Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense: the present and near future

Photo: Lockheed Martin / Getty Images, archive

To begin with, we will announce a few points:

1. At the moment, not a single missile defense system (ABM) is capable of completely counteracting the blow inflicted by a great power - Russia, the USA, China, Great Britain, France, carried out simultaneously by several hundred carriers with hundreds or thousands of warheads.

2. Clause No. 1 is relevant only if there are no international treaties limiting the number of nuclear charges and their carriers.

3. Despite the theses # 1 and # 2 voiced, the United States will increase the effectiveness of the missile defense system in order to increase the likelihood and number of intercepted targets.

US National Missile Defense

A new stage in the creation of the missile defense system began on July 23, 1999, when U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the bill on the establishment of the National Missile Defense (NMD), under which it was planned to ensure the protection of not a limited area, as prescribed by the missile defense treaty, but the entire territory of the North American states. The official reason for the creation of NMD was the spread of missile weapons the "rogue countries." Of the entire American rogue list at that time, only North Korea could be considered a threat. The rest had neither intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching US territory, nor nuclear warheads that could be deployed on them. And the ability of North Korea to hit the continental states is a big question even now.

Also in 1999, the United States tested the NMD prototype, hitting the Minuteman ICBM with a training warhead, and on December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush officially announced the US’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Missile Defense Treaty.

As in the case of SOI program, the new NMD system was supposed to ensure the defeat of ballistic missiles in all areas of the flight, as mentioned in the memorandum of the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of January 2, 2002, but unlike the SDI program, the number of intercepted missiles should be limited.

The US NMD being created can be divided into theater missile defense (theater missile defense) and strategic missile defense.

US NMD Elements

SAM Patriot PAC-3

The theater of missile defense includes ground-based mobile anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) Patriot PAC-3, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles of operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK). As the practice of military conflicts showed, the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense systems of previous versions of PAC-1 and PAC-2 turned out to be low even with outdated Soviet Scud missiles. An acceptable probability of defeat was achieved only in the PAC-3 version, however, this only applies to relatively old missiles OTRK, how the meeting between the Iskander-type OTRK missiles and the Patriot PAC-3 missile complex will end is impossible to predict.

The range and height of the defeat of ballistic targets of the Patriot PAC-3 are about twenty kilometers. The maximum speed of the hit targets is not more than 1800 meters per second. The disadvantages of the Patriot PAC-3 SAM are the need to orient the launchers in the direction from which the enemy’s missile attack is expected.

Photo: livemint.com
Launchers Patriot PAC-3

The possibility of intercepting missiles of the OTRK Iskander by the Patriot PAC-3 complex can be called into question

Complex PRO THAAD

A much more advanced weapon of missile defense theater is the THAAD missile defense system, developed by Lockheed since 1992. Since 2006, the US Armed Forces began mass purchases of THAAD missile defense. The missile of the THAAD missile defense system is equipped with an infrared homing head (IR seeker) with an uncooled matrix operating in the ranges 3,3 - 3,8 μm and 7 - 10 μm. Defeat the target by a direct hit - kinetic interception, the warhead is missing.

The maximum range and height of target destruction is about 200 kilometers. The THAAD missile defense system is capable of hitting medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 3500 kilometers, flying at speeds of up to 3,5 kilometers per second.

Photo: US Department of Defense / Reuters
Missile launch from the launcher of the THAAD missile defense system

The search for targets is carried out by X-band radar of the AN / TPY-2 complex with a maximum detection range of about 1000 kilometers.

Radar AN / TPY-2 missile defense complex THAAD

The disadvantage of the THAAD missile defense system is its high cost, according to some sources it amounts to about three billion dollars for the complex, of which more than five hundred million falls on the cost of the AN / TPY-2 radar. In addition to supplying its own armed forces, the United States is actively arming its allies with the THAAD missile defense systems.

Aegis missile defense system

The most advanced element of a theater missile defense can be considered a ship’s air defense system, which was created on the basis of the Aegis multifunctional weapon control system (Aegis), modified for interception of ballistic and cruise missiles, with vertical launch anti-ballistic missiles of the Standard family.

Originally developed as an air defense (air defense) tool for US naval ships, the Aegis system was refined to allow the destruction of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Aegis system also ensures the defeat of objects in near space.

The core of the Aegis missile defense system is the eponymous naval combat information and control system (BIO) used on Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Arly Burke-class destroyers. In total, the US Navy includes approximately 67 URF destroyers of the Arly Burke type and 22 UIC type cruisers of the Ticonderoga equipped with Aegis BIUS. In total, it is planned to build 87 destroyers of the URO type “Arly Burk”, while the cruisers of the URO type “Ticonderoga” will gradually be withdrawn from combat, as well as the destroyers of the URO type “Arly Burke” of the early construction. It should be noted that SM-3 interceptor missiles cannot be carried by all URO ships, but all of them can be upgraded to solve this problem.

It was assumed that by 2020, about 500-700 SM-3 missile defense systems could be deployed on the ships of the American Navy, the total number of cells in the universal vertical launch launchers (UWP) of American URO ships theoretically allows the deployment of about 8000-9000 missile defense systems (subject to failure from loading other types of anti-aircraft missiles, ship-to-ship and ship-to-ground missiles).

UIC type cruiser Ticonderoga, URO type destroyer Arly Burke and Standard Missile type missile (SM-1/2/3), launched from UVP

Of all the missile defense missile defense systems, the Aegis missile defense system can be considered the most effective, promising and dangerous. Its effectiveness is due to the highest characteristics for weapons of this class.

The Aegis missile defense system includes an AN / SPY-1 multi-functional three-coordinate radar with a phased antenna array (PAR) with a detection range of more than 500 kilometers, the ability to track 250-300 targets and aim up to 18 missiles on them (characteristics may vary depending on version Radar).

As a missile, three-stage SM-3 interceptor missiles of various modifications are used. The maximum range for hitting a target for the latest modification of the SM-3 Block IIA is 2500 kilometers, the height for hitting a target is 1500 kilometers (external target designation most likely is required). The speed of the missile is about 4,5-5 kilometers per second.

The target is hit by an exoatmospheric kinetic interceptor, equipped with its own correction engines, providing course correction within five kilometers. Target capture is carried out by a matrix uncooled infrared homing head from a distance of up to 300 kilometers.

The evolution of SM-3 interceptor missiles

The Aegis missile defense system is constantly being improved both in hardware and in software. If the Aegis missile defense system of BMD version 3.6.1 from 2008 was capable of shooting down ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3500 kilometers, then in version BMD 4.0.1 of 2014 and BMD 5.0.1 of 2016, ballistic missiles with a range of up to 5500 can already be hit kilometers, and in BMD version 5.1.1 2020-2022, it is planned to ensure the possibility of destruction of ICBMs in separate sections of the trajectory.

The list of targets, albeit training ones, struck by the Aegis missile defense system is also impressive: in 2007, a group (2 units) ballistic target was successfully intercepted at an altitude of about 180 kilometers, in 2008, an emergency reconnaissance satellite USA-247 was shot down, in 193, a successful interception of an intermediate-range ballistic missile was carried out; in 2011, two cruise and one ballistic missiles were simultaneously intercepted over the Pacific Ocean.

The prospects of the Aegis missile defense system are due to the possibility of further improving its characteristics and deploying a large number of these systems in the land version, on the territory of the American base abroad and the territory of allied countries, including at their own expense. In particular, the appearance of the ground-based version of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system immediately increased the geography of this type of missile defense, and created new tension points between states and blocs. Do not forget that, like the shipboard system, the Aegis Ashore missile defense can be used to deploy subtle cruise missiles, which in turn can be used to apply sudden disarming strike in combination with other means of attack.

The Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense system has significantly higher performance than the Patriot PAC-3 air defense system and the THAAD missile defense system

European missile defense is generally created as in a competent business plan. First, a need is created, for example, by withdrawing from the Treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), and then the EU countries are saturated with missile defense systems, which solves two problems at once: the American military-industrial complex earns and improves at the expense of Europeans, at the same time they become target No. 1 for the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in case of conflict. The United States has done the same in Asia, for example, in South Korea and Japan..

The danger of the Aegis missile defense system is due to the large ammunition of the missile defense on board the ship, the range of the missile defense and the mobility of the carriers themselves, which, even revealing the approximate patrol routes of Russian strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs), allows not only hunting them with hunting submarines, but also to keep surface ships with the Aegis missile defense system capable of intercepting the launching ICBMs in pursuit of the speed of missiles of the Aegis missile defense system in the alleged patrol area of ​​the SSBN up to five kilometers per second!).

Possible areas of deployment of American missile defense theater

Given the total superiority of the American fleet in terms of the number and quality of surface ships, the missile defense problem of defeating ballistic missiles launched from American SSBNs (atomic submarines with ballistic missiles) can theoretically be solved only with the help of the complex and specific types of weapons discussed in the articles Atomic Multifunctional Submarine Cruiser: Asymmetrical Response to the West и Atomic Multifunctional Submarine Cruiser: Paradigm Shift.

GBMD Strategic ABM

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBMD) missile defense ground defense system was launched in 2005, and to this day is the only missile defense system capable of defeating ICBMs.

The GBMD missile defense system includes three PAVE PAWS radars with an active phased array and target detection range of about 2000 kilometers, as well as a mobile X-band SBX radar located on a towed offshore platform (former CS-50 oil platform), with target detection range, with effective dispersion surface of 1 square meter, up to 4900 kilometers. Given the mobility of the SBX radar, the GBMD missile defense system can hit ICBMs virtually anywhere in the world.

PAVE PAWS radars and radar coverage areas of the GBMD missile defense system

Towed offshore radar SBX

The striking means of the GBMD missile defense system is the ground-based interceptor (GBI), a three-stage solid-fuel ground-based interceptor designed to launch the EKV transatmospheric kinetic interceptor into the near-Earth space. The missile range is from 2000 to 5500 kilometers, the maximum launch height is 2000 kilometers. Moreover, in fact, the speed of the transatmospheric kinetic interceptor EKV can be higher than the first space one, that is, in fact, it is put into the orbit of the Earth and can hit a target at any point above the planet. Currently, 44 anti-missile missiles are deployed in the United States in Alaska and California, and an additional 20 anti-missile missiles are planned to be deployed in Alaska.

GBI ground-based interceptor missile

Transatmospheric Kinetic Interceptor EKV

The current capabilities of the GBMD missile defense system allow to destroy only ICBMs with a single-unit warhead. The development of the Multi Object Kill Vehicle (MKV) cluster interceptor was frozen in 2009, presumably due to technical difficulties, but was supposedly resumed in 2015. The MKV concept involves the installation of several interceptors on one carrier, for which their mass is supposed to be significantly reduced. Two options are being considered: MKV-L (Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company) and MKV-R (Raytheon Company). In the MKV-L variant, the guidance of interceptors provides a single carrier that does not itself hit the target. In the MKV-R variant, all interceptors are equipped with a single set of equipment, but during the attack one of them becomes the “leader” and distributes the targets between the “followers” ​​(reminds the principle of the “wolf pack” declared for the Russian anti-ship missiles “Granite”).

MKV-L Cluster Interceptor Ground Test

In the event of successful development, MKV interceptors are planned to be installed not only on GBI missiles of the GBMD strategic missile defense, but also on the SM-3 missiles IIA missile defense Aegis missile system, as well as the KEI ground-based mobile missile defense system being developed.

Why is such a complex and layered missile defense system being built? For North Korea to repeat the fate of Iraq and Yugoslavia? It is unlikely that such a missile defense system is too expensive. For this money, three times it is possible to arrange “perestroika” in North Korea in the image and likeness realized in the USSR or decompose it “into atoms” if you try to resist. But “After all, if the stars are lighting up - does it mean someone needs this?”, Is it possible that the US missile defense system deployed is needed for larger game hunting than North Korea?

Pravdorub Donald

U.S. President Donald Trump on January 17, 2019, published at the Pentagon an analytical report on national missile defense (Missile Defense Review). The document includes a new US strategy in space, which is called defense and provides for the expansion of the arsenal of missile defense. In particular, the strategy proposes to place in space a new generation of missile attack early warning satellites. According to the document, the most serious threat to the United States is North Korea, Iran, Russia and China. The report said that the United States will not limit itself in developing missile defense against countries that do not recognize international standards.

So, the masks are reset. Now it is no longer said that the American missile defense is aimed only against Iran or North Korea. Now Russia and China are clearly indicated as targets, and even the most stubborn liberals will not be able to deny it. No, you don’t formally find fault, they said that the missile defense is being created against “rogue countries”, so no one broke the word, just Russia and the PRC were also ranked as “rogues”.

For overly optimistic “cheers-patriots” who consider that the US missile defense against Russia is useless, one can cite the words of the First Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Viktor Poznikhir, said on April 24, 2019 at the VIII Moscow Conference on International Security.

Missile defense systems (ABM) near the borders of Russia are deployed by the United States in order to obtain the possibility of a nuclear strike against our country. The general explained that the United States is trying to build a missile defense system in which Russia will not be able to retaliate against the United States. The general noted that now American destroyers equipped with the Aegis system are on combat duty in the Japanese and South China Seas and regularly appear in the Baltic and Black Seas. In addition, Poznihir said that Washington plans to develop missile defense space systems that can intercept Russian ballistic missiles in the early stages of flight, as well as deliver preventive strikes on Russian territory. “The Americans intend to achieve strategic superiority through the implementation of the so-called pre-launch interception,” the representative of the General Staff summed up his analysis.

Hack and predictor Aviator

With regard to the confrontation between the United States and Russia, the missile defense system can not be categorically considered separately from the means of delivering a sudden disarming strike. How senseless the US missile defense is now and in the short term if Russia uses all available means to launch a nuclear strike, the same is a dangerous missile defense system if most of Russia's nuclear deterrence potential is destroyed by a sudden disarming strike.

Questions for further consideration. How is US missile defense evolving in the medium term? How dangerous will it be in the context of a sudden disarming strike? By what means can such a strike be delivered in the medium term and what will be the consequences?

Comments

[lopvlad]

it is still impossible to predict how the meeting between the Iskander-type OTRK missile and the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile system will end.

as in the song "you are on land. I am at sea. We cannot meet in any way"

[maden.usmanow]

Divine. Very good stuff.

[NEXUS]

Damn, well, the truth was got with this all the vanging, comparisons, and measures from someone thicker. Everything can be put in place only by a war in which all these weapons will really work against each other. Everything else is informational masturbation.
I’ve looked at the video that amused me, and that’s how I recommend these comparisons and predictions, because as long as this is all there is no war.

[illi]

Yeah. I’ve been listening to this joke since the 90s, now they’ve done a video on YouTube.

[SETSET]

Quote: Military Review # Armament. Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense: the present and near future. Andrey Mitrofanov. January 27, 2020

The GBMD missile defense system includes three PAVE PAWS radars with an active phased array and target detection range of about 2000 kilometers ...

Dear Andrey Mitrofanov! When writing about the range of a radar, then indicate with respect to which EPR values ​​(otherwise it is not a radar parameter) or indicate for what purposes!

[illi]

Here's another one in 1.5 million views. Someone earns money on views amusing CSV Russian. And a bunch of fools believe. There is also an anecdote about paratroopers with sapper shovels in Kosovo and "Urya".

[NEXUS]

Quote: illi

There is also an anecdote about paratroopers with sapper shovels in Kosovo and "Urya".

Do you hear, "urya" ... can you retell my grandfather's story, how they "loved" mattresses in Germany in 45? And how did the mattresses come from us? And what did they say at the same time ...
You were in Kosovo to open your mouth at all, what was and wasn’t there?

[illi]

And so you compose all these jokes. Sorry ruined your business.

[thanks]

Quote: Andrei Mitrofanov Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense: the present and near future January 27, 2020.

Search for targets is carried out X-band radar complex AN / TPY-2 with a maximum detection range about 1000 kilometers.

Quote: Sergey Linnik Turkey's air defense radar: will they ensure the safety of air lines? December 9, 2019.

The AN / TPY-2 mobile early warning missile radar deployed in Turkey is located at an altitude of 2000 m above sea level, and approximately 700 km from the border with Iran. According to information published by Raytheon Corporation, a radar operating in the frequency range 8,55-10 GHz is capable of fixing ballistic targets over the horizon at a distance of 4700 km.

Dear author! Which of you is right? Although Sergey Linnik previously also indicated a detection range of 1000 km. When discussing his topic, he and his friend opus, could not answer this question, or maybe didn’t want to, although in their dialogue they probably didn’t know ... Everything is in the discussion of the topic.

[thanks]

Dear author! Which of you is right? Although Sergey Linnik previously also indicated a detection range of 1000 km. When discussing his topic, he and his friend opus, could not answer this question, or maybe they didn’t want to, although in their dialogue they probably didn’t know ... Everything is in the discussion of the topic.

Dear author! Americans are cunning! The range of the AN / TPY-2 radar is estimated to be approximately D = 5000 km for targets with an image intensifier = 10 m2 in free space, according to Reiteon. This is very good, given its mobility and 3-centimeter range ... Many sites provide data - the range of AN / TPY-2 D = 4700 km or more, however, according to which image intensifier, everything remains a mystery. The calculation above gives a complete picture of this.

[bk316]

Fortunately (or unfortunately) at the present time and in the foreseeable future (until there are means of interception on the notorious new principles) even the interception of a single target if this is the goal of the BSP.
This is especially true for kinetic interception where a miss even by 10 meters is fatal.
Shoot down ballistic targets is one thing, shoot down maneuvering targets in oncoming courses at a speed of approach of tens of sweeps, and even do it FROM a gravitational well - EVERYTHING ELSE

[illi]

Yes, you just need to withdraw from the treaty in outer space and all.
The United States withdraws from all treaties that are not beneficial to them and we should go.
Than to build doubtful Poseidons, it is better to place the necessary number of warheads in orbit.
Especially in space we still have not yet forgotten how.

[Alex Nevs]

Are you sure that they are not there?

[illi]

Maybe there is something for us. We must deliver a guaranteed strike. Better than from space, no options

[Sergei 777]

The conclusion is extremely simple: to improve the system for overcoming pro and, if possible, to increase the number of deployed carriers in order to increase the total% of warheads that are guaranteed to reach the United States.
Well, to develop your means about, in order to minimize the disarming blow to us.

[ANB]

You can not build up media and BB. START. That is why the USSR linked the SALT treaties with missile defense treaties. And when the United States withdrew from missile defense, the wrong situation arose, which Putin and Shoigu are trying to resolve. We wish them good luck in this and will try if not to help, then at least not to interfere.

[Vasily Ponomarev]

the Soviet Union didn’t kill nuclear weapons, it’s not their missile defense that destroys our country

[illi]

Shhhh. There is a military forum. And then you still doubt the guarantor.

[God save the king]

And what is wrong with the guarantor?
Or did you forget how he raised the country, revived the army and returned stability and prosperity to the people ?!

[illi]

But how about you forget about it. All by his prayers.

[Operator]

Anti-missiles specialized in atmospheric and atmospheric interception of ICBM and SLBM warheads are absolutely useless if an adversary inflicts a massive nuclear missile strike, which their developers have repeatedly publicly confirmed from both sides.

Another thing is anti-missiles, specialized in intercepting ICBMs and SLBMs themselves in the active section of the trajectory up to the separation of the BB from the disengagement stages. This section has a length of about 1000-1500 km and a completion height of 300-400 km. The diagram in the article shows that the active sections of the trajectories of all Russian ICBMs based in the European part of the Russian Federation come under the double blow of American land-based (Poland and Romania) and sea-based Aegis antimissiles (Arly Burke destroyers).

If in the case of ground-based missile defense radars have known coordinates and they can easily be disabled by a magnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear explosions of leading medium-range missiles, then the coordinates of destroyers maneuvering in the waters of the Mediterranean, Baltic, Northern and Norwegian seas are generally unknown. Moreover, due to the large number of such ships, measured in dozens of units, there is no guarantee of jamming all of their radars (some of which can be turned off at the time of high-altitude nuclear explosions), which leaves the possibility of joint missile guidance by remaining operational radars.

Two solutions can be guarantees from interception of Russian ICBMs starting from the European part of the country:
- the construction of new mine launching devices in the Asian part of the Russian Federation (which is very expensive);
- Development of new ICBMs with a short active section.

An example of the implementation of the latter solution is the PRS-135M short-range missile defense system A-1, domestic, weighing about 10 tons, accelerating a 150 kg warhead to a speed of 5 km / s in 4 seconds with an acceleration of 125 g at a distance of 100 km. Such indicators are ensured by the corresponding strength of the rocket body and its conical form factor (with a large cross-sectional area of ​​the end face to increase the size of the solid propellant nozzle).

By reducing the acceleration developed by the missile by four times (and, accordingly, the requirements for the strength of a missile body with a cylindrical form factor), it is possible to keep within 400 km of the AUTO length of domestic ICBMs launching from the European part of the country, with a full guarantee against the interception of a ground-based and naval missile defense system of the USA .

[God save the king]

So, the masks are reset. Now Russia and China are clearly indicated as targets

Just the same exposure of the century, it turns out that NATO soldiers consider us as adversaries.

[Old26]

Andrew! The article is, of course, interesting, but nevertheless the "triad" means strategic systems. Have you added Patriot, Standard and THAAD here?

Some additions

The GBMD missile defense system includes three PAVE PAWS radars with an active phased array and target detection range of about 2000 kilometers, as well as a mobile X-band SBX radar located on a towed offshore platform (former CS-50 oil platform), with target detection range, with effective dispersion surface of 1 square meter, up to 4900 kilometers. Given the mobility of the SBX radar, the GBMD missile defense system can hit ICBMs virtually anywhere in the world.

PAVE PAWS radars have a slightly longer range. Radar AN / FPS-123 and AN / FPS-132 have a range of 5500 km. EMNIP with a range of 2000 km had PAVE PAWS AN / FPS-115 stations, which have long been replaced by newer ones.
The SBX station has a detection range of 4000 km. And for some reason, stations like BMEWS, of which 3 units are also deployed, are not lit. Plus stations in Qatar, Taiwan, on Shemiya Island (Cobra Dane)

Quote: Operator

The diagram in the article shows that the active sections of the trajectories of all Russian ICBMs based in the European part of the Russian Federation come under the double blow of American land-based (Poland and Romania) and sea-based Aegis anti-missiles (Arleigh Burke destroyers).

Andrew, do not invent. The maximum that can be hit by American missile defense is missiles from the division in Bologoye. They could theoretically be hit by anti-ballistic missiles based in Radzikovo. And even that is problematic. And you write ALL ROCKETS, based in the European part.

[Operator]

The picture from the article is better than words - the blue circles of the radar coverage of American radars cover the outs of all Russian ICBMs starting from the European part of the Russian Federation

And it does not matter that the ground / sea radars do not see the moment of ICBM launch - the command to launch and the preliminary calculated interception point is sent to Aegis by the US missile defense space component.
Those. ground / sea radars in this case are purely firing radars.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

Andrew! The article is, of course, interesting, but nevertheless the "triad" means strategic systems. Have you added Patriot, Standard and THAAD here?

Well, "Patriot" is of course for the "kit", but about "Standard", and THAAD disagrees.
Firstly, in the context of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there is a prospect for the deployment of MRBMs in Europe and Asia, respectively, we will begin to deploy similar, and therefore "Standard", and THAAD is already a direct threat to our nuclear shield.
Secondly, as indicated in the article, at least for the "Standard" it is planned to refine it to the possibility of working on ICBMs.
Thirdly, promising MKV cluster interceptors, which are being developed for GBI, can be installed on the "Standard", and possibly on THAAD, which brings us back to the "second" point.

On the radar there are inaccuracies, a lot of data, sources of information for different periods of time, and the time that can be allocated for writing articles, unfortunately, is limited.

[voyaka uh]

A serious missile defense will appear when they begin to install lasers on satellites.
But this is not yet.

[agond]

In principle, if a ballistic missile is launched at a shorter range or with a lower throw weight, but with a higher trajectory, then it will be possible to shoot it down only in the acceleration section, that is, at the very beginning of its "perpendicular" distance from planet Earth, and then nothing will be high-far, and when it starts to decrease again, after all, the infection drops too quickly, over 7 km / s, if you additionally apply a periodically activated fall accelerator, the rate of descent will also be an unpredictable value

[bars1]

And what does Russia oppose to this power (without sarcasm)?

[Vadmir]

2. Clause No. 1 is relevant only if there are no international treaties limiting the number of nuclear charges and their carriers.

The most important principle of building a missile defense.
When the missile defense system was created, the United States actively negotiated to reduce nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the USSR, the United States had the strongest army on the planet and only nuclear weapons prevented its full use.
But now everything has begun to change - China has gained such power that it began to strain the Americans. The armies of Russia, India, Iran, and Pakistan are also strengthening. The world is gradually becoming multipolar.
And in the United States, a struggle between the authorities began, as a result of the lack of a strategy, including in the field of nuclear weapons and missile defense.
They are investing a lot of money in missile defense and at the same time they want to withdraw from START-3, which will make missile defense senseless, in general, money wasted.
But sooner or later, Trump will leave, a strategy will begin to be worked out, and we need to remember very well that a further reduction in nuclear weapons is extremely dangerous. There is a paradoxical principle - the more nuclear weapons, the lower the likelihood of war.
If any of our future President is pushed into signing START-4, which reduces the number of missiles, it will be tantamount to treason. We all remember the example of Gorbachev, with his "good intentions".

[Old26]

Quote: voyaka uh

A serious missile defense will appear when they begin to install lasers on satellites.
But this is not yet.

Fortunately, Alex, fortunately. Although progress cannot be avoided. Decades will pass and a belt of such stations will appear in Earth’s orbit.

Quote: agond

In principle, if a ballistic missile is launched at a shorter range or with a lower throw weight, but with a higher trajectory, then it will be possible to shoot it down only in the acceleration section, that is, at the very beginning of its "perpendicular" distance from planet Earth, and then nothing will be high-far, and when it starts to decrease again, after all, the infection drops too quickly, over 7 km / s, if you additionally apply a periodically activated fall accelerator, the rate of descent will also be an unpredictable value

Any ICBM can be launched at a minimum range. But at the same time, the accuracy of catastrophic drops
Zaupskaya with less throwing weight can achieve greater range. But for now, even at the initial stage, it is not possible to shoot down ICBMs. The Americans closed the Standart SM-3 Block 2B program, which was planned specifically for the defeat of ICBMs at the ATU. Too expensive and they would have to rebuild almost all of their ships.
The Standart SM-3 Block 2A system currently in service, although it has a large range of destruction (2500 km) and a very significant range of 1500 km, however, it has detection locators with a range of about 700-1000 km. And even being near the coast of Russia, she does not have time to intercept the launched ICBMs

There will be no prohibitive fall rate. There will be an ordinary fall under the influence of gravity. And there will be no accelerator either. Warheads are not equipped with high-thrust rocket engines to accelerate them to 2nd space speed. The interception will be at the end of the trajectory

Quote: bars1

And what does Russia oppose to this power (without sarcasm)?

Which one? In the same way, we have a triad and a missile attack warning system and a missile defense system, though with less long-range missiles. But as the author correctly wrote at the very beginning, not a single country can intercept a massive strike now ...

[Mityay65]

Quote: Old26

Quote: voyaka uh
A serious missile defense will appear when they begin to install lasers on satellites.
But this is not yet.

Fortunately, Alex, fortunately. Although progress cannot be avoided. Decades will pass and a belt of such stations will appear in Earth’s orbit.

It seems that due to the progress in the field of anti-satellite weapons over the past couple of decades, the topic of space grouping of missile defense can be closed for some time, or maybe forever. Including and laser weapons, and, in my opinion, which has great prospects, beam weapons.
So far, everything that is supposed in this area, primarily low-orbit systems, looks vulnerable and, accordingly, strategically unstable. Now everything that is in orbits of up to 800, or even 1200 km, can be easily shot from national territory, not to mention offshore platforms.
The anti-satellite systems for higher orbits, in general, are also worked out in detail, and they have been tested in space. So while the topic is closed.
This does not mean that there are no prospects at all, but new ideas are needed. Something like active satellite defense from an interceptor. Or a satellite with energy for an orbital evasion maneuver. Or the creation of heavy orbital platforms with a complex of defensive and offensive weapons. Capable of performing an orbital maneuver, although this will require a launch vehicle with the ability to output block modules weighing 300 - 400 tons. It is within the power of the economy, I believe, the end of the century, not earlier.
In the meantime, a technical and strategic impasse.
It is better to engage in cosmic tourism, flying to the moon and into the asteroid belt ...
Here is a video on the topic:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDFi86cqLjs&t=1209s

[golovastik]

Quality article, thanks! But still, the clatter of hooves of a spherical horse in a vacuum somewhere in the distance is still audible, yes! Although, I repeat that the information is presented in a high-quality, systematic and informative manner, in a good style. The basis of any military operations is planning, comprehensiveness and continuity. If the article discusses the work and composition of missile defense of potential partners, then we assume that something has already flown to us, and, therefore, the stages of the threatened periods have been completed with a full range of events, we won’t say what measures, the dispersal of forces and assets has been carried out, and we, at least, participated in the exchange of non-nuclear greetings, both on the theater of war and on the rest of the territory. The same "disarming strikes" were delivered to the position areas and combat patrol areas of nuclear weapons carriers. In the worst case, nuclear weapons are used throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. It seems to have missed nothing large? So about planning, complexity and continuity. Suppose that the political and military leadership made the right decisions from the point of view of the situation and in time transferred the troops and means of destruction to the level of combat readiness corresponding to the moment in time (otherwise the discussion loses its meaning in principle). Hmm ... Yes. Consequently, we have dispersal on the routes of combat patrols of the submarine, strategic aviation and PGRK, plus the mine complexes transferred to the PBG. I can’t say anything for sailors and pilots, since I didn’t sail and did not fly, but theoretically the resistance to non-nuclear defeat of the Strategic Missile Forces should be very high due to the dispersal of some and the high security of others. I don’t know how it is now, but opening the coordinates of PBSP with reconnaissance and re-aiming weapons, it seems, is calculated in days, not minutes and hours, therefore, it can be assumed that the combat use of at least PGRK will successfully take place, as intelligence about the actions and intentions of the enemy, regardless of 100500 launched axes and other iron. This is to say that the integrated use of countermeasures against reconnaissance (any) and the layered cover of air defense areas of combat patrols greatly increase the likelihood of delivering a high-quality smut (the pun, however). And here, just, the question arises about the probability of an enemy missile defense breakthrough. I agree that mine samovars fly long and high, therefore, in the breeding area, it is very likely that they will be defeated by the means described in the article. However, damn them a lot! And if we don’t linger and supplement, as we are being given an example, spitting on the contracts, falsely aiming for a normal state, then everything will not be so sad, because the enemy will not be able to do without selective nuclear explosions, and I won’t be in such plans of the aforementioned enemy I’ll never believe it. PGRK shoot along a flat trajectory, the withdrawal area is short, the speeds are high, the launch coordinates with a high probability are unknown to the enemy beforehand, and I consider the probability of defeat in the breeding area to be further, as, in fact, for heavy ICBMs, pure water as a fantasy. As a conclusion: 1.
2. The concept of “acceptable damage” for them, most likely, is purely theoretical reasoning and cannot be applied in military doctrine in words but in real terms.
3. Damage to the enemy’s territory will definitely be. It is impossible to reduce it to whatever acceptable values ​​with the current and medium-term state of armaments.
4. For the same medium-term prospect, the enemy’s missile defense is nothing more than a means of earning producers and politicians and material for military-technical articles.
5. It’s too early to talk about the sunset of the triad and, honestly, from some point of view, it’s harmful for a certain audience (“everything is gone, the plaster is removed”). They’ll stop sleeping and their fingers will be erased.

[Lexus]

Questions for further consideration. How is US missile defense evolving in the medium term? How dangerous will it be in the context of a sudden disarming strike? By what means can such a strike be delivered in the medium term and what will be the consequences?

Fortune-telling on coffee grounds is a futile task. Work is underway, electronics are miniaturizing, they are not sparing money, the whole world is hunching over the USA, including scientific. Today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, is not so important, but the result will be achieved. Water, as you know, sharpens a stone.
My forecast is that the missile defense group will be increased, MKV is a priority.
A disarming blow has already been inflicted - funds received from the sale of natural resources are accumulated abroad, and not in their own, Russian, industry, incl. defense. The slightest crisis - and the "top" will flee to the camp of "partners" (if they have not already agreed, they will certainly agree). A delta in a couple of days will be enough to eliminate the potential for a retaliatory strike by any available forces and known means.
And then - the last, not charred, survivors will tear their hair from the ass in thoughts of how to save themselves from extermination on the slightly tainted remains of the Soviet heritage.
It is then that the true cost of "analogless" relations and "cartoons" is realized.

[agond]

Quote: Old26

There will be no prohibitive fall rate. There will be an ordinary fall under the influence of gravity. And there will be no accelerator either. Warheads are not equipped with high-thrust rocket engines to accelerate them to 2nd space speed.

Yes, the usual fall under the influence of gravity, but from a higher altitude and with a greater speed in the final section., On the issue of falling accuracy, so for a long time put navigation systems on the stars, there is no need to accelerate the fall speed to 2 space, there is a modest task to change unpredictably the magnitude of the fall rate.
There they have long and stubbornly dealt with the problem of ballistic interception, if you try so hard, the result will be, so you need to consider all possible counter options in advance, for example, connect two warheads with a wire, chain, rope and finally make them quickly rotate around a common center of gravity, which will make a direct hit less probable

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Well, "Patriot" is of course for the "kit", but about "Standard", and THAAD disagrees.
Firstly, in the context of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there is a prospect for the deployment of MRBMs in Europe and Asia, respectively, we will begin to deploy similar, and therefore "Standard", and THAAD is already a direct threat to our nuclear shield.
Secondly, as indicated in the article, at least for the "Standard" it is planned to refine it to the possibility of working on ICBMs.
Thirdly, promising MKV cluster interceptors, which are being developed for GBI, can be installed on the "Standard", and possibly on THAAD, which brings us back to the "second" point.

Andrew! I still understand by the designation "triad" complexes of strategic purpose. Yes, of course, if the Americans deploy MRBMs in Europe, we will take similar measures, and then such missile defense systems as Standard and THAAD will pose a threat. But not a nuclear shield in the sense that is usually invested in it, but in relation to medium and short-range weapons. Here I agree. With regard to the nuclear shield, then place the Americans THAAD even in the Baltic States, their performance characteristics are such that they have a range of only 200 km. Even if a complex with an increased range appears, it will still be too far from the deployment areas of our "nuclear shield". And it is not intended to intercept ICBMs. As well as "Stand7dart". In addition, in general, the radar is weak enough to record our ICBMs from the area of ​​their permanent deployment.
They tried to adapt the "Standard" to intercept ICBMs, but it lacks the speed and range of the radar. Now they plan to replace the radar with more "long-range" ones, but about the missile itself ... What the Americans planned - "Standart-3 Block 2B" - they did not even freeze this program. If you believe open sources, it was canceled due to the fact that the caliber of anti-missiles in this version will not be 533 mm, as in the first stage of the "Standart-3 Block 1A / B" interceptor and not as the caliber of "Standart-3 Block 2A", but more ... That is, all Mk-41 launchers designed for this caliber would have to be altered, reducing the number of cells and increasing their diameter. And this is very expensive even for Americans ...

With regard to cluster interceptors, this will really increase the potential of missile defense. But the EMNIP from GBI and "Standard" (THAAD) are still different interceptors in size. I'm afraid to make a mistake (I write from memory), but the "Standard" and THAAD have interceptors of about 32-35 kg, and the GBI - under 60

Quote: agond

Yes, the usual fall under the influence of gravity, but from a higher altitude and with a greater speed in the final section., On the issue of falling accuracy, so for a long time put navigation systems on the stars, there is no need to accelerate the fall speed to 2 space, there is a modest task to change unpredictably the magnitude of the fall rate.
There they have long and stubbornly dealt with the problem of ballistic interception, if you try so hard, the result will be, so you need to consider all possible counter options in advance, for example, connect two warheads with a wire, chain, rope and finally make them quickly rotate around a common center of gravity, which will make a direct hit less probable

The astro correction system is placed not on warheads, but on the missiles themselves. There are none on the warheads.
The fall rate cannot be changed unpredictably. If you "drive", as you write, the warhead to a high altitude (let the apogee, for example, be 4500 km instead of 1500), then the difference in speed will not be particularly large. Approximately 7,7 km / s at an apogee of 1500 km and 9,4 km / s at an apogee of 4500 km. But this is all only in the absence of braking ...
Fall time increases. If in the first case it will be about 9 minutes, then in the second it will be about 22 minutes. (again, in the absence of braking) That is, the response time of the missile defense system will double. Further. Interception in the overwhelming majority of cases is still carried out not in space (this is now the appearance of anti-missiles with an altitude range of 1500-2000 km), but after the selection of targets has taken place. That is, at first all easy targets will "lag behind". only warheads and heavy targets will remain, capable of completely repeating the characteristics of warheads. But there are not so many false heavy targets on the rocket.
Connect two warheads with wire, chain or rope - - no comment here

[thanks]

Quote: Old26

In general, the radar weak enough in order to fix our ICBMs from the area of ​​their permanent deployment.

Old26! These are only your assumptions and no more. The search for targets is carried out by the X-band radar of the AN / TPY-2 complex - an excellent radar, no one even knows its range, but an excellent and more powerful radar may not work ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

With regard to cluster interceptors, this will really increase the potential of missile defense. But the EMNIP from GBI and "Standard" (THAAD) are still different interceptors in size. I'm afraid to make a mistake (I write from memory), but the "Standard" and THAAD have interceptors of about 32-35 kg, and the GBI - under 60

Most likely, it is planned to significantly reduce the mass of the interceptor, due to which it will be possible to place them in "clusters", it seems that the figure of 5 kg is even flashing. 12 pcs. for GBI or 6-7 for "Standard", but of course this is very little. Well, let's say it will be 15 kg, then it will be possible to put 4 interceptors on GBI, and 2 on "Standard". Or 1 on "Standard", but throw it higher, further, faster.

Regarding the "Standard" radar, the United States pays great attention to the interaction of various complexes, the very same network centricity, i.e. missiles can be guided according to data from third-party radars, it is possible that not only the United States, but its allies.
And new radars may well appear on new generations of Arly Berkov.
Simply "Standard" is a lot of PU, unlike the TCAAD or GBI, moreover, mobile launchers, which allows concentration of forces in missile-hazardous areas, which makes it attractive.

Another question arises about the defeat of our starting SLBMs in pursuit.

[Maxim Muravyov]

Andrey, do about our missile defense and air defense, please. Yes, you need to know the enemy by sight, but it would be nice to look at yourself in the mirror.

[Old26]

Quote: Mersi

Quote: Old26

In general, the radar weak enough in order to fix our ICBMs from the area of ​​their permanent deployment.

Old26! These are only your assumptions and no more. The search for targets is carried out by the X-band radar of the AN / TPY-2 complex - an excellent radar, no one even knows its range, but an excellent and more powerful radar may not work ...

Amernikans themselves claim that his range is about 1000 km. Therefore, a program has now begun to replace the AN / TPY-2 radar with the AN / TPY-6 radar, which will have a EMNIP of a three to four times greater range. The deployment of this radar is planned from 2021-2023. No one can say for sure yet.

[thanks]

Quote: Old26

Amernikans themselves claim that his range is about 1000 km.

Old26, on the website of Reiteon Firm, the range of the AN / TRY-2 radar is more than 1300 km, but in fact more than 4700 km, if calculated. Americans also do not give accurate data in open sources. No one canceled secrecy. But, experts can estimate according to their schedules presented on the website of the company Raytheon.

[Old26]

Quote: Mersi

Quote: Old26

Amernikans themselves claim that his range is about 1000 km.

Old26, on the website of Reiteon Firm, the range of the AN / TRY-2 radar is more than 1300 km, but in fact more than 4700 km, if calculated. Americans also do not give accurate data in open sources. No one canceled secrecy. But, experts can estimate according to their schedules presented on the website of the company Raytheon.

Thanks for the tattoo. I have not been on this site for a very long time and there EMNIP and saw the number 1000

[thanks]

Quote: Old26

Quote: Mersi

Quote: Old26

Amernikans themselves claim that his range is about 1000 km.

Old26, on the website of Reiteon Firm, the range of the AN / TRY-2 radar is more than 1300 km, but in fact more than 4700 km, if calculated. Americans also do not give accurate data in open sources. No one canceled secrecy. But, experts can estimate according to their schedules presented on the website of the company Raytheon.

Thanks for the tattoo. I have not been on this site for a very long time and there EMNIP and saw the number 1000

Old26! There is no tattoo! Read the materials from Raytheon to VO site in discussions on the topic:

Sergey Linnik Turkish air defense radar: will they ensure the safety of air borders? December 9, 2019.

In the materials presented by the opus from the Reiteon website, the figure is D = 1300 km or more, there is, and not D = 1000 km.

[Old26]

Quote: Mersi

Old26! There is no tattoo! Read the materials from the Reiteon website on VO in the discussion on the topic:

Comrade! I prefer to read the original. And there was material on the Internet (a footnote will have to be found) on the purchase of Aegis missiles. There EMNIP also had material on the old AN / TRY-2 radar and the new AN / TRY-6. On this resource, plus on the Reytheon website, I came across the figure of 10 km 1000 years ago. It is possible that the materials have undergone adjustments over time.