Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons

In the first article, Strategic Conventional Weaponsstrategic strategic objective weapons It is formulated as causing damage to the enemy, significantly reducing his organizational, industrial and military capabilities from a distance, minimizing or eliminating the likelihood of a direct combat collision with the armed forces of the enemy. Based on this task, it is necessary to determine the composition of the strategic conventional forces (SCS) for its solution.

ICBM R-36M "Satan", UR-100N UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol"

Strategic conventional weapons based on the Strategic Missile Forces weapons

The most logical solution in this case is the creation of non-nuclear warheads for existing ballistic missiles, following the example of the proposed implementation of the US Fast Global Strike program.

The basis for strategic conventional weapons based on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) should be guided non-nuclear warheads with various types of equipment for hitting point and area targets. The most preferable solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36M "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces. Depending on the carrying capacity and dimensions of the head compartment of the carrier, the number of universal conventional warhead units displayed can vary. Taking into account the limitations of the strategic offensive arms treaty (START III), in order to prevent a substantial weakening of the "nuclear shield", about thirty different ICBMs of various classes can be used to solve the problems of delivering strategic conventional weapons.

Another promising option for a non-nuclear warhead is the creation of a conventional version of the Avangard hypersonic product. The flight path features of this unit reduce the likelihood of its detection by the enemy radar, which, combined with the ability to correct the flight path, complicates the determination of the target’s final coordinates and makes it difficult to counter the attack. The Avangard block is planned to be placed on thirty-two ICBM UR-100N UTTKh Stillet received for debts from Ukraine. A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data.

Product "Vanguard"

The main alleged problem with the implementation of conventional ICBM warheads may be the low accuracy of guidance of Russian warheads. Unfortunately, this problem has long been characteristic of Russian Strategic Missile Forces; at the moment, there is no reliable information on the circular probable deviation (CIR) of the latest generation Russian ICBMs. Presumably, according to foreign sources, the KVO ICBM “Bulava” is 350 m, the KVO ICBM “Sineva” 250 m, the KVO ICBM “Yars” 150 m, while, for example, the KVO ICBM ICBM “Trident-II” D5 is 90 m. For guaranteed target destruction by a conventional warhead must be provided with a CWO of order 10-30 m. Ensuring the necessary accuracy of guidance of warheads is critical for deciding on the creation of this type of weapon. The maximum unification of conventional warheads will allow to reduce their cost due to the construction of a large series of similar products. They will receive a “second wind” of ICBMs, which could otherwise be sent for disposal.

Of the positive aspects, one can note a study by the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which states that START III conditions make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed or undeployed categories, and therefore such launchers do not fall under the established ceiling of armaments. If there will be ICBMs in such launchers, then such ICBMs will be considered as non-deployed, and therefore neither the number of ICBMs in unprotected launchers nor the number of warheads on them can be limited. Considering the fact that strategic conventional weapons are first-strike weapons, the requirements for their combat stability are obviously lower than for ICBMs for launching a reciprocal-return nuclear strike, so placing ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads in unprotected positions can be considered justified.

Given the withdrawal of the United States and the Russian Federation from the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the second element of strategic conventional weapons may be long-range cruise missiles (CR), placed on mobile carriers. In this direction, the greatest interest is the possibility of placing CR in containers, similar to how it was implemented in the Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles.

Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles

In turn, containers can be placed as part of a military railway missile system (BZHRK). Four missiles of the Caliber complex are located in one container, respectively, eighty cruise missiles will be placed in a freight train of twenty wagons, one hundred and sixty cruise missiles in forty wagons, which exceeds the striking power of a destroyer, cruiser or nuclear submarine with cruise missiles ( PLARK). In this case, the maximum length of the train can reach sixty cars, and for new locomotives up to one hundred cars (depending on the mass of the car).

BZHRK with intercontinental ballistic missiles

Accommodation on a railway platform will ensure high mobility and secrecy of the complex.

Large freight railway junctions. Track in them BZHRK almost impossible

Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

When placing the BZHRK at the extreme points of the European part of the Russian Federation, the whole of Europe, Iceland, part of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia will be in the affected zone of the Kyrgyz Republic.

The defeat zone "West" BZHRK with the Kyrgyz Republic

When placing the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic.

The defeat zone "East" BZHRK with the Kyrgyz Republic

Strategic conventional weapons based on the Navy

From the composition of the Navy fleet In the Russian Federation, the most advanced strategic missile submarine strategic cruisers (SSBNs) of Project 667BDRM Dolphin can be transferred to the strategic conventional forces as they are replaced by SSBNs of Project 955A Borey. The last of the built are the K-18 RPKSN and the Karelia K-407 Novomoskovsk RPKSN, launched in 1989 and 1990, or the K-117 Bryansk, which is currently undergoing medium repairs. Accordingly, the remaining four submarine missile carriers of this project can be used as donors of spare parts to maintain the combat effectiveness of the K-18 and K-407 or K-117 RPKSN. For these submarines, the R-29RMU2.1 “Liner” missiles must be adapted with the deployment of universal conventional warheads on them, with the achievement of the KVO of 10-30 meters. The total ammunition of two conventional submarines with conventional weapons will be 32 missiles.

SSBN project 667BDRM "Dolphin" and ICBM R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner"

Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

By analogy with the Strategic Missile Forces, the second component of the naval strategic conventional forces should be a submarine with missiles of the Caliber complex. The issue of creating SSGNs based on the SSBN of the 955A Borey project, similar in characteristics to the US SSGN Ohio, was considered in detail in the article “Nuclear submarines - carriers of cruise missiles: reality and prospects”. At the moment, the RF Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of continuing the SSBN series of the 955A Borey project as a carrier of long-range cruise missiles - “The Navy can get two submarines of the new project Borey-K”. Thus, this element of the strategic conventional forces takes on a very real shape.

SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"

Air Force Strategic Conventional Weapons

With the Air Force, everything is much simpler. As mentioned in the previous article, strategic aviation It is the most useless component of strategic nuclear forces (SNF), since it is extremely vulnerable to a first strike. All thoughts about the possibility of re-targeting in flight, cancellation of striking do not stand up to criticism, because in an emergency situation events will develop much faster than aviation can react, in order to exert political pressure it does not matter what is on board the bomber, especially since they don’t fly on such tasks with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the capabilities of strategic aviation in terms of delivering massive strikes with conventional weapons are unique. No other type of armed force can compare with them in the possibility of promptly delivering concentrated strikes at a great distance, at least until they are adopted by ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

The main Russian bombers are the Tu-160M and Tu-95MS / MSM. Both vehicles undergo timely modernization in terms of extending the service life, improving performance and expanding the range of weapons. At present, it is planned to resume production of Tu-160 aircraft in the amount of 50 units, in a modernized version of the Tu-160М2. The main armament of missile-carrying bombers within the framework of the strategic conventional forces should be long-range cruise missiles of the X-101 type. The combination of the range of the bombers of the order of six to eight thousand kilometers and the range of cruise missiles to five and a half thousand kilometers allows you to strike at almost any target on the planet.

Tu-95MSM with X-101 cruise missiles

One of the most important elements of the strategic conventional forces should be the supersonic bombers Tu-160M2 with hypersonic dagger missiles. The possibility and necessity of adapting the Tu-160M2 under the “Dagger” missiles was discussed in detail in the article Hypersonic Dagger on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction? ” The combination of the supersonic cruising flight speed of the Tu-160М2, which is part of the 1,5М and the speed characteristics of the “Dagger” missile, will make it possible to deliver swift attacks on the enemy. The range of the Tu-160M2 at supersonic speed is 2000 kilometers without refueling, which, combined with the flight range of the Dagger rocket, which is on the order of 1000 kilometers, will make it possible to strike targets located 3000 kilometers from the airfield. Taking into account the indicated speed and range of flight of the carrier and ammunition, the total time for striking a target will be less than half an hour, without taking into account preparation for departure.

Tu-160 bomber bomber and dagger hypersonic aerial ballistic missile

Why the dagger rocket, and not the promising hypersonic zircon rocket? For the reason that the “Dagger” is based on the spent rocket of the Iskander ground complex, which is produced in a fairly large series. It can be assumed that the cost of Zircon missiles will be significantly higher, and the advance into the troops will be slowed not only by a high price, but also by testing the shortcomings of a fundamentally new weapon revealed during operation. Nevertheless, Zircon missiles should also be adapted for Tu-160М2 missile bombers, and, possibly, Tu-95MS / MSM, to solve the tasks of counteracting aviation and naval strike groups in the ocean.

Missile bombers are multi-functional weapons, one way or another, but in START III they count as one carrier and one combat unit. Thus, their attribution to the strategic conventional forces is rather an organizational issue. If necessary, they can easily be returned to the strategic nuclear forces.

Thus, within the framework of the strategic conventional forces, a full-fledged strategic non-nuclear triad can be formed, which makes it possible to inflict a massive strike on high-precision non-nuclear weapons against an enemy located at a considerable distance.

Legal and organizational issues

The combat use of strategic conventional forces in some cases, for example, when launching ICBMs with non-nuclear equipment, will require responsible interaction with “partners”, primarily the United States, to eliminate the risk of a full-scale nuclear war.

Given the interest of the United States in the development of a similar class of weapons, in future START treaties they can be moved to a separate class so that both countries do not reduce their nuclear deterrence potential, this is of course if the START treaties do not history following the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) or on the missile defense treaty (ABM).

No matter how cynical it may sound, it can be considered acceptable to conclude open agreements or secret agreements with the United States, China, and some other countries to prevent the uncontrolled development of strategic conventional weapons, including the possibility of joint preemptive non-nuclear attacks on countries trying to create them.

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- thirty ICBMs of the R-36M "Satan" type, RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 "Yars" with three (on average) non-nuclear warheads each;
- ten ICBM UR-100Н UTTH “Stiletto” with a hypersonic maneuvering non-nuclear block based on the Avangard product ”
- ten BZHRK with forty wagons and a total ammunition load of 160 KR "Caliber" in each BZHRK;
- thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;
- four Borey-K submarines and / or 949AM submarines with the 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine;
- Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;
- fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

Taking into account striking at one target with two to four blocks / RC, the total number can be from 716 / 819 to 1432 / 1638 of the targets hit. Of course, the airborne component of the SCS can carry out repeated sorties with striking at targets up to the exhaustion of ammunition of cruise and aeroballistic missiles at air bases.

Under the existing START III treaty, the composition of the strategic nuclear forces will decrease by 182 of the carrier, while it should be borne in mind that missile-carrying bombers can be armed with nuclear weapons in the same terms as non-nuclear ones, that is, in fact 60 carriers are not excluded. If ICBMs deployed in unprotected positions are not taken into account under the START III treaty, then the composition of strategic nuclear forces will be reduced by only 32 ICBMs deployed on the Delphin’s 667BDRM SSBN.

Scenarios of application and goals of strategic conventional forces

The simplest example is the 08.08.08 war. Instead of three days, the war could last three hours from the moment a decision was made to strike back. During this period, the main administrative buildings, the buildings of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, airplanes at airfields, large fuel storages and ammunition depots would be destroyed. If necessary, large power plants, elements of transport and energy infrastructure can be added to them. It can be assumed that the surviving remnants of the Georgian leadership would have announced the cessation of any hostilities within a few hours after striking. There would be no loss of tactical and long-range aircraft, it would hardly take the heroic passage of the Roki tunnel. But most importantly, in the event of the death of most of the country's top leadership, including M. Saakashvili, his followers in the post-Soviet space would ask their Western curators a simple question: how can they guarantee their safety? And they would hardly have received a convincing answer. Based on this answer, events could have developed in a completely different way, for example, in Ukraine, which would have saved thousands of military and civilian lives on both sides of the conflict.

Another example is the situation that arose after Turkey shot down our plane from the Syrian air group, justifying it by violating its state border. The leadership of the Russian Federation did not intensify the conflict, limiting itself to economic and diplomatic measures. But what if the situation developed differently? For example, in response to our downed plane, we shoot down Turkish, they deliver a missile and bomb attack on the Khmeimim base - dozens of pieces of lost equipment, hundreds of victims. Turkey is a tough enough nut, if their ground forces do not pose a threat due to their geographical location, then the aviation and fleet are quite combat-ready and can cause significant damage to the general forces of the Russian Federation, primarily the Black Sea Fleet. Worst of all, if the conflict drags on, NATO forces will begin to provide more and more support to the Turkish armed forces. Even if there is no direct intervention due to fears of a transition to a global conflict, Turkey will definitely organize intelligence supply and arms supplies, which may ultimately lead Russia to a defeat similar to the one in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 of the year.

In this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey. At least after such a strike, the work of the general forces of the Russian Federation will be greatly simplified, as a maximum - the hostilities will end within 24 hours. In such a time interval, NATO structures will most likely simply not have time to work out a consolidated solution to intervene in the situation, which will give the Russian Federation space for military and political maneuvering.

In the case of aggressive actions by the United States and the NATO bloc, as well as the threat of a conflict escalating into a nuclear SCS, they can destroy US foreign bases in the affected area, primarily the missile defense and radar stations of the US missile defense system. Their defeat in Poland, Romania, and Norway will clearly demonstrate the futility of the missile defense system in the event of a global nuclear conflict, and will cool the ardor of the “opponents” and their younger allies.

US missile defense bases in Europe and the possible location of US missile defense ships in the oceans

Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

In the world there are quite unfriendly countries towards Russia, which, having a relatively small military potential, but using a remote geographical position, can harm the interests of the Russian Federation with impunity. Where is the guarantee that during the advancement of the interests of the Russian Federation somewhere in a remote region of the planet our plane will not be shot down again? Strategic conventional forces are an effective tool for resolving such situations in their favor. At the same time, one must clearly understand that strategic conventional forces are not a tool for conducting protracted conflicts. For example, in a situation of confrontation with militants in Syria, this tool is practically not applicable, but the general purpose forces of the Russian Federation should already work here. The task of the strategic conventional forces is that, in terms of the level of technical equipment of the armed forces, the enemy quickly slide down to the level of militants in Syria, with a destroyed command structure, without a fleet, air support and reserves.

Comments

[silverwolf88]

A very controversial concept ... strategic forces make sense only in nuclear equipment ... to fight a strong enemy is a global exchange of strikes for complete destruction (alas, no other way) ... and it’s kind of silly to use strategists in Zimbabwe ... there are other methods ... the idea of ​​covenantedness of strategic forces erodes the notion of the possibility of damage to many ... or the beginning of a light war with Russia ... but our doctrine provides for striking nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to territorial integrity, striking at vn f or enemy invasion
the example of the 08 / 08 / 08 war is not correct ... it’s not about the possibility of destroying Georgian command posts ... it was a common approach ... frankly missed the very beginning of the escalation and concentration of Georgian troops (although intelligence data were) there was no plan for deployment and action in case of the outbreak of hostilities in the territory of Ossetia ... the use of aviation without suppressing air defense and the possible loss of the Roki tunnel (there was such a danger) speaks for itself ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: silberwolf88

A very controversial concept ... strategic forces make sense only in nuclear equipment ... to fight a strong enemy is a global exchange of strikes for complete destruction (alas, no other way) ... and it’s kind of silly to use strategists in Zimbabwe ... there are other methods ... the idea of ​​covenantedness of strategic forces erodes the notion of the possibility of damage to many ... or the beginning of a light war with Russia ... but our doctrine provides for striking nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to territorial integrity, striking at vn f or enemy invasion
the example of the 08 / 08 / 08 war is not correct ... it’s not about the possibility of destroying Georgian command posts ... it was a common approach ... frankly missed the very beginning of the escalation and concentration of Georgian troops (although intelligence data were) there was no plan for deployment and action in case of the outbreak of hostilities in the territory of Ossetia ... the use of aviation without suppressing air defense and the possible loss of the Roki tunnel (there was such a danger) speaks for itself ...

The goals in my opinion are clearly defined. These are powers that are well armed enough to constitute a danger to the general forces of the Russian Federation, but after the strike, the NKR will approach the level of Zimbabwe. Who said that this cannot be done? The United States, at least, is developing this topic.

And in the situation with Georgia, the SCS could compensate for the leadership’s mistakes at the beginning of the escalation, the concentration of troops and more ...

[Narak-zempo]

Quote: AVM

And in the situation with Georgia, the SCS could compensate for the leadership’s mistakes at the beginning of the escalation, the concentration of troops and more ...

Yes. It was possible to work out Saakashvili directly in the presidential bunker, and now he would not have flashed at the Ukrainians.

[Sancho_SP]

Yes, it was possible to work out with the hands of Chechen youths for a couple of days. The whole Georgian army was enough for a day of effective resistance.

[Narak-zempo]

Quote: Sancho_SP

Yes, it was possible to work out with the hands of Chechen youths for a couple of days. The whole Georgian army was enough for a day of effective resistance.

Yes, you can.
But you can't really send Chechen "workers" to Washington, Berlin, London. And so the hint would be very well understood.

[Moore]

I will not discuss the air and sea component, I will stop on the ground.

The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

1. These missiles are not being withdrawn from the Strategic Missile Forces combat life from a good life — from heavy wear of both the element base, fatigue of the product structures, strength characteristics of the TT charge, and wear of the process equipment and outdated ASBU systems.
2. If the placement of such BBs on the GPRK is a debatable question, then where would you order the silos for the R-36M and UR-100N UTTH? IMHO, placing 13 units of UR-12N UTTKh with 100-1 Vanguard BBs in the silo, where the R-2Ms with 36 BBs stood, in 10 yards is a controversial issue in itself from the point of view of combat effectiveness, but here it is proposed forty mine-based ICBMs - a whole division ...

.... that the conditions of START III make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed category or the non-deployed category,

Here it is not very clear. According to the START-3 protocol, the term “launcher in an unprotected position” means any ICBM ground stationary launcher or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.
Those. in fact, it is a launcher-shaped launcher, like 8-63, for example. How to attach here P-36M and UR-100N UTTH?

Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

In principle, I am also for everything good and against everything bad. The use of such non-nuclear forces based on ICBMs promises considerable bonuses .. But here's the trouble (at least for the time being):
-Where to get l / s on essentially another Strategic Missile Forces missile division;
-Where to dig up funds for infrastructure for such a project, when equipment in rearmament missile divisions often costs already half the warranty period in the open;
- Launching ICBMs (in any equipment at least) for our overseas opponents will always be, to put it mildly, an unpleasant moment with poorly calculated reactions of airborne control and strategic command calculations.
I did not stop at the BZHRK with "Caliber", so as not to download content.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Moore

I will not discuss the air and sea component, I will stop on the ground.

The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

1. These missiles are not being withdrawn from the Strategic Missile Forces combat life from a good life — from heavy wear of both the element base, fatigue of the product structures, strength characteristics of the TT charge, and wear of the process equipment and outdated ASBU systems.

Yars are generally still produced, as I understand it. I see the following logic. If, for example, the ICBM has a life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it is transferred to the SCS. Why are all the rockets listed? Because to me their condition and potential service lives are unknown. From the order of 300 30-40 carriers, you can dial for SCS. But I do not deny the possibility of manufacturing new missiles for this purpose on the basis of the same Yars, they can be simplified - there are no means of counteracting a nuclear explosion, means of breaking through an ABM, etc.

Quote: Moore

2. If the placement of such BBs on the GPRK is a debatable question, then where would you order the silos for the R-36M and UR-100N UTTH? IMHO, placing 13 units of UR-12N UTTKh with 100-1 Vanguard BBs in the silo, where the R-2Ms with 36 BBs stood, in 10 yards is a controversial issue in itself from the point of view of combat effectiveness, but here it is proposed forty mine-based ICBMs - a whole division ...

Are they located somewhere now? I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has been reduced from the 1990's.

Quote: Moore

.... that the conditions of START III make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed category or the non-deployed category,

Here it is not very clear. According to the START-3 protocol, the term “launcher in an unprotected position” means any ICBM ground stationary launcher or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.
Those. in fact, it is a launcher-shaped launcher, like 8-63, for example. How to attach here P-36M and UR-100N UTTH?

This is the only paragraph taken practically in quotation, so it can be considered rather as a subject for reflection, how to combine technical requirements and the legal side of the issue. In any case, I believe that SCS will give greater advantages than a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons by 10%, or the United States will withdraw them to a separate START-4 position (for example).

Quote: Moore

Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

In principle, I am also for everything good and against everything bad. The use of such non-nuclear forces based on ICBMs promises considerable bonuses .. But here's the trouble (at least for the time being):
-Where to get l / s on essentially another Strategic Missile Forces missile division;
-Where to dig up funds for infrastructure for such a project, when equipment in rearmament missile divisions often costs already half the warranty period in the open;
- Launching ICBMs (in any equipment at least) for our overseas opponents will always be, to put it mildly, an unpleasant moment with poorly calculated reactions of airborne control and strategic command calculations.

Not only ICBMs, it is much easier to implement a component based on the Air Force / Navy with cruise missiles. Not much more complicated than the Tu-160 with Daggers. ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment are clearly more complicated, but certainly not more difficult to deploy, for example, Poseidons.

Quote: Moore

I did not stop at the BZHRK with "Caliber", so as not to download content.

And what is bad with the KRGK KR? In my opinion, the simplest and cheapest way to provide maneuver with firepower by projecting it over a huge distance. INF Treaty is gone. Any better 8-16 missiles on MRC?
In the variant of their equipment with anti-ship missiles, they can, with an external command and control system, simply carry out all the fleets within the radius of destruction, adding to the Bastions and Balls. And also, if you recall the article - Universal Modules: Solving the problem of the disconnectedness of the four fleets of Russia - https://topwar.ru/156005-universalnye-moduli-reshenie-problemy-razobschennosti-chetyreh-flotov-rossii.html, then the BZHRK can be universal a solution, either acting as a PU, or moving a significant strike potential between fleets.

Their combat stability is higher than that of any surface ship. Of course, they will not be able to maneuver as aircraft or deliver the Kyrgyz Republic to the shores of the United States, but within a radius of 3000-4000 km from their territory, they are a threat to any enemy.

[Sancho_SP]

Is it possible to do the same, but with specific goals?

[Moore]

Quote: AVM

If, for example, the ICBM has a service life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it will be transferred to the SCS. Why are all the rockets listed? Because to me their condition and potential service lives are unknown.

The warranty period is 10 years with a further annual extension, which sometimes reaches the same ten years or more. Share SNF and SCS, IMHO, unauthorized, because:
-the goals for both those and for others are essentially strategic:
- the flow of malfunctions after the end of the main warranty period is very different from the flow during the originally declared warranty period - is it correct to create deliberately "invalid teams";
-groups from "on you, wretched, that we do not want", IMHO, increase the likelihood of failure to perform a combat mission.

I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has decreased since the 1990s.

This is not true. The BSP of the reduced units of the Strategic Missile Forces are being reclaimed. I don’t know how it is now, but in the 90s-XNUMXs it was customary to put an explosive charge under the "glass", which carried it to the surface by half its size. There was no question of restoration.

Quote: AVM

And what is bad with the KRGK KR?

I did not say that he was bad, just did not write a comment the size of an article. There are pluses, minuses - like any model. This is perhaps the only thing that is feasible in terms of the ground component - a range limitation, perhaps. The question rests on the readiness of the military-industrial complex to ensure the production of the required number of missiles and launchers, which, in turn, rests on money. I believe that with the funeral of the INF Treaty, steps in this direction will be taken.

[Alexey Z]

And what is bad with the KRGK KR? It’s painfully interesting, it’s designed here, some launchers. And where is the crew, power supply and so on? Remind the composition of BZHRK real?

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

If, for example, the ICBM has a service life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it will be transferred to the SCS.

Actually, this is not economically and technologically feasible, if only because the element base has changed in 20 years, and the costs of maintaining SCS missiles are generally inconceivable in terms of the cost of a kiloton, which will be too expensive than with traditional operational tactical weapons.

Quote: AVM

I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has decreased since the 1990s.

Mines can and will be enough, but it’s too expensive to maintain them with non-nuclear missiles, the effectiveness of which is orders of magnitude lower than that of missiles with nuclear equipment. Why is a goat such a button accordion?

Quote: AVM

In any case, I believe that SCS will give greater advantages than a 10% larger arsenal of nuclear weapons, or the United States will withdraw them to a separate START-4 position (for example).

Your opinion only indicates that you have no idea about the military economy.

Quote: AVM

And what is bad with the KRGK KR?

High cost and remoteness from enemy borders.

Strategic conventional forces are an effective tool for resolving such situations in their favor.

Based on all of the above, I can only draw an unambiguous conclusion from the author's proposals - "the benefit is doubtful, the harm is obvious."

[bayard]

Quote: ccsr

Based on all of the above, I can only draw an unambiguous conclusion from the author's proposals - "the benefit is doubtful, the harm is obvious."

I was especially touched by the proposal to use ICBMs as carriers of conventional warheads ... if a middle school student would freeze this, I would understand ... Even without taking into account the PRICE of the question ... ACCURACY. As far as I remember, the accuracy of the masterpiece of the late Soviet military-industrial complex ICBM "Molodets" had an accuracy (CEP) of 250 m. "Poplar" was hardly more accurate, and even if the "Yars" it (KVO) is higher, well, let's say 150 m. ... but at least 100 ... What damage to a point target was the author going to inflict with a conventional warhead? And what type should this warhead be? High-explosive? To shoot a missile of a couple of billion rubles to thrust a warhead with 0,5 - 2 tons of explosives 200 meters from the target?
No, the glass will certainly be knocked out ... and the facades will probably be damaged (if the purpose of the building) ...
Therefore, discussing this topic is simply not serious.

It’s just that all the means necessary for the non-nuclear defeat of a distant enemy are already there, they are standing or getting into service and are growing numerically.
First of all, this is Long-Range Aviation - Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 (M), having for this purpose the X-101, X-555, "Dagger" (on the Tu-22M3M), the X-50 (on it ).
The second priority is the Fleet. With the same "Caliber" and "Caliber-M" (4500 km. Declared range). And these are not only the ever-memorable RTOs and Black Sea frigates, but also "Gorshkovs", of which there will be two in service by the end of the year, and then the series has gone ... Not enough? After a couple of years, take a nuclear cruiser with 80 "Caliber" \ "Caliber-M", go to the shores of the wilderness foe like crucian carp "Caliber" until complete satisfaction. Few ? Take a couple of a couple of modernized Antey-type APRKs (the first from the modernization - Omsk is already in service), they each have 72 Caliber on board, and as an option, 1 more pieces of 10 - 12 in torpedo ammunition racks ... and arrange "Armageddon" zealous adversaries ... Not enough? Well, wait until they build new Boreis with CD in the mines, they will have more ammunition ...
And in the third place (after all, the INF Treaty is already FSE) pack "Caliber" \ "Caliber-M" into secret-based containers in any quantities reasonable for the budget, place them wherever your heart desires ... Yes, even in Tartus, store them and the whole world will be under yours "caliber". From Tartus he will cover the entire Middle East, North Africa and ALL of Europe like a bull to a sheep ... And from Cuba and Nicaragua, ALL North America.
And if you are not too lazy to exercise, then you can adapt the X-101 for ground launch from the container ... it is so beautiful, inconspicuous ... and there are no technical and legal obstacles to this.

And everything will work out with us ... It has already worked out ... And it continues to work out ...

And it is better to leave the ICBM alone - with its native YABCh.
So everyone will be better.

[Sancho_SP]

1. TNT delivery by an intercontinental missile is very expensive. The economic effect of the application may be lower than the cost of the rocket.

2. In a Georgian-type war, the matter was in order. To cause serious damage to Georgia, and so on, there were substantial aircraft-based cruise missiles in stock. But there was no order to bomb Tbilisi.

3. The most interesting idea of ​​the article is to use mines with old mbrs in non-nuclear equipment as “legitimate” false targets. After all, it is not known in which mine which rocket is. But probable partners in the event of such cheating can do the same in a way that de facto ceases START-3.

4. Turkey, Israel, Japan, and other militarily strong US allies hear nuclear warheads. It is not a matter of bloodthirstiness, just a conventional war with them is more likely to lead to a conventional, and then to an atomic war with their masters. At that time, a direct nuclear strike would likely remain without a direct response from the United States, at least immediately.

[Winnie76]

Quote: Sancho_SP

TNT delivery by an intercontinental missile is very expensive. The economic effect of the application may be lower than the cost of the rocket

Economic effect - free disposal of an expiring missile. And a nice bonus minus one opponent’s base.

Quote: Sancho_SP

But probable partners in the event of such cheating can do the same in a way that de facto ceases START-3.

START-3 is relevant for Russian-American relations. In a situation where medium-range missiles are starting to do everything and sundry, the DRMSD fell apart START-3 is of little relevance.

Quote: Sancho_SP

Turkey, Israel, Japan, and other militarily strong US allies are listening to atomic warheads. It is not a matter of bloodthirstiness, just a conventional war with them is more likely to lead to a conventional, and then to an atomic war with their masters.

The task is to remove the military infrastructure and strategic civilian facilities of these countries in a few hours. And without the use of nuclear weapons. Then Nate is too late to twitch. Well, if the owners decide to fit in with their lapdogs - we will die all together

[Sancho_SP]

Free disposal - this is if you use that rocket in the coming year (Syria, Libya?). And if it’s decades on alert, the cost of maintaining an alert state is the same as for the carrier of an atomic head.

Nevertheless, we are still observing it.

The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.

[Winnie76]

Quote: Sancho_SP

The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.

And that army will fight a lot without headquarters, storage bases, airfields, bridges, railways, fuel, spare parts. Without all this, the army turns into an organized crowd with Kalash

[Sancho_SP]

Well, if you are going to bomb some Croatia, Ukraine or Portugal, maybe it is. For the same Turkey - there isn’t enough strength already. None. Recall the recent attack by the Tomahawks at an airfield in Syria. Efficiency is not 100%. So your 1000 warheads are substantially less than 1000 targets. Once in 10.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sancho_SP

Free disposal - this is if you use that rocket in the coming year (Syria, Libya?). And if it’s decades on alert, the cost of maintaining an alert state is the same as for the carrier of an atomic head.

The requirements for duty will be lower than for nuclear weapons (although of course they will be) and their number of the whole order is 10% of the strategic nuclear forces, i.e. not such a fatal burden on the budget, PMSM benefits more. The same CRs on the DBC are much easier to provide than on the RTOs.

Quote: Sancho_SP

Nevertheless, we are still observing it.

So far, we are complying with the agreement, because nothing has passed since the time has passed, and the US is already planning to put something in Asia that falls within the medium range, China is nervous. If we can still refrain from deploying a ballistic missile system with nuclear warheads, then the deployment of long-range non-nuclear weapons is in my opinion inevitable.

Quote: Sancho_SP

The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.

The army is yes, but the Air Force and Navy in modern conditions in almost all countries are very limited in the number of aircraft and ships, at least modern ones. Their simultaneous destruction (to the maximum possible) is considered a victory in the war.

[Sancho_SP]

Well, put the containers on the trucks. What is there to compose. They piled a warehouse at the right time in the right place and bang ... why are there intercontinental missiles?


But what to consider a victory in a war depends on your goals. Why do we need a war with Turkey, what goals can be in it, and what should be considered a victory? Annexation of Constantinople?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sancho_SP

Well, put the containers on the trucks. What is there to compose. They piled a warehouse at the right time in the right place and bang ... why are there intercontinental missiles?

So trucks will cost much more, and camouflaging a convoy from 40 trucks is unrealistic, even from satellites will be spotted.

Quote: Sancho_SP

But what to consider a victory in a war depends on your goals. Why do we need a war with Turkey, what goals can be in it, and what should be considered a victory? Annexation of Constantinople?

I am considering a response, when the aggression comes from the same Turkey, as it was with the plane. Victory? Preservation of our free passage through the straits, preservation of the Black Sea Fleet. Least.

[bayard]

Andrey, do not compose a problem where it does not exist.
Russia has all the necessary means for a quick non-nuclear strike against distant targets. And this is the air, sea and land-based CD (INF Treaty is already FSE). These are Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-50 (soon to be on the Tu-22M3M), "Dagger" (on the MiG-31 and Tu-22M3M), "Caliber" (including ground-based on the "Iskander" launcher, "Bastion" or in container design), "Caliber-M" with a declared range of 4500 km. with a non-nuclear warhead (with a nuclear warhead, the range will be greater). All this is more than enough to resolve the issue of a quick strike at a distant enemy.
The first APRK "Omsk" modernized for the carrier "Caliber" (72 pcs.) Is already in service, two more in the process, and in total by 2025 there will be 4 such units. Send such one to the enemy's shores and take out all unnecessary from a safe distance and without even surfacing. And there, and "Borei" with the same "Caliber" \ "Caliber-M" will catch up ...
And all will be well .
Enough for everyone.
Rational, fast and reliable.
And leave the ICBMs alone, they and their relatives are more familiar with nuclear warheads - they were created for each other, they (nuclear warheads) for her (ICBMs) are like native children.

And the Americans came up with stupid things about ordinary warheads on ICBMs, and not from a good life. It’s just that they have very few combat-ready nuclear warheads left, and they are fooled by hopelessness. They do not have the capacity to produce 235 uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, and their competencies are lost. And the maximum warranty period for the most advanced nuclear warhead - 30 years - is physics ... So they got a hassle - there are rockets and other carriers, but the nuclear warhead for them ... almost ran out. Through 1,5 - 2 years will end completely.
But this is not our problem.

[garri-lin]

I am extremely sorry. But since I remembered 080808. How much did the BB need to calm the Georgian troops? Quantitatively and not abstract.

[PSih2097]

Quote: garri-lin

Quantitatively, not abstract.

one missile in equipment of 10 BB at 800 Kt in Washington ...

[garri-lin]

Few. In addition to Washington, there are centers. In the strategic nuclear forces, the bottom line is that you have to hit it to the fullest. So kick so that he was crazy when he saw what happened. Half measures here will only do much harm.

[Pushkowed]

A lot of non-nuclear (conventional) cruise missiles in the BZHRK, in the Aerospace Forces and on the SSGN is good. But calling them "strategic" is not entirely correct. This is part of the DREAM - general purpose forces. They are designed for conventional combat. It's just that the nature of ordinary wars changes over time. Exaggerating: half a century ago, the SLE was represented by tens of thousands of tanks and thousands of missiles, and now it should be represented by tens of thousands of missiles and thousands of tanks. Yes, in advertising Concern "Agat" was told that RK Club (export "Caliber") can play the role of a strategic deterrent, but only for small countries. Russia is not such.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Pushkowed

A lot of non-nuclear (conventional) cruise missiles in the BZHRK, in the Aerospace Forces and on the SSGN is good. But calling them "strategic" is not entirely correct. This is part of the DREAM - general purpose forces. They are designed for conventional combat. It's just that the nature of ordinary wars changes over time. Exaggerating: half a century ago, the SLE was represented by tens of thousands of tanks and thousands of missiles, and now it should be represented by tens of thousands of missiles and thousands of tanks. Yes, in advertising Concern "Agat" was told that RK Club (export "Caliber") can play the role of a strategic deterrent, but only for small countries. Russia is not such.

Here is rather an organizational issue. Assigning them to a separate structure suggests precisely the application for applying the first massive strike. If you draw a parallel with the tanks, then when they were used singly with infantry, there was little sense from them. When tanks began to be used massively, using their maneuverability and firepower, they began to decide the outcome of the war.

With KR, the same thing. Leave them to the general forces and they will solve the local tasks of each type of troops, and as part of the SCS, they must solve the single problem of the primary maximum damage to the enemy in order to reduce their organizational and military level, which will then affect the actions of all general forces.

In a sense, the SCS can be attributed to general forces - the difference is that they do not enter into direct combat contact with the enemy and use only long-range weapons.

[Sancho_SP]

Once again - who are the targets for this attack? Who exactly are you going to fight in this way?

[mark1]

Yes, Andrey! Almost everything is debatable, but with Turkey and Georgia the examples are not at all successful. But as they say - you have the right.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: mark1

Yes, Andrey! Almost everything is debatable, but with Turkey and Georgia the examples are not at all successful. But as they say - you have the right.

Always glad to have detailed comments, why is Turkey a bad example?

[mark1]

[quoteIn this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey.] [/ Quote]
And after that, you want to "shake off" NATO (sharpen a blow on the territory of the participating country)? Believe me, then it's better to have a preemptive nuclear strike - at least we'll scare you more, maybe they won't want to get involved. And so we will be slowly strangled by sanctions with elements of armed pressure - in short, a khan.
Putin did everything right - he blocked access to the territory of Syria and the economic blow.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: mark1

In this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey.]

And after that, you want to "shake off" NATO (sharpen a blow on the territory of the participating country)? Believe me, then it's better to have a preemptive nuclear strike - at least we'll scare you more, maybe they won't want to get involved. And so we will be slowly strangled by sanctions with elements of armed pressure - in short, a khan.
Putin did everything right - he blocked access to the territory of Syria and the economic blow.

Sanctions will strangle us so slowly, this is a question from a different plane. After the use of nuclear weapons will be even worse. In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered), after that we can talk about peace talks, especially since our actions are reciprocal.

By the way, it is precisely such scenarios - lightning strikes and the completion of the operation before the beginning of a possible reaction that the United States fears from the end of the 90's, there were such articles in the Western Military District.

[mark1]

Quote: AVM

In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered),

These are not real tasks for conventional weapons - at least low-power nuclear weapons.
Are you considering separately Turkey and separately the "distant Red Army" (in our case NATO) and Incirlik with nuclear weapons, and the bases in Cyprus? Kneading, believe me. will be cool, you will have to beat everyone at once.

Quote: AVM

especially since our actions are reciprocal.

We answered well, well, maybe it made sense to bring down a couple of F-16s over Syria but probably didn’t have time, a blow to someone else’s territory is already an aggression.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: mark1

Quote: AVM

In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered),

These are not real tasks for conventional weapons - at least low-power nuclear weapons.
Are you considering separately Turkey and separately the "distant Red Army" (in our case NATO) and Incirlik with nuclear weapons, and the bases in Cyprus? Kneading, believe me. will be cool, you will have to beat everyone at once.

The Turkish Air Force is 10 airbases and about 300 aircraft, generally all.
The Turkish Navy is 10 based and less than 40 ships.

If these forces are dispersed and put into battle, then they represent a good force, but if 2 / 3 are destroyed by a sudden blow, the alignment changes greatly.

Quote: mark1

Quote: AVM

especially since our actions are reciprocal.

We answered well, well, maybe it made sense to bring down a couple of F-16s over Syria but probably didn’t have time, a blow to someone else’s territory is already an aggression.

The article just gives an example of what we bring down in response, and in response they started. Erdogan's head is clearly not all right.

And Incirlik should not be touched with nuclear weapons, the United States will not give the keys to it to the Turks.

[Operator]

Why publish an obviously inadequate article in the "Armament" section, when there is a "Opinions" section for such opuses?

The author has already been explained as twice as two that the launch of a strategic launch vehicle, not to mention a massive missile strike, will be unambiguously qualified by the opposite side as a nuclear attack. Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.

It seems that the Pentagon pays extra money to the author for promoting the disarmament of the Russian strategic nuclear forces

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Operator

Why publish an obviously inadequate article in the "Armament" section, when there is a "Opinions" section for such opuses?

The author has already been explained as twice as two that the launch of a strategic launch vehicle, not to mention a massive missile strike, will be unambiguously qualified by the opposite side as a nuclear attack. Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.

It seems that the Pentagon pays extra money to the author for promoting the disarmament of the Russian strategic nuclear forces

Everything is inadequate for you, which does not correspond to your point of view. In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...

And why not consider it, especially low-power nuclear charges? For example, in Hiroshima they still live and do not worry, despite the nuclear bombing - what scares you so much in using tactical nuclear charges?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AVM

In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...

And why not consider it, especially low-power nuclear charges? For example, in Hiroshima they still live and do not worry, despite the nuclear bombing - what scares you so much in using tactical nuclear charges?

Escalation of the conflict. It's like letting a genie out of a bottle. After that, everyone will think about nuclear weapons - Turkey, Japan, Iran, South Korea, Germany, etc. Therefore, even when the USSR did not become and the Russian Federation was greatly weakened, the United States did not dare to use cheap nuclear weapons and spent thousands of conventional KR in Iraq and Yugoslavia.

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

Escalation of the conflict. It's like letting a genie out of a bottle.

The launch of ballistic missiles in itself means that the whole war will last 30-40 minutes, and therefore it is better not to remember about gin. By the way, how does the enemy determine that non-nuclear missiles - you have already been asked this question more than once.

Quote: AVM

Russia greatly weakened The United States did not dare to use cheap nuclear weapons and spent thousands of conventional Kyrgyz Republics in Iraq and Yugoslavia.

You apparently did not understand that these countries did not threaten US security and did not have their strategic weapons, which is why the Americans used conventional weapons.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Operator

Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.

Strategic weapons
The totality of various types of weapons, special information management and providing technical means designed to solve strategic problems in the war. The basis of modern S.v. makes up nuclear weapons. Sometimes to S.v. also include high-precision weapons in conventional equipment, used to destroy strategically important enemy targets. By appointment S.v. It is customary to subdivide into strategic offensive (strike) and strategic defensive weapons, as well as information and control components.

https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14376@morfDictionary

[Pushkowed]

Non-nuclear warheads for ICBMs, from a military-strategic point of view, are useless for Russia. In addition, they take up space on deployed carriers, reducing their number in the strategic nuclear forces. But from a political point of view, they have a certain meaning.
01.03.2018/XNUMX/XNUMX, at the presentation of the Sarmat missile, it was announced that it can hit targets through the South Pole. Actually, both Russia and the United States are in the northern hemisphere, the shortest route between them is through the North Pole. If you hit through the southern one, then:
a) the flight time is increased (although the missile defense system is also bypassed);
b) a huge range is required from the missile (more than 30000 km, moreover, the "passport" range of the Sarmat is no more than 20000 km).
Such a high range can only be achieved by using a partially orbital trajectory: the rocket brings the combat load into the polar near-earth orbit, it makes a part of the orbit (incomplete orbit) there, then leaves orbit and hits the target along a ballistic trajectory. Technically, it's real. "Sarmat" was created on the basis of the R-36, and it had both a partially orbital modification (removed from duty on the basis of an international treaty) and a "fenced" modification (carrier rocket "Dnepr"). So for "Sarmat" it is quite possible to put the payload into orbit. To do this, you need to accelerate it to the 1st cosmic speed. Typically, ICBMs do not accelerate like this, but fly along a suborbital trajectory. Reaching the 1st space requires reducing the mass of the payload. But international treaties prohibit the deployment of nuclear warheads on such missiles! However, it was publicly announced that Russia would have such missiles. If anything, you can refer that they can be made non-nuclear. Perhaps this was a hint that Russia might respond symmetrically to BSU.
What's the point of this?
Possible scenario:
1. The USA is putting forward an ultimatum to Russia ... well, for example, to close a plant where, as they believe, some kind of "ban" is being made (which one depends on their imagination: from "inhuman" lasers to pirated content);
2. After Russia’s refusal, they inflict on the controversial plant of the Belarusian State University with a non-nuclear weapon, immediately declare that they “received satisfaction” and hypocritically offer to be friends further (read - until the next ultimatum).
3. Russia's nuclear response in such a situation is inappropriate (the "red line" has not been crossed), but some kind of "response" is required. Commensurate. And, preferably, symmetrical.
4. If they know in advance that Russia has funds for such a "response" (non-nuclear biogas plant), then points 1-3 most likely will not happen.
So non-nuclear ICBMs are more of a ceremonial weapon. Not for war, but for "keeping to protocol" in controversial international situations. And many of these missiles are not required. IMHO, a dozen pieces are enough for the eyes.

[Operator]

Quote: Pushkowed

a huge range is required from the rocket (more than 30000 km, while the "passport" range of the "Sarmat" is no more than 20000 km)

On our globe, there are no distances greater than 20000 km.

[Pushkowed]

Around the world along the meridian - more than 40000 km.

[Sancho_SP]

Is it that you want to shoot yourself so extravagantly? ;)

[Rus_Balt]

The US and the EU have completely abandoned the RF space cargo services. The entire volume went to Space-X Elon Musk. This will make it possible to concentrate all forces on solving strategic tasks in the defense sphere. Previously, the forces of the domestic military-industrial complex were "diverted" to solving tasks for the commercial delivery of goods into space, which harmed the solution of strategic tasks in the defense sphere.

[Prutkov]

The effectiveness of such conventional weapons based on ICBMs is doubtful. It can be assumed that, according to the area of ​​destruction by tungsten pins, one warhead will correspond to the strike of the BM-21 division. But the price of such ammunition with ICBMs will be sky-high. And the efficiency is so-so. "Grad", like tungsten pins, is effective against an enemy located in an open area. If the equipment and l / s are in a shelter, then the effectiveness of the lesion decreases significantly. If the column moves, then in 15-30 minutes of the ICBM flight, the target can leave the affected area. In general - shooting from a cannon at sparrows. So the idea of ​​"lightning fast to punish the bad guy" is not working. Now, consider the use of conventional ammunition for stationary objects with conventional non-nuclear warheads. It's still easier. For a rough look, you can take a warhead equivalent in power to the Tomahawk warhead. It’s not even necessary to count something, because there are a sufficient number of examples of the use of Tomahawk-type missiles. So, to inflict more or less sensitive damage in Syria, it took at least a hundred Tomahawk missiles. Therefore, to “punish” a small country, you will need at least a dozen ICBMs with conventional warheads. In any case, a volley of such conventional ICBMs will cause neighboring countries not just questions, but an immediate response. And then prove in the absence of any agreements that "they didn’t shoot there and the nuclear warheads weren’t." Moreover, modern gentlemen do not believe not just a word, their signatures under the agreements cost little.

[BAI]

countries that are rather unfriendly towards Russia, which, having a relatively small military potential, but using a remote geographical position, can harm the interests of the Russian Federation with impunity.

For instance? Who can damage Russia with impunity by military means? I hope the author does not mean Israel? Then the singular should be used.

[gregor6549]

People, you read the article and numerous comments and you begin to feel like a driver in front of a traffic sign on which two eggs are depicted. You get lost at once, but then you realize that this sign merely means that the road ahead is forked. So it is here. An article seems to indicate a new approach to the creation and use of non-nuclear strategic forces, but then you recall that all this already happened. It began with theory (the Douai doctrine) and continued in practice (massive aerial bombardments of cities in Great Britain, Germany, the USSR, Japan, etc.), and although the damage from these bombings was sometimes comparable to the damage that atomic bombings could inflict, they would ensure victory for anyone on their own failed. Therefore, it is hoped that the same bombardment with conventional weapons, even the most advanced ones, is just another illusion. As long as the foot of a soldier of the opposing armed forces does not set foot on the enemy’s land, there can be no question of victory. Not to mention the "tricks" that were offered in huge numbers and which are designed to ensure that the probable opponent has everything, like one eared one who can hang noodles on his ears, and they will only clap their eyes and smile blissfully. At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that to a probable adversary all of these tactics become known even at the stage of their discussion, and when they become operational, the adversary already has quite effective technical and undercover intelligence tools for their detection and tracking. For example, for the exploration of the BZHRK, a whole system of technical means was developed that allows remotely (from satellites, aircraft, etc.) to detect and identify the BZHRK among other railway trains and also make individual "portraits" of these BZHRK in different wavelengths. What will happen to these BZHRK in case of war is clear in my opinion.

[ccsr]

Quote: gregor6549

As long as the foot of a soldier of the opposing armed forces does not set foot on the enemy’s land, there can be no question of victory.

This is not so long ago - the example of Yugoslavia clearly showed that the NATO soldiers did not enter this country, but it ceased to exist during the hostilities.

[toha124]

I don’t know how Russia and the USA exchange data before the strategic forces exercises and whether they exchange at all ...
But what comes out of it, in order to actually use one of the converted ICBMs - will it be necessary to warn the Americans? But how should they respond to the launch? Especially not single.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: toha124

I don’t know how Russia and the USA exchange data before the strategic forces exercises and whether they exchange at all ...
But what comes out of it, in order to actually use one of the converted ICBMs - will it be necessary to warn the Americans? But how should they respond to the launch? Especially not single.

I think that we and the USA may be interested in such weapons, moreover, it is the USA that is promoting it (the idea of ​​BSU comes from them). Therefore, it is quite possible to agree on a safe application. For example, to concentrate ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads at specific sites that mutually inspect for the non-deployment of nuclear warheads there. Those. in the event of an ICBM launch from there, the opponent will already know that there is no nuclear weapons there. Well, other ways to resolve the issue.

[Sasha_rulevoy]

bring down the enemy to xnumx cruise missiles

640 tons of explosives. Those. approximately the raid of three regiments B-29. One military plant may be enough. Taking into account the greater accuracy of guidance and concrete-piercing warheads (which, however, are not on the "Calibers"), multiply by four. Four factories or the same number of naval bases or air bases. Or one factory, one naval base, one airbase, several warehouses. Of course, the result is serious, but there is still a long way to a complete victory even in Turkey or Poland.

For reference: the production of Caliber missiles is approximately 100 units per year. Those. to strike at Turkey, which will destroy 20% of its combat potential by force, it will take 16 years to accumulate weapons.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sasha_rulevoy

bring down the enemy to xnumx cruise missiles

640 tons of explosives. Those. approximately the raid of three regiments B-29. One military plant may be enough. Taking into account the greater accuracy of guidance and concrete-piercing warheads (which, however, are not on the "Calibers"), multiply by four. Four factories or the same number of naval bases or air bases. Or one factory, one naval base, one airbase, several warehouses. Of course, the result is serious, but there is still a long way to a complete victory even in Turkey or Poland.

For reference: the production of Caliber missiles is approximately 100 units per year. Those. to strike at Turkey, which will destroy 20% of its combat potential by force, it will take 16 years to accumulate weapons.

No, well, if you make them uncontrollable, then you can draw an analogy. And if you take targets at bases and airfields? 1600 KR against 50 ships and 300 aircraft, many of them will cease to exist. Weaken the enemy in 1,5-2-2,5 times?

Concerning the 100 Caliber - this is a question of setting the problem, as for me. It will be necessary, the series will be increased. If the issue is doubled, then this is not 16 but 8 years, triple - 5 years, and this is not so much time. And this is not specifically against Turkey, it is against any targets in the radius.

[Old26]

ICBM R-36M "Satan", UR-100N UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol"

In the first photo, it is not the R-36M "Satan" specifically, but the R-36M UTTH. Although NATO has the same code "Satan". On the right photo, not RT-2PM "Topol", but RT-2PM1 / 2 "Topol-M" or "Yars" in general. Outwardly they are not distinguishable

The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

This is called throwing money away. Moreover, the R-36M missile has long been decommissioned, and the UR-100N UTTH is practically the same. They want to deploy a dozen with Avangard, but that is all the reserves. RT-2PM "Topol" are written off due to the impossibility of extending their service life. It is nonsense to develop a block for a rocket that can stand for another 3-5 years for a DB. Only Yars remains, but they will have to replace Topol-M in the near future, so there are no reserves for this either

Another promising option for a non-nuclear warhead is the creation of a conventional version of the Avangard hypersonic product. The flight path features of this unit reduce the likelihood of its detection by the enemy radar, which, combined with the ability to correct the flight path, complicates the determination of the target’s final coordinates and makes it difficult to counter the attack. The Avangard block is planned to be placed on thirty-two ICBM UR-100N UTTKh Stillet received for debts from Ukraine. A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data.

Yes, the development of a promising non-nuclear unit within the framework of the Avangard product is quite possible. Here is just a common misconception that its flight path reduces the likelihood of its detection where did it come from? The range of American early warning missile radars is about 6000 km. And how will its flight path make it difficult to detect? If he starts to maneuver at the initial stage of the trajectory, he will leave the zone of the location of false targets. And instead of hiding among false targets, on the contrary, he will identify himself.
The ability to adjust the trajectory can make it difficult to determine the final coordinates of the target. but one should not think that at speeds of entry into the upper atmosphere of 25-27M, it is capable of performing "evolutions" comparable to those that a fighter makes when performing aerobatics. Firstly, engines cannot have a large supply of fuel for such evolutions, secondly, it can be corny from overloads to fall apart

The Avangard block is planned to be located on TWELVE modernized missiles UR-100N UTTH. The network even found the index of this ICBM - 15A71 instead of 15A35, like the UR-100N UTTH. The fact that 15 "dry" UR-32N UTTKhs were handed over to us almost 100 years ago does not mean that they all remained intact. They sometimes replaced the missiles fired during the UBP, and were used as test ones. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense announced the deployment of TWO regiments consisting of 12 launchers in the position area of ​​the 13 taxiway.
And whence 10 "Vanguards" on one "weave of OU" ??? If during the test one "Vanguard" intermeddle in it, And not because of the weight, but because of the dimensions?

Of the positive aspects, one can note a study by the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which states that START III conditions make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed or undeployed categories, and therefore such launchers do not fall under the established ceiling of armaments. If there will be ICBMs in such launchers, then such ICBMs will be considered as non-deployed, and therefore neither the number of ICBMs in unprotected launchers nor the number of warheads on them can be limited. Considering the fact that strategic conventional weapons are first-strike weapons, the requirements for their combat stability are obviously lower than for ICBMs for launching a reciprocal-return nuclear strike, so placing ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads in unprotected positions can be considered justified.

Yes, such an option is provided, but the verification mechanism is not defined. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will not react in any way if 3-4 ICBMs are launched simultaneously from the same California. They will not be informed in advance about the test ones, and no one will know whether the ICBMs with nuclear or conventional ones took off.
And the whole concept of a quick global strike is designed primarily for third world countries. But you have to agree in the end with Russia

Given the withdrawal of the United States and the Russian Federation from the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the second element of strategic conventional weapons may be long-range cruise missiles (CR), placed on mobile carriers. In this direction, the greatest interest is the possibility of placing CR in containers, similar to how it was implemented in the Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles.

What is the point of such missiles? In order for them to cover the territory of Europe they must be placed in the border areas. But the question arises, why are they needed. NATO countries, with the exception of the Baltic states, have a pretty decent air defense system to shoot down subsonic missiles. Maybe not all, but they can very well decimate such a volley

Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

Well, first of all, radars were located in separate control containers. Why are they needed when launching the CRBD? I do not quite understand. Then, introducing flight missions into 1 missiles is also not a matter of 80-1 minutes. But the train is moving, which means that at every moment in time you have to recalculate the PP
Further, well, you are very much dreaming, Anedrei. The Soviet Union planned to deploy 7 divisions, deployed 4 in 12 formations. And you are going to deploy 10 complexes at once with 1200 "Calibers". Now, on average, a little more than 100 "Calibers" are produced per year. It will take almost 12 years to accumulate one ammunition load only for BZHRK. It is fantastic

It is certainly easy to draw the reach zones of the Kyrgyz Republic, except for the fact that the entire territory through which they will go in the west will be saturated with air defense systems for various purposes.

When deploying the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic

China and both Koreas are for sure. about Japan - there are doubts. The current 3M14 Gauges coordinate their location on an electronic map (correction area). Almost 900 km, that is, an hour's journey, will have to go over the water of the Kyrgyz Republic. even the best gyroscopes have the ability to accumulate errors and it is possible that in Japan the missile may not fall into the correction area.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Thank you for the detailed comments!

Quote: Old26

This is called throwing money away. Moreover, the R-36M missile has long been decommissioned, and the UR-100N UTTH is practically the same. They want to deploy a dozen with Avangard, but that is all the reserves. RT-2PM "Topol" are written off due to the impossibility of extending their service life. It is nonsense to develop a block for a rocket that can stand for another 3-5 years for a DB. Only Yars remains, but they will have to replace Topol-M in the near future, so there are no reserves for this either

Since I do not have information about the technical condition and potential service life of specific products, they are all presented without decoding the modifications. In fact, according to the results of a detailed study, it is necessary to choose the best ICBMs for this task. Perhaps it will be only Liners and Sineva, maybe Yars ...

Quote: Old26

Yes, the development of a promising non-nuclear unit within the framework of the Avangard product is quite possible. Here is just a common misconception that its flight path reduces the likelihood of its detection where did it come from? The range of American early warning missile radars is about 6000 km. And how will its flight path make it difficult to detect? If he starts to maneuver at the initial stage of the trajectory, he will leave the zone of the location of false targets. And instead of hiding among false targets, on the contrary, he will identify himself.
The ability to adjust the trajectory can make it difficult to determine the final coordinates of the target. but one should not think that at speeds of entry into the upper atmosphere of 25-27M, it is capable of performing "evolutions" comparable to those that a fighter makes when performing aerobatics. Firstly, engines cannot have a large supply of fuel for such evolutions, secondly, it can be corny from overloads to fall apart

I agree on the trajectory. He will not deceive American SPRN radars, but, as I have already said, the USA is not the target for SCS. And I doubt that he flies with false targets, if flying in the atmosphere, even in the upper layers, he will “blow them away”.

Quote: Old26

The Avangard block is planned to be located on TWELVE modernized missiles UR-100N UTTH. The network even found the index of this ICBM - 15A71 instead of 15A35, like the UR-100N UTTH. The fact that 15 "dry" UR-32N UTTKhs were handed over to us almost 100 years ago does not mean that they all remained intact. They sometimes replaced the missiles fired during the UBP, and were used as test ones. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense announced the deployment of TWO regiments consisting of 12 launchers in the position area of ​​the 13 taxiway.
And whence 10 "Vanguards" on one "weave of OU" ??? If during the test one "Vanguard" intermeddle in it, And not because of the weight, but because of the dimensions?

No, not 10 Vanguards on the 1-th hundredth, one by one. If you are right, and all UR-100 10 pcs., Then this can be done only if the Vanguard is moved to Sarmat.

Quote: Old26

Yes, such an option is provided, but the verification mechanism is not defined. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will not react in any way if 3-4 ICBMs are launched simultaneously from the same California. They will not be informed in advance about the test ones, and no one will know whether the ICBMs with nuclear or conventional ones took off.
And the whole concept of a quick global strike is designed primarily for third world countries. But you have to agree in the end with Russia

I agree, but I am sure that the United States will want to talk about this issue, the idea of ​​BSU comes from them.

Quote: Old26

What is the point of such missiles? In order for them to cover the territory of Europe they must be placed in the border areas. But the question arises, why are they needed. NATO countries, with the exception of the Baltic states, have a pretty decent air defense system to shoot down subsonic missiles. Maybe not all, but they can very well decimate such a volley

Honestly, I doubt it. If there are no balloons from the radar or the constant alert of the AWACS aircraft in the air, then the air defense positions can be circumvented using the range reserve of the Kyrgyz Republic. I am impressed by the enormous load capacity of the BZHRK KR, the secrecy in the mass of other trains, and the potentially lowest cost of carrier, less than an airplane, ship, car. At the same time, huge mobility throughout the country.

Quote: Old26

Well, in 1, radars were located in separate control containers. Why are they needed when launching the CRBD? I do not quite understand.

It is possible for firing anti-ship missiles of the same size.

Quote: Old26

Then, introducing flight missions into the 80 missiles is also not a matter of 1-2 minutes. But the train is moving, which means that at every moment in time you have to recalculate the PP

No, should be standing during the shooting. Previously, the Tomahawk was programmed for a day, now the data input speed is likely to be increased, this would be logical.

Quote: Old26

Further, well, you are very much dreaming, Anedrei. The Soviet Union planned to deploy 7 divisions, deployed 4 in 12 formations. And you are going to deploy 10 complexes at once with 1200 "Calibers". Now, on average, a little more than 100 "Calibers" are produced per year. It will take almost 12 years to accumulate one ammunition load only for BZHRK. It is fantastic

I think it’s quite realistic to double-triple the production of a used product, there would be political will. And those Soviet BZHRK was a completely new, complex product, and in these very big unification - a car + container + 4 missiles. I repeat, PMSM BZHRK is better than producing RTOs with eight missiles.

Quote: Old26

It is certainly easy to draw the reach zones of the Kyrgyz Republic, except for the fact that the entire territory through which they will go in the west will be saturated with air defense systems for various purposes.

Of course, the zones shown are maximum, in fact they will be reduced. But here a lot of questions arise about specific air defense, EPR KR, etc.

Quote: Old26

When deploying the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic

China and both Koreas are for sure. about Japan - there are doubts. The current 3M14 Gauges coordinate their location on an electronic map (correction area). Almost 900 km, that is, an hour's journey, will have to go over the water of the Kyrgyz Republic. even the best gyroscopes have the ability to accumulate errors and it is possible that in Japan the missile may not fall into the correction area.

There is also a Glonass correction, otherwise why put them on ships?

[Local from the Volga]

As soon as this miraculous ballistic cracker leaves its place in the direction of a nuclear power, there will immediately be a retaliatory strike from the nuclear warhead!
For everyone else, a stupidly expensive and other means car and a small cart! The question is, why? Is there a lot of money?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Local from the Volga

As soon as this miraculous ballistic cracker leaves its place in the direction of a nuclear power, there will immediately be a retaliatory strike from the nuclear warhead!
For everyone else, a stupidly expensive and other means car and a small cart! The question is, why? Is there a lot of money?

Nuclear powers are not considered targets, well, it’s written several times (

The issue of price is the criterion of cost / effectiveness, moreover, it can be considered in different ways:

Missile for 100 000 shoots down aircraft for 1000 000 is it effective?
A rocket behind 100 000 knocks a rocket behind 50 000, but doesn’t allow to hit a protected object behind 1000 000 000, effectively?

It is clear that there are questions for the second example, but Israel and the United States are ready to shoot down cheaper ammunition with more expensive missile defense systems, compensating for the cost / effectiveness shortcomings with the power of their economy, but protecting their territory as much as possible.

[Old26]

I will continue

Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

Your statement is not entirely clear, Andrei, why conventional weapons should be the first strike weapon. In principle, as I already wrote, the origins of the development of the BSU concept was the unsuccessful use of Tomahawks in the camp where Bin Laden was. But since the "axes" went to the goal for a couple of hours, he managed to leave. Then they thought about the option when the blow is delivered in 0,5-1 hour. But it is foolish to think that this is a first strike weapon against countries like Russia or China. The early warning systems have not been canceled either by us or by the Chinese. And launching several missiles, let alone a dozen or two, will cause an instant reaction. If after a single start they could still use the "hot line", then when 2-3 dozen start, they answer without any phone calls. Therefore, I will repeat myself. Conventional strategic weapons can only be used against third world countries when it is necessary to punish quickly and demonstratively, but not to use nuclear weapons. Moreover, these launches must be coordinated with the same Moscow and Beijing, so that they do not perceive these launches as an attack against them.

SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"

Well, firstly, more than a hundred, if we are talking only about "Caliber". A maximum of 8 KR can be entered into the inner diameter of the shaft, but most likely 7 (that is, from 112 to 128 calibers). "Onyx" in the mine from "Bulava" will fit no more than 4, and therefore such missiles on the boat can be 64. About "Zircon" nothing can be said at all. We do not know its dimensions. And is it really necessary to put a photo of the American X-51 instead of the Zircon?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

I will continue

Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

Your statement is not entirely clear, Andrei, why conventional weapons should be the first strike weapon. In principle, as I already wrote, the origins of the development of the BSU concept was the unsuccessful use of Tomahawks in the camp where Bin Laden was. But since the "axes" went to the goal for a couple of hours, he managed to leave. Then they thought about the option when the blow is delivered in 0,5-1 hour. But it is foolish to think that this is a first strike weapon against countries like Russia or China. The early warning systems have not been canceled either by us or by the Chinese. And launching several missiles, let alone a dozen or two, will cause an instant reaction. If after a single start they could still use the "hot line", then when 2-3 dozen start, they answer without any phone calls. Therefore, I will repeat myself. Conventional strategic weapons can only be used against third world countries when it is necessary to punish quickly and demonstratively, but not to use nuclear weapons. Moreover, these launches must be coordinated with the same Moscow and Beijing, so that they do not perceive these launches as an attack against them.

Everything is so, in the article about it there is:

Legal and organizational issues

The combat use of strategic conventional forces in some cases, for example, when launching ICBMs with non-nuclear equipment, will require responsible interaction with “partners”, primarily the United States, to eliminate the risk of a full-scale nuclear war.

Given the US interest in developing a similar class of weapons, in future START treaties they can be moved to a separate class so that both countries do not reduce their nuclear deterrence potential, this is of course if the START treaties do not become a history following the medium-range missile treaty and a shorter range (INF Treaty) or a missile defense treaty (ABM).

Quote: Old26

SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"

Well, firstly, more than a hundred, if we are talking only about "Caliber". A maximum of 8 KR can be entered into the inner diameter of the shaft, but most likely 7 (that is, from 112 to 128 calibers). "Onyx" in the mine from "Bulava" will fit no more than 4, and therefore such missiles on the boat can be 64. About "Zircon" nothing can be said at all. We do not know its dimensions. And is it really necessary to put a photo of the American X-51 instead of the Zircon?

I sincerely hope that there will be more of them, which is why I wrote - “of the order of one hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type“ Caliber ”,“ Onyx ”(“ Yakhont ”),“ Zircon ”.

[Old26]

I will continue

With the Air Force, everything is much simpler. As mentioned in the previous article, strategic aviation is the most useless component of strategic nuclear forces (SNF), since it is extremely vulnerable to a first strike. All thoughts about the possibility of re-targeting in flight, cancellation of striking do not stand up to criticism, because in an emergency situation will develop much faster than aviation can react, in order to exert political pressure it does not matter what is on board the bomber, especially since they don’t fly on such tasks with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the capabilities of strategic aviation in terms of delivering massive strikes with conventional weapons are unique. No other type of armed force can compare with them in the possibility of promptly delivering concentrated strikes at a great distance, at least until they are adopted by ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

The Air Force is as much an active component of the triad as everything else. And you can retarget them, and return them to the base if there was an unauthorized launch on the other side. But the rocket cannot be returned. The fact that now strategists do not fly with nuclear weapons on board does not mean at all that just before the time "H" such flights will not be performed with nuclear weapons on board.
And I repeat, Andrey, once again. There will be no mass use of conventional weapons by strategists (boats, airplanes, ground complexes). The number of such launchers will be strictly limited to 2-3 by dozens, if they come to this

One of the most important elements of the strategic conventional forces should be the supersonic bombers Tu-160M2 with hypersonic dagger missiles. The possibility and necessity of adapting the Tu-160M2 under the “Dagger” missiles was discussed in detail in the article “Hypersonic“ Dagger ”on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction? ” The combination of the supersonic cruising flight speed of the Tu-160M2, which is 1,5M and the high-speed characteristics of the Dagger, will make it possible to strike swiftly at the enemy. The radius of action of the Tu-160M2 at supersonic speed is 2000 kilometers without refueling, which, combined with the flight range of the Dagger rocket, which is about 1000 kilometers, will make it possible to strike at targets located 3000 kilometers from the airfield. Given the indicated speed and range of flight of the carrier and ammunition, the total time for striking a target will be less than half an hour, without taking into account preparation for departure ..

All this can be considered with a decrease in the number of Yao on each side to 3-4 hundred warheads. Then it makes sense to replace certain means with conventional weapons. But to put the "Dagger" on the strategist for solving the tasks of anti-ship defense is, to put it mildly, rather inadequate. For example, I would place "Daggers" on the TU-95. This would give both a "long arm" and the possibility of loitering in the air with a slight decrease in the flight range of the hypersonic missile itself.

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- thirty ICBMs of the R-36M "Satan" type, RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 "Yars" with three (on average) non-nuclear warheads each;

Except that the R-36M is no longer in service, and the Topol is capable of carrying only one warhead. That is, the number 30, let's say, is sucked from the finger

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- ten ICBM UR-100Н UTTH “Stiletto” with a hypersonic maneuvering non-nuclear block based on the Avangard product ”

The number of missiles with the Nuclear "Aangard" is 12. Where are you going to recruit a dozen more UR-100N UTTH ICBMs with the non-nuclear "Vanguard", which does not yet exist. And when even missiles with a nuclear "Vanguard" appear, they will have to be scrapped ...

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- ten BZHRK with forty wagons and a total ammunition load of 160 KR "Caliber" in each BZHRK;

The number of BZHRK even from ICBMs until 2027 year will be calculated BIG AND ABSOLUTE ZERO. And maybe after the 2027 year. you dream to have at least 10 regiments, and even in 40 cars ... And why, by the way, not in 50-60 ??

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;

Well, this is even more or less real, except for the absence of a non-nuclear unit for the Liner. And why, by the way, not for "Leader" ??

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- four Borey-K submarines and / or 949AM submarines with the 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine;
.

"Little, I want more, little ..."
He is planning only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have 4. Maybe it is worth cutting the sturgeon in half?

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555

General composition of strategic conventional forces

Presumably, SCS may include:
- fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

Okay, let's suppose that a miracle happens and we build 50 Tu-160M2, so in 12 years. Suppose that each will house 12 X-101 missiles. Well, what makes you think that 6-8 "Daggers" will fit into it. the dimensions of the bomb bay are known, I'm afraid more than one "Dagger" will not fit in the bomb bay, especially on a rotor launcher. A total of two "Daggers". And you are going to place 4-6 more on an external sling and are sure that at the same time it will reach a speed of 1,2M

Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

Thus, the number of blocks must be reviewed taking into account the comments made.

Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Old26

I will continue

The Air Force is as much an active component of the triad as everything else. And you can retarget them, and return them to the base if there was an unauthorized launch on the other side. But the rocket cannot be returned. The fact that now strategists do not fly with nuclear weapons on board does not mean at all that just before the time "H" such flights will not be performed with nuclear weapons on board.

Let’s say an unauthorized launch was detected, how quickly will the aircraft refuel, arm the nuclear weapons, and fly into the air? PMSM by this time or it will all end, or nothing will start. The only way to secure missile-carrying bombers is by air watch, but it is monstrously expensive due to the consumption of their resource and fuel, and the limitation of warheads on the number of takeoffs and landings.

Quote: Old26

And I repeat, Andrey, once again. There will be no mass use of conventional weapons by strategists (boats, airplanes, ground complexes). The number of such launchers will be strictly limited to 2-3 by dozens, if they come to this

It was already, if we talk about the Kyrgyz Republic. If about the ICBMs, then there are questions, but as I wrote somewhere in the comments, one of the solutions is to place them in special zones, under the supervision of observers of interested parties - the United States, China, so that launch from this zone is not considered as the beginning of a global conflict + other mechanisms.

Quote: Old26

All this can be considered with a decrease in the number of Yao on each side to 3-4 hundred warheads. Then it makes sense to replace certain means with conventional weapons. But to put the "Dagger" on the strategist for solving the tasks of anti-ship defense is, to put it mildly, rather inadequate. For example, I would place "Daggers" on the TU-95. This would give both a "long arm" and the possibility of loitering in the air with a slight decrease in the flight range of the hypersonic missile itself.

As I said, I generally have doubts about their expediency in a nuclear war, but they have no equal to solve the problems of a conventional war.

As for the Tu-95, I’m not sure, maybe the Dagger needs some minimum speed to get to the “mode”. But if possible, then I am only FOR.

Quote: Old26

Except that the R-36M is no longer in service, and the Topol is capable of carrying only one warhead. That is, the number 30, let's say, is sucked from the finger
...
The number of missiles with the Nuclear "Aangard" is 12. Where are you going to recruit a dozen more UR-100N UTTH ICBMs with the non-nuclear "Vanguard", which does not yet exist. And when even missiles with a nuclear "Vanguard" appear, they will have to be scrapped ...

I can not argue, but otherwise, I rely only on open sources.

Quote: Old26

The number of BZHRK even from ICBMs until 2027 year will be calculated BIG AND ABSOLUTE ZERO. And maybe after the 2027 year. you dream to have at least 10 regiments, and even in 40 cars ... And why, by the way, not in 50-60 ??

Everything is possible, it is possible that something else will not happen, the Husky nuclear submarine or EM Leader, or Almaty - the economy will collapse, for example, but a little optimism will not hurt. Repeatingly, BZHRK with KR is the simplest percussion device. No shipyards, airbases are needed - only standard containers, standard railway cars and standard rockets. Technical risk is close to zero.

40 wagons - the average figure, maybe more. It seems there were trains of 500-700 cars. It is necessary to build on something.

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;

Well, this is even more or less real, except for the absence of a non-nuclear unit for the Liner. And why, by the way, not for "Leader" ??

Somehow it passed me, do not explain what kind of Leader? The next modification?

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- four Borey-K SSBNs and / or 949AM SSBNs with 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine; .

"Little, I want more, little ..."
He is planning only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have 4. Maybe it is worth cutting the sturgeon in half?

So now there will be 4 "loaves" of 949AM with 72 KP on each.

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555

It is possible that with X-555, it doesn’t matter to me, the information is different, they write what will be on them X-101, then no.

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

Okay, let's suppose that a miracle happens and we build 50 Tu-160M2, so in 12 years. Suppose that each will house 12 X-101 missiles. Well, what makes you think that 6-8 "Daggers" will fit into it. the dimensions of the bomb bay are known, I'm afraid more than one "Dagger" will not fit in the bomb bay, especially on a rotor launcher. A total of two "Daggers". And you are going to place 4-6 more on an external sling and are sure that at the same time it will reach a speed of 1,2M

I wrote about this separate material Hypersonic "Dagger" on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction?
- https://topwar.ru/153987-giperzvukovoj-kinzhal-na-tu-160-realnost-ili-vymysel.html

I thought about the size of the compartment, 3-4 pieces should enter the compartment, respectively, 6-8 in two. There should not be anything on the outside. It seems that in the comments the people discussed this possibility.

Regarding speed - there are speed / range flight profiles, but I could not find it depending on the load. It is possible that the sturgeon will have to be cut. The trick is that the Tu-160 is faster and more load-bearing anyway, there is nothing, the inevitable will not be in the near future.

About 50 pcs., What can I say, let's say I believe the president and the government ...

Quote: Old26

Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

Thus, the number of blocks must be reviewed taking into account the comments made.

Of course, the figure is very rough.

Quote: Old26

Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs

Circles are not mine, honestly taken from the network. It is clear that at maximum range they will not catch up. But then how else to draw, a range indicating the probability of interception? Yes, and the US is constantly upgrading blocks.

Thanks again for the informative comments.

[Nikolai]

The states have global plans. And who are we against? Somalia? The media you proposed are extremely expensive, there is no economic feasibility. And then, your idea is not new. Termination of the INF Treaty and, as a consequence, the launch of the production of SMD missiles for ground mobile carriers, the program for the construction of submarines and small missile ships with Caliber (they have the ability to move around inland waters), Dagger on air carriers. This technique allows you to concentrate forces on the direction of the blow. Here is the existing solution and the answer. Calibers in containers on barges on the Volga and on railway platforms are also not new. "Everything is taken into account by a mighty hurricane."

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Nikolai Aleksandrovich

The states have global plans. And who are we against? Somalia? The media you proposed are extremely expensive, there is no economic feasibility. And then, your idea is not new. Termination of the INF Treaty and, as a consequence, the launch of the production of SMD missiles for ground mobile carriers, the program for the construction of submarines and small missile ships with Caliber (they have the ability to move around inland waters), Dagger on air carriers. This technique allows you to concentrate forces on the direction of the blow. Here is the existing solution and the answer. Calibers in containers on barges on the Volga and on railway platforms are also not new. "Everything is taken into account by a mighty hurricane."

I do not claim absolute novelty. SCS goals and objectives indicated at the end of the article. PMSM for the Kyrgyz BZHRK is the easiest and cheapest way to maneuver firepower.

And as for the global plans - then we must generally sit quietly, not climb into Syria, Venezuela. And if we climb, then we need appropriate tools.

[Nikolai]

No tools for Syria? In any case, the infantry wins the war. Global instruments need global intelligence. She is? First, intelligence, then everything else.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ffaff

THE AUTHOR OF THIS NON-MITROPHANES IS CLINICAL ...!
I EXPLAIN THE ELEMENTARY:
It's a shame to read such nonsense!

As it is interesting to discuss with normal and educated people, it is just as unpleasant to read the ravings of people with low intelligence and obvious nervous disorders (which is usually indicated by the abundant use of CAPITAL letters in the text. Obviously, due to the characteristics of the nervous system, they are overexcited at the sight of or topics, and then read it and comprehend the whole force they no longer have, and they write comments on what was not there.

Now on the points:

Quote: ffaff

1. "Non-nuclear equipment" of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is:
- Suicidal STUPIDness - since the Adversary cannot know that it is NOT nuclear - but non-nuclear warheads - and he will definitely answer NUCLEAR ONLY!
- Financial NONSENSE is like firing GOLD ammo ....
just imagine:
- The US President is reported: "Russian ICBMs have started!"
- President: "Destroy Russia!"
- "What if there is a non-nuclear equipment?"
- President: "Do we know WHERE ...?"
It's like AIMING a pistol with a rubber cartridge at your opponent - and then wondering, "Why did he shoot you?"

And somewhere about the United States as a goal something said? Goals and objectives are clearly indicated.

Quote: ffaff

2. "The concept of a" Rapid Global Strike "- supposedly launching 3500-4000 cruise missiles to destroy Russia's nuclear potential - is taken seriously only by ...!
PRESENT:
The President of Russia is reported: "HUNDREDS of cruise missiles are flying at us, what should we do?" President: "Do nothing, let's wait a few hours - until the country's nuclear potential is destroyed!"
Ha Ha Ha!
It is IMPOSSIBLE to hide the launch of the Kyrgyz Republic - there is a huge number of space and ground-based over-the-horizon tracking systems - and with the mass launch of the Kyrgyz Republic - we will destroy the USA in half an hour (!)!
By the way - KR - SUBSONIC (they only call a "fast" strike - they fly for several hours), and the US WILL NOT EXIST - and American cruise missiles will still fly to our (ALREADY EMPTY) launchers!

About this, too, was not a word, idiot.

Quote: ffaff

3. "Railroad missiles" are unnecessary, expensive and dangerous STUPIDITY!
Which will simply beckon spies and saboteurs to the railways - with tragic consequences for cargo, passengers, and railroad infrastructure. There is NOTHING to do anything for spies and saboteurs in the missile regiment (behind two high fences under voltage of over a thousand volts!), And the rocket men themselves are all trained professionals dedicated to the Service (and even under round-the-clock control of the Specialists).
And on thousands of kilometers of railways it is EASY to plant explosives - having filled up a train with missiles - and EASY to recruit an "informant" among tens of thousands of locomotives (often semi-literate drunks).
In Russian Railways, a huge number of all switchmen, technicians, minders and other small fry - which is ALWAYS on the course of all movements and easily WATCHES for a bottle of vodka!
And in general - "masking" the weapon of attack among passengers, women and children - this is the method of TERRORISTS AND DALS .... !

Obviously, the early autumn weather that came this year causes specific processes in the heads of some of the population ...

[Zaurbek]

Good article!
A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data. for GP shells has such guidance accuracy been achieved?

[Zaurbek]

Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

Given our territory with good air defense and aviation ... and the presence of neighbors such as the EU, Turkey, China, Japan ..... this is the best choice. In a short time, you can transfer a lot of Kyrgyzstan to the right part of the country. And quite stealthily.

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

There is also a Glonass correction, otherwise why put them on ships?

There is of course. But krsmicheskaya navigation system is one of the subsystems for determining its location. For greater accuracy, there should be several such subsystems. And given the non-nuclear nature of warheads - this becomes mandatory. It’s one thing when a 100-200 kt warhead misses a hundred or two meters and quite another when a conventional BG 200-400 kg misses the same 200 meters. It can and will ruin an apartment building even having missed such a distance (but not a fact), but it will not destroy a point target. Yes, not even a point, but fortified

Quote: AVM

Nuclear powers are not considered targets, well, it’s written several times.

Not considered.
But there is a second side to the coin. Consider, as an example, not Russia, but the United States. Let the launchers of these conventional ICBMs be located at Vandenberg Air Base on the Pacific coast. Let such launchers be, for example, 20-30. It is unlikely that Russia, and the United States, will agree to a massive number of such conventional missiles. No one canceled the control issues
So. the United States decided to launch a non-nuclear strike by such forces (as you gave them the name - SCS) on such a non-nuclear country as Iran. The start command has gone and these conventional "minutemans" start to start one by one. A couple of minutes later, these launching ICBMs are detected by the satellite subsystem of the early warning system. The information goes to the control center. After another couple of minutes, these missiles appear on the radar screens of the early warning system located in the Far East. But here's the fun part. Missiles fired at Iran will have a trajectory passing through the North Pole. In Malaysia or Vietnam, the trajectory will be different and will not pass through the pole, moreover, the trajectory will be "away" from our territory. But in Iran - only across the pole. And what can you tell the duty shift of the central control center of the early warning system when a dozen missiles are visible on the screen, starting in the direction of Russia. Well, if ten, and not all 20 or 30 ... The reaction will be unequivocal. Launching nuclear missiles towards the United States.
Of course, you can say that you can tell Russia about your intention to "punish Iran." But here, too, options are possible.
1. But will we not report this to Iran
2. Will we be guaranteed that all of these 20-30 missiles are intended for Iran? and not for example 5 Iran, and the rest to us. Yes, I remember the condition that the use of the SCS against a nuclear power is not considered. But two or three dozen ICBMs flying in the direction of the country will by no means add peace, despite all the assurances. There will always be some "What if?" And in this case, as they say, it is better to keep out and send your nuclear missiles in response to them.
Quite harsh guys with no sense of humor sit in the Central Administration. They say that these missiles passing through your territory are not against you, but will not make an impression on your neighbor Iran.

Quote: AVM

The issue of price is the criterion of cost / effectiveness, moreover, it can be considered in different ways:

Missile for 100 000 shoots down aircraft for 1000 000 is it effective?
A missile for 100 knocks a missile for 000, but does not allow to hit a protected object for 50, effectively ?.

An airplane and an anti-aircraft missile are somewhat different though. Since the same plane for 1 million can carry several ammunition that will cause damage ten times the cost of the same salette and the same anti-aircraft missile.
And the second is correct.
BUT SCS is something else. To begin with, the conventional warhead on the same ballistic missile is nonsense.
First and foremost. The WEIGHT of such a warhead and the range to which it can be delivered. Take the same "Minuteman-3". over a distance of 12-13 thousand kilometers, it can deliver a combat load of 1,15 tons. Subtract the thermal protection of the hull, the warhead hull itself - as a result, let 1 ton of explosives reach the target. What do we have in the radius of destruction. Strong damage (not complete, but strong, that is, 50% of the walls are destroyed, overlappings, etc.) from such a charge will be within 60-80 meters. For an unprotected person, of course more. KVO at the same "Minuteman" about 180-250 meters. In fact, it turns out that such a warhead can destroy a residential building, but not a fortified target. And spending $ 7 million on a rocket to destroy a house is so effective. Perhaps at short distances of 2000 or 3000 km, the efficiency will be higher, since the weight of the BG will be higher. But these are no longer strategic systems.

Quote: AVM

It is clear that there are questions for the second example, but Israel and the United States are ready to shoot down cheaper ammunition with more expensive missile defense systems, compensating for the cost / effectiveness shortcomings with the power of their economy, but protecting their territory as much as possible.

The power of the economy is not always at the forefront. The same "Iron Dome", having a decent value missile (many times its cost exceeds the cost of the shot down ammunition), fires only those ammunition that threaten the infrastructure and the population. Here cost / efficiency has a different foundation. Saving lives of people and infrastructure, kmk

Quote: AVM

I sincerely hope that there will be more of them, which is why I wrote - “of the order of one hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type“ Caliber ”,“ Onyx ”(“ Yakhont ”),“ Zircon ”.

Geometry cannot be fooled. If the diameter of the "Caliber" is 520 mm, and the "Onyx" is 720, then you will not enter it into the shaft with diameters of 2,1 meters or if you don’t want more than 4 "Onyxes" in this dimension. As well as 7-8 "Caliber".

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

Let’s say an unauthorized launch was detected, how quickly will the aircraft refuel, arm the nuclear weapons, and fly into the air? PMSM by this time or it will all end, or nothing will start. The only way to secure missile-carrying bombers is by air watch, but it is monstrously expensive due to the consumption of their resource and fuel, and the limitation of warheads on the number of takeoffs and landings.

What time, Andrey? If in a peaceful period, then the reaction to an unauthorized launch, and this implies the launch of a single missile, is usually different. Network hotline and both sides can find out what it is. System crash, crazy shift duty or what. Accordingly, knocking down a single missile with one or turning on the self-destruction mechanism for others is much simpler.
If this is the pre-war period, not long before the "H" time, then the attitude towards aviation will be different. It will be dispersed at airfields, and not located at a permanent base. Cars will be ready (2 or 1, not in the know). Refueled. Perhaps already with suspended nuclear weapons and sometimes already sitting in the cockpits of the crews. For how much the same regiment of strategists will be lifted into the air - I do not know, but it is almost certain that in much less time than the enemy's nuclear warhead will fall on the airfield.
Or there will be a duty in the air. Yes, it’s expensive, monstrously expensive, but defense is not cheap. At least it will be cheaper than creating SCS ...

Quote: AVM

It was already, if we talk about the Kyrgyz Republic. If about the ICBMs, then there are questions, but as I wrote somewhere in the comments, one of the solutions is to place them in special zones, under the supervision of observers of interested parties - the United States, China, so that launch from this zone is not considered as the beginning of a global conflict + other mechanisms ..

So far, it’s in relation to decision mechanisms and no

Quote: AVM

As I said, I generally have doubts about their expediency in a nuclear war, but they have no equal to solve the problems of a conventional war.

As for the Tu-95, I’m not sure, maybe the Dagger needs some minimum speed to get to the “mode”. But if possible, then I am only FOR.

Of course, the "weight" of strategic aviation is different now and in the 50s. Sometimes the conversation sometimes gets ahead of time about the uselessness of the "Triad", but so far this tool remains, and sometimes it is more flexible than missile forces. As for solving problems in non-nuclear wars, strategic aviation has shown that it is too early to write it off. Not a single more or less serious conflict was complete without her

As for the "Dagger", "Launch" speed would be necessary if the rocket was using a ramjet engine. But the rocket doesn't care. From the ground, the same Iskander reaches a speed of more than 6M. The speed of the carrier plays a role only on the final speed of the rocket, but in any case it will be hypersonic, as well as the range of the rocket. But the supersonic speed of the carrier is "desirable but not necessary." Sometimes the large radius of a subsonic aircraft will play a big role ...

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

I can not argue, but otherwise, I rely only on open sources ..

And open sources say the same thing that I wrote.

Quote: AVM

Everything is possible, it is possible that something else will not happen, the Husky nuclear submarine or EM Leader, or Almaty - the economy will collapse, for example, but a little optimism will not hurt. Repeatingly, BZHRK with KR is the simplest percussion device. No shipyards, airbases are needed - only standard containers, standard railway cars and standard rockets. Technical risk is close to zero.

40 wagons - the average figure, maybe more. It seems there were trains of 500-700 cars. It is necessary to build on something.

Sometimes outwardly the simplest will not be. For BZHRK need points of permanent deployment. And for each composition - a separate PPD. And PPD is essentially a small railway station with its own infrastructure. Putting flight missions into such a number of winged arcades is a very difficult and time-consuming event. If you say that such BZHRK will shoot not on the move, but from the parking lot, then you will need a very large number of field starting positions equipped in the engineering and geodetic sense, so that the enemy does not know where such BZHRK is at any given time. And this is a huge cost. For example, I can say that for the divisions deployed in the USSR, the BZHRK was created around TWO field starting positions. Plus, the routes should be equipped not only with sensors of the navigation system, as was already the case with the BZHRK, but also with a large number of places "sludge". For BZHRK with ICBMs, such places of "sludge" were not so relevant, but for BZHRK with KR - relevant. Especially if they are so long in length (40 cars). He will not be "on the move" all the time. after all, it may turn out that at the right time he will not be at the right point.

Quote: AVM

Somehow it passed me, do not explain what kind of Leader? The next modification? .

"evil tongues" say yes.

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- four Borey-K SSBNs and / or 949AM SSBNs with 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine; .

"Little, I want more, little ..."
He is planning only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have 4. Maybe it is worth cutting the sturgeon in half?

So now there will be 4 "loaves" of 949AM with 72 KP on each.

I have nothing against 4 "loaves". Just the number of "Boreev-K" was announced as TWO corps

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

General composition of strategic conventional forces
Presumably, SCS may include:
- Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555

It is possible that with the X-555, it doesn’t matter to me, the information is different, they write what will be on them X-101, then no ..

Of the total number of TU-95MS bombers, part is in the modification of MS-8, part is in the modification of MS-16. The latter are newer. They are going to be converted into a modification of the TU-95MSM. But since the bomb bay on the TU-95 is too small for the X-101, and reworking it is to change the design of the fuselage - we went along the optimal path. These MSMs will have 4 twin pylons for the X-101. I honestly do not know whether they will carry the X-55CM or X-555 in the bomb bay either. On older ones (MS-8 version) their regular X-55SM or X-555 will be in the bomb bay

Quote: AVM

I wrote about this separate material Hypersonic "Dagger" on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction?
- https://topwar.ru/153987-giperzvukovoj-kinzhal-na-tu-160-realnost-ili-vymysel.html

I thought about the size of the compartment, 3-4 pieces should enter the compartment, respectively, 6-8 in two. There should not be anything on the outside. It seems that in the comments the people discussed this possibility.

Regarding speed - there are speed / range flight profiles, but I could not find it depending on the load. It is possible that the sturgeon will have to be cut. The trick is that the Tu-160 is faster and more load-bearing anyway, there is nothing, the inevitable will not be in the near future.

About 50 pcs., What can I say, let's say I believe the president and the government ....

The length of the "Dagger can and does fit into the bomb bay. The question is that with its body diameter of about 90 cm (plus the aerodynamic planes of the rocket) and most likely 1 meter" Dagger is hardly possible to install on a rotary launcher. can be placed there exclusively "one above the other." This means that a maximum of 2 pieces will fit in the bomb bay

It seems to be necessary for the president to believe. But how reliable is this?

Quote: AVM

Quote: Old26

Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs

Circles are not mine, honestly taken from the network. It is clear that at maximum range they will not catch up. But then how else to draw, a range indicating the probability of interception? Yes, and the United States is constantly upgrading blocks ..

I understood that, Andrey. I have always been touched by these circles of reach radius, and in this case, the radius of reach by American missile defense trajectories of our ICBMs. Without considering how far the radar of these air defense bases sees, in how many seconds, or rather tens of seconds (and sometimes even hundreds), the target - our missile will come out from behind the radio horizon. Whether it will be still a rocket or already a group of targets consisting of warheads and false targets, what will be the speed, the possibility of firing at oncoming intersecting or catch-up courses. In short, dozens of questions to which such schemes do not give any answer.

Quote: AVM

Thanks again for the informative comments.

No problem