In addition, 233 vehicles from the Southern Front were engaged to support the offensive of the southern strike force.

From the south, the advancing troops of the South-Western Front were to provide the Southern Front, whose command was to organize defense on the southern front of Barvenkovsky ledge by the 57 Army under the command of Lieutenant General KP Podlas and 9 Army Major General F. M. Kharitonov. The 57 Army consisting of five rifle divisions, reinforced by three regiments of the GDG and a separate tank battalion, defended the 80-kilometer front on the south protrusion. The 9 Army is six rifle divisions, one rifle, 121 and 15-I tank brigades, five artillery regiments of the RGK on the southern and southeast. Behind them was the reserve of the commander of the Southern Front: the 5th cavalry corps of General I.A. Pliev and 12-I tank brigade. In addition, if necessary, fighting 57 and 9 army could support the reserve 2 th cavalry corps, two rifle divisions and 92 th heavy tank battalion, located at the junction of two fronts. Thus, the Southern Front had impressive forces. However, the High Command of the South-West direction did not set active tasks for the troops of the Southern Front, which subsequently adversely affected the course of the Kharkov operation.

Wehrmacht. On the German side, Soviet forces were opposed by the forces of Army Group South, under the command of F. von Bock, comprising: 6-I army of F. Paulus, 17-I army of G. Goth and 1-I tank army of E. Kleist. The 14 Infantry and 2 Tank Divisions of the 6 Army and the 1 Infantry Division of the Kleist Army Group operated against the South-Western Front.

In general, the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops over the enemy was insignificant. This was due to the low staffing of the Soviet divisions - 8-9 thousand people each. German divisions were more weighty - equipped with manpower and equipment for 90%, and numbered thousands of people for 14-15. The connections of the South-Western Front had a one-and-a-half superiority in guns and mortars. On the side of the Red Army there was some superiority in the tanks. The number of aircraft on both sides was approximately equal. But the Germans had superiority in bomber aircraft.

It is worth noting that the German command was also preparing an offensive operation in the Kharkiv region. 10 May 1942 Paulus presented von Bock the Friedericus plan. The start of the operation was scheduled for 18 May. The purpose of the operation was to cut off rear communications to the Soviet troops located south of the Donets River and occupy the area north of the r. Raisins. This area was planned to be used as a springboard for the deployment of further offensive. The German command planned to cut the Barvenkovsky ledge with two blows, striking them in descending directions: the first was from the 6 Army to the south, the second from the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk region in the north-west direction by the Kleist army group. German units were replenished with personnel and equipment, new infantry and tank divisions were being transferred from France.

At the same time, the Germans spared no effort to strengthen the already occupied lines and to improve the defense. In the Kharkov direction, the main strip had two or three positions with a total depth of 6-7 km. The basis of each of them was the strong points and the nodes of resistance created around the settlements. The second defensive zone was built in 10-15 km from the front edge, the rear - in 20-25 km at the boundary of settlements Zmiev, Chuguev, Liptsy, Cheremoshnoe. A well-developed system of defense and fire interaction allowed Paulus to keep the entire front of the upcoming Soviet offensive by six infantry divisions, the rest of the troops were on the rear lines, ready to provide support at any sector. In addition, the Germans knew that the Russians were preparing for an offensive. The regrouping and concentration of the Soviet troops were carried out without special observance of measures of secrecy, camouflage and lasted almost 30 days. On the preparation of the Soviet troops reported and defectors. As a result, the Germans were ready for the Soviet offensive.

Thus, in the area of ​​Kharkov and Barvenkovsky ledge both sides were simultaneously preparing for an attack. Therefore, the Germans had serious forces in the area and were able to respond quickly to the offensive of the Soviet troops. Further, a negative role (for the Red Army) was played by the qualitatively better preparation of the German command for such scenarios and the higher combat capability of the Wehrmacht during this period.

Tankers of the Soviet 5 Guards Tank Brigade with their T-34-76

Thus, the command of the South-Western direction saw the danger of a German strike in the area of ​​the Barvenkovsky bulge. To cover the southern shock group from the flank were allocated serious forces. The troops received an order: ““ to create a solid defense, developed in depth, with a well-thought-out anti-tank defense system, with maximum development of engineering structures, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles and a wide adaptation to the defense of human settlements ”. Directive No. 00275 of April 28, signed by Tymoshenko, Khrushchev and Baghramian, in particular, stated that "... the enemy may attempt to eliminate the Barvenko-Lozovsky bulge and at the same time launch an offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Kupyansk in order to reach the main lines of communications of our armies operating on the inner wings of the fronts of the South-West direction ".

The problem was that the orders and directives were changed several times a day, and the Soviet plan did not take into account the possible actions of the enemy. The Germans considered the headquarters of the South-Western direction to be incapable of any active actions. “Strange as it may seem, the Front Military Council did not consider the enemy dangerous,” recalls the former commander of the 38 Army, “... I was strongly assured that the opposing enemy was weak and that we had everything necessary to defeat it. The Military Council of the South-Western direction was convinced of the infallibility of its assessment of the forces of the opposing enemy. ”

On the eve of the offensive, the commander convened a meeting of commanders in Kupyansk; once again assuring them of the weakness of the enemy, he spoke of the full advantage of his armies - both in manpower and in technical support. “The spirit of optimism ... was vital at the command post of the front,” Moskalenko recalled.

T-34 130 Tank Tank Brigade captured near Kharkov

To be continued ...

Comments

[marmalade]

as for the Soviet troops, for 42 years many analysts assessed as “training” and the result of these exercises was Stalingrad ... we still hadn’t had clear interaction and understanding completely + the winter victory near Moscow “intoxicated” us and the Wehrmacht was firm the belief that this happened by accident ...

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Marmalade

many analysts rate it as "training"

normally "learned" so ... and before the war what were you doing?

[marmalade]

You yourself know what ... they learned to beat the warrior on its territory and with little blood without succumbing to provocation

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Marmalade

learned to beat the warrior on its territory and with little blood

Well, yes, but they could not organize an offensive without plunging into a "boiler" on their territory.

[Molot1979]

And before the war, the army was reformed. If anything, the general military in the USSR was introduced only in 1939. Just in time for the start of World War II. So by the beginning of World War II there was not even a really trained reserve. The explosive growth of the army created an inevitable problem - there were not enough trained commanders. Or, do you think it was a coincidence that lieutenants commanded battalions and captains regiments? There is a reinforced concrete reason for everything. Not "mass repressions", but a sharp increase in the number of aircraft became the reason. Plus, new equipment went, the states changed under the influence of the experience of an ongoing war. So it is not surprising that it was precisely during the war that it was necessary to learn to fight. 1941 is not a study yet. This is a creep from the disaster. But 1942 in this regard is quite "educational" is obtained. And the training was not without success: for the whole of 1942, as many people were lost as they were for six months in 1941. The density of losses halved, despite the fact that the Germans gained a lot of success. Well, what this year ended with, you already know.

[ImPerts]

Stalin believed that the army would be ready in 1942. And he did his best to delay the start of the war.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

Stalin believed that the army would be ready in 1942.

as practice has shown, we are never ready for war, even when we attacked ourselves (Finnish campaign)

[ImPerts]

I do not agree. The Finnish company was a failure in the first half due to the inertia of the higher and middle command staff. It was an attempt to deal with the enemy by the ways and methods of the Civil War. The second half, where aviation, artillery, tanks were already involved, led to negotiations.
Stalin, speaking to graduates of high schools, spoke about this.
What really could not decide that in Finnish, that at the beginning of the Second World War, this is a communication problem. The confusion of the first months of the Second World War, the lack of knowledge about the real situation, the position of the units, their capabilities led to a panic retreat, although there are many examples of heroes and successful actions of the Red Army in the first months.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

I do not agree. The Finnish company was a failure in the first half due to the inertia of the higher and middle command staff. It was an attempt to deal with the enemy by the ways and methods of the Civil War.

What did I write about? All the same, at first they are not ready for war, and then we “study” on bones and blood.

[Nehist]

I do not agree !!! The experience of Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol was in Finnish, as we can see from the Finnish results, conclusions were drawn but fundamentally wrong

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Nehist

In Finnish was the experience of Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol

if you mean the sequence, then yes, the Finnish was after Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol, nothing more. What kind of experience? The completely different nature of war and terrain. In the east, maneuver warfare in the steppe is approximately equal in strength of troops, in the north - the assault of fortifications and the counterguerrilla war at the same time. The same mess at the beginning and a bloody victory afterwards.

[Glory1974]

What really could not decide that in Finnish, that at the beginning of the Second World War, this is a communication problem.

They tried to justify their failures in command and control by the lack of communication. Of course, there were communication problems, but not as catastrophic as they are trying to present us.
In the initial period of the war by the shooting of signalmen, the bosses tried to justify themselves. In July 1941, Stalin issued an order prohibiting the shooting of signalmen.
And the HF communication system was of such a quality that the front commanders recognized each other's voices by telephone.

[RUSS]

Quote: nizhegorodec

as practice has shown, we are never ready for war, even when we attacked ourselves (Finnish campaign)

An example of the Soviet-Polish war ....

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: RUSS

An example of the Soviet-Polish war ....

yes here, no matter what the war, then an example: Hassan, Khalkhin goal ...

[Pancer]

Quote: ImPerts

Stalin believed that the army would be ready in 1942.

Yes, a fact.
And the fact that Russophobia anti-Soviet people are telling us all here .. well, let’s say for everyone there is a RESPONSE here-http: //vn-parabellum.com/battles/kharkov.html

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Pancer

Russophobic anti-Soviet .. well, let’s say for every sneeze here, there is an ANSWER

Yes, there are answers, but which ones:

Non-observance of secrecy ...

Bad disguise ...

Errors in calculating the transfer of enemy troops ....

Poor organization of communication ....

underestimation of the enemy ....

inconsistency in the actions of the troops ....

reassessment of their strength .....

in short, a full bunch of errors, showing all the mediocrity of command and control. Well, what does it have to do with it

Quote: Pancer

Russophobic anti-Soviet ..

moreover, he wrote this article in 1987 in the Soviet Military History Journal, Major General of the Soviet Army, KVN, Associate Professor

[ImPerts]

Quote: nizhegorodec

this article in 1987 in the Soviet "Military History Journal" major general of the Soviet Army, KVN, associate professor

There they started to write a lot of things for the sake of conjuncture. This is not specifically about this major general, it is about the era of glasnost and perestroika.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

There they started to write a lot of things for the sake of conjuncture.

actually this article was brought as a rebuke to all

Quote: Pancer

Russophobia anti-Soviet ..

so no conjuncture

[avt]

Quote: nizhegorodec

in short, a full bunch of errors, showing all the mediocrity of command and control. Well, what does it have to do with it

In short - WHERE was the French army in 44 days, moreover, under the guidance of marshals-winners and the type without repression? For 1942, I don’t ask. As well as the number of German at that time.

Quote: Molot1979

And before the war, the army was reformed. If anything, the general military in the USSR was introduced only in 1939. Just in time for the start of World War II. So by the beginning of World War II there was not even a really trained reserve. The explosive growth of the army created an inevitable problem - there were not enough trained commanders.

This is even half the trouble - there was no banal time for coherence in the interaction of newly formed parts and compounds. In the end, yes - they really studied with blood, having lost tank units in oncoming battles.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Molot1979

Not "mass repressions", but a sharp increase in the number of aircraft became the reason. Plus, new equipment went, the states changed under the influence of the experience of an ongoing war. So it is not surprising that it was precisely during the war that it was necessary to learn to fight.

Yeah and the Germans didn’t it? Both new equipment and troops were increasing, but they had already arrived as trained, especially since the second year of the war was on

[ImPerts]

The Wehrmacht at that time was not Khuhra-Mukhra. The German General Staff was called the 8 wonder of the world. Operation planning was top notch. Even near Kursk, the Wehrmacht was able to unpleasantly surprise us, although by that time they had to announce full mobilization and untrained units began to fall on the front. By the end of 43, this was already clearly visible, but in 1944 it was already total, rowing children and the elderly.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

The Wehrmacht at that time was not Khuhra-Mukhra.

but why did our “galaxy of outstanding ..." "armed with the most advanced ideology ..." not become a miracle by then? Yes, and the Red Army also did not shine with training, all on the heroism of some soldiers and officers left.

[ImPerts]

Quote: nizhegorodec

and why is our "galaxy of outstanding ..." "armed with the most advanced ideology ...

1944 and 1945 - it was already a galaxy. Here, neither Jodl, nor Beck, nor Halder, nor Guderian could do anything or come up with anything.
Neither Montgomery, nor Eisenhower ... But Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky, etc.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

1944 and 1945 - it was already a galaxy.

so I ask about 1941 and 1942

Quote: ImPerts

Neither Montgomery nor Eisenhower

why not them?

[ImPerts]

Quote: nizhegorodec

as I ask about 1941 and 1942

Zhukov and Vasilevsky, Moscow, counteroffensive near Moscow.

Quote: nizhegorodec

why not them?

If you compare Montgomery and Rommel, I will give the palm to Rommel. And then, in Europe, these two military leaders did not show anything significant.
All combat-ready units, their maximum, were on the eastern front.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

Zhukov and Vasilevsky, Moscow, counteroffensive near Moscow.

to exhausted Germans? Here is the merit, most likely the rear and transport, who managed to transfer large masses of equipment and troops, armed and equipped them and our intelligence agents, who managed to unravel the direction of the attack of the Japanese General Staff. And then there were frontal attacks against German troops not prepared for winter by superior forces. Zhukov then tried to repeat this under Rzhev, but .... did not work, unfortunately.

[ImPerts]

Quote: nizhegorodec

to exhausted Germans?

Was it not so near Kharkov in 1942? On the exhausted parts of the Red Army piled fresh reserves of the Wehrmacht.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

If you compare Montgomery and Rommel, I will give the palm to Rommel.

why is it, ultimately Rommel did not win. His somewhat successful “cavalry” attacks were of only tactical importance, and the Allies strategically defeated.

[hohol95]

In fact of the matter! The supply of the desert fox went to the Eastern Front! So he went to the "cavalry attack" chasing the Libyan and Egyptian deserts BRAVING, BUT BATTLE 8 army! The scale was certainly not the same as ours, but managed the Germans and the remnants of Italians only in 1943 with the GREAT HELP OF AMERICA !!!

[avt]

Quote: nizhegorodec

so I ask about 1941 and 1942

Again

Quote: avt

- WHERE was the army of France in 44 days, moreover, under the guidance of marshals-winners and the type without repression?

For a second under the command of those who dealt with all

Quote: ImPerts

Jodl, neither Beck, nor Halder, nor Guderian

almost past World War I?

[vova1973]

And who could fight at all against the Germans? They defeated all armies in Europe in six months. They were the best at that time. Our only by the year 44 learned to fight.

[Glory1974]

but why did our “galaxy of outstanding ..." "armed with the most advanced ideology ..." not become a miracle by then?

Well, how did she not? Broke the ridge 8 wonder of the world, is this not an indicator?

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: ImPerts

By the end of the 43rd, this was already clearly visible, and in 1944 it was already total, rowing children and the elderly.

Look at the faces of our soldiers in Harbin 1945 - a large half of a young man 18-19 years old.
There was very little chance of surviving that massacre.

[BRIZ1981]

well, marches and roundabout maneuvers they went around the Maginot line but well done, but explain to me a fool how to get around the manerheim line that ours took into our heads, and in terms of timing it turned out as much as the Germans went around the French, and after that I don’t understand where the logic of clay feet

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: BRIZ1981

ours took over forehead, and in terms of time it turned out as much as the Germans went around the French

But is the timing important? The Germans, after bypassing the Maginot line, cut through the French defenses and went across the coast to France, defeating an equal army and occupying France. They took Mannerheim’s line, putting a bunch of people, struggling to defeat the tiny army of Finland, and failing to achieve the solution to the main task: to cut Finland, to plant their government led by Kuusinen, and, in fact, to occupy it.

[BRIZ1981]

you’re not talking about that task. Molvis deputy polit. The task was to move the border from Leningrad and the rest of the husk was fulfilled or as a bonus, and you forgot to impose this war on us and after it the country became an outcast political and economic, so then the world community imposed its rules on us and do not forget the slogan of arrogance sounds like Russia - the prison of nations changes only the names grew imp ussr not the essence

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: BRIZ1981

the task was to move the border from Leningrad and it was completed

yeah, just such a task for boobies like you. Read who Kuusinen is and why he was pulled out of the Comintern on the eve of the war. Only look for information not in textbooks on the history of the USSR.

Quote: BRIZ1981

and you forgot this war was forced upon us

again

Quote: BRIZ1981

3 difference in the supply of supplies
4 all men of military age have been raked into the Finnish army without paying attention to health plus repression to deviators

So what? Say what I wanted, dear?

[BRIZ1981]

and there’s nowhere else to go around the Mannerheim line
2 a tiny army was sitting in long-term fortifications made not in a hurry, and during the assault on a defender, a threefold numerical advantage was taken, but even this does not give full guarantee for victory
3 difference in the supply of supplies
4 all men of military age were raked into the Finnish army without paying attention to health plus repression to deviators there were who your dad was and who could go along the stage with the dodger son a good law by the way

[BRIZ1981]

Well, not quite so the question arises of where exactly 10000 tanks have gone and I don’t remember how many planes you don’t answer
1 replicas of English and American cars adopted by themselves weren’t quite a step in front of
2 most of the commanders showed low qualifications in the winter war when the Mehlis complained that he had to drive these barchuk to the front lines because of this and high losses, because from the unit there were horns and legs and the commander with the commissar went to Leningrad for replenishment, and in vain read memoirs of both our and Finnish generals I advise you to sober up and take off your pink glasses
3 tactics showed complete failure even in Spain and that something hasn’t changed and why it’s not bad with us, plus repressions I hope you know who this person is, I’ll recall the actions of this gbshnik still attributed for some reason Beria is strange didn’t so because Beria is not a Jew
4 42years gobbled up all the Lutsk reserves, I mean I learned a lot, but by the way, don't forget the techniques of the land-lens technique as well

[avt]

Quote: BRIZ1981

Well, not quite so the question arises of where exactly 10000 tanks have gone and I don’t remember how many planes you don’t answer

Lost in the three pines? Everything remained in the oncoming battles in the summer of 1941. On aviation, to some extent, to Zhukov, he gave the order to bomb from heights of 400 meters. Actually, the Il-4 unit, which stormed the German tank column, didn’t get out of the battle. One car under the command of Gastello.

Quote: BRIZ1981

1 replicas of English and American cars adopted by themselves weren’t quite a step in front of

Question to Marshal Misha - he was deputy in armament. According to Aglitsky I agree, but according to Christie - no. 34 came out of BT. Well, the fact that the 41st modernization potential was exhausted by them, well, actually, 34-ku and KV were already put in the series. BUT! Time! It’s not enough to make a car, you need to train the crew and teach them how to operate as part of a unit, and this is a year or two no less. And taking into account the staff of the pre-war mechanized division ..... in general, look - competent people have painted the topic for a long time.

Quote: BRIZ1981

42years gobbled up all Lutsk reserves I mean

And already Martians fought. Maybe the Poles are right, well, what do they paint in their museums about how they took Berlin in 1945 with the remnants of the Soviet Army?

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: avt

Well, the fact that the 41st modernization potential was exhausted by them, well, actually, 34-ku and KV were already put in the series. BUT! Time! It’s not enough to make a car, you need to train the crew and teach them how to operate as part of a unit, and this is a year or two no less. And taking into account the staff of the pre-war mechanized division ..... in general, look - competent people have painted the topic for a long time.

Samsonov, as always, threw Temko ....

I agree 100% that it is necessary to fight with a quality that consists of experience and ability. This is especially true for tank and mechanized formations.
As an example.

... Comparison of the tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet and German tanks leaves no stone unturned by the common thesis about the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles - they were comparable. The situation was much worse with the staff.
Junior specialists — tank commanders, driver mechanics, gun commanders, machine gunner radio operators — trained in training battalions and junior command personnel. In connection with the formation of a large number of new units, an additional network of courses was created in the districts and armies, but this was not enough. The situation was aggravated by the fact that many new tank units were created on the basis of rifle and cavalry units and formations. Mass retraining of personnel was organized — infantrymen, cavalrymen, artillerymen, signalmen became ... tank mechanics, gunners and other specialists of the tank forces. In a short time it was impossible to solve such a problem. As a result, the new crews did not have time to master the technology by the beginning of the war, many driver mechanics, for example, received only 1,5 - 2-hour tank driving practice. There was a catastrophic lack of command personnel. The staffing of most of the mechanized corps formed in the spring of 1941, according to the command and command structure, was 22 - 40%, and for the youngest - from 16 to 50%. On June 1, 1941 at the headquarters of the 15th, 16th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps even such departments as operational and intelligence were not staffed! ...
Baryatinsky, Soviet still in battle ..., p. 8

If someone thinks that in the 42nd situation has improved qualitatively, then this is a clear misconception. The Red Army and the Wehrmacht were at different levels in terms of the quality of the organizational structures of tank and mechanized formations, both in 1941 and in 1942.
If the Wehrmacht found the "golden section" of tank divisions, groups and armies from autumn 1939 to June 1940, then the Red Army was only on the way to an effective combination of tanks, vehicles, field, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, etc. in independent shock compounds. Which once again proves the absurdity of the version of the preventive war of Germany against the USSR.
Again.
The Red Army did not manage to bring its forces in the organizational and mobilization plan by June 1941, in order to fight on equal terms (and later win) with the Wehrmacht. And do not think that the General Staff did not do anything, or did something very badly.
As an example, we can compare the state of our football team with the teams that will come to Russia for the Confederation Cup. The same story - there are many football players, we have built first-class fields. But the game, and the results, no ...

[BRIZ1981]

except bt would be even what mass unspeakable right t-26 and yet 28

[BRIZ1981]

the answer to your question from which year the Struvbat appeared and the conditions for conscription in the army before the war, then you’ll understand where the Martians came from

[Kenneth]

Many analysts are Beshanov forever offended?

[ImPerts]

GS suggestions were reasonable. The headquarters was aware of the power of the Wehrmacht, therefore, emphasis was placed on defense, active, but defense. And von Bock opposed them. Tymoshenko had to stop on time. But to see the NS and the member of the Armed Forces convinced Tymoshenko.
Small touches to the portrait.
We know about Khrushchev and the expression about voluntarism did not arise out of thin air.
But Baghramyan ... Ivan Khristoforovich loved to get involved.
During the war, troops under the command of Baghramyan were the first to reach the Baltic. To present this event with more pathos, the Armenian general personally poured a bottle of water from the Baltic Sea and ordered his adjutant to fly to Moscow with this bottle to Stalin. He flew. But while he was flying, the Germans counterattacked and threw Baghramyan away from the Baltic coast. By the time the adjutant arrived in Moscow, they were already aware of this, but the adjutant himself did not know - there was no radio in the plane. And so the proud adjutant enters Stalin’s office and pathosly proclaims:
- Comrade Stalin, General Baghramyan sends you Baltic water!
Stalin takes the bottle, twirls it in his hands for a few seconds, then gives it back to the adjutant and says:
- Give it back to Baghramyan, say, let it pour out where you took it.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

Give it back to Baghramyan, say, let it pour out where you took it.

[Okolotochny]

Class, is this a joke or from life? If from life - Respect of IVS. In one phrase, put "in the stall."

[Okolotochny]

You are not against the fact that I’ll put this case in my piggy bank?

[ImPerts]

This is already a national treasure!
https://ruposters.ru/life/21-04-2015/20-luchshih-
shutok-stalina

[avt]

Quote: ImPerts

GS suggestions were reasonable.

Yes . At that time, from the operational-tactical side. BUT! Stalin had STRATEGIC reasons ... and perhaps political ones too, to carry out practically THREE strategic operations. The deblockade of Leningrad, there’s nothing to explain here. Stripping Crimea, without which the fleet is cramped tightly by aviation on the coast of the Caucasus. And Kharkov. This was a mystery to me before - Why Kharkov? While the man did not tell odini (I really didn’t take a word), and Sudoplatov later confirmed in his memoirs. There, the Germans got a nuclear laboratory with a part of the staff, which was supervised by the SS-ec and physicist Hotherman, who was arrested in 1937 as a German spy and for whom physicists and Bohr in particular were asked. As a result, they released them. By the way, in 1938, Vasya Stalin’s friend tested equipment there-friend or foe on airplanes. Well, in the end, Stalin took over a burden that nearly broke the RKKA ridge. The General Staff turned out to be right. But this is the result and the background we know what events! And so that the present fiery accusers would take the place of Stalin when they would regularly put a bulletin from Leningrad on those tables ??? When would you read the report on the supplies of Sevastopol? And when the remaining material from the underground of the Tainitskaya tower of the Kremlin was evacuated in 1941 ? Know-it-alls will now tell about how an atomic project in the USSR began with a letter from a front-line soldier.

[ImPerts]

Interesting. Did not know.
"Sudoplatov P.A. Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930 – 1950 years."
These?

[avt]

Quote: ImPerts

"Sudoplatov P.A. Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930 – 1950 years."

Yes, but separately, at the same time, an extended version was practically released specifically for the atomic project. I won’t tell the name - I gave it to a friend, but I don’t remember the name for memory.

[parusnik]

The command of the South-West direction underestimated the enemy

... Of course, there is still an underestimation of intelligence data ...

[Olgovich]

The Kharkov catastrophe is the result of the blatant mistakes of the Stavka that led to the Nazi attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

But by Order 227, the main responsibility was assigned to anyone, but not to the true culprits of the catastrophe, who never suffered any, even symbolic penalties.

[Kostya Andreev]

in this case, in order to justify, modern and Soviet historians and history buffs, as well as stubborn patriots say: "I had to buy time." A universal formula that allows you to write off any mistakes and mistakes !! you can also add about the experience of the Wehrmacht and about the lack of a second front among the allies, and little experience, coupled with a large number of uneducated in the Red Army !!!
I do not agree with you about order 227, as this is an order, not an explanatory note!
In general, it is strange that Comrade Stalin was abruptly reprisal for minor trivialities, and here .... maybe, but why punish them if they carried out the order.
The paths by which he punished and merciful (for me) are inscrutable.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

I do not agree with you about order 227, as this is an order, not an explanatory note!

Read the Order again: there is an explanatory part, where both the main reasons and the culprits are indicated- "lack of discipline and order in companies, battalions, etc. This is our MAJOR flaw. "

[RUSS]

Quote: Olgovich

The Kharkov catastrophe is the result of the blunders of the Bet that led to the advance of the Nazis in Stalingrad and the Caucasus

The essence of the article is all to blame, Stalin has nothing to do with it.

[Olgovich]

Quote: RUSS

The essence of the article is all to blame, Stalin has nothing to do with it.

Of course, nothing to do with: he was just the Commander-in-Chief ...

[avt]

Quote: RUSS

The essence of the article is all to blame, Stalin has nothing to do with it.

Quote: Olgovich

Of course, nothing to do with: he was just the Commander-in-Chief ...

Well, yes, it was necessary as Yeltsin - ,, I’m leaving. Forgive me the Russians. "Or like Nikolashka at the Dno station - to strike out the conspirators on paper, and then roll the telegram to Alekseyev at the General Staff - I say they joked and markers - re-hide. Then everything would be like one mobilized and would be inspired to beat the adversary .. Ah-ahh! It was still necessary to issue an order for the Army and Navy to issue, well, as in 1917, about the abolition of all punishment and at the same time to cancel the ranks and titles. brain weakened. Well, not the first time, already somehow .... tradition ... ponimash.

[RUSS]

Quote: avt

Well, yes, it was necessary as Yeltsin - ,, I'm leaving

And here is Yeltsin again? By the way, he transferred the power on time to the GDP, did not drag him to collapse, but how the Communists reached out and merged the country in the 91st.

Quote: avt

The downturn of the eternal candidates for monarchic nobility completely weakened the brain. Well, not the first time, already somehow .... tradition ... ponimash.

boor and ignoramus

[avt]

Quote: RUSS

boor and ignoramus

Well, still rude and not feminine - there is such a thing. But the nerdy intelligent one still answer the question then essentially

Quote: avt

It’s weak to quote WHERE in WHAT Army of the World they sing about how this same army will all die on its territory and ultimately win ???

And not excuses by type

Quote: RUSS

It was not necessary to sing songs

[captain]

No, dear RUSS. The essence of the article is to whitewash our generals. My opinion on this operation is very different from the opinion of our military historians. I believe that our leadership did not possess strategic thinking, had no idea about the forces of the Wehrmacht, did not take into account the weak training of our troops and did not train the troops. Most importantly, our leaders did not have accurate intelligence about the intentions of the enemy (although from films and other sources we all seemed to know, even to what extent Hitler went to sleep in his pajamas). During the war years, we never learned how to conduct military intelligence. Tymoshenko drew conclusions based on the intelligence that he had available, apparently very weak. By the way, NS Baghramyan is to blame for this (NS is responsible for organizing intelligence). My father's cousin at that time was the commander of the artillery battalion of regimental artillery. He said that our generals were very self-confident and behaved already as winners. Summed up self-confidence.

[RUSS]

Quote: captain

He said that our generals were very self-confident and behaved already as winners. Summed up self-confidence

Well in the song of those times, self-confidence is shown ...

If tomorrow is war, if the enemy attacks,
If the dark force comes
As one person, the whole Soviet people
Will stand up for a free Motherland

Chorus:

On earth in heaven and sea
Our refrain is both powerful and severe:
If tomorrow is war
If the hike is tomorrow,
Be ready for the trip today!

If war tomorrow, the country will stir
From Kronstadt to Vladivostok,
The country will be stirred up, great and strong,
And we will cruelly break the enemy!

Chorus:

A plane will fly, a machine gun will be sharpened,
Mighty tanks rumble
And the battleships will go, and the infantry will go,
And dashing tachanka rush

Chorus:


We don’t want war, but we will protect ourselves-
We mount defense for a reason.
And in enemy land, we will crush the enemy
Little blood, mighty blow!

Chorus:

Rise up the people, pack your camping trip
Drums Drums Stronger!
Musicians, go ahead! Singers, go ahead!
Come our victorious song!

[avt]

Quote: RUSS

Well in the song of those times, self-confidence is shown ...
If tomorrow is war, if the enemy attacks,

It’s weak to quote WHERE in WHAT Army of the World they sing about how this same army will all die on its territory and ultimately win ??? Well, there is a search engine - look for and find almost ONE movie plots of the type “Fighters” in the USA and Germany of those years. Like a carbon copy.

Quote: Pancer

In short, according to your writings, it’s not clear, they didn’t know anything, they didn’t know anything. They weren’t trained in anything.

So the monarchists are! They won Russia World War I, led by Nikolashka.

[RUSS]

Quote: avt

So the monarchists are! They won Russia World War I, led by Nikolashka.

At least the Germans did not reach Moscow in World War I. Well, the Reds generally lost to the losing country, signing the infamous Brest Peace, subsequently pushing both the WWII and the Brest Peace to the margins of history, bashfully circumventing and shortening those events in the history books of the USSR
.

Quote: avt

It’s weak to quote WHERE in WHAT Army of the World they sing about how this same army will all die on its territory and ultimately win

It was not necessary to sing songs about the “solid armor of our tanks”, but to prepare for the war and to trust intelligence, and your paranoid, because of your mistrust, June 1941 snapped.

[avt]

Quote: RUSS

In World War I, the Germans at least did not reach Moscow,

But they simply shamed the Empire .. ALL, launching a mediocre revolution that brought to power the Bolsheviks led by Lenin. Which really

Quote: RUSS

signing the infamous Brest Peace, subsequently pushing both the WWII and the Brest Peace to the margins of history, bashfully circumventing and shortening those events in USSR history textbooks

Saved the same Moscow from real occupation after the murder of Mirbach. And do not lie, and stupidly, showing your monarchical ignorance - the theme of the Brest Peace in the USSR was covered in detail in detail and there was even a feature film about the rebellion of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, where the topic was revealed precisely.

Quote: RUSS

and your paranoid because of his mistrust June 1941 snapped.

Our, “paranoid,” won the war, unlike your Nikolashka - the “owner of the Russian land”, who ruined the power entrusted to him. Well, HOW does your “anointed one” prepare for war, so look for Fedorov in 1915 .. Well, for 41, again - where was France in conditions quite comfortable and without reprisals with a mobilized army after 44 days of a real war? The Red Army in 1941 fought as best she could, but was able, despite real terrible defeats, quite worthily. This indicates that Our country was prepared and prepared OUR ,, paranoid "quite seriously and in an adult and even more so painful fantasies, it is simply impossible to imagine HIM in the role of Nikolashka in the car at the station" Bottom. "Even liberal liberal science fiction writers have not bothered to get it.

[Pancer]

Quote: captain

The essence of the article is to whitewash our generals. My opinion on this operation is very different from the opinion of our military historians. I believe that our leadership did not possess strategic thinking, had no idea about the forces of the Wehrmacht, did not take into account the weak training of our troops and did not train the troops. Most importantly, our leaders did not have accurate intelligence about the intentions of the enemy (although we all seemed to know from films and other sources, right down to what

In short, according to your writings, it’s not clear, they didn’t know anything, they didn’t know. anger to their own, or the Reds are not your own, you are not in vain for the nickname "captain." they took it ... it was only in the Vlasov army that he served the Nazis ...

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Pancer

In short, according to your writings, it’s not clear, they didn’t know anything, knew nothing.

Unfortunately, the concept of "Kharkov catastrophe" refers to the Red Army, and not to the Wehrmacht .... therefore Rotmister is right. Again, unfortunately.

[captain]

In short, according to your writings, it’s not clear, they didn’t know anything, they didn’t know anything. They weren’t trained whatsoever .. BUT, bang and gouged to the naught of trained knowledgeable, well-trained warriors of the Wehrmacht and the SS .. it’s not clear where you got so much anger to their own, or the Reds are not your own, you are not for nothing that the nickname "captain." they took .. not other than in the army of Vlasov that he served the Nazis ... [/ quote]

[captain]

Pancer, I am certainly surprised by your statement, did not know that in the 1942 near Kharkov we defeated the Germans. You are apparently a great Ukrainian, because only this category of people from any defeat makes a victory. The flag is in your hands. Incidentally amazed at your knowledge of the insignia of the ROA. There the title "captain" did not exist. Great Ukrain is excusable. You and Shukhevych have a national hero, by the way the SS Hauptsturmfuhrer.

[sergo1914]

Quote: captain

He said that our generals were very self-confident and behaved already as winners. Summed up self-confidence

There is such a point of view. In peacetime, a running general causes laughter, and in war time, panic. Maybe this is not self-confidence?

[Looking for]

The specific question is what Stalin is to blame for.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Seeker

The specific question is what Stalin is to blame for.

but as always, "Yosya, we’re not learning anything else!"

[BRIZ1981]

and that he should wipe out the snot to all generals so sorry here not only Stalin but Beria is not enough

[sergo1914]

Quote: Olgovich

The Kharkov catastrophe is the result of the blatant mistakes of the Stavka that led to the Nazi attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
But by Order 227, the main responsibility was assigned to anyone, but not to the true culprits of the catastrophe, who never suffered any, even symbolic penalties.

Do not belittle the merits of the Germans. A brilliant operation, rearmament reserves, new equipment were tightened ... Baghramyan is not to blame for Manstein's genius. Or did he have to shoot for it?

[Olgovich]

Quote: sergo1914

Do not belittle the merits of the Germans. Ingenious operation, rearmament reserves, new equipment are tightened ..

Themselves climbed into the mousetrap, they themselves did not stop in time.
The Germans correctly used ERRORS.

[Curious]

Dear Olgovich! Your comments very well illustrate the system of double standards.
In the next article, which describes the defeat of the army of General Samsonov in East Prussia as a result of mediocre command, you limited yourself to a brief comment, and that is not the point.
But here you are spreading thoughts on wood. So what?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Curious

Dear Olgovich! Your comments very well illustrate the system of double standards.

Are you able to refute something from what I said in the comments on this article? No. Is trying Also no. The meaning of your comment, in this case, is there? No. Pointless clapping on the clave is ...

Quote: Curious

In the next article, which describes the defeat of the army of General Samsonov in East Prussia as a result of mediocre command, you limited yourself to a brief comment, and that is not the point.

The next article describes successful specific actions of the Gurko division, and not the defeat of Samsonov’s army.
This article is about OTHER, as suggested by the Rules

Quote: Curious

here you are spreading thoughts on wood.

You crawled down a tree to an ordinary flood.

[Curious]

Dear Olgovich! You can demonstrate your knowledge of the site’s rules as much as you like, you can even print them out and paste them into the frame.
However, in essence you did not answer. The question then was why your events until 1917 arouse delight and reverence, and after 1917 - similar in outcome and reasons, turn you into a convict and a crusher.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Curious

Dear Olgovich! You can demonstrate your knowledge of the site’s rules as much as you like, you can even print them out and paste them into the frame.

Я - I am punished for their "violation."

Quote: Curious

However, in essence you did not answer. The question then was why your events until 1917 arouse delight and reverence, and after 1917 - similar in outcome and reasons, turn you into a convict and a crusher.

And what is the "being"? You do not know how to read. The answer was given and specific:

Are you able to refute something from what I said in the comments on this article? No. Is trying Also no. The meaning of your comment, in this case, is there? No. Pointless clapping on the clave is ...

Those. I write what seems interesting to me on this topic. Do you disagree with something? Or do you agree? What do you want to say on it? Nothing, as it turns out ... And why then torment Klava?
Flood ...

[Curious]

Dear Olgovich! Your answers are tortuous, like a bat flying. Have you tried to slip between the raindrops in the rain? It should work, try.
My text is a direct question. You have already written down how much, but you stubbornly do not want to approach the answer. There is a suspicion that you were either a political officer in the army, or a lecturer in the regional committee. It was?

[Olgovich]

.

Quote: Curious

My text is a direct question. You have already written down how much, but you stubbornly do not want to approach the answer.

You DO NOT have a direct question and some kind of "being." Again (third) I ask: what are you specifically disagree, what do you dispute?

And the counter question: why litter discussion of the topic flood?

Quote: Curious

There is a suspicion that you were either a political officer in the army or a lecturer in the regional committee

God forbid, even the party didn’t, um, “joined”

[Curious]

Okay, I take my word for it, I won’t clog, I take your advice. Anyway, as I see it, you will not give an answer.

[Pancer]

Quote: Olgovich

You crawled down a tree to an ordinary flood.

This is what you are doing here and you have been caught by the hand, how shyly you have limited yourself to a brief comment on the defeat of the Samson army, and how here, you are directly gushing with fairy tales, myths and other floods.
So do not hide behind the words, they say-

Quote: Olgovich

The next article describes the successful specific actions of the Gurko division, and not the defeat of Samsonov’s army.
This article is about OTHER, as suggested by the Rules

RULES it is not forbidden to 1-oppose the likes of you, 2-show the futility of your efforts to throw dirt at the Red Army, 3-belittle the importance of certain leaders of the country at that time.

Quote: Olgovich

Pointless clapping on the clave is ...

Yours? Undoubtedly, for writing what you are writing here in what’s new. What’s in your old nickname is ONE and the same, a collection of all unclean myths. Gossip mud. It is impossible to not understand the arguments given once, persisting in sediment mud, if what you do is not your natural goal, more lies, more dirt.
However, I’ll notice to you and your kind-you have been lying for nearly 30 years in a row. And the result for you is deplorable, people already understood who you are and why you are so oppressed by the Victory and the Red Army with its Supreme.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Pancer

Quote: Olgovich
You crawled down a tree to an ordinary flood.
This is what you are doing here and you were caught by the hand, as you shyly limited yourself to a brief

Flood: not a word by Topic. No thoughts, no knowledge, no ability to express them.

One and the same thing in EVERY comment, just your opinion about my humble person ...

You are not opposed to yourself?

[Cartalon]

Manstein then what side?

[sergo1914]

Oops This is me about the third. von Bock, of course.

[Cartalon]

No one seemed to consider Boca a genius

[sergo1914]

Zhukov called one of the most serious opponents.

[Cartalon]

Zhukov generally did not give contemptuous characteristics to opponents, and a genius is one who can accomplish the impossible.

[Predator]

Quote: Marmalade

as for the Soviet troops, for 42 years many analysts assessed as “training” and the result of these exercises was Stalingrad ... we still hadn’t had clear interaction and understanding completely + the winter victory near Moscow “intoxicated” us and the Wehrmacht was firm the belief that this happened by accident ...

In, bent! Training write?! And read the statistics, in 1942. (May 1) the total number of the Red Army exceeded 11.5 million. Fighters, By the beginning of 1943. no more than 8.6 million and above didn’t rise when. Well, we learned ...... But who died, who will answer for this ?! For studying on the bones ?!

[bober1982]

who will answer? .... For study on bones? It turns out that the Kharkov catastrophe itself is educational. This happens when they speak up.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: bober1982

This happens when they speak up.

if you read all the comments from the beginning, you would understand who is talking

[bober1982]

Yes, I meant Mr. marmalade

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: bober1982

and I had in mind Mr. Marmalade

then I take my words "back", sorry

[bober1982]

Well, I'm sorry, I need to speak more clearly, I hurried with an answer.

[ImPerts]

Quote: Predator

in 1942 (on May 1) the total number of the Red Army exceeded 11.5 million fighters, by the beginning of 1943. no more than 8.

I have other numbers:
"... By April 1942, the size of the army grew by one and a half million people, reaching 5600 thousand soldiers and commanders. On ten fronts, the 48 combined armies and 3 operational groups included 293 infantry and 34 cavalry divisions, 121 infantry and 56 separate tank brigades ... "
http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/313958

[avva2012]

As always, do not blush. Solzhenitsyn, an example. The non-policeman.

[Molot1979]

Somewhat anticipating the following parts: the catastrophe did not happen on the Southwest, but on the Southern Front. In the part that was supposed to hold the Barvenkovsky ledge. And why they didn’t immediately order the retreat, it’s also clear: had the Red Army reached Kharkov and captured it, perhaps the entire German front would have collapsed within a couple of days. Did not make it. But the chance was very real.

[Cartalon]

Why would the German front collapse if the Germans had reserves and we do not.

[vladimirvn]

I was always worried about the question: "Price error?" I understand that there are no infallible people. But, people who made a mistake, negligence, as a result of which then many thousands of people die, understand their responsibility? How do they then live with it?

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: vladimirvn

How do they then live with it?

Great!!! One of the culprits of the Kharkov catastrophe even became the Secretary General!

[vladimirvn]

And becoming secretary general, he threw all his strength into proving that Stalin was the main culprit.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: vladimirvn

I threw all my strength into proving that Stalin was the main culprit.

and kakbe himself became one of the authors of the victory, major battles under his leadership were won, Zhukova pushed back, but then the era of the Lesser Land came

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: nizhegorodec

One of the culprits of the Kharkov catastrophe even became the Secretary General

Khrushchev was not the Secretary General. He was the first secret of the Central Committee of the CPSU

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alexander Green

Khrushchev was not the Secretary General. He was the first secret of the Central Committee of the CPSU

significant amendment does it change anything?

[avt]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Quote: Alexander Green
Khrushchev was not the Secretary General. He was the first secret of the Central Committee of the CPSU
a significant amendment does this change something?

For a koeckaker - nothing.

[Uncle Murzik]

nizhegorodec and just proves once again that you are a simple dreamer!

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: nizhegorodec
Quote: Alexander Green
Khrushchev was not the Secretary General. He was the first secret of the Central Committee of the CPSU
a significant amendment does this change something?

Quote: nizhegorodec

Quote: avt
a significant amendment does this change something?
For a koeckaker - nothing.

Quote: Uncle Murzik
yes just proves once again that you are a simple dreamer!

I just wanted to emphasize by this that you, because of your poor knowledge of history, are mistaken even in the small, and what then to speak of the big?

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alexander Green

I just wanted to emphasize by this that you, because of your poor knowledge of history, are mistaken even in the small, and what then to speak of the big?

I wanted to show by this that he had grown to the head of state, and what he called there was not the point.

[Operator]

The Red Army near Kharkov summed up the adventurism of the high command, led by layman Stalin and the main command of the South-West direction, headed by spineless Tymoshenko - knowing the absence of a two-three-fold advantage over the enemy, they still planned an offensive operation.

After Kharkov and Crimea, Stalin was guided by the advice of his General Staff.

[Pancer]

Quote: Operator

The Red Army near Kharkov summed up the adventurism of the high command, headed by layman Stalin

An unconfirmed hypothesis.

Quote: Operator

Main command of the South-West direction, led by spineless Tymoshenko

spineless ... yeah, and why Khrushchev was forgotten, because he was just directly responsible for the TRUTH in the reports on the situation, but he preferred to hide behind Tymoshenko and feel sorry for whining.
Third, where is the Academy teaching you this vision of the situation with this unsuccessful operation for us? Read carefully ..http: //vn-parabellum.com/battles/kharkov
.html

[Operator]

What academies taught you the method of attacking a prepared defense without achieving more than twofold superiority over the enemy?

[mamaekero]

Some commanders did not appreciate the soldiers at all, "he told the soldiers not to spare, the women still give birth," and where is the time to wait, because most of the fatal mistakes were corrected by the very soldier, who was not appreciated, but was used as cannon fodder, and because without soldiers it’s not possible to win one battle, be it an infantryman. amphibious assault, gunner or tanker.

[hohol95]

Soldiers ................ give birth! And for the horses weeping gold! And these words refer to the royal generals of the times of Elizabeth!

[ImPerts]

The phrase "women still give birth" turned out to be a historical myth
Read more at http://www.politonline.ru/provocation/22882876.ht
ml

[hohol95]

WE HAVE ONE HISTORY MYTHS IN HISTORY ...

[avva2012]

"without soldiers, not one battle is impossible to win"
It is possible if the educational system is destroyed.

[avt]

Quote: mamaekero

Some commanders didn’t appreciate the soldiers at all, "he told the soldiers not to spare, the women still give birth,"

And here is Svidomikus globalikus vulgaris (ordinary) The main thing is to spoil, and you grumble in a rebuttal

Quote: ImPerts

The phrase "women still give birth" turned out to be a historical myth

Moreover, facts are not needed for this witness of revelation - for the sectarian, the sivol of faith does not require confirmation. They invested him - so he chews without a shadow of doubt and the search for sources of confirmation, or refutation.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: hohol95

The scale was certainly not like ours,

yes, the scale was not the same, but the essence is the same, at first the Germans beat the allies, then the allies of the Germans. In the 41-42th Germans then we - we are Germans.

[hohol95]

You again lose sight of the supply of troops in Africa! Who was better supplied? To whom help came in the form of American troops! And what happened to these troops before the German surrender in 1943? The battle for the Kasserin Pass in February 1943! Even then, the numerical advantage did not help the Americans and the British!

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: hohol95

You again lose sight of the supply of troops in Africa!

and you do not find that supply is one of the main components of victory? Without shells and fuel, without timely replenishment, battles are not won.

[hohol95]

However, Rommel succeeded! And he defeated the HIGHLY EDUCATED British warlords! They had enough shells and fuel, tanks with planes and soldiers - the British, Indians, Australians! And there were all one bits! Yes, the bloody defeat near Kharkov was a strong blow to our country! But they were able to mobilize and survive! Perhaps it was necessary to shoot the guilty in this disaster! BUT we LIVE at another time and think differently ....

[hohol95]

When in the Ardennes “SORROWED FRIED” the allies immediately tearfully requested help from the Red Army! In 1941-1942, there was no one to ask us! The British in Africa and Burma ran, the Americans were driven across the islands of the Pacific Ocean! And we were alone with the enemy!

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: hohol95

allies immediately tearfully requested help from the Red Army!

where do you get all this from? They even managed without the help of the Red Army.

[ImPerts]

There are different points of view on this.
For example, Churchill's letter is given:
“In the West, there are very hard battles, and at any time the High Command may need big decisions ... I will be grateful if you can tell me if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January ... I consider the matter urgent. 6 January 1945 years. "
This is explained by Yuri Nikiforov, head of the scientific sector of the Russian Military Historical Society.
But this is already complete:
"PERSONAL AND STRICT SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
Very heavy battles are taking place in the West, and large decisions may be required from the High Command at any time. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing the situation is when you have to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. General Eisenhower is very desirable and necessary to know in general terms what you intend to do, as this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message, our .emissary Chief Air Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, being weather bound. His trip was dragged out through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived at you, I will be grateful if you can tell me if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other moments that you may be talking about. wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly confidential information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brook and General Eisenhower, and only if it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent.
6th of January 1945

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our Envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of yours. In case he has not reached you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention.
I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent.
January 6th, 1945 ".
It can be definitely stated that the OKW and Hitler considered the Eastern Front more significant and began to transfer the 6 Tank Army from the west to the east, thereby making Eisenhower's life easier.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: hohol95

The British in Africa and Burma ran, the Americans were driven across the islands of the Pacific Ocean!

so then they drove everyone and everyone ran, including the Red Army

Quote: hohol95

In 1941-1942, there was no one to ask us!

so the allies were in the same position

[hohol95]

You forget that the ALLIES did not conduct the fighting in OWN TERRITORY! TO COLONY! Let's not take the Battle of Britain! Even having landed without millet in NORWAY, even they could not stay there!

[RUSS]

Quote: hohol95

When in the Ardennes “SORROWED FRIED” the allies immediately tearfully requested help from the Red Army!

And what kind of request for help is this? What kind of nonsense?

[ImPerts]

Here is the request:
"PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM PREMIER JV STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL
Your message of January 6 reached me in the evening of January 7.
I am sorry to say that Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.
It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavourable. Still, in view of our Allies' position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January. Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valiant forces of our Allies.
January 7, 1945 "

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: ImPerts

To the exhausted parts of the Red Army

something quickly expired, the nemchury had enough strength for four and a half months from Brest to Moscow to reach the battles, and then less than a month later they were exhausted, on their land, and even in the summer. Invalid comparison.

[ImPerts]

Correct. Here they analyze a specific event of the Second World War or WWII, and try to pull a specific owl on a globe.
This is like a photograph of a famous and beloved actor. He’s always cool, and then he put a finger in his nose, everything is a disqualification.
Something like that:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rta59DGxHCA
What is it for?
If you talk about 4,5 of the month before Moscow, then where did the war end?
What were the losses of the armed forces of Europe and Japan over the 4 year?
What were the losses of the Red Army?
And the puzzle will turn out ...

[Pilat2009]

Quote: ImPerts

that the army will be ready in 1942. And he did his best to delay the start of the war.

And it is still unknown to anyone it was at hand. Germany, too, was getting ready. If it had solved the problem of England, it would have been generally sour. Well and even technically the Germans had succeeded by the end of the war — jet planes, missiles ... It’s scary to think that it would be if we were left alone with them

[Pilat2009]

Quote: hohol95

When in the Ardennes "SORROWED FRIED

There was no smell there. The Germans did not have the strength to turn the tide. All their actions were predicted and calculated:
“Thus, the US command prepared in advance to repulse the enemy’s advance, deploying large mobile groups of its troops north and south of the Ardennes, and in the Ardennes themselves, deliberately weakened its defense, leaving the 28th and 106th infantry divisions there. Everything happened exactly as the American commanders expected - German troops went on the offensive in the Ardennes, where the Allies deliberately weakened the defense, and when the Germans broke through almost 100 km to the west - American troops attacked them with their mobile groups of the 1st and 3rd armies from the flanks - from the north and south, putting the Germans at risk of encirclement "
Guderian: “So, the offensive began on December 16, the 5th Panzer Army deeply penetrated the enemy’s defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces — the 116th and 2nd tank divisions — went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached r. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Accumulations of troops on narrow icy mountain roads, delays in putting a second echelon into the battle of the 5th tank army, insufficiently quick use of the initial success - all this led to the army losing its pace of offensive - the most necessary condition for each major operation. In addition, the 7th Army encountered difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the tank units of Manteuffel south to prevent a threat from the flank. After that, there was no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22, it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, a command that would think on a large scale should recall the anticipated offensive on the Eastern Front, the position of which depended on the timely completion of the largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days, they thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes, before the end of the war. On December 24th, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to immediately shift all our efforts to the east, if it was not already too late. I carefully watched from the headquarters, transferred to Maybahlager near Zossen, the progress of the offensive in the west. In the interests of my people, I wanted it to end in complete success. But when already on December 23 it became clear that major success could not be achieved, I decided to go to the Fuhrer’s main headquarters and demand the cessation of dangerous tension and the immediate transfer of all forces to the Eastern Front ... "
Eisenhower: “No matter how sudden the time and power of this strike was for us, we were not mistaken either about the place of its delivery, nor about the inevitability of such a move on the part of the enemy. Moreover, as for the general reaction to these enemy actions, in this case Bradley and I had a long-agreed response plan. ”

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: avt

Even stupidly type and find out what is Vichy France and WHEN REALLY the Nazis occupied France, and then, oh, something to bleat about, nowhere to retreat. Truly fools to learn, only spoil.

Well...

[avt]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Well...

,, Study, study and study again"

Quote: nizhegorodec

But in fact? There is a difference?

For a cowaker, and even an intellectual whose only opinion is holy and true - no, but for an intellectual ..... however

Quote: Alexander Green

On the issue of the difference between the Secretary General and the First Secretary.
This difference was seen by every Soviet schoolchild.

BUT colleague Green! It is said -

In the Gospel of Matthew (chap. 7, v. 6), the words from the Sermon on the Mount of Jesus Christ (Russian transl.) Are given: “Do not give sanctuary to the dogs and do not throw your pearls before the pigs, so that they do not trample it underfoot and did not tear you to pieces. ”

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: avt

For a koeckaker - nothing.

But in fact? There is a difference?

[Alexander Greene]

On the issue of the difference between the Secretary General and the First Secretary.
This difference was seen by every Soviet schoolchild.
Since the CPSU was the leading and guiding force, the Secretary General was considered the head of state. And the return, for example, by Brezhnev of the post of Secretary General put an end to the legal norm, according to which the USSR did not have a single head of state.
In addition, the General Secretary could only remove the party congress, but the first secretary - the usual plenum of the Central Committee.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alexander Green

And the return, for example, by Brezhnev of the post of Secretary General put an end to the legal norm, according to which the USSR did not have a single head of state.

Khrushchev from March 27, 1958 at the same time Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. All the fullness of power is in the hands of one person and therefore: that the Secretary General, that the 1st Secretary is that on the forehead, that on the forehead.

Quote: Alexander Green

In addition, the General Secretary could only remove the party congress, but the first secretary - the usual plenum of the Central Committee.

the difference is what? As practice has shown, while the plot was not woven, nothing worked, the state was totalitarian and that’s it.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Quote: Alexander Green
And the return, for example, by Brezhnev of the post of Secretary General put an end to the legal norm, according to which the USSR did not have a single head of state.

Khrushchev from March 27, 1958 at the same time Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. All the fullness of power is in the hands of one person and therefore: that the Secretary General, that the 1st Secretary is that on the forehead, that on the forehead.
Quote: Alexander Green
In addition, the General Secretary could only remove the party congress, but the first secretary - the usual plenum of the Central Committee.

the difference is what? As practice has shown, while the plot was not woven, nothing worked, the state was totalitarian and that’s it.

You have political color blindness, and this, unfortunately, is not treated.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: avt

Even stupidly type and find out what is Vichy France and WHEN REALLY the Nazis occupied France,

Quote: nizhegorodec

- WHERE was the army of France in 44 days, moreover, under the guidance of marshals-winners and the type without repression?
In 44 days, the Red Army left the territory more than the French army in the same time,