Defeat of the Crimean Front

75 years ago was defeated by the Crimean Front. 8 May 1942, the German offensive began. Because of the inept command, the Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat. 13 May Soviet defenses were broken through. On the night of May 14, Marshal S. M. Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula. 15 May opponent broke into Kerch. Evacuation continued on May 20. Our troops were evacuated, some of the forces were encircled and were destroyed and captured. Crimean front suffered heavy losses. After the evacuation of the Stavka directive was completed, the Crimean Front and the North Caucasus sector were eliminated. The remnants of the troops were sent to the formation of the new North Caucasus Front.

As a result, the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front became much more complicated. The enemy began to threaten an invasion of the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula. The Germans were able to concentrate forces and means to seize Sevastopol. Soon after the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, Sevastopol fell.

prehistory

During the 1941 campaign in the southwestern direction, the Wehrmacht achieved significant successes: in the battle of Uman and in the "Kiev Cauldron" the main forces of the South-Western Front of the Red Army were defeated, most of the Ukrainian SSR was occupied. In mid-September, the Wehrmacht reached the approaches to the Crimea. The Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance: 1) as the base of the Black Sea fleet and a possible location based on the German and Italian Navy; 2) as the basis for aviation. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would lose the possibility of raids on the oil fields of Romania, and the Germans would be able to strike at targets in the Caucasus; 3) as a bridgehead for the invasion of the North Caucasus, through the Kerch Strait and Taman. Adolf Hitler attached great importance to the capture of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus.

The Soviet high command also understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated on this effort, abandoning the defense of Odessa. The only land route to the Crimea lay through the Perekop Isthmus. The defense of the peninsula was entrusted to the 51-th Separate Army directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters formed in August. By mid-October, the Maritime Army was transferred from Odessa by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters. From the side of the enemy, the 11-I army of Erich von Manstein and the Romanian units acted. Air support was provided by parts of the Luftwaffe XNUM th air fleet.

September 24 German forces, with the support of artillery and aviation, launched an offensive on the Perekop isthmus. During the heavy fighting, they managed to break through the Turkish rampart on 26 September and capture the city of Armyansk. The counter-strike, hastily organized by the commander of the operational group, Lieutenant-General P. I. Batov, did not lead to the desired result. By September 30, the Soviet troops had withdrawn to Ishun positions. Manstein, due to heavy losses and the diversion of part of the troops to the Rostov direction, refused to continue the offensive.

Soldier and sergeant major of the Wehrmacht Crimean group, who distinguished themselves in the battles for Kerch, awarded with 2-class iron crosses

October 18 Germans again went on the attack. Fierce fighting went on for several days. Soviet troops counterattacked with the help of units of the arriving Maritime Army. However, on October 26, Manstein introduced at the junction of the Soviet armies two fresh infantry divisions and on October 28, German troops broke through the defenses. The Red Army units went to Sevastopol, Kerch and partially scattered in the mountainous terrain (many fighters became partisans). The attempt of the retreating Soviet troops to gain a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula was unsuccessful. As a result, the remnants of the 51 army could not be kept in the Crimea, and by November 16 were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The Primorsk army consisting of five rifle and three cavalry divisions was ceded to Sevastopol. Thus, by November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied by German troops.

From October 30 to November 11 1941, battles were fought at the distant approaches to Sevastopol, and from November 2 attacks on the outer line of the defense of the fortress began. 9-10 November Wehrmacht managed to completely surround the city from the land. However, during November, the rearguard forces made their way through, in particular, part of the 184 th Infantry Division of the NKVD, covering the withdrawal of the 51 th army. 11 November with the approach of the main grouping 11 th army of the Wehrmacht began fighting around the perimeter of the Sevastopol fortified area, which by the beginning of World War II was one of the most fortified places in the world. During the 10 days, the advancing German forces managed to slightly penetrate into the forward line of defense of Sevastopol, after which a pause began in the battle. November 21 Wehrmacht suspended the storming of the city. Thus, Sevastopol withstood the first assault.

The linear ship of the Black Sea Fleet "Paris Commune" ("Sevastopol") is firing at enemy positions from the South Bay of Sevastopol. December 1941

Kerch-Feodosia operation

To continue the siege of Sevastopol, the commander of the 11 Army, Manstein pulled off most of the available forces to the city, leaving only one infantry division and one Romanian regiment to cover the Kerch area. The Soviet command decided to use a convenient moment to strike back with the forces of the Transcaucasian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. The plan of the operation, drawn up by the chief of the Transcaucasian Front, F. I. Tolbukhin, was to simultaneously and Xench the 51 armies in the Kerch area and the Feodosia port to surround and destroy the Kerch grouping of the enemy. In the future, it was supposed to develop the offensive deep into the peninsula, unlock Sevastopol and completely liberate the Crimea. The main attack, in the region of Feodosia, was to be inflicted by the 44 Army withdrawn from the Iranian border, and the auxiliary, in the Kerch region, the 44 Army. The landing of the troops was planned to be conducted on a wide front (up to 51 km) at several points simultaneously, in order to deprive the enemy of the ability to maneuver reserves and pin down him on all the most important directions.

26 December 1941 Soviet command attempted a strategic offensive in the Crimea, known as the "Kerch troops". December 28 landed naval landing in the area of ​​Kerch and December 29 - in the area of ​​Feodosia. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand fighters. In Feodosia, the unloading of the landing force took place in the port. The resistance of the small German garrison was broken by the end of December 29, after which reinforcements began to arrive in Theodosia. Landing around Kerch was much more complicated: the infantry landed directly on the icy sea and walked to the shore along the chest in water. Hypothermia caused great losses. A few days after the start of the landing, frost hit and most of the 51 Army crossed over the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait. Small German-Romanian troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but left behind all heavy weapons. By 2 January 1942 Soviet troops fully occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Thus, in December 1941 - January 1942, as a result of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, Soviet forces returned the Kerch Peninsula and advanced 8 days by 100-110 km.

As a result of the landing, the position of the German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11 Army, E. von Manstein, wrote: “If the enemy had taken advantage of the situation and quickly began to pursue the 46 Infantry Division from Kerch, it would also have hit the Romanians who had fled from Feodosia, and the situation would be hopeless, not only for this newly created area ... the fate of the whole 11 army would be decided. ... In the first days of January, 1942 actually opened the way to the vital artery of the 11 army, the railway Dzhankoy - Simferopol for the troops who landed at Theodosia and approached from Kerch. The weak front of preservation, which we were able to create, could not resist the onslaught of large forces. 4 January it became known that the enemy in the area of ​​Feodosia already had 6 divisions. ”

However, the 51 army advancing from Kerch did not advance fast enough, while the 44 army from Theodosia did not move to the west, but to the east, towards the 51 army. This allowed the enemy to retaliate. Given the weakness of the German defense, the General Headquarters indicated to the commander of the Crimean front, General D. T. Kozlov, that it was necessary to get to Perekop as quickly as possible and to attack the rear of the enemy’s Sevastopol grouping. But the front commander Kozlov postponed the offensive, citing the insufficiency of forces and means.

In the first half of January, 1942, the troops of the Crimean Front were preparing for a further offensive deep into the Crimea. To support the future offensive, Sudak assault forces landed. However, the German troops ahead of the Crimean front for a few days. On January 15, the Germans suddenly launched an offensive, delivering the main blow at the junction of the 51 and 44 armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops, the enemy broke through our defenses and on January 18 beat off Theodosius. Sudak assault, almost two weeks heroically defending the bridgehead seized (its remnants went to the partisans), almost completely died.

On January 28, the Stavka decided to allocate troops operating on the Kerch direction into an independent Crimean front under the command of General Kozlov. The front was reinforced by new rifle divisions, tank parts and artillery. In early February, the 47th Army of Major General K.S. Kolganov, withdrawn from Iran, crossed over the strait and became part of the front. Troops in the Crimea were significantly reinforced by armored vehicles. The Crimean front was to break through the encirclement of Sevastopol. In February - April 1942, Soviet troops made three counterattacks in the Crimea, but in the end they only suffered heavy losses.

Operation Hunting Bustard

At this time, the Crimean Front had in its composition: the 44 Army of S. I. Chernyak (5 divisions and the 2 separate tank battalion), the 47 Army of K. S. Kolganov (5 rifle divisions) and the 51 Army (5 divisions). In addition, the infantry and cavalry divisions, the 3 rifle brigades, the 1 naval rifle brigade, the 4 tank brigades, the 2 separate tank battalions and other units submitted to the front. By the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered about 250 thousand people.

The front had large forces and means, however, the command reacted to the organization of defense without due attention. The troops maintained battle formations designed for offensive operations. All divisions were located in one line, their battle formations were extremely condensed. The divisions occupied the defense strip with an average length of 2 km. The main forces were concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front line, not having sufficient depth. The front command did not take serious measures to remedy the situation even when information about the preparation of the enemy for the attack began to arrive. For the open terrain characteristic of the Kerch Peninsula, an echeloned anti-tank and air defense, well-equipped in engineering terms, and with strong reserves located far from the front and near road junctions was needed. However, the defense of the Crimean Front did not respond to these demands. In addition, most of the forces of the Crimean Front were concentrated in the north of the Parpachsky Isthmus. This took advantage of the Germans.

At the beginning of April, 1942 began to receive reinforcements into the army of Manstein: for the first time since the beginning of the offensive against the Crimea, the 22 Tank Division was attached to it. By special order of Hitler, the 8 th Luftwaffe air corps of Wolfram von Richthofen was transferred to the Crimea. At the beginning of May 1942 460 aircraft arrived in Crimea. The German army 11 had three corps: the 30 and 42 army corps and the 7 Romanian corps (1 tank, 4 infantry, 1 Jaeger division, 2 Romanian infantry division and 1 divisions. The 11 th Luftwaffe air fleet provided air support to the 4 Army.

The tanks of the 22 Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht on the platforms. Crimea, March 1942

Contrary to popular belief, the Crimean Front did not have a serious quantitative superiority over the Germans. 11-Army on May 2 1942 232 549, there were (243 760 to 11 May) servicemen in military units and formations, about 25 thousand. Thousand. Man Luftwaffe personnel, 2 thousand men of the Kriegsmarine and about 95 thousand. Romanian soldiers and officers. In total, this gave more than 350 thousands of people in the total number of Manstein's army. In addition, several thousand people of the staff of the imperial railways, SD, the organization of Todt in the Crimea and more than 9 thousand collaborators identified in the German report as "Tatars" submitted to her.

E. Manstein recalled: “In the southern sector of his front, between the Black Sea and the village of Koy-Assan, he mostly still occupied his old, well-equipped Parpach line, since all his attacks in this sector were repulsed. In the northern part of the same, its front deflected in a large arc westward to Kieta, going far ahead over this line. This front was formed at a time when the enemy knocked down the 18-th Romanian division. ... Our intelligence showed that the enemy concentrated two thirds of its forces on the northern sector ... In the southern sector, only three divisions defended and another two or three divisions made up a reserve ... This situation was the basis on which army headquarters developed the plan for Operation Hunt for bustard ". The idea was to deliver a decisive blow not directly to the outstanding front arc of the enemy front, but in the southern sector, along the Black Sea coast, that is, in the place where the enemy, apparently, least expected it. ”

German troops made serious preparations for the offensive. The German command took into account all the lessons of the battles of January-April 1942. The Germans, with the help of aerial photography, a survey of defectors and prisoners, were able to assess the Soviet defense and find its weaknesses.

Battle

Prior to the start of the ground attack, German bombers delivered an aimed strike at previously reconnoitered targets. As a result, the Soviet headquarters, which had not changed their location for a long time, were destroyed: the commander of the 51 army, Lieutenant-General V.N. Lvov, was killed, and his deputy, Major-General K. I. Baranov, was seriously wounded. The connection has been broken. This partially disorganized the Soviet troops. In the morning of May 8, the Germans launched an offensive. They struck the main blow in the lane of the 44 Army S.I. Chernyak, along the Black Sea coast. At the same time, troops landed on boats (about two companies) in the area of ​​Mount As-Chalule (15 kilometers northeast of Theodosia) in the rear of the 63 Mountain Division, which caused panic. By the end of the day, the Wehrmacht broke through the defenses of the 44 of the Soviet army, creating a gap width of 5 km and depth of 8 km. On the rest of the front, the Germans tied the Soviet troops with separate attacks by forces up to the battalion.

On the direction of the main attack of the Germans was the 63-I Mountain Division, rather weak in number, morale and armament. In general, the 63-I Mountain Division was one of the weakest units of the Crimean Front. Shortly before the German offensive, 29 on April 1942, General Staff officer in the 44 Army, Major A. Zhitnik, prophetically wrote in his report to the Chief of Staff of the Crimean Front: “It is necessary either to withdraw completely [division] ... to the second echelon (and this is the best) or at least in parts. Its direction is the direction of the enemy’s likely strike, and as soon as he has accumulated defector from this division and is convinced of the low morale of this division, he will be strengthened in the decision to inflict a blow on this sector. ” Initially, the plan did not envisage a change of division, only the rotation of the regiments within the formation, with a conclusion to rest in the second echelon. The final version, approved by 3 in May of 1942, suggested that the division be withdrawn to the second echelon of the 10-11 army in May, two days after the start of the German offensive. Major Zhitnik was heard, but the measures taken were late.

On May 9, the German 22 Panzer Division launched an offensive. By May 10, it broke into the depths of the defense of the Crimean Front and turned north, launching communications from the 47 and 51 armies. Taki 44 th army tried to stop the enemy breakthrough, but without success. The anti-tank defense of the advancing German troops was stronger than expectations. In the first days of the battle, the most critical for the outcome of the operation, the command of the Crimean front could not take any decisive measures to stabilize the situation and repel the blow of the enemy. All the troops of the front, except for one rifle and one cavalry division, were linked by combat. In the morning of May 10, the Stavka ordered the withdrawal of troops to the positions of the Turkish (Cimmerian) Wall and organize defense there. The front command could not complete this task. Only on the night of May 11, part of the troops (without proper management and organization) began to retreat to the Turkish shaft. Could not the Soviet command and organize the actions of our aircraft. Soviet aviation did not even attempt to inflict powerful blows on the most dangerous enemy groups and to cover the withdrawal of our troops, which were subjected to the continuous influence of enemy aviation. As a result of May 12, the Stavka was forced to temporarily subordinate front aviation to the deputy commander of long-range aviation. Our fleet was also inactive, without using its great capabilities. In particular, no opposition to the naval landing by the small ships of the Black Sea Fleet was rendered.

Soviet heavy tank KV, padded on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942

Further fighting developed even more adversely for the Crimean front. On May 12, the Germans landed an airborne landing in the rear of the 44 Army. Our troops failed to gain a foothold on the Cimmerian shaft and began to retreat to Kerch. By the end of May 14, the Germans had broken through to the southern and western outskirts of the city. On the night of May 14, Marshal S. M. Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula. 15-20 May, our rearguards fought stubbornly in the Kerch area, enabling the main forces to cross to the Taman Peninsula. However, to conduct an organized evacuation failed. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons, and later used them during the storming of Sevastopol. Part of the Soviet troops could not escape. After exhausting the possibilities for resistance in the city, the remaining defenders of Kerch went to Adzhimushkay quarries. For almost 170 days, the heroic defense of Kerch Brest - Adzhimushkay quarries continued (from 16 of May 1942 of the year to 31 of October of 1942 of the year). This is one of the most heroic and scary pages of the Great War ("Kerch Brest". Heroic defense of Adzhimushkay quarry; H. 2).

Results

As a result, the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front became much more complicated. The enemy was able to invade the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula. The defeat of the Crimean front and its evacuation significantly worsened the position of the Soviet garrison in Sevastopol. German troops could concentrate the main forces and means to defeat the Sevastopol fortified area. Since May 8, the Crimean Front has lost more than 162 thousand people, 4646 guns and mortars, 196 tanks, 417 aircraft, 10,4 thousand cars, 860 tractors and more other property.

The main reason for the defeat of the Soviet troops in the Kerch battle was the poor organization of the fighting forces. Improper organization of defense, carelessness and carelessness of front and army headquarters in defense, shallow formation of troops in one line, lack of reserves for parrying enemy breakthrough. In particular, the lack of masking of the headquarters and the neglect of the regular change of their location, led to the fact that German aircraft bombed these points during the first raid, disrupting wire communications and command and control of troops. The headquarters were not ready for the use of radio and other means of communication. The front command failed to properly organize the interaction between the armies, the interaction between the ground forces and aviation. Our aircraft did not use the available capabilities to deter the enemy. The situation was similar with the fleet. Quite serious capabilities of the fleet were not used to attack the enemy on the coastal flanks and organized evacuation of troops.

Interestingly, most defeats of the Soviet troops in 1941-1942. in one way or another, they are connected with a very sparse formation of formations, when divisions occupied a strip much wider than the statutory norms. The Crimean front represented to all this the exact opposite: its troops occupied defenses on a narrow isthmus and had sufficient means for defense. At the same time, the command on such a narrow sector could have built a strong defense on any sector where the enemy would have struck the main blow. Prepare strong reserves to parry an enemy strike, create a second, third line of defense.

The headquarters studied in detail the course of the Kerch operation, - noted A. M. Vasilevsky. - We came to the conclusion that the leadership of the front forces from the side of the Crimean Front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, member of the Military Council of divisional commissar F.A. Shamanin, Chief of Staff, Major General P.P. Eternal, and a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Army Commissioner 1 Rank L. Z. Mehlis was clearly untenable. ” The headquarters removed Mehlis from the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and lowered his military rank to corps commissioner. The front commander, Kozlov, and a member of the Military Council, Shamanin, were also removed from their posts and demoted. S.I. Chernyak, the commander of the 44 Army, S.C. Kolganov, the Commander of the 47 Army, and E.M. Nikolayenko, the Air Force Front Commander, were dismissed from the command and lowered in the rank of XNUMX Army.

Two Soviet tanks T-34, shot down during battles on the Kerch Peninsula

Comments

[Olgovich]

Such a rout, with the superiority of forces and means, can only be explained by the complete incompetence of the command all levels ..

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Olgovich

can only be explained by the complete incompetence of command at all levels ..

The front command failed to organize the interaction between the armies and the interaction between the ground forces and aviation.

When there is no agreement in the comrades,
They won’t work out well.

[Velizariy]

It was all over the place! These are the "great" Bolsheviks, so the Germans fought on its territory. This red trash is guilty of death, if you count from 1917 to 1947, almost 100 million Russian people. This is not a single nation in history.
The actions of the red commanders led to the death and capture of entire corps! millions of soldiers died and were captured with technical and numerical superiority!
And the turning point in the war came only when Stalin began talking about the Russian people, not the abstract Soviet people, and returning to the traditions of the Russian army, even shoulder straps and uniforms.
And most importantly, the persecution of the church stopped.
You can talk about komunyak achievements as much as you like, but they are all on bones and a sea of ​​blood, Russian blood. Yes, and achievements, the soap bubble, the agrarian Soviet Union imported grain! and where from? from USA!!!
They received atomic energy and another without blood, the benefit of scientists in the Empire was enough, the whole West then went to these scientists. Sikorsky is just what it costs.

[avva2012]

Velizariy This red trash is guilty of death, if you count from 1917 to 1947 years, almost 100 of millions of Russian people. This is not a single nation in history.

What color?

[Velizariy]

IIIii ... ??? Are you innocent of the deaths of 100 million Russian people?)

[Molot1979]

Not 100 million, but one hundred thousand billion sextillons. According to reliable information (yesterday the grandmother at the entrance said), the Bolsheviks ate half of them alive.

[Velizariy]

Quote: Molot1979

the Bolsheviks ate half of them alive.

this could well be. Zalkind did everything.

[Han Tengri]

Quote: Velizariy

Quote: Molot1979
the Bolsheviks ate half of them alive.
this could well be. Zalkind did everything.

And you, of course, have evidence ?! For, if not, then you, not any Belizear, you are the vulgar Peace da Ball.

[Uncle Murzik]

Velizariy Solzhenitsyn stole the numbers! do not lie tossing bags!

[Ivan Ivanov]

Quote: avva2012

This red trash is guilty of death, if you count from 1917 to 1947, almost 100 million Russian people.

After the fracture, the "great Bolsheviks" returned the Germans to their previous positions, i.e. to Berlin with even greater speed.

the population decreased in the civil war by 12 million .. by 6 million during the era of democrats without any war
27 million, of which the majority civilians killed by the Germans-also attribute to the Bolsheviks?
100 million nonsense. with such losses there would be no one to fight and build before and after the war

[avva2012]

Ivan Ivanov, why are you carrying my alien nonsense under my nickname? Engaged in cheating.

[Ivan Ivanov]

I’m sorry, the error came out, I don’t understand how

[parusnik]

You can talk about achievements

... Tell us about the achievements of modern bourgeois-democratic power, please ... It is very interesting to hear ...

[Velizariy]

Quote: parusnik

modern bourgeois-democratic

Name at least one representative of this government who has not stepped out of that government?

Quote: parusnik

interesting to hear ...

Even the beloved Chubais and that communist!)))) And Gaidar and Germans, and even Chernomyrdin, and of course not forgotten Boris)) they are all from your strong party nomenclature.

[zoolu300]

That is, there are no achievements. Not surprising.

[parusnik]

Velizariy

all of them from your strong party nomenclature.

..But they have created a bourgeois-democratic system for you, de-communize, abolished the "bloody communist" regime..Therefore, they are yours .. for you, they’re trying .. but you’re so good about them .. not good, sir .. yours and watering ... Well, what are the achievements under bourgeois-democratic power ... You have not told about this ...

[Velizariy]

Did I even say a word about the current government?

Quote: parusnik

and water your own.

Not yours, yours. They are yours. and the current state of affairs is a consequence of your power.

[parusnik]

So all such achievements from scratch .. for 25 years of bourgeois-democratic power ..?

[Velizariy]

Well, you must admit that all these traitors are from your wonderful Soviet system? My region has a depressed economy, nepotism is booming and there is no hope of improvement. But among the powers that be, there is NO NEW from the "democrats", ALL from the Soviet regime, only the name of the party is different and the rest is the same. After 1991, no one left the government, all yours, and the economy to zero.

Quote: parusnik

But what are the achievements under bourgeois-democratic power.

At least the Crimea you lost was returned and we will return the Donbass quietly.

[Alex_59]

Quote: Velizariy

Well, you must admit that all these traitors are from your wonderful Soviet system?

But Lenin, Stalin and other Bolsheviks from the wonderful tsarist system. Everything is logical.
By the way, what about the achievements of the tsarist era? PMV - discharge. Russian-Japanese - drain. Kohl 2 - drain (even his family - and then drain, not like himself). How many millions of aircraft engines and tanks, for example, did RI produce before the revolution? (my favorite question to the monarchists)

[Velizariy]

Quote: Alex_59

And Lenin, Stalin and other Bolsheviks from the wonderful tsarist system

stupid example. Lenin Stalin was not in power and did not belong to the state administration! They were brought to power by others.

Quote: Alex_59

PMV - drain

They merged just the Bolsheviks.

Quote: Alex_59

How many millions of aircraft engines and tanks, for example, did RI produce before the revolution?

And I think they do not answer him?) The question is very stupid)))
How many millions of aircraft engines and tanks for example did France produce?
If everything is draining, then why did the Bolsheviks in the forties seek to reach the level of 1913?

[Alex_59]

Quote: Velizariy

They merged just the Bolsheviks.

Oops! New in history! Sensation!
Those. there are no Bolsheviks in power - they are to blame. There are Bolsheviks in power - they are also to blame. Cool!
Good luck in life with such a coherent logic!

Quote: Velizariy

stupid example.

Not smarter than yours. Think about what you flog: the communist Gorbachev ruined the USSR, the former communist Yeltsin is not the cause of the success of the new Russia, the former communist Putin is the reason for the success of the present. This alone makes a normal person think that chasing witches under the label "communist" is unpromising, and the point is not in the sign "communist / not communist" but in something else.
Just reducing all the calculations to the formula "damned Bolsheviks are to blame for everything" you actually substitute yourself, dear anti-Soviet. You are depriving yourself of the opportunity to fully evaluate the successes or failures of a given historical period, fitting all events under the theory of "Bolsheviks are to blame." Thus, you are missing out on the clearly useful experience of the Soviet period and ignoring the obvious failures of your beloved "democrats / capitalists." Those. act in the worst style of dogmatic Soviet ideologists. Why are you better than Suslov?
Bottom line - the Chinese Communists in a capitalist wrapper over the entire width of their Chinese mouths laugh at modern "hurray" -capitalist Russia, and about the late USSR.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alex_59

But Lenin, Stalin and other Bolsheviks from the wonderful tsarist system. Everything is logical.

these other Bolsheviks what posts did the tsar hold?

Quote: Alex_59

PMV - discharge.

it was the Bolsheviks who merged, Kaiser’s troops didn’t reach St. Petersburg, and even less so to Moscow.

Quote: Alex_59

How many millions of aircraft engines and tanks, for example, did RI produce before the revolution?

and how many councils did they produce before the revolution? But seriously, let's compare the performance characteristics of aircraft engines manufactured in the USA and this stuff in the USSR by the 45th year. Or how many washing machines, vacuum cleaners, televisions, l / cars were per capita in the 60s in the USSR and comparable to the United States.

[Alex_59]

Quote: nizhegorodec

these other Bolsheviks what posts did the tsar hold?

Those. are they not a cultural habitat product? Materialized out of nothing? Alright - and Lenin!

Quote: nizhegorodec

this is the Bolsheviks leaked

Those. from 1914 of the year did the Bolsheviks command the army? Yeah. Well, this is understandable in principle, I no longer have questions about the WWII. And, excuse me, Trotsky and Frunze also ruled the Russo-Japanese War, or what?

Quote: nizhegorodec

and how many councils did they produce before the revolution?

Tips .... before the revolution ... sorry, I do not drink.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alex_59

Those. are they not a cultural habitat product?

Well, yes, logically, we go further, and Vlasov with his cohort, but no, they are products of the living environment commie !!

Quote: Alex_59

Well, this is understandable in principle, I no longer have questions about the WWII.

thank God at least learned

Quote: Alex_59

And, excuse me, Trotsky and Frunze also ruled the Russo-Japanese War, or what?

Well, here at Hassan Blucher "distinguished himself" so what?

Quote: Alex_59

Tips .... before the revolution ... sorry, I do not drink.

but it seems to me the opposite. Compare the 13th year with 60 ???

[Alexey RA]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Well, here at Hassan Blucher "distinguished himself" so what?

And the fact that citizen Blucher was immediately leaned against the wall for the Khasan affairs. And not appointed a member of the State Council.
And the next conflict in the same regions was sent from the Center. sovereign's eye - sharp, like ... who wrote off such details about the local command to the Center that they immediately threw out this command, appointing this very eye in its place.

I am afraid that with Bolshevik methods of government, citizen Kuropatkin would not have survived Liaoyang. And then Wafangou.

[Alex_59]

Quote: nizhegorodec

vzhuh and Vlasov with his cohort

Yes exactly. And what did Vlasov come from nowhere? No, he is his own, dear. I, unlike you, are not dogmatic; for me the story is not black and white. Vlasov is our bastard. Fact. Product of his people.

Quote: nizhegorodec

thank God at least learned

A very primitive move is to try to pass off the irony as straightforward. I learned that you have bedlam in your head.

Quote: nizhegorodec

Well, here at Hassan Blucher "distinguished himself" so what?

Never mind. Everyone has always had ups and downs. But there are people who stick out the failures of one era, and ignore the failures of another. And it is depressing.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Velizariy

At least the Crimea you lost was returned and we will return the Donbass quietly.

and from importers of grain turned into an exporter, in the store you can buy at least something, and not run like a pounding tusik in search of sausages for shopping, or even to Moscow by train "sausage flight"

[parusnik]

So wait ... those are for you trash red .. and this identity ...? ... I apologize to ask, and yours then? .. If all of ours ... yours who..for whom are you, forgive generously, gracious sovereign, you are tearing your shirt ..? ... Call yours .. what if we join them .. It’s just interesting ... Who are yours ...?

[Uncle Murzik]

Velizariy still Putin and Shaygu returned Crimea was a communist! Well, you do not know

[avva2012]

parusnik
Yes, no for them, neither ours nor yours. This is not a monarchist. Ukrainian.

[Velizariy]

no more mind enough?

[avva2012]

Not. Big mind is not needed to determine. There is a marker, "100 MILLION." Neurons of an ordinary person do not produce such numbers.

[Velizariy]

Count with civil, the Red Terror, the famine that was not once, the notorious 37 year, and the whole WWII plus the famine of 1947.

[avva2012]

The Second World War is also a marker. Not the Great Patriotic War, but WWII. NTS vocabulary. I’m saying, not a monarchist. We have disagreements with them, but if we find ourselves in some trenches (maybe pathos, but do not change the essence), but with a similar ideology, it is unlikely.

[Velizariy]

The Finnish one was still in front of the Second World War, there were big losses there, there were also Hassan and Halkingol, these databases were not included in the Second World War, and this is why the abbreviation WWII is taken.

Quote: avva2012

I say, not a monarchist

Well, with such conclusions it’s clear who you are)))))

[chenia]

Quote: Velizariy

Count with civil, the Red Terror, the famine that was not once, the notorious 37 year, and the whole WWII plus the famine of 1947.

Total losses from 1918 to 1960 -70 млн. (and taking into account emigration -6-8 million and unborn -25 million). and no more.
Civil Loss-16-16,5 million
Where
-4,5 million emigration.
-5 million pandemic "spaniard"
- 7 million unborn, typhoid, victims of hostilities, white and red terror.

From 1922 to 1960, these losses were not born 10 million\\

Famines and repressions of 1918-1960 (the sixtieth was specially chosen, then there were definitely no repressions) .- 5 million (five)

Loss of WWII 38 million (as of 1945)
11 million unborn
1,5-3 million emigration
23-24 million dead.
12 ml of them. military personnel (4 million in captivity).

on 1960 g loss of WWII40 млн.
Here is such arithmetic, and who shouts that it is more (if he is not on the salary of conditional Soros),
that MIRACLE of which he constantly dropped his head in childhood (it happens).

[Palch]

Dear parusnik, one of the achievements of the rotten west is the monitor that you are currently watching, the Internet that you use to communicate with the VO community, the keyboard and mouse with which you write ..... yes .. yes ... alas, these are their achievements and the fruits that we all use ..... and do not say that we all came up with it - and they successfully developed ..... let's be objective.

[parusnik]

And I’m not talking about that .. who and how much I came up with, I’m talking about concrete achievements ... over 25 years ... without a Soviet base ... what exactly was created from scratch in the last 25 years ...

[serezhasoldatow]

I agree. Who defeated fascism? For objectivity.

[Looking for]

this is not objectivity. this is the primitiveness of your childish reasoning.

[Pancer]

Quote: Palch

one of the achievements of the rotten west is the monitor in which you are currently watching, the Internet that you use to communicate with the VO community, the keyboard and mouse with which you write ..... yes .. yes ... alas,

Are these all your so-called “arguments"? Well, I tell you. A rotten set of allegedly worthless "facts2" which in fact turned out to be candy wrappers.
Is the secret to you the activities of Chubais and Co. in the destruction of primarily high-tech enterprises, including those producing electronics?
http://www.perunica.ru/nauka/6801-pervyy-sovetski
y-noutbook-elektronika-ms-1504.html
so for example .. will you understand what I’m talking about, I personally doubt very much ..
http://www.computerra.ru/11485/pervyie-sovetskie-
noutbuki-i-myishi /

[serezhasoldatow]

But they forgot Putin !!!

[Ivan Ivanov]

Quote: Velizariy

Name at least one representative of this government who has not stepped out of that government?

That’s it, it turns out that all post-socialist countries will not grow up good capitalists in any way, that’s the problem .. yes, in central and southern America, following the logic, the former communists in power are therefore poor.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Velizariy

The actions of the red commanders led to the death and capture of entire corps! millions of soldiers died and were captured with technical and numerical superiority!

I’m embarrassed to ask - did the red commanders also command in France? Or in the UK (fighting in Africa, Singapore, Operation Anakim)? Or was MacArthur a latent communist?

Quote: Velizariy

And the turning point in the war came only when Stalin began talking about the Russian people, not the abstract Soviet people, and returning to the traditions of the Russian army, even shoulder straps and uniforms.

I really didn’t know. that in December 1941 they returned to the epaulettes and uniforms of the Russian army.

[Velizariy]

Let the French speak for themselves.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Velizariy

Let the French speak for themselves.

Well, you write what exactly

These are the "great" Bolsheviks, so the Germans fought on its territory. This red trash is guilty of death, if you count from 1917 to 1947, almost 100 million Russian people. This is not a single nation in history.
The actions of the red commanders led to the death and capture of entire corps! millions of soldiers died and were captured with technical and numerical superiority!

That is, such losses are due precisely to the presence of bolshevichkov и red commanders - and nothing else. So I want to know - which red commanders have provided exactly the same results in the armies of the Allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition?

[Velizariy]

I am not interested in the state of affairs in the allied armies.
And ours near Vyazma lost as many killed as all the allied armies put together during the whole war.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Velizariy

I am not interested in the state of affairs in the allied armies.

And it should.
For you derive the losses of the Red Army solely from the Bolshevik nature of its commanders, not paying attention to the fact that with exactly the same result the Wehrmacht smashed the army with bourgeois-democratic commanders, moreover, who had the experience of the WWII. That is, you adjust the facts to the theory, discarding the results of similar tests of the Wehrmacht on a much more experienced enemy that do not fit into your theory.

Quote: Velizariy

And ours near Vyazma lost as many killed as all the allied armies put together during the whole war.

If you give up after 2 weeks of fighting - where do the losses come from?
Losses of the same French army in WWII = its total strength, minus the troops who went to the “Battle of France”.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alexey RA

that in December 1941 they returned to the epaulettes and uniforms of the Russian army.

and what in

Quote: Alexey RA

in December 1941

fracture? Even in Soviet textbooks, the Battle of Stalingrad is called only the beginning of a turning point in the Second World War

[Alex_59]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Even in Soviet textbooks

This is your problem. In Soviet textbooks it is written that the Bolsheviks made the 1917 revolution of the year, that it was their merit. It is sad, but the fact is that few people heard about the Bolsheviks until October 1917. RI was destroyed by completely different people, mainly in uniform and in large offices. The Bolsheviks only took advantage of the mess that arose and successfully seized power, pushing away from it in October those who imagined themselves victorious in February.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alex_59

This is your problem.

i'm not a communist so this is not my problem

Quote: Alex_59

The Bolsheviks only took advantage of the mess that arose and successfully seized power

and this is the problem of the whole country and its peoples

[Alex_59]

Quote: nizhegorodec

i'm not a communist so this is not my problem

I, too, am not a communist, and I understand that in the Soviet textbooks the Bolsheviks deified and attributed to them what they were not capable of in principle. And you still consider it at face value. Those. a victim of Soviet propaganda, only with the opposite sign.

[Velizariy]

Quote: Alex_59

Sadly, the fact is that few people heard about the Bolsheviks until October 1917

About Poroshenko, parubia, Yarosh, Groysman, too, was not heard especially until 2013. And they were brought to power as well as Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

Quote: Alex_59

RI collapsed completely different people

Under these other people, the empire existed within its borders with the same device — mono-ethnic, but under the Bolsheviks the territory shrank greatly and the mono-ethnic state was fragmented into pseudo-national republics with borders taken from the ceiling, and the USSR itself collapsed and a hearth was created tensions around Russia.

[Alex_59]

Quote: Velizariy

Under these other people, an empire existed within its borders.

And now in which? Everything is changing, everything is fleeting. Then it was so, now it’s different. The objective course of history.

Quote: Velizariy

And they were brought to power as well as Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

But it all started with the fact that Yanukovych leaked. And this is the fault of Yanukovych. Learn already to take responsibility for your schools on yourself. Freedom is not only rights, but also duties and responsibilities. No Bolsheviks could put Nicholas 2 not to go into the stupid war of WWII, not to fight so mediocre in the Russo-Japanese, not to carry out the reforms necessary for the country, not to set up production of aircraft engines very necessary for the country, and not to preserve their power. He was responsible for everything that happened before the abdication - and he is guilty of the fact that the coming to power of some Bolsheviks became possible. He merged the country, himself and his family. He is a traitor to the motherland.
Likewise, no one is to blame except the Communists for ruining the USSR, they could not understand in time that it was impossible to continue, that modernization was needed, that people did not believe in stupid slogans about the "Glory of the CPSU." Only they are to blame, no one else.
In the same way, no Bolsheviks are to blame for our current failures - only we ourselves. When we recognize this, we will begin to grow as the Chinese. In the meantime, we are lying in a swamp.

[Alexey RA]

What I love Russian anti-communists for is the unconditional faith in red propaganda.
The turning point in the Second World War is precisely the end of 1941. When it became clear to everyone that Directive 21 was covered with a copper basin, its main goals could not be achieved - and the Germans stood up to the full ghost of WWII, a long and bloody war on several fronts.
However, some people realized that the war was lost, back in November 1941 - for which he paid the post of Reich Minister.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: Alexey RA

When it became clear to everyone that Directive 21 was covered with a copper basin, its main goals cannot be achieved.

that Directive 21 is not feasible, smart people understood before the start of the war and either were removed from their posts or shot themselves right after the start of the war, and those who were lower in rank became defectors.

Quote: Alexey RA

What I love Russian anti-communists for is the unconditional faith in red propaganda.

faith in red propaganda is a commies disease (otherwise they are not commies but traitors), I treat this propaganda with sarcasm

[p20]

Quote: nizhegorodec

that Directive 21 is not feasible, smart people understood even before the war

Why is this not feasible? It was quite feasible. Another thing is that starting from 12.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. she actually ceased to exist. But it was already a school of Germans, too early to celebrate the victory.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: p20

Why is this not feasible?

Do you really think that Germany would be able to defeat the USSR even if the Barbarossa plan was fulfilled and the chances were reached to the Urals?

[p20]

Quote: nizhegorodec

Do you really think that Germany would be able to defeat the USSR even if the Barbarossa plan was fulfilled and the chances were reached to the Urals?

But what, the Barbaross plan provided for Germany to enter the Urals? No, he was much more modest; he left in the fall of 1941. on the line Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk along the Volga and the North. Dvina.
The plan was realistic. Why it did not happen, see above.
The roots of this behavior of the Germans lie in the company in France in 1940. The German combatant generals also planned to fail that company, but Hitler intervened (heeded the staff) and did not let them do this. It is a pity, because in this case, 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. would not be. Hitler was kicked for this by the combatant generals then all the way, such as "he didn’t let them finally win."
In 1941 Hitler, already stammered by combatant generals, did not intervene in the affairs of the military and did not take the side of the staff generals. The result was the failure of the blitzkrieg in 1941.

[Velizariy]

Only in 1943, the Germans, with full awareness of their defeat, were advancing with the speed of a tank and inflicting tremendous losses on our army and population ... But since the summer of 1943 they have already retreated and have not carried out major strategic offensive operations.

[Niccola Mack]

Only even in 1943 the Germans, with full awareness of their defeat, were advancing with the speed of the tank

They didn’t advance anywhere “at the speed of a tank”, but quite reasonably still hoped for victory. After the Kursk Bulge, they lost the most important thing - strategic initiative and defeat became a matter of time. You mentioned Vyazma here, or maybe you remember the “German 41” -Belarusian operation “Bagration” - almost a complete defeat of the Army Group “Center” (they were also lucky to have found a Model to restore the front). The Germans still can not calculate the number of dead, missing - from 300 to 500 thousand (and the wounded too). Only the number of German prisoners is reliable - 150 thousand. Something no one gets into a hysteria about "German criminal and stupid commanders."
But the Germans had an enormous five-year experience of the war — which we had practically not had for 41 years.
Also, apparently, the “tsarist commanders" fought wonderfully in the First World War - as a result of which the Bolsheviks took power.
And who else fought perfectly at the beginning of WWII - Poles, French, British (who just sat behind the canal), Americans?
Maybe the Japanese flashed at 45 in northern China?

[p20]

Quote: Nikkola Mac

After the Kursk Bulge, they lost the most important thing - strategic initiative and defeat became a matter of time.

The rout became a POSSIBLE affair of the time after 12.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, i.e. after the Germans canceled the action of the Barbarossa plan. Do not cancel the Germans then the action of this plan, the USSR would have saved nothing. The Bolsheviks would have to go for the Volga and the North. Dvinu and continue to build communism there.
However, the Germans could well do without this plan. But 24.09.1941 The USSR entered WW2 on the side of the Anglo-Saxons. And then the Germans already had no chance.

Quote: Nikkola Mac

But the Germans had an enormous five-year experience of the war — which we had practically not had for 41 years.

Yeah, huge. A month in Poland and a half in France. Overwhelm the "enormous five-year experience of war." The USSR fought in Finland longer.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Velizariy

Only in 1943, the Germans, with full awareness of their defeat, were advancing with the speed of a tank and inflicting tremendous losses on our army and population ... But since the summer of 1943 they have already retreated and have not carried out major strategic offensive operations.

Until December 1941, the Germans successfully and quickly advanced in three (three!) Strategic directions - and diverging ones.
In 1942, the Germans advanced in one strategic direction, having robbed the remaining army groups for this. The attempt to conduct a major operation in the second strategic direction turned into protracted battles in the Sinyavinsky swamps, into which all the forces and supplies assigned to the operation sank.
In 1943, the Germans scrambled their strength for half a year for a normal operation by the standards of 1941 - such as the same Typhoon. ICH - failed her in 10 days, not even breaking through the frontline defense zone.

[Kostya Andreev]

I’m tired of plusing you! Well done! Well, the minuses were canceled, otherwise you would be overwhelmed.
Do not hope that you can change the views of your opponents, but you made them think!
In general, sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there weren’t communists in power, then there wouldn’t be such a terrible war, and many of the problems of our time too !!!!!

[avva2012]

Kostya Andreev Your opponents, but you made them think!

Kostya Andreev, to think about what, over the imperfection of the human mind? If you put so many exclamation points, then not Velizariy. Reread the source. For example, "Appeal of the Russian Committee to the fighters and commanders of the Red Army, to the entire Russian people and other peoples." That's where the pirduha and the titans thought !!!! Ah, Velizariy, so, is retelling.

[Kostya Andreev]

Belisarius! Tired to ply you! Well done! Well, the minuses were canceled, otherwise you would be overwhelmed.
Do not hope that you can change the views of your opponents, but you made them think (judging by their comments)!
In general, sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there weren’t communists in power, then there wouldn’t be such a terrible war, and many of the problems of our time too !!!!!

[IGOR GORDEEV]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

In general, sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there weren’t communists in power, then there wouldn’t be such a terrible war, and many of the problems of our time too !!!!!

What are you saying! And if there were no Nazis, then there would be no 2nd World War. If only ...

[Kostya Andreev]

and sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there were no communists there would be no Nazis. read: Dyakov Yu. Bushueva T. The fascist sword was forged in the USSR.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

and sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there were no communists there would be no Nazis. read: Dyakov Yu. Bushueva T. The fascist sword was forged in the USSR.

This is not peace, this is a truce for 20 years.

© Marshal Foch
The Nazis would come to power in the Reich in any case. For Germany needed a revenge after Versailles. And its winners ... some needed a tool for intra-European dismantling and restoration of the Euro-system of checks and balances, and others needed a tool for a long and protracted war in Europe, which would have turned out to be the winner sitting on the tree overseas wise eagle. So they decided to pump up a military hamster. But something went wrong ...
And the USSR until the end of the 30s was just an object of world politics. Actually, the role of the USSR in Europe was well shown by Munich, when the Powers, having done nothing more, merged the Germans with a country that had a Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Union.
As for the fascist sword ... you can write with the same success that soviet sword forged germany. From the training of our tankers and aviators to Adolf's rise to power, to the supply of machine tools, technologies and weapons before the war. One sale by the USSR of Krupp's patents for the manufacture of vidia and titanite (hard alloys that completely surpassed everything that the USSR had) was worth it. By the way, EMNIP, stamped towers for the T-34 were made on German press equipment.

[Kostya Andreev]

I will not give you the statements of politically-minded figures of directly opposite content. Consider that I do not know !!!

Quote: Alexey RA

As for the fascist sword ... you can write with the same success that the Soviet sword was forged by Germany. From the training of our tankers and aviators to Adolf's rise to power, to the supply of machine tools, technologies and weapons before the war. One sale by the USSR of Krupp's patents for the manufacture of vidia and titanite (hard alloys that completely surpassed everything that the USSR had) was worth it. By the way, EMNIP, stamped towers for the T-34 were made on German press equipment.

I agree with this unconditionally, this is called symbiosis, if you want the symbiosis of the Nazis and the Communists !!!! And as for the arrival of Adolf, the book is about the fact that the Union forged a sword before coming and put it in Adolf’s hands !!!

[IGOR GORDEEV]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

and sometimes I come to the conclusion that if there were no communists there would be no Nazis. read: Dyakov Yu. Bushueva T. The fascist sword was forged in the USSR.

Well, you give a pancake! already ... well, do not be so naive as you read all evil spirits.

[p20]

Quote: Alexey RA

when it became clear to everyone that Directive 21 was covered with a copper basin

Actually, the Germans understood this on July 10.07.1941, 1941, when, contrary to Barbaross’s plan, they allowed themselves to be drawn into the Smolensk operation. And the fact that this was a mistake became clear closer to the beginning of September 11.09.1941. 2/XNUMX/XNUMX they tried to enter the same river a second time, having played everything as if on a new one (Typhoon plan). But XNUMX key months were lost, and with them the hope of a blitzkrieg was lost.
The Germans were not ready for a protracted war, because they did not prepare for it in principle. Therefore, further they did not have any bushes. Although they could still have a drink of blood. Actually what they were doing until May 1945, delaying the inevitable.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: p20

Actually, the Germans understood this on July 10.07.1941, XNUMX, when, contrary to Barbaross’s plan, they allowed themselves to be drawn into the Smolensk operation.

This is a failure only of the military side of the operation. And in November 1941, Schacht declared that the Reich had lost economically - that is, all, no actions by the Wehrmacht would not allow to win the war.

Quote: p20

The Germans were not ready for a protracted war, because they did not prepare for it in principle.

So .. the reason is clear - the long war Germany lost in any way. Why prepare in advance for a war that you lose?
In addition, the PMV left persistent phobias to all its participants. The French were afraid of losses, ours - of an internal conspiracy and rebellion, and the Germans ... Germans were afraid of a long war with all its charms such as starvation in the rear (and again the subsequent "knife in the back of the front").

[p20]

Quote: Alexey RA

And in November 1941, Schacht declared that the Reich had lost economically - that is, everything, no actions of the Wehrmacht would not allow to win the war.

Stated maybe in November. But it became clear on September 24.09.1941, 2. When the USSR entered the XNUMXnd Imperialist Won on the side of the Anglo-Saxons.
After a 2-month summer fooling around (German combat generals played "Makhno Old Man") and the above fact, Germany no longer had any chances. Hitler only extended his life as far as possible.
The Germans this "extension" cost 6 million lives. The Germans gave approximately 4,5 lives for each additional day Hitler lived.
This neo-Nazis, by the way, on a note. You look, and the degree of adoration of Hitler by them from the indicated figure will immediately fade.

[serezhasoldatow]

Do not choke on the bile you pour.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Velizariy

This red trash is guilty of death, if you count from 1917 to 1947, almost 100 million Russian people

Your accomplices plus another 100 million who were sitting in the Gulag ....
And then who gave birth to children?

[Amurets]

Quote: Alexander Green

And then who gave birth to children?

Like who? Belisarius. He shared, budded, was an artificial inseminator, and so he restored the population of the USSR

[Han Tengri]

Quote: Velizariy

1917 to 1947, almost 100 million Russian people.

I hope you can justify this figure?

[chenia]

Quote: p20

But 52 million 812 thousand losses for the period 1941-45. are quite an official figure.

Is not! So far, only the historian Chubais is basing, they have found supposedly evidence (did not present) that the USSR before the war had 209 million.

WHERE FROM!
What did the owners tell the liberals that they couldn’t count the fools (there isn’t enough population for losses)? .A scum started up in the archives, and they throw a fake.
What did you forget when you previously accused Stalin of repressions against extras, for small indicators of the population? That is, the opposite is true.

Here are the numbers

Quote: chenia

Total losses from 1918 to 1960 -70 million (and this, taking into account emigration -6-8 million and unborn -25 million) and no more.
Civil total loss is 16-16,5 million.
Where
-4,5 million emigration.
-5 million pandemic "spaniard"
- 7 million unborn, typhoid, victims of hostilities, white and red terror.
From 1922 to 1960, 10 million were not born from these losses. \\
The famines and repressions of 1918-1960 (the sixtieth was specially chosen, then there were definitely no repressions) .- 5 million (five)
World War II losses - 38 million (as of 1945)
11 million unborn
1,5-3 million emigration
23-24 million dead.
12 ml of them. military personnel (4 million in captivity).
for 1960, the loss of WWII-40 million.
Here is such arithmetic, and who shouts that it is more (if he is not on the salary of conditional Soros),
that MIRACLE of which he constantly dropped his head in childhood (it happens).

[p20]

Quote: chenia

Is not! So far, only the historian Chubais basics

What does it mean is not? What is the "historian of Chubais"?
It is quite the official figure, deduced by the USSR State Planning Commission (the CSB of the USSR was previously part of the State Planning Commission) presented in February 2017. in the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

[chenia]

Quote: p20

State Planning Committee of the USSR (CSB USSR was previously part of the State Planning Commission) presented in February 2017. at

Counterfeit,

Executive fools, a dangerous thing.

Guys. insert the following document (before it’s too late). that the population of RI was in 1917 -200 million

Otherwise, it does not converge !!!!

Figures, citizen, like to cling to each other (correlation).

And you constantly drop out.

[p20]

Quote: chenia

Counterfeit,

Do you think that you deserve more trust than the CSB of the USSR? I doubt it.

[chenia]

Quote: p20

Do you think that you deserve more trust than the CSB of the USSR?

Suddenly, documents that were accidentally found do not completely correspond to the previous ones (and with such an interval of discrepancy either 200 million, or 209).

And what about the OFFICIAL (Khrushchev) figure you don’t like -20 million (by the way more likely),

Here it correlates, with the numbers BEFORE and AFTER.

[p20]

Quote: chenia

friend, documents accidentally found

Actually, it’s not by chance found, but declassified.

[chenia]

Quote: p20

Actually, it’s not by chance found, but declassified.

Ha! It was declassified 30 years ago (in perestroika), and more serious documents ..
10 million are not considered? So I want to say from the classics - "Uncle Petya you d .... cancer"
You (like you) at that time sang that Stalin repressed extras FOR REDUCED DATA according to the census and made them (naturally secretly) correct upwards.

Forgot?
No, not forgotten. It’s just that your owners said that under the declared losses there is NO SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PEOPLE.
That accidentally declassified the right digit.
Well she doesn't beats with the population of the Republic of Ingushetia until 1917.

[p20]

Quote: chenia

But what about the OFFICIAL (Khrushchev) figure you don’t like -20 million.

I and 1 person do not like.

[p20]

Quote: chenia

Just your hosts said-

I'm tired of you. In addition, I prefer to communicate with intelligent and competent people.
Good luck to you.

[chenia]

Quote: p20

I'm tired of you

Another deep knockout. I knew that (they didn’t even enter the clinch - they didn’t try to catch the number).

[chenia]

Quote: p20

I believe these numbers, because these data of the Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR approximately correspond to the old figures of Sokolov. AND

THESE DATA DO NOT MEET THE HEALTH.
And you don’t want to challenge my data, since the truth unfavorable to you will come out.

[Uncle Murzik]

chenia you for "especially gifted" explain that you write not about direct losses, but about losses where demographic losses enter!

[chenia]

Quote: Uncle Murzik

not about direct losses, but about losses, which includes demographic losses!

Those guys know all this (and I already painted it that I understand), but they have such a job. And you won’t argue when you’re running out of their numbers (well, that would not be fools).

Yes, and p20 is another reincarnation of FNN - the flag (French) is not set, but we know that (a bird can be seen by flight.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: p20

Quote: HanTengri

I hope you can justify this figure?

As for 100 million, it is not easy to justify. But 52 million 812 thousand losses for the period 1941-45. are quite an official figure. Why in the remaining 26 years another 47 million victims could not have come running? Several famines, the Civil War, the Soviet-Polish War, Khalkhin-Gol, the Finnish War, 800 thousand only executed (until 1953). I didn’t count, but it could run.

And who are the children? Who gave birth to children? AND? Is everyone shot? Everyone died of the famine?

[Rastas]

Here it is not necessary to invent here. At least look at how the Bolshevik party increased during the war years, how many people joined the party and the Komsomol to say that people did not want to fight for socialism. Just the socialist system, albeit imperfect, the people defended. Again, do not talk about the sea of ​​blood and bones, in the same 50-80 - how many scientific discoveries, construction projects and absolutely no blood and bones. And before that, Russia was experiencing a turning point, but again there were never rivers of blood. You will call me Sikorsky or Zvorykin, although they left before the end of the Civil War, and I will tell you that such scientists as Beketov, Mendeleev, Mechnikov, Botkin, Sechenov worked abroad under the empire.

[Uncle Murzik]

Velizariy, well, with the king the priest was dying much more, and it doesn’t bother you !!!! According to surveys (1887-1896), the proportion of deceased children under five years of age on average in Russia was 43,2%, and in some provinces more than 50%. ” Agree, the data on child mortality is impressive, is not it? I decided to "dig" deeper in this matter and the fact that I "dug up" plunged me into a real shock. “According to the data for 1908-1910. the number of deaths under the age of 5 years was almost 3/5 of the total number of deaths. The infant mortality rate was especially high ”(Rashin,“ The Population of Russia for 100 Years. 1811-1913 ”). Do you think this author is exaggerating? Then read another source - N.A. Rubakin “Russia in Figures” (St. Petersburg, 1912 edition): “... in 1905, out of every 1000 deaths of both sexes in 50 provinces of European Russia, 5 dead were children; almost two-thirds (!!!). Out of every 606,5 deceased men, 1000 were children in the same year, 5 out of every 625,9 women who died, girls were under 1000 years old. In other words, a huge percentage of children under the age of 5 die every year in Russia, a terrible fact that cannot but make us think about the difficult conditions the Russian population lives if such a significant percentage of the dead for children under 585,4 years old. "
More information at http://voprosik.net/detskaya-smertnost-v-carskoj-
rossii / © QUESTION Only under the leadership of the Bolsheviks and I.V. Stalin managed to overcome child mortality in Russia, lowering it at times, but this is a completely different story =)

[Ascetic]

Quote: Olgovich

Such a rout, with the superiority of forces and means, can only be explained by the complete incompetence of command at all levels.

Of the 250 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Crimean Front, over 12 days of fighting 162.282 people were irretrievably lost - 65%. German losses amounted to 7,5 thousand. As written in the "History of the Great Patriotic War":

"it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol."

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme High Command declared the command of the Crimean Front guilty of the "unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation."

The 1st-rank Army Commissar Mehlis was removed from the posts of deputy commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and demoted to corps commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from the post of commander of the front and demoted to major general.

The division commissar Shamanin was removed from the post of member of the Military Council of the Front and demoted to the brigadier commissar.

Major General Eternal removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from the posts of army commanders and demoted to colonels.

Major General Nikolayenko removed from the post of front commander of the Air Force and demoted to colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein receives the rank of Field Marshal.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Ascetic

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme High Command declared the command of the Crimean Front guilty of the "unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation."

Well, even if they hadn’t put it to the wall ...
And Manshtein further proved more than once that brot with a butterfly is not in vain ....

[Castro Ruiz]

Vinovat zhid Mekhlis. On Kozlovu diktoval shto delat, igralsa v Napoleona, politruk. Plokho, shto ego srazu nerozstrelyali.

[Alekseev]

Quote: Olgovich

Such a defeat, with the superiority of forces and means, can only be explained by the complete incompetence of command at all levels.

That's right.
BUT ... Not only the incompetence of the command played a role in the defeat of the Crimean front.
The troops of this front, recently formed in the North Caucasus, were also weakly suitable for confronting the German army of Manstein.
The example cited by the representative of the General Staff on the 63rd Mountain Division is very characteristic.
He strongly proposed removing this compound, equipped with "national" cadres, with the front line, until it all ran to the Germans.
And there were many such unreliable troops.
Comrade Mehlis issued an order to combat the "crossbow", defectors, etc. who took on a massive scale ...
The fate of the Crimean Front is a typical tragic example from our military history that it is fighting with skill, and not with a trained and unstable number.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alekseev

Comrade Mehlis issued an order to combat the "crossbow", defectors, etc. who took on a massive scale ...

The collapse of the Crimean Front, which dragged along the fall of Sevastopol - the whole "merit" of the Mehlis - is the worst example of the intervention of "political officers" in the command of the troops.

Mehlis crushed his authority over the front command (Kozlova and the beginning of the headquarters of the Eternal) and, in fact, single-handedly made decisions on command and control of the troops, in which he did not understand anything, made simply crazy decisions.

16 armies are concentrated on a plot of 3 km!
- the divisions are lined up tightly in line - the division could occupy 700-800 meters along the front! But she did not have a defense in depth.
- there were no reserves - everything in the first line - this is not a defense or an offensive. This is the nonsense of the Mehlis.
- Army headquarters have been advanced almost to the forefront!

[parusnik]

Alexei Isaev (book by George Zhukov): Generally speaking, D.T. Kozlov was one of the most unfortunate Soviet military leaders. I emphasize - it is unfortunate, and not mediocre and stupid. Of course, he was not the Hindenburg, but one cannot but admit that Dmitry Timofeevich was catastrophically unlucky. Each time he didn’t voluntarily find himself where German troops were strong on the ground and in the air. Instead of room for maneuver, or at least protecting the mask of forests from the all-seeing eye of aerial reconnaissance, Kozlov was given an open, lifeless steppe on a narrow and dense positional front. It was as if he was pursued by the most powerful German air connection - 8 air corps. Both in Crimea in May 1942, and near Stalingrad in September 1942, planes of 8 air corps appeared over troops subordinate to D.T. Kozlov, inexorably carrying death and destruction. After Stalingrad, Kozlov managed to get under Manstein’s counterattack near Kharkov in February - March 1943. So, he formally turned out to be responsible for the surrender of Kharkov, which was no longer possible to keep. This last episode overflowed the patience of the leadership, and D. T. Kozlov was exiled from the army in Transbaikalia. If he sat out the terrible 1942 somewhere far from the close attention of the 8th air corps - on the North-Western or Bryansk Front - he would have every chance to remain in the memory of his descendants as a completely successful military leader and even end the war in Berlin.

[captain]

Kozlov was afraid of the army commissar Mehlis and it is not known what is more terrible for a military leader, fear of the enemy or fear of a senior boss (lizoblyudstvo). Bad luck of him (Kozlov), consisted in the wrong choice of profession, it was necessary to go to political instructors.

[Army soldier2]

These events are described in detail in Karpov’s novel “The Leader”.
General Kozlov, at least, lacked will. He completely fell under the influence of the Mehlis, who forbade the transition to defense. As a result, the troops met the German strike in an offensive battle formation.
Of course, it’s easy to wave a “saber” 75 years after the events, but nevertheless, in my opinion, the main reason for the defeat is the lack of initiative, lack of will and incompetence of the leadership of the Crimean Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Air Force.

[73bor]

The omnipotence and military idiocy of the political leader Mehlis was then known to everyone, as well as his habit of “poking his nose everywhere,” moreover, when the generals tried to give orders to dig in, this was regarded as “defeatism” and panic!

[Castro Ruiz]

Za Krimskoe porazhenie neset polnuyu vinu zhid Mekhlis.

[Roman 11]

Quote: parusnik

If he sat out the terrible 1942 somewhere far from the close attention of the 8th air corps - on the North-Western or Bryansk Front - he would have all the chances to remain in the memory of posterity quite successful

And if he commanded the front of Rokossovsky? Although in the presence of the Mehlis everything could happen to any military leader .... this commissar only made confusion, it was not for nothing that Stalin later said that the Mehlis was suitable only for destruction.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Novel 11

And if he commanded the front of Rokossovsky? Although in the presence of the Mehlis everything could happen to any military leader .... this commissar only made confusion, it was not for nothing that Stalin later said that the Mehlis was suitable only for destruction.

Actually, Mehlis knocked out tanks and weapons for the Crimean Front. And he raised the problem of low combat efficiency of non-Slavic infantry. And Ak-Monai positions began to be occupied after his instruction.
And here is how the army men disposed of the equipment that Mehlis provided them. During two operations surrounding the German forces in the Feodosia region, the losses amounted to:

... for the entire time of the fighting from February 27 to April 12, 1942, the Crimean Front irretrievably lost 14 KV out of 66 arrived on the Kerch Peninsula, 6 out of 20 T-34s, 110 T-26s out of 320, 51 T-60s out of 150
(...)
In total, from April 9 to 11, the troops of the Crimean Front lost 119 tanks, including 35 KV.

© Isaev

[Operator]

The reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the Kerch area in May 1942 was the national composition of the military - units and formations were formed mainly from Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Uzbeks.

The military personnel, including the command staff, had low moral and volitional qualities, were poorly educated and poorly skilled in military affairs, did not have the skills to operate military equipment and weapons, ran away to the enemy on occasion and surrendered en masse in battle.

After the disaster in Kerch, the share of national minorities in the units and divisions of the Red Army never exceeded 25 percent.

[Roman 11]

Quote: Operator

After the disaster in Kerch, the share of national minorities in the units and divisions of the Red Army never exceeded 25 percent.

Perhaps such a factor was, but it is shown here that the main damage to the body came from the brain - the uncertainty of the troops, on the one hand the order to advance and cleanse the whole Crimea, on the other hand the enemy was clearly stronger than they thought ..... it would seem it’s necessary to dig in, build solid fortifications, but .... Simple examples, after all, say a lot, but the headquarters have not been replaced, what is this about? Low competence, fear from the activities of the ubiquitous Mehlis, what other reasons? Or wired connection fault? Many people know what the control of troops by wire led to, especially in the early days of the war, when the front commanders, unaware of the situation, went to the army .... so Pavlov spent a week with this tail in this chaos, only to find out the situation, he’s I didn’t command it.

So now it’s difficult to judge what was happening on the Kerch Front if Kozlov, without a glance, understood the situation and began to carry out defensive measures of the Mehlis, and with his submission the Headquarters could print treason. And so there are no nerves, frequent retreats, the moral depression of the soldiers, and then this Mehlis annoys about the betrayal of all and solid deserters .... etc, etc. And how to organize the organization of the front here? You will start to do the right thing, they can remove it from the front and shoot like Pavlova. So, first of all, the commanders needed to be given freedom for initiative, organization and management. I have no doubt, everything then collapsed in Kozlov from the turbulent activity of Mehlis, as an army commissar of the 1st rank and representative of the headquarters, a kind of formidable royal eye that after Hassan killed Blucher.

Well, from here such clutter in parts, seeing a lot of stupidity, the soldiers didn’t just want to die together, if they forbid to dig into the ground, then something is wrong here, the area is bare, then this attitude is to them .... go, try it explain that Mehlis forbade it to increase the offensive rush. And then that kind of nonsense.

[Operator]

Kozlov and Mehlis understood very well who was under their command (potential deserters), therefore they so carefully planned their operations and built a superdense defense without separation of troops.

But national minorities all the same scattered in all directions at the first sounds of shots from the enemy.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Novel 11

Perhaps such a factor was, but it is shown here that the main damage to the body came from the brain - the uncertainty of the troops, on the one hand the order to advance and cleanse the whole Crimea, on the other hand the enemy was clearly stronger than they thought ..... it would seem it is necessary to bury, to build solid fortifications, but ....

And to repeat again 1941 - to give the initiative to the enemy, so that in calm conditions he finds the least protected point in our line of defense and breaks through it.

Quote: Novel 11

if Kozlov, offhand, would understand the situation and begin to conduct defensive measures of the Mehlis, and with his submission and Headquarters could print treason

And is it nothing that the Headquarters after the previous Kerch disaster itself required to equip and occupy defensive lines?

The winter indication of the Headquarters on the compulsory occupation of Ak-Monai positions was carried out, they were occupied by the 396th SD with three companies of high-explosive flamethrowers.

Moreover, at the beginning of May 1942, the 151st SD was transferred to the Crimea to strengthen the defense of Ak-Monai positions.

Quote: Novel 11

So, first of all, the commanders needed to be given freedom for initiative, organization and management. I have no doubt, everything then collapsed in Kozlov from the turbulent activity of Mehlis, as an army commissar of the 1st rank and representative of the headquarters, a kind of formidable royal eye that after Hassan killed Blucher.

You correctly remembered Blucher. He was just given freedom for initiative, organization and management. It all ended with the complete sky-readyness of the entrusted units and formations (as well as the theater as a whole) and the refusal to help border guards. And then citizen Blucher almost turned a limited conflict into a full-scale war, declaring universal mobilization on the territory entrusted to him - despite the direct prohibition of such actions from Moscow.

Quote: Novel 11

Well, from here such clutter in parts, seeing a lot of stupidity, the soldiers didn’t just want to die in a crowd, if they forbid to dig into the ground, then something is wrong here, the area is bare, so the attitude towards them is ....

Yeah ... it was especially forbidden to dig into the ground that Order No. 63 "on strengthening the equipment of positions", which was not executed in 143 GDS.

The state of defense of the 63rd State Security Service was not brilliant. Inspection carried out in the division for performance Order No. 143 on strengthening equipment positions a few days before the German offensive (the report was dated May 7), it showed: "the trenches and passages were made very narrow and small in places", parapets were not framed, only some fighters had primitive loopholes.

[Alexey RA]

And most importantly - the Crimean Front and its armies included action plans in the event of an enemy strike:

In the event of an enemy attack in the 44th Army, a counterattack plan was developed in three versions, which was finally fixed in the combat order No. 028 of April 28, 1942. The first version was developed in case of an enemy attack in the 51st Army lane along the railway. Vladislavovka, Art. Ak-Monay, the second - in the event of a strike along the Feodosia road to Arma-Eli, the third - in case of a breakthrough into the area of ​​Art. Ak-Monay and strike development further along the railway (in fact, the development of the first option). All three options provided for art. support from the regiments of the RGC.
As mentioned above, the 2nd option turned out to be relevant. He suggested the formation of two shock, "tank groups":
a) 56th brigade, 157th brigade, 13 mtsp-th and 124th brigade (counterattack from the region of high. 63, 8 to the south-west);
b) 39th brigade, 404th battalion and 126th barrels (counterattack from Arma-Eli to the south-west on As-Chalul).
The task was to "eliminate the erupted pr-ka and restore the former position of the left flank of the 44th Army." An additional tank reserve was the 124th reb.

© Isaev
The problem was that when they tried to implement the plans, it turned out that the Germans were advancing faster than expected. And our connections are the other way around (plus the problem of ignoring the commanding officers of orders from above again got out). As a result, while ours gathered a fist for a counterattack, the Germans managed to occupy the concentration areas planned for him.
Well, plus - the traditional domination of the Germans in the air, which actually thwarted the maneuver of artillery and the normal supply of its shells.

[Sergej1972]

Somehow to the Kazakhs, Tatars and Bashkirs, the Soviet government had no complaints during the war years. Uzbeks had a problem with poor knowledge of the Russian language.
And Tatars, for the most part, were no less educated on average than soldiers of Russian nationality of rural origin.

[serezhasoldatow]

What about the Panfilov Division?

[EvilLion]

Well, it is certain that a certain Alexander Samsonov is much better at commanding than Soviet generals. It’s a pity that 100 wasn’t born years before, then I would have asked the Germans.

[nizhegorodec]

Quote: EvilLion

Someone Samsonov Alexander is much better able to command than the Soviet generals.

but does he really teach someone how to command? He simply set out the facts as they are, but the facts are such that our generals Crimea Crimea twice. And there’s no getting around it.

[Army soldier2]

Samsonov has many biased articles, but here, in my opinion, there is nothing to complain about.

[EvilLion]

Due to the inept command, the Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat.

If he claims, then he knows how better.
Due to an inept game, Karpov lost to Kasparov in 1985. Is funny But in fact an equivalent statement.

[Alexey RA]

The front had great forces and means, but the command reacted to the organization of defense without due attention. The troops maintained military formations designed for offensive operations. All divisions were located in one line, their battle formations were extremely compacted. The divisions occupied the defense strip with an average length of 2 km. The main forces were concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front line, not having sufficient depth. The front command did not take serious measures to rectify the situation even when information began to come about the preparation of the enemy for the offensive.

There is another opinion:

Available documents now indicate that the Crimean Front at the turn of April - May 1942, without any doubt, was preparing to defend itself. Moreover, in relation to the strip of the 44th Army quite reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of enemy attacks: from Koy-Asan to Parpach and further along the railway and along the Feodosia Highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in Hunting the Bustard chose the second option and attacked in May 1942 along the highway to Armagh-Eli.
Strengthened the entire strip, defended by the troops of the front. So during the negotiations between the commander of the 47th army and the front headquarters on May 3, 1942 Kolganov reported: “In front of the 47th army there is a continuous minefield [...] west of Tulumchak and south of Korpech there is a second minefield. To cover the artillery detachment, 50 advanced anti-tank hedgehogs were issued to the advanced units and 500 min were issued. ” At the same negotiations, possible counterattacks of the 55th brigade were discussed.
If we talk about the situation of the troops of the Crimean Front as a whole, then seven of its rifle divisions were in the front line at the front of about 22 km, seven rifle divisions 3-12 km in depth - in army reserves, including two divisions - on Ak- Monay positions. In the northern part of the peninsula, 20–25 km from the front, there were three rifle brigades (12, 143 brigades, 83 mbr). Further east, there was one front division submission division (72nd cd), and at the eastern end of the peninsula there was one rifle division (156th division) also front submission.
By the beginning of the German offensive in the 44th Army, the 63rd State Command and the 276th Regiment were in the first line, and the veterans of the battles on the Parpach Isthmus, the 404th and 157th Regiments were withdrawn to the rear, being at the same time an army reserve . The winter indication of the Headquarters on the compulsory occupation of Ak-Monai positions was carried out, they were occupied by the 396th SD with three companies of high-explosive flamethrowers. That is, talking about the lack of reserves is still incorrect.

© Isaev

[Music]

I read that the 22nd Panzer Division had 220 Czech t-38 tanks, which were rather weak. And calmly defeated in three days the stronger tank units of the goats ...

[Aleksandr]

Registered
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LAST ACTIVITY
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SPECIALLY FOR THE QUOTE SURVIVED))))?

[Han Tengri]

Quote: Music

I read that the 22nd Panzer Division had 220 Czech t-38 tanks, which were rather weak. And calmly defeated in three days the stronger tank units of the goats ...

Adolf Aloizych, go over!

[Roman 11]

On November 11, with the approach of the main group of the 11th Wehrmacht army, fighting broke out around the perimeter of the Sevastopol fortified area, which at the beginning of World War II was one of the most fortified places in the world.
It is somehow debatable ..... One of the most fortified places in the world? There, like 2 12 "ok tower batteries, there were smaller calibers. But what about the impregnable forts or fortifications from the lines of reinforced concrete bunkers? Here the author confuses in my opinion.

[nnz226]

I agree! Sevastopol was fortified for defense from the sea, but from the land there were just no special defensive structures! In addition, the “atmiral” Oktyabrsky komflot, instead of putting all its forces into building the external line of defense (from 30.09 to 30.10 — the beginning of defense), was a month away, ordered the internal line to be strengthened, and the sailors and soldiers had to stop the Germans with heroic death on an unprepared defense line ...

[nnz226]

And they will talk about the "smart" commanders of the Red Army !!! One of the critical fronts of the war and who commands ?! Fully lives up to his last name! Stalin told Mehlis that he did not have the Hindenburg when the latter asked to replace Kozlov. But he had to listen to his "faithful dog"! And try to find a replacement. There were many generals who showed themselves well ... The Crimean Front in the 1942 year was the “dashboard” of the Red Army defense; without its defeat, the Wehrmacht was sharply limited in its operations in the southern and Caucasian direction, where Hitler planned the main military operations in the 1942 year. And this "bone in the throat" of the Wehrmacht safely profuka. And how many people were put in flight and further landing in Kerch in 1943 ?!

[Alex_59]

Quote: nnz226

And they will talk about the "smart" commanders of the Red Army !!!

You were not there, sorry. You would - wow! Well done in a swoop - all the Nazis would have been defeated.

[Victor N]

A lot of people were killed! In the 50s, in Kerch, Victory Day was a great nationwide holiday, gathered on Mount Mithridates by large companies, commemorated all those who died during the offensives and retreats. The elders told how desperate the fighters were - they asked for troughs to try to cross the strait in already very cold water. The Tatars were the most atrocious in the occupation; I did not hear complaints from the Germans. The steppe was strewn with weapons and ammunition for a long time.

[Alexey RA]

Before the start of the ground offensive, German bombers dealt a targeted blow to previously explored targets. As a result, Soviet headquarters, which did not change their location for a long time, were destroyed: the 51st army commander, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, was killed, and his deputy major general, K. I. Baranov, was seriously wounded. Communication has been broken. This partially disorganized Soviet troops.

General Lviv could not be killed before the start of the ground offensive, since May 9, 1942 - a day later after the beginning of a ground attack - he personally set tasks for the tankmen to counterattack on the columns of the 22nd Panzerdivisia, entered into battle at 16:00 on 09.05.42/XNUMX/XNUMX.

Despite the general unhurriedness of the gathering of forces by both sides, the Germans nevertheless made the first move, introducing the 16.00nd vol. As indicated in the 17.00th report, the commander of the 51st army personally (General Lvov was faithful to himself and ruled with the forefront) sets the battalion the task of counterattacking the enemy moving from Arm-Eli to the Kara-Oba and Suruk-Oba barrows. These were already two columns of tanks of the 22nd. At that moment, the 229th camp counted 8 KB in the ranks. The infantry of the 236th SD under the attacks of enemy tanks began to withdraw. The situation as a whole was similar to the German attack on March 20, but in terms of technology, the alignment of forces has fundamentally changed.
In the tank battle near Armagh Eli, which began at about 16.45:XNUMX p.m. 9 May 1942 g. 229th baseball lost 5 kV at once

And Lviv died on the morning of May 11, 1942:

Early in the morning, at 4.30–5.00 on May 11, the German advance northward from Armagh-Elie continued. The 138th and 77th gas traffic police and partially the 236th SD were hit. The Germans managed to capture the village of Oguz-Tobe and the slopes of Mount Oguz-Tobe. Thus, they got the opportunity to control the breakthrough along the coast by fire.
That same morning, at 11.30, from the raid of German aircraft at a command post located on Mount Konchi, the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lviv The army was led by Chief of Staff Colonel G.I. Kotov. Despite the growing chaos, the body of V.N. Lviv was taken out and sent on May 13, 1942 by plane PS-84 to Tbilisi

[nivander]

and how many mistakes, one 184th division of the NKVD is worth something. Well, the unpleasant darling is that we are again touted with a book by Manstein which the author clearly learned by heart

[Alex_59]

In general, the easiest way is to start yelling "oh, these Bolsheviks" and so on. Meanwhile, one should only compare the biographies of D.T. Kozlov and Manstein in order to understand how hard it was for Kozlov. Already in WWI, Manstein was an accomplished officer, chief of the operational management of a number of divisions. At that time, Kozlov only reached the ensign in the 1917 year. Such things just can't be fixed. In addition, Manstein had experience in massive command and control since 1939 of the year — several years of continuous practice. While Kozlov didn’t manage anything in real combat situations until the 1941 (except for the Finnish War, which in terms of scope and mass of the database cannot be compared with the Polish or French German campaigns).
Manstein level officers in the Red Army were not immediately for a number of reasons. Again, the rabid Soviophobes will immediately remember the repression. Yes, and they too. But among other things, part of the officer corps left with the whites (and it is difficult to hang the preconditions for a civil war and dividing them into white / red into Bolsheviks - February 1917 of the year was not their business, and the country's degradation during the inter-revolutionary period too). Secondly, a part of the officers who swore allegiance to the Soviet regime, being at a very respectable age, simply did not live up to the 1941 year, or were retired. And of course, the part was repressed, as a result of unforgivable errors of power in the 30 years (for which Yezhov actually was sent after the victims).
Therefore, as the Red Army did not try to correct the situation before the war, the personnel problem could be completely solved only through blood and sweat - so that as a result of combat experience the most quick-witted commanders acquire real practical knowledge. And it took more than one year. At the beginning and even the middle of the war, all future legendary victorious military commanders made tragic mistakes and mistakes. Kozlov is no exception. Another question is that a number of commanders were demonstratively punished at the beginning of the war and they were not allowed to correct their mistakes, and those we today know as marshals of victory were given.
And most importantly, even if by the 1941 year not everything had been done to prepare for war, but enough was done so that in general someone could learn something. Because the Poles and the French did not manage to learn at all.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex_59

In addition, Manstein had experience in massive command and control of troops since 1939 - several years of continuous practice. While Kozlov didn’t manage anything in real combat situations until 1941 (with the exception of the Finnish War, which in terms of scope and mass of the database cannot be compared with the Polish or French German campaigns).

By the way, judging by the transcript of the famous "Meeting", it was Kozlov who raised the issues of the absence of a permanent field charter in the Red Army before the top leadership, as well as the inconsistency of the articles of the temporary PU-36 with the realities of the war.
And it was Kozlov who voiced the main problem of the Red Army infantry, which would haunt it right up to 1943:

In this regard, in the battles it was revealed that infantry did not use their weapons or used very little. In the battles near Loymola, the total consumption of grenades was 0,5 ammunition, rifle cartridges - 0,35 ammunition, while the cost of artillery shells reached 7 combat sets.

However, Kozlov also liked to lie - for which he also ogreb at the same “Meeting”, when the temporary detention center itself went over the certain “torn fortified area with concrete bunkers” mentioned in his report.

[Molot1979]

In general, I did not find a single successful operation at all in the military biography of Kozlov. Isaev speaks of bad luck, saying that 8 Germans air corps specifically chased him across the entire Eastern Front. Forgive me a respected historian, but this is nonsense to the fifth degree. And what, all the rest were in a privileged position? Rokosovsky, Vasilevsky, Katukov - did they "sit out" somewhere scary 1942? This is a war. There will be no Richthofen - there will be other Germans. And as Kozlov related to his duties, it can be seen from numerous reports. The troops are engaged in frank nonsense, while neither dugouts nor machine-gun nests are ready, even trenches of a full profile are not open. What kind of defense is there in three echelons. And who is responsible for this? As far as we know, the boss is responsible for everything. If you missed, did not follow, did not control - his problems. So the point is not in luck / unluckiness, but simply in the fact that Kozlov was once ... guild. As a result, they recognized this by putting this stuffed animal in a place where it could no longer harm anyone

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Molot1979

Isaev speaks of bad luck, saying that 8 Germans air corps specifically chased him across the entire Eastern Front. Forgive me a respected historian, but this is nonsense to the fifth degree. And what, all the rest were in a privileged position?

The remaining meetings with 8 air corps in each operation were not.

Quote: Molot1979

There will be no Richthofen - there will be other Germans.

That's it - other Germans. And not the main striking force of backlash.

Quote: Molot1979

And as Kozlov related to his duties, it can be seen from numerous reports. The troops are engaged in outright nonsense, while neither dugouts nor machine-gun nests are ready, even trenches of a full profile are not open. What kind of defense is there in three echelons.

But with this, alas, have to agree. Lack of control over the execution of orders entirely on the conscience of the command.

[Alex_59]

Quote: Molot1979

Isaev speaks of bad luck, they say, 8 Germans air corps specifically chased him across the entire Eastern Front. Forgive me a respected historian, but this is nonsense to the fifth degree.

I understand that this is a coincidence. Of course, the 8 corps did not personally chase after Kozlov.

[avva2012]

Velizariy,
Who am I? Well, not Krasnovets, for sure.

[Predator]

Quote: Olgovich

Such a rout, with the superiority of forces and means, can only be explained by the complete incompetence of the command all levels ..

I will not give all the calculations, this is a long and separate topic. But you are wrong. Nor did the Red Army have any particular superiority. Such as Mehlis paralyzed the entire leadership of the Crimean Front (and they could not or were afraid to bring its destructive activities to Stalin). the commander of him (well, not given to man) is completely zero. He then again marked himself on the Western Front with the same results. Whoever stole him at the headquarters was only Chernyakhovsky (he was the real commander) who was not afraid of either Mehlis or Stalin. And the defeat was due to the presence on the right flank of 3 national divisions, which, without accepting the battle, simply fled, opening the front to Manshein and its 22 TD with infantry divisions.
As for the rest of the comments, I can say that in the period 1939-1942 there was no army in the world stronger and more powerful than the Wehrmacht. It was even knocked out by the Red Army (albeit with losses) during the 2 years of the war and the Wehrmacht could not then oppose it to anything. And I note, under the leadership of the commies. And everything else is from the evil one (English-Russian sissy). And the loss of armies is the Wehrmacht (East) -more than 9 million soldiers, the Red Army-9.5 million soldiers. And you do not need to shag your grandmother.

[Alexander Greene]

How much can all the “dogs” be hanged on L.Z. for the disaster of the Crimean Front? Mehlis?

After the successful completion of the landing operation and the seizure of the bridgehead, front commander General D.T. Kozlov received an order from the Stavka no later than January 12 to launch a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet.

But the offensive failed, because there was no well-thought-out attack plan, there was no normal technical support, and there was a catastrophic lack of ammunition and fuel.

More than 100 malfunctioning aircraft accumulated on the peninsula, there wasn’t enough ammunition for artillery, and Koflov didn’t know the position of his units, their condition, or the position of the enemy’s group, since the front command was in Tbilisi. Mehlis, of course, noted this in his telegram to Stalin.

Then he got 450 more machine guns for the front, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 pieces of 82 mm caliber, as well as two divisions of M-8 rocket mortars. The issue of providing the front with an additional number of tanks, anti-tank rifles and their ammunition was being decided. Moreover, Mehlis strengthened the command of the troops with experienced personnel.

The offensive began very late February 27, 1942. The front commander, Kozlov, instead of letting tanks break through in open areas, launched infantry forward, which the Germans simply destroyed because there was nowhere to hide. By April, more than 200 thousand people were killed. After which Mehlis demanded to immediately replace the command of the front for blatant professional unfitness. Unfortunately, this has not been done.

So the offensive was stifled, but the defense was not strengthened. There was no depth of defense. There was no air defense, all the troops accumulated in the first echelon, and, in the end, they became an excellent target for German aviation and artillery. As a result of the rout, panic. Mehlis tried to save the situation, he worked until the end on the evacuation of troops, almost got captured. And the front command at that time was sitting in ... Tbilisi !!!

So whose fault is it?

And all the bumps fell on the Mehlis. For what? And because he, the commissar, encroached on the authority of the generals, and the generals of commissars did not favor. Therefore, he was slandered.

This is the truth about the affairs of Mehlis on the Crimean front.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

And all the bumps fell on the Mehlis. For what?

For the fact that it was Mehlis who actually removed from the leadership and the commander of the front and the head of the headquarters and "taxied" personally, having no idea about command and control.

That is why, on the 16-22 km front of 3 armies, the divisions are lined up. There are almost no combat reserves.
The defense is not separated. Not prepared for depth.
As a result, they are cut off and defeated.

Quote: Alexander Green

How much can all the “dogs” be hanged on L.Z. for the disaster of the Crimean Front? Mehlis?

As much as you need to understand: laymen in the army are not needed, even if they are politically savvy!

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: DimerVladimer

For the fact that it was Mehlis who actually removed from the leadership and the commander of the front and the head of the headquarters and "taxied" personally, having no idea about command and control.

That is why, on the 16-22 km front of 3 armies, the divisions are lined up. There are almost no combat reserves.
The defense is not separated. Not prepared for depth.

The offensive began very late February 27, 1942. The front commander, Kozlov, instead of letting tanks break through in open areas, launched infantry forward, which the Germans simply destroyed because there was nowhere to hide. By April, more than 200 thousand people were killed. After which Mehlis demanded to immediately replace the command of the front for blatant professional unfitness.

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

Let us turn to historical sources:
The offensive undertaken on February 27, 1942 was unsuccessful, despite the advantage in manpower (13 of our divisions versus 3 of the enemy). The very next day, the enemy returned all of the little that the Red Army forces managed to capture the day before, especially the main defense unit - Koy-Asan.
These days, the military correspondent of the 'Red Star' Konstantin Simonov was in the combat formation of units of the 51st Army. “The offensive began ... very unsuccessfully,” he wrote. - In February, a snowstorm went along with the rain, everything was incredibly transported, everything literally stood up, the tanks didn’t go, and the density of troops fitted out by the Mehlis, who led this attack, replacing the virtually commanding front of the limp general Kozlov, was monstrous. Everything was pushed close to the front line, and every German shell, every mine, every bomb, bursting, inflicted huge losses on us ... In a kilometer - two - three - five - seven from the front line, everything was in corpses ...

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

You either don’t know the story - or you distort, although there is a lot of evidence available for mehlis.
Lev Zakharovich, feeling himself a sovereign master on the Crimean front, constantly pressed on the front commander in anticipation of quick results. For instance, already on January 25, 1942 he achieved issuing an order on the front to conduct a private offensive operation to liberate Theodosius.
The headquarters, having condemned such haste, revised the start date of the operation and demanded that it be carefully prepared. February 15 L.Z. Mehlis together with P.P. Eternal were urgently called to I.V. Stalin for the report "on the degree of readiness of the troops and on the progress of their preparation."
http://moscow-crimea.ru/history/20vek/mehlis.html

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

".... By order of Comrade Mehlis, all operational plans, directives, and other orders for front-line troops are checked and authorized by him," informed DT Kozlov of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, AM Vasilevsky. And clearly disoriented by this turn of events, he asked: - Should in this case, submit to the People's Commissar for approval operational plans, their proposals on the upcoming activities of the troops or all instructions on all matters of life and activities of the troops to receive from him directly on the spot? ' [8].
Such a line of behavior of the representative of the Bet was, it seems, not only impractical, but also harmful. She disoriented the leading cadres, confused the decisions made and their implementation.
Visited the headquarters of the Crimean Front in April 1942 People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov recalled about the confusion reigning there: 'Commander of the Crimean Front D.T. Kozlov was already “in the pocket” of the Mehlis, who intervened literally in all operational matters. Chief of Staff P.P. Eternal did not know whose orders to fulfill - the commander or Mehlis. Marshal S.M. Budyonny (the commander in chief of the North Caucasus direction, which included the Crimean Front. - Yu.R.) also could not do anything. Mehlis did not want to obey him, referring to the fact that he receives instructions directly from the Headquarters ... "
Or are you Mr. Green - N. Kuznetsov's memoirs - not authoritative too?
Will you continue to sing deferambs to Mehlis, contrary to history?

"... The attack undertaken on February 27, 1942 was unsuccessful, despite the advantage in manpower (13 of our divisions versus 3 of the enemy). The very next day, the enemy returned all of the few that the Red Army managed to capture the day before, total main defense node - Koy-Asan ... "

On March 2, in the face of obvious failure, the front command reported to the Headquarters on a decision due to the impassability of roads to gain a foothold at the reached lines, and to transfer to a decisive offensive when the soil dries. On March 5, the Stavka ordered the resumption of the operation as soon as the weather and roads allowed, without waiting for additional instructions from it [12].
Trying to make up for the huge losses (and they from February to April amounted to more than 225 thousand people.), L.Z. Mehlis again and again contacted Moscow. Only In March-April, he claimed nearly 2,5 thousand political fighters..

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

You are not right - there are supporting evidence and documents:
"... On March 29, 1942, a new report was sent to Moscow with a request to replace D.T. Kozlov. The representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters summarized the conclusions about him: lazy, dumb," the master of the peasants was guzzled ". He does not like painstaking, everyday work, operational He’s not interested in questions, trips to the troops are “punishment” for him. He doesn’t use authority in the troops of the front, besides he’s “dangerously lying” ...
... Lev Zakharovich at the same time could not resist a compliment to himself: 'If the front-line machine works in the end somehow satisfactorily, this is due to the fact that the front has strong military advice, a new headquarters (I mean P.P. Eternal. - Yu.R.), and I am not here an American observer, but in accordance with your instructions interfering in business.
In preparing a new offensive, the command of the front forces and the representative of the Supreme High Command were not able to timely identify the enemy’s plans and hinder him. As a result, both a powerful German bombing and assault strike on May 7, 1942, and the advance of the ground forces of the enemy at the dawn of the next day were largely unexpected ...

And under the summary:

"At the beginning of May 1942, a representative of the Headquarters obviously believed in the Germans' inability to attack: "Do not take the enemy’s false maneuvers for truth," "one must look ahead, prepare column roads and bridges, work out actions to block', - according to the memoirs of A.F. Khrenova ...

Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, who visited April 28 with Marshal S.M. Budyonny at the command post of the Crimean Front in the village of Leninsky, recalls: "Any talk about the possibility of a successful German offensive and our forced withdrawal L.Z. Mehlis considered harmful, and precautionary measures unnecessary'... Being confident in the' blindness' of the Germans, Lev Zakharovich rejected the most modest assumptions that they even know where the front headquarters are located ...
"... LZ. Mehlis was among the representatives of the Headquarters the only unprofessional military man. His extensive experience in political and administrative activities, could not compensate for the low competence in the field of command and control ..."
http://moscow-crimea.ru/history/20vek/mehlis.html

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

The Mehlis had not yet crushed anyone or removed anyone. So 200 thousand died on the conscience of Kozlov.

"... Seeing that the front command and the representative of the Stavka have completely lost control and the position of our troops is becoming increasingly threatening, the Supreme Command headquarters on May 11 at 23:50 gave Marshal S.M. Budyonny the following order: '... urgently leave in the area of ​​the headquarters of the Crimean Front (Kerch), put things in order in the Military Council of the front, force Mehlis and Kozlov to stop their formation work in the rear, transferring this matter to the rear workers, force them to leave immediately on the Turkish Wall, accept the withdrawing troops and material , put them in order and organize a stable defense on the line of the Turkish Wall ...
CM. Budyonny visited the headquarters of the Crimean Front, but limited himself to only a few general instructions. "
. Here is what Admiral N.G. wrote on this subject. Kuznetsov: 'Mehlis, during the battle, rushed on the' Gazik 'under fire, trying to stop the withdrawing troops, but everything was in vain. At such a moment, it is not the personal courage of the individual chief that is decisive, but the previously worked out military organization, firm order and discipline'
The enemy did not wait. Tanks and infantry, with active support from the air, the Turkish Wall was broken by the end of the day.
Seeing that the command of the Crimean Front had completely lost control, the Stavka began to give instructions that, unfortunately, could only ease the agony.
May 15, at 1 hours 10 minutes, Stalin telegraphed to Lieutenant General
D.T. Kozlov:
'The High Command Headquarters orders:
1. Do not hand over Kerch, organize a defense similar to Sevastopol.
2. To transfer to the troops fighting in the west a group of courageous commanders with walkie-talkies with the task of picking up troops, organizing an attack group in order to liquidate the enemy who broke through to Kerch and restore the defense along one of the Kerch contours. If the situation allows, you must be there personally.
3. You command the front, not the Mehlis. Mehlis should help you. If it does not help, let me know ... '[40].
In a collective letter to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, a group of political workers of the 51st, 47th, and 44th armies writes: “the absence of at least some organizing principle during the withdrawal, which quickly grew into a stampede, a terrible stampede at crossings, mass casualties - 'This all happened thanks to the treacherous command of the Crimean Front, otherwise it cannot be considered'...

http://moscow-crimea.ru/history/20vek/mehlis.html

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

This is the truth about the affairs of Mehlis on the Crimean front.
Reply Quote Complaint

Since the loss of Theodosius:
"... To get an idea of ​​the state of affairs on the Crimean front, LZ Mehlis had two days. January 22, he reported to IV Stalin: 'Arrived in Kerch 20.01.42/XNUMX/XNUMX ... We found the most ugly picture of the organization of command and control ...
Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov Comfront Kozlov does not know the position of units at the front, their condition, as well as enemy groupings. Not a single division has data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a bewildered and unsure commander. Since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula, none of the leading workers of the front have been in the troops ... "
Next:
“... Lev Zakharovich acted with his usual energy, pressure, he tried to use his capabilities as deputy defense people's commissar and representative of the General Headquarters General Headquarters. He did not immediately appreciate the front commander, General D.T. Kozlov, and took all the control threads on himself ... "

"... Even while noting the Moscow envoy considerable arrogance in assessing the capabilities of his own and the enemy, one cannot help but notice that his actions were active and initially purposeful. They achieved increased combat readiness of the troops, command and political personnel, which the army commissar of the 1st rank did not give peace, as if shook, began to act more quickly, more dynamically.
The other is not deserving of approval - the rude, incompetent intervention of the Headquarters representative in the daily activities of the commander and front headquarters, and total control over them. .. "
http://moscow-crimea.ru/history/20vek/mehlis.html

[Alexander Greene]

I respect K. Simonov, but he writes biased about the Mehlis, because at that time Simonov worked in line with the Khrushchev installations, so 100% is not worth believing in his testimonies.

The conclusions of Mehlis two days later regarding the command of the Crimean Front were objective, in order to understand that there was no one from the front command at the front, many days were not required. By the way, the content of the Mehlis telegram was included in the order on the front, which was signed by Kozlov, i.e. he himself confirmed that everything is true there.
The offensive began on February 27, 1942. Due to poor preparation and ill-conceived offensive, Soviet troops suffered huge losses. And on March 9, Mehlis sent the first telegram to Stalin asking him to change Kozlov. March 29, repeated the request in a letter of similar content. The fact that he described Kozlov as a gluttonous master is also true.
By May, the offensive was completely drowned, and the Stavka insisted on strengthening the defense, but the defense was not strengthening, despite the fact that Stalin had ordered the construction of defensive structures in the North Caucasus Military District three times in October - November 1941, including in the strip of the future Crimean front. There is an ordinary crime.
Stalin gave the Mehlis carte blanche only on May 9, 1942, and on May 18 the front ceased to exist. So, where does the Mehlis?

And about his incompetence. Do not forget that there was a civil war behind Mehlis, he was the commissar of the brigade, then a division and even a group of troops.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

I respect K. Simonov, but he writes biased about Mehlis

Simonov, for example, is biased. A N.G. Kuznetsov? There are quite a lot of recollections of high military ranks, that Mehlis practically put Kozlov out of control.
A decrease of 2 ranks following the collapse of the front - just does not happen.

From the memoirs relating to this front, it is clear that it is controlled not just ineptly - mediocre. Second Rzhev, only groups of other scales.
At the same time, the May defeat was carried out by the Germans with lesser forces and on such a narrow front and with such a dense concentration of troops that there are no words except obscene.

Quote: Alexander Green

And about his incompetence. Do not forget that there was a civil war behind Mehlis, he was the commissar of the brigade, then a division and even a group of troops.

So what? Budenny was also a legend of the civil war, which does not mean his ability to control troops in modern warfare.

Troops should be controlled by military professionals, not by narcissistic party organizers who didn’t finish academies. Who massively survived in Oina and wrote "fabulous" post-war memoirs, mythologizing the Second World War.

Mehlis was a really energetic person and improved the supply of the front, but as a military organizer he was no one - the collapse of the Crimean front, this is a well-deserved aspen stake in his career.
Or do you want to refute the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Vissarionovich, who, following the results of the defeat, reduced Mehlis to 2 ranks?

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

Stalin gave the Mehlis carte blanche only on May 9, 1942, and on May 18 the front ceased to exist. So, where does the Mehlis?

Again untrue - I repeat the above written again for you:

"" ... March 29, 1942 from a telegram to the Headquarters: 'If the front-line vehicle ultimately works somewhat satisfactorily, this is due to the fact that the front has strong military advice, a new chief of staff (meaning P.P. Eternal. - Yu.R.), and I am not here an American observer, but in accordance with your instructions interfering in business... ".
How did this happen? The above telegrams to the headquarters and the recollections of eyewitnesses in high ranks, who can be trusted as historical sources, show.

in April 1942, at the headquarters of the Crimean Front, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov recalled the confusion that reigned there: 'Commander of the Crimean Front D.T. Kozlov was already in the pocket of the Mehlis, who literally intervened in all operational matters.

".... By order of Comrade Mehlis, all operational plans, directives and other orders for front-line troops are checked and authorized by him," informed D.T. Kozlov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky. Kollov asked: “Should this be the case submit for approval to the People’s Commissar operational plans, their proposals on all upcoming activities of the troops or all instructions on all issues of life and activities of the troops to receive from him directly on the spot? "

It seems to me that I have cited enough sources from respected authors, indicating their authorship, dates and documents that form the picture of the real management of the Crimean Front.
You did not bring a single documentary evidence that the Mehlis is not involved in the collapse of the Crimean Front.
I believe that the discussion at the level is good, because good is of little interest.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: DimerVladimer

I believe that the discussion at the level is good, because good is of little interest.

And you be more objective, and do not trust Kuznetsov’s memoirs. It was also convenient for him to blame all the blame on the Mehlis in order to account for the surrender of Sevastopol.
And this is why you didn’t understand why Stalin lowered the Mehlis to two ranks. Stalin demoted Kozlov and Petrov in the rank for defeat, and Mehlis for not being able to force these generals to fight correctly. In addition, there was double demand from Mehlis, because he was a representative of the bet.
And about Budyonny you are wrong. Budyonny fought very skillfully, according to all the rules of military art, this was also noted by German generals in their diaries and memoirs.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

And this is why you didn’t understand why Stalin lowered the Mehlis to two ranks. Stalin demoted Kozlov and Petrov in the rank for defeat, and Mehlis for not being able to force these generals to fight correctly. In addition, there was double demand from Mehlis, because he was a representative of the bet.

This is your opinion and unreasonable interpretation, which only you believe in, contrary to documents, eyewitness accounts and logic.

Quote: Alexander Green

And about Budyonny you are wrong. Budyonny fought very skillfully, according to all the rules of military art, this was also noted by German generals in their diaries and memoirs.

Amaze your vision of the military genius of Budyonny, glorified in the memoirs of the German commanders of armies or fronts?
Budyonny was the commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces of the South-Western direction (South-Western and Southern fronts). Budyonny’s troops were surrounded during the battle for Uman and the battle for Kiev, losing up to 1,5 million people killed and captured.
Probably for this they praise Budenny? ...
Or did he become famous on the command of the Reserve Front? Or the North Caucasus Front? That in August 1942 they trampled him from direct command to honorary cavalry commanders.

Amaze me with the successful operations of the "ingenious" Marshal Budyonny?
In what operations did he defeat the Germans in May-August 1942?
Or was he the cavalry commander of the Red Army participated in the planning of operations alone? Probably like Guderian during the period of "patronage" of the armored forces - the same "wedding general", responsible for the formation and equipment of the armed forces.

You would not make the audience laugh, here people are well-read.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: DimerVladimer

You would not make the audience laugh, here people are well-read.

What is the hardest thing in the war? Experts believe that this is a retreat. Why?
While the troops are on the defensive, they are able to repulse the attacks of a three times superior enemy. They are in the trenches, in bunkers and bunkers, in front of them are minefields and barbed wire. To retreat, they need to throw trenches and gather in columns. The enemy, if he is more mobile, can get ahead of the retreating, occupy the trenches and strengthen their new line of defense. And then smash them front and back in a clean field. Therefore, successfully withdrawing troops is a great art.
And in 1941, the work of this difficult maneuver was undertaken by the "old" marshals, including Budyonny. But which of the historians appreciated this work? Now these marshals are exposed almost as idiots. This is all an eructation of the Khrushchev thaw.
But the enemy appreciated, so Halder, in particular, characterizing the actions of Marshal Budenny, noted in his diary July 26, 1941: “The enemy again found ways to withdraw his troops from the threat of the emerging environment. This, on the one hand, is a fierce counterattack against our front-line detachments of the 17th Army, and on the other, it’s a great art with which he withdraws his troops from threatened areas and quickly transfers them by rail and by car. ”
And here is how the defeat of the Soviet troops, commanded by S. M. Budenny, was supposed by the Barbaross plan.
“The group of armies operating south of the Pripyat swamps, through concentric strikes, is to be named the main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops located in Ukraine, even before the latter reached the Dnieper.
To this end, the main blow is delivered from the Lublin region in the general direction to Kiev. At the same time, troops in Romania are crossing the river. Rod in the lower reaches and carry out deep coverage of the enemy. The task of the Romanian army is to forge the Russian forces inside the mites formed. "
Hitler did not succeed with this part of the plan - they could not close the encirclement of Kiev and the Romanians did not help. On the contrary, Hitler had to abandon the Barbarossa plan, and he removed the Guderian’s Panzer Group from the Moscow direction and threw it south, on Budyonny. Blitzkrieg was foiled, Hitler was able to realize it only at the front at Pavlov.

And here is how Halder estimates the contribution of Budyonny to military science ..
The same Halder, on the second day of the war, when nothing was yet clear, writes in his diary: “... Von Bock from the very beginning was against the joint attack of both tank groups on Smolensk and wanted to target the Goth group to the north. In this case, the tank groups of Goth and Guderian would be separated by an almost impassable strip of lakes and swamps, which could give the enemy the opportunity to separately defeat both of them. This danger should be taken into account, especially since it was the Russians who first put forward the idea of ​​massaging mobile compounds (Budyonny). ”
That is, judging by the diaries of F. Halder, the Germans considered S. M. Budenny to be the father of the maneuver war, who successfully led the masses of mobile troops behind the whites and Poles in the Civil War.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexander Green

And here is how the defeat of the Soviet troops, commanded by S. M. Budenny, was supposed by the Barbaross plan.

Plans have plans. Hitler ridiculed Guderian for his assumption that the Red Army has about 10000 tanks in service (in fact, three times as many).
So German strategic planning did not rely on the real numbers of the forces opposing them. Another thing is that the German headquarters, adhering to the general directives, tactically rather flexibly operated troops within the front, competently massing troops in the most vulnerable areas, replayed the headquarters of the Red Army in speed. What offset the miscalculations of the strategic command.
Kiev strategic defensive operation
The troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of Colonel General M.P. Kirponos ...., under the general leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny.
You should be familiar with the concept of "under the general command" - this means that the operations themselves are developed by the front headquarters (chief of staff), the marshal approves and then the headquarters. So Budyonny had nothing to do with planning operations - only a general guide.
How did you praise the individual operational successes - the Kiev strategic operation, ended in defeat.
According to data published in 1993 by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Soviet losses amounted to over 700 thousand people, of which 627,8 thousand were irrevocable.
On the basis of 10-day reports of their own losses, the Germans lost: General losses of GA "South" and GA "Center" in the battle for Kiev: 128670 people. One can argue with this figure, but the approximate ratio of losses shows how catastrophic the defeat was when the attackers lost six times less than the defenders.

So do not praise Budenny, dear, there is only one result - the defeat of the fronts under his general guidance is a historical fact.
Moreover, the defeat of the Crimean Front, when the Germans defeated a smaller group by small forces, put an end to Budenny's career, which was never allowed again not only to the operational leadership of the troops, but also to the general.

Note:
The defeat of the South-Western Front opened the way for the enemy to Eastern Ukraine, to the Donbass (see map). The forces of the Southern Front of the Red Army fell into a difficult position:

On October 8, the 18th Army of the Southern Front was surrounded and perished in the Sea of ​​Azov;
On October 16, the Odessa defensive region was left to the enemy;
October 17, busy Donbass (fell Taganrog);
October 25, captured Kharkov;
November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked;
November 30 - the forces of Army Group South consolidated at the turn of the Mius Front.

On the other hand, the distraction of the 2nd Wehrmacht tank group from the central direction to the south slowed the advance of Army Group Center and allowed the Soviet command to prepare for the defense of Moscow.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: DimerVladimer

So do not praise Budenny, dear, there is only one result - the defeat of the fronts under his general guidance is a historical fact.

We all learned a bit of something and somehow, and you still grabbed on top of the perestroika literature and believe everything that is written there.
Even under Khrushchev began rewriting recent history, reassessing the activities of yesterday's heroes. So at the level of mass consciousness, they began to form the idea of ​​Budyonny as a mediocre military leader, a near-sighted person, in a word - a cavalryman.
And as the most striking indicator of Budyonny’s military insolvency, they note the position of cavalry commander occupied by him at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War.
Here you are, for example, blaming Budyonny for the defeat of the Kiev fortified area. You deducted from someone that he was guilty and do not even go to deal with either the conditions or the terms. Yes July 10, 1941 Budyonny was appointed commander in chief of the South-West direction.
The task was to keep Kiev and the border in the right-bank Ukraine. The situation began to deteriorate in late August, when the Guderian tank group turned south from the Moscow direction, with the goal of reaching the rear of the Soviet group defending Kiev. Sent to stop Guderian Eremenko did not cope with the task.
And on September 11, Kleist’s tank group launched an offensive towards Kudrin from the Kremenchug bridgehead, and on September 15, the ring around Kiev closed, and Kirponos’s troops were in the boiler.
And Budyonny timely warned the Stavka about imminent danger and recommended leaving Kiev, which was refused.
Here is an excerpt from his telegram: “... I believe that by this time the enemy’s intention to embrace and surround the South-Western Front from the directions Novgorod-Seversky and Kremenchug was completely outlined. To counter .... It is necessary to create a strong group of troops. The Southwestern Front is unable to do this. If the High Command Headquarters, .... since he’s not able to concentrate such a strong group at the moment, the withdrawal for the South-Western Front is quite overdue ... Procrastination with the withdrawal ... may lead to the loss of troops and a huge amount of equipment. ”
There is a sober vision of the operational situation and the understanding that delaying the withdrawal of troops can lead the front to disaster. Unfortunately, in Moscow they did not understand the situation, and did not see the impending danger in time. In addition, Kirponos refused the offer of Budyonny.
The day after this telegram, Budyonny was removed from his post, and a week later the front troops were surrounded. However, Budenny is not to blame for this. In September – October 1941, he already headed the Reserve Front.
In addition, all historians write that near Kiev, the Germans surrounded millions of Soviet soldiers and 600 thousand were captured. people, forgetting that this figure was voiced by Dr. Goebbels in leaflets. which were dropped on the encirclement. This is an ordinary lie, in the four surrounded armies there were only 300 thousand people. (Halder writes about 290 thousand.)
The end of September, the Wehrmacht began an operation to seize Moscow. The General Staff again failed to determine the areas where the enemy strike groups were concentrated, as a result, the troops of the Western (I.S. Konev) and Reserve Fronts were surrounded in the Vyazma area.
But here one cannot blame Budyonny, there was a mistake of intelligence, In addition, then the troops of one of the best generals Konev were defeated.
In 1943, Budyonny was appointed commander in chief of the cavalry, and the point here is not in his unsuitability, but in a change of mood in the Red Army. The Red Army began to advance, and in order to advance successfully it was necessary to change the psychology of the commanders, so Stalin everywhere replaced those who stood up in defense and appointed young commanders who were eager to advance, and were more active, more lively on the offensive. Behind them there was no burden of responsibility for the retreats and they were not careful.
But the fact that the Red Army in the early years of the war survived and learned to fight is a great merit of Budyonny.