The sunset of the nuclear triad? Ground and space echelons of SPRN


The advent of ballistic missiles provided strategic nuclear forces (SNF) the ability to strike at the enemy in the shortest possible time. Depending on the type of missile - intercontinental (ICBM), medium-range (BRRS) or short-range (BRMD), this time can be from about five to thirty minutes. At the same time, the so-called threatened period may be absent, since the preparation of modern ballistic missiles for launch takes a minimum of time and is practically not determined by reconnaissance means until the moment the missiles are launched.


In the event of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike by the defender, either a retaliatory or retaliatory nuclear strike can be carried out. In the absence of information about the enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike, only a retaliatory strike is possible, which places increased demands on the survival of the components of the strategic nuclear forces.

Earlier we looked at sustainability air, ground и Maritime components of strategic nuclear forces. In the foreseeable future, a situation may well arise where none of the components of the strategic nuclear forces will have sufficient survivability to ensure guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy.

The air component is actually weapon first strike, unsuitable for retaliatory and even retaliatory strike. The marine component can be extremely effective in retaliating, but only if securing the deployment and patrolling of strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) is secured, which can be called into question due to the total superiority of the enemy naval forces (Navy). Worst of all, there is no reliable information about the stealth of our SSBNs: we can assume that their stealth is ensured, but in fact the enemy monitors all SSBNs on alert throughout the patrol route. The ground component is also vulnerable: stationary mines will not withstand the impact of modern high-precision nuclear warheads, and the issue of stealth of mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) is the same as with respect to the SSBN. It is not known whether the adversary “sees” our PGRK or not.

Thus, you can only rely on a retaliatory strike. A key element that enables a retaliatory strike is the missile attack warning system (SPRN). Modern SPRN leading powers include ground and space echelons.

Ground Tier SPRN


The development of the ground based SPRN component, radar stations in the USA and the USSR began in the 50s after the advent of ballistic missiles. In the late 60s and early 70s, the first SPRN radars came into service in both countries.


Radar AN / FPS-49 developed by D.K. Barton of the American SPRN

The first SPRN radars were huge, occupied one or several buildings, were extremely difficult to build and maintain, had huge energy consumption, and, accordingly, a significant cost of construction and operation. The detection range of the first SPRN radars was limited to two to three thousand kilometers, which corresponded to 10-15 minutes of flight time of ballistic missiles.


Radar 5N15 "Dniester" SPRN USSR

Subsequently, monstrous Daryal radars were created with the ability to detect a target the size of a soccer ball at a range of up to 6000 km, which corresponded to 20-30 minutes of the ICBM flight time. Two Daryal-type radars were built in the region of Pechora (Komi Republic) and near the city of Gabala (Azerbaijan SSR). Further deployment of this type of radar was discontinued due to the collapse of the USSR.


Receiving and transmitting antennas of the Daryal radar SPRN USSR


Scheme of the planned deployment and control zone of the Daryal radar

In the Byelorussian USSR, the Volga radar was built, capable of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles and space objects with an effective dispersion surface (EPR) of 0,1-0,2 square meters at a range of up to 2000 kilometers (maximum detection range of 4800 kilometers).


Radar "Volga" SPRN USSR

Also included in the SPRN is the Don-2N radar, the only one of its kind, created in the interests of the missile defense (ABM) of Moscow. The capabilities of the Don-2N radar make it possible to detect small objects at ranges up to 3700 km and at altitudes up to 40000 meters. During the 1996 Oderax international experiment to detect small-sized space objects and space debris, the Don-2N radar was able to detect and build a trajectory of small space objects with a diameter of 5 cm at a distance of up to 800 kilometers.


Radar "Don-2N" missile defense of Moscow

The sunset of the nuclear triad? Ground and space echelons of SPRN

Control zone radar SPRN USSR

After the collapse of the USSR, a part of the radar station continued to work for some time in the Russian SPRN system, but gradually, as relations with the former republics of the USSR worsened and the material part became obsolete, a need arose for the construction of new facilities.

At present, the basis of the ground component of the RF SPRN are modular radars of high factory readiness, meter (Voronezh-M, Voronezh-VP), decimeter (Voronezh-DM) and centimeter (Voronezh-SM) wavelength ranges. Also developed a modification of "Voronezh-MSM", capable of working in the meter and centimeter ranges. Voronezh-type radars should replace all SPRN radars built in the USSR.


Radar type "Voronezh-M"


Placement of existing and under construction radar type "Voronezh"

To protect against low-flying cruise missiles, SPRNs are supplemented with over-the-horizon radars (ZRLS), such as over-the-horizon radars (ZGO) 29B6 “Container” with a detection range for low-flying targets of up to 3000 kilometers.


Radar ZGO "Container"


Control zones of the radar SPRN RF

On the whole, the ground level echelon of the Russian Special Forces is actively developing and it can be assumed that its effectiveness is quite high.

Space Tier SPRN


The space echelon of the USSR SPRN, the Oko system, was put into operation in 1979 and included four US-K spacecraft (SC) located in highly elliptical orbits. By 1987, a constellation of nine US-K satellites and one US-KS satellite, located in a geostationary orbit (GSO), was formed. The Eye system provided the ability to control missile-hazardous areas of the United States, and due to the highly elliptical orbit and some possible patrol sections of American nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).


US-K 73D6 satellite of the Eye system


US-KS 74X6 satellite located on GSO

In 1991, the deployment of the new generation of US-KMO satellites of the Oko-1 system began. The Oko-1 system was supposed to include seven satellites in geostationary orbits, and four satellites in high elliptical orbits. In fact, eight US-KMO satellites were launched, but by 2015 all of them were out of order. The US-KMO satellites were equipped with solar shields and special filters that made it possible to observe the surface of the earth and the sea at an almost vertical angle, which made it possible to detect sea launches of ballistic missiles of submarines against reflections from the sea surface and clouds. Also, the US-KMO satellite equipment made it possible to detect infrared radiation from working rocket engines even with relatively dense cloud cover.


US-KMO 71X6 satellite of the Eye-1 system

In 2015, the deployment of the new Unified Space System (CEN) Tundra began. It was assumed that ten satellites of the CSC “Tundra” will be deployed by 2020, but the creation of the system was delayed. It can be assumed that the most important obstacle to the creation of the Tundra CSC, as in the case of satellites of the Russian global navigation satellite system (GLONASS), was the lack of domestic space-based electronics, while imposing sanctions on foreign components of this type. This problem is complex, but quite solvable, moreover, it’s just suitable for space electronics that seem to be optimally suitable, like the existing technological processes in the Russian Federation of 28 and more (65, 90, 130) nanometers. However, this is a topic for another discussion.

It is assumed that satellites 14F112 CEN "Tundra" will not only be able to track the launches of ballistic missiles from the ground and water surface, but also calculate the flight path, as well as the area of ​​impact of the enemy’s ICBMs. Also, according to some reports, they should give preliminary target designation to the missile defense system and ensure the transfer of commands for a retaliatory or retaliatory counter-nuclear strike.

The exact characteristics of the KA 14F112 CEN Tundra are unknown, as is the current state of the system. Presumably satellites of the CSC “Tundra” operate in test mode or are mothballed, the final terms for the deployment of the system are unknown. Most likely, the space echelon of the SPRN of the Russian Federation is currently practically not operational.

conclusions


The country's leadership pays considerable attention to the development of the Russian Federation of Socialist Development. The ground level SPRN is actively developing, radars of various types are being built. Almost circular control of missile-hazardous directions was provided in the part of detecting high-altitude objects (ballistic missiles) at a range of up to 6000 km, ZGRLS detections of low-flying targets (cruise missiles) at a distance of up to 3000 km were built.

At the same time, the space echelon of the SPRN does not seem to be functioning or is operating in a limited mode. How critical is the absence of an SPRN space echelon?

The first most important criterion for an SPRN is the time during which an enemy strike is detected. The second criterion is the reliability of the information provided to the country's leadership for deciding whether to retaliate.


Nuclear case of the Kazbek system

It is unlikely that the enemy will decide on a sudden disarming strike on any one component, for example, a control and decision-making system. Most likely, the task will be to destroy all components of the strategic nuclear forces with multiple overlapping - the stakes are too high. By the way, the Perimeter system, also called the Dead Hand, is not considered in the article for this reason: there will be no one to give the command if all carriers are destroyed during the attack.


Command missile 15А11 of the Perimeter system

Regarding the first criterion, the time during which an enemy strike will be detected, the space echelon is an essential element of the SPRN, since the rocket engine will be seen from space much earlier than the missiles enter the coverage area of ​​ground-based radars, especially when providing a global view of the space echelon of the SPRN .

Regarding the second criterion, the reliability of the information provided, the space echelon of the SPRN is also critically important. In the event that primary information is received from satellites, the country's leadership will have time to prepare for striking and delivering / canceling it if the fact of striking is confirmed / refuted by the ground level SPRN.

The practice of "do not put all the eggs in one basket" is quite applicable to SPRN. The combination of satellites and ground-based radars allows you to receive information from sensors operating in fundamentally different wavelength ranges - optical (thermal) and radar, which virtually eliminates the possibility of their simultaneous failure. At the moment, there is no information about whether the enemy can affect the operation of the SPRN radar, but such work may well be conducted. For example, offhand it can be assumed that the HAARP project, one of the invariable objects of conspiracy theory enthusiasts, or its analogues, may well be used not only to study the ionosphere, but also be considered as a means of reducing the effectiveness (read: detection range) of the SARS radar, first of all turn ZGRLS, the principle of operation of which is based on the reflection of radio waves from the ionosphere. Or used to explore the possibility of creating systems that can do this.


HAARP Antennas

Thus, the space echelon of the SPRN is extremely important, it provides both a margin in time for making a decision and increases the likelihood of the country's leadership making the right decision to launch or cancel a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy. Also, the space echelon significantly increases the stability and survivability of the SPRN in general.

It must be understood that the situation with strategic nuclear forces and missile defense systems is not “static”. On the one hand, we increase the survivability, security and effectiveness of strategic nuclear forces and missile defense systems, on the other hand, the enemy is looking for ways to deliver an irresistible first strike. We will talk about what means the United States previously planned and can plan in the future to crack the SPRN and the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the following article.
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  1. Vladimir_2U 11 January 2020 05: 39 New
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    but also be considered as a means of reducing the effectiveness (read: detection range) of radar SPRN, primarily ZGRLS, If this conclusion was made by the author of the article, it remains only to take off his hat in front of his capabilities as an analyst, without jokes! And even if not, then anyway, the level of the article is very high.
    1. Operator 11 January 2020 17: 23 New
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      HAARP is not at work - it emits directly vertically above itself, and the point of reflection from the ionosphere of the probing radiation of the ZGRLS is 3000 km further.
  2. Cheldon 11 January 2020 07: 28 New
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    SPRN ground stations detect missiles on a passive flight site. And satellites detect at the time of launch, therefore, without a space constellation, the missile attack warning system is inferior. Any attempt to interfere with the operation of ground stations is equivalent to declaring war.
    1. Octopus 11 January 2020 18: 14 New
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      Quote: Cheldon
      Any attempt to interfere with the operation of ground stations is equivalent to declaring war.

      )))
      Equate who is bothering you.
      1. Cheldon 11 January 2020 21: 25 New
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        Quote: Octopus

        )))
        Equate who is bothering you.

        These are not my Wishlist. This is an agreement between countries.
        1. Octopus 11 January 2020 21: 32 New
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          Quote: Cheldon
          This is an agreement between countries.

          The first time I've heard. Which contract?
    2. Nick 12 January 2020 12: 00 New
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      Quote: Cheldon
      Any attempt to interfere with the operation of ground stations is equivalent to declaring war.

      Well, this is the actual beginning of military aggression.
      1. telobezumnoe 13 January 2020 02: 31 New
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        nothing equals, here at our station, for example, a failure, and we declare war .. here already if the equipment does not cope with the interference - it’s our own fault, and in every way interfere - and it’s normal practice to look at the reaction .. or the example of evil hackers hacked something - immediately it is necessary to strike a nuclear strike from the usa?
        1. Nick 13 January 2020 17: 53 New
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          Quote: telobezumnoe
          nothing is equated, here at our station a failure for example, and here we declare war .. here already if the equipment can not cope with the interference - they themselves are to blame

          This is not about a failure, but a targeted external suppression of the radio equipment of the country's defense system.
          Quote: telobezumnoe
          or an example of evil hackers hacking something - do you immediately need to strike a nuclear strike from the usa?

          The United States is planning to act. According to the Pentagon’s cyber strategy, the US Department of Defense will henceforth equate cyber attacks with traditional military operations and respond to them as an act of aggression.
  3. antivirus 11 January 2020 08: 42 New
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    a difficult situation - the outskirts and the Republic of Belarus on the perimeter.
    write letters to "allies"
    1. Fan-fan 11 January 2020 11: 48 New
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      Even a significant piece of Turkey is inside the perimeter.
      1. Octopus 11 January 2020 18: 17 New
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        There are the Baltic states with Ukraine inside the perimeter. So if the partners do not give a ride to the INF, it will turn out funny.
        1. Nick 12 January 2020 12: 03 New
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          Quote: Octopus
          There are the Baltic states with Ukraine inside the perimeter. So if the partners do not give a ride to the INF, it will turn out funny.

          The hosts will be pissed off. Putin warned - the answer will go according to the CPR.
          Greetings from Chukotka, Anadyr drawbar them.
          1. Octopus 12 January 2020 15: 47 New
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            Quote: Nick
            Putin warned

            Does anyone else believe him?
            Quote: Nick
            The hosts will be pissed off.

            Wait and see. If we survive.
            1. Nick 12 January 2020 15: 52 New
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              Quote: Octopus
              Putin warned

              Does anyone else believe him?

              It is more profitable to believe in these matters. Otherwise, Big Kirdyk for everyone can happen.
              Quote: Octopus
              Wait and see.

              Exactly. If kirdyk does not happen, then they believed.
              1. Octopus 12 January 2020 16: 08 New
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                Quote: Nick
                If kirdyk does not happen, then they believed.

                Why did kirdyk not happen during the drunk - Yeltsin?
                1. Nick 12 January 2020 16: 11 New
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                  Quote: Octopus
                  Quote: Nick
                  If kirdyk does not happen, then they believed.

                  Why did kirdyk not happen during the drunk - Yeltsin?

                  All the same. At that time, Russia still had a Soviet backlog in the area of ​​strategic nuclear forces
    2. Operator 11 January 2020 17: 25 New
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      It doesn’t matter - the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation are completely covered by the Container ZGRLS.
      1. antivirus 11 January 2020 19: 17 New
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        such is geography - it is necessary to keep the closest neighbors in their arms, except for Darial and the container. hug - don't crush
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Peter Tverdokhlebov 23 March 2020 05: 07 New
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        Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkov, Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine are in the blind zone of the ZGRLS Container, so it is quite possible that new American aeroballistic missiles can be placed there.
        1. Operator 23 March 2020 09: 35 New
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          In addition to the “Container”, we also have the Sunflower ZGRLS with a range of 400 km for air targets and a 130 km blind zone.
  4. RuSFr 11 January 2020 09: 27 New
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    The situation is considered in sufficient detail.
    However, everything actually works in tight connection with the work of illegal intelligence of all departments, technical intelligence monitoring control objects (activity of control centers and communications centers, nuclear technical support facilities, activity of air force, air defense missile defense units and so on and so forth), deployment of naval enemy groups, etc.
    Therefore, it can be stated that there will be no unexpected blow to our country. The sad experience of 1941 has long been taken into account.
    1. Fan-fan 11 January 2020 11: 49 New
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      Are you sure you are accounted for? I am not very sure.
      1. bayard 12 January 2020 01: 38 New
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        The experience was taken into account, otherwise so much effort and money would not have been spent (and continues) to deploy a continuous field of SPRN (based on the Voronezh station family). At present, the perimeter is completely closed.
        Problems with the deployment of the satellite constellation PRN are associated with the problems (tautology) of the element base for space purposes. This is sad, but solvable, albeit with a traditional shift to the right.
        But there will be no sudden attack.
        The enemy will not succeed for objective reasons.
        And an open attack, as well as preparation for it, by definition is not sudden.
        And "they just die."
        1. Peter Tverdokhlebov April 15 2020 13: 05 New
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          Will we be able to apply a “counter strike” strategy, that is, launch all missiles, including SLBMs with nuclear submarines at base points?
          1. bayard April 15 2020 13: 21 New
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            Of course . For the sake of this, this infrastructure has been created \ is being created, which requires a lot of money and effort for its maintenance.
            If a massive launch of an ICBM or SLBM of the enemy is recorded, then a counter-strike will be delivered according to the algorithm request - the prose of the life of the Strategic Missile Forces. A massive salvo of the Kyrgyz Republic can also be classified as a threat to the existence of the state, because no one will wait for the operation of their warheads (nuclear-non-nuclear), but standard battlefield control algorithms will pass.
            But the decision, of course, will be made by the Supreme - that’s why the “nuclear suitcase” is with him.
            1. Peter Tverdokhlebov April 15 2020 17: 17 New
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              And if the Supreme is killed, who will make the decision?
              1. bayard April 15 2020 17: 37 New
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                All according to the algorithm.
    2. dauria 12 January 2020 01: 17 New
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      However, everything works in reality in a tight connection with the work of illegal intelligence of all departments, technical intelligence that monitors control objects


      I have no doubt that we’ll have time to read on Twitter - “Sensation !!! Rockets have started, like and subscribe to my channel”, and a week before that “Sensation !!! Great drape of family members of close friends from New York and Moscow” laughing
      1. telobezumnoe 13 January 2020 02: 35 New
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        reminded
        Best of all, Tinder used one Finnish lieutenant. During the next NATO exercises, the Finns are on one side, the Norwegians are on the other. The battery went to the firing position, there are no orders, "act according to the situation." A bored lieutenant launches Tinder, but why is he in the Lapland snow desert? However, the girls are full, and all at the same distance, and, interestingly, in Norwegian uniforms. “Fighters, who has a Tinder on a smartphone? So, you are at the height of №№№, you are at the height of %%%, report the distance to the women! ” Three serifs - even a “triangle of mistakes” is being built. The outskirts of the village - a separate building in the pictures. “Battery, for battle!” Sight ... Goniometer ... Level ... Conditionally fire! " “Mediator, sir!” The battery entrusted to me made a fire attack on a building in the village ***, the consumption of NNN shells! ” Shocked intermediary - “You destroyed the headquarters of the corps! But how did you know ?! ” “Sir, didn’t you know that the Finns are the best scouts in the world!” And so three times ...
        So information technology wins the Third World War. Unless, of course, cute ladies help them. ©
    3. Nick 12 January 2020 12: 42 New
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      Quote: RuSFr
      Therefore, it can be stated that there will be no unexpected blow to our country. The sad experience of 1941 has long been taken into account.

      It is extremely widespread in Russia that the USSR "missed" the preparations for Germany to attack the USSR on 22.06.1941, but this is far from the case. Stalin knew very well that there would be an attack, but he also knew one more thing - the fact is that in 1937 Roosevelt declared that if Germany attacks the Soviet Union, then the United States will help the USSR, and if the Soviet Union attacking Germany, or allowing itself to provoke, then the United States will help Germany. On April 17, 1941, the U.S. Congress adopted a relevant decision that recorded these words of Roosevelt as the official position of the United States.
      Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the Stalinist leadership consciously dodged the confrontation on the borders with the Wehrmacht, so as not to be accused of starting an aggression against Germany. Perhaps Stalin even allowed the capture of the border areas of the USSR by German troops in order to convincingly show the US leadership and the entire international community who the aggressor is. The only thing that perhaps the leaders of the USSR did not take into account was the force of striking the German Wehrmacht, which allowed the German troops to reach almost three months in almost Moscow.
    4. Peter Tverdokhlebov April 15 2020 13: 07 New
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      How long does it take for the Americans, for example, to withdraw their fleet from basing points and how quickly will we find it?
  5. rocket757 11 January 2020 10: 43 New
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    An irresistible blow can not be carried out by anyone.
    So far, so on ... you need to work in this direction.
    The shield and the spear must be kept on the head, this is our reality.
    1. Fan-fan 11 January 2020 11: 51 New
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      An irresistible blow can not be carried out by anyone.

      How irresistible? 100%? This does not happen, especially since the means of attack are always more effective than the means of defense.
      1. rocket757 11 January 2020 12: 02 New
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        Irresistible, a generic term, not quite that.
        No one will be able to deliver even the first (conditionally) blow and not receive in response, on the contrary, the same blow.
        All sides of the conflict will have catastrophic consequences, and no one will be very happy around.
        Therefore, I am not considering any options for a "moderate" conflict between super-vigorous powers.
        It will either fly together to the Tatars, or NEVER AND NEVER fight against each other.
        1. Fan-fan 11 January 2020 12: 07 New
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          I agree, this is why the military-political leadership of the country needs to work effectively, developing both means of attack and means of defense and, after all, restoring the space echelon of missile defense.
          1. Nick 12 January 2020 12: 48 New
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            Quote: Fan-Fan
            I agree, this is why the military-political leadership of the country needs to work effectively, developing both means of attack and means of defense and, after all, restoring the space echelon of missile defense.

            What, in fact, is being done
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Cheldon 11 January 2020 21: 49 New
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        Quote: Fan-Fan
        An irresistible blow can not be carried out by anyone.

        How irresistible? 100%? This does not happen, especially since the means of attack are always more effective than the means of defense.

        ICBM launches are very vulnerable. They are unmasked by the flame at startup. Therefore, the Yankees were very annoyed by our mobile complexes and the Barguzin railway complex.
    2. ser56 11 January 2020 17: 04 New
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      Quote: rocket757
      An irresistible blow can not be carried out by anyone.

      you forgot the experience of the collapse of the USSR-the country was gone without retribution ....
      so it is necessary to combine not only technical, but also other measures of strategic stability of the state - economic, political, moral, etc. .... request
      1. rocket757 11 January 2020 17: 16 New
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        Quote: ser56
        you forgot the experience of the collapse of the USSR

        This topic has already been discussed and will be discussed many more times.
        While we are considering aspects of a strategic vigorous confrontation.
        There will be a topic that you have identified, I invite you to a conversation. The topic is important, relevant forever.
        1. ser56 13 January 2020 12: 23 New
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          Quote: rocket757
          namely, a strategic vigorous confrontation.

          You can discuss a spherical horse in a vacuum, but as far as I remember from the military, there are characteristics of the leadership of the troops, and so it should be hardcontinuous etc. Without the firmness of leadership, the availability of any equipment does not make sense .... request
          1. rocket757 13 January 2020 12: 40 New
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            We need firmness in the whole complex of government ... the military sphere is only a PART of everything in common.
            1. ser56 13 January 2020 13: 00 New
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              Quote: rocket757
              We need firmness in the whole complex of government ... the military sphere is only a PART of everything

              Who is arguing? request However, we are talking about nuclear weapons, the decision on the application of which is made by the Supreme ... hi so that the Perimeter system, which is not considered in the article, can be of great importance in this regard - the robot runs the program without a doubt ... repeat
              1. rocket757 13 January 2020 13: 06 New
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                Skynet is also dangerous because errors / glitches occur in machine brains as well.
                In such a FINITE case, a triple level of protection will not be superfluous.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  6. Star Destroyer 11 January 2020 11: 26 New
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    At first, the author honestly admitted
    there is no reliable information about the secrecy of our SSBNs ... It is not known whether the adversary “sees” our PGRK or not.
    ... in the further material of the article, he immediately collected all the myths and conjectures associated with the SPRN and ZGRLS.
    How so possible, I don’t even know.
    1. Fan-fan 11 January 2020 12: 09 New
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      And I did not notice any contradictions in the article, everything is logical. Even more, I am simply positively surprised by such articles on this site. Where else can you read such an analysis?
      1. Star Destroyer 11 January 2020 14: 31 New
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        Comrade Damantsev rivets the same “analyzes” almost daily.
    2. evgen1221 11 January 2020 14: 52 New
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      I support the myth, the author has printed a lot. I have also walked on this issue in the comments below.
  7. Old26 11 January 2020 12: 09 New
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    Quote: Cheldon
    SPRN ground stations detect missiles on a passive flight site. And satellites detect at the time of launch, therefore, without a space constellation, the missile attack warning system is inferior. Any attempt to interfere with the operation of ground stations is equivalent to declaring war.

    Not always only passive. It all depends on the launch site of the ICBM (SLBM) and the location of the SPRN radar.
    1. thanks 11 January 2020 14: 27 New
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      Quote: Old26
      It all depends on the launch site of the ICBM (SLBM) and the location of the SPRN radar.

      Old26! It will be right - from the installation site of the radar (its radio visibility relative to the radio horizon) and its parameters: viewing area limited by the maximum (minimum) range D, viewing sectors in the vertical and horizontal planes ... If the target starts out of the viewing area - of course it does not radar is detected - that is why the SPRN radars are positioned so as to provide a complete overview of the space around the perimeter of Russia, overlapping their radiation patterns of antenna systems.
  8. Guazdilla 11 January 2020 13: 04 New
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    Worst of all, there is no reliable information about the secrecy of our SSBNs.
    Probably for conducting international experiments "Oderax"
    Kvzbek system nuclear suitcase
    ... Major Pronin didn’t have this?
  9. Old26 11 January 2020 14: 31 New
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    Quote: Mersi
    Quote: Old26
    It all depends on the launch site of the ICBM (SLBM) and the location of the SPRN radar.

    Old26! It will be right - from the installation site of the radar (its radio visibility relative to the radio horizon) and its parameters: viewing area limited by the maximum (minimum) range D, viewing sectors in the vertical and horizontal planes ... If the target starts out of the viewing area - of course it does not radar is detected - that is why the SPRN radars are positioned so as to provide a complete overview of the space around the perimeter of Russia, overlapping their radiation patterns of antenna systems.

    In principle, I meant this. If the start was in the radar zone visibility, then not only in the passive area.
    1. Military Specialist 11 January 2020 21: 06 New
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      Here we need to understand one fundamental point: the over-the-horizon SPRN radars, in addition to detecting the launch of the BR, should reliably establish whether this BR is a threat to the country, and this can only be done by observing the missile in the passive section, when the trajectory is already formed and the point of incidence can be determined (if this point lies within the territory of the country, then such a goal receives the attribute “attacking” with all the ensuing consequences). That is why, even if the starting BR will be detected “off the table”, until the end of the active section of the output information warning system PRN will not be generated.
      1. Operator 11 January 2020 21: 53 New
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        SPRN provides information to its operators always and precisely from the moment the rocket launch is fixed, regardless of which section of the trajectory the rocket was detected.

        Another thing is that a message about a nuclear missile attack for the top military-political leadership is formed after determining the estimated point of completion of the flight path (after the AUT), with one exception - in the case of a mass launch of US missiles, there is no need to calculate their path and the message leaves immediately.
  10. evgen1221 11 January 2020 14: 43 New
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    I quote-There is no data on the stealth parameters of our SSBNs (and who is the author to disclose secret information to him?), But we can be sure that our boats can see and hear everything from afar (i.e. we don’t know for sure and sure- but our boats exactly th ... oh because- (and why?) and western kull, but their search engine parameters are not known to us (secret), but we must definitely and definitely be sure (and if not, then what?) that they are our boats hear! (and on what grounds do I apologize?) - A delightful dissonance in my head. T. author, please refrain from similar pearls in the future c, the right word, if you think a little, then some sentences and paragraphs in the articles look like nonsense and duplicate myths.
    1. ser56 11 January 2020 17: 06 New
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      Quote: evgen1221
      Delightful dissonance in the head

      depending on who .... repeat
      the author is right - you need to consider all options, including not very pleasant ones ... request
      1. evgen1221 11 January 2020 18: 11 New
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        I'm sorry, did you read the article diagonally? Carefully and leisurely read what the author wrote and what I answered in a specific paragraph and slightly strain my brain to compare and find inconsistencies in the author in two sentences following one after another in the article, is this not fate, or is religion not allowing? I'm sorry.
        1. bayard 12 January 2020 02: 12 New
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          [quote = evgen1221] I'm sorry [/ quote]
          repeat

          [quote = evgen1221] I'm sorry. [/ quote]
          laughing

          [quote = evgen1221] slightly strain the brain [/ quote]
          yes
          [quote = evgen1221] match [/ quote]
          yes
          [quote = evgen1221] find inconsistencies
          lol
          Are you a specialist in this field?
          What do you understand about radar and missile warning systems?
          How deeply are you aware of the relationship between the fleets of Russia and the opposing countries and blocs? On the number and combat capabilities of the US MAPL, NATO bloc countries, as well as the NPL of Japan, Norway, Sweden and all of the same NATO? Where are they on alert near the submarine-based areas of the Russian Navy? How often has their presence been revealed (and revealed), including in the territorial waters of Russia?
          What do you even know?
          You have not mastered the spelling ... lol And you need to know your native language.
          However, it is unlikely that he is dear to you. request



          [quote = evgen1221] I'm sorry. [/ quote]
          1. evgen1221 12 January 2020 06: 16 New
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            It’s not me, but first of all the author who writes that our boats are noisy and everyone hears them (and how does he know that they are all noisy and sucks?) But we can be sure that the enemy will destroy them all (quote) - well, this is the author wants to be sure that our boats will destroy everything (and why not theirs?) - for example, I’m not at all sure about this and should not be in this nonsense to be sure how the author insists.
            1. bayard 12 January 2020 06: 22 New
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              Young man, study the subject.
              Only then can you be sure of something.
              The author knows the subject.
              I know the subject.
              And many forum users, too.
              They don’t need to discuss it - they KNOW it.
              And you need to LEARN.
              This is not arithmetic, but trigonometry, mathematical analysis and the theory of large numbers.
            2. SHURUM -BURUM 12 January 2020 10: 58 New
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              The author is absolutely right that our side can only assume that the enemy does not hear and does not see what we consider to be securely hidden and muffled. Unfortunately, this will be clarified only with active contact. And in this regard, statements about the lack of a global analogue are especially dangerous.
              1. ser56 13 January 2020 12: 27 New
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                Quote: SHURUM -BURUM
                declarations of a nontrivial world.

                Yeah, we’ll throw our hats ... hi
        2. ser56 13 January 2020 12: 26 New
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          Quote: evgen1221
          I'm sorry, did you read the article diagonally?

          alas, but you didn’t master my answer to your comment .... request
          Quote: evgen1221
          or religion does not allow?

          why am I Orthodox ... one thing is not clear - what does this have to do with God? hi Or are you a militant atheist? repeat
  11. Operator 11 January 2020 14: 45 New
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    ZGRLS "Container", in addition to detecting the launch of cruise missiles, detects in a radius of 6000 km the launch of medium-range ballistic missiles and SLBMs launched from SSBNs using an ionized torch of rocket engines.

    The space component of the SPRN is a necessary thing, because it allows you to double-triple (up to 30-45 minutes) to increase the time of detection of the launch of ICBMs and SLBMs at a distance of 10 or more thousand kilometers.

    Moreover, you need to understand that the most dangerous - the so-called. a disarming strike is the use of SLBM and SLBMs at a range of 3000 km with a flight time of 10-15 minutes, to detect the launch of which is the Container ZGRLS.
    1. Military Specialist 11 January 2020 20: 55 New
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      I can’t agree with you ... the Container-type ZGO radars are not designed to work on ballistic missiles and certainly cannot detect anything at a range of up to 6000 km, since the station’s coverage range from 900 km to 2700 km (sometimes they say 3000 km). This is due to the fact that a one-hop sounding option is implemented. Initially, the station is focused on detecting a mass take-off of strategic enemy aircraft (or reaching the launch lines of the Kyrgyz Republic), again mass (group) launches of the Kyrgyz Republic and, possibly, promising hypersonic missiles on the flight routes.
      1. Operator 11 January 2020 21: 23 New
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        The Russian “Container” is a functional analogue of the Soviet “Arc” (three-hop, with the intended purpose - detecting the launch of ICBMs at a distance of 9000 km from the ionized torch of a rocket engine)

        Due to the unstable operation of the “Arc” in the three-hop mode, the “Container” implemented a two-hop mode with a maximum range of 6000 km when working on surface and air (including ballistic missiles) targets with a length of 50 meters and 3000 km in single-hop mode when working on targets with a length of from 5 meters.

        The parameters of the "Container" in the single-hop mode are publicly lit.
  12. evgen1221 11 January 2020 15: 01 New
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    Damn, just looked at the photo (photoshop collages) on the splash screen of the article. Burning radar station Daryal or Volga-Milota is what (sarcasm). And religion does not allow the author to depict the American station in a similar way to the author? Not only our stations will burn.
  13. Military Specialist 11 January 2020 20: 42 New
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    "... Also, the Don-2N radar station is included in the SPRN ..." The Don-2N radar station has never been and is not part of the SPRN, because It is a firing locator of the strategic missile defense system A-135. This station operates on target designation from the PRN system. In addition, in peacetime, it is involved in solving some of the related tasks, for example, monitoring the test launches of our ICBMs and SLBMs, clarifying the ephemeris of new spacecraft, etc. However, in a combat situation, the ballistic missile system exclusively solves the missile defense of the main object.
  14. Old26 11 January 2020 20: 47 New
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    Quote: evgen1221
    Damn, just looked at the photo (photoshop collages) on the splash screen of the article. Burning radar station Daryal or Volga-Milota is what (sarcasm). And religion does not allow the author to depict the American station in a similar way to the author? Not only our stations will burn.

    If the left picture is a picture, then the right one is a real photo. The burning building No. 2 (receiver) of the Daryal radar in Sary-Shagan September 17, 2004
  15. VLADIMIR VLADIVOSTOK 12 January 2020 05: 01 New
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    Stop writing nonsense. Even with modern Russian missile defense. America will have irreparable damage upon impact, Russia will have something left. Separated missile defense, air defense is not a single country in the world. Yes, it will be shitty, but other states will disappear. Western ideology to bomb, take Moscow, Russia will collapse. So Hitler thought.
    1. agond 12 January 2020 11: 18 New
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      Over-the-horizon radars, whose operation is based on the reflection of waves from the ionosphere, have a weak spot, the so-called dead zone, or a minimum distance of detection of close targets, equal to several hundred kilometers, that is, it is impossible to detect a target in the immediate vicinity of radar No. 1, but sent by the station No. 1 signal will still be reflected from the ionosphere and then hit a close target, reflected from it back to the ionosphere and another radar No. 2 located outside the dead zone of radar No. 1 can be detected. Moreover, a target close to radar No. 1 will be x clearly visible on radar number 2, such radars can be "single-hop" and therefore small.
  16. MrFox 12 January 2020 11: 21 New
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    How about the drone delivering the jammer to the Fresnel zone of ground-based SPRN?

    All these systems were created based on certain prerequisites, only life does not stand still
  17. Efreytor 12 January 2020 17: 51 New
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    We have swill the sunset of everything high-tech, except oil and gas. Ten years later, the Soviet legacy will finally be consumed. Third world country.
  18. Efreytor 12 January 2020 17: 56 New
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    For 19 years, 113 CNC machines were built in the Russian Federation, and about the same number of tractors and excavators. Superpower!
  19. VALENTIN-37 13 January 2020 13: 47 New
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    Thanks, well done. Copied.
    I will add information at the beginning of the 2000s.
    With the passage of the signal for the mass use of SSN, information will be received by the two sides BEFORE the launch of the missiles.
    Then it was believed that the countdown would not come from the update. torch or radar marks, and from the team to START.
    It was this component that was then tracked both in the USA and in the Russian Federation.
    I don’t know how at the moment, but it hasn’t changed much.
    The Supreme was convinced to remove the station in Lourdes from duty on the grounds that they were tracking the transactions of the left financial flows of the Russian Federation through US banks, which could not but worry the environment of the Supreme. What and how much was withdrawn from the country.
    But, a large share of information about preparations for launching missiles passed through Cuba specifically.