How the Wehrmacht stormed the Caucasus

How the Wehrmacht stormed the Caucasus

75 years ago, 25 July 1942, the battle for the Caucasus began. The Caucasian operation, which took place simultaneously with the Stalingrad and Kursk battles, played an important role in creating and completing a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Soviet Union.

Carrying out its main strategic plan for the summer campaign of 1942 to crush the Soviet armed forces, seize the most important military-economic centers of the USSR, which led to victory in the war, German troops launched an operation to seize the Caucasus simultaneously with the attack on Stalingrad.

The battle for the Caucasus became one of the longest in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 442 days, from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943. It was a series of defensive and offensive operations carried out on a vast territory in difficult conditions of steppe, mountain and mountainous-forested areas, as well as on the Black Sea coast. The main components of the Caucasian battle were: the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation, which lasted more than five months, the North Caucasian strategic offensive operation, the Novorossiysk landing operation, the Krasnodar and Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operations, which lasted a total of more than nine months. During these operations, the Red Army (Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian Fronts together with the NKVD troops) in cooperation with the forces of the Black Sea fleetIn the fierce battles and battles, the Azov and Caspian military flotillas exhausted the formations of the German Army Group “A”, stopped their advance and defeated them, knocked them out of the Caucasus.

Value of the Caucasus

In the 1940-s of Baku (Transcaucasia) and the North Caucasus were the largest sources of oil in the Eastern hemisphere. In those days, the USSR occupied the second place in the world in oil production, producing a tenth of all the oil in the world. Germany, which was experiencing an acute shortage of petroleum products throughout the war, was striving at all costs to capture this region. There were also reserves of other strategic raw materials, for example, tungsten-molybdenum ore. In addition, the loss of the Caucasus would have left the Soviet Union almost without oil at all, since only 12% of oil was mined outside the Caucasus. Not surprisingly, Adolf Hitler attached such importance to the Caucasus. At a meeting in Poltava in June 1942, Hitler stated: “If we fail to capture the oil of Maikop and Grozny, then we will have to stop the war!”

In Berlin, it was hoped that the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht in Transcaucasia would lead to the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. Turkey at the beginning of the war took a hostile position against the USSR, but was still cautious. The Turkish army was focused on the Caucasus, which forced Moscow to keep a large grouping of troops in the region in order to protect the Caucasus and important communications going through Iran. In Iran, where the nationalist elite was leaning toward an alliance with Germany, with the start of the war, Soviet and British forces were introduced. In Berlin, hoping to occupy the Caucasus, to penetrate into the Middle and Near East, into Central and South-East Asia. In addition, the Nazis pinned high hopes on the divisions, which, according to their calculations, were to arise between the peoples of the Caucasus and the uprising against the "Russian occupation". The local peoples were to supply the Eternal Reich with auxiliary military units and become a reserve of cheap labor for the German economy. However, thanks to the skillful actions of the Soviet leadership (in particular, the operation “Lentils”), these plans could not be realized. It is worth considering that in the pre-war years a lot of work was done to eliminate the “fifth column” in the USSR, including the ethnic separatists.

Plans to turn the Caucasus into a colony of Germany were voiced during the First World War and, in general, retained their significance during the Third Reich. The German generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg saw in Ukraine and the Caucasus suppliers of raw materials for German industry, sources of replenishing their armed forces with new formations - “cannon fodder” and, finally, a reserve of cheap labor. It should be noted that modern Ukraine, by these signs, is already a real colony of the West. Also, the Caucasus needed Berlin as a strategic springboard for influencing Turkey, Iran, and the spread of German influence in the Middle East, Central and South-East Asia.

Thus, the Caucasus needed the supreme German command in order to: 1) get the strategic resources necessary to continue the world war and create a world empire; 2) for access to the Near and Middle East, to areas of Central and Southeast Asia; 3) deprive Moscow of an important economic region, as well as a reference center for the Red Army, the Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet; 4) destroy Russia, raising against her Caucasian peoples. Therefore, the German command concentrated the main efforts during the 1942 campaign of the year on the southern sector of the front.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Caucasus in the life of the Soviet Union. The presence of rich reserves of minerals and fertile lands made the Caucasus the most important source of industrial and military-strategic raw materials, one of the country's food bases (especially given the loss of agricultural areas of Ukraine, Crimea and Belarus). During the years of Soviet power, the Caucasus from the agrarian outskirts of Russia became an important industrial region. During the years of the prewar five-year plans, the industry of the Transcaucasian republics has grown significantly. Hundreds of new heavy and light industrial enterprises were built in the Caucasus. Much attention was paid to the expansion of oil production and refining, the most important strategic product of the Caucasus. Only in the Baku region for the period from 1934 to 1940, the drilling of 235 new wells was started (Socialist national economy of the USSR in 1933-1940 M., 1963.). In total, 1940 new wells were commissioned in the Caucasus by 1726. This accounted for about 73,5% of all wells entered by this time in the USSR. Thus, oil production in the Caucasus before the Great Patriotic War increased significantly. A special role was played by the Baku oil-bearing region, the largest in the Union.

Along with the development of the oil industry, much attention was paid to the development of natural gas fields. As a result, the gas industry of Azerbaijan, together with other areas of the Caucasus in 1940, gave the national economy and population about 2,5 billion cubic meters of natural gas. This amounted to about 65% of all-union gas production. A large development in the Caucasus was received by the electric power base. Before the war, new power plants of union and local importance were built here. The development of manganese ore in Georgia in the pre-war years was of great economic and military-strategic importance. Chiatura Mine produced in 1940 1448,7 thousand tons of manganese ore. This amounted to about 56,5% of the all-Union production of manganese ore. Of great importance was agriculture. The North Caucasus and Kuban were among the richest regions of the country for the production of wheat, corn, sunflower, and sugar beet. Cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, grapes, tea leaves, citrus and oil-bearing crops are grown in the republics of the Transcaucasus. A good fodder base allowed developing livestock. In the pre-war years, the light and food industries were actively developed on the basis of agricultural raw materials. The Caucasus and its ports on the Black and Caspian Seas during the pre-war period were of paramount importance in the USSR’s foreign trade: 55% of all exports and 50% of USSR imports went through southern, including Caucasian, ports. Communications of the Caspian and Black Seas linked the USSR with Turkey and Iran, and through them with the world's ocean routes. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, trade routes running through the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Caspian Sea, took the second place in the supply of arms, ammunition and food, as well as strategic raw materials from the United States and the British Empire.

The military-strategic importance of the Caucasus was determined not only by the presence of large reserves of oil and other types of strategic raw materials, not only by the mobilization capabilities of human resources, but also by an advantageous geographical position. The Caucasus was a strategic base for access to Asia Minor (Turkey), to the Near and Middle East. The Caspian Sea, located mainly on the territory of the USSR, connected the Caucasus with the Soviet republics of Central Asia with its water communications, and through the Volga with the central regions of the country. The southern part of the Caspian Sea enters the territory of Iran. A major role in the strategic characteristics of the Caucasus is played by the Black Sea. After the loss of the Crimea, the coast of the Caucasus became the main base of the Black Sea Fleet.

It is clear that the loss of the Caucasus (together with the Volga route) would have been for the USSR, if not fatal, then a very heavy blow, comparable to the loss of Ukraine, or the possible fall of Leningrad or Moscow.

Caucasus in German plans

Hitler's directive No. 21 from 18 December 1940 did not say anything about the Caucasus. Based on the idea of ​​a lightning war, in Berlin they believed that the destruction of the main Soviet forces from the troops located in the western part of the USSR, the seizure of the territory of the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine, the Wehrmacht to Moscow and Leningrad would lead to the collapse of the Union and to the almost unhindered mastery of the Third Reich territories. In this case, the operation to seize the Caucasus and Baku would not be necessary. However, the 1941 campaign of the year did not lead to a quick victory. And in the summer of 1941, German strategists began to make adjustments to the plan of war.

So, in addition to the OKB directive No. 33 of July 12, 1941, the necessity of attacking the Caucasus was emphasized. “As soon as the operational situation and material and technical support allow,” the directive said, “1st and 2nd tank the groups subordinated to the command of the 4th Panzer Army, together with the infantry and mountain rifle divisions following them, should launch an attack through the Don into the Caucasus after taking control of the Kharkov industrial region. ” In addition to the OKB directive No. 34 dated 12.8 1941, the southern wing of the German eastern front was tasked with capturing the Crimea, which was also considered as a springboard for the operation to capture the Caucasus. The same addendum to Directive No. 34 prudently indicated the need to send mountain rifle troops to the Crimea and “check the possibility of their use for crossing the Kerch Strait and in the further offensive in the direction of Batumi”.

When it finally became clear that the war was being delayed, there were two points of view on the further campaign in the supreme German command. The ground forces commander proposed to continue the advance of the main forces in the central (Moscow) strategic direction. Hitler proposed a strategy of successive tank strikes on the flanks in order to seize the Crimea, the Donbass on the southern part of the Soviet-German front, to deprive the Soviet country of the possibility of obtaining oil from the Caucasus and together with the Finnish army crush Leningrad in the north. About the solution of these problems spoke Hitler's directive from 21 August 1941, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces. It emphasized the importance of the fastest capture of the Crimea, the Donbass by the German troops, and penetration into the Caucasus.

Hitler’s note on 22 in August 1941 to the Army High Command noted that the final destruction of Russia as a continental power can only be achieved by destroying the Russian armed forces and seizing or destroying the economic base on which they are based. "... For reasons of a political nature, it is imperative to quickly go to areas where Russia receives oil, not only to deprive it of this oil, but above all to give Iran hope that it will be possible in the near future assistance from the Germans in the case of resistance to threats from the Russians and the British. In the light of the aforementioned task ... - noted later in the note, - the problem of Moscow in its significance substantially recedes into the background. ”

Later, the German generals, trying to blame Hitler for defeat in the war, will speak about the “fatal mistake of the Führer” - transferring the main efforts of the Wehrmacht from the Moscow strategic direction to the south. They created the myth of one-sided - economic, political and strategic - decisions of Hitler. Thus, General Günther Blumentritt, the main cause of the “unfortunate consequences” in the battle of Moscow, calls Hitler’s “economic” position in his approach to the strategy of war. “Hitler,” he wrote, “approached the war from a purely economic position. He wanted to take possession of the rich bread Ukraine, the industrial Donets Basin, and then the Caucasian oil ”(Fatal decisions. M., 1958.).

However, a significant part of the German generals also saw a way out in transferring their main efforts to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The Wehrmacht could no longer, as in the 1941 campaign of the year, launch a decisive offensive in three strategic directions. In addition, it was in the Moscow sector that the Soviet Headquarters and the General Staff were waiting for the main blow of the enemy, here were the main strategic reserves of the Red Army. In the south, the Wehrmacht could have achieved decisive success. “The implementation of these intentions,” wrote the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces (1942-1944) General Kurt Zeitzler, “would certainly be of great importance. If the German army were able to force the Volga in the region of Stalingrad and thus cut the main Russian communication line going from north to south, and if Caucasian oil went to meet Germany’s military needs, then the situation in the East would be radically changed and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would have greatly increased. " “Having achieved these goals,” Zeitler wrote, referring to the seizure of the Caucasus, “he wanted to send highly mobile units to India through the Caucasus or by other means.” Thus, not only Hitler and his headquarters, but also representatives of the Army High Command pinned great hopes on the Caucasus.

The essence of the strategic plan for the 1942 summer campaign was officially set out in Hitler's directive No. 41 of 5 in April of 1942 (Operation Blau). The general plan of the Wehrmacht’s high command was to hold the position it occupied on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, with successive strikes on the southern wing to crush the flank groups of the Soviet troops, seize the Leningrad forces with liberated forces and establish communications overland with the Finnish army and then break through to the Caucasus . “Therefore,” the directive said, “first of all, all available forces should be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector in order to destroy the enemy west of the Don, in order to then seize oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus Range (G. Durr Hike to Stalingrad. M., 1957.). 1 June 1942, in Poltava, Hitler approved a plan for a new general offensive at a meeting of the high command. The Fuhrer said that if he did not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny, he would have to stop the war.

Plan "Edelweiss"

In the spring and summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht created the conditions for a breakthrough to the Caucasus. German troops captured the Crimea, including Sevastopol. The unsuccessful offensive of the Red Army near Kharkov led to the catastrophe and a serious weakening of the southern flank of the Red Army. 7 July 1942 Army Group South was divided into Army Group A (attack on the Caucasus) under Field Marshal Liszt and Army Group B (attack on Stalingrad) under Field Marshal von Bock (then von Weichs). 28-30 June, German troops broke through the defenses of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts. The Wehrmacht went to the Don, forced it and captured part of Voronezh. Developing the offensive, the German troops advanced to Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don and Stalingrad. The troops of the South-Western Front with heavy fighting went to the Don, to Stalingrad, the troops of the Southern Front - to the lower Don.

In early July, 1942, German troops reached the Don along its entire length, from Voronezh to the mouth, with the exception of a large bend west of Stalingrad. 17-I German army forced the Don and in 25 July captured Rostov-on-Don. Two days before that, Hitler had signed directive No. 45 “On the continuation of Operation Braunschweig.” General Paulus was ordered to take Stalingrad, then turn south and develop an offensive along the Volga towards Astrakhan and further down to the Caspian Sea. Army Group "A" was given the task of attacking the Caucasus, with part of the forces of the 13 Tank Army transferred to it on July 4.

Obviously overestimating his successes, Hitler believed that the Russians were at the limit of their forces and brought the last reserves into battle, that favorable conditions were created for the simultaneous attack on Stalingrad - Astrakhan and the Caucasus. The main forces were thrown on the conquest of the Caucasus. Contrary to the advice of Halder, the Führer threw both tank armies south and took the tank corps from Paulus, which, in turn, could not but affect the pace of advance of the 6 army to Stalingrad. In addition, considering that the existing forces in the south are enough to take Stalingrad and capture the Caucasus, the Fuhrer sent Manstein's 11 Army near Leningrad with the task of establishing contact with the Finnish army, seizing the city "and leveling it with the ground." Two motorized SS divisions from Army Group A, Hitler transferred to France and Army Group Center (Adolf Hitler, Great Germany), two tank divisions from Group B (9 and 11) ) - to the army group "Center". In total, by the end of July, 11 German divisions, including 2 tank and 2 motorized, were withdrawn from the main line.

Thus, if 28 June 1942 of the year, the 800 German divisions and 68 allied divisions were concentrated on the 26 km front on the 1 front, then all 57 German and 36 allied divisions were available for 1200 in August. The front line at this point was already about XNUMX km. Nominally, the total number of connections remained the same, but the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian units were significantly weaker than the German ones, both in combat spirit, in the quality of combat training, and in armament, in the material part.

Colonel-General Halder 23 July wrote in his diary: “... the still underestimation of enemy capabilities takes grotesque forms and becomes dangerous ... Serious work is out of the question. The painful reaction to the instant impressions and the underscoring of the deficiencies in the evaluation of the governing apparatus and its capabilities alone is what determines the character of this so-called leadership. ”

Army Group A now included: Col. Gen. Ewald von Kleist's 1 Tank Army, Colonel-General German Goth's 4 Panzer Army, Colonel General Richard Ruoff's 17 Army, General Roman 3 Army. Dumitrescu. By the beginning of the new offensive, the group had 40 divisions: 18 infantry, 4 tank, 3 motorized, 6 mountain rifle, 3 light infantry, 4 cavalry and 2 security. Romanian divisions were part of the German associations: 4 divisions - in the army of Goth, 3 - in the submission of Ruoff. There were a total of more than 170 thousand soldiers and officers, 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars at the disposal of Field Marshal Liszt, up to 1000 aircraft of the 4 air fleet (part of the aircraft operated on the Stalingrad direction). These troops had high combat capability, were impressed by the latest victories. Many of their units participated in the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkov and south-west of Voronezh, in the June battles.

The immediate task of Army Group A was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops that had departed beyond the Don, south and southeast of Rostov. For this, the Germans intended to use strike groups of mobile units that were to attack from bridgeheads in the Konstantinovskaya and Tsimlyansk areas in the general direction of Tikhoretsk, as well as infantry divisions from Rostov. After the seizure of the North Caucasus, according to the Edelweiss plan, it was planned to bypass the Greater Caucasus Range from the west and east, the 17 Army was to reach the Black Sea coast, capture Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In addition, in the Crimea, the 3-I Romanian Mining Infantry Division of General Filcinescu was preparing to force the Kerch Strait, in order to then strike along the road going along the Black Sea coast to the south-east. Another group had the task of seizing Grozny and Makhachkala, part of the forces to cut off the Military Ossetian and Georgian Military Highways. The ultimate goal in this direction was Baku. Simultaneously with the bypass maneuver, it was planned to overcome the Caucasian ridge in its central part by passes and reach the districts of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi.

With the release of the Transcaucasus, the German army captured the last bases of the Black Sea Fleet, established direct communication with the Turkish troops. In the future, Adolf Hitler hoped to involve Turkey in the war on the side of the Third Reich, as well as create the conditions for an invasion of the Middle East. In a different scenario, there was a plan for the occupation of Turkey as a convenient springboard for the transfer of troops to Syria and Iraq. The German command also planned in September, after the breakthrough of the Tersky frontier, to deploy naval operations in the Caspian Sea in order to disrupt the communications of the USSR.

German troops in Rostov-on-Don

To be continued ...
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  1. +7
    19 July 2017 07: 53
    Thank you, we are waiting for the continuation ..
  2. +4
    19 July 2017 08: 56
    As always, I didn’t write any links to sources
    1. +5
      19 July 2017 13: 23
      No, not myself. Compiled, already progress. About the Russian-Turkish war of 1877, he fought unashamedly, but this time he compiles.
      Beshanov V.V. suffered mainly, the book “The Year of 1942 -“ Training ”, the chapter“ The Battle for Oil, ”but there is an admixture of others, too lazy to look for.
  3. +5
    19 July 2017 08: 58
    Local peoples had to supply auxiliary military units to the Eternal Reich and become a reserve of cheap labor for the German economy. However, thanks to the skillful actions of the Soviet leadership (in particular, operation “Lentil"), these plans could not be realized

    What nonsense is that?
    "Lentil" is the eviction of Chechens and Ingush in March 1944 yearswhen the red army is already crossed the border of the USSR и entered the territory of Romania. , and in the Caucasus, even the spirit of the Germans was long gone. What auxiliary units could they create in the Caucasus .... 1944-th?lol belay
    “Lentil” did not prevent the possible, but punished for already committed 41m-42m.

    Moreover, the concrete killer-traitors and accomplices of the Nazis quietly left for their settlement, instead of being shot under wartime laws for aiding.

    Naturally, in the harsh conditions of resettlement and settlement, these healthy and adult criminals survivedbut the children who were not at war were dying.

    "Skillful" operation, yeah .. No. By the way, the Russian legislation "skillful" operation CONDEMNED,
    1. +3
      19 July 2017 09: 29
      Quote: Olgovich
      What nonsense is that?
      Lentil is the eviction of Chechens and Ingush in March 1944, when the Red Army had already crossed the USSR border and entered Romanian territory. , and in the Caucasus, even the spirit of the Germans was long gone. What auxiliary units could they create in the Caucasus .... 1944? lol belay
      “Lentil” did not prevent the possible, but punished for already committed 41m-42m.

      And here the Banshee gave me a warning “insulting the author”, called Samsonov “historian”. So be careful))
      1. +3
        19 July 2017 14: 58
        And here the Banshee gave me a warning “insulting the author”, called Samsonov “historian”. So be careful))
        Yeah, here you have to keep your eyes open. With reference to the great and mighty Aesopian language, even a pronoun or union may seem insulting, inciting, etc. etc. belay
    2. avt
      19 July 2017 09: 42
      Quote: Olgovich
      “Lentil” did not prevent the possible, but punished for already committed 41m-42m.

      Yes . in fact, the author froze stupidity. Laurenti, namely, he led from the Stavka with his team, including Sudoplatov, who was moving along the front all the way to military formations, extinguishing the very effective work of the same Brandenburg, followed up on the results and threw this idea. It’s famously famously the Germans launched sabotage activities relying on the local population. And since Andryusha-Adrian Felkersam famously almost with his team destroyed the defense system of Maykop, but simply organized an escape from it - worthy of study for specialized units. But to see Laurenti before him already with the nominal ,, Lentil ” got it, banged him and interestingly, no one publicly disclosed responsibility for this action. So, it was not just the avengers who worked, but specific specialists in a completely targeted development.
      1. +1
        19 July 2017 10: 20
        Quote: avt
        Laurenti already got to him with the nominal “Lentil", banged him

        Named and targeted lentils EVERYONE tens of thousands of traitors it was necessary and fair there, but in fact they escaped retaliation, lived a life and raised their own kind ...
        1. avt
          19 July 2017 16: 41
          Quote: Olgovich
          Named and targeted lead lentils EACH of tens of thousands of traitors there was necessary and fair,

          request It’s actually addressed that it’s certainly beautiful and a dream, so that, like in a movie, Iron Felix comes in and directly determines. BUT in practice, and even in wartime, in the absence of the proper professional resource, it doesn’t happen .... well, nowhere, and never has been. Laurenti did the same thing that the tsarist government did in present-day Abkhazia during its then cleansing, when only one Abkhazian-Apsua actually remained there, the rest either under the knife or in Turkey, also what the Angles did with the Boers, when they drove them to concentration camps by families, well and the classics of the genre - Franklin Delano Roosevelt with ethnic Japanese in the USA. So, as if I didn’t want to, but taking into account the real clogging by very specific accomplices, ALL special services were engaged in sweeps. A question of scale, yes. Actually in Crimea they did the same. But there the sabotage positions were very serious, taking into account the topic of the work of white emigrants from Wrangel in Yugoslavia who could not walk around the Crimea with Crimea and could work for the Germans on a rotational basis with shift-vacation in Yugoslav apartments. what to the question of the Serbs - What are you afraid of? After all, the Russians came, well, when the Red Army -SA moved to Yugoslavia, there was nothing to say.
          Quote: Olgovich
          but in fact they have gone from retaliation, have lived their lives and raised their own kind ...

          request Just now at a rally in Zapadentia, the death of Didu is the head of the UPA cell. I got a tower when I was caught, but knocked up to 25 years old ... I entered the Khrushchev thaw under an amnesty in honor of the October ones ... request For the beast salashists who were even massively released to Hungary before the 56th, they were tired of repeating it. So on the field of educating the Nazis on the Ruin during the time of Khrushchev, the start was not quite sour.
          1. 0
            20 July 2017 08: 49
            Quote: avt
            It’s addressed that it’s certainly beautiful and a dream

            What dream?
            Not only the Caucasus and Crimea were liberated and everywhere - hung, shot accomplices of the Nazis, traitors, deserters. And immediately after the liberation, and for many decades after-without statute of limitations.
            OBLIGED to do so in the Caucasus. But they saved the bandits by deportation, created problems for decades to come ...
    3. +1
      19 July 2017 13: 24
      Olgovich! And what about the author with the information of others?
  4. +2
    19 July 2017 09: 17
    Honor and glory to the Soviet soldiers who defended the right to life for us. Eternal memory to those with heads folded in the battlefield.
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. +7
    19 July 2017 11: 08
    Reading the material I recall the old Soviet film: "Snowdrops and Edelweiss." Thank.
    1. +1
      19 July 2017 13: 54
      Quote: Okolotochny
      Reading the material I recall the old Soviet film: "Snowdrops and Edelweiss." Thank.

      Well, reading the next part, we recall the film "White Explosion", Stanislav Govorukhin.
      "The action takes place during the years of World War II in the mountains of the Caucasus. German soldiers from the Edelweiss mountain rifle division took up a position in the mountains from which they fired refugees and wounded who were crossing the ridge."
      1. +6
        19 July 2017 14: 11
        Well, while reading the next part, we recall the film "White Explosion", Stanislav Govorukhin

        I didn’t see the film. Thanks for the help, I will look. And the next part is where?
        1. 0
          19 July 2017 14: 29
          Quote: Okolotochny
          And the next part is where?

          Yesterday I saw on one of the sites, I don’t remember which one.
          1. +8
            19 July 2017 23: 30
            Nikolay, just looked. It seems like a film "so-so", compared to modern blockbusters, but one-piece. By the way, I can advise "Winds are blowing in Baku", also for fighting in the Caucasus, though the theme is there for the work of the NKGB. Solid Soviet film.
  7. 0
    19 July 2017 21: 10
    why did the hans want to close
    "As on the Volga-Matushka, on the river-nurse, All vessels with goods, plows and boats" (c)
    it is in Stalingrad, not 100 km upstream or downstream
    fairy tales about the "possessed Furrrer" are not accepted
    in Moscow, London, Washington sat the same
  8. 0
    19 July 2017 22: 20
    When I read in the comments, like some L.P. Beria is called bravely Laurentius, I recall the Eastern proverb: "If a jackal kicks a dead lion, then this does not change anything. A jackal remains a jackal, a lion a lion."
    1. 0
      22 July 2017 23: 51
      Beria, of course, was not a jackal, but, as Stalin told him, "a cross between a jackal and a hyena." Details in the memoirs of Alikhanov.
      And you should know the words of one of the few who were absolutely not afraid of this nits and thieves - Pervukhin: "Everything is already prepared, you can move us so that we don’t share laurels." It was said on the atomic topic, Gadget Badalovich.
      By the way, back in the Baku Commune, the signalmen set up in the Cheka that a certain Beria was calling a lot to the Aglitsky embassy ... apparently he was a KGB officer, since they hadn’t shot him.
      1. 0
        23 July 2017 00: 36
        Straight multi-station Lavrenty Palych. And he called the English embassy, ​​and the Musavatsty of the Azeibardzhan sold out in 1919, along with Dekanozov.
  9. 0
    24 July 2017 11: 10
    The presence of rich mineral reserves and fertile lands made the Caucasus the most important source of industrial and military-strategic raw materials, one of the country's food bases ...

    What a strange stamp? If about fertile lands, then yes. But minerals? What in the Caucasus besides oil was extracted by Baku and Maykop?
    Known ore or coal regions in the Caucasus?
    What is worth mentioning is “The Chiatura mines yielded 1940 thousand tons of manganese ore in 1448,7 {6}. This amounted to about 56,5 percent of the all-union production of manganese ore” (Grechko AA Battle for the Caucasus).
    But that’s all it’s worth mentioning (of course, except for oil and natural gas).

    During the years of Soviet power, the Caucasus from the agrarian outskirts of Russia has become an important industrial area. Over the years of the prewar five-year plans, the industry of the Transcaucasian republics has grown significantly. In the Caucasus, hundreds of new enterprises of heavy and light industry were built.

    OO is generally an interesting statement - you feel the stamp of the Soviet exposition, "not needing confirmation":
    where in the Caucasus did important heavy industry enterprises operate?
    Judging by historical studies "... In the North Caucasus in 1940 2,5% of ferrous metals were produced for the all-Union production, automobiles - 14%" (INDUSTRY OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR I. SKVORTSOV)

    One aircraft factory (the history of the Tbilisi aircraft factory began in September 1941 after the outbreak of World War II, when the aircraft factory No. 31 was evacuated from Taganrog in Tbilisi), which experienced constant quality problems (apparently, local personnel were not “trained” for technical education )
    Without a doubt - light industry was an increase.
    But it cannot be said that the Caucasus before the war played any significant industrial role as part of the USSR in terms of heavy industry 2.5% of the extraction and processing of ferrous metals is not an indicator.
  10. zav
    2 December 2017 08: 39
    There is mention of another possible direction of Hitler’s movement: the advance of tank columns to the north, along the Volga after the alleged fall of Stalingrad. In the case of the "folding" of the Russian front from Bryansk to N. Novgorod, no battle for the Caucasus would have been required anymore - with a small part of the forces, the Wehrmacht would simply marched to the Iranian and Turkish borders.
    At first, for List, Stalingrad did not matter, it was just a “point on the map”. But in fact, it was a fulcrum - not having mastered it, it was impossible to move deeper into the Caucasus. So Hitler was again summed up by the strategy and ignorance of Russian reserves: in the 41st attacked in three directions - did not achieve the stated goals, in the 42nd attacked in two - a catastrophe of the southern front, and in the 43rd, when there was only enough strength for defense, I tried to advance in one - I couldn’t do anything at all.
  11. 0
    24 June 2019 11: 36
    I’m curious about what the Germans prevented, without spraying their strength, to strike primarily at Stalingrad with the entire southern group, without dividing it into the Caucasian and Stalingrad groups, because in this situation they had more chances to succeed than get 0 result in both directions, simply cutting through the Don Caucasus, having captured Stalingrad, going further south to Astrakhan, then giving the councils the opportunity to try to unlock the enormous encirclement of the southern and southwestern fronts, in the future if they did not have the opportunity to storm Grozny and Baku just to bomb the oil-bearing objects, this was probably the only chance throughout the war when the Germans were close to victory as never before, because all the support of the Soviet military machine relied specifically on Baku oil, there will be people who say that in the event of the loss of Baku oil, the Soviets could replenish Iranian oil and land lease, but in that short-lived war, such handicap as with the transfer of production it would not be possible anymore and Iranian Oil at that time could not 100% make up for the loss of the Baku oil treasure!
    One thing strikes me in the most fateful days of the war when the 6th army was surrounded, they had at least 2 more months to bomb the Baku oil wells but they didn’t do it. The question arises why? Is it even more so when the enemy is much stronger than you can’t believe me that the Germans just missed the last opportunity to restrain the onslaught of councils, in wartime, the fuel reserve could be made by no more than 1 or max 2 months, that certainly would not have saved 6 the army, but in general, could greatly influence the general course of the war, the Germans were in the Kuban until October of that year
  12. 0
    16 July 2019 11: 26
    Do any of you ever explain to me why Hitler froze so when they, after having crossed the Don and were eager to both the Caucasus and Stalingrad, removed several divisions from the advancing troops? And in general, it was not more logical from the beginning to take over Stalingrad and thus put the entire Caucasian group in a big bag? And even in the scenario of the events that occurred when the Germans reached Grozny and Maykop, it was clear that the ground forces could not break through further, as a desperate way out of the situation, they could bomb the Baku oil fields for this many bombs and planes would probably not be required, I read one article that the range was not enough for their bombers, but in those days when it was at stake the whole fate of the Reich to sacrifice several hundred soldiers, I think it would not play a big role, here the Germans missed their only chance!

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