"We will storm Stalingrad and take it ...". Second storming of the stronghold on the Volga
Second storm
The German command made a regrouping of forces to direct the main efforts for actions against the center and the northern part of Stalingrad. From September 27 to October 4 1942, there was heavy fighting on the northern outskirts of the city for the Red October workers' settlements and the Barricades. At the same time, the enemy led an offensive in the area of Mamayev Kurgan (city center) and on the extreme right flank of the 62 Army in the Orlovka area.
Having redeployed forces, the German command was going on September 27 to deploy an offensive on the village. Red October. Here was supposed to attack 71-I Infantry Division, Lieutenant General von Hartman. This division was preparing a strike from the west, from the region south-east of the Razgulyaevka junction. The 100 th Eger (light infantry) division under the command of Lieutenant General Zanne was given the task of attacking Mamayev Kurgan and making its way here to the Volga.
German Tanks Pz.Kpfw. III at the starting position for the attack near Stalingrad
Sturmgeschütz III Ausführung B 244 assault battalion of the Wehrmacht assault guns (Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 244) assault gun with soldiers of the 1 battalion of the Wehrmacht 194 infantry regiment in Smolensk Street in Stalingrad
German self-propelled gun StuG III with the soldiers on the armor moves on Kursk street in Stalingrad. In the group to the right of the SAU, along with German soldiers, are probably Soviet prisoners of war.
Soviet intelligence revealed the intentions of the enemy. Our command tried to thwart the enemy offensive. The 62 Army was assigned by the forces of the 23 tank corps, the 95 and 284 rifle divisions to clear the central part of the city from the enemy. The 64 Army had to strike from the south with the troops of the 36 Guards Rifle Division to capture the Kuporosnoe area. Early in the morning of September 27, in accordance with the order, the troops of the 62 Army began an offensive. 95-I rifle division with a swift attack cleared the western and southern slopes of the Mamayev Kurgan from the enemy.
However, in general, the counterattack of the 62nd Army did not lead to success. German aviation continuously bombed and stormed the battle formations of the 62nd Army. German aviation and artillery were especially active in the area of the Mamaev Kurgan. The command of the German 6th Army, making sure that the Soviet troops did not have serious forces, launched the planned offensive. In the area of the Mamayev Kurgan, in addition to the 100th ranger, the 295th infantry and 24th tank divisions advanced. The enemy’s armored fist was advancing from the areas Gorodische and Razgulyaevka. Despite the losses, they broke through minefields and battle formations of the advanced units of the Soviet troops. Following the tanks, German infantry moved in waves. By 14 p.m. the enemy broke into the western outskirts of the village. Red October to Banny ravine and in the southwestern part of the village. Barricades. Here fierce street fights flared up. In some areas, the Germans advanced 2-3 km east. By evening, the 95th Rifle Division was pushed back from the Mamaev Kurgan.
An extremely difficult situation arose in the area of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, where the 42-I, 95-I infantry brigades and the 10-I regiment kept the defense. Having suffered great losses, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and foodstuffs, having lost control, they did not withstand the onslaught of the Wehrmacht and began to dispatch in scattered groups to the left bank of the Volga. As a result, German troops broke through to the Volga south of the r. The queens on the site up to 10 km.
Thus, the preventive offensive of the Soviet troops did not lead to the desired success. The Germans counterattacked and achieved some success, taking advantage of the exhaustion of the small reserves of the 62 Army. The 62 army suffered serious losses, especially parts of the 23 tank corps and the 95 rifle division. The offensive of the Soviet 64 Army in the Kuporosnoe region also did not lead to success.
Driver V. Lyubov, who destroyed German tanks 6, in the hatch of a disguised Soviet KV-1 heavy tank during the battle for Stalingrad
The prevailing situation demanded further strengthening of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad sector. The headquarters decided to urgently send the 159 th fortified area, which had 12 machine-gun artillery battalions, to the Stalingrad Front. The rifle formations were sent to the Southeastern Front (they arrived a month later), as well as the 84-I and 90-I tank brigades. Simultaneously bloodless infantry divisions and tank brigades lost their materiel were relegated to the rear for replenishment. On the night of September 28, two regiments of the 193 Infantry Division, Major-General FN Smehotvorov, were deployed on the right bank of the Volga River, and they were immediately put into action on the western outskirts of the village. Red October.
On the morning of September 28, units of the 24-th tank and 71-th infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht attacked again, but without much success. German troops repeatedly attacked, they were actively supported by artillery fire and massive air strikes. There were stubborn street battles on the territory of the settlements, and in the village of Barricades the enemy managed to move forward and move the front edge of the Soviet defense to the south-western outskirts of the Silikat plant. A fierce battle went on in the Mamayev Kurgan area.
Due to the increased composition of the fronts and the large length of their lanes, the Supreme Command Headquarters 28 of September abolished the unified command of the South-East and Stalingrad fronts. The Stalingrad Front was renamed Donskoy, led by Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky. The main forces of the former Stalingrad front, the new Donskoy, were cut off from the city — the 63, 21, 24, 66, and 1 Guards armies. The front ranked the Don River from Pavlovsk to Kachalinsk and further to Erzovka on the Volga. The Stalingrad Front, headed by Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko, included the 62-I, 64-I, 57-I, 51-I and 28-I armies. Each front was subordinated directly to the Bet.
On September 29, the enemy threw large forces into battle: General Angern's 16-I tank division, General Mangus's 389-Infantry Division and the Stachel group with the support of aviation. The Wehrmacht launched an offensive against the right wing of the 62 Army in the Orlovka area. The German command, seeking to seize the northern part of Stalingrad, decided to eliminate the Oryol bulge of the Soviet troops, which threatened the flank of the German group operating from the Gorodishche area. “The troops of the Oryol group at that time were located with a ledge reaching depths of 10 kilometers and widths of 5 kilometers. The total length of the front here was 24 kilometers. The defense was fragile ”(Eremenko A.I. The Battle of Stalingrad.).
The Germans had a strong aviation and artillery training. Then the enemy attacked in two directions - from the north-east and from the west. Here the combined battalion of the 112 th infantry division (around 250 fighters) and part of the 115 th infantry brigade of Colonel K. M. Andryusenko, defended in previous battles, defended themselves. The first attacks of our troops repulsed. But later the Germans broke through the front of the defending units and reached the railway line. The Oryol corridor narrowed to 1000-1200. Continuing to push our troops, and under the threat of encirclement, they withdrew. North-west of Orlovka, part of the defending troops was surrounded. For several days, the units of the 115 Infantry Brigade of the 2th Motorized Rifle Brigade fought hard in full surroundings. As a result of fierce fighting, these units broke off the encirclement and united with the troops of their army. Thus, Paulus's 6 Army managed to destroy the Oryol ledge and take Orlovka.
The Russian units in the environment offered such fierce resistance that even the Germans noted this. F. Mellenthin in his book cites evidence of a participant in the battles for Orlovka from the German side, Colonel G. R. Dingler. “All our attempts to suppress the resistance of the Russians in the beam have so far remained vain. The beam was bombed by dive bombers, shelling artillery. We sent more and more new units to the attack, but they invariably rolled back with heavy losses, so much did the Russians dig into the ground ... In the end, the Russians were completely cut off from the outside world. They could not count on air supplies either, since our aircraft at that time possessed complete superiority ... The beam interfered with us, like an eyesore, but there was nothing to think about forcing the enemy to surrender under the threat of starvation. " Mellentin F. Tank battles 1939-1945.).
The 62 Army replied with the counterattacks of the newly arrived 39 Guards, 193 and 308 rifle divisions. Chuikov was constantly supported by reinforcements. On the night of October 1, the 39-th Guards Rifle Division began ferrying under the command of Major-General S. S. Guriev. The regiments of this division were not fully equipped, but were a serious force. The division took up defenses west of the Krasny Oktyabr plant at the front of Kazachya Street - Banny ravine and directly in the workshops of the plant, turning them into strong points. On October 1, the Germans got into the battle formations of the 193 th rifle division of Smehotvorov, trying to seize the Red October plant, so the arrival of Guriev's division was very timely.
In the morning of October 2, two rifle regiments of the 308 th rifle division under the command of Colonel L.N. Gurtyev, who had crossed over to the right bank by this time, attacked the enemy near the village of Barricades The 42-I separate rifle brigade also participated in the application of this counterattack. Counterattack began at 6 hours. Breaking down the resistance of the enemy, the units broke into the outskirts of the village. “A fierce struggle unfolded for each house, for each building. Let's go grenades. Fighting the enemy in a number of places turned into hand-to-hand combat. ” The Germans, by strong attacks, stopped the advance of the Soviet troops. Yet a significant part of the village. Barricades by the end of the day was cleared from the enemy.
At this time, the Germans used a non-standard course. On the night of October 1, a group of 300 people, reinforced with mortars, penetrated the steep ravine through a drainpipe and then went unnoticed to the Volga. Turning south, the Nazis began to go to the rear of the 13 Guards Rifle Division. German groups were leaked to the rear of the Soviet division in other sectors. At the same time, the enemy launched an attack on the right flank of the division. The division commander Rodimtsev made a decision to destroy them by simultaneous strikes at the wedged groups. Guardsmen launched a decisive attack and regained their position.
The fights were still extremely violent. Both sides suffered heavy losses. So, the 93-division of General FN Smekhotvorov lost 4 / 5 of its staff in six days of fighting, from the 13-th and 35-th guards, the NKVD, who had been fighting in the city for two weeks, only the headquarters remained. The number of most German divisions fell to the level of the regiment.
Soviet machine gunners of the Stalingrad front by the river
Two submachine gunners of the Stalingrad Front in intelligence
The approaches to the southern part of Stalingrad continued to be defended by the troops of the 64 Army under the command of Major General M.S. Shumilov. On the night of October 2, the 64 Army on the right flank struck in the direction of the Gerbil, which was left in September. However, the attacks did not bring success. Using the superiority of forces, the enemy broke into Voroshilovsky district and captured a significant part of it. He wedged into the territory of the Kirov industrial region. Both sides constantly exchanged blows, went over to the attacks. The troops of the 64 Army tried to break through to the north, to restore contact with the 62 Army. But to solve this problem, despite all the attacks, stubbornness and courage of the Soviet troops, failed.
“The days and nights of the 64 Army Division made their way north to join the 62 Army, but the distance between the armies almost did not decrease, we were divided by the territory of the present Soviet district and the city center,” recalled the XI NUMX rifle division, General I K. Morozov.
Map source: Samsonov A.M. The Battle of Stalingrad. M .: Science, 1989.
Counterstrike Soviet troops
The command of the Stalingrad Front, seeking to ease the pressure of the enemy troops directly on the city and alleviate the position of the 62 and 64 armies, organized a number of private operations south of Stalingrad. The coordination of the troops was carried out by A. M. Vasilevsky. Vasilevsky "... recommended the commander of the 57 and 51 armies to take measures in the near future to seize the enemy’s exits from the defile between the lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa and Barmantsak and secure them." The offensive actions of the ground units were supported by the 8 th Air Army.
During September 28 - October 4, units of the 51 Army commanded by Major General TK Kolomiets launched a counterattack in 75 km from the southern line of Stalingrad. The combined detachment under the command of the commander of the 302 th rifle division, Colonel EF Makarchuk, using surprise, on the night of September 29 broke through to the rear of the Romanian corps 6 and quickly rushed to Sadovoe.
Attack of the Soviet tanks KV-1 of the Stalingrad Front with the support of infantry
September 28 - On October 2 a second counterstrike was inflicted by the combined squadron of 57 Army General F. I. Tolbukhin in the area of Sarpa, Tsats and Barmantsak lakes. The combined detachment of the 57 Army of October 1 occupied the settlement of Tsatsa, Semkin. The Germans pulled up reserves and at the end of the day counterattacked, having pressed our troops. On October 2, units of the 57 Army, with the support of tanks and aircraft, knocked out the enemy from Semkin and entrenched themselves between the lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa and Barmantsak. Thus, as a result of successfully conducted operations, Soviet success achieved local success. The counterstrikes of the 57 and 51 armies to the south of Stalingrad led to the strengthening of the defense of the southern wing of the Stalingrad Front and made it possible to occupy advantageous springboards for a future counteroffensive.
Map source: Samsonov A.M. The Battle of Stalingrad. M .: Science, 1989.
To be continued ...
- Alexander Samsonov
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