The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

The historically most important components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) of the USSR and then of the Russian Federation have always been Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Rocket Forces). As we reviewed in the previous material, Strategic Missile Forces may well effectively carry out nuclear deterrence even in the event of an enemy sudden disarming strike and full deployment of a missile defense system. Nevertheless, there are still aviation and marine components of the nuclear triad. In this article, we consider the prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces.

Air component of strategic nuclear forces

We considered in detail the capabilities and effectiveness of the air component of the strategic nuclear forces in the article Sunset of the Nuclear Triad? Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces. Based on the results of the analysis, we can say that the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is currently practically useless from the point of view of deterring the United States. A long reaction time does not allow carriers (strategic bombers) to avoid defeat at aerodromes during the enemy’s delivering a sudden disarming strike. Weapon strategic bombers, cruise missiles (CR), are extremely vulnerable to fighter aircraft and enemy air defense systems.

Thus, we can say that the existing and promising strategic bombers of the "classical" design are absolutely useless as a tool of nuclear deterrence, provided that the enemy makes the "first move". Moreover, they are quite effective as a weapon of the first strike, taking into account some of the shortcomings, which we will discuss below. Even more strategic missile bombers are effective as strategic weapon of conventional forces.

Classic missile bombers are practically useless in terms of nuclear deterrence

Could a strategic bomber be created capable of effectively solving the tasks of nuclear deterrence in the presence of the possibility of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike? Theoretically, this is possible, but such a product should radically differ from traditional aircraft.

Aircraft systems of constant readiness

First of all, the carrier should be constantly ready for launch within three to five minutes after receiving a warning about a missile attack. That is, it should be something like an intercontinental ballistic missile in a container: an airplane in a closed hangar, with direct access to the runway. After an alarm, the duty pilots take up seats, the tunnel to the cockpit is cleaned, emergency take-off, possibly at rocket boosters, and departure from the airfield based at least several tens of kilometers. In case of cancellation of the launch, a return to the airfield and re-preservation in the hangar are carried out.

The weapon of such a carrier should not be cruise missiles, at least subsonic, at least hypersonic, but intercontinental ballistic missiles with an air launch. As such, a modification of the YRS intercontinental ballistic missile, the mass of which is about 46-47 tons, which is quite acceptable for a carrier aircraft, can be considered. Accordingly, the range of ICBMs with an air launch should ensure the possibility of hitting targets in the United States when launched from the basing area.

Air-launched ballistic missile launch

The carrier is an “oak” construction, something like B-52 with its unrealistically long life cycle and excessive strength of hull structures, uneconomical, but reliable engines.

The life of the B-52 bomber exceeds the life of many warships. The reason for its survivability was largely due to the huge margin of safety of the structure, high maintainability and relatively low cost of operation

What are the advantages of such a system? The reaction time is comparable to launching an ICBM from the mine, there is no need for the carrier to leave the borders of the Russian Federation, and it is possible to cancel the launch after launch. In the case of an initial warning of a missile attack, even the slightest suspicion, carriers can start immediately, even before the information about the attack is confirmed, in order to leave the affected area. If the information is not confirmed, the carriers simply return to the airfield, go through maintenance and take their place in the hangar.

The main problem of constant readiness aviation systems is that it is necessary to create and ensure the synchronous operation of the aircraft itself, ICBMs and all associated infrastructure - emergency take-off in any weather, constant readiness of equipment and pilots. How difficult, expensive, and generally possible, difficult to assess. How will the ICBM behave after several take-off and landing cycles? The adversary can play on the verge of a foul, causing the take-off of carriers and wasting their resource, and then deliver a real blow during the passage of carriers or a missile maintenance.

In addition, it is necessary to understand that due to the need to ensure emergency take-off and to be in constant readiness, such complexes will be extremely highly specialized, no multifunctional application - everything is just like with the Topol or Yars mobile complexes.

Are the strategic nuclear forces and the air forces of the Russian Federation ready to create such weapons? If so, what should be the number of such media? Given the novelty and narrow specialization, it is unlikely that it will be possible to build them in quantities of more than 10-20 units, especially given the need for collateral support - special hangars adjacent to the runways intended only for them. If there are one or three nuclear warheads (YaBCh) on one air-based ICBM, this will be a total of 10-60 warheads.

The above allows us to consider that in the context of resistance to a sudden disarming strike, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is practically useless, and this cannot be changed. The development of aviation systems of constant readiness is likely to be a complex and economically expensive task with a large number of technical risks.

So, the aviation component of strategic nuclear forces can be written off?
In addition to the task of nuclear deterrence of the enemy by delivering a guaranteed retaliatory strike, the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can and should be assigned the task of exerting continuous pressure on the potential enemy. That is, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces should be used to create an unpredictable threat, the repulsion of which will require significant funds from the enemy, which, in turn, will reduce its offensive capabilities due to the inevitable finiteness of any resources: financial, technical, human.

Unpredictable threat

To some extent, existing strategic bombers are suitable for solving this problem: Tu-95, Tu-160, promising PAK-DA. Nevertheless, for the most effective implementation of the task of creating threatened situations to the enemy, the design and armament of promising aviation systems of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation must meet certain requirements:

- Firstly, the main requirements for a promising strategic bomber-missile carrier should be minimizing the cost of flight hours and maximum reliability. Everything else - speed, inconspicuousness and other things a second time;

- secondly, the existing cruise missiles with nuclear warheads as the main weapons of strategic bombers can hardly be considered an effective solution. Due to the subsonic speed of flight, they can be intercepted by almost any means of air defense (AA), as well as by enemy fighter aircraft. Hypersonic missiles will most likely have a limited flight range, which will require missile-carrying bombers to reach the borders of their launch beyond the state border of the Russian Federation, where they (carriers) can also be destroyed by air defense and enemy fighter aircraft.

Based on this, the most effective weapon for promising missile-carrying bombers can be air-launched air-launched ICBMs, which we previously considered in the context of constant readiness in aviation systems. The missile design can be largely unified with the promising ICBM for the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces.

Given the dimensions of existing and prospective ICBMs, their placement on traditionally designed missile-carrying bombers may be difficult or even impossible. The best option is to create a missile carrier aircraft based on one of the modifications of the IL-76, or on the basis of a promising transport aviation aircraft (PAK TA).

The length of the existing Yars ICBM is about 23 meters with a mass of about 47 tons, which is already quite acceptable for a transport aircraft. The estimated length of the promising missile 15Zh59 of the Courier complex should be about 11,2 meters, with a mass of about 15 tons.

The approximate dimensions of the Yars ICBM and the promising ICBM 15Zh59 of the Courier complex

The maximum carrying capacity of the IL-76MD is 48 tons, and the IL-76MD is 60 tons. In the modification of IL-76MF, the length of the cargo floor is increased to 31,14 m, the flight range of IL-76MF with a load of 40 tons is 5800 km. The capacity of the latest modification of the IL-476 is 60 tons, the flight range with a load of 50 tons is up to 5000 km.

IL-476. Photo: Alexey Mikheev, take-off.ru

PAK TA with an estimated carrying capacity of about 80-100 tons may have even greater possibilities for deploying air-based ICBMs.

Sketch image of PAK TA

Thus, a promising missile-ballistic aviation complex (PAK RB) based on a modified IL-476 can carry one aviation-based ICBM, and a PAK RB based on the PAK TA (possibly) two aviation-based ICBMs.

PAK RB based on PAK TA may become the carrier of two air-based ICBMs

An important problem that will need to be solved when creating the PAK RB is the possibility of carrying out multiple take-offs and landings of the carrier aircraft with ICBMs on board. Most likely, it will be something like a complex computerized system of dampers, with active suppression of shock, vibration and vibration over a wide range.

What is the difference between the PAK RB and the previously considered aviation readiness complex? In the absence of the need to ensure constant duty on the ground, in minute readiness for launch, in the absence of requirements to strengthen the structure for emergency take-off. Also, during the operation of the PAK RB, the existing infrastructure and airbases of strategic bombers should be used, there is no need for dedicated bands for each aircraft. The operation of the PAK RB itself should be carried out in the normal mode for aircraft of this type.

Is the creation of the PAK RB real? Yes, it’s quite possible to create such a complex. This is confirmed by research and testing in this direction conducted by the USSR and the USA during the years of the Cold War. The Makeeva mall considered the possibility of creating the Air Start complex on the basis of the An-124 aircraft and a rocket with a liquid rocket engine. Do not forget about the success of private astronautics in this direction.

Models and sketches of the “Air Start” complex being developed by “Makeeva Mall”

NASA's Pegasus Rocket Launch

In what quantities should PAK RB be built? Presumably, their number should be comparable with the number of existing strategic missile-carrying bombers, that is, be about 50 units. Accordingly, the number of warheads will be 50-150 nuclear warheads for the PAK RB based on the Il-476, or 100-300 nuclear warheads for the PAK RB based on the PAK TA.

Can the PAK RB be used as a carrier for cruise missiles with nuclear warheads? Yes, moreover, RCs with nuclear warheads are more likely to be placed on the PAK RB in a larger quantity than on classic design missile-carrying bombers, especially with regard to the PAK RB version based on PAK TP.

In the cargo compartment of the PAK RB on the basis of the IL-476, approximately 18 missiles of the X-102 type or their non-nuclear version of the Kh-101 can potentially be placed (mass of 18 missiles without a launcher 43,2 tons). In turn, the PAK RB on the basis of PAK TA could potentially carry about 36 missiles of the X-101 / X-102 type (mass of 36 missiles without a launcher of 86,4 tons), which is already comparable to the ammunition of a “frigate” warship or multipurpose nuclear submarine (ICAPL) of the "Ash" type. KR discharge can be carried out from special cartridge-type containers, by analogy with the discharge of ICBMs.

Images from the patent for “Device for the transportation and dumping of cargo for a transport aircraft”

Thus, the PAK RB can be used as an effective carrier of high-precision non-nuclear weapons - an element of the Strategic Conventional Forces. Whether this will be one modification of the PAK RB with a variable load in transport launch containers (TPK), or it will be necessary to create separate modifications for air-based ICBMs and for the Kyrgyz Republic, the question is open, but, most likely, the creation of a single version of the PAK RB is possible.

How expedient is the creation of a PAK RB on the basis of transport aircraft? Perhaps it is better to create specialized bombers of a classic design? Creating specialized aircraft of this type will cost much more than developing a modification of the IL476 or PAK TA. The range of missile weapons is such that entering the anti-aircraft defense zone or fighter aircraft is no longer required, and bombing is possible only against an enemy who has no anti-aircraft defense in principle, even if the carrier is “invisible” even “hypersonic”.

The Russian Air Force urgently needs a large fleet of transport aircraft, which is the cornerstone of the mobility of modern armed forces. In addition, we need refueling aircraft, early warning aircraft, and other auxiliary aircraft, which are built on the basis of transport aircraft. Perhaps, on the basis of the IL-476 or PAK TA will be built aviation combat laser complex (ABLK) "Peresvet-A". In this sense, the development of the PAK TA and the further modernization of the IL-76 (or the creation of a new aviation complex to replace it) have a much higher priority than the creation of the PAK DA - the "classic" bomber-bomber. The construction of PAK TA and / or IL-476 in a large series, in many unified modifications, will significantly reduce the cost of an individual machine.

Are strategic classic-design missile bombers needed then? Is there a niche for them? Yes, such machines can and will play an important role as a conventional weapon. But the very essence of such machines will change significantly, most likely, these will not be strategic bombers, but multifunctional aircraft capable of hitting ground, surface, air targets, and possibly targets in near space. However, this is a topic for another discussion.

Perhaps the B-21 Raider will be the first multifunctional bomber equipped, in addition to air-to-ground weapons, also air-to-air weapons, laser weapons

Conclusions

1. The aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is unsuitable for nuclear deterrence in the context of the possible US launch of a sudden disarming strike. Even if it is theoretically possible to realize complexes that can provide continuous duty on the ground and take off a minute after receiving a command, in practice their implementation can be fraught with both technical difficulties and significant financial costs.

2. Nevertheless, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces can be an important element of strategic deterrence designed to exert continuous pressure on a potential enemy using the uncertainty of the location of carriers and their combat load.

3. As a carrier of nuclear weapons for the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces for the period from 2030 to 2050, a promising missile-ballistic aviation complex - PAK RB based on the Il-476 transport aircraft or PAK TA can be considered.

4. The main weapon of the PAK RB should be an air-launched ICBM with air launch, as much as possible unified with a promising solid-fuel ICBM for promising mine and mobile ground missile systems (PGRK).

5. In addition to air-launched ICBMs, existing and promising cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which are currently the main weapons of strategic bombers, and also promising hypersonic air-launched missiles with nuclear warheads, can be used on the PAK RB.

6. Significant volumes of internal compartments and a large carrying capacity of transport aircraft allow you to take on board large volumes high-precision cruise, hypersonic or aeroballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads, which will make the PAK RB an important element of the Strategic Conventional Forces.

7. The shorter range of the PAK RB, implemented on the basis of a transport aircraft, in comparison with existing and promising classic-design bombers, is compensated by the longer range of weapons, which should be about 8000-10000 kilometers for air-launched ICBMs. The range of existing cruise missiles is about 5500 kilometers and can be increased in promising weapons of this type.

8. Promising air-based ICBMs should provide the ability to strike on a gentle trajectory with a minimum launch range of about 2000 km or less in order to put pressure on the enemy with the threat of a sudden decapitation strike on him.

9. An important advantage of the PAK RB will be its ability to disguise among a huge fleet of military transport and auxiliary aircraft, made on the basis of aircraft of a similar type. In fact, it will be something like a PGRK disguised as a cargo van, only in the air. If now the US Air Force and NATO are forced to react to the appearance of Russian strategic bombers in the air near their territory, then if the PAK RB is created, they will have to react similarly to all aircraft of the military transport and auxiliary aircraft of the Russian Federation, which will lead to an increased load on their Air Force , reducing the resource of fighter aircraft aimed at intercepting, increasing the fatigue of personnel, significantly complicating the work of intelligence.

10. The estimated number of PAK RB should be about 50 units. Depending on the selected source aircraft, IL-476 or PAK TA, the total number of air-based ICBMs can be about 50-100 units, respectively, the number of nuclear warheads deployed on air-launched ICBMs can be about 50-300 units, in depending on the type of warhead (monoblock or separable). The total number of cruise missiles in nuclear or non-nuclear equipment can be about 900-1800 units when placed on the PAK RB instead of aviation-based ICBMs.

Comments

[faterdom]

This is all built in relation to the United States. But they do not like to fight with their own hands, but then there is Japan, Great Britain, and Canada in the end, and this may already look different to them. And there are less missiles needed, and there are planes, to equip the Tu-22 with the same "Dagger" - eat, do not slap - for these countries it is quite strategic and fatal.

[Aleksandr1971]

You faterdom, what exactly do you want to say about the article?

[Aleksandr1971]

Interesting article.
Indeed, logically, everything is exactly as the author describes.
But the creation of air-based ICBMs is a resolved issue, but it still requires not only a lot of money, but also many years of work (if not decades). This is judged by the experience of creating other ICBM samples. Although the idea of ​​the author as a whole is like.
However, I object to the author according to his thesis that the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is useless. It is useless only in the way it is now managed.
But is there any way to improve the situation with the existing material base of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces? Maybe it makes sense to restore the network of dispersal airfields, which was ditched under Serdyukov, and organize chaotic movements of Tu-95 and Tu-160 along them?
In addition, one can debate with the author’s thesis about the futility of cruise missiles based on the Tu-95 and Tu-160. Indeed, the attack by cruise missiles should, in theory, go as a retaliatory strike when the enemy’s air defense and missile defense system is destroyed by ground strategic nuclear forces. And the residual radiation will also interfere with the work of surviving enemy radars. So both cruise missiles and their carriers will probably have a chance to break through to targets.
In general, I believe that maintaining the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is necessary in order to be able to:
1) strike back at the remaining targets on the territory of the enemy. After all, initially it will not be known what exactly was destroyed and what remained. And here heavy transport aircraft as carriers of air-based ICBMs have fewer opportunities, because they will not be able to monitor enemy territory;
2) to conduct, if necessary, a conversation with the enemy from the position of the forces that remained after the initial exchange of nuclear strikes. For if it becomes necessary to conduct diplomatic negotiations, then you will not bargain much with empty hands.

[Sancho_SP]

The whole question is whether we are going to continue fighting after the exchange of the bulk of the warheads, or is this already beyond the “maximum project scenario”?

If the goal of the strategic nuclear forces is to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor, the mines (including false ones) and other disguised ground systems (like a marine standard container with a missile inside) will simply be cheaper and there may be more.

If we allow the war to be completely annihilated, to the last bayonet of the knife and to the last cripple, then digging already stands on the side of biological weapons, dirty bombs and other lovely things.

[Aleksandr1971]

The concept of unacceptable damage is meaningful for the parties to the conflict only before the "hot stage" of this conflict begins. After the exchange of nuclear strikes has taken place, it will only be a matter of who will become the owner of the destroyed land and who will dictate conditions to the enemy, if he is still alive.
Therefore, of course we need to have a second-strike weapon in order to either fight off a weakened but not fallen enemy (since we will be weakened even more), or to achieve relatively acceptable peace conditions.
In addition, do not forget that if we had only ground-based strategic nuclear forces, they would be used up or perish in the first hours and minutes of a nuclear conflict. But there are a bunch of countries that either will not be involved in the war at all, or that they will suffer relatively weakly. This is China, India and others. A pretty story will be if Russia and the West weaken each other with nuclear strikes, and some Brazil becomes the mistress of the Earth. Or our CIS neighbors are simply chopping off pieces of territory from Russia, which was left without strategic nuclear forces (or even without the Armed Forces).
That is why it is necessary to have such components of the strategic nuclear forces that can be preserved after the first exchange of nuclear strikes.

[Aleksandr1971]

The strange thing is that they negate me for this post. Explain what I said illogical here?

[bolotin.vic]

There is a reason.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexander1971

But is there any way to improve the situation with the existing material base of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces? Maybe it makes sense to restore the network of dispersal airfields, which was ditched under Serdyukov, and organize chaotic movements of Tu-95 and Tu-160 along them?

Heh heh heh ... regular trainings of strategists with relocation to advanced airfields began just at the furniture maker. And Rogachevo was restored under him.
If by numbers, then when Serdyukov became minister, the Russian Defense Ministry had 245 military airfields. After the reform, 70 remained. Horror-horror-horror ... if you do not remember that the USSR Air Force had 2500 military airfields. The same airfield Veshchevo near Vyborg, with its concrete shelters and a strip of 2500 m, was abandoned long before the furniture maker.

[agond]

... what a bold idea to carry a ballistic missile weighing 48 tons on an airplane, because it also needs to land, and there will probably be overloads and vibrations from the flight, which will cause stresses and deformations of solid fuel in the engine and dramatically reduce its shelf life, and on earth, an airplane with a rocket must be hidden somewhere. and then planes with airfields are more expensive than multi-axle cars with roads.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: agond

An important problem that will need to be solved when creating the PAK RB is the possibility of carrying out multiple take-offs and landings of the carrier aircraft with ICBMs on board. Most likely, it will be something like a complex computerized system of dampers, with active suppression of shock, vibration and vibration over a wide range.

The idea is not new; it was worked out both in the USA and in the USSR. Besides:

An important problem that will need to be solved when creating the PAK RB is the possibility of carrying out multiple take-offs and landings of the carrier aircraft with ICBMs on board. Most likely, it will be something like a complex computerized system of dampers, with active suppression of shock, vibration and vibration over a wide range.

Now they are making the most difficult pendants for luxury cars, which can partially compensate for uneven terrain. Active vibration suppression is used on submarines. So the PMSM creation of an active platform for the rocket container is quite real.

[Vladimir_2U]

In general, I agree with you on this article, except for the inexpediency of constant duty.

The aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is unsuitable for nuclear deterrence in the context of the possible US launch of a sudden disarming strike.

I do not agree with this and here is why:

The estimated number of PAK RB should be about 50 units

Even if you allocate only ten percent to those constantly in the air, it will be five cars, i.e. from five to ten missiles, and how many warheads are there, this is quite comparable with the number of missiles in silos, for example, France, and in its best years. )))

[Ka-52]

Even if you allocate only ten percent to those constantly in the air, it will be five cars,

Do not write your next fantasies.
There are several modes of duty alert on departure. There is readiness number 1 - when you sit in the cabin, the harness is fastened, power is supplied. With such a watch, engine start, taxiing and take-off takes 2 minutes.
Readiness number two is when the duty unit is on duty, but at the same time in VKK-6M, but without emergency shutdown. Departure time for 2 readiness is 8 minutes. There is a third willingness when the duty couple is called from the garrison. From 3 readiness, the departure time is 12 minutes. Readiness can be increased or decreased by the team at the regiment command post and further at the DCT.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Ka-52

There are several modes of duty alert on departure.

Learn not to read a line, it was about duty in the air.
The fact that you are prone to exaltation and quarrelsomeness is already clear, but why also demonstrate your limitations? The constant combat duty of airplanes in the air has long been worked out and used, is it really not in the know?

Airborne combat duty with thermonuclear weapons on board was conducted B-52 periodically from 1958 and continuously in 1961 – 1968 on one or more of the eight main patrol routes leading to the USSR through the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Canada and the Arctic. In the air at the same time were first two, and later 4 – 12 aircraft. During the 1962 crisis, combat duty in the air was carried simultaneously by 72 B-52 (12,5% of combat strength). Patrols with nuclear weapons were discontinued in 1968, after the next crash of the aircraft carrier.

Yes, it is quite complicated and rather risky, but not impossible. Even the constant presence of AWACS aircraft in the patrol area, if necessary, can talk about something, but it does not seem to you.

[Ka-52]

Learn not to read a line, it was about duty in the air.
The fact that you are prone to exaltation and quarrelsomeness is already clear, but why also demonstrate your limitations? The constant combat duty of airplanes in the air has long been worked out and used, is it really not in the know?

another empty blablabla. Let's start with how long you yourself spent on duty in readiness to fly? Or on the route? And then you will be shrewd about limitation. So far, I see again ranting about "high matters" of a person related to aviation the same as Klitschko to ballet

[Vladimir_2U]

Yes, you already through a paragraph began to read:

Quote: Ka-52

another empty blablabla.

If this is not a confirmation of my point, then what is it?

Quote: Vladimir_2U

At first, two, and later 4–12, aircraft were simultaneously in the air. During the crisis of 1962, 72 B-52s (12,5% ​​of the combat personnel) carried combat duty in the air at the same time.

Quote: Ka-52

Let's start with how much you yourself spent on duty in readiness for departure? Or on the route?

Well, start, who are you and where are you from? Why are you asking me such questions, is it not because you essentially have nothing to write about, other than angry questions, which are essentially irrelevant.

Quote: Ka-52

And then you’ll bust about limitedness

Well, refute the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft. And then blablabla from you and can be seen.

Quote: Ka-52

like Klitschko to ballet

Haha, you seem to be unaware that there is a concept of "ballet" in boxing, albeit somewhat mocking.

[Ka-52]

If this is not a confirmation of my point, then what is it?

you first need to get a point.

Well, start, who are you and where are you from? Why are you asking me such questions, is it not so that, in fact, you have nothing to write

don't worry about me. I just have the first and second of my question to you.

Well, refute the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft.

I devoted more than 30 years to aviation and flew until I retired. And we did not have "combat duty in the air." There were scheduled flights along the route with various weapons. This is reality. And what you write is fantasy.

Haha, you seem to be unaware that there is a concept of "ballet" in boxing, albeit somewhat mocking.

you can see both Klitschko and ballet better versed - good luck with your discussions of articles on this topic.

[Vladimir_2U]

So then you are unable to refute

Quote: Vladimir_2U

the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft.

Quote: Ka-52

Well, refute the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft.

I devoted more than 30 years to aviation and flew until I retired. And we did not have "combat duty in the air." There were scheduled flights along the route with various weapons. This is reality.

In its purest form, blablabla. Did you fly strategic missile-launch vehicles from an article or B-52 bombers? Or at least on domestic strategists and AWACS planes?

Quote: Ka-52

And we did not have "combat duty in the air"

It's just ridiculous, "mine didn't have it, so neither did kavo."

Quote: Vladimir_2U

During the crisis of 1962, 72 B-52s (12,5% ​​of the combat personnel) carried combat duty in the air at the same time.

Quote: Ka-52

you can see in Klitschko and in ballet

Oh, and whose words are these?

Quote: Ka-52

related to aviation is the same as Klitschko to ballet

However yours. In my comments on this article about Klitschko not a word.

[Ka-52]

Did you fly strategic missile-launch vehicles from an article or B-52 bombers?

tu16, tu22, 199 and 203 tbap (Nezhin and Baranovichi from Soviet times). Your shkolyarsky trolling speaks for itself.
The article talks about the possibilities Russian strategic nuclear forces and in particular the air component. If you, in your infancy, classify the B-52 as a Russian delivery vehicle, then I’m not just funny, but sorry for you.

It's just ridiculous, "mine didn't have it, so neither did kavo."

well, instead of antics, cite here an excerpt from the BA combat charter on the organization of combat duty in the air. You can at least the Soviet period, even the Russian. I will be happy to get acquainted. I hope you now quietly do not merge into silence.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Ka-52

The article talks about the capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

You read the article through a line, it does not write about capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, it writes generally about possible Ways of development of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation as a whole and the aviation component of strategic nuclear forces in particular, and the conclusion says:

strategic nuclear forces component maybe statl an important element of strategic containment

;

maybe A promising missile-ballistic aviation complex - PAK RB based on the Il-476 transport aircraft or PAK TA was considered

;

The main weapon of the PAK RB should become ICBMs

;etc. All this is assumed in the future tense.

Quote: Ka-52

Your shkolyarsky trolling

Of course:

Quote: Ka-52

don't write your next fantasies

Quote: Ka-52

another empty blablabla

Quote: Ka-52

Let's start with how much you yourself spent on duty in readiness for departure

This is just a fat method of demagogy and trolling, having failed to at least tell something about the topic, suddenly start asking rather abstract questions.

Quote: Ka-52

I see again the rants about "high matters" of a person related to aviation the same as Klitschko to ballet

Quote: Ka-52

you can see both Klitschko and ballet better

Is that all I wrote? Okay, at least you would have read the article carefully, otherwise you jumped out with denunciations, and for some reason they appointed me as a troll.

Quote: Ka-52

well, instead of antics, cite here an excerpt from the BA combat charter on the organization of combat duty in the air.

How sweet, you deny the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft, but for some reason, I must quote excerpts. No, it’s you who cite the refutation of the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft, you can from the BA charter, I’m not against it. I brought the FACTS of such duty. And you are just questions, not even a single quote from the unfortunate.

Quote: Ka-52

tu16, tu22,

When were these planes strategists? In a very hoary antiquity?

[Ka-52]

I brought the FACTS of such duty.

American strategic aviation duty facts? And what side is it to our Russian reality? Campaign you are already in your big top confused

it writes in general about the possible ways of developing the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation as a whole and the aviation component of strategic nuclear forces in particular

How sideways does this strategic reality relate to the US strategic aviation fleet and their methods of organizing combat work?

How sweet, you deny the possibility of constant combat duty in the air of strategic aircraft,

because there is no such regime in the organization of the combat work of bomber aircraft. What are in reality - I have listed. Including based on my own experience.

but for some reason, excerpts I must quote.

because you declare that such a combat duty regime exists in the Russian Air Force. So a reasonable question arises - on the basis of what have you been setting up a booth here for half a day? You can leave links to Americans. In the meantime, I thought that something could have changed in the newest management architecture since my service, since you are so zealously defending your statements. But from you confirmation - zero along. One blablabla and buffoonery.

When were these planes strategists? In a very hoary antiquity?

What has changed? began to fly not along, but across?
in general, you can not answer. Your level of competence is clear (SBS - the neighbor's grandmother said). If I don’t understand nicherta in submarines, for some reason I don’t try to argue with rudolff or, without understanding artillery, I don’t argue with Lopatov. You are trying to cram your "authoritative" (actually not) opinion everywhere.

[Vladimir_2U]

You obviously just do not care about the content of the article, because in it the author discusses possible the development of strategic nuclear forces, for you, such a particularly attentive, possible, probable, desirable development, not the current state of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, but about a future that is desirable for the author.

Quote: Ka-52

American strategic aviation duty facts? And what side is it to our Russian reality

Once again, this article is about possible future the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, not about the current reality, but you do not care, you have here your own article, invisible.

Quote: Ka-52

it writes in general about the possible ways of developing the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation as a whole and the aviation component of strategic nuclear forces in particular

How sideways does this strategic reality relate to the US strategic aviation fleet and their methods of organizing combat work?

What kind of reality are we talking about? Develop eyes, at least read the title of the article

The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

PROSPECTS, this is about the future! But no, you are not a reader, you are a writer. What prevents in the future, after adopting the aircraft models proposed by the author of the article, to organize constant combat duty in the air ?! What? The fact that you personally could not organize 20 or 30 years ago does not mean that no one can organize it, or do you doubt the ability of the Russian Aerospace Forces to repeat the American experience of more than 50 years ago?

Quote: Ka-52

because you declare that such a duty mode exists in the Russian Air Force

Excuse me, did you completely fall into insanity? Didn’t read the article, and even scored on my comments? Where did you read it? An article about the probable future, my comment on the article about the probable future, and what are you doing? How much did you write there about your flight experience, 30 years? This is now at least 70 years old, is it too early for insanity?

Quote: Ka-52

But from you confirmation - zero along

Have you brought any refutation at least? Are you demanding something from me, at least once, at least some kind of link, a quote, at least somehow checked, have you brought? There is nothing but your references, by the way it can be mythical, experience, at least 20 years ago, unless of course you lied about serving in

Quote: Ka-52

tu16, tu22, 199 and 203 tbap (Nezhin and Baranovichi from Soviet times)

.

[Ka-52]

rudolff (rudolff) Yesterday

But the MO did not show much interest in this topic.

The Americans developed a similar system based on the S-5A and MX ICBMs. Also later turned off the program

[Vladimir_2U]

Well, and how does this disprove the possibility of constant combat alertness in the air of strategic aircraft? Not to mention the fact that the author of the article proposes the use of airplanes not of special design, but on the basis of existing (created) BTA and P.B.A.

[Ka-52]

Well, and how does this disprove the possibility of constant combat alertness in the air of strategic aircraft?

I didn’t write to you at all. You can continue to clown and fantasize about ballet

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Ka-52

the same as Klitschko for ballet

Of course, these are not your words, but whose else, whose?

[AAK]

If, according to the author of the article, an ordinary strategic bomber with the Kyrgyz Republic is more like a preemptive nuclear or convectional strike weapon, and we position ourselves as the opponents of the principle of attacking first, then why do we plan to significantly increase the number of Tu-160s and develop the PAK- YES? Who will we attack? Ukraine? Europe? Japan? Or .... China?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: AAK

If, according to the author of the article, an ordinary strategic bomber with the Kyrgyz Republic is more like a preemptive nuclear or convectional strike weapon, and we position ourselves as the opponents of the principle of attacking first, then why do we plan to significantly increase the number of Tu-160s and develop the PAK- YES? Who will we attack? Ukraine? Europe? Japan? Or .... China?

Strategic bombers are extremely powerful weapons in non-nuclear conflict. They are capable of drowning ship groupings, destroying the delicate economy and infrastructure of modern high-tech countries. What will happen if we knock out large power plants, oil refineries, fuel depots, etc.?

Of course, bombing the squalid Ishilovites with them is not very effective - only spend motor resources. If you only consider this as a workout ...

[Operator]

The minimum flight time for American medium-range missiles deployed in Europe or in its waters to Moscow is 6 minutes. The launch of the MRBM is detected by the OGRLS "Container" within a few seconds after the launch. Mine ICBMs are constantly in one-minute readiness for launch. The case is small - to put into service ICBMs, the active section of the trajectory of which, up to the separation of combat equipment, would fit in five minutes.

At the moment, the Russian Armed Forces are armed with the A-135 missile, made in a conical form factor, 12 meters long, 2 meters in diameter, with a starting weight of 10 tons and a detachable warhead weighing 700 kg (which corresponds to the mass of the megaton warhead). During the passage of the ATU, the anti-missile supports an average acceleration of 1250 m / s2, the burnup time of the fuel in the rocket engine is 4 seconds, the rocket speed at this moment reaches 5 km / s.

To ensure intercontinental flight range, the maximum speed of the rocket should be at least 7 km / s. When a modernized A-135 is carried out in a cylindrical form factor, its starting weight will be 20 tons, the average acceleration will decrease to 600 m / s2, the time of the autopilot will increase to 12 seconds, and the maximum speed will be 7,2 km / s.

3 seconds after the launch, at an altitude of 2,7 km, the speed of the upgraded A-135 will reach 6M and it will be covered with a plasma cocoon of ionized air, which protects against the radiation of lasers planned to be deployed on space missile defense platforms of a potential enemy. The missile ATU will end at an altitude of 45 km within the atmospheric zone of plasma formation, after which the MS will be separated, protected from laser exposure by an ablative coating.

The mine of the modernized A-125, subject to its mortar launch from the TPK, will be three times smaller than the Yarsov and Sarmatov launch mines with a corresponding reduction in construction costs. Therefore, such mines can be dug up in Western and / or Eastern Siberia in the amount of several thousand units. As a result, the Strategic Missile Forces will be equipped with highly stable strategic weapons with a minute degree of constant readiness, protected from the missile defense space echelon of a potential enemy, and, moreover, from the foremost land and sea-based missile defense echelon.

Then why develop the aviation and naval components of the domestic strategic nuclear forces (with the exception of the Poseidon missile launcher with 100 Mtn warheads, designed to implement the policy of intimidating potential adversaries)?

[Old26]

Quote from rudolf

I remember that in Makeeva mall expressed their willingness to develop air-based ICBMs with the appropriate task. But the MO did not show much interest in this topic.

In addition to this development, more precisely the adaptation of the R-29R / possibly R-29RM missiles was also the development of Krechet (NPO Yuzhnoye). On the Tu-160 it was planned to install 2 ICBMs with a range of 8000 km and a weight of 24 tons. But the question arises
1. How to land any of the aircraft (IL-76 or TU-160) with a cargo of 49 tons. What is their authorized landing mass.
2. How to bypass the articles of treaties banning the possession of air-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 600 km on strategic bombers and the ban on the use of transport aircraft as carriers of such weapons

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Quote from rudolf

I remember that in Makeeva mall expressed their willingness to develop air-based ICBMs with the appropriate task. But the MO did not show much interest in this topic.

In addition to this development, more precisely the adaptation of the R-29R / possibly R-29RM missiles was also the development of Krechet (NPO Yuzhnoye). On the Tu-160 it was planned to install 2 ICBMs with a range of 8000 km and a weight of 24 tons. But the question arises
1. How to land any of the aircraft (IL-76 or TU-160) with a cargo of 49 tons. What is their authorized landing mass.
2. How to bypass the articles of treaties banning the possession of air-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 600 km on strategic bombers and the ban on the use of transport aircraft as carriers of such weapons

1. I think that nothing, only the described PAK RB on the basis of a transporter.
2. You can, just like the United States, "bypassed" the INF Treaty. Or consider the PAK RB as a separate type of aircraft. And what looks like, well ... As a last resort on the PAK RB, it is bad to provide for changes in the glider to distinguish them from transport aircraft, but you can use the Luneberg lenses integrated into the glider, then they will be able to distinguish the PAK RB from the transport aircraft, from some distance ... But not from the satellite.

[Nikolai]

Andrei Mitrofanov, what do you think of a possible PAK BR accident on takeoff or landing with a pair of Yarsov in his belly?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Nikolai Aleksandrovich

Andrei Mitrofanov, what do you think of a possible PAK BR accident on takeoff or landing with a pair of Yarsov in his belly?

The same as about the accident of the Tu-160 with 12 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, or the crash of the Burevestnik cruise missile with nuclear power units.

It is necessary to base in a distance from settlements. The nuclear ballistic missile ICBMs themselves may not collapse in an accident; they are durable, stronger than the nuclear ballistic missiles of the Kyrgyz Republic, since the latter do not need to withstand such overloads as nuclear ballistic missiles.

[Nikolai]

This dangerous thing is patrolling with apples. How many bombs are lost. And then there are tens of tons of rocket fuel. Darkness!

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Nikolai Aleksandrovich

This dangerous thing is patrolling with apples. How many bombs are lost. And then there are tens of tons of rocket fuel. Darkness!

I repeat. Summarize the fuel for 12 KR? And they don’t have a strong shell on their 12 NFCs that can withstand overloads when they fall from near space, + there is always a risk of a crash on take-off, which is tens of tons of fuel for the aircraft itself, so 1-2 ICBMs with 1-6 NFCs in total it will not add or diminish anything.

[Nikolai]

I don’t think so. If the accident occurs at runway, it will take time to eliminate the consequences (putting out the fire, repair runway, search for apples, decontamination, etc.), and this closes the base. Well, the complexity of protecting the object from drg. One stinger on the glide path and hello!

[adept666]

Tu-160 in scheduled flights never go with the KR equipped with special. Warhead. Either imitators (almost always), or with ordinary heads (training starts). This is the development of the flight program for the regime of H or exercises, as well as the designation of presence, so that some people do not seem to be honey and at the same time reconnaissance in battle as and who will respond to them (time of approach, availability of duty means, radar, etc.) With special. with equipment they are only on duty on earth. Above, the person correctly wrote there is no air watch and will not be - this is stupid. They are on duty only on the ground. Everything in the air - scheduled flights on assignment or already combat work.

[Pavel57]

It is necessary to evaluate through cost-effectiveness in the face of enemy opposition. I admit that the air component with a ballistic missile will be more efficient than SLBMs.

[faterdom]

Quote: Alexander1971

You faterdom, what exactly do you want to say about the article?

1. What should be kept in good shape not only in the USA. And for this, we have an aviation missile component and is developing. With the growth of the characteristics of the border between ICBMs and other missiles will be vague
2. It is difficult, expensive and incomprehensible why to carry ballistic missiles on an airplane as an PU, rather it will go to other areas - space (the Americans will also withdraw from this treaty), under water in the form of maintenance-free launchers, maybe in Antarctica.
Therefore, trampling the dead-end branches of evolution at a very high price - let the Americans do this, they print money for free.

[To be or not to be]

On March 12, 2 B-2 planes of 509 bacr according to the Bomber Task Force Europe 20-2 accompanied 15 Fighter Airplanes of 48 thiacres flying on the North Sea

[Saxahorse]

The article is curious, thanks to the author for the topic raised!

By the way, the author for some reason does not like KR very much. Apparently, therefore, he did not consider the option of combat duty on the carrier in the air. And this option gives an additional bonus in the form of an unexpected attack direction with a significant number of missiles. It’s obviously impossible to drag the ICBMs over thousands of kilometers, and even into the other hemisphere. This simplifies the work of enemy missile defense.

[Aleksandr1971]

Technically, you, Saxahorse, are right. But the conduct of constant air watch by strategic bombers was carried out by the Americans for many years and ended in the loss of atomic bombs in Greenland. However, this was only an excuse for abandoning such duty. The main reason is too expensive. Even for Americans. Moreover, such a thing will not be pulled by Russia. For her money turned into accounts, in the villas and yachts of our oligarchs in the West. Therefore, the proposed option will not work.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Saxahorse

The article is curious, thanks to the author for the topic raised!

By the way, the author for some reason does not like KR very much. Apparently, therefore, he did not consider the option of combat duty on the carrier in the air. And this option gives an additional bonus in the form of an unexpected attack direction with a significant number of missiles. It’s obviously impossible to drag the ICBMs over thousands of kilometers, and even into the other hemisphere. This simplifies the work of enemy missile defense.

Not at all, but they impress me more as non-nuclear weapons:

Nuclear submarines - carriers of cruise missiles: reality and prospects - https://topwar.ru/153714-atomnye-podvodnye-lodki-nositeli-krylatyh-raket-realnost-i-perspektivy.html

Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons - https://topwar.ru/161030-strategicheskie-konvencionalnye-sily-nositeli-i-vooruzhenie.html


Air watch is certainly an interesting thing, but it doesn’t make much sense with the Kyrgyz Republic - their range is not enough to hit targets on the territory of the continental states, and the carrier is likely to be shot down outside the borders of the Russian Federation - the potential enemy has too much power.

The main scenario that I am considering is the first nuclear strike against us, after which our offensive capabilities will be reduced by orders of magnitude. Yes, and the Kyrgyz Republic itself is easy enough to intercept. It must be understood that in the event of a conflict, everything that can be taken into the air will be taken just to intercept them.


The US missile defense system will certainly evolve into a global system, so it will not matter where it goes from:

Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense after 2030: intercept thousands of warheads - https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle-2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html

[Saxahorse]

Quote: AVM

Duty in the air is certainly an interesting thing, but it doesn’t make much sense with the Kyrgyz Republic - their range is not enough to hit targets on the territory of the continental states, and the carrier is likely to be shot down outside the borders of the Russian Federation

It is difficult to agree on the short range of the KR, 2-2.5 thousand km. it's serious enough to reach half of America. As for the "immediately knocked down" is a moot point, if you defiantly hang out on the borders of the enemy's 12-mile zone, then probably yes. They will get air defense missiles and the interceptors will accompany them. However, if you are polite, for 500-1000 kilometers, then the enemy will immediately have a problem. Missiles will not reach and constant escort at such distances is extremely problematic for fighters. Again, you can work on a quick release and launch of ammunition, because our task is to have time to respond to the enemy's nuclear strike, it will not be easy for the enemy to simultaneously destroy a dozen strategists over the world's oceans. The plane is not a submarine, everything is open in the air, an attack on any of them will immediately become known to everyone.

Although of course you need to think about the aircraft for such a task. Something inexpensive to operate and with a long range is needed.

[adept666]

And this option gives an additional bonus in the form of an unexpected attack direction with a significant number of missiles.

It does not give anything good except adventure to its fifth point. In order to launch the missile carrier into distant distances, the missile carrier must reach a point with predetermined coordinates. In the mode of such a "watch" he will have to hang out there non-stop, surrounded by the enemy aircraft on duty. He will not even have time to launch one rocket as he will be cut off. Plus, they will shoot down the rocket itself (it's just a tasty treat at the time of reset and the engine is turned on). These coordinates have a rather narrow range, since the GOS is programmed for them in advance at the aerodrome. Therefore, during a big H ... he must quickly take off, jump out to these coordinates before the enemy's duty unit, shoot back and dump. This is how the "unexpected direction of attack" mode is realized.

Drag ICBMs away thousands of kilometers

In principle, it is not necessary, the ICBM has a wider range of launch points, since it can use astro correction. But it is also pointless, it is better to put 2 Yars pieces on duty or Sarmat instead of this perversion. And better than that and that from the heels ... There are not many good missiles

[Saxahorse]

Quote: adept666

These coordinates have a fairly narrow range since the GOS is programmed for them in advance at the airport. Therefore, during a big Ch ... he must quickly fly up, jump out into these coordinates before the enemy’s duty line

Come on! And why then do all sorts of GLONASS and GPS-s invent? Again, we are talking about alert duty, how can you "quickly take off"? Not to mention the "duty link" 1000 km from the coast. Fighters in such a unit should be at least as big as B-52s, otherwise there will not be enough fuel for a watch for several hours .. :)

[adept666]

Come on! And why then all sorts of GLONASS-s and GPS-s invent?

When the Axes appeared and the X-55 there was no satellite positioning - time, second - all this was jammed quite efficiently and the third all this is actually more for high-precision weapons, and not for products with special warheads - three. Yes, for some areas it is used in modern products to correct the accumulation of errors in the inertial system (especially in complex areas such as a water mirror), but not as the main means of guidance.

Again, we are talking about alert duty, how can you "quickly take off"?

From the airfields of the EU ...

Not to mention the "duty link" 1000 km from the coast.

Yeah, that's why there are a large number of airdromes built around our country (Europe, Japan, South Korea, the USA (Alaska)), and there is still some refueling in the air. There is space reconnaissance, constantly flapping AWACS aircraft, ground and ship tracking stations. After the fact of the takeoff of our strategists is established, they are taken for escort, the possible routes are calculated, we actually do not have as many routes as you think. There is a window period when we can shoot back and get on the skis until the moment of interception, but the window is not so wide.

Fighters in such a link should be no smaller than B-52, otherwise there will not be enough fuel on duty for several hours.

This is not required, they take off according to the intelligence-based analytical center. information, so ours and fly watching who, when and where in various ways goes to interception. On the other hand, they are not fools either and know their own and our strengths / weaknesses. The game of cat and mouse.

[Saxahorse]

I did not understand what you ultimately wanted to say. Jam Bomber 1000 km from its shore - what will they be? Yes, satellite plus inertia, the Kyrgyz Republic knows where to fly, where you can touch the ground and determine the area.

And again, we are talking about combat duty with combat, nuclear missiles in the air. What take-off? What kind of escort? Pecks towards the type show interception and back to base. There are no fighters with the same range as a strategist.

[adept666]

I did not understand what you ultimately wanted to say. Jam Bomber 1000 km from its shore - what will they be?

I want to say that in addition to theoretical numbers there is a reality - these are actually the geographical borders of states, the terrain, as well as geographical latitude and longitude. And so that you understand if you are looking at a map, then you need to look not at the sweep of the globe, but at the globe itself and then it will become clear that even the north is not 1000 km for us. There the corridor to the Atlantic is only about 700 km, given the distance between Svalbard and the coast of Norway. So, if you look at the map, you will see that from the north-west and from the west and south-west, as soon as our strategist approaches the border, there are no 1000 km there to his main goals and he is already in real accessibility of both aviation and enemy fleet. The same picture is in the east. Shoot the kp with specials. A warhead from its territory, and even more so on duty with them in the air above its territory, is strong ... Especially in the densely populated western part of Russia, while spending valuable motor resources, it is unclear what and endangering half of the country.

And again, we are talking about combat duty with combat, nuclear missiles in the air. What take-off? What kind of escort?

Firstly, there is a PTB, secondly, additional airborne corrections, thirdly, they change along the route of our aircraft, some of them intercepted from the Baltic, others replaced them from Norway. The hand of a modern fighter allows you to keep strategists at a distance of at least 800 km, and if desired, more.

There are no fighters with the same range as a strategist.

I wrote above why this is not required.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: adept666

Especially in the densely populated western part of Russia

And why do not you like Kamchatka and the Pacific Ocean? And from Murmansk to the Atlantic is not so far.

Quote: adept666

The hand of a modern fighter allows you to keep strategists at a distance of at least 800 km

The air-to-air missile range is a maximum of 80-120 km. And she will fly for about five minutes. Fighter range of 2000 km approximately. With the PTB there will be 3000 km, it will just fly to the patrol line and then back. What is the escort here? Let me remind you that the range of the same Tu-95 is 12-15 thousand km. Half a ball. From Kamchatka to Venezuela or from Murmansk to Cuba - easily. And organizing such a patrol every second is unrealistic.

[adept666]

And why do not you like Kamchatka and the Pacific Ocean?

The fact that everything is blocked there by Alaska, Japan and South Korea.

The air-to-air missile range is a maximum of 80-120 km. And she will fly for about five minutes. Fighter range of 2000 km approximately. With the PTB there will be 3000 km, it will just fly to the patrol line and then back.

Once again, I suggest you look at the globe and measure real distances - there is such a function in the same Google Earth. You theorize with numbers without real reference to the terrain, borders and possible goals of our strategists from the Kyrgyz Republic. You can wander over the Pacific Ocean pointless because within a radius of 3500 km there will be no goal for you.

What is the escort here?

He will not be where there is no threat to NATO countries. And where it is accompanied as much as possible by the methods that I wrote about above. And it is. And they have much more resources to provide it.

From Kamchatka to Venezuela or from Murmansk to Cuba - easily.

We have to ensure the safety of such duty least there is no smallness ... of the ocean fleet.

And organizing such a patrol every second is unrealistic.

1: Such patrolling is not realistic. Our strategic air fleet will have enough of a three-year resource in these situations, and that's all. 2 It is meaningless - there are no real goals for the Kyrgyz Republic (and there is no way to provide them with CCs anyway) 3: It is dangerous, there are no resources to support it from the water or from the air despite the loss of such a side somewhere in the Pacific Ocean for over 4 thousand km from the coast, the threat of both the fact that technology and secrets will go to the enemy and the danger of environmental disaster. Our do not fly in scheduled flights with the KR equipped with special. Warhead - no fools. Well, in those areas where all these three points are not relevant, they accompany us on a regular basis.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: adept666

The fact that everything is blocked there by Alaska, Japan and South Korea.

Well, I'm sorry .. Now I advise you to look at the globe.

[Knell wardenheart]

In my opinion, all this is useless fantasy and another dispersal of resources on the topic of "aircraft + missiles". As the author noted, the creation of such a system is an expensive hemorrhoid, which generally does not promise anything that will multiply our security, especially since the stability of this system at the first blow to us is even more doubtful ..
Given the saturation of our adversary with multilevel missile defense systems - and economic resources incomparable with ours - I think that countering our move would be in the spirit of a general modernization of the US missile defense, and would not require any cardinal alterations and significant R&D.
On our part, of course, this would be a long and economically expensive path associated with the separation of resources from drones, fighters, the fleet, and the ground component of strategic nuclear forces.

Unfortunately, I increasingly notice that the general tone of many authors drifts further and further away from real DEFENSE and the associated economy, towards some kind of epic festival of sophisticated assured destruction (or attempt). For all the gloomy aesthetics of such an action, I want to note that missile defense and air defense technologies, as well as network-centric and satellite components for solutions related to them, are now developing much more dynamically than the good old "big-fat-super-powerful-missiles. from-land-from-under-water-and-from-planes. " So in the foreseeable future, we may well face the fact that a significant proportion of our missile solutions can be leveled out - before the start, at the start, during, at the acceleration stage, and so on. Developments in hypersonic interceptors, saturation of satellite constellations, laser missile defense - all this is underway, and good money is being attracted for all of this.

[BREAKTHROUGH READY]

If the idea of ​​air deployment of ballistic missiles of the strategic deterrence forces can be called monstrous, then the use of transport aircraft to launch cruise missiles in the concept of a "rapid global strike" can be considered a quite sensible concept.

[Undecim]

Author, all this has already happened. It was called ALBM - air-launched ballistic missile.

High Virgo - USA, 1958.

[Undecim]

Bold Orion - USA, 1959.

[Undecim]

GAM-87 Skybolt - USA, UK, 1962. This rocket even succeeded. Although, too, like the two previous ones, I did not go beyond the tests. But it provoked a serious scandal between Britain and the United States.
The development of ICBMs on all these projects put an end to. True, there is information that the Chinese decided to try.

[Undecim]

As for launching ICBMs from a transport aircraft, in the early 1970s, the U.S. Air Force tested the Minuteman 1b ICBM air launch from a C-5A transport aircraft and made sure that this was possible.

But the project did not receive development.
So the author’s ideas are a well-forgotten old.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Undecim

So the author’s ideas are a well-forgotten old.

Thanks for the selection of project images. I considered them, but did not publish everything, I limited myself to a brief mention that such work was being carried out, the article had already proliferated

[Aleksandr1971]

Cool selection! Thanks, Undecim.
Why not use unmanned airships for airborne ICBMs? Place them in the middle of the country. No NATO aircraft will reach them. "Tridents" and "Minutemans" will not get them either. And it will cost a hundred times less than placing ICBMs on airplanes. The indestructible weapon of the second strike! It would seem fantastic, but why not count it?

[Undecim]

Absolute weapons do not exist. Therefore, an invulnerable airship - launcher - is an illusion.
Try to calculate at least the height at which it should be placed.

[Aleksandr1971]

The height of such airships should exclude the defeat of MANPADS, that is, 3-5 km. maximum. For other means of destruction, airships with ICBMs will be invulnerable. Minutemans and Tridents will not reach them because the airship with ICBMs, like the mobile GRK Yars or Topol-M, will also move a little, and unlike the latter, without the risk of running into a sabotage group. The vulnerabilities of such airships will be only: 1) carelessness of control operators, who can lose the airship due to weather conditions; 2) malware. But other components of strategic nuclear forces also have such risks (indifference and software).

[Undecim]

3-5 km. maximum.
6-7 km minimum.

[Aleksandr1971]

Even if it’s 6-7 km., All the same, the idea needs calculations, it can be implemented. Indeed, in other aspects, there will be mostly pluses

[Nikolaevich I]

Are those tunnels new? Shtoto Authors more and more often undertake to "pour from empty to empty ..."! The topic: "Air Launch ICBMs" was popular in the second half of the last century ... This topic was vigorously dealt with both in the USA and in the USSR ... And it ended with the fact that "both the USA and the USSR" spat on this the topic and pounded ... There were more minuses than pluses! Not too long ago, at the VO, "some" topic related to ICBMs was discussed ... (maybe ... like: The expediency of creating a BZHRK? Disguise of a PGRK? ...) and then, in the commentary, I recalled the topic "ICBM air launch "... How I was" waxed "then ... some" tovarischi "! From all over the Internet, from all Internet archives, they raked out "critical materials" on this topic, and they whipped me in "joyful excitement"! Therefore, now I do not want to participate in the discussion ... But I'm waiting! Ay, those same "tovarischi"! Where are you ? "A new victim" has appeared ... (Andrey Mitrofanov ...)! Show your critical eloquence class! Do you have enough "paraffin"?

[Igor E.]

Under the current state system, it is impossible to develop what kind of development, it has been proved by the last 20 years! We must change the system along with the beneficiaries from it! And only then put not cartoony but real plans for the development of the country as a whole!

[Nameless]

Here it is, a miracle Yudo came out called "a fighter with the regime" ... but I naively thought that at least one article with comments from people really knowledgeable in the topic without you I could easily read ...

[Old Michael]

There is a critical omission in the article that casts doubt on the subsequent reasoning and conclusions.
To maintain a ballistic missile in readiness for combat use, preparation for launch and launch itself, a number of systems are required - from power supply and TVR to protection against unauthorized access. It all fits on the launcher and weighs like a cast-iron bridge.
So, focusing on a Yars-type missile, it is worth taking into account the mass of PU PGRK without a chassis. And it will be far beyond 50 tons. To them will have to add ASBU equipment with workplaces of combat crew. This is still a whole KUNG both in volume and in mass.
In short - you need a carrier like Ruslan.

[Operator]

Quote: Ka-52

American strategic aviation duty facts? And what side is it to our Russian reality?

The airborne flight of American strategic aircraft with nuclear weapons on board is indeed irrelevant to the Soviet rogue strategic aviation

[agond]

Quote: Operator

The airborne flight of American strategic aviation with nuclear weapons on board is indeed irrelevant to the Soviet rogue strategic aviation

They drove a B-52 with bombs along our borders, that is, far from our territory, and we have to carry rockets over our territory in an airplane, and if it falls .. this is what such an idea might come to mind.

[Operator]

All American bombers with nuclear bombs on board crashed during the air watch on the borders of NATO countries: one fell on American territory (Florida), the second on Spanish (Palomares) and the third on Danish (Greenland).

[Angry]

Well, why compare like that. After Khrushchev, her scraps remained from the SA, and as it turned out over time, he was right to direct all the efforts of our impoverished country to ICBMs. Against which the United States had no weapons either then or even now. Then they whined about the START I Treaty. About their ABM countries on the continent, in general, nothing is heard, except perhaps the ABM on the BNK. So this is also not quite a hard surface, etc., etc. And it makes sense to develop the SA only after the next military-technical revolution, when it will receive small-sized air-based ICBMs, with a launch range of 1 km and in the size of the existing ALCMs, and even with one small-sized warhead of a megaton class. Which also need to be developed. Then each strategist turns into a serious force, even with the death of most of the SA at the airfields. Of course, sooner or later they will appear, the entire history of weapons is an example of this. And the hope for the SA with the ALCM is a chimera .... we may release it, but "for now and if" they reach the goal .... we all will not know this already ...

[Interdum_silentium_volo]

What if REPRESENT
We have 30 ready-made armed Tu-160s out of 10 constantly in the air on patrol (which means they are not able to get under a sudden disarming strike), 10 at aerodromes with a high degree of readiness are able to fly into the air almost immediately, and then again get out of the disarming strike. Well, 10 on the scheduled maintenance, but capable in difficult times to switch to standby mode.
And we have at least 20 strategists capable of striking carriers carrying 240 missiles with a radius of 5,5 thousand kilometers and nuclear warheads capable of destroying the city. This at least completely solves the problems on the continent. European Theater, East.
And the guys on another continent have some other "gifts".
And why does this arrangement not suit the author ?!

[timokhin-aa]

The above allows us to consider that in the context of resistance to a sudden disarming strike, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is practically useless, and this cannot be changed.

And why did the Americans do not have the whole XB, and Andrew?

[Aleksandr1971]

Because it was the Americans, not us, who planned the sudden disarming strike. After this strike, our air defense and missile defense system would have been largely destroyed. And then the B-52 and "Spirits" could freely search and beat the targets remaining on our territory.

[agond]

The idea of ​​air-based ballistic missiles is very complex, dangerous, expensive and ineffective, because you can’t drag a large missile into the plane, you can’t build a bunker for the Tu-160, all the planes are visible, the airfields themselves are on our territory. It would be more reasonable to transfer strategic nuclear forces from their land to water, or rather, under water, and most importantly for any, instead of 10 large aircraft with one small missile, it is better to have one small submarine with one large missile

[timokhin-aa]

No, not therefore, they had an incident when NORAD showed a massive attack from the USSR. By the time they figured out that this was a malfunction, like after seven minutes of everything, they were already raising the bombers from the standby forces on readiness into the air with bombs, moreover, along with refuellers.
This was done as part of a retaliatory strike and not as a preventive one.

[pavelty]

Tin what "take off in a few minutes" .. 76 has one engine, how long does it take to start?

[storm]

The Russian fleet has actually been locked up in bases, we don’t have enough forces and means even to provide anti-submarine defense of strategic nuclear submarine patrol sites, and building a powerful fleet requires enormous financial resources and considerable time, an alternative way to develop strategic nuclear forces is needed to compensate for these problems.

The number of strategic nuclear submarines should be limited to 8 units. Northwind / Northwind And of which:
- 3 units must be constantly on alert under the cover of at least 6 Yasen-M multipurpose nuclear submarines
- 3 units. in standby mode
- 2 units undergoing repairs, tech. maintenance, modernization

Using the "reserve" available to Russia for the deployment of additional 200 launch vehicles (START-3 allows to have 800 launch vehicles, 700 of which are deployed and 100 units in storage), by reducing the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces for the Strategic Missile Forces, to launch the production of 200 Kurier-2 ICBMs »In container design with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 300 kTn.
Since the patrol places of the Yars PGRK, as well as the strategic nuclear submarines Borey, are under the constant "sight" of the United States, the redeployment of 200 containers by truck tractors, railway the composition, the forces of military aviation with the appropriate level of secrecy will remain completely unnoticed by the United States and NATO, which should significantly affect the combat stability of the Strategic Missile Forces and their ability to retaliate.

[agond]

If as an option to imagine that on Nova Zemlya a single-track railway was laid along a closed route with a length of for example 100 km, every 3 km land-based shelter tunnels, cars with BZHRK were launched along the road, if there are shelters, it will not even be possible to determine the exact number of cars, by the way in winter bad weather and visibility drops to 1 m,

[iouris]

Asks in the book: how does the airborne deployment affect the combat readiness of the "component" and what is the cost of operation? Something suggests that the answer will be unsatisfactory.
What is the duration of preparation "on alert" of the aviation regiment in the DA, a day, two?

[G. Georgiev]

absolute nonsense. ICBMs by plane. 2 great expensive targets in one hit. That's why there are submarines like Ohio with 154 Tomahawks. What is the problem of putting the X-101 in a similar number of Russian submarines or in combination with ICBMs.