Power conversion
The main elements of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, which minimize the likelihood of large-scale aggression against our country, are strategic nuclear forces (SNF). In its current form, the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation are a classic nuclear triad, which includes strategic missile forces, naval strategic forces and strategic Aviationcapable of striking an order of one and a half thousand nuclear charges. The ratio of the number of charges between the components of the strategic nuclear forces can vary, but in general, the strategic nuclear forces structure inherited by Russia from the USSR is preserved. The ground component of strategic nuclear forces is predominant.
Tactical nuclear weaponThe weapons of the Russian Federation are about two thousand warheads for various purposes.
According to the existing version of the military doctrine, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when threatened the very existence of the state.
The structure of the United States SNF generally corresponds to the structure of the Russian (USSR) SNF, with the difference that the naval component is dominant in the United States.
In other countries of the nuclear club, there is about the same picture, adjusted for the absence or underdevelopment of some components of the strategic nuclear forces and the lower potential of carriers and warheads.
A distinctive feature of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, the United States and other countries of the world is a narrow specialization: ensuring the deterrence of the enemy from a full-scale attack, including with the use of nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear forces can not prevent the enemy, to carry out hostile actions, such as organizing coups d'état, organizing local conflicts on the borders or even on the territory of the object of aggression, taking measures of economic and political pressure and other similar hostile actions. In this regard, the SNF is a useless load on the state budget and the armed forces, limiting the development of general-purpose forces.
After the collapse of the USSR, the developers of the US nuclear strategy concluded that the new era of international relations is characterized by the presence of numerous potential opponents, sources of conflicts and unprecedented challenges, as well as a spectrum of difficultly predictable scenarios. Compared to the era of the Cold War, the world has become more dangerous and unpredictable for the United States. As a result, the existing containment policy, which was based on a nuclear confrontation with one country, the Soviet Union, must be adapted to the new conditions.
According to the new US nuclear strategy, the traditional triad of nuclear forces was supposed to be transformed into a triad consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, active and passive anti-missile defense systems (PRO) of global coverage, as well as a flexible, capable of recreating infrastructure of testing, production and the combat use of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons united by a communications, reconnaissance and control system based on new information technologies.
In the new US nuclear triad, components such as the presence of a global missile defense system, a non-nuclear component of strategic forces in which it was planned to include means of rapid global strike, and a highly effective command and control intelligence system to quickly identify targets should be highlighted.
Also, low-power nuclear charges were considered as means of operational use, the use of which, according to the US, can be justified in some regional conflict scenarios. For some time the theme of the so-called active clean nuclear charges, which leave virtually no radioactive contamination after themselves and can be widely used in local conflicts. However, no detailed information on this area is currently available.
In recent years, the Russian Federation is facing increasing pressure from Western countries, primarily the United States. The main instrument of the United States in this matter is an instrument of economic sanctions. Using the available economic and political instruments, the United States imposes participation in sanctions against the Russian Federation to countries one way or another connected with the American economy.
In addition, military rhetoric is escalating. Under the guise of alleged breaches by Russia of a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles (DDSMD), the United States threatens to withdraw from this treaty, as they previously withdrew from the ABM treaty.
The list of existing and potential threats at the beginning of 2019:
The threat of US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, expressed in the ultimatum form, is already 2 February 2019, Washington will be able to start the procedure for exiting the agreement.
For Russia, the deployment of medium-range missiles and cruise missiles means a significant reduction in the time taken to make a decision and launch a retaliatory strike, as well as a decrease in the number of missiles for retaliation.
Placement of launchers of conventional weapons on the borders of the Russian Federation, positioned as elements of US missile defense.
Actually, this can be considered as preparatory measures for the previous item. In the event that the United States leaves the INF Treaty, cruise missiles with a nuclear and conventional warhead can be deployed in universal launchers. In the future, as the United States develops medium-range missiles, they can be placed on the same bases of US vassals, where missile defense elements are now deployed.
Economic sanctions.
The list of economic sanctions is constantly expanding and has a significant impact on the Russian economy. In addition to the sanctions that are already in force, the uncertainty factor for both parties has a significant effect. In particular, the supplier of sophisticated high-tech equipment may in the future abandon its support services, under the pretext of a new package of sanctions, in turn, the Russian buyer must take this factor into account when purchasing. The complete import substitution ... Firstly, in the conditions of the modern world, with a monstrously overgrown technology tree, it is not at all capable of any country in the world, including the United States. Secondly, it is definitely impossible in Russia, given the collapse of the industry for several decades and the loss of many critical industries.
Creating hostile regimes and hotbeds of tension on the borders of the Russian Federation.
Geographical isolation - the impossibility of transporting goods, laying pipelines, the impossibility of moving the armed forces. Breaking economic ties and the need to respond to the emergence of a zone of instability. In the future, the provision of bridgeheads for the deployment of nuclear or conventional weapons of medium and shorter range.
Political pressure.
Adoption at the level of international organizations and at the intergovernmental level of declarations and resolutions defining Russia as an aggressor country with an illegitimate regime. Summing up the political base for the further imposition of economic sanctions and legitimization of hostile actions against Russia.
Information impact at all levels.
Blackening of any information originating from Russia, starting from programs News and ending with children's cartoons. Psychological preparation of the population of Western countries for aggression against Russia, focusing on Russia as the main source of world problems. Distortion historical facts, including the role of the USSR in World War II.
If you extrapolate the above actions, they directly lead to a transition from the Cold War to a real “hot” conflict. And from here to a full-scale nuclear war close. Given the potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, it is unlikely that someone will dare to direct armed aggression, but sometimes the logic of the emergence and development of armed conflicts does not meet the expectations of their participants. Example: in the event of an escalation of the situation in Ukraine, a regional conflict with the participation of Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries may begin with unpredictable consequences.
No less serious threat are economic sanctions. As mentioned earlier, in the modern world, no one, even the largest country, can develop normally without interaction with other countries, without adopting someone else's experience and not participating in scientific research. Taking advantage of the attractiveness of its economy, market capacity and high purchasing power of the population, the United States is forcing economic entities from other countries not interested in sanctions against Russia to participate in them under the threat of restricting access to US company technologies and sales markets.
An example of the effectiveness of such sanctions. In April, 2018, the US Department of Commerce imposed a seven-year ban on the purchase of ZTE products by American technology companies because of violations of the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea. For ZTE, this decision almost turned into a complete collapse of the company, and only “having gone to repentance” in the United States and paying billions in fines, the company was able to stay afloat.
How can we cool the ardor of our Western partners and their accomplices?
As one of the effective means, it is possible to suggest the reorganization of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
All the measures listed below can be taken simultaneously or in stages in response to the US withdrawal from the INF mode or, for example, exceeding a certain critical threshold of economic sanctions.
1. Exit from all contracts limiting the number and means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are necessary so that war does not start. The smaller it is, the greater the desire to "try." It is guaranteed destruction that makes war unacceptable to all parties. For us, it does not matter at all whether the US will have 10 000 warheads, we need to have enough of them to ensure that all targets are hit in conditions of a retaliatory and retaliatory strike. In this sense, 10 000 warheads in the United States and 5000 warheads in Russia are better than in 1 500 units both in our country and in theirs. Moreover, with an increase in the number of warheads, the factor of difference in the volume of a nuclear arsenal will play an ever smaller role. Moreover, we are already concluding agreements on limitation with the United States, not taking into account the nuclear arsenals of other NATO countries and Israel. With a decrease in the total number of warheads in Russia and the United States, their contribution is becoming more significant.
An exception must be made in this paragraph - to keep the treaty on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in space.
2. The maximum secrecy in terms of the nomenclature and the number of strategic nuclear forces is similar to how it is implemented in the PRC.
What is the point of helping the enemy to prepare for the first strike, as well as to protect against our retaliatory strike?
3. Shift the emphasis in international cooperation on ensuring maximum awareness of launches, to avoid accidental exchange of nuclear strikes.
4. Inclusion of anti-missile defense elements and high-precision conventional long-range weapons in the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Modeled on the updated triad of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, to increase the flexibility of use and effective use in a limited conflict.
5. "Personalization" of a nuclear strike.
At this point it is necessary to dwell in more detail.
Exact lists of nuclear weapons targets are classified. At the end of 2018 of the year, the US National Archives and Records Administration published a list of targets for nuclear missile strikes in the USSR developed by 50-ies of the last century, where item 275 - “population” looks most impressive. The list itself is an 800-page document marked as secret. It was developed by the Strategic Aviation Command in 1956 for the war, which could well have happened about three years after the creation of the list. It was planned to destroy the population, because, in the opinion of the military of that time, the enemy, both soldiers and civilians, should have been demoralized.
According to open sources, a modern list of US targets for Russia is contained in the plan of operations CONPLAN-8044 (perhaps there is already an updated document). In general terms, its content is known.
If necessary, the American president can choose from four options for delivering a nuclear strike (Major Attack Option, MAO). MAO-1 involves an attack on all components of the Russian nuclear forces and the entire infrastructure for the creation and functioning of nuclear weapons: plants, the fleetstrategic aviation, missile silos, radar, satellite communications, telecommunications, etc. In MAO-2, these military targets are supplemented by conventional military bases and large airfields. Both options intentionally spare politicians and a significant part of the army leadership - so that it was with whom to negotiate surrender. With the implementation of MAO-3, a pair of warheads will go to them. And finally, MAO-4 is the most uncompromising bombardment: in addition to all the previous, nuclear strikes are carried out at economic targets - the fuel and energy complex and large, primarily defense, industries. In total, such a blow is designed for 1000-1200 targets and suggests that from 8 to 12 million Russians will die.
It is obvious that in Russia there is a similar document, including certain lists of goals.
This document is proposed to supplement the open part, which includes a dynamic (updated) list of goals.
These goals are the actors of international politics whose actions are directed against the interests of the Russian Federation and whose actions bring closer or may bring the beginning of a “hot” conflict that could develop into a full-scale nuclear war.
Currently, there are a huge number of people who conduct active hostile, anti-Russian activities: journalists, politicians, opening organizations and closed clubs. Often these people and their property are located on the territory of third countries not involved in the conflict. In the case of the outbreak of hostilities, even under the worst scenario, they may hope to sit out in a cozy bunker in New Zealand or in a villa in Latin America.
For those who are poorer:
For those richer:
Some politicians may think that his country is too small and does not have military value, so it is unlikely that it will be in jeopardy, and it’s very desirable to provide political capital for opposing the “Evil Empire”.
The task of the fifth point is to convey to those hostile to Russia and their environment, regardless of citizenship, country of residence, profession or position, that in the event of a conflict, their actions will not go unpunished.
In fact, this will make the SNF an element of information warfare.
The list should include an open and closed part. In some cases, only the identity of the goal can be indicated, but the property is not indicated, since she may be in a friendly country. Also for political reasons, most likely, the leaders of the states and their closest circle will not be indicated (although this is not a dogma).
Also in the closed part of the list will be strategic goals - military and industrial facilities from existing secret documents.
A multilateral commission, including representatives of various branches of government and law enforcement agencies, should work on the creation of an open list of targets. After the list of targets is approved, intelligence structures ensure maximum disclosure of information on the target - real estate, owned or leased, location, etc.
Then this information is placed on the official state website, up to indicating the types of warheads that will be applied to specific objects. The site, in addition to the text part, must contain a graphic part on which it will be possible to see in the zone of what damaging factors of a nuclear explosion there will be one or another object. Example of implementation: https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/interactive/bomb-blast/.
The open list may include not only people, but also government facilities - for example, the US missile defense base in Romania. Perhaps a clear understanding of how many kilotons will fly to them in the event of a conflict, will force the population to actively counteract the involvement of their country in the conflicts of great powers.
How can the fifth point affect the above threats? Presumably, in addition to exerting psychological pressure directly on hostile individuals, secondary effects may also appear. For example, the cost of land on which objects of potential targets are located will decrease. In turn, this may cause discontent among landowners of nearby plots, refusals to sell or to purchase such plots. Such secondary financial pressure (“nuclear marketing”) may be more effective than an immediate threat to life. In the end, you want to disperse the crowd of a million - announce the collection of money ...
Some countries may even deny the right to enter and purchase real estate on their territory to persons from the list.
In addition to the "stick", it is assumed, and "gingerbread." Since the list is supposed to be dynamic, in the event of a policy change, the adoption of decisions that are positive for Russia, the closure of the US bases, etc., the targets are excluded from the list. Make your own neutral from the use of nuclear weapons - what is not the goal for the politician?
In this decision, it seems to me, there is also some kind of justice in the fact that the consequences of the conflict will be eased not only by some abstract John, who hates Russia, as far as he is receptive to TV news, but by the direct participants and organizers of the show.
Can potential opponents respond to the fifth point symmetrically? Hardly ever. It so happened that the actors of our policy prefer to invest in real estate in Western countries, i.e. they will actually have to strike their territory. As for confiscations, it can be carried out now, within the framework of existing economic sanctions.
Technically, the implementation of the fifth point will require effective interaction between the strategic nuclear forces and reconnaissance structures, as well as, possibly, the creation of compact warheads with minimal power (5-10 kilotons) and dimensions, but with high accuracy.
The smallest ammunition is based on the 152-mm artillery projectile. The combat unit for a ballistic missile, of course, will be more, due to thermal protection and guidance systems, but in general it is possible to hope that modern technologies will make it possible to obtain the necessary product in minimum dimensions.
As carriers - medium-range missiles for targets in Europe and Asia and intercontinental ballistic missiles for remote regions. Separately, it is necessary to allocate a promising missile "Sarmat". Its capabilities will make it possible to deliver warheads even to New Zealand, which is often considered a safe place in the event of a global conflict.
Minimizing the size of warheads will increase their number on one carrier, which, in turn, will allow to reduce the cost of deploying this element of the strategic nuclear forces. For Sarmat-type missiles, it is declared from 10 to 15 warheads, depending on power (usually 100-300 kilotons). For low power charges, good results would be on a carrier of this class of order 30-40 warheads.
And finally, the inclusion of conventional means of destruction in the SNF will make it possible to break the destruction of targets into stages when some targets are hit with non-nuclear weapons during the period of threat. For example, the leaders of the same Ukraine will think three times over to bring our nations to a fraternal war, realizing that they themselves will be the first victims. And it's far from a fact that after such a demonstration, the United States or one of the EU countries will decide to “fit in”. As Henry Kissinger said: "Great powers do not sacrifice themselves for the sake of allies."
How much should it be financially costly? It all depends on how many additional targets appear, how much it will be possible to miniaturize warheads, how many and on what carriers they can be placed. Since not in all directions of impact there will be missile defense systems, then on a part of the carriers, it is possible to abandon the means of breakthrough, false blocks, to reduce the cost.
How many warheads do you need, subject to withdrawal from contracts to limit the number of warheads? Here we return to the previous question.
Finally, the voiced scenario can be used as a means of political pressure. Those. plans and intentions can be declared, preliminary preparations begin. In the future, depending on the development of events, this scenario can be partially implemented or canceled completely, as well as fully implemented.
Summarizing, we can say that it is not a fact that Russia will be the initiators of withdrawing from the treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapons. If the US decides that it is profitable for them, then they will do it without hesitation: they do not have the determination to denounce the contracts. One should not rely on the fact that their industry in terms of the production of nuclear weapons is going through far from the best of times. There will be a task - they will solve it, their scientific base and industry are colossal. In my opinion, it is better to take the initiative themselves, rather than swim in the direction of someone else's policies.
Tactical nuclear weaponThe weapons of the Russian Federation are about two thousand warheads for various purposes.
According to the existing version of the military doctrine, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when threatened the very existence of the state.
The structure of the United States SNF generally corresponds to the structure of the Russian (USSR) SNF, with the difference that the naval component is dominant in the United States.
In other countries of the nuclear club, there is about the same picture, adjusted for the absence or underdevelopment of some components of the strategic nuclear forces and the lower potential of carriers and warheads.
A distinctive feature of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, the United States and other countries of the world is a narrow specialization: ensuring the deterrence of the enemy from a full-scale attack, including with the use of nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear forces can not prevent the enemy, to carry out hostile actions, such as organizing coups d'état, organizing local conflicts on the borders or even on the territory of the object of aggression, taking measures of economic and political pressure and other similar hostile actions. In this regard, the SNF is a useless load on the state budget and the armed forces, limiting the development of general-purpose forces.
After the collapse of the USSR, the developers of the US nuclear strategy concluded that the new era of international relations is characterized by the presence of numerous potential opponents, sources of conflicts and unprecedented challenges, as well as a spectrum of difficultly predictable scenarios. Compared to the era of the Cold War, the world has become more dangerous and unpredictable for the United States. As a result, the existing containment policy, which was based on a nuclear confrontation with one country, the Soviet Union, must be adapted to the new conditions.
According to the new US nuclear strategy, the traditional triad of nuclear forces was supposed to be transformed into a triad consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, active and passive anti-missile defense systems (PRO) of global coverage, as well as a flexible, capable of recreating infrastructure of testing, production and the combat use of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons united by a communications, reconnaissance and control system based on new information technologies.
Image taken from pentagonus.ru
In the new US nuclear triad, components such as the presence of a global missile defense system, a non-nuclear component of strategic forces in which it was planned to include means of rapid global strike, and a highly effective command and control intelligence system to quickly identify targets should be highlighted.
Also, low-power nuclear charges were considered as means of operational use, the use of which, according to the US, can be justified in some regional conflict scenarios. For some time the theme of the so-called active clean nuclear charges, which leave virtually no radioactive contamination after themselves and can be widely used in local conflicts. However, no detailed information on this area is currently available.
In recent years, the Russian Federation is facing increasing pressure from Western countries, primarily the United States. The main instrument of the United States in this matter is an instrument of economic sanctions. Using the available economic and political instruments, the United States imposes participation in sanctions against the Russian Federation to countries one way or another connected with the American economy.
In addition, military rhetoric is escalating. Under the guise of alleged breaches by Russia of a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles (DDSMD), the United States threatens to withdraw from this treaty, as they previously withdrew from the ABM treaty.
The list of existing and potential threats at the beginning of 2019:
The threat of US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, expressed in the ultimatum form, is already 2 February 2019, Washington will be able to start the procedure for exiting the agreement.
For Russia, the deployment of medium-range missiles and cruise missiles means a significant reduction in the time taken to make a decision and launch a retaliatory strike, as well as a decrease in the number of missiles for retaliation.
Placement of launchers of conventional weapons on the borders of the Russian Federation, positioned as elements of US missile defense.
Actually, this can be considered as preparatory measures for the previous item. In the event that the United States leaves the INF Treaty, cruise missiles with a nuclear and conventional warhead can be deployed in universal launchers. In the future, as the United States develops medium-range missiles, they can be placed on the same bases of US vassals, where missile defense elements are now deployed.
Economic sanctions.
The list of economic sanctions is constantly expanding and has a significant impact on the Russian economy. In addition to the sanctions that are already in force, the uncertainty factor for both parties has a significant effect. In particular, the supplier of sophisticated high-tech equipment may in the future abandon its support services, under the pretext of a new package of sanctions, in turn, the Russian buyer must take this factor into account when purchasing. The complete import substitution ... Firstly, in the conditions of the modern world, with a monstrously overgrown technology tree, it is not at all capable of any country in the world, including the United States. Secondly, it is definitely impossible in Russia, given the collapse of the industry for several decades and the loss of many critical industries.
Creating hostile regimes and hotbeds of tension on the borders of the Russian Federation.
Geographical isolation - the impossibility of transporting goods, laying pipelines, the impossibility of moving the armed forces. Breaking economic ties and the need to respond to the emergence of a zone of instability. In the future, the provision of bridgeheads for the deployment of nuclear or conventional weapons of medium and shorter range.
Political pressure.
Adoption at the level of international organizations and at the intergovernmental level of declarations and resolutions defining Russia as an aggressor country with an illegitimate regime. Summing up the political base for the further imposition of economic sanctions and legitimization of hostile actions against Russia.
Information impact at all levels.
Blackening of any information originating from Russia, starting from programs News and ending with children's cartoons. Psychological preparation of the population of Western countries for aggression against Russia, focusing on Russia as the main source of world problems. Distortion historical facts, including the role of the USSR in World War II.
If you extrapolate the above actions, they directly lead to a transition from the Cold War to a real “hot” conflict. And from here to a full-scale nuclear war close. Given the potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, it is unlikely that someone will dare to direct armed aggression, but sometimes the logic of the emergence and development of armed conflicts does not meet the expectations of their participants. Example: in the event of an escalation of the situation in Ukraine, a regional conflict with the participation of Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries may begin with unpredictable consequences.
No less serious threat are economic sanctions. As mentioned earlier, in the modern world, no one, even the largest country, can develop normally without interaction with other countries, without adopting someone else's experience and not participating in scientific research. Taking advantage of the attractiveness of its economy, market capacity and high purchasing power of the population, the United States is forcing economic entities from other countries not interested in sanctions against Russia to participate in them under the threat of restricting access to US company technologies and sales markets.
An example of the effectiveness of such sanctions. In April, 2018, the US Department of Commerce imposed a seven-year ban on the purchase of ZTE products by American technology companies because of violations of the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea. For ZTE, this decision almost turned into a complete collapse of the company, and only “having gone to repentance” in the United States and paying billions in fines, the company was able to stay afloat.
How can we cool the ardor of our Western partners and their accomplices?
As one of the effective means, it is possible to suggest the reorganization of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
All the measures listed below can be taken simultaneously or in stages in response to the US withdrawal from the INF mode or, for example, exceeding a certain critical threshold of economic sanctions.
1. Exit from all contracts limiting the number and means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are necessary so that war does not start. The smaller it is, the greater the desire to "try." It is guaranteed destruction that makes war unacceptable to all parties. For us, it does not matter at all whether the US will have 10 000 warheads, we need to have enough of them to ensure that all targets are hit in conditions of a retaliatory and retaliatory strike. In this sense, 10 000 warheads in the United States and 5000 warheads in Russia are better than in 1 500 units both in our country and in theirs. Moreover, with an increase in the number of warheads, the factor of difference in the volume of a nuclear arsenal will play an ever smaller role. Moreover, we are already concluding agreements on limitation with the United States, not taking into account the nuclear arsenals of other NATO countries and Israel. With a decrease in the total number of warheads in Russia and the United States, their contribution is becoming more significant.
An exception must be made in this paragraph - to keep the treaty on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in space.
2. The maximum secrecy in terms of the nomenclature and the number of strategic nuclear forces is similar to how it is implemented in the PRC.
What is the point of helping the enemy to prepare for the first strike, as well as to protect against our retaliatory strike?
3. Shift the emphasis in international cooperation on ensuring maximum awareness of launches, to avoid accidental exchange of nuclear strikes.
4. Inclusion of anti-missile defense elements and high-precision conventional long-range weapons in the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Modeled on the updated triad of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, to increase the flexibility of use and effective use in a limited conflict.
5. "Personalization" of a nuclear strike.
At this point it is necessary to dwell in more detail.
Exact lists of nuclear weapons targets are classified. At the end of 2018 of the year, the US National Archives and Records Administration published a list of targets for nuclear missile strikes in the USSR developed by 50-ies of the last century, where item 275 - “population” looks most impressive. The list itself is an 800-page document marked as secret. It was developed by the Strategic Aviation Command in 1956 for the war, which could well have happened about three years after the creation of the list. It was planned to destroy the population, because, in the opinion of the military of that time, the enemy, both soldiers and civilians, should have been demoralized.
According to open sources, a modern list of US targets for Russia is contained in the plan of operations CONPLAN-8044 (perhaps there is already an updated document). In general terms, its content is known.
If necessary, the American president can choose from four options for delivering a nuclear strike (Major Attack Option, MAO). MAO-1 involves an attack on all components of the Russian nuclear forces and the entire infrastructure for the creation and functioning of nuclear weapons: plants, the fleetstrategic aviation, missile silos, radar, satellite communications, telecommunications, etc. In MAO-2, these military targets are supplemented by conventional military bases and large airfields. Both options intentionally spare politicians and a significant part of the army leadership - so that it was with whom to negotiate surrender. With the implementation of MAO-3, a pair of warheads will go to them. And finally, MAO-4 is the most uncompromising bombardment: in addition to all the previous, nuclear strikes are carried out at economic targets - the fuel and energy complex and large, primarily defense, industries. In total, such a blow is designed for 1000-1200 targets and suggests that from 8 to 12 million Russians will die.
It is obvious that in Russia there is a similar document, including certain lists of goals.
This document is proposed to supplement the open part, which includes a dynamic (updated) list of goals.
These goals are the actors of international politics whose actions are directed against the interests of the Russian Federation and whose actions bring closer or may bring the beginning of a “hot” conflict that could develop into a full-scale nuclear war.
Currently, there are a huge number of people who conduct active hostile, anti-Russian activities: journalists, politicians, opening organizations and closed clubs. Often these people and their property are located on the territory of third countries not involved in the conflict. In the case of the outbreak of hostilities, even under the worst scenario, they may hope to sit out in a cozy bunker in New Zealand or in a villa in Latin America.
For those who are poorer:
Bunker "Mini 8 × 12". Price 39 000 dollars. Information from risingsbunkers.com
For those richer:
Bunker "Aristocrat." Price 8 350 000 dollars. Information from risingsbunkers.com
Some politicians may think that his country is too small and does not have military value, so it is unlikely that it will be in jeopardy, and it’s very desirable to provide political capital for opposing the “Evil Empire”.
The task of the fifth point is to convey to those hostile to Russia and their environment, regardless of citizenship, country of residence, profession or position, that in the event of a conflict, their actions will not go unpunished.
In fact, this will make the SNF an element of information warfare.
The list should include an open and closed part. In some cases, only the identity of the goal can be indicated, but the property is not indicated, since she may be in a friendly country. Also for political reasons, most likely, the leaders of the states and their closest circle will not be indicated (although this is not a dogma).
Also in the closed part of the list will be strategic goals - military and industrial facilities from existing secret documents.
A multilateral commission, including representatives of various branches of government and law enforcement agencies, should work on the creation of an open list of targets. After the list of targets is approved, intelligence structures ensure maximum disclosure of information on the target - real estate, owned or leased, location, etc.
Then this information is placed on the official state website, up to indicating the types of warheads that will be applied to specific objects. The site, in addition to the text part, must contain a graphic part on which it will be possible to see in the zone of what damaging factors of a nuclear explosion there will be one or another object. Example of implementation: https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/interactive/bomb-blast/.
Image from outrider.org
The open list may include not only people, but also government facilities - for example, the US missile defense base in Romania. Perhaps a clear understanding of how many kilotons will fly to them in the event of a conflict, will force the population to actively counteract the involvement of their country in the conflicts of great powers.
How can the fifth point affect the above threats? Presumably, in addition to exerting psychological pressure directly on hostile individuals, secondary effects may also appear. For example, the cost of land on which objects of potential targets are located will decrease. In turn, this may cause discontent among landowners of nearby plots, refusals to sell or to purchase such plots. Such secondary financial pressure (“nuclear marketing”) may be more effective than an immediate threat to life. In the end, you want to disperse the crowd of a million - announce the collection of money ...
Some countries may even deny the right to enter and purchase real estate on their territory to persons from the list.
In addition to the "stick", it is assumed, and "gingerbread." Since the list is supposed to be dynamic, in the event of a policy change, the adoption of decisions that are positive for Russia, the closure of the US bases, etc., the targets are excluded from the list. Make your own neutral from the use of nuclear weapons - what is not the goal for the politician?
In this decision, it seems to me, there is also some kind of justice in the fact that the consequences of the conflict will be eased not only by some abstract John, who hates Russia, as far as he is receptive to TV news, but by the direct participants and organizers of the show.
Can potential opponents respond to the fifth point symmetrically? Hardly ever. It so happened that the actors of our policy prefer to invest in real estate in Western countries, i.e. they will actually have to strike their territory. As for confiscations, it can be carried out now, within the framework of existing economic sanctions.
Technically, the implementation of the fifth point will require effective interaction between the strategic nuclear forces and reconnaissance structures, as well as, possibly, the creation of compact warheads with minimal power (5-10 kilotons) and dimensions, but with high accuracy.
The smallest ammunition is based on the 152-mm artillery projectile. The combat unit for a ballistic missile, of course, will be more, due to thermal protection and guidance systems, but in general it is possible to hope that modern technologies will make it possible to obtain the necessary product in minimum dimensions.
The smallest nuclear weapon ever used is the 152-mm artillery shell developed by VNIITF. Image from starcom68.livejournal.com
As carriers - medium-range missiles for targets in Europe and Asia and intercontinental ballistic missiles for remote regions. Separately, it is necessary to allocate a promising missile "Sarmat". Its capabilities will make it possible to deliver warheads even to New Zealand, which is often considered a safe place in the event of a global conflict.
Minimizing the size of warheads will increase their number on one carrier, which, in turn, will allow to reduce the cost of deploying this element of the strategic nuclear forces. For Sarmat-type missiles, it is declared from 10 to 15 warheads, depending on power (usually 100-300 kilotons). For low power charges, good results would be on a carrier of this class of order 30-40 warheads.
And finally, the inclusion of conventional means of destruction in the SNF will make it possible to break the destruction of targets into stages when some targets are hit with non-nuclear weapons during the period of threat. For example, the leaders of the same Ukraine will think three times over to bring our nations to a fraternal war, realizing that they themselves will be the first victims. And it's far from a fact that after such a demonstration, the United States or one of the EU countries will decide to “fit in”. As Henry Kissinger said: "Great powers do not sacrifice themselves for the sake of allies."
How much should it be financially costly? It all depends on how many additional targets appear, how much it will be possible to miniaturize warheads, how many and on what carriers they can be placed. Since not in all directions of impact there will be missile defense systems, then on a part of the carriers, it is possible to abandon the means of breakthrough, false blocks, to reduce the cost.
How many warheads do you need, subject to withdrawal from contracts to limit the number of warheads? Here we return to the previous question.
Finally, the voiced scenario can be used as a means of political pressure. Those. plans and intentions can be declared, preliminary preparations begin. In the future, depending on the development of events, this scenario can be partially implemented or canceled completely, as well as fully implemented.
Summarizing, we can say that it is not a fact that Russia will be the initiators of withdrawing from the treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapons. If the US decides that it is profitable for them, then they will do it without hesitation: they do not have the determination to denounce the contracts. One should not rely on the fact that their industry in terms of the production of nuclear weapons is going through far from the best of times. There will be a task - they will solve it, their scientific base and industry are colossal. In my opinion, it is better to take the initiative themselves, rather than swim in the direction of someone else's policies.
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