The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

As we indicated in previous materials, throughout the newest stories The United States sought to break nuclear parity with the USSR (Russia). If they had their plan, it is highly likely that we would no longer be able to discuss the consequences of this. There are well-founded fears that the United States is still actively considering scenarios for obtaining a unilateral advantage in the field of strategic weapons for the final solution of the "Russian question".

The first milestone in this matter is the US withdrawal from the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles, due to which it can be created and deployed sudden disarm weapon. This weapon it is necessary so that the missile attack warning system (SPRN) of Russia does not have time to react, as a result of which the retaliatory strike will be disrupted, and the retaliatory strike will be significantly weakened - thousands of warheads will turn into hundreds, or even tens.

The second milestone is the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) agreement of 1972. In the medium term, the United States could deploy a missile defense system that could theoretically intercept thousands of warheads. Such a system is guaranteed to be able to intercept hundreds of warheads, even taking into account the use of anti-missile defense systems.

How can the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) of Russia evolve in order to ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike in the medium term, for example, from 2030 to 2050?

How many nuclear charges and their carriers are needed?

At the end of the previous article on the topic, the words of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Richard Deloyer, which he said during the Cold War era and the SDI program that, given the unlimited build-up of Soviet nuclear warheads, any missile defense system would be inoperative, are given. However, now our nuclear arsenal is limited by START III, which will end on February 5, 2021.

So how many nuclear charges can be considered sufficient? At the peak of the Cold War, the USSR and the United States together had more than 100 nuclear weapons. Moreover, at present, the total number of charges in the USSR and the USA is an order of magnitude less - about 000 units.

The dynamics of changes in the number of nuclear charges in the USSR / RF and USA

What criteria affect the number of charges that we need to strike back? It’s the reciprocal one, since the reciprocating one may not take place due to the application of the USA a sudden disarming strike with medium-range ballistic missiles (BRRS) or hypersonic missiles with a flight time of about 5-10 minutes, which may not be enough for the SPRN reaction.

There are two main criteria: the number of charges that will survive when an adversary strikes, and the number of charges that can then overcome the missile defense system and cause unacceptable damage to the enemy. A sufficient number of charges is disproportionately associated with a sufficient number of carriers - 1500 warheads on 1500 carriers are 3 times more difficult to destroy with a sudden disarming strike than 1500 warheads on 500 carriers. Accordingly, the type of carrier also partially determines the vulnerability of warheads to the missile defense system.

Based on this, we will first try to determine the optimal type of carriers for the ground, air and sea components of the strategic nuclear forces, based on their resistance to a sudden disarming strike.

Ground component of strategic nuclear forces

We considered in detail the capabilities and effectiveness of the air component of the strategic nuclear forces in the article Sunset of the Nuclear Triad? Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces. In short, it can be summarized that the capabilities of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces in the current form will gradually decrease. The exponential development of the enemy’s satellite constellations will allow it to track in real time the mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) of the “Topol” and “Yars” types, and it is possible that the military rail-missile systems (BZHRK), if the latter are nevertheless will be developed and adopted. Given the lack of resistance to nuclear shock in mobile systems, their fate becomes unenviable. At the same time, ICBMs located in stationary highly protected mines can be destroyed during sudden disarming strike high-precision warheads with a nuclear warhead.

How can a ground component evolve? Let us first consider mobile complexes.

Mobile systems: PGRK and BZHRK

In order to ensure high secrecy of the PGRK, and, accordingly, to ensure survival after the enemy inflicts a sudden disarming strike, their appearance should become indistinguishable from any civilian, widespread technique. First of all, it is about heavy-duty long cars. This decision is most justified, since it had already been worked out under the theme of PGRK 15P159 Courier with a 15Zh59 rocket.

As one of the possible ICBM carriers, the MAZ-15 truck tractor with the MAZ-159 semi-trailer was considered under the PGRK 6422P9389 Courier topic. The range of ICBM PGRK "Courier" was to be more than 10 km.

Image of the proposed Courier PGRK and the MAZ-6422 tractor unit with the MAZ-9389 semi-trailer selected as the base for the Courier PGRK

Such a complex is quite capable of being lost among many thousands of trucks on a million kilometers of Russian roads, even despite continuous tracking from satellites in real time.

The total length of the Russian road network as of 2013 was estimated by Rosstat at 1 kilometers, including 396 kilometers of paved

At the end of 2019, there are 18 Topol-M PGRKs and 120 RS-24 Yars PGRK in the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, it can be assumed that they will need to deploy about 150-200 courier-type PGRKs to replace them. If there are three warheads per ICBM, the total number of nuclear warheads (NWF) on them will be about 450-600 units.

With BZHRK situation is more complicated. Despite the enormous length of Russian railways, it will be easier to track a train (train) leaving the base than one or more trucks. In addition, it is likely that the enemy’s reconnaissance structures can lay specialized reconnaissance and signaling devices (RSP) in the ground near the railway, which can detect signs of the presence of a nuclear charge in the train — for example, weak radioactive radiation, or specific ground vibration due to suspension features, electromagnetic radiation. To implement the same thing on public roads is much more difficult because of their much greater branching, compared with railways.

In 2018, the operational length of the public railway network of Russia is 85,5 thousand kilometers

On the other hand, the railroad track is better controlled and maintained compared to public roads i.e. bookmarks can be timely detected, destroyed or altered. The train itself can accommodate several dozen ICBMs + auxiliary units and security forces, which makes it comparable in combat power to a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

Article Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons considered the possibility of creating a non-nuclear BZHRK designed to deliver massive strikes with precision weapons with a non-nuclear warhead. The best option would be to create a version of the BZHRK, in which the chassis of wagons carrying weapons, security wagons, heat and electric locomotives, navigation, communications and so on could be unified. Detection by an adversary of BZHRK with ICBMs will be significantly more difficult for the adversary if a similar amount of BZHRK with high-precision conventional carriers will be deployed.

The projected Barguzin BZHRK was supposed to have 14 cars, of which only three were supposed to be with ICBMs.

Infographics BZHRK "Barguzin"

The mass of Yars ICBMs is about 47 tons, for a promising missile this mass may be even less. The carrying capacity of modern railway cars is an average of 70 tons - most likely this will be enough to accommodate ICBMs and a lifting and launching device for it. The total mass of such a freight car is about 100 tons. Since the beginning of 2017, 88,7 thousand trains weighing from 6000 to 8050 tons and 3659 trains weighing more than 8050 tons were carried out on the Russian Railways network.

Mass and size characteristics of some freight cars

According to another source, a standard train can include up to 110 freight cars, on average about 75 cars, which is completely correlated with the above data on the mass of cars and railway trains.

To increase the efficiency of camouflage, the BZHRK by the number of cars should be comparable with the most common railway trains. Even if approximately half of the 75 cars are auxiliary, this is up to 35-40 ICBMs per train. 3 warheads per missile - there will be 105-120 nuclear warheads per one BZHRK. For 10 compositions, 350-400 carriers or 1050-1200 nuclear warheads will fall.

Of course, an increase in the number of carriers on one BZHRK increases the risk of their destruction by the first blow, but here we can give an analogy with SSBNs. If for SSBNs it makes sense to reduce the size, to reduce the likelihood of its detection, then the BZHRK is logical to disguise as the freight trains that are most common, and these are freight trains of 75 wagons. To reduce the visibility of the BZHRK, auxiliary cars can be masked, for example, fuel cars like acid tanks, security and control cars for “hopper” freight cars. At the basing point or nodal points of the route, it is possible to reconnect the cars to distort the radar and optical signature of the BZHRK.

Wagon for transportation of chemically active substances and hopper car

What are the main disadvantages of PGRK and BZHRK? First of all, it is the fact that the enemy’s lack of information about their location will lead to the logical assumption that they are hidden in places where trucks and trains are concentrated, which in turn can be located near large settlements. Thus, there is a risk of exposing the civilian population to a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, which in any case will be delivered using nuclear warheads.

Truck parking and train parking

The second drawback is reduced anti-terrorism security, and for truck-based PGRCs there is also an increased risk of a regular car accident. However, these issues can most likely be resolved by the competent organization of routes, special security and the presence of quick response groups.

ICBM Mine Missile Systems

The main advantage of silo-based ICBMs is their almost complete invulnerability to conventional weapons. At least from the existing one. Theoretically, in the distant future, the defeat of protected mines can be realized. non-nuclear kinetic warheads launched from space from maneuvering orbital spacecraft or by hypersonic weapons. But such weapons are unlikely to be created in quantities that could pose a threat to strategic nuclear forces in the next few decades.

Projects of promising American hypersonic kinetic weapons

However, if it is nevertheless created, it will require the adoption of radical decisions to ensure the capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces to strike back, which we will return to in another article. In the meantime, we will believe that only a high-precision nuclear charge can ensure guaranteed defeat for a protected missile mine in the United States.

What does this tell us? Yes, considering the agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the deployment of all nuclear weapons of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in highly protected mines, at the rate of 1 nuclear warhead per carrier, a U.S. surprise disarmament becomes impossible. To do this, they must concentrate their entire nuclear arsenal at a distance of no more than 1-2000 km from the locations of Russian mines with ICBMs (to ensure the surprise of the strike), and spend on their destruction all of their rapidly deployed nuclear units. It should be borne in mind that to destroy one ICBM with a probability of 3000, two W-0,95 charges with a capacity of 88 kilotons are needed. However, if there is a missile defense, the United States can take the risk and use one W-475 warhead per mine ICBM, with a probability of destruction of 88.

One UGM-133A Trident II missile can carry up to 8 W-88 warheads with a capacity of 475 kilotons or up to 14 W76 warheads with a capacity of 100 kilotons

Of course, no one will do it. Even if we assume that not all mines will be hit, and some of the Russian missiles will be able to take off, but they will be intercepted by the US missile defense system, there is a far non-zero risk that the same China will inflict a nuclear strike on the disarmed USA, which will understand what will happen next after Russia the target. There is really one trick that the United States may resort to. For example, under the agreement (START IV?), Deploy carriers with a reduced number of warheads, and then increase their number due to the return potential - nuclear warheads located in storage facilities.

Based on this, in order to increase the survival of the Russian strategic nuclear forces against the threat of a sudden disarming strike, the US strategic nuclear forces should have more targets than they can cover with their warheads. How to implement this?

One of the methods is the creation of a unified ICBM such as YRS, which will be the same for mines, PGRK and BZHRK. Something like a missile complex "Courier" at a new technological level.

The number of nuclear warheads on a promising ICBM should be no more than three, and ideally one nuclear warhead per carrier. In the second case, the place of two nuclear warheads should be taken by heavy false targets, which include active means of breaking through missile defense. Unfortunately, in the end, everything depends on the cost of creating media. Nevertheless, the difference between 500 ICBMs with three nuclear warheads and 1500 ICBMs with one nuclear warhead will be noticeable, not to mention the large ratios.

Another way is to implement measures to create an excess of silo launchers (silos). At the same time, on one ICBM with three nuclear warheads there should be two spare operational silos, with all the means of protection. You can argue that it will be prohibitively expensive? This is an open question, since the prices for ICBMs, NFCs and silos are reliably unknown, everything has to be considered with a certain amount of speculation. After all, silos for ICBMs are an extremely long-term investment.

The cover of the launch shaft of the R-36M missile and the exit from the silos of the Topol-M ICBM

Reserve silos should be placed at a distance that excludes their defeat of one enemy nuclear warhead. Installing ICBMs in silos or changing silos should be carried out under the cover of smoke screens containing aerosols that impede the operation of optical, thermal and radar means of satellite intelligence of the enemy.

Reserve silos do not have to be empty. They can accommodate appropriately modified launchers (launchers) of anti-aircraft missiles or missile defense, which in this case will be fully protected from conventional weapons. From time to time a “thimble game” may be carried out, with the rearrangement of containers with anti-ballistic missiles and ICBMs from mine to mine, under the cover of a smoke screen, which will further confuse enemy intelligence.

Missile defense can be placed in silos in containers visually similar to ICBMs

The next factor of unmasking should be false shafts, which are a complete visual imitation of the silo cover. To ensure the concealment of their essence, the construction of both real and false mines should be carried out in a similar way, for example, under fast-erected hangars, while it is necessary to simulate the movement of special equipment and the movement of personnel.

What should all this lead to? Moreover, the United States is highly likely to be unable to find out which mine the real ICBM is located in, even if over time they can weed out the false mines. This means that to destroy 900 nuclear warheads in 300 Russian ICBMs with a probability of 0,95, the United States will have to spend 600 nuclear warheads if they know exactly the silos with real ICBMs. Or 1800 nuclear warheads, in case they cannot determine which of the three reserve mines the ICBMs are currently located. The presence of false shafts will make the task of delivering a sudden disarming strike even more difficult.

How will START IV be respected in terms of the number of deployed charges, if any? We negotiate home areas with the USA. Only one or two roads lead to each district; at the entrance to the United States, they can control the number of missiles and warheads under the agreement - they can even set up a stationary post. And in the most closed territory, they have nothing to do, which will save the intrigue with the placement of ICBMs in a particular mine.

What most likely does not need the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is heavy missiles to replace the RS-20 ICBM Voevoda (Satan), that is, the Sarmat ICBM currently under development. Complicated, expensive, with a large number of nuclear warheads on one ICBM, they will be a priority for the United States in the course of their application sudden disarming strike. According to RBC insurance for one launch of Topol or Yars ICBMs is about 295 thousand rubles, and insurance for one launch of the promising Sarmat ICBM will cost more than 5,2 million rubles. Even taking into account the fact that Sarmat ICBM is a new development, and insurance rates for it are probably overstated, the difference is 18 times impressive. Hopefully, in terms of the cost of the products themselves, the difference between Yars ICBMs and Sarmat ICBMs will not be so enormous.

ICBM “Voevoda” (“Satan”) and ICBM (Topol-M). The sizes of Sarmat ICBMs and Yars ICBMs will also be roughly correlated

Conclusions

Speaking about the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces, it can be assumed that ICBMs in highly protected silos will have the maximum probability of sustaining a sudden disarming strike, provided that one carrier (ICBM) is available for one nuclear warhead, or the real situation of ICBMs with three nuclear warheads is unclear due to the construction of reserve and false mines, as well as the subsequent rotation of ICBMs between reserve mines under cover of camouflage means. The most practical solution would be to deploy two nuclear warheads and one heavy missile defense penetration weapon on one ICBM, with the creation of at least one reserve mine for each ICBM. In this case, it is possible to increase the nuclear potential by 1/3 as soon as possible by placing the return potential on the ICBM - the third nuclear warhead.

The mobile ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can remain in demand only if the PGRK is created, indistinguishable from civilian trucks. At the same time, the risks relative to the PGRK will in any case be higher, since if its location is disclosed, it can be destroyed by both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which is almost impossible for ICBMs in highly protected silos.

The creation of the BZHRK is an even more risky task, since the railway network is much less extensive and extensive in comparison with the road network. In addition, railway trains of 75 wagons are optimal from the point of view of secrecy. On the one hand, this allows them to carry about 35-40 ICBMs with 105-120 nuclear warheads, which makes the ALCC comparable in firepower to SSBNs, on the other hand, this allows the enemy to cover the same 105-120 nuclear warheads with just one of their nuclear warheads. And the visibility in the radar range of the railway train of 75 cars may be too high, which will allow the enemy to track the BZHRK in real time immediately after leaving the base. Also, a strike on the BZHRK can be inflicted by conventional forces and / or enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups.

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that the most promising deterrent, in terms of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces, should be promising unified solid-fuel ICBMs in protected silos, with an excess of deployed reserve silos. Their relative amount in the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be 80-95%.

The reserve mines should be equipped with missile defense systems to defeat the enemy’s space echelon and missile defense.

The second element of the ground component of strategic nuclear forces should be PGRK disguised as trucks, which will be extremely difficult to track even with advanced satellite reconnaissance capabilities capable of operating in real time. The advanced PGRK missile should be unified with ICBMs deployed in silos. Their relative amount in the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be 5–20%.

The basis for a single unified ICBM of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can be a product based on the 15Zh59 missile, which is being developed as part of the theme for the creation of the PURK 15P159 Courier.

In the next article, we will consider the possible directions for the evolution of the air and sea components of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, evaluate which component of the strategic nuclear forces is most optimal in the medium term, and see what can be saved.

Comments

[Ruslan]

I remember reading about such an idea. place ballistic missiles in lakes. here it will be more difficult to observe. or like the Chinese, rummage through all the mountains and cram them pgrk)))
Well, satellites blind with something. lasers there or reb, purely over their territory.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ruslan

I remember reading about such an idea. place ballistic missiles in lakes. here it will be more difficult to observe. or like the Chinese, rummage through all the mountains and cram them pgrk)))
Well, satellites blind with something. lasers there or reb, purely over their territory.

You can’t blind and hide.
Contracts prohibit ...

[Fan-fan]

Ruslan correctly reminded of missiles launched from underwater containers, it is problematic to detect a container with ICBMs under water. And there are plenty of such places in the Caspian, the Caspian does not freeze. Lake Baikal freezes, so in winter there may be a problem with such ICBMs. Why did the author not consider this possibility?

[Guest147]

The first milestone in this matter is the US withdrawal from the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles

Such a weapon is necessary so that the missile attack warning system (EWS) of Russia does not have time to react

Not necessary.





When firing ICBMs on a flat trajectory, flight time is very short. For example, when shooting a Trident 2 ICBM at a range of 1850 km, the flight time will be 7 minutes (and at a range of 3000 km - 10 minutes). At the same time, the height of apogee will not exceed 60 km. Such a range allows shelling targets deep in Russia directly from the Barents Sea.

[Guest147]

Such a system is guaranteed to be able to intercept hundreds of warheads, even taking into account the use of anti-missile defense systems.

In 2015, the General Designer of the Academician V. P. Makeev State Missile Center published an article entitled “Directions for Improving Strategic Nuclear Forces under the Conditions of the Development of Missile Defense”.
http://federalbook.ru/files/BEZOPASNOST/soderghanie/NB_2/NB2-2015-Degtyar'.pdf

http://web.archive.org/web/20191208130712/http://federalbook.ru/files/BEZOPASNOST/soderghanie/NB_2/NB2-2015-Degtyar%27.pdf

This article states the following:

In the case of equipping interceptor missiles with multi-object warheads (Multi-Object Kill Vehicle), a missile with a throwable mass of 4,3 tons (Stiletto ICBM) will be required to deliver warheads with a total mass of 0,5 kg to US territory with a probability of 1320.

And if the missile is equipped with neutron warheads, the same missile (Stillet ICBM) will be able to deliver warheads to the United States with a total mass of only 800 kg.

That is, light-class missiles (Yars, Mace) are simply useless.

And mine rockets are extremely vulnerable to a first strike, since their coordinates are known in advance.

Russian nuclear "Dead Hand" recognized useless

The Perimeter Russian complex of automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike (known in the West as the Dead Hand) will only use a limited number of missiles, if necessary, Zvezda weekly the former chief (in 1994-1996) of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces Viktor Yesin.

Colonel General, who participated in international negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons with the United States and on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine in the early 1990s, noted that the Perimeter system was functioning and improved. “But when it works, we will have little money left - we can only launch those missiles that survive after the aggressor’s first strike", - said a military analyst and political scientist.

According to Yesin, in the case of deployment in Europe of medium-range ballistic missiles that violate the current Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF) Americans "will have the opportunity to defeat the bulk of our missile assets deployed in the European part of the country, and intercept the remaining ones on the trajectory of their flight using the missile defense system".
https://lenta.ru/news/2018/11/09/inf/

[Guest147]

It should be borne in mind that in order to destroy one ICBM with a probability of 0,95, two W-88 charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are needed.

Experts talked about a sharp increase in US capabilities in the first nuclear strike

We are talking about equipping the nuclear warheads W76-1 / Mk.4 (power 100 kilotons, installed on Trident II marine missiles) with the new MC4700 super-fuze system. 

The peculiarity of the MC4700 system is that it is able to compensate for a part of misses - “flights” by early blasting of the block at a small height above the target.

As a result, the probability of a 100-kiloton warhead being hit by a protected silo launcher (designed for a blast wave with a pressure of 10 thousand pounds per square inch), according to experts, increases from 0,5 to 0,86. For objects designed for pressures up to two thousand pounds per square inch, the probability increases from 0,83 to almost 0,99.

Thus, experts write, sea-based missile blocks can now be effectively used for counter-force nuclear strikes, including suppressing silo launchers: in the case of Russia, according to their calculations, 272 W76-1 / Mk.4 blocks out of 506 deployed (not counting 384 W88 heavy blocks with a capacity of 455 kilotons, which can be used for other in-depth strategic facilities).

https://lenta.ru/news/2017/03/03/superfuze/

[ccsr]

Quote: Guest147

As a result, the probability of a 100-kiloton warhead being hit by a protected silo launcher (designed for a blast wave with a pressure of 10 thousand pounds per square inch), according to experts, increases from 0,5 to 0,86. For objects designed for pressures up to two thousand pounds per square inch, the probability increases from 0,83 to almost 0,99.

You are apparently still confident that we are not in a position to reveal the preparation of the United States for a nuclear strike, and your delusion gives rise to incorrect conclusions. First, we will reveal the preparation of the United States for war much earlier on a number of intelligence indicators than the first missiles will fly in our direction. Secondly, by the time of the first mass launch of American missiles of any basing, all our SNF duty officers will already have their hands on the key, so they will actually need less time to launch our missiles before the silos are destroyed.
So all the talk that our mines will be amazed even before they get a command to start, to put it mildly, the fantasies of people who do not know how it all works on the scale of all armed forces, including in military intelligence, as a species, and GRU GSH.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Guest147

Such a system is guaranteed to be able to intercept hundreds of warheads, even taking into account the use of anti-missile defense systems.

In 2015, the General Designer of the Academician V. P. Makeev State Missile Center published an article entitled “Directions for Improving Strategic Nuclear Forces under the Conditions of the Development of Missile Defense”.
http://federalbook.ru/files/BEZOPASNOST/soderghanie/NB_2/NB2-2015-Degtyar'.pdf

http://web.archive.org/web/20191208130712/http://federalbook.ru/files/BEZOPASNOST/soderghanie/NB_2/NB2-2015-Degtyar%27.pdf

This article states the following:

In the case of equipping interceptor missiles with multi-object warheads (Multi-Object Kill Vehicle), a missile with a throwable mass of 4,3 tons (Stiletto ICBM) will be required to deliver warheads with a total mass of 0,5 kg to US territory with a probability of 1320.

And if the missile is equipped with neutron warheads, the same missile (Stillet ICBM) will be able to deliver warheads to the United States with a total mass of only 800 kg.

That is, light-class missiles (Yars, Mace) are simply useless.

And mine rockets are extremely vulnerable to a first strike, since their coordinates are known in advance.

Russian nuclear "Dead Hand" recognized useless

The Perimeter Russian complex of automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike (known in the West as the Dead Hand) will only use a limited number of missiles, if necessary, Zvezda weekly the former chief (in 1994-1996) of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces Viktor Yesin.

Colonel General, who participated in international negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons with the United States and on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine in the early 1990s, noted that the Perimeter system was functioning and improved. “But when it works, we will have little money left - we can only launch those missiles that survive after the aggressor’s first strike", - said a military analyst and political scientist.

According to Yesin, in the case of deployment in Europe of medium-range ballistic missiles that violate the current Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF) Americans "will have the opportunity to defeat the bulk of our missile assets deployed in the European part of the country, and intercept the remaining ones on the trajectory of their flight using the missile defense system".
https://lenta.ru/news/2018/11/09/inf/

Again, everything is correct. We just make different conclusions.

1. Promising intelligence tools will track all existing PGRK.
2. The mines must be masked with false and reserve ones, then the USA simply does not have enough funds to completely destroy them (2 charges per mine), even if they know the coordinates of all the mines, but they don’t know which of them has ICBMs.
3. We will return to the breakthrough of missile defense.
4. There will be no neutron warheads, because during a mass launch the first exploding neutron warheads can damage all other missile defense elements, i.e. in fact, she will destroy herself. This was understood back in the days of the SDI.
5. SRC "Makeeva" makes big rockets, it is clear that they are in favor of them. But we won't make many big rockets. And the more nuclear warheads there are, with fewer ICBMs, the higher the chance that there will be simply nothing to retaliate.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Guest147

The first milestone in this matter is the US withdrawal from the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles

Such a weapon is necessary so that the missile attack warning system (EWS) of Russia does not have time to react

Not necessary.





When firing ICBMs on a flat trajectory, flight time is very short. For example, when shooting a Trident 2 ICBM at a range of 1850 km, the flight time will be 7 minutes (and at a range of 3000 km - 10 minutes). At the same time, the height of apogee will not exceed 60 km. Such a range allows shelling targets deep in Russia directly from the Barents Sea.

Everything is correct. I would not be surprised that the actual close range capability of the Trident II SLBM is one of the United States' greatest secrets. We simply do not have the ability to let them approach our shores at the minimum range of destruction with a minimum flight time.

[bayard]

Quote: Fan-Fan

missiles launched from underwater containers, it is problematic to detect a container with ICBMs under water. And such places in the Caspian Sea are full

Is the Caspian the inland sea of ​​Russia? I remember the United States deployed on its coast (Kazakhstan) and gathered (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan). Yes, and fly from there to the USA further. Such a basing system is very vulnerable from underwater saboteurs and weapons of underwater targets (torpedoes, drones, depth charges), as well as hydrodynamic shock from a powerful, including nuclear underwater explosion.
If it’s itching, then you can place it in the waters of the northern seas in the areas of guaranteed quality control - the same landfills, etc.

[Vladimir_2U]

Automobile ICBMs and a launcher for it in dimensions and under the guise of a typical truck is a utopia! Where do you order outriggers, for example, to put on, and very powerful? Security is simpler, but still questions.

Creating a BJRK is an even more risky task

The track is already trodden, design problems are not expected! In addition, the author for some reason is going to put 30-40 rockets on the train! To what? Even 1-2 missiles are more expensive than at least hundreds of cars and platforms and other things, it’s enough to form a composition for 1-2 missiles and dilute it with all kinds of rolling stock, and if the toad presses at all, then with something to be written off with half the ballast weight. In the end, in the composition of the military echelons, there are few of them traveling in Russia or something, you can drive these two, three, or even five cars for one missile! Otherwise, I agree with the author.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Automobile ICBMs and a launcher for it in dimensions and under the guise of a typical truck is a utopia! Where do you order outriggers, for example, to put on, and very powerful? Security is simpler, but still questions.

Was the topic discussed back in the USSR, within the framework of the "Courier" topic mentioned in the article? Considering that the USSR was approaching sunset at that time, it is not surprising that the topic was not completed. Now, for sure, this issue can be resolved.

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Creating a BJRK is an even more risky task

The track is already trodden, design problems are not expected! In addition, the author for some reason is going to put 30-40 rockets on the train! To what? Even 1-2 missiles are more expensive than at least hundreds of cars and platforms and other things, it’s enough to form a composition for 1-2 missiles and dilute it with all kinds of rolling stock, and if the toad presses at all, then with something to be written off with half the ballast weight. In the end, in the composition of the military echelons, there are few of them traveling in Russia or something, you can drive these two, three, or even five cars for one missile! Otherwise, I agree with the author.

The fact of the matter is that short trains are suspicious. If there are a lot of them, then it will be strange - a lot of small trains scatter from the base, the railway network is not so ramified .. 75 cars are the average length of Russian Railways trains. And drag ballast, I don’t know ...

For a long time I was a supporter of BZHRK, until I compared the length of railways and automobile roads. It is clear that a Yars-type PGRK can be detected from a satellite, but it is almost unrealistic to isolate 50-100 trucks with ICBMs from thousands or even tens of thousands across the country.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: AVM

For a long time I was a supporter of BZHRK, until I compared the length of railways and automobile roads. It is clear that a Yars-type PGRK can be detected from a satellite, but it is almost unrealistic to isolate 50-100 trucks with ICBMs from thousands or even tens of thousands across the country.

the mass of the PGRK missile itself will be about 45 tons. This is already an overload.
Tangible overload.
The legally allowed mass of the road train is 44 tons.
But the semitrailer should be prepared, protected, armored and it also has its own mass. And the tractor has its own mass.
Accordingly, your road train will be about 70-80 tons.


Respectively:
1. The technical support of such transportation will be visually determined by much more serious semi-trailers.
2. The movement of such a road train on public roads will be illegal. To be passed everywhere without stopping by each controlling service, it must be unmasked. Whether special coloring, special escort team, etc.
3. The number of public roads, whose bearing capacity allows you to freely move overloaded road trains - is very small.
4. Do not forget that on the roads there are tens of thousands of bridges, bridges - whose bearing capacity does not allow to withstand such an overload.

You should see how oversized and extra-heavy loads are transported and by what regulations and by what routes. That would be an understanding of what road infrastructure is.

Then all the "wet dreams" about the disguised PGRK, hundreds of them plying among us, melt like spring snow, leaving not only dissolving dreams, but also the remaining related knowledge.

[SHOPPING MALL]

[quote = SovAr238A] [quote = AVM]
For a long time I was a supporter of BZHRK, until I compared the length of railways and automobile roads. It is clear that a Yars-type PGRK can be detected from a satellite, but it is almost impossible to isolate 50-100 trucks with ICBMs from thousands or even tens of thousands across the country. [/ Quote]

the mass of the PGRK missile itself will be about 45 tons. This is already an overload.
Tangible overload.
The legally allowed mass of the road train is 44 tons.
But the semitrailer should be prepared, protected, armored and it also has its own mass. And the tractor has its own mass.
Accordingly, your road train will be about 70-80 tons. [/ quote]

The length of the 15Ж59 missile of the Kurier complex is 11,2 meters, and its mass is 15 tons. Proceeding from this, everything else decreases and many problems are removed. A multitude of trucks with "no inspection" passes with the cargo of all our defense factories are cruising across the country.

[quote = SovAr238A] [quote = AVM]
Then all the "wet dreams" about the disguised PGRK, hundreds of plying among us - melt like spring snow, leaving not only dissolving dreams, but also the remaining related knowledge. [/ Quote]

So there should not be hundreds of them. Dozens are the maximum. Basis - silos.

[Narak-zempo]

IMHO a wagon as a base for placing ICBMs always wins in front of a semi-trailer.
For reliable camouflage of such cars, it is necessary to achieve maximum (ideally - complete) automation of all functions associated with combat duty. Including security.
If all this can be realized in the dimensions of one car, it can be disguised as a freight car and included in the composition of civilian goods according to a special randomized schedule, change the appearance of overhead panels. And for each combat missile to rivet a dozen bogie cars.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: AVM

A multitude of trucks with "no inspection" passes with the cargo of all our defense factories are cruising across the country.

Sorry, but you are wrong.
There are only a few such trucks.
And they always come with an escort.

I myself, 22-15 years ago, produced trucks with tilt "garages" on a trawl from one Syzran plant.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: SovAr238A

Quote: AVM

A multitude of trucks with "no inspection" passes with the cargo of all our defense factories are cruising across the country.

Sorry, but you are wrong.
There are only a few such trucks.
And they always come with an escort.

I myself, 22-15 years ago, produced trucks with tilt "garages" on a trawl from one Syzran plant.

I have other quantity data. A support and PGRK should be.

[asv363]

Well, the article is framed, that is, that is. Still, the content was sensible - this is, apparently, a dream. A few questions to the author.
1. What is the length of the so-called. "sea container" or semi-trailer of a widespread wagon? The ICBM will not fit there.
2. How does a respected author plan to protect hypothetical wagons along the route without standing out from the general traffic flow on general-purpose routes? Considering that the PGRK have patrol areas allocated to them, off-road for general purposes.
3. Does the author know the number of ICBMs that our industry can now produce per year? (This is a proposal for one ICBM mine - one missile with one warhead.)
Etc. etc.

PS Even under the USSR, from memory during consultations and negotiations on SALT-2, the United States tried in every possible way to limit the number of mines for heavy liquid ICBMs. 40 years pass and suddenly, in the author's article, I see a call to abandon Sarmat, the "heir" of the Voevoda.

[bistrov.]

Quote: asv363

so called "sea container" or semi-trailer of a widespread wagon? The ICBM will not fit there.

In theory, it will fit. The length of the sea container is about 13 meters, (40 feet) - disappears, and the standard wagon of 20 meters is quite comparable to the length of the "Poplar". Another issue is the weight characteristics: a two-axle wagon should not exceed 20 tons, a four-axle one - 32 tons, and the weight of a rocket suitable for 50 tons, you need to create a special tractor and a multi-axle cargo conveyor, which immediately unmasks the PU, in addition, when moving on roads, there are maximum axle loads and a network of control points that monitor this, this is another problem. Also, where to place the starting crew and guards, who should be able to change, eat, rest, etc.?
Even based on all of the above, placing ICBMs in an automobile wagon is approaching at least an adventure.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: asv363

Well, the article is framed, that is, that is. Still, the content was sensible - this is, apparently, a dream.

Thank you.

Quote: asv363

A few questions to the author.
1. What is the length of the so-called. "sea container" or semi-trailer of a widespread wagon? The ICBM will not fit there.

We need a new rocket. When the PGRK "Courier" was being developed, they considered the Trailer of the MAZ 938920 container ship
Number of axles/wheels 2/10+1
Carrying capacity, kg 33000
Internal / external dimensions of the platform (length x width x height), mm 11985x2259x1415 / 12260x2500x1415

Length of ICBM "Yars 17" meters
The length of the 15Zh59 missile of the Kurier complex is 11,2 meters, and the mass is 15 tons

The development of the Kurier missile system (according to NATO classification - SS-X-26) began on June 21, 1983 at the Moscow Institute of Thermophysics. The military was prompted to take this step by the realization that large-sized self-propelled launchers cannot be hidden from space optical and radar reconnaissance systems of the United States. For the complex, a launcher was originally designed on a four-axle MAZ-7909 chassis, and then on a five-axle chassis. From March 1989 to May 1990, four missile test launches were made.

Quote: asv363

2. How does the respected author plan to protect hypothetical wagons on the route without standing out from the general traffic flow on general routes?

1-2 ICBMs + 1 security truck + one mobile group on an SUV + alarm group on helicopters (promising high-speed helicopters would be useful here, by the way)

Quote: asv363

Considering that the PGRK have patrol areas allocated to them, off-road for general purposes.

Certain zones can also be selected, only not in forests and fields, but certain sections of the road network of the Russian Federation.

Quote: asv363

3. Does the author know the number of ICBMs that our industry can now produce per year? (This is a proposal for one ICBM mine - one missile with one warhead.)
Etc. etc.

Rather, one with two. And the ability to install a third backup. No exact data. In 2008 over the years 10 Poplars were made. Then it seems like the possibilities doubled.

This is a matter of political will. It will be necessary - up to 50-70 pcs. will be brought in a year. Making Sarmatians will be an order of magnitude harder, because the liquid ICBM itself is much more complex than a “fiberglass powder keg”.
It’s like with electronic tubes and transistors in computers. If we only develop technologies, then it is easier to get acceptable characteristics on liquid (conventionally lamp) missiles, and if solid-state ICBM technology is already there (like transistor technology), then it can be made much simpler, bigger, cheaper. There are no tube PCs left, transistors have supplanted everything ...

Quote: asv363

PS Even under the USSR, from memory during consultations and negotiations on SALT-2, the United States tried in every possible way to limit the number of mines for heavy liquid ICBMs. 40 years pass and suddenly, in the author's article, I see a call to abandon Sarmat, the "heir" of the Voevoda.

Then the USSR riveted "Voivode" as I now propose to make light ICBMs. ICBM "Sarmat" is likely to be a little 10-20 pcs.? They will be a priority target for the first strike.

Previously, for the United States it was necessary to reduce its possible damage by contract, saving the USSR from the most powerful missiles, and now, with an increase in the accuracy of warheads, they can try to reduce the damage by destroying the most dangerous targets for them - 3 of their nuclear warheads versus 10 of ours in Sarmatia.

This is the meaning of the dispersal of nuclear warheads over light ICBMs - not to be allowed to cover with a sudden blow.

[Amateur]

In the medium term, the United States can deploy a missile defense system that can theoretically intercept thousands of warheads. Such a system is guaranteed to be able intercept hundreds of warheads

The author himself has not decided what he is writing about?
Well, to the country that deployed missile defense

capable of theoretically intercepting thousands of warheads.

you don’t even have to attack, because the country will simply go broke.
All these "projects", sucked out of thin air and not having a real technical and economic base, should be published in the new section "Unscientific Fiction"

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Amateur

In the medium term, the United States can deploy a missile defense system that can theoretically intercept thousands of warheads. Such a system is guaranteed to be able intercept hundreds of warheads

The author himself has not decided what he is writing about?

There is a difference:
1. Theoretically they want to intercept and practically can.
2. The probability of interception for 1000 warheads may be 0,5, and for 100 warheads 0,99
3. You can intercept 1000 warheads without a set of missile defense breakthrough tools, or 100 with it

Quote: Amateur

Well, to the country that deployed missile defense

capable of theoretically intercepting thousands of warheads.

you don’t even have to attack, because the country will simply go broke.
All these "projects", sucked out of thin air and not having a real technical and economic base, should be published in the new section "Unscientific Fiction"

It is far from the fact that they will go broke. They reduce both the cost of launching into orbit and the cost of the satellites themselves, stamping them "like pies". All this is detailed here: https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle-2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html

And about fiction, let's see. Human memory is so short, it would seem a quarter of a century ago there were a clock with a coolness calculator, and now everyone carries a supercomputer in his pocket.
Try to make a forecast for 20-30 years of development of military equipment?

[Amateur]

and for 100 warheads 0,99

That is, you will be completely satisfied with the result that out of 100 warheads only 1 in 10 megatons will get to Washington? After that, you are pleased to tell the remaining Washingtonians that they would be even worse if it weren’t for the missile defense and the others too flew by.
The meaning of strategic missile defense is 100% defeat of attacking missiles. And this is possible only with local 1-10 warheads. In all other cases, only a retaliatory destructive strike is effective. This was not invented by me, but by Robert McNamara's "eggheads" in the 60s of the 20th century.

[Narak-zempo]

Quote: Amateur

The meaning of strategic missile defense is a 100% defeat of attacking missiles.

Nuclear deterrence strategy based on guaranteed delivery to aggressor unacceptable damage. Accordingly, the meaning of strategic missile defense is to neutralize this deterrent. To do this, it is not necessary to intercept 100% of the missiles - it is enough to reduce the expected damage from a retaliatory strike to a level that the country's leadership considers acceptable.

[Amateur]

it is enough to reduce the expected damage from a retaliatory strike to a level that the country's leadership considers acceptable.

Do you think that 1% in the form of a 1 mgt bomb in Washington is acceptable damage, or you too

tell the remaining Washingtonians with satisfaction that they would be even worse if it weren’t for the missile defense system, which protected them from the rest.

[Narak-zempo]

And it depends on how brainwashed in the population.
In the realities and moods of the Cold War, especially the initial period, the Americans were quite ready to exchange a couple of large cities for the destruction of the USSR.

[ccsr]

Quote: Amateur

All these "projects", sucked out of thin air and not having a real technical and economic base, should be published in the new section "Unscientific Fiction"

I completely agree with this assessment - the author simply does not understand what all this results in when they begin to calculate the cost of the weapons program. Regarding mine installations, I do not share the opinion of the author of the article - for several decades they will be the basis of our strategic nuclear forces, at least in terms of cost, operating costs, safety and reliability of such systems.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Amateur

All these "projects", sucked out of thin air and not having a real technical and economic base, should be published in the new section "Unscientific Fiction"

I completely agree with this assessment - the author simply does not understand what all this results in when they begin to calculate the cost of the weapons program. Regarding mine installations, I do not share the opinion of the author of the article - for several decades they will be the basis of our strategic nuclear forces at least in terms of cost, operating costs, safety and reliability of such systems.

Sorry, but you read the article, at least the conclusions:

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the most promising deterrent, in terms of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces, should be promising unified solid-fuel ICBMs in protected silos, with an excess of deployed backup silos. Their relative amount in the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be 80-95%.

The reserve mines should be equipped with missile defense systems to defeat the enemy’s space echelon and missile defense.

The second element of the ground component of strategic nuclear forces should be PGRK disguised as trucks, which will be extremely difficult to track even with advanced satellite reconnaissance capabilities capable of operating in real time. The advanced PGRK missile should be unified with ICBMs deployed in silos. Their relative amount in the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be 5–20%.

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

Sorry, but you read the article, at least the conclusions:

I carefully read what you wrote before this article, and if you read some of my comments, you will understand that I do not share many of your views. In this article, you write about a truck tractor with a trailer, and this already says that you do not understand that this requires at least an active road train, because our roads are covered with snow in winter, and its weight will require a different wheelbase. As for the "reserve mines", you were rightly told that this is nonsense, if only because this is a complex engineering structure that requires constant presence of personnel in it, and this is expensive. Why defend our mines with an anti-missile system if they will be without missiles after our retaliatory strike? Do you yourself have an idea of ​​what the scenario of a future nuclear war with our main enemy is, and what time interval will all this take? I realized that you have a naive idea about this, and hence the erroneous views in your article.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AVM

Sorry, but you read the article, at least the conclusions:

I carefully read what you wrote before this article, and if you read some of my comments, you will understand that I do not share many of your views.

It is your right.

Quote: ccsr

In this article, you write about a truck tractor with a trailer, and this already says that you do not understand that at least an active road train is needed, because our roads are covered with snow in winter, and its weight will require a different wheelbase.

These are not my inventions, but tests of the Kurier PGRK. And this is not a dogma. The base may be different. The main thing is inconspicuous, mimicking trucks.

Quote: ccsr

As for the "reserve mines", you were rightly told that this is nonsense, if only because this is a complex engineering structure that requires constant presence of personnel in it, and this is expensive.

Once, SAM and OTRK served 50 people, refueled 20 minutes. And now everything is automated, missiles in the TPK. Why in the mine can not do something like that.

Do you know what is a serious obstacle against new developments and staff reduction? Yes regulatory documents. There are 20 people in the mine, which means 20, and it doesn’t matter that modern technical solutions allow two to be planted.

Quote: ccsr

Why defend our mines with a missile defense system if they are without missiles after our retaliatory strike? Do you yourself even have an idea what is the scenario of a future nuclear war with our main adversary, and what time interval will all this take? I realized that you have naive ideas about this, and hence the erroneous views in your article.

Missile defense is needed after a strike to which we did not have time to respond, i.e. missed the counter-strike for the reasons described here: https://topwar.ru/166564-zakat-jadernoj-triady-nazemnyj-i-kosmicheskij-jeshelony-sprn.html and here: https://topwar.ru/166706 -zakat-jadernoj-triady-oruzhie-ssha-dlja-nanesenija-obezglavlivajuschego-udara.html

First, the surviving anti-missile launch to destroy the U.S. missile launcher satellites, which provide the primary issue of their missile defense missile launchers, starts: https://topwar.ru/167041-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-nastojaschee-i-blizhajshee-buduschee.html opportunities are affected by promising orbital elements of the missile defense system https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle-2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html

Surviving ICBMs will start simultaneously with anti-ballistic missiles, but anti-ballistic missiles will have higher climb rates - they will overtake ICBMs.

[Vasily]

Hmm. A fun article. I won’t talk about the spring aggravation, but I especially enjoyed the text about the spare silos and the bzhrk with four dozen rockets.
Author!!! A mine is not a hole in the ground with a lid, it is a complex structure with a bunch of complicated equipment and even the Americans considered a huge burden to build them in reserve of three pieces per rocket. About loading rockets under cover of smoke - to the doctor.
The author, the BZHRK is not a steam locomotive and how many cars are attached at point A in order to detach at point B. This is the most complicated mechanism for interaction and can be filled with dozens of missiles either by an absolute amateur or .... spring aggravation comes to mind again.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Vasily

Hmm. A fun article. I won’t talk about the spring aggravation, but I especially enjoyed the text about the spare silos and the bzhrk with four dozen rockets.
Author!!! A mine is not a hole in the ground with a lid, it is a complex structure with a bunch of complicated equipment and even the Americans considered a huge burden to build them in reserve of three pieces per rocket.

The Americans almost completely focused on SSBNs, as their fleet dominates the oceans. And our fleet is only the miserable remnants of the USSR fleet, but at the same time we are concentrating half of the nuclear warheads on the SSBN - ideal targets for the US Navy.

The spare silos will not stand idle, they can be equipped with anti-missile missiles to "break through" the enemy's missile defense system during a retaliatory strike. At the very least, destroy the US early warning missile satellites that issue command control systems to ground-based missile defense systems; at the most, destroy the missile defense space echelon when it is deployed.

Quote: Vasily

About loading rockets under cover of smoke - to the doctor.

The fleet uses powerful directors of protective smoke and aerosols to disrupt the attack of anti-ship missiles. It is likely that a service machine with ship jamming installations or their analogs could be created, capable of introducing significant distortions into the optical and radar image of the terrain from space, which will not allow us to determine where the real ICBM is, where the missile defense systems, and where the layout is generally.

The process of loading ICBMs into silos now takes several hours, it is likely that it can be shortened. To minimize the drift of the smoke screen, weather with a minimum wind speed can be selected.

Quote: Vasily

The author, the BZHRK is not a steam locomotive and how many cars are attached at point A in order to detach at point B. This is the most complicated mechanism for interaction and can be filled with dozens of missiles either by an absolute amateur or .... spring aggravation comes to mind again.

Old BZHRK - yes, compound cars, etc. New should be easier. One ICBM - one wagon.

What is your limitation? 3-5-10 cars in the train? What is it dictated by? Why can't 40-60-75 cars be linked into a single system?

The number of BZHRK wagons was considered based on its maximum disguise among the freight trains of the same type. And if you haven’t noticed, I don’t think it makes sense to deploy the BZHRK, be it at least 3, at least 75 cars.

[Vasily]

Quote: AVM

Spare mines will not stand idle, they can put anti-missiles,

maybe this is terrible news for you, but today you cannot put one rakut in the mine, take it out and put another one tomorrow. Once again - a mine is not a hole with a lid.

Quote: AVM

To minimize the drift of the smoke screen, weather with a minimum wind speed can be selected.

So be it, I’ll open one more secret, despite the super duper automation of the process of loading a rocket into a mine, it requires at least constant visual control, and as a maximum it is performed manually. Having thoroughly smoked the launcher for several hours, you simply will not stick a rocket there. And the production time includes not only the very descent of the rocket into the mine but also a bunch of preliminary and final operations, which is not several hours.

Quote: AVM

Why can't 40-60-75 cars be linked into a single system?

Well ... it’s probably worth asking about the plan for using this or that weapon and everything will fall into place.

Quote: AVM

New should be easier. One ICBM - one wagon.

Well, here I don’t understand at all, I hope you don’t mean that the rocket used to ride in two cars before?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Vasily

Quote: AVM

Spare mines will not stand idle, they can put anti-missiles,

maybe this is terrible news for you, but today you cannot put one rakut in the mine, take it out and put another one tomorrow. Once again - a mine is not a hole with a lid.

Today it’s impossible, but tomorrow it will be possible. More recently, missiles fueled for half an hour. And now they are all in the TPK. Why can not ICBMs be implemented, the TPK of which will allow its operational movement?

Quote: Vasily

Quote: AVM

To minimize the drift of the smoke screen, weather with a minimum wind speed can be selected.

So be it, I’ll open another secret, in spite of the super duper automation of the process of loading a rocket into a mine, it requires at least constant visual control, and as a maximum it is performed manually. Having thoroughly smoked the launcher for several hours, you simply will not stick a rocket there.

The smoke screen does not have to spread along the ground.

Quote: Vasily

And the production time includes not only the very launch of the rocket into the mine, but also a bunch of preliminary and final operations, which is not several hours.

Given that TPKs with anti-ballistic missiles and ICBMs are interchanged, both silos will be in vain. Visually, containers can be almost indistinguishable. This, by the way, reduces smoke requirements.

Quote: Vasily

Quote: AVM

Why can't 40-60-75 cars be linked into a single system?

Well ... it’s probably worth asking about the plan for using this or that weapon and everything will fall into place.

Quote: AVM

New should be easier. One ICBM - one wagon.

Well, here I don’t understand at all, I hope you don’t mean that the rocket used to ride in two cars before?

The ICBM then occupied one wagon, but at launch it relied on two neighboring ones. Perhaps now this is not required (this meant one carriage), but it is possible that it will be required. By the way, the Soviet BZHRK disguised as a passenger train - 17 cars, of which only 3 missiles. The rest is security and equipment. Since then, the equipment could be reduced many times, i.e. even on a BZHRK with an imitation of a passenger train, there may be 7-10 ICBMs.

However, I’m still against the DBC.

[Vasily]

Quote: AVM

By the way, the Soviet BZHRK
disguised as a passenger train

Have you ever seen a bzhrk? Then the question is - what did three refrigerated eight-axle cars do in such a "passenger" train ???
Well, if your knowledge in this area is obtained in social networks, then you should not advertise it so clearly, not seriously. Rather stupid.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: AVM

The spare silos will not stand idle, they can be equipped with anti-missile missiles to "break through" the enemy's missile defense system during a retaliatory strike.

Prohibited by contract.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: SovAr238A

Quote: AVM

The spare silos will not stand idle, they can be equipped with anti-missile missiles to "break through" the enemy's missile defense system during a retaliatory strike.

Prohibited by contract.

Previously, a lot of what was prohibited by treaties, and missile defense, and the INF Treaty. Do we have to wait for a potential opponent to make a move?
Well, did we "score" on it? What's next? Will the sanctions be introduced? Build up their arsenal? For God's sake. It's more important to me that we can guarantee to destroy them once, than that they can destroy us twice.

And the large nuclear arsenal is not profitable for the USA. He eats up a lot of money that they can spend on conventional weapons, which, in turn, are constantly at war and "regulate" the world as they see fit.

[agond]

It would be more correct not to place missiles where people live, and vice versa, not to live where it is located, no matter how it is located, in a mine, on a wheeled vehicle, or on a railway or military base at an airfield. The missiles should be located in other places, anywhere just not on land where a person lives .. These other places are in the seas and oceans (and this has long been understood in the states), but this does not mean at all that the missiles can be placed only on submarines, for us it will be much easier and safer to keep your ballistic missiles in underwater containers near their shores like the Skif bottom-based complex, the problem of launching from the podold can and must be solved, by the way, half of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is not covered with ice in winter.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: agond

It would be more correct not to place missiles where people live, and vice versa, not to live where it is located, no matter how it is located, in a mine, on a wheeled vehicle, or on a railway or military base at an airfield. The missiles should be located in other places, anywhere just not on land where a person lives .. These other places are in the seas and oceans (and this has long been understood in the states), but this does not mean at all that the missiles can be placed only on submarines, for us it will be much easier and safer to keep your ballistic missiles in underwater containers near their shores like the Skif bottom-based complex, the problem of launching from the podold can and must be solved, by the way, half of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is not covered with ice in winter.

Far from cities - yes.
Stationary underwater - no. It is extremely difficult to protect and control them there. Where is the guarantee that the enemy did not find them, and did not send a small-sized drone that lay on the ground and would be blown up by command?

[SovAr238A]

Quote: agond

...
The missiles should be located in other places, anywhere just not on land where a person lives .. These other places are in the seas and oceans (and this has long been understood in the states), but this does not mean at all that the missiles can be placed only on submarines, for us it will be much easier and safer to keep your ballistic missiles in underwater containers near their shores like the Skif bottom-based complex, the problem of launching from the podold can and must be solved, by the way, half of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is not covered with ice in winter.

Quote:
18. Each of the Parties undertakes not to produce, test or deploy:

a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, as well as launchers of such missiles for installation on floating equipment, including free-floating launchers, which are not submarines. This obligation does not require changes to the existing procedure for storage, transportation, loading or unloading of ballistic missiles;

b) ballistic and cruise missile launchers for placement or anchorage on the bottom of the oceans, seas or inland waters and inland waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the bottom of the oceans, seas or inland waters and inland waters as well as missiles for such launchers. This obligation applies to all areas of the bottom of the oceans and seas, including the seabed area referred to in articles I and II of the Treaty banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the bottom of the seas and oceans of February 11, 1971;

[Fan-fan]

Russia has every right to withdraw from this treaty, since the United States has long unilaterally withdrawn from certain treaties. And on the other hand, didn’t you think why they imposed this agreement on placement of launchers under water for us? And many people know why, because it’s hard to find such a missile there, especially in reservoirs to which the USA does not have access, for example, the Caspian.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: Fan-Fan

And many people know why, because it’s hard to find such a missile there, especially in reservoirs to which the USA does not have access, for example, the Caspian.

Great lakes in the USA?
also no access ...

But the agreement went from the 70s, not fools.
Mutual Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, I'm sorry but there are more fundamental treaties than the INF Treaty.
.

Read, but only think in depth.
The treaty opened all borders to the inspectors.
They can inspect our positions at any time.
We can inspect their positions at any time.
Agreement of complete mutual openness.
in essence.
since the 70s.
When we still Brezhnev was in the juice itself.
And the Cold War was, and sanctions are stronger than the current ones.
But these agreements were completely open.
but you didn’t read them.
Read, they are very informative.
With all related protocols.

[SovAr238A]

Have many read the START treaty itself?
Cognitive points regarding control.

The author also wants to read ...

Article X

1. In order to ensure control over compliance with the provisions of this Agreement, each of the Parties undertakes:

(a) Use the national technical means of control at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;

b) not interfere with the national technical controls of the other Party performing their functions in accordance with this Article; and

c) not to apply camouflage measures that impede the control of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of control.

2. The obligation not to apply camouflage measures includes the obligation not to apply them at test sites, including measures that conceal ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers or the relationship between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to apply camouflage measures does not extend to the practice of sheltering or camouflage at ICBM bases or to the use of shelters to protect strategic offensive weapons from atmospheric effects.

Article XI

1. In order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on strategic offensive arms falling within the scope of this Treaty and to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each of the Parties has the right to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Chapter Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each of the Parties has the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases and at air bases. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the quantities and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive weapons subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads deployed on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; as well as the number of nuclear weapons deployed on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections are referred to below as inspections of the first type.

3. Each of the Parties has the right to carry out inspections at the facilities listed in Section VII of Chapter Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the quantities, types and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive weapons falling within the scope of this Treaty, as well as to confirm the fact of conversion or elimination of strategic offensive weapons.

In addition to this, each of the Parties has the right to conduct inspections at previously declared facilities, which are provided for in Chapter Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not used for purposes incompatible with this Treaty.

And much, much more ..

[agond]

Quote: AVM

Far from cities - yes.
Stationary underwater - no. It is extremely difficult to protect and control them there. Where is the guarantee that the enemy did not find them, and did not send a small-sized drone that lay on the ground and would be blown up by command?
Reply

You overestimate human capabilities, for example, a container lies somewhere on the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, which is closed to strangers and suddenly a submarine drone square by square, kilometer by kilometer, month after month carefully explores the bottom !!!, creating such a drone will be more difficult than creating a descent vehicle on Mars, okay, let's imagine this miracle of technology exists in nature, and you once a year, at the beginning and at the end of navigation, lift the container, inspect and tow it to a new place. and note you are moving away from the words STATIONARY placement of weapons to the words TEMPORARY place of their storage, that is, the clauses of the agreements are not violated. And then what command can be received by a small-sized drone being a supply at a distance of 8 thousand km !!! Such a command can only be sent from a repeater located somewhere nearby, that is, in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, by your nose.
And yet, in the article there was infa about the possibility of defeating our mines with their kinetic weapons, in other words, you can get a blank in the mine 10 by 10 m from orbit, which means you can also get into an aircraft carrier 50 m by 350 m in size

[agond]

Quote: SovAr238A

8. Each of the Parties undertakes not to produce, test or deploy:

a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, as well as launchers of such missiles for installation on floating equipment, including free-floating launchers, which are not submarines. This obligation does not require changes to the existing procedure for storage, transportation, loading or unloading of ballistic missiles;

"not being a SUBMARINE", that is, submarines do not fall under the prohibition of the contract, see the definition of what a submarine is
Submarine (PL) (submarine, submarine) - a class of ships capable of sinking and operating underwater for a long time.
From the description of the third version of the bottom complex "Skif", "a projectile - a carrier equipped with a rocket engine, on command travels a certain path to the intended target under water", that is, the projectile already has one sign of the submarine, it can move under water, if it is supplemented will be able to submerge and surface, then we have a second sign, if a small wheelhouse is welded to the projectile outside, so that a standing person can fit in it to the waist, then we will see the crew on the surface on the projectile and we can invite journalists to demonstrate a new submarine, that is, none the clause of the contract is not violated.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: SovAr238A

Have many read the START treaty itself?
Cognitive points regarding control.

The author also wants to read ...

Article X

1. In order to ensure control over compliance with the provisions of this Agreement, each of the Parties undertakes:

(a) Use the national technical means of control at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;

b) not interfere with the national technical controls of the other Party performing their functions in accordance with this Article; and

c) not to apply camouflage measures that impede the control of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of control.

2. The obligation not to apply camouflage measures includes the obligation not to apply them at test sites, including measures that conceal ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers or the relationship between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to apply camouflage measures does not extend to the practice of sheltering or camouflage at ICBM bases or to the use of shelters to protect strategic offensive weapons from atmospheric effects.

Article XI

1. In order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on strategic offensive arms falling within the scope of this Treaty and to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each of the Parties has the right to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Chapter Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each of the Parties has the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases and at air bases. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the quantities and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive weapons subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads deployed on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; as well as the number of nuclear weapons deployed on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections are referred to below as inspections of the first type.

3. Each of the Parties has the right to carry out inspections at the facilities listed in Section VII of Chapter Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the quantities, types and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive weapons falling within the scope of this Treaty, as well as to confirm the fact of conversion or elimination of strategic offensive weapons.

In addition to this, each of the Parties has the right to conduct inspections at previously declared facilities, which are provided for in Chapter Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not used for purposes incompatible with this Treaty.

And much, much more ..

START III will end soon. And what will replace it is unknown, and whether it will come at all. Where is the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty? As soon as the United States gains a unilateral advantage, the treaty on peaceful outer space will also go there. Why should we re-sign unfavorable conditions in START-3? The US real-time intelligence capabilities are growing, first strike weapons are being developed and can be deployed near our borders, and should we not stop them from "having" us?

[SovAr238A]

Quote: AVM

START III will end soon. And what will replace it is unknown, and whether it will come at all. Where is the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty? As soon as the United States gains a unilateral advantage, the treaty on peaceful outer space will also go there. Why should we re-sign unfavorable conditions in START-3? The US real-time intelligence capabilities are growing, first strike weapons are being developed and can be deployed near our borders, and should we not stop them from "having" us?

My opinion.
Due to the situation of financial, political, etc. etc.
We cannot dictate terms.
They will be able to withdraw from the agreements and they will have enough money for thousands of SDI satellites, for an additional ten SSBNs Colombia, and for an additional fifty hundred Virgins and a hundred Berkov with Standards SM-3 and 6.
Also for three rubles Ford - just enough money.

With additional sanctions, they will stop the export of gas and oil from our country.
As can be seen in recent years - this is absolutely possible.

SWIFT will block, and impex operations will end for us, in principle, in general.
We will be like North Korea.

Previously, we were not very spread rot, for they sold us 20 million tons of grain, pipes, etc.
And now we do it all ourselves and export grain for real money worth 25 million tons.
Having overwhelmed us with sanctions, they kill our economy, deprive us of huge amounts of money, and, accordingly, they personally select for themselves the export that was ours.
They will supply LNG to Europe, they will supply grain to Africa and Asia.

Accordingly, they will have a lot of dough, but that everything will be built, and we will not have money at all.
Accordingly, what are we talking about? What parity, in the event of a contract break?

Do you understand that the economy of the Soviet Union died at a precisely chosen moment?
When at the high cost of energy resources, fundamental enormous plans were planned and financing of our military power and the military economy and military infrastructure including was planned. Hundreds of costly R&D have been created. and the construction of super-expensive ships and SSBNs, and their support.

And then, when everything began to go on rails, the Americans, together with the Sauddites, took and dumped oil to a price of $ 7 per barrel.
And all our plans, all our economy I just collapsed.
Just could not stand such costs in the absence of revenues to the treasury ...

Do not forget the story ...


At the moment, the contract works for us. And not against us.
Anyone who thinks otherwise - blinded and not seeing the surrounding realities ...
not able to add 2 + 2 ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: SovAr238A

Quote: AVM

START III will end soon. And what will replace it is unknown, and whether it will come at all. Where is the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty? As soon as the United States gains a unilateral advantage, the treaty on peaceful outer space will also go there. Why should we re-sign unfavorable conditions in START-3? The US real-time intelligence capabilities are growing, first strike weapons are being developed and can be deployed near our borders, and should we not stop them from "having" us?

My opinion.
Due to the situation of financial, political, etc. etc.
We cannot dictate terms.
They will be able to withdraw from the agreements and they will have enough money for thousands of SDI satellites, for an additional ten SSBNs Colombia, and for an additional fifty hundred Virgins and a hundred Berkov with Standards SM-3 and 6.
Also for three rubles Ford - just enough money.

With additional sanctions, they will stop the export of gas and oil from our country.
As can be seen in recent years - this is absolutely possible.

SWIFT will block, and impex operations will end for us, in principle, in general.
We will be like North Korea.

Previously, we were not very spread rot, for they sold us 20 million tons of grain, pipes, etc.
And now we do it all ourselves and export grain for real money worth 25 million tons.
Having overwhelmed us with sanctions, they kill our economy, deprive us of huge amounts of money, and, accordingly, they personally select for themselves the export that was ours.
They will supply LNG to Europe, they will supply grain to Africa and Asia.

Accordingly, they will have a lot of dough, but that everything will be built, and we will not have money at all.
Accordingly, what are we talking about? What parity, in the event of a contract break?

Do you understand that the economy of the Soviet Union died at a precisely chosen moment?
When at the high cost of energy resources, fundamental enormous plans were planned and financing of our military power and the military economy and military infrastructure including was planned. Hundreds of costly R&D have been created. and the construction of super-expensive ships and SSBNs, and their support.

And then, when everything began to go on rails, the Americans, together with the Sauddites, took and dumped oil to a price of $ 7 per barrel.
And all our plans, all our economy I just collapsed.
Just could not stand such costs in the absence of revenues to the treasury ...

Do not forget the story ...


At the moment, the contract works for us. And not against us.
Anyone who thinks otherwise - blinded and not seeing the surrounding realities ...
not able to add 2 + 2 ...

The problem is that the contracts are just concluded equal. As soon as the USSR / Russia weakened, so immediately goodbye to the ABM Treaty, and now on the INF Treaty. I’m sure that the USA will definitely place weapons in space. And if they have agreements, then not with us, but with China, and then not soon.

North Korea does not need international treaties. The destiny of the weak is to play against the rules.

But, I repeat, the joke with nuclear weapons is that to us its quantity in the USA is not as critical as ours. We need to be able to destroy them, and whether they can destroy us 2-3-10 times is not so critical.

If they follow the path of unlimited buildup of a nuclear arsenal, they themselves will go bankrupt.

[Carib]

Medium-range missiles can be placed on automobile chassis, for which targets will be American bases in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

[agond]

For a car chassis, it would be nice to create two-stage "clamshell" rockets, that is, we carry on a car two stages of 7 m long, connected by a hinge, and before starting, we quickly unfold and get a rocket 14 m long,

[Old26]

Yes, Andrey! The article is well framed, which is what it is. But the content ... Still, the content would match. Have you thought for a long time whether to "call you a face about the table" or not to react? But, unfortunately, you have so many "thoughts" that run counter to reality that you still decided to write. For later on, they will start referring to your article as reliable facts, although there are a lot of "exaggerations" in it

The exponential development of the enemy’s satellite constellations will allow it to track in real time the mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) of the “Topol” and “Yars” types, and it is possible that the military rail-missile systems (BZHRK), if the latter are nevertheless will be developed and adopted. Given the lack of resistance to nuclear shock in mobile systems, their fate becomes unenviable. At the same time, ICBMs deployed in stationary highly protected mines can be destroyed during a sudden disarming strike by high-precision warheads with a nuclear warhead.

A very controversial statement. The OER satellites have a resolution of at least 15 cm, which, in principle, would be enough to identify the APU, but only this resolution it has in a 2x2 km "frame". If the launcher gets there, yes, it will detect and identify. But they won't be able to hit the launcher in real time. For from the moment of detection to the moment of guaranteed identification, some time will pass, measured well, if minutes. And most often tens of minutes or hours. In the survey mode of operation, the OER satellites will not be able to identify the launcher. It will be clear that this is something big, but what is not known. Maybe it is a pipe carrier or a timber carrier, and not a launcher. Therefore, "Keyholes" and go in pairs. One satellite conducts survey, the second, if necessary, detailed survey. All other satellites, such as ERS satellites, have a much worse resolution and can only be guaranteed to find something in a complex.
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to hit them. Moreover, in each unit there is a document on the satellite situation. And at the time of flight, the launch can be masked.
It is extremely difficult to hit a highly protected silo with high-precision nuclear warheads. For the KVO (the best) for the Americans is about 120 meters. To hit the silos with a guarantee, according to the same American calculations, at least 2 blocks are needed, and the explosion should not be airborne, and perhaps even not ground, but the warheads should go deep into the ground, so that later, during the explosion, the seismic wave would "crush the mine." ... And given the fact that the doctrine spelled out OVU (retaliatory strike), no one will wait for the defeat of the mines. In the tens of minutes that will elapse between the start of the American weapon and before
missile targets (silos) missiles have time to start ...

Such a complex is quite capable of being lost among many thousands of trucks on a million kilometers of Russian roads, even despite continuous tracking from satellites in real time.

Continuous tracking by satellites does not exist in nature. And in general, an ordinary truck and an ordinary wagon were only at the first stage of development. As you yourself wrote below, then the three-axle tractor was replaced by four, and then by a five-axle tractor. And the last two already did not resemble a "civilian truck" at all ...

At the end of 2019, there are 18 Topol-M PGRKs and 120 RS-24 Yars PGRK in the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, it can be assumed that they will need to deploy about 150-200 courier-type PGRKs to replace them. If there are three warheads per ICBM, the total number of nuclear warheads (NWF) on them will be about 450-600 units.

Sorry, but on the "Courier" it was planned ONE WARNING. That is, in fact, you are replacing almost 380 warheads with 150-200. Meaning???

The train itself can accommodate several dozen ICBMs + auxiliary units and security forces, which makes it comparable in combat power to a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

BZHRK "Molodets" had 3 launchers with three missiles and 30 warheads. "Barguzin", if they decide to deploy it, will have 6 missiles in its composition. Dozens of missiles are out of the question.

The projected Barguzin BZHRK was supposed to have 14 cars, of which only three were supposed to be with ICBMs.

No one knows how many wagons there should be wagons. It is only known that the composition should be SIX launchers. Therefore, the iconography that you cited, although watchable, does not correspond to reality. As well as "Bulava" as a missile for BZHRK. It was clearly stated that the rocket would be based on Yars.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

The exponential development of the enemy’s satellite constellations will allow it to track in real time the mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) of the “Topol” and “Yars” types, and it is possible that the military rail-missile systems (BZHRK), if the latter are nevertheless will be developed and adopted. Given the lack of resistance to nuclear shock in mobile systems, their fate becomes unenviable. At the same time, ICBMs deployed in stationary highly protected mines can be destroyed during a sudden disarming strike by high-precision warheads with a nuclear warhead.

A very controversial statement. The OER satellites have a resolution of at least 15 cm, which, in principle, would be enough to identify the APU, but only this resolution it has in a 2x2 km "frame". If the launcher gets there, yes, it will detect and identify. But they won't be able to hit the launcher in real time. For from the moment of detection to the moment of guaranteed identification, some time will pass, measured well, if minutes. And most often tens of minutes or hours. In the survey mode of operation, the OER satellites will not be able to identify the launcher. It will be clear that this is something big, but what is not known. Maybe it is a pipe carrier or a timber carrier, and not a launcher. Therefore, "Keyholes" and go in pairs. One satellite conducts survey, the second, if necessary, detailed survey. All other satellites, such as ERS satellites, have a much worse resolution and can only be guaranteed to find something in a complex.
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to hit them. Moreover, in each unit there is a document on the satellite situation. And at the time of flight, the launch can be masked.

I proceed from the fact that the United States will radically increase its ability to produce cheap satellites, having worked out technologies in the civil sector, I wrote about this here: https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle- 2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html
Those. they will provide real-time control of the planet in high resolution in the radar range, with the specification of the type of target in the optical and thermal, and possibly in the UV ranges.

Quote: Old26

It is extremely difficult to hit a highly protected silo with high-precision nuclear warheads. For the KVO (the best) for the Americans is about 120 meters. To hit the silos with a guarantee, according to the same American calculations, at least 2 blocks are needed, and the explosion should not be airborne, and perhaps even not ground, but the warheads should go deep into the ground, so that later, during the explosion, the seismic wave would "crush the mine." ... And given the fact that the doctrine spelled out OVU (retaliatory strike), no one will wait for the defeat of the mines. In the tens of minutes that will elapse between the start of the American weapon and before
missile targets (silos) missiles have time to start ...

Not easy, but they are working on it. And for this, they left the INF Treaty so that there were not tens of minutes, but 5-7. SPRN may not be in time. About this here: https://topwar.ru/166706-zakat-jadernoj-triady-oruzhie-ssha-dlja-nanesenija-obezglavlivajuschego-udara.html

Quote: Old26

Such a complex is quite capable of being lost among many thousands of trucks on a million kilometers of Russian roads, even despite continuous tracking from satellites in real time.

Continuous tracking by satellites does not exist in nature. And in general, an ordinary truck and an ordinary wagon were only at the first stage of development. As you yourself wrote below, then the three-axle tractor was replaced by four, and then by a five-axle tractor. And the last two already did not resemble a "civilian truck" at all ...

If not, then no. If you noticed, I focus on “many mines”. Real and false.

Quote: Old26

At the end of 2019, there are 18 Topol-M PGRKs and 120 RS-24 Yars PGRK in the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, it can be assumed that they will need to deploy about 150-200 courier-type PGRKs to replace them. If there are three warheads per ICBM, the total number of nuclear warheads (NWF) on them will be about 450-600 units.

Sorry, but on the "Courier" it was planned ONE WARNING. That is, in fact, you are replacing almost 380 warheads with 150-200. Meaning???

In general, the meaning of 1 nuclear warhead per 1 ICBM is that covering the first hit with 600 ICBMs with 1 nuclear warhead is 3 times more difficult than 200 ICBMs with 3 nuclear warheads.
Warheads haven't been understated since? Maybe they can put 3 now?

Quote: Old26

The train itself can accommodate several dozen ICBMs + auxiliary units and security forces, which makes it comparable in combat power to a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

BZHRK "Molodets" had 3 launchers with three missiles and 30 warheads. "Barguzin", if they decide to deploy it, will have 6 missiles in its composition. Dozens of missiles are out of the question.

The projected Barguzin BZHRK was supposed to have 14 cars, of which only three were supposed to be with ICBMs.

No one knows how many wagons there should be wagons. It is only known that the composition should be SIX launchers. Therefore, the iconography that you cited, although watchable, does not correspond to reality. As well as "Bulava" as a missile for BZHRK. It was clearly stated that the rocket would be based on Yars.

It is interesting to understand what the limitation is, why exactly 6, not 8 or 12? As I said, I considered the size of BZHRK on the basis of the need for camouflage among the same compositions, nothing more.

[db1967]

Wells have periods between flights over a certain point 1h45-50min. and the extra amount to run is IMPOSSIBLE.

[Old26]

To increase the efficiency of camouflage, the BZHRK by the number of cars should be comparable with the most common railway trains. Even if approximately half of the 75 cars are auxiliary, this is up to 35-40 ICBMs per train. 3 warheads per missile - there will be 105-120 nuclear warheads per one BZHRK. For 10 compositions, 350-400 carriers or 1050-1200 nuclear warheads will fall.

Perfect is not necessary. Maybe such trains are moving on the Trans-Siberian Railway, but in the provinces, where they will be based (if they are) BZHRK compositions are much shorter.

Of course, an increase in the number of carriers on one BZHRK increases the risk of their destruction by the first blow, but here we can give an analogy with SSBNs. If for SSBNs it makes sense to reduce the size, to reduce the likelihood of its detection, then the BZHRK is logical to disguise as the freight trains that are most common, and these are freight trains of 75 wagons. To reduce the visibility of the BZHRK, auxiliary cars can be masked, for example, fuel cars like acid tanks, security and control cars for “hopper” freight cars. At the basing point or nodal points of the route, it is possible to reconnect the cars to distort the radar and optical signature of the BZHRK.

As part of the BZHRK (what it was), there was only ONE tank for fuel reserves for diesel-electric stations. Security cars were generally disguised as postal, rather than freight. As well as the KP car, the auxiliary equipment car and the launch car were disguised as refrigerated cars ...

The number of nuclear warheads on a promising ICBM should be no more than three, and ideally one nuclear warhead per carrier. In the second case, the place of two nuclear warheads should be taken by heavy false targets, which include active means of breaking through missile defense. Unfortunately, in the end, everything depends on the cost of creating media. Nevertheless, the difference between 500 ICBMs with three nuclear warheads and 1500 ICBMs with one nuclear warhead will be noticeable, not to mention the large ratios.

Maybe one day we’ll get to this, in some START-5 or START-6 treaty. Now there is no such thing and it is unlikely in the coming years

Another way is to implement measures to create an excess of silo launchers (silos). At the same time, on one ICBM with three nuclear warheads there should be two spare operational silos, with all the means of protection. You can argue that it will be prohibitively expensive? This is an open question, since the prices for ICBMs, NFCs and silos are reliably unknown, everything has to be considered with a certain amount of speculation. After all, silos for ICBMs are an extremely long-term investment.

,
This is prohibited by the EMNIP treaty even SALT-2, the provisions of which we and the Americans continue to adhere to ... False mines are "outlawed" ....

Reserve silos should be placed at a distance that excludes their defeat of one enemy nuclear warhead. Installing ICBMs in silos or changing silos should be carried out under the cover of smoke screens containing aerosols that impede the operation of optical, thermal and radar means of satellite intelligence of the enemy.

Draining fuel, removing a rocket from a mine, relocating to another launcher, installing it in a mine, refueling - all this will take hours. In addition, work on silos should be carried out without means of disguise. so that "fumes" and "aerosols" do not pass. And how you will be able to continuously maintain this state for half a day - nothing is known only to you

Reserve silos do not have to be empty. They can accommodate appropriately modified launchers (launchers) of anti-aircraft missiles or missile defense, which in this case will be fully protected from conventional weapons. From time to time a “thimble game” may be carried out, with the rearrangement of containers with anti-ballistic missiles and ICBMs from mine to mine, under the cover of a smoke screen, which will further confuse enemy intelligence.

The average shaft diameter from the same "Voevoda" is about 6 meters. The launcher itself is 3 meters in diameter. What transport container from an anti-aircraft or anti-missile missile do you intend to place there, when the diameters of these TPKs are 2 times larger than that of solid-propellant missiles. Besides, how are you going to use these anti-missile or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar equipment ??? Thimble game is good, provided you play this game. And if the enemy also makes such a move, who will be worse from this "game of thimbles" ???

How will START IV be respected in terms of the number of deployed charges, if any? We negotiate home areas with the USA. Only one or two roads lead to each district; at the entrance to the United States, they can control the number of missiles and warheads under the agreement - they can even set up a stationary post. And in the most closed territory, they have nothing to do, which will save the intrigue with the placement of ICBMs in a particular mine.

And what can be monitored on the roads, when mine missiles are placed in silos for years and can only be removed for routine maintenance, and the PGRK routes will be "inside" such a zone. Don't you think that the Americans are so "stupid" that they would agree to such an agreement ...

The mobile ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can remain in demand only if the PGRK is created, indistinguishable from civilian trucks. At the same time, the risks relative to the PGRK will in any case be higher, since if its location is disclosed, it can be destroyed by both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which is almost impossible for ICBMs in highly protected silos.

You correctly specified. In case of disclosure. Even under START-1/2, the deployment area was set at 250 square meters. km And without a contract, purely technical restrictions are imposed on the deployment area. And the advanced divisions have their own anti-sabotage units. Yes, and try to find a division in the forest in a circle with a radius of 000-300 km ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

To increase the efficiency of camouflage, the BZHRK by the number of cars should be comparable with the most common railway trains. Even if approximately half of the 75 cars are auxiliary, this is up to 35-40 ICBMs per train. 3 warheads per missile - there will be 105-120 nuclear warheads per one BZHRK. For 10 compositions, 350-400 carriers or 1050-1200 nuclear warheads will fall.

Perfect is not necessary. Maybe such trains are moving on the Trans-Siberian Railway, but in the provinces, where they will be based (if they are) BZHRK compositions are much shorter.

I took the data of Russian Railways: https://www.rzd-partner.ru/zhd-transport/news/sredniy-ves-gruzovogo-poezda-na-seti-rzhd-uvelichen-do-4045-tonn/ and repelled from them.

Quote: Old26

Of course, an increase in the number of carriers on one BZHRK increases the risk of their destruction by the first blow, but here we can give an analogy with SSBNs. If for SSBNs it makes sense to reduce the size, to reduce the likelihood of its detection, then the BZHRK is logical to disguise as the freight trains that are most common, and these are freight trains of 75 wagons. To reduce the visibility of the BZHRK, auxiliary cars can be masked, for example, fuel cars like acid tanks, security and control cars for “hopper” freight cars. At the basing point or nodal points of the route, it is possible to reconnect the cars to distort the radar and optical signature of the BZHRK.

As part of the BZHRK (what it was), there was only ONE tank for fuel reserves for diesel-electric stations. Security cars were generally disguised as postal, rather than freight. As well as the KP car, the auxiliary equipment car and the launch car were disguised as refrigerated cars ...

It doesn’t matter to me at all, i.e. PMSM BZHRK less effective than PGRK on a cargo chassis, and they are both less effective protected shafts, subject to masking.

Quote: Old26

The number of nuclear warheads on a promising ICBM should be no more than three, and ideally one nuclear warhead per carrier. In the second case, the place of two nuclear warheads should be taken by heavy false targets, which include active means of breaking through missile defense. Unfortunately, in the end, everything depends on the cost of creating media. Nevertheless, the difference between 500 ICBMs with three nuclear warheads and 1500 ICBMs with one nuclear warhead will be noticeable, not to mention the large ratios.

Maybe one day we’ll get to this, in some START-5 or START-6 treaty. Now there is no such thing and it is unlikely in the coming years

START-3 ends February 5, 2021.

Quote: Old26

Another way is to implement measures to create an excess of silo launchers (silos). At the same time, on one ICBM with three nuclear warheads there should be two spare operational silos, with all the means of protection. You can argue that it will be prohibitively expensive? This is an open question, since the prices for ICBMs, NFCs and silos are reliably unknown, everything has to be considered with a certain amount of speculation. After all, silos for ICBMs are an extremely long-term investment.

,
This is prohibited by the EMNIP treaty even SALT-2, the provisions of which we and the Americans continue to adhere to ... False mines are "outlawed" ....

Yes? Well, these are problems to be solved. The United States does not take a steam bath when they need it, withdraw from any treaties. We need false mines. It is effective. The US needs SSBNs because they dominate the sea. Why do we need them to meet them?

Quote: Old26

Reserve silos should be placed at a distance that excludes their defeat of one enemy nuclear warhead. Installing ICBMs in silos or changing silos should be carried out under the cover of smoke screens containing aerosols that impede the operation of optical, thermal and radar means of satellite intelligence of the enemy.

Draining fuel, removing a rocket from a mine, relocating to another launcher, installing it in a mine, refueling - all this will take hours. In addition, work on silos should be carried out without means of disguise. so that "fumes" and "aerosols" do not pass. And how you will be able to continuously maintain this state for half a day - nothing is known only to you

What kind of fuel is draining? Solid? A modern rocket is installed in 2 hours. I’m not sure that the task of reducing time was generally posed, because now they are being set for a long time. And if such a task is posed for a promising solid-fuel ICBM, then it is possible that they will meet it in half an hour.

Quote: Old26

Reserve silos do not have to be empty. They can accommodate appropriately modified launchers (launchers) of anti-aircraft missiles or missile defense, which in this case will be fully protected from conventional weapons. From time to time a “thimble game” may be carried out, with the rearrangement of containers with anti-ballistic missiles and ICBMs from mine to mine, under the cover of a smoke screen, which will further confuse enemy intelligence.

The average shaft diameter from the same "Voevoda" is about 6 meters. The launcher itself is 3 meters in diameter. What transport container from an anti-aircraft or anti-missile missile do you intend to place there, when the diameters of these TPKs are 2 times larger than that of solid-propellant missiles.

And here is the "Governor"? It was about launching Yars ICBMs. Yes and it doesn’t matter. In your opinion, the anti-missiles in their own TPKs cannot be assembled in a package such as how ships form UVP assemblies?

Quote: Old26

In addition, how are you going to use these anti-missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar means ???

This is a question. Or the radar is installed directly in the general anti-missile defense complex, and is advanced when the mine opens (i.e., it turns out something like a highly protected missile defense system in silos). Or the radar should be carried out at a considerable distance, so that it is not destroyed by the first strike and carries out an external control system. In the worst case, the enemy will have to strike at it, reducing the strike order for silos with ICBMs.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Thimble game is good, provided you play this game. And if the enemy also makes such a move, who will be worse from this "game of thimbles" ???

1. So they play. We do not know where their SSBNs are, and if we find out, then their huge fleet guards them.
2. Worse for the one who attacks first. If we plan only to defend ourselves, then it makes no sense for us to hit the carriers - silos, SSBNs of the enemy, because they are already firing by this time.

Quote: Old26

How will START IV be respected in terms of the number of deployed charges, if any? We negotiate home areas with the USA. Only one or two roads lead to each district; at the entrance to the United States, they can control the number of missiles and warheads under the agreement - they can even set up a stationary post. And in the most closed territory, they have nothing to do, which will save the intrigue with the placement of ICBMs in a particular mine.

And what can be monitored on the roads, when mine missiles are placed in silos for years and can only be removed for routine maintenance, and the PGRK routes will be "inside" such a zone. Don't you think that the Americans are so "stupid" that they would agree to such an agreement ...

Do not mix warm with soft. About PGRK did not go.
For silos a certain zone is allocated, large, closed. One entry - one exit to the zone. The United States can control the number of ICBMs and UCL at entry. But how we move them inside the zone from silos to silos is not their business.

Quote: Old26

The mobile ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can remain in demand only if the PGRK is created, indistinguishable from civilian trucks. At the same time, the risks relative to the PGRK will in any case be higher, since if its location is disclosed, it can be destroyed by both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which is almost impossible for ICBMs in highly protected silos.

You correctly specified. In case of disclosure. Even under START-1/2, the deployment area was set at 250 square meters. km And without a contract, purely technical restrictions are imposed on the deployment area. And the advanced divisions have their own anti-sabotage units. Yes, and try to find a division in the forest in a circle with a radius of 000-300 km ...

I may not find it, but when several thousand satellites are hanging in the sky, forming radars with a distributed synthesized aperture and a set of multispectral sensors, then the chances of hiding will be much less than now, if at all. We are talking about the medium term.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

To increase the efficiency of camouflage, the BZHRK by the number of cars should be comparable with the most common railway trains. Even if approximately half of the 75 cars are auxiliary, this is up to 35-40 ICBMs per train. 3 warheads per missile - there will be 105-120 nuclear warheads per one BZHRK. For 10 compositions, 350-400 carriers or 1050-1200 nuclear warheads will fall.

Perfect is not necessary. Maybe such trains are moving on the Trans-Siberian Railway, but in the provinces, where they will be based (if they are) BZHRK compositions are much shorter.

I took the data of Russian Railways: https://www.rzd-partner.ru/zhd-transport/news/sredniy-ves-gruzovogo-poezda-na-seti-rzhd-uvelichen-do-4045-tonn/ and repelled from them.

Quote: Old26

Of course, an increase in the number of carriers on one BZHRK increases the risk of their destruction by the first blow, but here we can give an analogy with SSBNs. If for SSBNs it makes sense to reduce the size, to reduce the likelihood of its detection, then the BZHRK is logical to disguise as the freight trains that are most common, and these are freight trains of 75 wagons. To reduce the visibility of the BZHRK, auxiliary cars can be masked, for example, fuel cars like acid tanks, security and control cars for “hopper” freight cars. At the basing point or nodal points of the route, it is possible to reconnect the cars to distort the radar and optical signature of the BZHRK.

As part of the BZHRK (what it was), there was only ONE tank for fuel reserves for diesel-electric stations. Security cars were generally disguised as postal, rather than freight. As well as the KP car, the auxiliary equipment car and the launch car were disguised as refrigerated cars ...

It doesn’t matter to me at all, i.e. PMSM BZHRK less effective than PGRK on a cargo chassis, and they are both less effective protected shafts, subject to masking.

Quote: Old26

The number of nuclear warheads on a promising ICBM should be no more than three, and ideally one nuclear warhead per carrier. In the second case, the place of two nuclear warheads should be taken by heavy false targets, which include active means of breaking through missile defense. Unfortunately, in the end, everything depends on the cost of creating media. Nevertheless, the difference between 500 ICBMs with three nuclear warheads and 1500 ICBMs with one nuclear warhead will be noticeable, not to mention the large ratios.

Maybe one day we’ll get to this, in some START-5 or START-6 treaty. Now there is no such thing and it is unlikely in the coming years

START-3 ends February 5, 2021.

Quote: Old26

Another way is to implement measures to create an excess of silo launchers (silos). At the same time, on one ICBM with three nuclear warheads there should be two spare operational silos, with all the means of protection. You can argue that it will be prohibitively expensive? This is an open question, since the prices for ICBMs, NFCs and silos are reliably unknown, everything has to be considered with a certain amount of speculation. After all, silos for ICBMs are an extremely long-term investment.

,
This is prohibited by the EMNIP treaty even SALT-2, the provisions of which we and the Americans continue to adhere to ... False mines are "outlawed" ....

Yes? Well, these are problems to be solved. The United States does not take a steam bath when they need it, withdraw from any treaties. We need false mines. It is effective. The US needs SSBNs because they dominate the sea. Why do we need them to meet them?

Quote: Old26

Reserve silos should be placed at a distance that excludes their defeat of one enemy nuclear warhead. Installing ICBMs in silos or changing silos should be carried out under the cover of smoke screens containing aerosols that impede the operation of optical, thermal and radar means of satellite intelligence of the enemy.

Draining fuel, removing a rocket from a mine, relocating to another launcher, installing it in a mine, refueling - all this will take hours. In addition, work on silos should be carried out without means of disguise. so that "fumes" and "aerosols" do not pass. And how you will be able to continuously maintain this state for half a day - nothing is known only to you

What kind of fuel is draining? Solid? A modern rocket is installed in 2 hours. I’m not sure that the task of reducing time was generally posed, because now they are being set for a long time. And if such a task is posed for a promising solid-fuel ICBM, then it is possible that they will meet it in half an hour.

Quote: Old26

Reserve silos do not have to be empty. They can accommodate appropriately modified launchers (launchers) of anti-aircraft missiles or missile defense, which in this case will be fully protected from conventional weapons. From time to time a “thimble game” may be carried out, with the rearrangement of containers with anti-ballistic missiles and ICBMs from mine to mine, under the cover of a smoke screen, which will further confuse enemy intelligence.

The average shaft diameter from the same "Voevoda" is about 6 meters. The launcher itself is 3 meters in diameter. What transport container from an anti-aircraft or anti-missile missile do you intend to place there, when the diameters of these TPKs are 2 times larger than that of solid-propellant missiles.

And here is the "Governor"? It was about launching Yars ICBMs. Yes and it doesn’t matter. In your opinion, the anti-missiles in their own TPKs cannot be assembled in a package such as how ships form UVP assemblies?

Quote: Old26

In addition, how are you going to use these anti-missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar means ???

This is a question. Or the radar is installed directly in the general anti-missile defense complex, and is advanced when the mine opens (i.e., it turns out something like a highly protected missile defense system in silos). Or the radar should be carried out at a considerable distance, so that it is not destroyed by the first strike and carries out an external control system. In the worst case, the enemy will have to strike at it, reducing the strike order for silos with ICBMs.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

To increase the efficiency of camouflage, the BZHRK by the number of cars should be comparable with the most common railway trains. Even if approximately half of the 75 cars are auxiliary, this is up to 35-40 ICBMs per train. 3 warheads per missile - there will be 105-120 nuclear warheads per one BZHRK. For 10 compositions, 350-400 carriers or 1050-1200 nuclear warheads will fall.

Perfect is not necessary. Maybe such trains are moving on the Trans-Siberian Railway, but in the provinces, where they will be based (if they are) BZHRK compositions are much shorter.

I took the data of Russian Railways: https://www.rzd-partner.ru/zhd-transport/news/sredniy-ves-gruzovogo-poezda-na-seti-rzhd-uvelichen-do-4045-tonn/ and repelled from them.

Quote: Old26

As part of the BZHRK (what it was), there was only ONE tank for fuel reserves for diesel-electric stations. Security cars were generally disguised as postal, rather than freight. As well as the KP car, the auxiliary equipment car and the launch car were disguised as refrigerated cars ...

It doesn’t matter to me at all, i.e. PMSM BZHRK less effective than PGRK on a cargo chassis, and they are both less effective protected shafts, subject to masking.

Quote: Old26

The number of nuclear warheads on a promising ICBM should be no more than three, and ideally one nuclear warhead per carrier. ...

Maybe one day we’ll get to this, in some START-5 or START-6 treaty. Now there is no such thing and it is unlikely in the coming years

START-3 ends February 5, 2021.

Quote: Old26

This is prohibited by the EMNIP treaty even SALT-2, the provisions of which we and the Americans continue to adhere to ... False mines are "outlawed" ....

Yes? Well, these are problems to be solved. The United States does not take a steam bath when they need it, withdraw from any treaties. We need false mines. It is effective. The US needs SSBNs because they dominate the sea. Why do we need them to meet them?

Quote: Old26

Draining fuel, removing a rocket from a mine, relocating to another launcher, installing it in a mine, refueling - all this will take hours. In addition, work on silos should be carried out without means of disguise. so that "fumes" and "aerosols" do not pass. And how you will be able to continuously maintain this state for half a day - nothing is known only to you

What kind of fuel is draining? Solid? A modern rocket is installed in 2 hours. I’m not sure that the task of reducing time was generally posed, because now they are being set for a long time. And if such a task is posed for a promising solid-fuel ICBM, then it is possible that they will meet it in half an hour.

Quote: Old26

The average shaft diameter from the same "Voevoda" is about 6 meters. The launcher itself is 3 meters in diameter. What transport container from an anti-aircraft or anti-missile missile do you intend to place there, when the diameters of these TPKs are 2 times larger than that of solid-propellant missiles.

And here is the "Governor"? It was about launching Yars ICBMs. Yes and it doesn’t matter. In your opinion, the anti-missiles in their own TPKs cannot be assembled in a package such as how ships form UVP assemblies?

Quote: Old26

In addition, how are you going to use these anti-missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar means ???

This is a question. Or the radar is installed directly in the general anti-missile defense complex, and is advanced when the mine opens (i.e., it turns out something like a highly protected missile defense system in silos). Or the radar should be carried out at a considerable distance, so that it is not destroyed by the first strike and carries out an external control system. In the worst case, the enemy will have to strike at it, reducing the strike order for silos with ICBMs.

Quote: Old26

Thimble game is good, provided you play this game. And if the enemy also makes such a move, who will be worse from this "game of thimbles" ???

1. So they play. We do not know where their SSBNs are, and if we find out, then their huge fleet guards them.
2. Worse for the one who attacks first. If we plan only to defend ourselves, then it makes no sense for us to hit the carriers - silos, SSBNs of the enemy, because they are already firing by this time.

Quote: Old26

And what can be monitored on the roads, when mine missiles are placed in silos for years and can only be removed for routine maintenance, and the PGRK routes will be "inside" such a zone. Don't you think that the Americans are so "stupid" that they would agree to such an agreement ...

Do not mix warm with soft. About PGRK did not go.
For silos a certain zone is allocated, large, closed. One entry - one exit to the zone. The United States can control the number of ICBMs and UCL at entry. But how we move them inside the zone from silos to silos is not their business.

Quote: Old26

You correctly specified. In case of disclosure. Even under START-1/2, the deployment area was set at 250 square meters. km And without a contract, purely technical restrictions are imposed on the deployment area. And the advanced divisions have their own anti-sabotage units. Yes, and try to find a division in the forest in a circle with a radius of 000-300 km ...

I may not find it, but when several thousand satellites are hanging in the sky, forming radars with a distributed synthesized aperture and a set of multispectral sensors, then the chances of hiding will be much less than now, if at all. We are talking about the medium term.

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

I may not find it, but when several thousand satellites hang in the sky,

Do you even have a mind how to manage all this, and how to remove information from them for processing? I don’t even say about the fact that they will fail and correct the orbits - you just can’t imagine the essence of this problem, that's why you operate with numbers so wildly, not understanding what is behind all this. Trim the sturgeon - my advice to you, go down to the ground ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AVM

I may not find it, but when several thousand satellites hang in the sky,

Do you even have a mind how to manage all this, and how to remove information from them for processing? I don’t even say about the fact that they will fail and correct the orbits - you just can’t imagine the essence of this problem, that's why you operate with numbers so wildly, not understanding what is behind all this. Trim the sturgeon - my advice to you, go down to the ground ...

Let's see how Musk and his colleagues will manage this with their satellite networks of 2000-12000 satellites. No, of course you can deny everything - this will not happen, Musk is a con man, the Earth is flat. But in fact, it usually happens like this:
At the beginning: they are doing nothing, we don’t need it - lasers, stealth, aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers - underline what is necessary.
In the end: catch up and overtake, has no analogues ...

As for information processing, there are neural networks, this is also not a "flat earth". And the processing of large amounts of data is a difficult task that the largest IT companies are struggling to solve. With regard to such important goals as PGRK, live analysts will also work. How many maximum PGRK we can have, let's put a deliberately unrealistic figure - 600 machines. How many operators will it take to “graze” them around the clock with automated tracking systems? Let's say 1 operator for 3 PGRK, or even 10. Total 60-200 operators. With three-shift work, 180-600 operators - a small Call-center.

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

Let's see how Musk and his colleagues will manage this with their satellite networks of 2000-12000 satellites.

Firstly, they still do not have such a number of satellites, and secondly, it is not a fact that the Mask company will not have gone bankrupt at that time.

Quote: AVM

About information processing

With regard to the processing of information, the attack on the "twins" and the explosion at the Boston Marathon are very typical - it turns out that there was information on terrorists and the planned terrorist attacks, but it was lost in a huge array of all information.

Quote: AVM

Suppose 1 operator for 3 PGRK, or even 10. For a total of 60-200 operators. With three-shift work of 180-600 operators - a small Call Center.

All these your fantasies are not supported by real practice - collecting information is a multi-level process, and you grab only one link and build your own conjectures on this

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AVM

Let's see how Musk and his colleagues will manage this with their satellite networks of 2000-12000 satellites.

Firstly, they still do not have such a number of satellites, and secondly, it is not a fact that the Mask company will not have gone bankrupt at that time.

Then what is the point of assuming, analyzing, planning something? What if it does not come true?

There is a reality - satellites are already outputting bundles of 60 pieces. This has never happened before. Musk goes bankrupt, so there is OneWeb, for which Lockheed Martin, in my opinion, makes companions, like bundles. And on a reusable medium, there is also Bezos. So there are too many redundant technology providers to make it all so quiet.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AVM

About information processing

With regard to the processing of information, the attack on the "twins" and the explosion at the Boston Marathon are very typical - it turns out that there was information on terrorists and the planned terrorist attacks, but it was lost in a huge array of all information.

Quote: AVM

Suppose 1 operator for 3 PGRK, or even 10. For a total of 60-200 operators. With three-shift work of 180-600 operators - a small Call Center.

All these your fantasies are not supported by real practice - collecting information is a multi-level process, and you grab only one link and build your own conjectures on this

In this case, we are not interested in catching 50 terrorists in the 7 million population of the planet, but only tracking the PGRK. The tasks are a bit of a different level, right?

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

There is a reality - satellites are already outputting bundles of 60 pieces.

Look at any pier in the sea city, where hundreds of yachts and boats are based, and compare it with one tanker, which provides not only this city, but also many other fuels for life support, and which all boats and yachts cannot do. So in the satellite constellation - you can launch thousands of small satellites that can be used to solve some local problems, but specialized satellites can not be small, and the example with optical systems clearly demonstrates this. How can you use a small satellite in geostationary orbit to receive weak signals if it has an antenna of hundreds of square meters and requires a certain orientation of the radiation pattern, i.e. it must be constantly adjusted, and for this we need a supply of working fluid. You can, of course, continue to fantasize, but there is another insoluble problem - space debris that you don’t know how to deal with, and you want to increase it due to the ever-growing number of satellites. Oh well...

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

You can, of course, continue to fantasize, but there is another insoluble problem - space debris that you don’t know how to deal with, and you want to increase it due to the ever-growing number of satellites. Oh well...

Again, back to the topic of your careless denseness, you are not even interested in issues of materiel ...

All small satellites are equipped with dual-purpose micromotors.
1. for descent from orbit in the case of a standard output of a resource.
2. to move to a specially selected repair zone, where they will be served by new types of ships.

This may be news for you, and for the old Roskosmos sand sprinklers too, but for the last 20 years I have talked about this tebu with many supposedly "designers" from TsSKB Progress, they all dismissed it. And Musk is implementing this idea together with his military. And such plans will appear for Enas too - only in 10 years ...
When will be dismissed from the last Roskomos officials, when the last designer of the current school will be kicked out.
These mediocrity and loafers ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

All small satellites are equipped with dual-purpose micromotors.

Tell us more enlightened you are ours, at least in terms of the orientation of such a satellite so that your micromotors do not lead to the opposite result.

Quote: SovAr238A

2. to move to a specially selected repair zone, where they will be served by new types of ships.

Fantastic nonsense - contain expensive repair bodies in orbit for servicing cheap satellites. By the way, can you even imagine what kind of supply the working ship should have in this ship so that it can maneuver even in a certain area?

Quote: SovAr238A

but for the last 20 years I have been talking about this tebu with many supposedly "designers" from TsSKB Progress, they all dismissed it.

They always kick back from different city lunatics - they simply are not interested in discussing serious problems with amateurs.

Quote: SovAr238A

When will be dismissed from the last Roskomos officials, when the last designer of the current school will be kicked out.
These mediocrity and loafers ...

As my acquaintance, a doctor of medical sciences, professor of the Moscow medical university, says, God forbid, get to be treated to his students.
Burn on, verbiage ....

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

Burn on, verbiage ....

How much working fluid does a 227 kg satellite need for an ion Hall propulsion?

How long did such an engine work on the European space station?
Maybe 80 days with almost no shutdowns?

And what was the supply of working fluid?
maybe 80kg in total?

And it was necessary for the flight to the moon, but here we must change the position ...
With a satellite mass of 30% less and smaller tasks, in comparison with the action on the lunar program ESA - the working fluid needs a multiple less ...

Well, are you really the same unfettered bearer of a dense aplomb. like the rest of the Soviet school? Some ignoramuses work in TsSKB Progress ...
The work of ESA satellites - for them - will not work, Mask satellites - will not work.

Only now, the years have shown that everything works for them, and everything that is done by the hands of TsSKB progress works thanks to the technique of the 60s, they are not able to come up with anything new ... In general ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

How long did such an engine work on the European space station?

We have been using these engines since 1972, but they cannot do without a working fluid, which means the longer the satellite exists, the more it is needed:

A potential difference is provided between the anode and cathode. A working fluid (e.g. xenon) is fed into the annular chamber. Under the influence of an electrostatic field, the ions accelerate in the axial direction.

Quote: SovAr238A

And it was necessary for the flight to the moon, but here we must change the position ...
With a satellite mass of 30% less and smaller tasks, in comparison with the action on the lunar program ESA - the working fluid needs a multiple less ...

Tell this to the Americans, otherwise they have not been able to repeat the flight to the moon for fifty years - apparently they are not aware of your "brilliant" ideas.

Quote: SovAr238A

Some ignoramuses work in TsSKB Progress ...

It is unlikely that you will be able to justify your fantasies so that these "ignoramuses" take you seriously.

Quote: SovAr238A

they’re not able to come up with anything new ... Actually ...

Who's stopping you from coming up with everything and taking up the Mask post? Well, since you are so talented, then NASA should have taken your hands off for a long time. What did not stick together - tell ....

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

Who's stopping you from coming up with everything and taking up the Mask post? Well, since you are so talented, then NASA should have taken your hands off for a long time. What did not stick together - tell ....

Clearly, the next troll, which has nothing to say in fact ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

Clearly, the next troll, which has nothing to say in fact ...

So you have no facts, just one chatter that I’m a genius, and all are fools. Only it seems to me that in this case everything is the other way around, since you have already been kicked off by the specialists from the Progress TsSKB with your “brilliant ideas”.
By the way, if you are so "talented", tell us what is the breakthrough of "Tesla" Mask from loading warehouse electric cars, which were already widely used in our country in the sixties?

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

By the way, if you are so "talented", tell us what is the breakthrough of "Tesla" Mask from loading warehouse electric cars, which were already widely used in our country in the sixties?

Those. you are such a greasy troll, do you think that you cleverly hooked me right now?

And the rest are people reading and thinking
Really this ccsr - really did not see the difference between the electric truck of the 60s and Tesla-2020?
Does he really not see the difference between a 60s computer and a modern tablet, which is several orders of magnitude more productive?
Doesn’t he see the difference between a Mercedes of the 60s and a Mercedes of 2020?

Let them look at you such a troll, at your troll questions ...

Well, they will conclude about you ...

I don’t see the point, everything that you wrote already fully described you as dense nothing with a great aplomb ...

And so I, the designers from TsSKB Progress a little quietly embroil, and then when they leave the factory of their candle, they usually ask me to work ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

Those. you are such a greasy troll, do you think that you cleverly hooked me right now?

You apparently went crazy, not realizing that here you are just another clown.

Quote: SovAr238A

Really this ccsr - really did not see the difference between the electric truck of the 60s and Tesla-2020?

Fundamentally - no.

Quote: SovAr238A

and when they leave the factory of their candle, they usually ask me to work ...

So you are a descendant of Bender, and in your "Horns and Hooves" are you still the zits-chairman? Burn on, the concert continues ...

Quote: SovAr238A

Does he really not see the difference between a 60s computer and a modern tablet, which is several orders of magnitude more productive?

There is no fundamental difference - the tablet is only a higher level of technological progress, and it differs from previous computers just like the simplest wheel in a cart of ancient times from a modern car wheel, although functionally they are no different.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

There is no fundamental difference - the tablet is only a higher level of technological progress, and it differs from previous computers just like the simplest wheel in a cart of ancient times from a modern car wheel, although functionally they are no different.

What are you doing?
No different?

The fundamental difference in the element base is no different?
The fundamental difference in the interaction system - the interface, is no different?
By many orders of magnitude different media capacity, performance, programming speed?
And assembler then at least once wrote a program for some EU-ki? Do you know what assembler is?

And he calmly compares the electric cart of 50 years with ancient batteries with an ultramodern machine ... And he does not see the difference in them.

I ride on both.
And on trolleys in the late 80s, 18 aircraft plant and 9 gas processing plants rolled freely.
And on Tesla two years ago I traveled 200 kilometers.

And you will say that it is one and the same?

Do you still use a flap?
And plantain? Also?

So you really clowned you into a dense military ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

The fundamental difference in the element base is no different?
The fundamental difference in the interaction system - the interface, is no different?

These are not fundamental differences, but technological ones.

Quote: SovAr238A

I ride on both.
And on trolleys in the late 80s, 18 aircraft plant and 9 gas processing plants rolled freely.
And on Tesla two years ago I traveled 200 kilometers.

Well, tell me, verbiage, what is the FUNDAMENTAL difference between the principle of movement of an electric car and a Tesla car.

[bk0010]

The ion engine is very economical in the consumption of the working fluid, but it gives out a tiny impulse, which is enough to maintain the orbit, but not for maneuvers in any sane time. Plus, it is not clear how to get rid of the emerging charge of the device, because of which it begins to attract charged particles and degrade.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: bk0010

The ion engine is very economical in the consumption of the working fluid, but it gives out a tiny impulse, which is enough to maintain the orbit, but not for maneuvers in any sane time. Plus, it is not clear how to get rid of the emerging charge of the device, because of which it begins to attract charged particles and degrade.

When the system has 12000 satellites, then low-power engines are quite enough to control derailment or transfer to a repair orbit.
The main thing is that they are.
The failure is either predictably planned, or will always be taken into manual control and the satellite will be replaced on the network with a backup one.

They will be made in the amount of 12000 pieces.

high-tech engines - 12000pcs
high-tech solar panels - 12000pcs
high-tech antennas - 12000pcs.
high-tech laser transceivers - 12000pcs.
600 high-tech rockets and engines for them.
Which will give work to hundreds of thousands of American workers, who will all be the manufacturer, collect, test, launch into space, service and provide ...
Earn good money and pay good taxes.
Move your science and your lifestyle around the world.

And let the rest nod to the old Soviet victories and the complete absence of the future ...
and trying to mock those who make 12000 satellites ...

[ccsr]

Quote: bk0010

The ion engine is very economical in the consumption of the working fluid, but it gives out a tiny impulse, which is enough to maintain the orbit, but not for maneuvers in any sane time. Plus, it is not clear how to get rid of the emerging charge of the device, because of which it begins to attract charged particles and degrade.

Thank you very much that you began to explain the basics of space flights, about which this nerd just had wild ideas, but I would not have the patience.

[SovAr238A]

Read about the new Mask and Bezos space communications systems.
They plan 10 or more thousand satellites in total.
And it will be a managed system.

And yes, the dual-use system, joint exercises with the military have already begun.
So everything is feasible.

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

They plan 10 or more thousand satellites in total.

The Americans in fifty years cannot repeat the flight to the Moon, and use our engines for their rockets - that's all you need to know to understand Musk's "successes".

Quote: SovAr238A

And yes, the dual-use system, joint exercises with the military have already begun.

In fact, they have been used in our country since the seventies - what are you talking about?

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

The Americans in fifty years cannot repeat the flight to the Moon, and use our engines for their rockets - that's all you need to know to understand Musk's "successes".

You really need to tighten up your equipment and not use the headlines of stupid news sites and the same stupid newspapers ...
And I, I’ll crush you with numbers, so that everyone can see your inept unbridled lies and bragging about things that have long been gone or have not been at all ...
Notions only one and a lie.


For almost 15 years, two private American companies have been purchasing engines from us, RD-180 and NK-33 \ RD-181.
Yes, it is a fact.
But we must understand that this is one private company, and not all of America.

In 2018, these engines made only 6 (4 on the RD-180 and 2 on the RD-181) launches from 31 American missile launches, of which the share of Mask missiles was 21 units.
23 missiles were launched in the Russian Federation, including manned ones.


In 2019 - 4 (2 on RD-180 and 2 on RD-181) launches of 21 American missile launches, of which the share of Mask missiles is 13 units.
19 missiles were launched in the Russian Federation, including manned ones.

So wipe your anger at the Mask - the leadership is over ...


Patents for RD-180 have ended and can now be done in America quietly and without royalties.
The Americans have almost made a replacement for the RD-180 engine in the form of their newest and most modern BE-4 methane engine. Fire tests are already underway.
A new plant was built for the production of two new engines BE-4 and BE-7 (call us a new plant for space?).
In 2021, the first flight of a new ship and a new engine is planned, respectively.
And all ...

Quote: ccsr

In fact, they have been used in our country since the seventies - what are you talking about?

Yes, that Musk will put into orbit a system of 12000 satellites.
Unified Management System.

And VanWeb is about to launch nearly 2500 satellites into orbit.

And it will be.
For almost 10 years now I’ve heard that just about another month and Musk will go bankrupt ...
10 years the same ...

[ccsr]

Quote: SovAr238A

And I will crush you with numbers,

Do not overdo it, especially since the numbers sometimes lie, if you selectively use them.

Quote: SovAr238A

For almost 15 years, two private American companies have been purchasing engines from us, RD-180 and NK-33 \ RD-181.
Yes, it is a fact.

So their specialized companies are buying, not retail chains - what does not suit you in this fact?

Quote: SovAr238A

So wipe your anger at the Mask - the leadership is over ...

I don’t care at all because his programs don’t have any novelty, and if we don’t go in that direction, it’s only because we consider it unpromising for heavy media.

Quote: SovAr238A

Patents for RD-180 have ended and can now be done in America quietly and without royalties.

Let them do it, who prevented them from doing this earlier for internal needs?

Quote: SovAr238A

Yes, that Musk will put into orbit a system of 12000 satellites.
Unified Management System.

When we get out, then we’ll talk - until he just sent his car into deep space, and that’s all over.

Quote: SovAr238A

For almost 10 years now I’ve heard that just about another month and Musk will go bankrupt ...

You can also watch on YouTube about the "genius" of this swindler
https://youtu.be/R3oYwDUwEuI

[SovAr238A]

Quote: ccsr

When we get out, then we’ll talk - until he just sent his car into deep space, and that’s all over.

[Old26]

[quote] Creating a BZHRK is an even more risky task, since the railway network is much less extensive and extensive compared to the road network. In addition, railway trains of 75 wagons are optimal from the point of view of secrecy. On the one hand, this allows them to carry about 35-40 ICBMs with 105-120 nuclear warheads, which makes the ALCM comparable in firepower to SSBNs, on the other hand, it allows the enemy to cover the same 105-120 nuclear warheads with just one of their nuclear warheads. And the visibility in the radar range of the railway train of 75 cars may be too high, which will allow the enemy to track the BZHRK in real time immediately after leaving the base. Also, a strike on the BZHRK can be inflicted by conventional forces and / or enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups. [/ quote]
About BZHRK already wrote. There will be no 30-40 missiles in it, nor will there be 75 wagons

[quote = AVM] That's the point that short trains are suspicious. If there are a lot of them, then it will be strange - a lot of small trains scatter from the base, the railway network is not so ramified .. 75 cars are the average length of Russian Railways trains. And drag ballast, well, I don’t know .. [/ quote]
Not a short composition in itself was suspicious. The same passengers were no more in the number of cars. The unmasking sign was a short train with THREE locomotives.

[quote = AVM] The length of the Yars 17 ICBM meters
The length of the 15Zh59 missile of the Kurier complex is 11,2 meters, and the mass is 15 tons

The development of the Kurier missile system (according to NATO classification - SS-X-26) began on June 21, 1983 at the Moscow Institute of Thermophysics. The military was prompted to take this step by the realization that large-sized self-propelled launchers cannot be hidden from space optical and radar reconnaissance systems of the United States. For the complex, a launcher was originally designed on a four-axle MAZ-7909 chassis, and then on a five-axle chassis. From March 1989 to May 1990, four missile test launches were made. [/ Quote]
To begin with, the institute is called MOSCOW INSTITUTE OF HEAT ENGINEERINGAnd not THERMOPHYSICS .
Flight tests of the rocket were supposed to begin in 1992, but on October 6, 1991 the program was closed. As far as it was known, only the first stage test with incomplete filling of fuel was available. And whether the missile would reach the given range parameters is unknown. At least the Americans were able to achieve only EMNIP 7,5 thousand kilometers of range instead of 10-11 ....

[quote = AVM] [quote = asv363]
2. How does the respected author plan to protect hypothetical wagons on the route without standing out from the general traffic flow on general routes?

1-2 ICBMs + 1 security truck + one mobile group on an SUV + alarm group on helicopters (promising high-speed helicopters would be useful here, by the way) [/ quote]
But will we leave 1-2 communication vehicles, a combat duty support vehicle, a combat control vehicle on the RPM? Say, why carry them with you?

[quote = AVM] [quote = asv363] 3. Does the author know the number of ICBMs that our industry can now produce per year? (This is a proposal for one ICBM mine - one missile with one warhead.) And so on. etc.

Rather, one with two. And the ability to install a third backup. No exact data. In 2008 over the years 10 Poplars were made. Then it seems like the possibilities doubled.

This is a matter of political will. It will be necessary - up to 50-70 pcs. will be brought in a year. Making Sarmatians will be an order of magnitude harder, because the liquid ICBM itself is much more complex than a “fiberglass powder keg”.
It’s like with electronic tubes and transistors in computers. If we only develop technologies, then it is easier to get acceptable characteristics on liquid (conventionally lamp) missiles, and if solid-state ICBM technology is already there (like transistor technology), then it can be made much simpler, bigger, cheaper. There are no tube PCs left, the transistors have supplanted everything ... [/ quote]
It's not just about political will. It is about the OPPORTUNITIES of the plant, the only one left. And he produces about 50 units of ICBMs and SLBMs. And the first in the region of 20-25, no more.
A rocket with a rocket engine is no more complicated than a solid fuel. It is solid propellant that is technologically more difficult to manufacture, since it is necessary to fill in a solid propellant charge and preferably without cracks and other flaws. And in the liquid - refuel the tanks and that's it ...

[quote = AVM] Then the USSR riveted "Voivode" as I now propose to make light ICBMs. ICBM "Sarmat" is likely to be a little 10-20 pcs.? They will be a priority target for the first strike. [/ quote]
With the remaining 2,5 dozen mines, what do you propose to do ???

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

To begin with, the institute is called the MOSCOW INSTITUTE OF HEAT ENGINEERING, and not THERMAL PHYSICS.

This is a quote, an insert from another site, italicized, I did not change anything in it.

Quote: Old26

A rocket with a rocket engine is no more complicated than a solid fuel. It is solid propellant that is technologically more difficult to manufacture, since it is necessary to fill in a solid propellant charge and preferably without cracks and other flaws. And in the liquid - refuel the tanks and that's it ...

A rocket with a rocket engine is an order of magnitude more complicated due to a rocket engine. It was not in vain that I cited electron tubes and transistors as an example. initially it’s easier to develop a liquid rocket, but it will always be expensive to manufacture, like electronic lamps - a complex assembly technology, many components.

And solid fuel is more difficult to work out, but if you have already worked, then you can rivet in huge quantities. Why do you think all modern combat missiles are solid-fuel? After all, LPRE is more efficient? Long-term storage is also solved by ampulization. But even large missiles like Iskander or interceptor missiles are all solid-fuel, not to mention the little things. It is unrealistic to produce rockets with liquid-propellant engines in "commercial" quantities.

Quote: Old26

With the remaining 2,5 dozen mines, what do you propose to do ???

In the sense of? With the mines from "Voevoda"?

I am not claiming that there will be exactly 10-20 Sarmatov, but given that their cost will most likely be much higher than the Yars ICBM, which is indirectly indicated by the above cost of launch insurance, I assume that there will be few of them.

[Knell wardenheart]

I see the following options:
1) Creation of multiples of a large amount of "linden". Models of PGRK in fierce quantities, if necessary, then with radiation sources, if necessary, then with an autopilot, if necessary, with a comparable load - for which it is quite possible to introduce a state utilization program for large tonnage machines - which will be bought up, repaired and masked with proper images then be located in different parts of our country. The decision by military standards is a penny - but if the situation heats up, all this will be very menacing to creep out and go and understand what is a linden from this and what is not.

2) Informational background noise on the topic of expansion / construction of underground tunnels near silos, "in the Chinese style". Indeed, to carry out such works in a number of places - however, it is effective and large-scale to combine them with "fake" construction. To develop an economical and less secure version of a silo, suitable for rapid and mass construction - to widely trumpet about these developments and place similar installations throughout the country - let it be 80% "linden".

3) As long as our strategy is based on "guaranteed unacceptable damage" now - I believe that we need to approach differently the allocation of the main targets for destruction on the territory of a potential enemy. Perhaps less attention should be paid to military infrastructure - and more destruction of transport hubs with a large amount of valuable infrastructure, as well as goals, the destruction of which would lead to maximum disorganization of the rear and industrial ties. Under the conditions of the “doomsday war,” our own population is no less dangerous than enemy missiles - you need to take this into account.

4) Probably it is worth developing a compact analogue of a "cobalt bomb" or a similar weapon, dangerous for long-term contamination of the area - and informing the potential via closed channels. adversary that such a weapon will be used in the Kyrgyz Republic or by sabotage forces in food production areas in case of aggression ..

IMHO we must abandon the "symmetric" paradigm in looking at the US response. And to focus not on the elimination of the enemy "power", on which we are somewhat obsessed, but on the maximum value damage with a minimum of forces. Power it will bend itself - if you turn household communications and the rear into a mess. Without economic power, allies will quickly slip away from the enemy, both out of fear and in the desire to redirect trade flows and contracts. It is not at all necessary to apply all this tin - it is good enough for us to mathematically calculate this type of action, taking into account the peculiarities of the territory of potential. enemy.

Zy However, I have little faith in the desire of the United States to "bury" our country. For 40 years now, we ourselves have been doing this much more efficiently, and talk is still about the "threat from the West." Perhaps if our diplomacy had worked better - and if we were MORE CLEAR IN SELECTING PARTNERS (looks at Turkey) - we would have had fewer problems.

[snake]

And this is with our open spaces ...

What a shame ...

[AAK]

Well, India is 2 times ahead of the motorways ...: (((

[AAK]

Colleagues, there is another not named by you, but quite suitable option for camouflaging an ICBM launcher - ordinary river barges. Deadweight - from several hundred tons to 1000 tons, is quite enough to accommodate 4-6 ICBMs in the dimensions of the Kurier with the appropriate infrastructure (4 barges of 6 launchers - that's the Trident and no titanium vessels and reactors are needed ...) ... Launch containers are quite suitable masked with a small layer of sand (crushed stone, coal, etc.) or imitation of loading timber from an ordinary slab. From time to time, drag the tug from place to place, you can imitate loading and unloading ... Even on a frozen river - a perfectly acceptable position in the backwater, even a start on the move - even at anchor, we have hundreds of barges on large rivers, quite you can contain several dozen with the desired load. On the canals - drive them all over the European part ... In Siberia and the Far East - the rivers are long, and even the direction along the meridian, and the Amur - along the parallel, it is very convenient ... And the right people are like river workers ... :) )

[agond]

Quote: AAK

Colleagues, there is another, but not quite suitable, option for camouflaging the PU ICBMs - ordinary river barges

It’s true that it’s much cheaper to build a small barge for a pair of missiles than a chassis for Poplar or Yars, and if in Yars, for example, a saboteur can damage a plastic case from an ordinary gun by firing from bushes along the route, then it will be safer on the barge, and then with barges can be launched and heavier than missiles, for example Sineva.

[Tektor]

What is the advantage of mobile PGRK? Yes, that he can even shoot from Antarctica, which is not visible by satellites.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Tektor

What is the advantage of mobile PGRK? Yes, that he can even shoot from Antarctica, which is not visible by satellites.

And do you plan to deploy a lot of PGRC in Antarctica?

[Tektor]

If there were a pair of Mistral, then they would be able to deliver 2 pieces, i.e. 4 pcs in one go. Yars has up to 4 warheads, i.e. up to 16 key goals could be under attack.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

A rocket with a rocket engine is no more complicated than a solid fuel. It is solid propellant that is technologically more difficult to manufacture, since it is necessary to fill in a solid propellant charge and preferably without cracks and other flaws. And in the liquid - refuel the tanks and that's it ...

A rocket with a rocket engine is an order of magnitude more complicated due to a rocket engine. It was not in vain that I cited electron tubes and transistors as an example. initially it’s easier to develop a liquid rocket, but it will always be expensive to manufacture, like electronic lamps - a complex assembly technology, many components.

And solid fuel is more difficult to work out, but if you have already worked, then you can rivet in huge quantities. Why do you think all modern combat missiles are solid-fuel? After all, LPRE is more efficient? Long-term storage is also solved by ampulization. But even large missiles like Iskander or interceptor missiles are all solid-fuel, not to mention the little things. It is unrealistic to produce rockets with liquid-propellant engines in "commercial" quantities.

Well, I do not agree with the fact that liquid rocket engines are more difficult to manufacture (more expensive - quite possibly). For some reason, everyone who has become a rocket power starts with simpler rockets with liquid propellant rocket engines, and only after gaining experience, having gained a "school", they switch to solid-fuel ones. Take as an example the same China, the same DPRK, the same Iran. First, rockets with liquid propellant rocket engines, as simpler, and only then the transition to solid fuel.
Riveting in huge quantities of rockets with solid propellant rocket engines also does not work. For unlike liquid propellant rocket engines, they must be refueled in factories. Now imagine the complexity of the process of filling a solid fuel charge, if you need to simultaneously fill up 20-30 tons of fuel, for example. Moreover, depending on the need to make sure that there are not only channels in the body of the charge, but also that the hardening process takes place normally, without blemishes

Lrd is more effective? Yes, but now the difference, for example, in the specific impulses of liquid and solid fuel engines has significantly decreased. And solid propellant rocket motors have come close to liquid ones by this parameter

Modern solid rockets are not only because, as you say, they are simpler. They have many advantages compared to liquid rockets. But there are certain disadvantages ... The process of extending the service life of rockets with rocket engines is easier than rockets with solid propellant rocket engines

Sorry, Andrei, but I can't even call my tongue a large Iskander missile. Well, you would say this about 15Ж60, 15Ж61 - that would be understandable. Starting more than 100 tons, And the dimensions are decent. Iskander's launch mass is more than 20 times less ....
As for interceptor missiles, everything is not so simple there either. The 51T6 long-range intercept missiles have a solid-propellant starting engine, and a liquid-propellant sustainer. Atmospheric interceptors of the 53T6 type have solid fuel. At the "Nudoli", judging by the open materials - solid fuel.

Quote: AVM

It is unrealistic to produce rockets with liquid-propellant engines in "commercial" quantities.

Unrealistic? We will not consider space, we will focus only on the number put into service
(the number of produced is much larger, but we won’t even count them, what a trifle) strategic land-based missiles.
So, everything was armed with strategic missiles (with a range of more than 1000 km)
• rockets with LRE - 3504 units.
• missiles with solid propellant rocket engines - 1275 units.
And then you say that in commodity quantities is unrealistic? But I didn’t touch the SLBMs in service.
Two examples.
R-12 BRDS was in service with 572 units, and 2300 units were produced
IRBM RSD-12 "Pioneer" was in service with 405 units, and 728 units were produced.
And if the number of those standing in service can be judged, then the number produced is unfortunately not always. But even the liquid rockets that were in service were almost three times as many as solid fuel ...

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

With the remaining 2,5 dozen mines, what do you propose to do ???

In the sense of? With the mines from "Voevoda"?
I am not claiming that there will be exactly 10-20 Sarmatov, but given that their cost will most likely be much higher than the Yars ICBM, which is indirectly indicated by the above cost of launch insurance, I assume that there will be few of them.

I also do not know how much the same "Yars" costs, but how much "Sarmat". Of course, the Sarmat will be more expensive due to the small series compared to the Yars, due to the fact that the missile is larger and more materials and equipment will be needed. But this is not directly related to the cost of insurance. There, first of all, the launch risk is taken into account, then the risks of causing environmental damage due to the impact on the environment of the CMT ...
Well, the mines from "Voevod" in the amount of at least 46 units continue to be listed as undeveloped. Therefore, IMHO, at least 46 units of "Sarmat" will be deployed, some of which may be equipped with "Vanguards"

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

A rocket with a rocket engine is no more complicated than a solid fuel. It is solid propellant that is technologically more difficult to manufacture, since it is necessary to fill in a solid propellant charge and preferably without cracks and other flaws. And in the liquid - refuel the tanks and that's it ...

A rocket with a rocket engine is an order of magnitude more complicated due to a rocket engine. It was not in vain that I cited electron tubes and transistors as an example. initially it’s easier to develop a liquid rocket, but it will always be expensive to manufacture, like electronic lamps - a complex assembly technology, many components.

And solid fuel is more difficult to work out, but if you have already worked, then you can rivet in huge quantities. Why do you think all modern combat missiles are solid-fuel? After all, LPRE is more efficient? Long-term storage is also solved by ampulization. But even large missiles like Iskander or interceptor missiles are all solid-fuel, not to mention the little things. It is unrealistic to produce rockets with liquid-propellant engines in "commercial" quantities.

Well, I do not agree with the fact that liquid rocket engines are more difficult to manufacture (more expensive - quite possibly). For some reason, everyone who has become a rocket power starts with simpler rockets with liquid propellant rocket engines, and only after gaining experience, having gained a "school", they switch to solid-fuel ones. Take as an example the same China, the same DPRK, the same Iran. First, rockets with liquid propellant rocket engines, as simpler, and only then the transition to solid fuel.

OK, then another example. Mechanical watches appeared first, and with a huge lag behind electronic ones. But now, when electronic ones can be riveted by millions, mechanical ones comparable in accuracy are several orders of magnitude more expensive.

Russian Railways is a complex mechanical device requiring a huge number of technological operations. And you can’t get rid of it.

With solid fuel, it is necessary to reach a certain level, which is more difficult, but then it pays off with cheap production. This often happens - it's more difficult to design, easier to produce.

Or take our ATGMs. In the West, they are almost all non-rotating, but ours are rotating, why? Yes, because our technology is worse, tolerances on manufacturing accuracy are higher, therefore the “curvature” is compensated by rotation, which incidentally negatively affects the cumulative stream, and defeating the tank on the fly makes it generally impossible. And designing a control system for a rotating rocket is much more difficult.

So with the LRE. Initially, this technology was more difficult to master, so they started with rockets with LRE, but when the technology worked out, the proportion of LRE began to fall rapidly.

Quote: Old26

Lrd is more effective? Yes, but now the difference, for example, in the specific impulses of liquid and solid fuel engines has significantly decreased. And solid propellant rocket motors have come close to liquid ones by this parameter

This is true, and this is another plus in the treasury of solid rockets. In the United States, they even seem to want to make the first stage of one of the space rockets fully solid fuel, based on shuttle boosters.

Quote: Old26

Unrealistic? We will not consider space, we will focus only on the number put into service
(the number of produced is much larger, but we won’t even count them, what a trifle) strategic land-based missiles.
So, everything was armed with strategic missiles (with a range of more than 1000 km)
• rockets with LRE - 3504 units.
• missiles with solid propellant rocket engines - 1275 units.
And then you say that in commodity quantities is unrealistic? But I didn’t touch the SLBMs in service.
Two examples.
R-12 BRDS was in service with 572 units, and 2300 units were produced
IRBM RSD-12 "Pioneer" was in service with 405 units, and 728 units were produced.
And if the number of those standing in service can be judged, then the number produced is unfortunately not always. But even the liquid rockets that were in service were almost three times as many as solid fuel ...

Everything is correct. But there are two nuances:
1. We developed the technology of powerful solid propellant rocket engines later, hence the rockets from Russian Railways - there was no alternative. The same US switched to solid propellant rocket engines much earlier.
2. What funds have been spent on this? What percentage of GDP did they eat? And how much money would have been spent in rubles and in% for the production of solid fuel rockets equivalent in total weight to the load output. Enormous forces were thrown at the missiles in the USSR; the Russian Federation simply will not pull much LRE.

Quote: Old26

Well, the mines from "Voevod" in the amount of at least 46 units continue to be listed as undeveloped. Therefore, IMHO, at least 46 units of "Sarmat" will be deployed, some of which may be equipped with "Vanguards"

Quite possibly. Under the Vanguards, they may not be anything, although here everything depends on the actual invulnerability of the Vanguard itself. And then it turns out that knocking it down is easier than a conventional nuclear ballistic missile. And it is visible for 100500 km due to the huge thermal footprint.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

I proceed from the fact that the United States will radically increase its ability to produce cheap satellites, having worked out technologies in the civil sector, I wrote about this here: https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle- 2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html
Those. they will provide real-time control of the planet in high resolution in the radar range, with the specification of the type of target in the optical and thermal, and possibly in the UV ranges.

it is not difficult to increase the production of cheap satellites. Look, "kubsats" are launched by several tens of one launch vehicle .. The question is different. Their sizes are so insignificant that anything serious can hardly be put there. The same satellites of the KN series have a weight of 13 to 17 tons, a length of 19,5 meters and a diameter of 3 meters. About 2/3 of the length is occupied by a camera lens, which allows you to take pictures with a resolution of 15 cm.And what can be placed in a cube, whose length is 30 cm
Remote sensing satellites can play a role in the search for the same PGRK, because it is difficult to mask the launcher in several spectral zones at once, but these satellites have a resolution of tens of meters. And they cannot identify such a goal as APU. For radar satellites, the resolution is also insufficient to identify the target alone.
And something can be found only in the complex. OER satellite, remote sensing satellite, radar reconnaissance satellite. And in order to keep the territory of Russia under absolute control, the Americans would need several hundred satellites in each direction. This is unrealistic, both from a financial point of view and from the point of view of managing all this economy. Since besides this, a similar number of satellite transponders will be needed ...

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

It is extremely difficult to hit a highly protected silo with high-precision nuclear warheads. For the KVO (the best) for the Americans is about 120 meters. To hit the silos with a guarantee, according to the same American calculations, at least 2 blocks are needed, and the explosion should not be airborne, and perhaps even not ground, but the warheads should go deep into the ground, so that later, during the explosion, the seismic wave would "crush the mine." ... And given the fact that the doctrine spelled out OVU (retaliatory strike), no one will wait for the defeat of the mines. In the tens of minutes that will elapse between the start of the American weapon and before
missile targets (silos) missiles have time to start ...

Not easy, but they are working on it. And for this, they left the INF Treaty so that there were not tens of minutes, but 5-7. SPRN may not be in time. About this here: https://topwar.ru/166706-zakat-jadernoj-triady-oruzhie-ssha-dlja-nanesenija-obezglavlivajuschego-udara.html

They work, I do not argue. But do not think that American boats will appear near our territorial waters from nowhere. In addition, the location of boats near the territory of Russia will make it possible to use not only SPRN radars, but also other means. A flight time to the mines in a few minutes is enough for most missiles to reach their target

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

Such a complex is quite capable of being lost among many thousands of trucks on a million kilometers of Russian roads, even despite continuous tracking from satellites in real time.

Continuous tracking by satellites does not exist in nature. And in general, an ordinary truck and an ordinary wagon were only at the first stage of development. As you yourself wrote below, then the three-axle tractor was replaced by four, and then by a five-axle tractor. And the last two already did not resemble a "civilian truck" at all ...

If not, then no. If you noticed, I focus on “many mines”. Real and false.

Drew. But the strategic treaties contain a clause prohibiting reserve and false mines. Violation of this provision will automatically nullify all other provisions of the contract and we will have a hard time. In particular, the SALT-2 treaty contains a provision prohibiting the use of civilian aircraft (passenger and transport) as weapons carriers. Taking into account the fact that our civil air fleet "shrunk" in comparison with the Soviet Civil Air Fleet, and our "sworn friends" have it developed and large enough in size, it costs them nothing to replace a useful one on several dozen aircraft such as the Boeing-747 loads from passengers on cruise missiles ... Therefore, "sharp gestures" in violation of contracts are fraught. And first of all for us.

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

At the end of 2019, there are 18 Topol-M PGRKs and 120 RS-24 Yars PGRK in the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, it can be assumed that they will need to deploy about 150-200 courier-type PGRKs to replace them. If there are three warheads per ICBM, the total number of nuclear warheads (NWF) on them will be about 450-600 units.

Sorry, but on the "Courier" it was planned ONE WARNING. That is, in fact, you are replacing almost 380 warheads with 150-200. Meaning???

In general, the meaning of 1 nuclear warhead per 1 ICBM is that covering the first hit with 600 ICBMs with 1 nuclear warhead is 3 times more difficult than 200 ICBMs with 3 nuclear warheads.
Warheads haven't been understated since? Maybe they can put 3 now?

Yes, harder to cover, but harder to strike back. It’s necessary to have not 300 ICBMs, but 900. And this is money and time. The warheads, in principle, remained the same as they were at the time of the conclusion of the test ban treaty. It can be made both miniature and with a capacity of 200 megatons, but no one can guarantee operability without testing ...

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

The train itself can accommodate several dozen ICBMs + auxiliary units and security forces, which makes it comparable in combat power to a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

BZHRK "Molodets" had 3 launchers with three missiles and 30 warheads. "Barguzin", if they decide to deploy it, will have 6 missiles in its composition. Dozens of missiles are out of the question.

The projected Barguzin BZHRK was supposed to have 14 cars, of which only three were supposed to be with ICBMs.

No one knows how many wagons there should be wagons. It is only known that the composition should be SIX launchers. Therefore, the iconography that you cited, although watchable, does not correspond to reality. As well as "Bulava" as a missile for BZHRK. It was clearly stated that the rocket would be based on Yars.

It is interesting to understand what the limitation is, why exactly 6, not 8 or 12? As I said, I considered the size of BZHRK on the basis of the need for camouflage among the same compositions, nothing more.

Most likely in the first place by the staff of the missile regiment. It has 6 or 10 heavy missiles, or 6 light, or 9 mobile unpaved ones. Most likely there are limitations in the combat control equipment ...
On "Molodets" 3 launchers were determined by the structure of the complex. For, if necessary, each Pruska module, consisting of 3 cars, could be hooked up to the locomotive and moved to a sufficiently large distance, leaving the auxiliary cars and the checkpoint somewhere at the halt. It is not known how many locomotives there will be at Barguzin. Most likely there will be 1-2 and the launchers will not be "delivered".

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

I proceed from the fact that the United States will radically increase its ability to produce cheap satellites, having worked out technologies in the civil sector, I wrote about this here: https://topwar.ru/167689-zakat-jadernoj-triady-pro-ssha-posle- 2030-goda-perehvatit-tysjachi-boegolovok.html
Those. they will provide real-time control of the planet in high resolution in the radar range, with the specification of the type of target in the optical and thermal, and possibly in the UV ranges.

it is not difficult to increase the production of cheap satellites. Look, "kubsats" are launched by several tens of one launch vehicle .. The question is different. Their sizes are so insignificant that anything serious can hardly be put there. The same satellites of the KN series have a weight of 13 to 17 tons, a length of 19,5 meters and a diameter of 3 meters. About 2/3 of the length is occupied by a camera lens, which allows you to take pictures with a resolution of 15 cm.And what can be placed in a cube, whose length is 30 cm
Remote sensing satellites can play a role in the search for the same PGRK, because it is difficult to mask the launcher in several spectral zones at once, but these satellites have a resolution of tens of meters. And they cannot identify such a goal as APU. For radar satellites, the resolution is also insufficient to identify the target alone.
And something can be found only in the complex. OER satellite, remote sensing satellite, radar reconnaissance satellite. And in order to keep the territory of Russia under absolute control, the Americans would need several hundred satellites in each direction. This is unrealistic, both from a financial point of view and from the point of view of managing all this economy. Since besides this, a similar number of satellite transponders will be needed ...

Ancient satellites, now everything can be implemented much more compactly. As an example, see how the cameras in smartphones have changed. But the main thing is not this, but the fact that the radar and optical image can be formed on the principle of a dragonfly eye from many satellites. If there are numbers of thousands of satellites, then this is quite real.

Quote: Old26

They work, I do not argue. But do not think that American boats will appear near our territorial waters from nowhere. In addition, the location of boats near the territory of Russia will make it possible to use not only SPRN radars, but also other means. A flight time to the mines in a few minutes is enough for most missiles to reach their target

Indeed, it is necessary that the missiles not only come out of the mines, but also that the whole chain goes from the moment of detection of the SPRN — detection, transmission of commands, awaken the responsible persons, give a command to strike. Try to get up at 3 nights and make decisions about the end of the world in 1 minute.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

I took the data of Russian Railways: https://www.rzd-partner.ru/zhd-transport/news/sredniy-ves-gruzovogo-poezda-na-seti-rzhd-uvelichen-do-4045-tonn/ and repelled from them.

I repeat, Andrew. On central highways can be and go such trains on 75 cars. In the outback, not on the central highways. The divisions of the BZHRK, except for Krasnoyarsk, were not on the main highways, I think that even now, if we decide to deploy a division of the BZHRK, there will also be a division somewhere in the outback - so, there are no such formations there. And if there is, then they are extremely few. Most often, a maximum of 50 wagons. In 2018, he traveled on business from Stavropol to Moscow, and so I didn’t meet oncoming transverse ones of such length ... Somewhere within 30-50

Quote: AVM

START-3 ends February 5, 2021.

Nothing prevents or prolong the contract for the next 5 years, or without prolonging to withdraw from it, but by mutual agreement to comply with the provisions of the contract. It has already been so many times ...

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

This is prohibited by the EMNIP treaty even SALT-2, the provisions of which we and the Americans continue to adhere to ... False mines are "outlawed" ....

Yes? Well, these are problems to be solved. The United States does not take a steam bath when they need it, withdraw from any treaties. We need false mines. It is effective. The US needs SSBNs because they dominate the sea. Why do we need them to meet them?

Before withdrawing from contracts, you need to imagine the possible consequences of such a withdrawal. Leave the contract now and stop adhering to the parameters of previous contracts, we will receive a "response". which we will not like. Only offhand positions that "will be covered with a copper basin" with this output
• restriction on cruise missiles on bombers. Under the OSV-2 agreement, the maximum number of such missiles was to be 28. Such a number of ALCMs could raise the B-52. We had a maximum on TU-95 and this maximum was 16 ...
• a ban on the use of aircraft (passenger, transport) as carriers of weapons (cruise and ballistic missiles). The Boeing-747 should have accommodated EMNIP 72-78 cruise missiles. Others have less. But when a Boeing passenger flies to your country, there will be no guarantee that there will be no cruise missiles instead of passengers.
• ban on the creation of bases at the bottom (mobile and stationary)
• a ban on the installation of missiles at such bases with a range of not more than 600 km
• a ban on the use of boats as carriers of missiles if the range of the missile is more than 600 km and the placement of such means in inland waters ...
All this will lead to the fact that the enemy will deploy an order of magnitude more such bases and means than we ....

Quote: AVM

What kind of fuel is draining? Solid? A modern rocket is installed in 2 hours. I’m not sure that the task of reducing time was generally posed, because now they are being set for a long time. And if such a task is posed for a promising solid-fuel ICBM, then it is possible that they will meet it in half an hour.

They won't do it in half an hour. In this regard, the Strategic Missile Forces does not welcome the "Stakhanov movement" for the rapid removal of missiles from mines.
Moreover, now most of the mines have missiles with 1 BG and there is no reason to relocate for safety. But multi-headed ones need to be relocated. And such, in most cases, liquid. Mostly "Voevods". And it takes time to drain about 180 tons of SRT. Disconnect the fairing, extension, BB and APB, then remove the rocket. Then transfer it to a distance of at least 10-15 km and repeat the whole process in reverse order. I think at least 8 hours can be met ...

Quote: AVM

And here is the "Governor"? It was about launching Yars ICBMs. Yes and it doesn’t matter. In your opinion, the anti-missiles in their own TPKs cannot be assembled in a package such as how ships form UVP assemblies?

So much the worse. The diameter of the shaft will be even smaller. In the package you can collect anything you want. But how many such TPKs with interceptors can be placed in such a mine? One? Two? And what will it give if there is no control loop and the missiles do not know where the target is located, which the missile should hit

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

In addition, how are you going to use these anti-missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar means ???

This is a question. Or the radar is installed directly in the general anti-missile defense complex, and is advanced when the mine opens (i.e., it turns out something like a highly protected missile defense system in silos). Or the radar should be carried out at a considerable distance, so that it is not destroyed by the first strike and carries out an external control system. In the worst case, the enemy will have to strike at it, reducing the strike order for silos with ICBMs.

An example of a missile defense firing radar - radar "Don" in the Moscow region with a diameter of the EMNIP radar mirror of 16 meters. You want to put a radar with a diameter of 2-3 meters. And what will he see with you? A warhead at a height of a hundred meters? And to take it away - so on such a radar and it's not a pity to spend BG

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

I took the data of Russian Railways: https://www.rzd-partner.ru/zhd-transport/news/sredniy-ves-gruzovogo-poezda-na-seti-rzhd-uvelichen-do-4045-tonn/ and repelled from them.

I repeat, Andrew. On central highways can be and go such trains on 75 cars. In the outback, not on the central highways. The divisions of the BZHRK, except for Krasnoyarsk, were not on the main highways, I think that even now, if we decide to deploy a division of the BZHRK, there will also be a division somewhere in the outback - so, there are no such formations there. And if there is, then they are extremely few. Most often, a maximum of 50 wagons. In 2018, he traveled on business from Stavropol to Moscow, and so I didn’t meet oncoming transverse ones of such length ... Somewhere within 30-50

This is not critical, it is possible and less. I do not quite understand the subject of the dispute. First of all, I do not consider the BZHRK to be an ideal carrier of ICBMs, but conventional CRs like Caliber in a container yes. And there are too few paths for ICBMs - they will calculate it before the first strike.

Quote: Old26

Before withdrawing from contracts, you need to imagine the possible consequences of such a withdrawal. Leave the contract now and stop adhering to the parameters of previous contracts, we will receive a "response". which we will not like. Only offhand positions that "will be covered with a copper basin" with this output
• restriction on cruise missiles on bombers. Under the OSV-2 agreement, the maximum number of such missiles was to be 28. Such a number of ALCMs could raise the B-52. We had a maximum on TU-95 and this maximum was 16 ...
• a ban on the use of aircraft (passenger, transport) as carriers of weapons (cruise and ballistic missiles). The Boeing-747 should have accommodated EMNIP 72-78 cruise missiles. Others have less. But when a Boeing passenger flies to your country, there will be no guarantee that there will be no cruise missiles instead of passengers.
• ban on the creation of bases at the bottom (mobile and stationary)
• a ban on the installation of missiles at such bases with a range of not more than 600 km
• a ban on the use of boats as carriers of missiles if the range of the missile is more than 600 km and the placement of such means in inland waters ...
All this will lead to the fact that the enemy will deploy an order of magnitude more such bases and means than we ....

The whole trick is that they still do what they want, from the point of view of violation of US treaties there are no equal. And according to technology, a passenger plane just can’t be converted into a CD carrier - it will be a completely different design - you will have to change the entire power pack. If the United States does this, it will immediately become known, and their civil aviation will have problems, many countries will cease to let them in over their territory.

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

What kind of fuel is draining? Solid? A modern rocket is installed in 2 hours. I’m not sure that the task of reducing time was generally posed, because now they are being set for a long time. And if such a task is posed for a promising solid-fuel ICBM, then it is possible that they will meet it in half an hour.

They won't do it in half an hour. In this regard, the Strategic Missile Forces does not welcome the "Stakhanov movement" for the rapid removal of missiles from mines.
Moreover, now most of the mines have missiles with 1 BG and there is no reason to relocate for safety. But multi-headed ones need to be relocated. And such, in most cases, liquid. Mostly "Voevods". And it takes time to drain about 180 tons of SRT. Disconnect the fairing, extension, BB and APB, then remove the rocket. Then transfer it to a distance of at least 10-15 km and repeat the whole process in reverse order. I think at least 8 hours can be met ...

Of course, it is unrealistic to relocate the Governor or Sarmat. I spoke only about Yars. Actually, the presence of reserve and false mines does not mean that ICBMs need to be constantly dragged back and forth. Their very presence creates a situation of uncertainty for the enemy.

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

And here is the "Governor"? It was about launching Yars ICBMs. Yes and it doesn’t matter. In your opinion, the anti-missiles in their own TPKs cannot be assembled in a package such as how ships form UVP assemblies?

So much the worse. The diameter of the shaft will be even smaller. In the package you can collect anything you want. But how many such TPKs with interceptors can be placed in such a mine? One? Two? And what will it give if there is no control loop and the missiles do not know where the target is located, which the missile should hit

Depending on what diameter we can make anti-missiles, maybe 3-4. But even 2 can be enough for us to bring down the U.S. missile defense satellite issuing the missile defense system.

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

In addition, how are you going to use these anti-missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in the complete absence of radar means ???

This is a question. Or the radar is installed directly in the general anti-missile defense complex, and is advanced when the mine opens (i.e., it turns out something like a highly protected missile defense system in silos). Or the radar should be carried out at a considerable distance, so that it is not destroyed by the first strike and carries out an external control system. In the worst case, the enemy will have to strike at it, reducing the strike order for silos with ICBMs.

An example of a missile defense firing radar - radar "Don" in the Moscow region with a diameter of the EMNIP radar mirror of 16 meters. You want to put a radar with a diameter of 2-3 meters. And what will he see with you? A warhead at a height of a hundred meters? And to take it away - so on such a radar and it's not a pity to spend BG

Ancient radar. With redundant tasks for our purposes. We need an analogue of Aegis radar (1 canvas) or PRO THAAD. Moreover, here the tasks are already, since we are detecting and pointing at a target whose orbit is previously known. Even when changing the orbit, it does not change radically (satellites do not have so much fuel). In addition, the satellites will remain in place before the strike, otherwise their mass movement will cause suspicion.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

And what can be monitored on the roads, when mine missiles are placed in silos for years and can only be removed for routine maintenance, and the PGRK routes will be "inside" such a zone. Don't you think that the Americans are so "stupid" that they would agree to such an agreement ...

Do not mix warm with soft. About PGRK did not go.
For silos a certain zone is allocated, large, closed. One entry - one exit to the zone. The United States can control the number of ICBMs and UCL at entry. But how we move them inside the zone from silos to silos is not their business.

This is utter nonsense. A regiment of heavy missiles with 6 launchers is approximately a rectangle of 20 x 40 km, maybe a little less. Division - let there be 4 regiments - that is, the approximate area is more than 3000 square kilometers. Taking into account that the mine regiments and divisions are not located in the taiga, but rather in the forest-steppe zone, then try to "build" only two roads into a rectangle with an area of ​​3000 square kilometers. With a checkpoint. Are you going to fence this entire area around the perimeter? I can still understand when American inspectors were sitting at the VSW checkpoint, controlling the export of finished products. But in the positional area of ​​the division - this is beyond comprehension ...
The whole point of inspections is that inspectors can suddenly check a specific mine and check the number of APs on a rocket. And what you offer is a fiction, not an inspection. Or do you think that our missiles and BG will be tested, and the Americans will sit at two checkpoints if there are several dozen roads to this zone ???

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

You correctly specified. In case of disclosure. Even under START-1/2, the deployment area was set at 250 square meters. km And without a contract, purely technical restrictions are imposed on the deployment area. And the advanced divisions have their own anti-sabotage units. Yes, and try to find a division in the forest in a circle with a radius of 000-300 km ...

I may not find it, but when several thousand satellites are hanging in the sky, forming radars with a distributed synthesized aperture and a set of multispectral sensors, then the chances of hiding will be much less than now, if at all. We are talking about the medium term.

A few thousand WILL NEVER. The order of reconnaissance satellites - it can be 4-8 specialized and with a dozen auxiliary (ERS)

Quote: Knell Wardenheart

I see the following options:
1) Creation of multiples of a large amount of "linden". Models of PGRK in fierce quantities, if necessary, then with radiation sources, if necessary, then with an autopilot, if necessary, with a comparable load - for which it is quite possible to introduce a state utilization program for large tonnage machines - which will be bought up, repaired and masked with proper images then be located in different parts of our country. The decision by military standards is a penny - but if the situation heats up, all this will be very menacing to creep out and go and understand what is a linden from this and what is not.

PGRK models in fierce quantities can only be obtained in fantasy. The cost of the chassis for Yars is about 65 million rubles. For a year, we supply them with two dozen. Something other than rocketry, I have not seen 7 or 8-axle chassis from civilian consumers. Are you going to show this linden to the inspection too ???

Quote: Knell Wardenheart

I see the following options:
2) Informational background noise on the expansion / construction of underground tunnels next to silos, "in the Chinese style". Indeed, to carry out such works in a number of places - however, it is effective and large-scale to combine them with "fake" construction. To develop an economical and less secure version of a silo, suitable for rapid and mass construction - to widely trumpet these developments and place similar installations throughout the country - let it be 80% "linden"

As a last resort silos are located in the forest-steppe zone. Try to find in the area of ​​Dombarovskiy or Kozelsk a mountain ridge where you are going to carry out "false construction work". And most importantly, everyone is proposing to "trumpet" about it. That is, to sign your own stupidity?

Quote: Knell Wardenheart

I see the following options:
3) As long as our strategy is based on "guaranteed unacceptable damage" now - I believe that we need to approach differently the allocation of the main targets for destruction on the territory of a potential enemy. Perhaps less attention should be paid to military infrastructure - and more destruction of transport hubs with a large amount of valuable infrastructure, as well as goals, the destruction of which would lead to maximum disorganization of the rear and industrial ties. Own population in the conditions of "Yom Kippur War" is no less dangerous than enemy missiles - this must be taken into account

And we never planned to strike at exclusively military targets. In order to hit the positional area of ​​the regiment (or wing) it was necessary to have accurate missiles. And since our accuracy was lame until a certain time, we put super-powerful warheads with a capacity of 15-20 megatons on missiles. But to hit the already empty mines is extremely stupid. One goal remains - civilian infrastructure.
About 7-10 years ago, on the network, one of the users (ours) published his own study, built on open data. I calculated the approximate amount of required BG (minimum). So here. Among the goals he had 9 million cities with 6-12 charges per city. 28 large cities and industrial centers (3-6 warheads each), 6 naval bases, 15 air bases, 60 other military facilities, 25 power plants and about 22-25 large transport hubs ... As you can see, mostly civilian infrastructure

Quote: Knell Wardenheart

I see the following options:
4) Probably it is worth developing a compact analogue of a "cobalt bomb" or a similar weapon, dangerous for long-term contamination of the area - and informing the potential via closed channels. adversary that such a weapon will be used in the Kyrgyz Republic or by sabotage forces in food production areas in case of aggression ..

How everyone likes to do something and then inform the enemy through open and closed channels. Likely for him to do the same for our population. Or maybe something worse ...

Quote: agond

Quote: AAK

Colleagues, there is another, but not quite suitable, option for camouflaging the PU ICBMs - ordinary river barges

It’s true that it’s much cheaper to build a small barge for a pair of missiles than a chassis for Poplar or Yars, and if in Yars, for example, a saboteur can damage a plastic case from an ordinary gun by firing from bushes along the route, then it will be safer on the barge, and then with barges can be launched and heavier than missiles, for example Sineva.

Even if we ignore the fact that it is forbidden to deploy missiles with a range of more than 600 km on non-submarine floating craft, the question is, what, do our rifles have a firing range of 50-100 meters? What prevents to hit such a launcher on a barge from the same rifle. One more thing. Sineva is lighter than Yars ....

Quote: Fan-Fan

Why did the author not consider this possibility?

Because there is a ban in strategic agreements on such launchers.

Quote: SovAr238A

Have many read the START treaty itself?
Cognitive points regarding control.

There, the most interesting thing is not in the agreements themselves, but in the documents for such an agreement. All these joint definitions, statements, etc.

Quote: agond

For a car chassis, it would be nice to create two-stage "clamshell" rockets, that is, we carry on a car two stages of 7 m long, connected by a hinge, and before starting, we quickly unfold and get a rocket 14 m long,

Nda. For delirium with a hinge, he did not even put you a minus ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Old26

The order of reconnaissance satellites - it can be 4-8 specialized and with a dozen auxiliary (ERS)

This is too small, given that in the USSR even the fleet had its own specialized reconnaissance satellites, not to mention the GRU orbital group. If we want to talk about receiving real-time information from optoelectronic and radio-technical reconnaissance satellites, then we will only need a dozen low-orbit ones, and most likely more, given that we already have several areas of operational interest.

[agond]

Quote: ccsr

Even if we ignore the fact that it is forbidden to deploy missiles with a range of more than 600 km on non-submarine floating craft, the question is, what, do our rifles have a firing range of 50-100 meters? What prevents to hit such a launcher on a barge from the same rifle. One more thing. Sineva is lighter than Yars ....

True, the barge is not a submarine, so you need to do something that falls under the definition of a submarine, I repeat, imagine, for example, "Sineva" was placed in a container with the option of ascent, immersion and the option of at least some kind of underwater passage, and a barrel with a stool on which sitting (at the time of the performance) a sailor in a cap, then who can say that this is not a submarine?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

And what can be monitored on the roads, when mine missiles are placed in silos for years and can only be removed for routine maintenance, and the PGRK routes will be "inside" such a zone. Don't you think that the Americans are so "stupid" that they would agree to such an agreement ...

Do not mix warm with soft. About PGRK did not go.
For silos a certain zone is allocated, large, closed. One entry - one exit to the zone. The United States can control the number of ICBMs and UCL at entry. But how we move them inside the zone from silos to silos is not their business.

This is utter nonsense. A regiment of heavy missiles with 6 launchers is approximately a rectangle of 20 x 40 km, maybe a little less. Division - let there be 4 regiments - that is, the approximate area is more than 3000 square kilometers. Taking into account that the mine regiments and divisions are not located in the taiga, but rather in the forest-steppe zone, then try to "build" only two roads into a rectangle with an area of ​​3000 square kilometers. With a checkpoint. Are you going to fence this entire area around the perimeter? I can still understand when American inspectors were sitting at the VSW checkpoint, controlling the export of finished products. But in the positional area of ​​the division - this is beyond comprehension ...

The security system should be built, as now. The question is that there should be no other access routes, except through the checkpoint, where inspectors can check the number of nuclear warheads. And then I'm sorry.

You can also envisage measures to protect against the installation of additional nuclear warheads on ICBMs. However, if they are filled “to the eyeballs,” for example, 3 nuclear warheads per ICBM, then there will be nowhere to add new ones. Why would they then climb the mines?

A quietly transport ICBMs in the absence of roads, well, this is still a risk.

Quote: Old26

The whole point of inspections is that inspectors can suddenly check a specific mine and check the number of APs on a rocket. And what you offer is a fiction, not an inspection. Or do you think that our missiles and BG will be tested, and the Americans will sit at two checkpoints if there are several dozen roads to this zone ???

And can we just now check how many BBs are in the Trident mines? After all, he then goes to sea, where is the guarantee that he will not emerge at another base and will not be equipped?

Quote: Old26

A few thousand WILL NEVER. The order of reconnaissance satellites - it can be 4-8 specialized and with a dozen auxiliary (ERS)

PMSM says the opposite. At least the plans of commercial corporations imply just such quantities. Will they succeed? With 100% probability, this question cannot be answered. There is always a risk that something will go wrong - massive collisions of satellites, or increased solar activity.

But if you succeed, then these satellites will be 100% dual-use - UAV control, transmission of intelligence data. Civilian technologies often go hand in hand with the military. Have you heard that using Wi-Fi signals you can detect a person in a room behind a wall? Where is the guarantee that the signals of these celestial "base stations" cannot be used for distributed aperture radar?

Or the experience gained during their creation and mass production will not be used to deploy thousands of reconnaissance and missile defense satellites. Here we again return to the mechanical and electronic watches. Those satellites that are building now are mechanical watches, and perspective ones are electronic.

[bk0010]

I would suggest making a solid-fuel rocket (or 2 missiles with the maximum unification, for mine and mobile basing, if the mine version is much heavier due to the structures necessary for survival as a result of the passage of the shock wave) that could carry the Vanguard and have a minimum ballistic zone. And he would have put its mobile version into arsenal of the ARBR (with the Vanguard or a couple of ordinary goals - not fundamentally). Is it difficult to disguise a PGRK tractor? To make military trucks that look like PGRK, supplying the army, let them try to distinguish from a satellite who is going where. And let this army PGRK move every day from the garrison to the garrison.
Thimbles with mines is a bad idea to play: they’re such grandmothers that even the USA didn’t pull - see MX history. Hiding launchers by the lake’s shore is also spotted (the missile is delicate, it needs to be supplied and maintained, in addition, in the process of hunting for nuclear submarines, they learned to identify them at a shallow depth, and at a great depth there are big problems with placement and maintenance).
Regarding concerns that the states will withdraw from the treaties and rivet rockets. Let them go out and rivet: they have the goal of Russia, we have the whole of NATO, there are much more goals, plus they build missile defense, and not us, they do not need to create reserves for a possible interception, plus they plan the first strike, not us, they don’t it is necessary to create reserves for the destruction of missiles before launch. We need an increase in the arsenal for security, they are a heavy burden on the budget without sane benefits. We’ll make 2 heads from different carriers for each target plus reserves, and let them rivet as much as they like, they won’t kill them twice.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Ancient satellites, now everything can be implemented much more compactly. As an example, see how the cameras in smartphones have changed. But the main thing is not this, but the fact that the radar and optical image can be formed on the principle of a dragonfly eye from many satellites. If there are numbers of thousands of satellites, then this is quite real.

Smartphone cameras now and 5-10 years ago are really different things and in this regard it is difficult to object. Now imagine that you need to not just take a smartphone’s photo from a distance of 18-20 meters, but take a photo of a fly sitting on the lapel of a jacket of one of the guests. So with intelligence satellites (optoelectronic and remote sensing of the Earth). It is necessary not only to photograph, but also to distinguish details in this photograph. here you can not do without an apparatus with a good focal length of the lens. And these are the sizes. Whatever is said about the cameras of the smartphone.

Quote: AVM

Indeed, it is necessary that the missiles not only come out of the mines, but also that the whole chain goes from the moment of detection of the SPRN — detection, transmission of commands, awaken the responsible persons, give a command to strike. Try to get up at 3 nights and make decisions about the end of the world in 1 minute.

Andrew! They already wrote to you that it is extremely unlikely that a war with the use of nuclear missile weapons will happen absolutely suddenly. There will be a period of threat and tension will increase day by day. After all, no one sets the task of war to simply strike at another country and not take advantage of the fruits of such a strike. And this means that there should be a transfer to areas of concentration of personnel and equipment units. Auxiliary units and subunits were prepared, in particular, hospitals were deployed. Created stocks of fuel, ammunition, and finally food. Strategic aviation was redeployed to auxiliary aerodromes; the maximum possible number of boats, ships, aircraft carriers were put into the sea. And this is not just a watch. These are days, weeks, and possibly even months. And I do not exclude that in such a situation the president will spend the night at home. Rather, at its own CPSU in the air and not alone, but with those who are competent to launch a nuclear strike.
Therefore, he will not have to spend time moving to KP, etc.
The whole system is actually worked out. A massive launch of missiles from the continental part of the country will be recorded approximately 5-10 seconds after launch. It will take a couple of minutes for the information from the satellite control center to be forwarded to the President. Which by then will be lifted from bed. There can’t be many boats located near our waters, otherwise the mass number of such boats will be recorded by technical means of control. Well, etc. etc.
By the way, at one time there was an article by American specialists in this field, who, in the name of "philanthropy", advocated that each of the parties should move from a preemptive and retaliatory strike exclusively to a retaliatory one. Motivating this by the fact that although there will be enough time even for the OVU, but "suddenly this is a mistake" ...
So we have time to shoot at least ICBMs ....

Quote: AVM

This is not critical, it is possible and less. I do not quite understand the subject of the dispute. First of all, I do not consider the BZHRK to be an ideal carrier of ICBMs, but conventional CRs like Caliber in a container yes. And there are too few paths for ICBMs - they will calculate it before the first strike.

I also do not consider BZHRK an ideal carrier of ICBMs. Moreover, if in Soviet times, with the planned deployment of 7 divisions, only 3 could be deployed, now it is planned to deploy ONE division. Given the fact that the divisions ’PDPs have long been destroyed, they will have to be re-created. And it’s not even millions, it’s already billions, and it’s good if rubles, not dollars.
"Caliber" in a container is a green light for the enemy to begin total destruction of the country's transport infrastructure. Especially when you consider the dreams of many to use such containers on civilian ships, that is, to deal, in principle, with acts of piracy.
In addition, the problem of missile defense for "Caliber" is solved much easier than for ICBMs ...

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

Before withdrawing from contracts, you need to imagine the possible consequences of such a withdrawal. Leave the contract now and stop adhering to the parameters of previous contracts, we will receive a "response". which we will not like. Only offhand positions that "will be covered with a copper basin" with this output
• restriction on cruise missiles on bombers. Under the OSV-2 agreement, the maximum number of such missiles was to be 28. Such a number of ALCMs could raise the B-52. We had a maximum on TU-95 and this maximum was 16 ...
• a ban on the use of aircraft (passenger, transport) as carriers of weapons (cruise and ballistic missiles). The Boeing-747 should have accommodated EMNIP 72-78 cruise missiles. Others have less. But when a Boeing passenger flies to your country, there will be no guarantee that there will be no cruise missiles instead of passengers.
• ban on the creation of bases at the bottom (mobile and stationary)
• a ban on the installation of missiles at such bases with a range of not more than 600 km
• a ban on the use of boats as carriers of missiles if the range of the missile is more than 600 km and the placement of such means in inland waters ...
All this will lead to the fact that the enemy will deploy an order of magnitude more such bases and means than we ....

The whole trick is that they still do what they want, from the point of view of violation of US treaties there are no equal. And according to technology, a passenger plane just can’t be converted into a CD carrier - it will be a completely different design - you will have to change the entire power pack. If the United States does this, it will immediately become known, and their civil aviation will have problems, many countries will cease to let them in over their territory.

You know, Andrei, with regard to violations of strategic arms treaties, I’m afraid you will not be able to bring a single serious violation of such strategic treaties by the United States. Both they and we had minor violations, but as regards serious violations of the ABM, SAL, START, INF Treaty agreements, you will not find such serious violations.

As for the passenger carrier aircraft of cruise missiles. No need to redo the design

. Modernization and refinement are needed, but nothing needs to be redone in the design. Therefore, outwardly as he was, he will remain so. Of course, it is better to use the cargo option so that there is no unmasking sign - the absence of passengers on a passenger plane ...

Quote: AVM

Depending on what diameter we can make anti-missiles, maybe 3-4. But even 2 can be enough for us to bring down the U.S. missile defense satellite issuing the missile defense system.

Shoot down SPRN satellites UNREAL. such satellites are either in a geostationary orbit of 36000 km, or in highly elliptical orbits. There are no anti-missiles capable of hitting targets at that height

Quote: AVM

And can we just now check how many BBs are in the Trident mines? After all, he then goes to sea, where is the guarantee that he will not emerge at another base and will not be equipped?

Yes, the inspection allows you to do this. Moreover, the notification time under the new contract is reduced to one day. Now, under the START-3 treaty, the number of BGs is not what the rocket passed the test with, but how many are actually installed. And on one rocket they can be one, on the remaining 15 - for example, 4.
The port (base) of the registry of a specific missile carrier boat also implies that the combat units to it, to the boat, are stored at this base in the arsenal. And there are only two such bases: Bangor Base on the Pacific Coast and King's Bay Base on the Atlantic. The passing light from one ocean to another is frayed to fool Russian inspectors ...

Quote: bk0010

I would suggest making a solid-fuel rocket (or 2 missiles with the maximum unification, for mine and mobile basing, if the mine version is much heavier due to the structures necessary for survival as a result of the passage of the shock wave) that could carry the Vanguard and have a minimum ballistic zone. .

They already exist. "Yars" for mobile complexes and "Yars-M" for mines

Quote: bk0010

Is it difficult to disguise a PGRK tractor? To make military trucks that look like PGRK, supplying the army, let them try to distinguish from a satellite who is going where. And let this army PGRK move every day from the garrison to the garrison.

Have you seen a lot of eight-axle trucks carrying materiel from one garrison to another? And how on a "truck" you can imitate a TPK, outstanding for the dimensions of a truck? I am not even talking about the fact that the distance between missile garrisons in the European part of Russia is at least 750-800 km. The cruising range of such a "truck" is about 500 km. The maximum permitted speed is 40 km. Net travel time from 18 to 20 hours. But most importantly, what will it give?

[agond]

If you set a goal, it’s possible to create a quickly assembled rocket to carry steps separately in ordinary trucks, but this is all half measures to carry, store, ballistic missiles on land, it’s not good and every year it will get worse and worse if today it is relatively difficult to hit a protected mine, then tomorrow it will be an order of magnitude easier, so the ideal option is small submarines with one, two large missiles.
By the way, the Chinese are digging mines from tunnels to the surface of the earth so they can’t be found at all.

[bk0010]

Quote: Old26

They already exist. "Yars" for mobile complexes and "Yars-M" for mines

Yars will not drag Vanguard

Quote: Old26

Have you seen many eight-axle trucks transporting assets from one garrison to another?

Just the idea is to see them and a lot.

Quote: Old26

And how on a "truck" you can imitate a TPK, outstanding for the dimensions of a truck?

What is the problem? He is empty.

Quote: Old26

YaYa is not to say that the distance between the missile garrisons in the European part of Russia is at least 750-800 km.

So the idea is that a strategic missile could be in every ARBR, and not just in the Strategic Missile Forces garrison. And the ARBR could use it both as strategic (at the beginning of the war, on command from a suitcase), and as operational-tactical (if the target was hit by other means), depending on the situation. Let them search.

Quote: Old26

But most importantly, what will it give?

From satellites it will be seen that throughout the whole of Russia PGRK ride. Try to determine which ones are with the rocket and which ones are with footcloths.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: bk0010

Try to determine which ones are with the rocket and which ones are with footcloths.

It’s really easy.
The current level of development of sensors of various subjects, at least the same seismic ones, will give the whole picture in half a year, and then they will make selection in real time.


But ...
The use of PGRK is very dangerous in terms of providing road safety on public roads.
If you would drive 50-80 thousand kilometers annually along the roads of our country, you would know this firsthand.

[SovAr238A]

Quote: Old26

The port (base) of the registry of a specific missile carrier boat also implies that the combat units to it, to the boat, are stored at this base in the arsenal. And there are only two such bases: Bangor Base on the Pacific Coast and King's Bay Base on the Atlantic. The passing light from one ocean to another is frayed to fool Russian inspectors ...

Even more complicated than it sounds.

AR and SLBM storage arsenals - are located at least 100 km from the locations of the ICBM and SSBN launchers.
The movement of any missile from / to the factory, to service, etc. etc. - totally and transparently controlled by everyone.

You can't just take and load a "free" rocket (and even more so not one) onto an SSBN support ship and reload it somewhere in the sea ...

It's only "mother's detectives" write this ...

[Old26]

Quote: bk0010

Quote: Old26

They already exist. "Yars" for mobile complexes and "Yars-M" for mines

Yars will not drag Vanguard

Will not carry away. Is there a need for this? Or since there is now a maneuvering winged unit, so it needs to be poked onto each missile? It is quite possible that in the future Yars (I do not know what modification, perhaps Yars-S, and possibly some Yars-2) will become carriers of another winged vehicle, the same Anchara, for example

Quote: bk0010

Quote: Old26

Have you seen many eight-axle trucks transporting assets from one garrison to another?

Just the idea is to see them and a lot.

The idea is stillborn. The average price of such a chassis of the Minsk plant is around 65 million rubles per piece. We usually order within 20 pcs. in year. It is not clear why no one will spend hundreds of millions more. Moreover, the plant in-1 is not able to produce "many" such chassis ", in-2, even if such a truck can be made, it will still differ from the launch vehicle, which will be elementary recorded by satellites. And ruin the motor life of cars with incomprehensible functionality - Nobody will agree to do this, and to do "false" APUs - no one will do this, since false launchers of any type (silos or APUs) are prohibited by the treaty.

Quote: bk0010

Quote: Old26

And how on a "truck" you can imitate a TPK, outstanding for the dimensions of a truck?

What is the problem? He is empty.

The problem is that the Americans are not as stupid as M.N. Zadornov told us. They know perfectly well where the Strategic Missile Forces garrisons with mobile complexes are located and the approximate distance to which these installations can "go" from their PPD. Therefore, if someone drives such an imitation of a launcher for thousands of kilometers, it will immediately become clear that this is not a launcher, but a "linden". In addition, the treaty prohibits the creation of false launchers, as well as several launchers for 1 missile (this applies primarily to mine complexes)

Quote: bk0010

Quote: Old26

Not to mention that the distance between missile garrisons in the European part of Russia is at least 750-800 km.

So the idea is that a strategic missile could be in every ARBR, and not just in the Strategic Missile Forces garrison. And the ARBR could use it both as strategic (at the beginning of the war, on command from a suitcase), and as operational-tactical (if the target was hit by other means), depending on the situation. Let them search.

And what will you present to the inspectors, strategists who are outside the RPM of the regiments and divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces? And how do you imagine the use of such a strategist from a unit that is not a unit of the Strategic Missile Forces? Will you drive a combat control vehicle, support duty, and communications with a launcher?

Quote: bk0010

Quote: Old26

But most importantly, what will it give?

From satellites it will be seen that throughout the whole of Russia PGRK ride. Try to determine which ones are with the rocket and which ones are with footcloths.

You should not consider the enemy a complete dumbass. And all over Russia - it's cool. The division means it will be in Irkutsk, and the launchers can be seen in the Vladivostok area? ... And don't forget about one more detail. If we agree to such a violation of the treaty, then our adversary will do the same. and then we will have to "scratch our turnips" trying to understand where the American missiles are at the moment

[bk0010]

Quote: Old26

Or since there is now a maneuvering winged block, so it needs to be poked on every rocket?

Poke on every rocket is not necessary. But to be able to stick on most missiles is a must. Otherwise, the enemy will pay special attention to the carriers of the Vanguards (to increase the reliability of their missile defense).

Quote: Old26

The idea is stillborn. The average price of such a chassis of the Minsk plant is in the range of 65 million rubles apiece.

You don't need "such a chassis", you need a Kamaz, which looks like the 15P155M. It is not required to carry a rocket, it is not required to travel without roads, it is required to look from a height of 5 km or more indistinguishable from a PGRK. I estimate the loss of carrying capacity for camouflage at 0.5 tons, it will come out cheaper than the cars of the false division.

Quote: Old26

to do, since false launchers of any type (silos or silos) are prohibited by contract

Quote: Old26

And what will you present to the inspectors, strategists who are outside the RPM of the regiments and divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces?

The contract has less than a year to live.

Quote: Old26

They know very well where the Strategic Rocket Forces garrisons are.

Quote: Old26

Does the division mean it will be in Irkutsk, and can the launchers be seen in the Vladivostok area?

But the whole idea is that part of the missiles is not in the Strategic Missile Forces, but in conventional ARBRs.

[Bratkov Oleg]

And I'll write a little on an abstract topic. Neil Amstrong, in several interviews, bluntly said that he had not seen stars in space. The sky is black, the sun is visible, the earth is visible, the moon is visible, but the stars are not. In space, Amstrong, allegedly, was twice, first flew on Gemeni, and then for two weeks to the moon, and there he was in open airless space. And during all this time I have not seen a single star. This is absolutely and completely enough to prove that he, the key figure in the American scam, has never been in space in his life! No nonsense about the reflected light of the Moon, and the Sun shining through the window will not work. Two weeks of flight to the moon! Several hours on the Gemeni, where the window is right in front of the astronaut's nose during the entire flight! Well, the Americans did not fly into space, because there were no carriers, only on shuttles they were able to get into space, and only then they began to carry foreigners, cosmonauts from other countries into space. However, conclusions follow from this. In the United States, Atlas ICBMs were deployed, which in fact could hit the maximum of Kamchatka, these missiles were unable to deliver warheads to the economic regions of the USSR, and in fact, the United States lied about its capabilities in terms of its ability to hit the territory of the USSR. Why should they tell the truth now?
By the way, the "US Lunar Scam" is a joint Soviet-American project. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev personally authorized the Americans to "fly to the moon", and he also guaranteed them that the USSR would not refute their shameless lies. In confirmation, the N-1 missiles were destroyed, almost debugged. The 5th rocket, already fueled and ready to launch, was removed from the launch pad. The designers guaranteed the 7th launch to be accident-free, from the 12th manned flights would begin, probably no further than the 20th launch, they would have landed on the Moon ... By the way, already the 5th rocket could fly without accidents ... Therefore, the missiles were destroyed and completely terminated all the programs for exploring the moon, only for some time the power engineers were still whining about helium-4, which they had in their plans for the nuclear power industry of the future, but then they shut up too. The members of the CPSU Central Committee received a lot from this deal, as a result of a conspiracy, the glorification of America in which was only a small part, they became oligarchs, and can leave the goods stolen from the people, to their children, by inheritance.
Isn’t it worth it to betray everyone you can? Well, America lying through and through, again surpassing us in something in the missile field? Or is it again a lie?

[Observer2014]

The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

Everything will end with a teleportation system. Instantly teleport a nuclear charge to any coordinates of the planet Earth. Resistance? Recognize teleportation point.

[Dzafdet]

Again from the article, MITA's ears stick out. BZHRK is not needed by anyone. Too expensive and easily destroyed. Sarmat overlaps 12 Yars in power, like a bull to a sheep. No blow can be suddenly delivered today.

[Dzafdet]

The cost of manufacturing a solid-fuel rocket is 3-5 times more expensive than a liquid one. Watch Solomonov's interview, where he talks about it himself. So liquid-propellant rockets are easier and cheaper to make ...