Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons

In the first article, Strategic Conventional Weaponsstrategic strategic objective weapons It is formulated as causing damage to the enemy, significantly reducing his organizational, industrial and military capabilities from a distance, minimizing or eliminating the likelihood of a direct combat collision with the armed forces of the enemy. Based on this task, it is necessary to determine the composition of the strategic conventional forces (SCS) for its solution.



ICBM R-36M "Satan", UR-100N UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol"


Strategic conventional weapons based on the Strategic Missile Forces weapons


The most logical solution in this case is the creation of non-nuclear warheads for existing ballistic missiles, following the example of the proposed implementation of the US Fast Global Strike program.

The basis for strategic conventional weapons based on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) should be guided non-nuclear warheads with various types of equipment for hitting point and area targets. The most preferable solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36M "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces. Depending on the carrying capacity and dimensions of the head compartment of the carrier, the number of universal conventional warhead units displayed can vary. Taking into account the limitations of the strategic offensive arms treaty (START III), in order to prevent a substantial weakening of the "nuclear shield", about thirty different ICBMs of various classes can be used to solve the problems of delivering strategic conventional weapons.

Another promising option for a non-nuclear warhead is the creation of a conventional version of the Avangard hypersonic product. The flight path features of this unit reduce the likelihood of its detection by the enemy radar, which, combined with the ability to correct the flight path, complicates the determination of the target’s final coordinates and makes it difficult to counter the attack. The Avangard block is planned to be placed on thirty-two ICBM UR-100N UTTKh Stillet received for debts from Ukraine. A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data.


Product "Vanguard"


The main alleged problem with the implementation of conventional ICBM warheads may be the low accuracy of guidance of Russian warheads. Unfortunately, this problem has long been characteristic of Russian Strategic Missile Forces; at the moment, there is no reliable information on the circular probable deviation (CIR) of the latest generation Russian ICBMs. Presumably, according to foreign sources, the KVO ICBM “Bulava” is 350 m, the KVO ICBM “Sineva” 250 m, the KVO ICBM “Yars” 150 m, while, for example, the KVO ICBM ICBM “Trident-II” D5 is 90 m. For guaranteed target destruction by a conventional warhead must be provided with a CWO of order 10-30 m. Ensuring the necessary accuracy of guidance of warheads is critical for deciding on the creation of this type of weapon. The maximum unification of conventional warheads will allow to reduce their cost due to the construction of a large series of similar products. They will receive a “second wind” of ICBMs, which could otherwise be sent for disposal.

Of the positive aspects, one can note a study by the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which states that START III conditions make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed or undeployed categories, and therefore such launchers do not fall under the established ceiling of armaments. If there will be ICBMs in such launchers, then such ICBMs will be considered as non-deployed, and therefore neither the number of ICBMs in unprotected launchers nor the number of warheads on them can be limited. Considering the fact that strategic conventional weapons are first-strike weapons, the requirements for their combat stability are obviously lower than for ICBMs for launching a reciprocal-return nuclear strike, so placing ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads in unprotected positions can be considered justified.

Given the withdrawal of the United States and the Russian Federation from the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the second element of strategic conventional weapons may be long-range cruise missiles (CR), placed on mobile carriers. In this direction, the greatest interest is the possibility of placing CR in containers, similar to how it was implemented in the Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles.

Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons

Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles


In turn, containers can be placed as part of a military railway missile system (BZHRK). Four missiles of the Caliber complex are located in one container, respectively, eighty cruise missiles will be placed in a freight train of twenty wagons, one hundred and sixty cruise missiles in forty wagons, which exceeds the striking power of a destroyer, cruiser or nuclear submarine with cruise missiles ( PLARK). In this case, the maximum length of the train can reach sixty cars, and for new locomotives up to one hundred cars (depending on the mass of the car).


BZHRK with intercontinental ballistic missiles


Accommodation on a railway platform will ensure high mobility and secrecy of the complex.


Large freight railway junctions. Track in them BZHRK almost impossible


Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

When placing the BZHRK at the extreme points of the European part of the Russian Federation, the whole of Europe, Iceland, part of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia will be in the affected zone of the Kyrgyz Republic.


The defeat zone "West" BZHRK with the Kyrgyz Republic


When placing the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic.


The defeat zone "East" BZHRK with the Kyrgyz Republic


Strategic conventional weapons based on the Navy


From the composition of the Navy fleet In the Russian Federation, the most advanced strategic missile submarine strategic cruisers (SSBNs) of Project 667BDRM Dolphin can be transferred to the strategic conventional forces as they are replaced by SSBNs of Project 955A Borey. The last of the built are the K-18 RPKSN and the Karelia K-407 Novomoskovsk RPKSN, launched in 1989 and 1990, or the K-117 Bryansk, which is currently undergoing medium repairs. Accordingly, the remaining four submarine missile carriers of this project can be used as donors of spare parts to maintain the combat effectiveness of the K-18 and K-407 or K-117 RPKSN. For these submarines, the R-29RMU2.1 “Liner” missiles must be adapted with the deployment of universal conventional warheads on them, with the achievement of the KVO of 10-30 meters. The total ammunition of two conventional submarines with conventional weapons will be 32 missiles.


SSBN project 667BDRM "Dolphin" and ICBM R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner"


Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

By analogy with the Strategic Missile Forces, the second component of the naval strategic conventional forces should be a submarine with missiles of the Caliber complex. The issue of creating SSGNs based on the SSBN of the 955A Borey project, similar in characteristics to the US SSGN Ohio, was considered in detail in the article “Nuclear submarines - carriers of cruise missiles: reality and prospects”. At the moment, the RF Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of continuing the SSBN series of the 955A Borey project as a carrier of long-range cruise missiles - “The Navy can get two submarines of the new project Borey-K”. Thus, this element of the strategic conventional forces takes on a very real shape.


SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"


Air Force Strategic Conventional Weapons


With the Air Force, everything is much simpler. As mentioned in the previous article, strategic aviation It is the most useless component of strategic nuclear forces (SNF), since it is extremely vulnerable to a first strike. All thoughts about the possibility of re-targeting in flight, cancellation of striking do not stand up to criticism, because in an emergency situation events will develop much faster than aviation can react, in order to exert political pressure it does not matter what is on board the bomber, especially since they don’t fly on such tasks with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the capabilities of strategic aviation in terms of delivering massive strikes with conventional weapons are unique. No other type of armed force can compare with them in the possibility of promptly delivering concentrated strikes at a great distance, at least until they are adopted by ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

The main Russian bombers are the Tu-160M and Tu-95MS / MSM. Both vehicles undergo timely modernization in terms of extending the service life, improving performance and expanding the range of weapons. At present, it is planned to resume production of Tu-160 aircraft in the amount of 50 units, in a modernized version of the Tu-160М2. The main armament of missile-carrying bombers within the framework of the strategic conventional forces should be long-range cruise missiles of the X-101 type. The combination of the range of the bombers of the order of six to eight thousand kilometers and the range of cruise missiles to five and a half thousand kilometers allows you to strike at almost any target on the planet.


Tu-95MSM with X-101 cruise missiles


One of the most important elements of the strategic conventional forces should be the supersonic bombers Tu-160M2 with hypersonic dagger missiles. The possibility and necessity of adapting the Tu-160M2 under the “Dagger” missiles was discussed in detail in the article Hypersonic Dagger on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction? ” The combination of the supersonic cruising flight speed of the Tu-160М2, which is part of the 1,5М and the speed characteristics of the “Dagger” missile, will make it possible to deliver swift attacks on the enemy. The range of the Tu-160M2 at supersonic speed is 2000 kilometers without refueling, which, combined with the flight range of the Dagger rocket, which is on the order of 1000 kilometers, will make it possible to strike targets located 3000 kilometers from the airfield. Taking into account the indicated speed and range of flight of the carrier and ammunition, the total time for striking a target will be less than half an hour, without taking into account preparation for departure.


Tu-160 bomber bomber and dagger hypersonic aerial ballistic missile


Why the dagger rocket, and not the promising hypersonic zircon rocket? For the reason that the “Dagger” is based on the spent rocket of the Iskander ground complex, which is produced in a fairly large series. It can be assumed that the cost of Zircon missiles will be significantly higher, and the advance into the troops will be slowed not only by a high price, but also by testing the shortcomings of a fundamentally new weapon revealed during operation. Nevertheless, Zircon missiles should also be adapted for Tu-160М2 missile bombers, and, possibly, Tu-95MS / MSM, to solve the tasks of counteracting aviation and naval strike groups in the ocean.

Missile bombers are multi-functional weapons, one way or another, but in START III they count as one carrier and one combat unit. Thus, their attribution to the strategic conventional forces is rather an organizational issue. If necessary, they can easily be returned to the strategic nuclear forces.

Thus, within the framework of the strategic conventional forces, a full-fledged strategic non-nuclear triad can be formed, which makes it possible to inflict a massive strike on high-precision non-nuclear weapons against an enemy located at a considerable distance.

Legal and organizational issues


The combat use of strategic conventional forces in some cases, for example, when launching ICBMs with non-nuclear equipment, will require responsible interaction with “partners”, primarily the United States, to eliminate the risk of a full-scale nuclear war.

Given the interest of the United States in the development of a similar class of weapons, in future START treaties they can be moved to a separate class so that both countries do not reduce their nuclear deterrence potential, this is of course if the START treaties do not history following the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) or on the missile defense treaty (ABM).

No matter how cynical it may sound, it can be considered acceptable to conclude open agreements or secret agreements with the United States, China, and some other countries to prevent the uncontrolled development of strategic conventional weapons, including the possibility of joint preemptive non-nuclear attacks on countries trying to create them.

General composition of strategic conventional forces


Presumably, SCS may include:
- thirty ICBMs of the R-36M "Satan" type, RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 "Yars" with three (on average) non-nuclear warheads each;
- ten ICBM UR-100Н UTTH “Stiletto” with a hypersonic maneuvering non-nuclear block based on the Avangard product ”
- ten BZHRK with forty wagons and a total ammunition load of 160 KR "Caliber" in each BZHRK;
- thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;
- four Borey-K submarines and / or 949AM submarines with the 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine;
- Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;
- fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

Taking into account striking at one target with two to four blocks / RC, the total number can be from 716 / 819 to 1432 / 1638 of the targets hit. Of course, the airborne component of the SCS can carry out repeated sorties with striking at targets up to the exhaustion of ammunition of cruise and aeroballistic missiles at air bases.

Under the existing START III treaty, the composition of the strategic nuclear forces will decrease by 182 of the carrier, while it should be borne in mind that missile-carrying bombers can be armed with nuclear weapons in the same terms as non-nuclear ones, that is, in fact 60 carriers are not excluded. If ICBMs deployed in unprotected positions are not taken into account under the START III treaty, then the composition of strategic nuclear forces will be reduced by only 32 ICBMs deployed on the Delphin’s 667BDRM SSBN.

Scenarios of application and goals of strategic conventional forces


The simplest example is the 08.08.08 war. Instead of three days, the war could last three hours from the moment a decision was made to strike back. During this period, the main administrative buildings, the buildings of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, airplanes at airfields, large fuel storages and ammunition depots would be destroyed. If necessary, large power plants, elements of transport and energy infrastructure can be added to them. It can be assumed that the surviving remnants of the Georgian leadership would have announced the cessation of any hostilities within a few hours after striking. There would be no loss of tactical and long-range aircraft, it would hardly take the heroic passage of the Roki tunnel. But most importantly, in the event of the death of most of the country's top leadership, including M. Saakashvili, his followers in the post-Soviet space would ask their Western curators a simple question: how can they guarantee their safety? And they would hardly have received a convincing answer. Based on this answer, events could have developed in a completely different way, for example, in Ukraine, which would have saved thousands of military and civilian lives on both sides of the conflict.

Another example is the situation that arose after Turkey shot down our plane from the Syrian air group, justifying it by violating its state border. The leadership of the Russian Federation did not intensify the conflict, limiting itself to economic and diplomatic measures. But what if the situation developed differently? For example, in response to our downed plane, we shoot down Turkish, they deliver a missile and bomb attack on the Khmeimim base - dozens of pieces of lost equipment, hundreds of victims. Turkey is a tough enough nut, if their ground forces do not pose a threat due to their geographical location, then the aviation and fleet are quite combat-ready and can cause significant damage to the general forces of the Russian Federation, primarily the Black Sea Fleet. Worst of all, if the conflict drags on, NATO forces will begin to provide more and more support to the Turkish armed forces. Even if there is no direct intervention due to fears of a transition to a global conflict, Turkey will definitely organize intelligence supply and arms supplies, which may ultimately lead Russia to a defeat similar to the one in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 of the year.

In this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey. At least after such a strike, the work of the general forces of the Russian Federation will be greatly simplified, as a maximum - the hostilities will end within 24 hours. In such a time interval, NATO structures will most likely simply not have time to work out a consolidated solution to intervene in the situation, which will give the Russian Federation space for military and political maneuvering.

In the case of aggressive actions by the United States and the NATO bloc, as well as the threat of a conflict escalating into a nuclear SCS, they can destroy US foreign bases in the affected area, primarily the missile defense and radar stations of the US missile defense system. Their defeat in Poland, Romania, and Norway will clearly demonstrate the futility of the missile defense system in the event of a global nuclear conflict, and will cool the ardor of the “opponents” and their younger allies.


US missile defense bases in Europe and the possible location of US missile defense ships in the oceans


Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

In the world there are quite unfriendly countries towards Russia, which, having a relatively small military potential, but using a remote geographical position, can harm the interests of the Russian Federation with impunity. Where is the guarantee that during the advancement of the interests of the Russian Federation somewhere in a remote region of the planet our plane will not be shot down again? Strategic conventional forces are an effective tool for resolving such situations in their favor. At the same time, one must clearly understand that strategic conventional forces are not a tool for conducting protracted conflicts. For example, in a situation of confrontation with militants in Syria, this tool is practically not applicable, but the general purpose forces of the Russian Federation should already work here. The task of the strategic conventional forces is that, in terms of the level of technical equipment of the armed forces, the enemy quickly slide down to the level of militants in Syria, with a destroyed command structure, without a fleet, air support and reserves.
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  1. silberwolf88 9 August 2019 03: 43 New
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    A very controversial concept ... strategic forces make sense only in nuclear equipment ... to fight a strong enemy is a global exchange of strikes for complete destruction (alas, no other way) ... and it’s kind of silly to use strategists in Zimbabwe ... there are other methods ... the idea of ​​covenantedness of strategic forces erodes the notion of the possibility of damage to many ... or the beginning of a light war with Russia ... but our doctrine provides for striking nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to territorial integrity, striking at vn f or enemy invasion
    the example of the 08 / 08 / 08 war is not correct ... it’s not about the possibility of destroying Georgian command posts ... it was a common approach ... frankly missed the very beginning of the escalation and concentration of Georgian troops (although intelligence data were) there was no plan for deployment and action in case of the outbreak of hostilities in the territory of Ossetia ... the use of aviation without suppressing air defense and the possible loss of the Roki tunnel (there was such a danger) speaks for itself ...
    1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 06: 47 New
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      Quote: silberwolf88
      A very controversial concept ... strategic forces make sense only in nuclear equipment ... to fight a strong enemy is a global exchange of strikes for complete destruction (alas, no other way) ... and it’s kind of silly to use strategists in Zimbabwe ... there are other methods ... the idea of ​​covenantedness of strategic forces erodes the notion of the possibility of damage to many ... or the beginning of a light war with Russia ... but our doctrine provides for striking nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to territorial integrity, striking at vn f or enemy invasion
      the example of the 08 / 08 / 08 war is not correct ... it’s not about the possibility of destroying Georgian command posts ... it was a common approach ... frankly missed the very beginning of the escalation and concentration of Georgian troops (although intelligence data were) there was no plan for deployment and action in case of the outbreak of hostilities in the territory of Ossetia ... the use of aviation without suppressing air defense and the possible loss of the Roki tunnel (there was such a danger) speaks for itself ...


      The goals in my opinion are clearly defined. These are powers that are well armed enough to constitute a danger to the general forces of the Russian Federation, but after the strike, the NKR will approach the level of Zimbabwe. Who said that this cannot be done? The United States, at least, is developing this topic.

      And in the situation with Georgia, the SCS could compensate for the leadership’s mistakes at the beginning of the escalation, the concentration of troops and more ...
      1. Narak-zempo 9 August 2019 07: 56 New
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        Quote: AVM
        And in the situation with Georgia, the SCS could compensate for the leadership’s mistakes at the beginning of the escalation, the concentration of troops and more ...

        Yes. It was possible to work out Saakashvili directly in the presidential bunker, and now he would not have flashed at the Ukrainians.
        1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 08: 32 New
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          Yes, it was possible to work out with the hands of Chechen youths for a couple of days. The whole Georgian army was enough for a day of effective resistance.
          1. Narak-zempo 9 August 2019 09: 23 New
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            Quote: Sancho_SP
            Yes, it was possible to work out with the hands of Chechen youths for a couple of days. The whole Georgian army was enough for a day of effective resistance.

            Yes, you can.
            But you won’t really send Chechen “workers” to Washington, Berlin, London. And so the hint would be very well understood.
  2. Moore 9 August 2019 04: 37 New
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    I will not discuss the air and sea component, I will stop on the ground.
    The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

    1. These missiles are not being withdrawn from the Strategic Missile Forces combat life from a good life — from heavy wear of both the element base, fatigue of the product structures, strength characteristics of the TT charge, and wear of the process equipment and outdated ASBU systems.
    2. If the deployment of such BBs at the State Dispatching Complex is a debatable question, then where do you order to get silos for R-36M and UR-100N UTTX? IMHO, placing in 13 RD 12 pieces of UR-100N UTTX with 1-2 BB Avangard in the silos where the P-36M with 10 BB stood - a question in itself is controversial in terms of combat effectiveness, but here it’s suggested to stick somewhere forty silo-based ICBMs - a whole division ...
    .... that the conditions of START III make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed category or the non-deployed category,

    Here it is not very clear. According to the START-3 protocol, the term “launcher in an unprotected position” means any ICBM ground stationary launcher or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.
    Those. in fact, it is a launcher-shaped launcher, like 8-63, for example. How to attach here P-36M and UR-100N UTTH?
    Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

    In principle, I am also for everything good and against everything bad. The use of such non-nuclear forces based on ICBMs promises considerable bonuses .. But here's the trouble (at least for the time being):
    -Where to get l / s on essentially another Strategic Missile Forces missile division;
    -Where to dig up funds for infrastructure for such a project, when equipment in rearmament missile divisions often costs already half the warranty period in the open;
    - Launching ICBMs (in any equipment at least) for our overseas opponents will always be, to put it mildly, an unpleasant moment with poorly calculated reactions of airborne control and strategic command calculations.
    I did not stop at the BZHRK with Caliber, so as not to download the content.
    1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 08: 07 New
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      Quote: Moore

      I will not discuss the air and sea component, I will stop on the ground.
      The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

      1. These missiles are not being withdrawn from the Strategic Missile Forces combat life from a good life — from heavy wear of both the element base, fatigue of the product structures, strength characteristics of the TT charge, and wear of the process equipment and outdated ASBU systems.


      Yars are generally still produced, as I understand it. I see the following logic. If, for example, the ICBM has a life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it is transferred to the SCS. Why are all the rockets listed? Because to me their condition and potential service lives are unknown. From the order of 300 30-40 carriers, you can dial for SCS. But I do not deny the possibility of manufacturing new missiles for this purpose on the basis of the same Yars, they can be simplified - there are no means of counteracting a nuclear explosion, means of breaking through an ABM, etc.

      Quote: Moore
      2. If the deployment of such BBs at the State Dispatching Complex is a debatable question, then where do you order to get silos for R-36M and UR-100N UTTX? IMHO, placing in 13 RD 12 pieces of UR-100N UTTX with 1-2 BB Avangard in the silos where the P-36M with 10 BB stood - a question in itself is controversial in terms of combat effectiveness, but here it’s suggested to stick somewhere forty silo-based ICBMs - a whole division ...


      Are they located somewhere now? I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has been reduced from the 1990's.

      Quote: Moore
      .... that the conditions of START III make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed category or the non-deployed category,

      Here it is not very clear. According to the START-3 protocol, the term “launcher in an unprotected position” means any ICBM ground stationary launcher or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.
      Those. in fact, it is a launcher-shaped launcher, like 8-63, for example. How to attach here P-36M and UR-100N UTTH?


      This is the only paragraph taken practically in quotation, so it can be considered rather as a subject for reflection, how to combine technical requirements and the legal side of the issue. In any case, I believe that SCS will give greater advantages than a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons by 10%, or the United States will withdraw them to a separate START-4 position (for example).

      Quote: Moore
      Finally, the strategic conventional forces are an effective weapon for creating a huge A2 / AD zone in which any stationary and inactive targets, such as ships in ports, aircraft at air bases, and when using anti-ship missiles “Dagger” and “Zircon” and aircraft / ship strike groups (AUG / KUG) in the open ocean are at constant risk of destruction, with little or no chance of defending themselves against a strike or avoiding it.

      In principle, I am also for everything good and against everything bad. The use of such non-nuclear forces based on ICBMs promises considerable bonuses .. But here's the trouble (at least for the time being):
      -Where to get l / s on essentially another Strategic Missile Forces missile division;
      -Where to dig up funds for infrastructure for such a project, when equipment in rearmament missile divisions often costs already half the warranty period in the open;
      - Launching ICBMs (in any equipment at least) for our overseas opponents will always be, to put it mildly, an unpleasant moment with poorly calculated reactions of airborne control and strategic command calculations.


      Not only ICBMs, it is much easier to implement a component based on the Air Force / Navy with cruise missiles. Not much more complicated than the Tu-160 with Daggers. ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment are clearly more complicated, but certainly not more difficult to deploy, for example, Poseidons.

      Quote: Moore
      I did not stop at the BZHRK with Caliber, so as not to download the content.


      And what is bad with the KRGK KR? In my opinion, the simplest and cheapest way to provide maneuver with firepower by projecting it over a huge distance. INF Treaty is gone. Any better 8-16 missiles on MRC?
      In the variant of their equipment with anti-ship missiles, they can, with an external command and control system, simply carry out all the fleets within the radius of destruction, adding to the Bastions and Balls. And also, if you recall the article - Universal Modules: Solving the problem of the disconnectedness of the four fleets of Russia - https://topwar.ru/156005-universalnye-moduli-reshenie-problemy-razobschennosti-chetyreh-flotov-rossii.html, then the BZHRK can be universal a solution, either acting as a PU, or moving a significant strike potential between fleets.

      Their combat stability is higher than that of any surface ship. Of course, they will not be able to maneuver as aircraft or deliver the Kyrgyz Republic to the shores of the United States, but within a radius of 3000-4000 km from their territory, they are a threat to any enemy.
      1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 08: 29 New
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        Is it possible to do the same, but with specific goals?
      2. Moore 9 August 2019 10: 48 New
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        Quote: AVM
        If, for example, the ICBM has a service life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it will be transferred to the SCS. Why are all the rockets listed? Because to me their condition and potential service lives are unknown.

        The warranty period is 10 years with a further annual extension, which sometimes reaches the same ten years or more. Share SNF and SCS, IMHO, unauthorized, because:
        -the goals for both those and for others are essentially strategic:
        - the flow of faults after the end of the main warranty period is very different from the flow in the initially declared warranty period - is it right to create deliberately "invalid teams";
        -groups from "on you, wretch, that we are not worth it," IMHO, increase the likelihood of a missed mission.
        I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has decreased since the 1990s.

        This is not true. BSP reducible parts of the Strategic Missile Forces are being rehabilitated. I don’t know how it is now, but in the 90s, it was customary to put an explosive charge under the “glass”, which brought it to the surface half the size. There was no question of restoration.

        Quote: AVM
        And what is bad with the KRGK KR?

        I did not say that he was bad, just did not write a comment the size of an article. lol There are pluses, minuses - like any model. This is perhaps the only thing that is feasible in terms of the ground component - a range limitation, perhaps. The question rests on the readiness of the military-industrial complex to ensure the production of the required number of missiles and launchers, which, in turn, rests on money. I believe that with the funeral of the INF Treaty, steps in this direction will be taken.
        1. Alexey Z 9 August 2019 20: 08 New
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          And what is bad with the KRGK KR? It’s painfully interesting, it’s designed here, some launchers. And where is the crew, power supply and so on? Remind the composition of BZHRK real?
      3. ccsr 9 August 2019 12: 25 New
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        Quote: AVM
        If, for example, the ICBM has a service life of 20 years, then it is 15 years in the strategic nuclear forces, then it will be transferred to the SCS.

        Actually, this is not economically and technologically feasible, if only because the element base has changed in 20 years, and the costs of maintaining SCS missiles are generally inconceivable in terms of the cost of a kiloton, which will be too expensive than with traditional operational tactical weapons.
        Quote: AVM
        I think that we have done the mines with a margin, given how much the arsenal has decreased since the 1990s.

        Mines can and will be enough, but it’s too expensive to maintain them with non-nuclear missiles, the effectiveness of which is orders of magnitude lower than that of missiles with nuclear equipment. Why is a goat such a button accordion?

        Quote: AVM
        In any case, I believe that SCS will give greater advantages than a 10% larger arsenal of nuclear weapons, or the United States will withdraw them to a separate START-4 position (for example).

        Your opinion only indicates that you have no idea about the military economy.
        Quote: AVM
        And what is bad with the KRGK KR?

        High cost and remoteness from enemy borders.
        Strategic conventional forces are an effective tool for resolving such situations in their favor.

        Based on the foregoing, I can only make an unambiguous conclusion from the author’s suggestions - "the benefit is doubtful, the harm is obvious."
        1. bayard 9 August 2019 23: 58 New
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          Quote: ccsr
          Based on the foregoing, I can only make an unambiguous conclusion from the author’s suggestions - "the benefit is doubtful, the harm is obvious."

          yes
          Particularly touched by the proposal to use ICBMs as carriers of conventional warheads ... if a middle school student froze this, I would understand ... Even without considering the PRICE of the issue ... ACCURACY. As far as I remember, the accuracy of the masterpiece of the late-Soviet military-industrial complex of the ICBM Molodets had an accuracy (KVO) of 250 m. The “Poplar” was hardly more accurate, and even if the “Yars” had it (KVO) higher, well, let’s say 150 m ... but at least 100 ... What damage did the author intend to inflict on a point target with a conventional warhead? And what type should this warhead be? High explosive? Pull a rocket a couple of billion rubles to stick a warhead with 0,5 - 2 tons of explosives in 200 m from the target?
          No, the glass will certainly be knocked out ... and the facades will probably be damaged (if the purpose of the building) ...
          Therefore, discussing this topic is simply not serious.

          It’s just that all the means necessary for the non-nuclear defeat of a distant enemy are already there, they are standing or getting into service and are growing numerically.
          First of all, it is Long-Range Aviation - Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22М3 (M), having for this X-101, X-555, "Dagger" (on Tu-22М3М), X-50 (on it )
          Secondly, it is the Fleet. With the same "Caliber" and "Caliber-M" (4500 km. Declared range). And these are not only the memorable RTOs and the Black Sea frigates, but also the Gorshkovs, who will be two in service by the end of the year, and then the series went ... Not enough? After a couple of years, take the atomic cruiser with 80 "Caliber" \ "Caliber-M", go to the shores of the adversary, wilder him like crucian "Caliber" to complete satisfaction. Few ? Take a couple of Antei-type modernized anti-aircraft missiles (the first with modernization - Omsk is already in operation), they each have 72 Caliber on board and optionally have 1 pieces of 10 - 12 in torpedo warheads ... and arrange "Armageddon" zealous adversaries ... Not enough? Well, wait until they build new Boreas with the Kyrgyz Republic in the mines, they will have more ammunition ...
          And in the third turn (after all, the INF Treaty) pack "Caliber" \ "Caliber-M" in concealed containers in any quantities that are reasonable for the budget, place where your heart desires ... Yes, at least put them on in Tartus and the whole world will be under your "caliber". From Tartus, he will cover the whole Middle East, North Africa and ALL Europe as a bull ... And from Cuba and Nicaragua ALL North America.
          And if you are not too lazy to exercise, then you can adapt the X-101 for ground launch from the container ... it is so beautiful, inconspicuous ... and there are no technical and legal obstacles to this.

          And everything will work out with us ... It has already worked out ... And it continues to work out ...

          And it is better to leave the ICBM alone - with its native YABCh.
          So everyone will be better.
          wink
  3. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 08: 29 New
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    1. TNT delivery by an intercontinental missile is very expensive. The economic effect of the application may be lower than the cost of the rocket.

    2. In a Georgian-type war, the matter was in order. To cause serious damage to Georgia, and so on, there were substantial aircraft-based cruise missiles in stock. But there was no order to bomb Tbilisi.

    3. The most interesting idea of ​​the article is to use mines with old mbrs in non-nuclear equipment as “legitimate” false targets. After all, it is not known in which mine which rocket is. But probable partners in the event of such cheating can do the same in a way that de facto ceases START-3.

    4. Turkey, Israel, Japan, and other militarily strong US allies hear nuclear warheads. It is not a matter of bloodthirstiness, just a conventional war with them is more likely to lead to a conventional, and then to an atomic war with their masters. At that time, a direct nuclear strike would likely remain without a direct response from the United States, at least immediately.
    1. Winnie76 9 August 2019 09: 04 New
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      Quote: Sancho_SP
      TNT delivery by an intercontinental missile is very expensive. The economic effect of the application may be lower than the cost of the rocket

      Economic effect - free disposal of an expiring missile. And a nice bonus minus one opponent’s base.
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      But probable partners in the event of such cheating can do the same in a way that de facto ceases START-3.

      START-3 is relevant for Russian-American relations. In a situation where medium-range missiles are starting to do everything and sundry, the DRMSD fell apart START-3 is of little relevance.
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      Turkey, Israel, Japan, and other militarily strong US allies are listening to atomic warheads. It is not a matter of bloodthirstiness, just a conventional war with them is more likely to lead to a conventional, and then to an atomic war with their masters.

      The task is to remove the military infrastructure and strategic civilian facilities of these countries in a few hours. And without the use of nuclear weapons. Then Nate is too late to twitch. Well, if the owners decide to fit in with their lapdogs - we will die all together laughing
      1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 09: 13 New
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        Free disposal - this is if you use that rocket in the coming year (Syria, Libya?). And if it’s decades on alert, the cost of maintaining an alert state is the same as for the carrier of an atomic head.

        Nevertheless, we are still observing it.

        The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.
        1. Winnie76 9 August 2019 09: 26 New
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          Quote: Sancho_SP
          The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.

          And that army will fight a lot without headquarters, storage bases, airfields, bridges, railways, fuel, spare parts. Without all this, the army turns into an organized crowd with Kalash
          1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 10: 18 New
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            Well, if you are going to bomb some Croatia, Ukraine or Portugal, maybe it is. For the same Turkey - there isn’t enough strength already. None. Recall the recent attack by the Tomahawks at an airfield in Syria. Efficiency is not 100%. So your 1000 warheads are substantially less than 1000 targets. Once in 10.
        2. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 09: 30 New
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          Quote: Sancho_SP
          Free disposal - this is if you use that rocket in the coming year (Syria, Libya?). And if it’s decades on alert, the cost of maintaining an alert state is the same as for the carrier of an atomic head.


          The requirements for duty will be lower than for nuclear weapons (although of course they will be) and their number of the whole order is 10% of the strategic nuclear forces, i.e. not such a fatal burden on the budget, PMSM benefits more. The same CRs on the DBC are much easier to provide than on the RTOs.


          Quote: Sancho_SP
          Nevertheless, we are still observing it.


          So far, we are complying with the agreement, because nothing has passed since the time has passed, and the US is already planning to put something in Asia that falls within the medium range, China is nervous. If we can still refrain from deploying a ballistic missile system with nuclear warheads, then the deployment of long-range non-nuclear weapons is in my opinion inevitable.

          Quote: Sancho_SP
          The army of any country is designed to act in a situation of "removal of infrastructure", that is the problem.


          The army is yes, but the Air Force and Navy in modern conditions in almost all countries are very limited in the number of aircraft and ships, at least modern ones. Their simultaneous destruction (to the maximum possible) is considered a victory in the war.
          1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 10: 20 New
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            Well, put the containers on the trucks. What is there to compose. They piled a warehouse at the right time in the right place and bang ... why are there intercontinental missiles?


            But what to consider a victory in a war depends on your goals. Why do we need a war with Turkey, what goals can be in it, and what should be considered a victory? Annexation of Constantinople?
            1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 12: 45 New
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              Quote: Sancho_SP
              Well, put the containers on the trucks. What is there to compose. They piled a warehouse at the right time in the right place and bang ... why are there intercontinental missiles?


              So trucks will cost much more, and camouflaging a convoy from 40 trucks is unrealistic, even from satellites will be spotted.

              Quote: Sancho_SP
              But what to consider a victory in a war depends on your goals. Why do we need a war with Turkey, what goals can be in it, and what should be considered a victory? Annexation of Constantinople?


              I am considering a response, when the aggression comes from the same Turkey, as it was with the plane. Victory? Preservation of our free passage through the straits, preservation of the Black Sea Fleet. Least.
              1. bayard 10 August 2019 00: 49 New
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                Andrey, do not compose a problem where it does not exist.
                Russia has all the necessary means for a quick non-nuclear strike on remote targets. And this is the airborne, sea and ground-based KR (INF Treaty already FSE). These are X-101, X-555, X-50 (will soon be on the Tu-22М3М), “Dagger” (on the MiG-31 and Tu-22М3М), “Caliber” (including ground based on the Iskander PU, "Bastion" or in container execution), "Caliber-M" with the declared range of 4500 km. with non-nuclear warheads (with nuclear warheads the range will be greater). All this is more than enough to solve the issue of a quick strike on a distant enemy.
                The first Omsk nuclear submarine upgraded under the Caliber carrier (72 units) is already in operation, two more are in the process, and in total by 2025 there will be 4 units. Send this to enemy shores and take everything unnecessary from a safe distance and not even floating up. And there the Boreas with the same Caliber \ Caliber-M will catch up ...
                And all will be well .
                Enough for everyone.
                Rational, fast and reliable.
                And leave the ICBMs alone, they and their relatives are more familiar with nuclear warheads - they were created for each other, they (nuclear warheads) for her (ICBMs) are like native children.

                And the Americans came up with stupid things about ordinary warheads on ICBMs, and not from a good life. It’s just that they have very few combat-ready nuclear warheads left, and they are fooled by hopelessness. They do not have the capacity to produce 235 uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, and their competencies are lost. And the maximum warranty period for the most advanced nuclear warhead - 30 years - is physics ... So they got a hassle - there are rockets and other carriers, but the nuclear warhead for them ... almost ran out. Through 1,5 - 2 years will end completely.
                But this is not our problem.
          2. garri-lin 9 August 2019 12: 17 New
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            I am extremely sorry. But since I remembered 080808. How much did the BB need to calm the Georgian troops? Quantitatively and not abstract.
            1. PSih2097 9 August 2019 19: 14 New
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              Quote: garri-lin
              Quantitatively, not abstract.

              one missile in equipment of 10 BB at 800 Kt in Washington ...
              1. garri-lin 9 August 2019 21: 09 New
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                Few. In addition to Washington, there are centers. In the strategic nuclear forces, the bottom line is that you have to hit it to the fullest. So kick so that he was crazy when he saw what happened. Half measures here will only do much harm.
  4. Pushkowed 9 August 2019 08: 41 New
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    A lot of non-nuclear (conventional) cruise missiles in the BZHRK, in the VKS and on the SSGN is good. But to call them "strategic" is not entirely correct. This is part of SON - general purpose forces. They are intended for ordinary military operations. Just the nature of conventional wars changes over time. Exaggerating: half a century ago, SON were represented by tens of thousands of tanks and thousands of missiles, and now they must be represented by tens of thousands of missiles and thousands of tanks. Yes in advertising Agat concern was said that the RK Club (export Caliber) can play the role of a strategic deterrent, but only for small countries. Russia is not such.
    1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 09: 09 New
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      Quote: Pushkowed
      A lot of non-nuclear (conventional) cruise missiles in the BZHRK, in the VKS and on the SSGN is good. But to call them "strategic" is not entirely correct. This is part of SON - general purpose forces. They are intended for ordinary military operations. Just the nature of conventional wars changes over time. Exaggerating: half a century ago, SON were represented by tens of thousands of tanks and thousands of missiles, and now they must be represented by tens of thousands of missiles and thousands of tanks. Yes in advertising Agat concern was said that the RK Club (export Caliber) can play the role of a strategic deterrent, but only for small countries. Russia is not such.


      Here is rather an organizational issue. Assigning them to a separate structure suggests precisely the application for applying the first massive strike. If you draw a parallel with the tanks, then when they were used singly with infantry, there was little sense from them. When tanks began to be used massively, using their maneuverability and firepower, they began to decide the outcome of the war.

      With KR, the same thing. Leave them to the general forces and they will solve the local tasks of each type of troops, and as part of the SCS, they must solve the single problem of the primary maximum damage to the enemy in order to reduce their organizational and military level, which will then affect the actions of all general forces.

      In a sense, the SCS can be attributed to general forces - the difference is that they do not enter into direct combat contact with the enemy and use only long-range weapons.
      1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 10: 21 New
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        Once again - who are the targets for this attack? Who exactly are you going to fight in this way?
  5. mark1 9 August 2019 08: 41 New
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    Yes, Andrey! Almost everything is debatable, but with Turkey and Georgia the examples are not at all successful. But as they say - you have the right.
    1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 09: 10 New
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      Quote: mark1
      Yes, Andrey! Almost everything is debatable, but with Turkey and Georgia the examples are not at all successful. But as they say - you have the right.


      Always glad to have detailed comments, why is Turkey a bad example?
      1. mark1 9 August 2019 09: 28 New
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        [quoteIn this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey.] [/ Quote]
        And after that, you want to "break off" from NATO (sharpen the blow to the territory of the participating country)? Believe me, then a preventive nuclear strike is better - at least we’ll scare it more strongly, they may not want to get involved. And so we are slowly strangled by sanctions with elements of armed influence - shorter than the khan.
        Putin did everything right - he blocked access to the territory of Syria and the economic blow.
        1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 09: 34 New
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          Quote: mark1
          In this situation, the strategic conventional forces are able to quickly disable all ships at the berths, destroy the largest airbases, destroying aviation, ammunition and fuel depots. Well, of course, destroy the main government facilities and facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey.]

          And after that, you want to "break off" from NATO (sharpen the blow to the territory of the participating country)? Believe me, then a preventive nuclear strike is better - at least we’ll scare it more strongly, they may not want to get involved. And so we are slowly strangled by sanctions with elements of armed influence - shorter than the khan.
          Putin did everything right - he blocked access to the territory of Syria and the economic blow.


          Sanctions will strangle us so slowly, this is a question from a different plane. After the use of nuclear weapons will be even worse. In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered), after that we can talk about peace talks, especially since our actions are reciprocal.

          By the way, it is precisely such scenarios - lightning strikes and the completion of the operation before the beginning of a possible reaction that the United States fears from the end of the 90's, there were such articles in the Western Military District.
          1. mark1 9 August 2019 09: 46 New
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            Quote: AVM
            In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered),

            These are not real tasks for conventional weapons - at least low-power nuclear weapons.
            Do you consider separately Turkey and separately the “distant Red Army” (in our case, NATO) and Incirlik with nuclear weapons, and bases in Cyprus? Kneading, believe me. It will be cool, it will be necessary to beat everyone at once.
            Quote: AVM
            especially since our actions are reciprocal.

            We answered well, well, maybe it made sense to bring down a couple of F-16s over Syria but probably didn’t have time, a blow to someone else’s territory is already an aggression.
            1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 10: 26 New
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              Quote: mark1
              Quote: AVM
              In the example with Turkey, in less than a day, it should cease to pose a military threat to the Russian Federation (the fleet and the Air Force are badly battered),

              These are not real tasks for conventional weapons - at least low-power nuclear weapons.
              Do you consider separately Turkey and separately the “distant Red Army” (in our case, NATO) and Incirlik with nuclear weapons, and bases in Cyprus? Kneading, believe me. It will be cool, it will be necessary to beat everyone at once.


              The Turkish Air Force is 10 airbases and about 300 aircraft, generally all.
              The Turkish Navy is 10 based and less than 40 ships.

              If these forces are dispersed and put into battle, then they represent a good force, but if 2 / 3 are destroyed by a sudden blow, the alignment changes greatly.

              Quote: mark1
              Quote: AVM
              especially since our actions are reciprocal.

              We answered well, well, maybe it made sense to bring down a couple of F-16s over Syria but probably didn’t have time, a blow to someone else’s territory is already an aggression.


              The article just gives an example of what we bring down in response, and in response they started. Erdogan's head is clearly not all right.

              And Incirlik should not be touched with nuclear weapons, the United States will not give the keys to it to the Turks.
  6. Operator 9 August 2019 09: 43 New
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    Why publish an obviously inadequate article in the Armament section when there is an Opinion section for this type of opus?

    The author has already been explained as twice as two that the launch of a strategic launch vehicle, not to mention a massive missile strike, will be unambiguously qualified by the opposite side as a nuclear attack. Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.

    It seems that the Pentagon pays extra money to the author for promoting the disarmament of the Russian strategic nuclear forces laughing
    1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 10: 28 New
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      Quote: Operator
      Why publish an obviously inadequate article in the Armament section when there is an Opinion section for this type of opus?

      The author has already been explained as twice as two that the launch of a strategic launch vehicle, not to mention a massive missile strike, will be unambiguously qualified by the opposite side as a nuclear attack. Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.

      It seems that the Pentagon pays extra money to the author for promoting the disarmament of the Russian strategic nuclear forces laughing


      Everything is inadequate for you, which does not correspond to your point of view. In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...
      1. ccsr 9 August 2019 12: 30 New
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        Quote: AVM
        In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...

        And why not consider it, especially low-power nuclear charges? For example, in Hiroshima they still live and do not worry, despite the nuclear bombing - what scares you so much in using tactical nuclear charges?
        1. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 12: 48 New
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          Quote: ccsr
          Quote: AVM
          In my opinion, for any conflict, you immediately consider nuclear weapons as the main weapon ...

          And why not consider it, especially low-power nuclear charges? For example, in Hiroshima they still live and do not worry, despite the nuclear bombing - what scares you so much in using tactical nuclear charges?


          Escalation of the conflict. It's like letting a genie out of a bottle. After that, everyone will think about nuclear weapons - Turkey, Japan, Iran, South Korea, Germany, etc. Therefore, even when the USSR did not become and the Russian Federation was greatly weakened, the United States did not dare to use cheap nuclear weapons and spent thousands of conventional KR in Iraq and Yugoslavia.
          1. ccsr 9 August 2019 13: 27 New
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            Quote: AVM
            Escalation of the conflict. It's like letting a genie out of a bottle.

            The launch of ballistic missiles in itself means that the whole war will last 30-40 minutes, and therefore it is better not to remember about gin. By the way, how does the enemy determine that non-nuclear missiles - you have already been asked this question more than once.
            Quote: AVM
            Russia greatly weakened The United States did not dare to use cheap nuclear weapons and spent thousands of conventional Kyrgyz Republics in Iraq and Yugoslavia.

            You apparently did not understand that these countries did not threaten US security and did not have their strategic weapons, which is why the Americans used conventional weapons.
    2. Shopping Mall 9 August 2019 11: 38 New
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      Quote: Operator
      Plus, there is nothing strategic in conventional weapons by definition.


      Strategic weapons
      The totality of various types of weapons, special information management and providing technical means designed to solve strategic problems in the war. The basis of modern S.v. makes up nuclear weapons. Sometimes to S.v. also include high-precision weapons in conventional equipment, used to destroy strategically important enemy targets. By appointment S.v. It is customary to subdivide into strategic offensive (strike) and strategic defensive weapons, as well as information and control components.

      https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/[email protected]
  7. Pushkowed 9 August 2019 09: 43 New
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    Non-nuclear warheads for ICBMs, from a military-strategic point of view, are useless for Russia. In addition, they take up space on deployed carriers, reducing their number in the strategic nuclear forces. But from a political point of view, they have a certain meaning.
    01.03.2018 g. At the presentation of the Sarmat missile, it was announced that it could hit targets through the south pole. In fact, both Russia and the United States are in the northern hemisphere, the shortest route between them is through the north pole. If you beat through the south, then:
    a) the flight time is increased (although the missile defense system is also bypassed);
    b) a huge range is simply required from a rocket (more than 30000 km, despite the fact that the "passport" range of "Sarmat" is no more than 20000 km).
    You can achieve such a high range only by using a partially orbital trajectory: the rocket puts the combat load into the polar near-earth orbit, there it makes a part of the revolution (incomplete revolution), then leaves the orbit and hits the target along the ballistic trajectory. Technically, this is real. "Sarmat" was created on the basis of P-36, and it had a partial orbital modification (removed from duty on the basis of an international agreement) and a "civilized" modification (Dnepr booster rocket). So it’s quite possible for Sarmat to put a payload into orbit. To do this, you need to accelerate it to the 1-th cosmic speed. Typically, ICBMs do not accelerate like this, but fly along a suborbital path. Achieving the 1-th space requires reducing the payload mass. But international treaties prohibit the deployment of nuclear warheads on such missiles! However, it was publicly announced that Russia would have such missiles. If anything, you can refer that they can be made non-nuclear. Perhaps this was a hint that Russia might respond symmetrically to BSU.
    What's the point of this?
    Possible scenario:
    1. The USA is putting forward an ultimatum to Russia ... well, for example, to close a factory where, as they believe, some sort of “ban” is being made (which one depends on their imagination: from “inhumane” lasers to pirated content);
    2. After Russia’s refusal, they use non-nuclear weapons in the controversial BSU plant, immediately declare that they “received satisfaction” and hypocritically offer to continue friends (read - until the next ultimatum).
    3. Russia's nuclear response in this situation is inappropriate (the “red line” has not been crossed), but some kind of “answer” is required. Proportionate. And, preferably, symmetrical.
    4. If they know in advance about the availability of funds in Russia for such an “answer” (non-nuclear BSU), then points 1-3 are unlikely to happen.
    So non-nuclear ICBMs are more like ceremonial weapons. Not for war, but for “adherence to the protocol” in controversial international situations. And many such missiles are not required. IMHO, a dozen pieces are enough for the eyes.
  8. Operator 9 August 2019 09: 46 New
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    Quote: Pushkowed
    a huge range is simply required from the rocket (more than 30000 km, despite the fact that the "passport" range of "Sarmatian" is no more than 20000 km)

    On our globe, there are no distances greater than 20000 km.
    1. Pushkowed 9 August 2019 09: 49 New
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      Around the world along the meridian - more than 40000 km.
      1. Sancho_SP 9 August 2019 10: 22 New
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        Is it that you want to shoot yourself so extravagantly? ;)
  9. Rus_Balt 9 August 2019 10: 29 New
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    The US and the EU completely abandoned the cargo space services of the Russian Federation. The entire volume went to Space-X Ilona Mask. This will allow us to concentrate all our efforts on solving strategic tasks in the defense sphere. Previously, the forces of the domestic military-industrial complex were “distracted” to solve the problems of the commercial delivery of goods into space, which was detrimental to the solution of strategic tasks in the defense sphere.
  10. Prutkov 9 August 2019 12: 13 New
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    The effectiveness of such conventional weapons based on ICBMs is doubtful. It can be assumed that, according to the area of ​​destruction by tungsten pins, one warhead will correspond to the strike of the BM-21 division. But the price of such ammunition with ICBMs will be sky-high. And the efficiency is so-so. "Grad", like tungsten pins, is effective against an enemy located in an open area. If the equipment and l / s are in a shelter, then the effectiveness of the lesion decreases significantly. If the column moves, then in 15-30 minutes of the ICBM flight, the target can leave the affected area. In general - shooting from a cannon at sparrows. So the idea of ​​"lightning fast to punish the bad guy" is not working. Now, consider the use of conventional ammunition for stationary objects with conventional non-nuclear warheads. It's still easier. For a rough look, you can take a warhead equivalent in power to the Tomahawk warhead. It’s not even necessary to count something, because there are a sufficient number of examples of the use of Tomahawk-type missiles. So, to inflict more or less sensitive damage in Syria, it took at least a hundred Tomahawk missiles. Therefore, to “punish” a small country, you will need at least a dozen ICBMs with conventional warheads. In any case, a volley of such conventional ICBMs will cause neighboring countries not just questions, but an immediate response. And then prove in the absence of any agreements that "they didn’t shoot there and the nuclear warheads weren’t." Moreover, modern gentlemen do not believe not just a word, their signatures under the agreements cost little.
  11. BAI
    BAI 9 August 2019 12: 52 New
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    countries that are rather unfriendly towards Russia, which, having a relatively small military potential, but using a remote geographical position, can harm the interests of the Russian Federation with impunity.

    For instance? Who can damage Russia with impunity by military means? I hope the author does not mean Israel? Then the singular should be used.
  12. gregor6549 9 August 2019 16: 33 New
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    People, you read the article and numerous comments and you begin to feel like a driver in front of a traffic sign on which two eggs are depicted. You get lost at once, but then you realize that this sign merely means that the road ahead is forked. So it is here. An article seems to indicate a new approach to the creation and use of non-nuclear strategic forces, but then you recall that all this already happened. It began with theory (the Douai doctrine) and continued in practice (massive aerial bombardments of cities in Great Britain, Germany, the USSR, Japan, etc.), and although the damage from these bombings was sometimes comparable to the damage that atomic bombings could inflict, they would ensure victory for anyone on their own failed. Therefore, it is hoped that the same bombardment with conventional weapons, even the most advanced ones, is just another illusion. As long as the foot of a soldier of the opposing armed forces does not set foot on the enemy’s land, there can be no question of victory. Not to mention the "tricks" that were offered in huge numbers and which are designed to ensure that the probable opponent has everything, like one eared one who can hang noodles on his ears, and they will only clap their eyes and smile blissfully. At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that to a probable adversary all of these tactics become known even at the stage of their discussion, and when they become operational, the adversary already has quite effective technical and undercover intelligence tools for their detection and tracking. For example, for the exploration of the BZHRK, a whole system of technical means was developed that allows remotely (from satellites, aircraft, etc.) to detect and identify the BZHRK among other railway trains and also make individual "portraits" of these BZHRK in different wavelengths. What will happen to these BZHRK in case of war is clear in my opinion.
    1. ccsr 9 August 2019 20: 56 New
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      Quote: gregor6549
      As long as the foot of a soldier of the opposing armed forces does not set foot on the enemy’s land, there can be no question of victory.

      This is not so long ago - the example of Yugoslavia clearly showed that the NATO soldiers did not enter this country, but it ceased to exist during the hostilities.
  13. toha124 9 August 2019 18: 10 New
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    I don’t know how Russia and the USA exchange data before the strategic forces exercises and whether they exchange at all ...
    But what comes out of it, in order to actually use one of the converted ICBMs - will it be necessary to warn the Americans? But how should they respond to the launch? Especially not single.
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 23 New
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      Quote: toha124
      I don’t know how Russia and the USA exchange data before the strategic forces exercises and whether they exchange at all ...
      But what comes out of it, in order to actually use one of the converted ICBMs - will it be necessary to warn the Americans? But how should they respond to the launch? Especially not single.


      I think that we and the USA may be interested in such weapons, moreover, it is the USA that is promoting it (the idea of ​​BSU comes from them). Therefore, it is quite possible to agree on a safe application. For example, to concentrate ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads at specific sites that mutually inspect for the non-deployment of nuclear warheads there. Those. in the event of an ICBM launch from there, the opponent will already know that there is no nuclear weapons there. Well, other ways to resolve the issue.
  14. Sasha_rulevoy 9 August 2019 19: 05 New
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    bring down the enemy to xnumx cruise missiles


    640 tons of explosives. Those. about a raid of three regiments of the B-29. One military plant may be enough. Taking into account the greater accuracy of guidance and concrete-piercing warheads (which, by the way, are absent on Caliber), we multiply by four. Four factories or the same number of naval bases or air bases. Or one plant, one naval base, one air base, several warehouses. Of course, the result is serious, but even Turkey and Poland are still far from a complete victory.

    For reference: the production of Caliber rockets is approximately 100 pieces per year. Those. to strike Turkey, which will destroy from the force 20% of its combat potential, it is necessary to accumulate weapons of 16 years.
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 29 New
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      Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
      bring down the enemy to xnumx cruise missiles


      640 tons of explosives. Those. about a raid of three regiments of the B-29. One military plant may be enough. Taking into account the greater accuracy of guidance and concrete-piercing warheads (which, by the way, are absent on Caliber), we multiply by four. Four factories or the same number of naval bases or air bases. Or one plant, one naval base, one air base, several warehouses. Of course, the result is serious, but even Turkey and Poland are still far from a complete victory.

      For reference: the production of Caliber rockets is approximately 100 pieces per year. Those. to strike Turkey, which will destroy from the force 20% of its combat potential, it is necessary to accumulate weapons of 16 years.


      No, well, if you make them uncontrollable, then you can draw an analogy. And if you take targets at bases and airfields? 1600 KR against 50 ships and 300 aircraft, many of them will cease to exist. Weaken the enemy in 1,5-2-2,5 times?

      Concerning the 100 Caliber - this is a question of setting the problem, as for me. It will be necessary, the series will be increased. If the issue is doubled, then this is not 16 but 8 years, triple - 5 years, and this is not so much time. And this is not specifically against Turkey, it is against any targets in the radius.
  15. Old26 9 August 2019 21: 39 New
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    ICBM R-36M "Satan", UR-100N UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2PM "Topol"

    In the first photograph, not specifically the R-36M Satan, but the R-36M UTTX. Although NATO has the same code "Satan." On the right photo is not RT-2PM Topol, but RT-2PM1 / 2 Topol-M or Yars in general. Outwardly, they are not distinguishable

    The most preferred solution is to develop a universal combat unit (if technically feasible), which can be installed on various types of media: P-36М "Satan", UR-100Н UTTH "Stiletto", RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 " Yars ”, that is, ICBMs withdrawn or close to withdrawal from the Strategic Missile Forces.

    This is called throwing money away. Moreover, the P-36M missile has long been decommissioned, the UR-100N UTTX is practically the same. They want to deploy a dozen with Vanguard, but that's all the supplies. RT-2ПМ "Topol" are written off due to the inability to extend their useful life. To develop a block for a rocket that can stand on an 3-5 database for years is stupid. Only Yars remains, but they will need to replace Topol-M in the near future, so there are no reserves for this

    Another promising option for a non-nuclear warhead is the creation of a conventional version of the Avangard hypersonic product. The flight path features of this unit reduce the likelihood of its detection by the enemy radar, which, combined with the ability to correct the flight path, complicates the determination of the target’s final coordinates and makes it difficult to counter the attack. The Avangard block is planned to be placed on thirty-two ICBM UR-100N UTTKh Stillet received for debts from Ukraine. A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data.

    Yes, the development of a promising non-nuclear block in the framework of the Avangard product is quite possible. Here are just a common misconception that its flight path reduces the likelihood of its detection, where did it come from? The range of the US SPRN radars is approximately 6000 km. And how does its flight path make it difficult to detect? If he begins to maneuver at the initial stage of the trajectory, he will leave the zone of location of false targets. And instead of hiding among false goals, he will on the contrary designate himself.
    The ability to adjust the trajectory can make it difficult to determine the final coordinates of the target. but do not think that at the speeds of entry into the upper atmosphere in the 25-27М he is able to make "evolutions" comparable to those that a fighter performs, performing aerobatics. In-1 engines can not have a large supply of fuel for such evolutions, in-2 trivial overload can fall apart

    The Avangard block is planned to be placed on TWELVE modernized missiles UR-100N UTTH. The network even met the index of this ICBM - 15A71 instead of 15A35, like the UR-100N UTTX. The fact that we were given 15 “dry” UR-32N UTX almost 100 years ago does not mean at all that they all remained intact. They were sometimes replaced by rockets shot during UBP, and used as test ones. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense announced the deployment TWO regiments consisting of 12 launchers in the position area of ​​the 13 taxiway.
    And where did 10 “Vanguards” come from on one “hundredth of OU” ??? If during the test one “Vanguard” got into it, And not because of the weight, but because of the dimensions?

    Of the positive aspects, one can note a study by the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which states that START III conditions make it possible to deploy ICBMs in non-nuclear equipment without any restrictions. In particular, a launcher (launcher) in an unprotected position does not fall into either the deployed or undeployed categories, and therefore such launchers do not fall under the established ceiling of armaments. If there will be ICBMs in such launchers, then such ICBMs will be considered as non-deployed, and therefore neither the number of ICBMs in unprotected launchers nor the number of warheads on them can be limited. Considering the fact that strategic conventional weapons are first-strike weapons, the requirements for their combat stability are obviously lower than for ICBMs for launching a reciprocal-return nuclear strike, so placing ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads in unprotected positions can be considered justified.

    Yes, such an option is provided, but the verification mechanism is not defined. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will not react in any way if 3-4 ICBMs are launched simultaneously from the same California. They will not be informed in advance about the test ones, and no one will know whether the ICBMs with nuclear or conventional ones took off.
    And the whole concept of a quick global strike is designed primarily for third world countries. But you have to agree in the end with Russia

    Given the withdrawal of the United States and the Russian Federation from the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the second element of strategic conventional weapons may be long-range cruise missiles (CR), placed on mobile carriers. In this direction, the greatest interest is the possibility of placing CR in containers, similar to how it was implemented in the Club-K complex with Caliber cruise missiles.

    What is the point of such missiles? In order for them to cover the territory of Europe they must be placed in the border areas. But the question arises, why are they needed. NATO countries, with the exception of the Baltic states, have a pretty decent air defense system to shoot down subsonic missiles. Maybe not all, but they can very well decimate such a volley

    Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

    Well, first of all, radars were located in separate control containers. Why are they needed when launching the CRBD? I do not quite understand. Then, introducing flight missions into 1 missiles is also not a matter of 80-1 minutes. But the train is moving, which means that at every moment in time you have to recalculate the PP
    Further, well, you are very dreamy, Anedrey. The Soviet Union planned to deploy 7 divisions, deployed 4 as part of 12 formations. And you are going to deploy 10 systems right away with 1200 Caliber. Now, on average, a little more than 100 Caliber is being released per year. It will take almost 12 years to accumulate one ammunition only for the BZHRK. It is fantastic

    It is certainly easy to draw the reach zones of the Kyrgyz Republic, except for the fact that the entire territory through which they will go in the west will be saturated with air defense systems for various purposes.

    When deploying the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic

    China and both Koreas are for sure. about Japan - there are doubts. The current 3M14 Gauges coordinate their location on an electronic map (correction area). Almost 900 km, that is, an hour's journey, will have to go over the water of the Kyrgyz Republic. even the best gyroscopes have the ability to accumulate errors and it is possible that in Japan the missile may not fall into the correction area.
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 50 New
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      Thank you for the detailed comments!

      Quote: Old26
      This is called throwing money away. Moreover, the P-36M missile has long been decommissioned, the UR-100N UTTX is practically the same. They want to deploy a dozen with Vanguard, but that's all the supplies. RT-2ПМ "Topol" are written off due to the inability to extend their useful life. To develop a block for a rocket that can stand on an 3-5 database for years is stupid. Only Yars remains, but they will need to replace Topol-M in the near future, so there are no reserves for this


      Since I do not have information about the technical condition and potential service life of specific products, they are all presented without decoding the modifications. In fact, according to the results of a detailed study, it is necessary to choose the best ICBMs for this task. Perhaps it will be only Liners and Sineva, maybe Yars ...

      Quote: Old26
      Yes, the development of a promising non-nuclear block in the framework of the Avangard product is quite possible. Here are just a common misconception that its flight path reduces the likelihood of its detection, where did it come from? The range of the US SPRN radars is approximately 6000 km. And how does its flight path make it difficult to detect? If he begins to maneuver at the initial stage of the trajectory, he will leave the zone of location of false targets. And instead of hiding among false goals, he will on the contrary designate himself.
      The ability to adjust the trajectory can make it difficult to determine the final coordinates of the target. but do not think that at the speeds of entry into the upper atmosphere in the 25-27М he is able to make "evolutions" comparable to those that a fighter performs, performing aerobatics. In-1 engines can not have a large supply of fuel for such evolutions, in-2 trivial overload can fall apart


      I agree on the trajectory. He will not deceive American SPRN radars, but, as I have already said, the USA is not the target for SCS. And I doubt that he flies with false targets, if flying in the atmosphere, even in the upper layers, he will “blow them away”.

      Quote: Old26
      The Avangard block is planned to be placed on TWELVE modernized missiles UR-100N UTTH. The network even met the index of this ICBM - 15A71 instead of 15A35, like the UR-100N UTTX. The fact that we were given 15 “dry” UR-32N UTX almost 100 years ago does not mean at all that they all remained intact. They were sometimes replaced by rockets shot during UBP, and used as test ones. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense announced the deployment TWO regiments consisting of 12 launchers in the position area of ​​the 13 taxiway.
      And where did 10 “Vanguards” come from on one “hundredth of OU” ??? If during the test one “Vanguard” got into it, And not because of the weight, but because of the dimensions?


      No, not 10 Vanguards on the 1-th hundredth, one by one. If you are right, and all UR-100 10 pcs., Then this can be done only if the Vanguard is moved to Sarmat.

      Quote: Old26
      Yes, such an option is provided, but the verification mechanism is not defined. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia will not react in any way if 3-4 ICBMs are launched simultaneously from the same California. They will not be informed in advance about the test ones, and no one will know whether the ICBMs with nuclear or conventional ones took off.
      And the whole concept of a quick global strike is designed primarily for third world countries. But you have to agree in the end with Russia


      I agree, but I am sure that the United States will want to talk about this issue, the idea of ​​BSU comes from them.

      Quote: Old26
      What is the point of such missiles? In order for them to cover the territory of Europe they must be placed in the border areas. But the question arises, why are they needed. NATO countries, with the exception of the Baltic states, have a pretty decent air defense system to shoot down subsonic missiles. Maybe not all, but they can very well decimate such a volley


      Honestly, I doubt it. If there are no balloons from the radar or the constant alert of the AWACS aircraft in the air, then the air defense positions can be circumvented using the range reserve of the Kyrgyz Republic. I am impressed by the enormous load capacity of the BZHRK KR, the secrecy in the mass of other trains, and the potentially lowest cost of carrier, less than an airplane, ship, car. At the same time, huge mobility throughout the country.

      Quote: Old26
      Well, in 1, radars were located in separate control containers. Why are they needed when launching the CRBD? I do not quite understand.


      It is possible for firing anti-ship missiles of the same size.

      Quote: Old26
      Then, introducing flight missions into the 80 missiles is also not a matter of 1-2 minutes. But the train is moving, which means that at every moment in time you have to recalculate the PP


      No, should be standing during the shooting. Previously, the Tomahawk was programmed for a day, now the data input speed is likely to be increased, this would be logical.

      Quote: Old26
      Further, well, you are very dreamy, Anedrey. The Soviet Union planned to deploy 7 divisions, deployed 4 as part of 12 formations. And you are going to deploy 10 systems right away with 1200 Caliber. Now, on average, a little more than 100 Caliber is being released per year. It will take almost 12 years to accumulate one ammunition only for the BZHRK. It is fantastic


      I think it’s quite realistic to double-triple the production of a used product, there would be political will. And those Soviet BZHRK was a completely new, complex product, and in these very big unification - a car + container + 4 missiles. I repeat, PMSM BZHRK is better than producing RTOs with eight missiles.

      Quote: Old26
      It is certainly easy to draw the reach zones of the Kyrgyz Republic, except for the fact that the entire territory through which they will go in the west will be saturated with air defense systems for various purposes.


      Of course, the zones shown are maximum, in fact they will be reduced. But here a lot of questions arise about specific air defense, EPR KR, etc.

      Quote: Old26
      When deploying the BZHRK at the extreme points of the eastern part of the Russian Federation, China, Japan, and both Korea will be in the affected area of ​​the Kyrgyz Republic

      China and both Koreas are for sure. about Japan - there are doubts. The current 3M14 Gauges coordinate their location on an electronic map (correction area). Almost 900 km, that is, an hour's journey, will have to go over the water of the Kyrgyz Republic. even the best gyroscopes have the ability to accumulate errors and it is possible that in Japan the missile may not fall into the correction area.


      There is also a Glonass correction, otherwise why put them on ships?

  16. Local from the Volga 9 August 2019 21: 40 New
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    As soon as this miraculous ballistic cracker leaves its place in the direction of a nuclear power, there will immediately be a retaliatory strike from the nuclear warhead!
    For everyone else, a stupidly expensive and other means car and a small cart! The question is, why? Is there a lot of money?
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 54 New
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      Quote: Local from the Volga
      As soon as this miraculous ballistic cracker leaves its place in the direction of a nuclear power, there will immediately be a retaliatory strike from the nuclear warhead!
      For everyone else, a stupidly expensive and other means car and a small cart! The question is, why? Is there a lot of money?


      Nuclear powers are not considered targets, well, it’s written several times (

      The issue of price is the criterion of cost / effectiveness, moreover, it can be considered in different ways:

      Missile for 100 000 shoots down aircraft for 1000 000 is it effective?
      A rocket behind 100 000 knocks a rocket behind 50 000, but doesn’t allow to hit a protected object behind 1000 000 000, effectively?

      It is clear that there are questions for the second example, but Israel and the United States are ready to shoot down cheaper ammunition with more expensive missile defense systems, compensating for the cost / effectiveness shortcomings with the power of their economy, but protecting their territory as much as possible.
  17. Old26 9 August 2019 21: 40 New
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    I will continue

    Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

    Your statement, Andrey, why conventional weapons should be first-strike weapons is not entirely clear. In principle, as I wrote the origins of the development of the BSU concept, there was an unsuccessful use of the Tomahawks in the camp where Bin Laden was located. But since the “axes” went to the goal for a couple of hours, he managed to leave. That's when they thought about the option when the blow is delivered in 0,5-1 hour. But it’s stupid to think that this is the weapon of the first strike against countries such as Russia or China. None of the Chinese and Chinese systems have been canceled. And the launch of several missiles, and even more than a dozen or two, will cause an instant reaction. If after a single start they could still use the "hot line", then when the 2-3 dozen starts, the answer goes without any phone calls there. Therefore, I repeat. Conventional strategic weapons can be used exclusively against third world countries when it is necessary to quickly and exponentially punish, but not use nuclear weapons. Moreover, these launches must be coordinated with the same Moscow and Beijing, so that they do not take these launches as an attack against them

    SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"

    Well, firstly, more than a hundred, if we are only talking about “Caliber”. A maximum of 8 KR, but most likely 7 (that is, from 112 to 128 calibres), can be entered in the inner diameter of the shaft. "Onyx" in the mine from the "Bulava" will fit no more than 4, and therefore such missiles on the boat can be 64. Nothing can be said about Zircon. We do not know its dimensions. And is it really necessary to put a picture of the American X-51 instead of "Zircon"
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 57 New
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      Quote: Old26
      I will continue

      Since strategic conventional forces should be used as first-strike weapons, the obsolete characteristics of the 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs will not have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the combat use of this type of weapon.

      Your statement, Andrey, why conventional weapons should be first-strike weapons is not entirely clear. In principle, as I wrote the origins of the development of the BSU concept, there was an unsuccessful use of the Tomahawks in the camp where Bin Laden was located. But since the “axes” went to the goal for a couple of hours, he managed to leave. That's when they thought about the option when the blow is delivered in 0,5-1 hour. But it’s stupid to think that this is the weapon of the first strike against countries such as Russia or China. None of the Chinese and Chinese systems have been canceled. And the launch of several missiles, and even more than a dozen or two, will cause an instant reaction. If after a single start they could still use the "hot line", then when the 2-3 dozen starts, the answer goes without any phone calls there. Therefore, I repeat. Conventional strategic weapons can be used exclusively against third world countries when it is necessary to quickly and exponentially punish, but not use nuclear weapons. Moreover, these launches must be coordinated with the same Moscow and Beijing, so that they do not take these launches as an attack against them


      Everything is so, in the article about it there is:

      Legal and organizational issues

      The combat use of strategic conventional forces in some cases, for example, when launching ICBMs with non-nuclear equipment, will require responsible interaction with “partners”, primarily the United States, to eliminate the risk of a full-scale nuclear war.

      Given the US interest in developing a similar class of weapons, in future START treaties they can be moved to a separate class so that both countries do not reduce their nuclear deterrence potential, this is of course if the START treaties do not become a history following the medium-range missile treaty and a shorter range (INF Treaty) or a missile defense treaty (ABM).


      Quote: Old26
      SSBN "Borey-K" will be able to carry about a hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type "Caliber", "Onyx" ("Yakhont"), "Zircon"

      Well, firstly, more than a hundred, if we are only talking about “Caliber”. A maximum of 8 KR, but most likely 7 (that is, from 112 to 128 calibres), can be entered in the inner diameter of the shaft. "Onyx" in the mine from the "Bulava" will fit no more than 4, and therefore such missiles on the boat can be 64. Nothing can be said about Zircon. We do not know its dimensions. And is it really necessary to put a picture of the American X-51 instead of "Zircon"


      I sincerely hope that there will be more of them, which is why I wrote - “of the order of one hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type“ Caliber ”,“ Onyx ”(“ Yakhont ”),“ Zircon ”.
  18. Old26 9 August 2019 21: 41 New
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    I will continue

    With the Air Force, everything is much simpler. As mentioned in the previous article, strategic aviation is the most useless component of strategic nuclear forces (SNF), since it is extremely vulnerable to a first strike. All thoughts about the possibility of re-targeting in flight, cancellation of striking do not stand up to criticism, because in an emergency situation will develop much faster than aviation can react, in order to exert political pressure it does not matter what is on board the bomber, especially since they don’t fly on such tasks with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the capabilities of strategic aviation in terms of delivering massive strikes with conventional weapons are unique. No other type of armed force can compare with them in the possibility of promptly delivering concentrated strikes at a great distance, at least until they are adopted by ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

    The Air Force is the same active component of the triad as everything else. And you can retarget them, and return them to the base if, on the other hand, there was an unauthorized launch. But the rocket can not be returned. The fact that now strategists do not fly with nuclear weapons on board does not mean at all that right before the time “H” such flights will not be carried out with nuclear weapons on board
    And I repeat, Andrey, once again. There will be no mass use of conventional weapons by strategists (boats, airplanes, ground complexes). The number of such launchers will be strictly limited to 2-3 by dozens, if they come to this

    One of the most important elements of the strategic conventional forces should be the supersonic bombers Tu-160M2 with hypersonic dagger missiles. The possibility and necessity of adapting the Tu-160M2 under the “Dagger” missiles was discussed in detail in the article “Hypersonic“ Dagger ”on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction? ” The combination of the supersonic cruising flight speed of the Tu-160M2, which is 1,5M and the high-speed characteristics of the Dagger, will make it possible to strike swiftly at the enemy. The radius of action of the Tu-160M2 at supersonic speed is 2000 kilometers without refueling, which, combined with the flight range of the Dagger rocket, which is about 1000 kilometers, will make it possible to strike at targets located 3000 kilometers from the airfield. Given the indicated speed and range of flight of the carrier and ammunition, the total time for striking a target will be less than half an hour, without taking into account preparation for departure ..

    All this can be considered when reducing the number of Yao on each side to 3-4 hundreds of warheads. Then it makes sense to replace certain means with conventional weapons. But to put on the strategist "Dagger" to solve the tasks of anti-ship defense, to put it mildly, is quite inadequate. I would, for example, “Daggers” placed on the TU-95. This would give both a "long arm" and the possibility of barrage in the air with some decrease in the flight range of a hypersonic missile itself

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - thirty ICBMs of the R-36M "Satan" type, RT-2ПМ "Topol", RS-24 "Yars" with three (on average) non-nuclear warheads each;

    Except that the P-36M is no longer in service, and the Topol is capable of carrying only one warhead. That is, the number 30 say so sucked from the finger

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - ten ICBM UR-100Н UTTH “Stiletto” with a hypersonic maneuvering non-nuclear block based on the Avangard product ”

    The number of missiles with Nuclear Aangard is 12. Where are you going to collect another dozen ICBMs UR-100Н UTX with a non-nuclear Vanguard, which does not yet exist. And when even nuclear missiles appear, the Vanguard will have to be scrapped ...

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - ten BZHRK with forty wagons and a total ammunition load of 160 KR "Caliber" in each BZHRK;

    The number of BZHRK even from ICBMs until 2027 year will be calculated BIG AND ABSOLUTE ZERO. And maybe after the 2027 year. you dream to have at least 10 regiments, and even in 40 cars ... And why, by the way, not in 50-60 ??

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;

    Well, this is more or less real, except for the lack of a non-nuclear block for the Liner. And why, by the way, not for the "Leader" ??

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - four Borey-K submarines and / or 949AM submarines with the 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine;
    .

    "Little, still want, little ..."
    It plans only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have their 4. Maybe you should cut the sturgeon in half?

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

    The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
    In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555

    General composition of strategic conventional forces

    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

    Okay, suppose a miracle happens and we build 50 TU-160M2, years after 12. Suppose each one contains 12 X-101 missiles. Well, where did you get the idea that 6-8 "Daggers" will fit into it. the dimensions of the bomb bay are known, I'm afraid more than one “Dagger” will not fit in the bomb bay, especially on the rotary launcher. Total two daggers. And you are going to place 4-6 on the external sling and are sure that at the same time it will reach speed in 1,2М

    Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

    Thus, the number of blocks must be reviewed taking into account the comments made.

    Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 10: 20 New
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      Quote: Old26
      I will continue

      The Air Force is the same active component of the triad as everything else. And you can retarget them, and return them to the base if, on the other hand, there was an unauthorized launch. But the rocket can not be returned. The fact that now strategists do not fly with nuclear weapons on board does not mean at all that right before the time “H” such flights will not be carried out with nuclear weapons on board


      Let’s say an unauthorized launch was detected, how quickly will the aircraft refuel, arm the nuclear weapons, and fly into the air? PMSM by this time or it will all end, or nothing will start. The only way to secure missile-carrying bombers is by air watch, but it is monstrously expensive due to the consumption of their resource and fuel, and the limitation of warheads on the number of takeoffs and landings.

      Quote: Old26
      And I repeat, Andrey, once again. There will be no mass use of conventional weapons by strategists (boats, airplanes, ground complexes). The number of such launchers will be strictly limited to 2-3 by dozens, if they come to this


      It was already, if we talk about the Kyrgyz Republic. If about the ICBMs, then there are questions, but as I wrote somewhere in the comments, one of the solutions is to place them in special zones, under the supervision of observers of interested parties - the United States, China, so that launch from this zone is not considered as the beginning of a global conflict + other mechanisms.

      Quote: Old26
      All this can be considered when reducing the number of Yao on each side to 3-4 hundreds of warheads. Then it makes sense to replace certain means with conventional weapons. But to put on the strategist "Dagger" to solve the tasks of anti-ship defense, to put it mildly, is quite inadequate. I would, for example, “Daggers” placed on the TU-95. This would give both a "long arm" and the possibility of barrage in the air with some decrease in the flight range of a hypersonic missile itself


      As I said, I generally have doubts about their expediency in a nuclear war, but they have no equal to solve the problems of a conventional war.

      As for the Tu-95, I’m not sure, maybe the Dagger needs some minimum speed to get to the “mode”. But if possible, then I am only FOR.

      Quote: Old26
      Except that the P-36M is no longer in service, and the Topol is capable of carrying only one warhead. That is, the number 30 say so sucked from the finger
      ...
      The number of missiles with Nuclear Aangard is 12. Where are you going to collect another dozen ICBMs UR-100Н UTX with a non-nuclear Vanguard, which does not yet exist. And when even nuclear missiles appear, the Vanguard will have to be scrapped ...


      I can not argue, but otherwise, I rely only on open sources.

      Quote: Old26
      The number of BZHRK even from ICBMs until 2027 year will be calculated BIG AND ABSOLUTE ZERO. And maybe after the 2027 year. you dream to have at least 10 regiments, and even in 40 cars ... And why, by the way, not in 50-60 ??


      Everything is possible, it is possible that something else will not happen, the Husky nuclear submarine or EM Leader, or Almaty - the economy will collapse, for example, but a little optimism will not hurt. Repeatingly, BZHRK with KR is the simplest percussion device. No shipyards, airbases are needed - only standard containers, standard railway cars and standard rockets. Technical risk is close to zero.

      40 wagons - the average figure, maybe more. It seems there were trains of 500-700 cars. It is necessary to build on something.

      Quote: Old26
      General composition of strategic conventional forces
      Presumably, SCS may include:
      - thirty-two ICBMs based on the R-29РМУ2.1 "Liner" missile, with three non-nuclear warheads each, on the 667BDRM "Dolphin" SSBN;

      Well, this is more or less real, except for the lack of a non-nuclear block for the Liner. And why, by the way, not for the "Leader" ??


      Somehow it passed me, do not explain what kind of Leader? The next modification?


      Quote: Old26
      General composition of strategic conventional forces
      Presumably, SCS may include:
      - four Borey-K SSBNs and / or 949AM SSBNs with 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine; .

      "Little, still want, little ..."
      It plans only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have their 4. Maybe you should cut the sturgeon in half?


      So now there will be 4 "loaves" of 949AM with 72 KP on each.

      Quote: Old26
      General composition of strategic conventional forces
      Presumably, SCS may include:
      - Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

      The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
      In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555


      It is possible that with X-555, it doesn’t matter to me, the information is different, they write what will be on them X-101, then no.


      Quote: Old26
      General composition of strategic conventional forces
      Presumably, SCS may include:
      - fifty Tu-160М2 supersonic missile bombers (when building a full-fledged series of fifty vehicles, we believe that sixteen T-160s in service are exhausted by the time the series is completed) with twelve X-101 missiles on each or with six to eight hypersonic aeroballistic missiles "Dagger".

      Okay, suppose a miracle happens and we build 50 TU-160M2, years after 12. Suppose each one contains 12 X-101 missiles. Well, where did you get the idea that 6-8 "Daggers" will fit into it. the dimensions of the bomb bay are known, I'm afraid more than one “Dagger” will not fit in the bomb bay, especially on the rotary launcher. Total two daggers. And you are going to place 4-6 on the external sling and are sure that at the same time it will reach speed in 1,2М


      I wrote about this separate material Hypersonic "Dagger" on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction?
      - https://topwar.ru/153987-giperzvukovoj-kinzhal-na-tu-160-realnost-ili-vymysel.html

      I thought about the size of the compartment, 3-4 pieces should enter the compartment, respectively, 6-8 in two. There should not be anything on the outside. It seems that in the comments the people discussed this possibility.

      Regarding speed - there are speed / range flight profiles, but I could not find it depending on the load. It is possible that the sturgeon will have to be cut. The trick is that the Tu-160 is faster and more load-bearing anyway, there is nothing, the inevitable will not be in the near future.

      About 50 pcs., What can I say, let's say I believe the president and the government ...


      Quote: Old26
      Thus, a one-time strike by strategic conventional forces can range from 2864 to 3276 non-nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and aeroballistic missiles.

      Thus, the number of blocks must be reviewed taking into account the comments made.


      Of course, the figure is very rough.

      Quote: Old26
      Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs


      Circles are not mine, honestly taken from the network. It is clear that at maximum range they will not catch up. But then how else to draw, a range indicating the probability of interception? Yes, and the US is constantly upgrading blocks.

      Thanks again for the informative comments.
  19. Nikolai 9 August 2019 21: 54 New
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    States have global plans. And we are against whom? Somalia? Carriers you offer are extremely expensive, there is no economic feasibility. And then, your idea is not new. The termination of the INF Treaty and, as a result, the launch of the production of CIMD missiles for land mobile carriers, the program for the construction of submarines and small missile ships with Caliber (have the ability to move around inland waters), a dagger on air carriers. This technique allows you to quickly concentrate on the direction of impact. Here is the existing solution and answer. Gauges in containers on barges on the Volga and on railway platforms are also not new. "Everything is taken into account by the mighty hurricane."
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 19 New
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      Quote: Nikolai Aleksandrovich
      States have global plans. And we are against whom? Somalia? Carriers you offer are extremely expensive, there is no economic feasibility. And then, your idea is not new. The termination of the INF Treaty and, as a result, the launch of the production of CIMD missiles for land mobile carriers, the program for the construction of submarines and small missile ships with Caliber (have the ability to move around inland waters), a dagger on air carriers. This technique allows you to quickly concentrate on the direction of impact. Here is the existing solution and answer. Gauges in containers on barges on the Volga and on railway platforms are also not new. "Everything is taken into account by the mighty hurricane."


      I do not claim absolute novelty. SCS goals and objectives indicated at the end of the article. PMSM for the Kyrgyz BZHRK is the easiest and cheapest way to maneuver firepower.

      And as for the global plans - then we must generally sit quietly, not climb into Syria, Venezuela. And if we climb, then we need appropriate tools.
      1. Nikolai 10 August 2019 15: 16 New
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        No tools for Syria? In any case, the infantry wins the war. Global instruments need global intelligence. She is? First, intelligence, then everything else.
  20. The comment was deleted.
    1. Shopping Mall 10 August 2019 09: 16 New
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      Quote: ffaff
      THE AUTHOR OF THIS NON-MITROPHANES IS CLINICAL ...!
      I EXPLAIN THE ELEMENTARY:
      It's a shame to read such nonsense!


      As it is interesting to discuss with normal and educated people, it is just as unpleasant to read the ravings of people with low intelligence and obvious nervous disorders (which is usually indicated by the abundant use of CAPITAL letters in the text. Obviously, due to the characteristics of the nervous system, they are overexcited at the sight of or topics, and then read it and comprehend the whole force they no longer have, and they write comments on what was not there.

      Now on the points:

      Quote: ffaff
      1. The "non-nuclear equipment" of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is:
      - Suicidal STUPIDness - since the Adversary cannot know that it is NOT nuclear - but non-nuclear warheads - and he will definitely answer NUCLEAR ONLY!
      - Financial NONSENSE is like firing GOLD ammo ....
      just imagine:
      - The US President is told: "The Russian ICBMs started!"
      - President: "Destroy Russia!"
      - "What if there is non-nuclear equipment?"
      - President: "Do we know how to know ...?"
      It’s like sending a gun with a rubber cartridge to the enemy - and then wondering “Why did he shoot you?”


      And somewhere about the United States as a goal something said? Goals and objectives are clearly indicated.

      Quote: ffaff
      2. “The concept of the“ Quick Global Strike ”- supposedly launching 3500-4000 cruise missiles to destroy Russia's nuclear potential - is only taken seriously ...!
      PRESENT:
      Report to the Russian President: "HUNDREDS of HUNDRED cruise missiles fly, what should we do?" President: "Do nothing, wait a few hours - until they destroy the country's nuclear potential!"
      Ha Ha Ha!
      It is IMPOSSIBLE to hide the launch of the Kyrgyz Republic - there is a huge number of space and ground-based over-the-horizon tracking systems - and with the mass launch of the Kyrgyz Republic - we will destroy the USA in half an hour (!)!
      By the way - KR - SUB-SOUND (they call them “fast” only - they fly for several hours), and the USA WILL NOT EXIST - and American cruise missiles will still fly to our (ALREADY EMPTY) launchers!


      About this, too, was not a word, idiot.

      Quote: ffaff
      3. "Railroad missiles" - this is unnecessary, expensive and dangerous STUPIDness!
      Which will simply beckon spies and saboteurs to the railways - with tragic consequences for cargo, passengers, and railroad infrastructure. There is NOTHING to do anything for spies and saboteurs in the missile regiment (behind two high fences under voltage of over a thousand volts!), And the rocket men themselves are all trained professionals dedicated to the Service (and even under round-the-clock control of the Specialists).
      And on thousands of kilometers of railroads, it’s EASY to lay explosives — by filling up the train with missiles — and it’s EASY to recruit an “informant” among tens of thousands of steam locomotives (often even semi-literate drunks).
      In Russian Railways, a huge number of all switchmen, technicians, minders and other small fry - which is ALWAYS on the course of all movements and easily WATCHES for a bottle of vodka!
      And in general - to "mask" the weapon of attack among passengers, women and children - this is the method of TERRORISTS AND SCAMS .... !


      Obviously, the early autumn weather that came this year causes specific processes in the heads of some of the population ...
  21. Zaurbek 10 August 2019 11: 20 New
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    Good article!
    A completely justifiable solution would be to place ten Avangard blocks in non-nuclear equipment on ICBM data. for GP shells has such guidance accuracy been achieved?
  22. Zaurbek 10 August 2019 11: 28 New
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    Using containers as part of one BZHRK will simplify and cheapen the design of Club-K complexes by placing a control / guidance point in only one / two containers. Such a complex will no longer fall under the effect of any international treaties. Ten complexes of forty wagons can bring down to the enemy up to 1600 cruise missiles at a range of about 3000-4000 km or more, for promising missiles.

    Given our territory with good air defense and aviation ... and the presence of neighbors such as the EU, Turkey, China, Japan ..... this is the best choice. In a short time, you can transfer a lot of Kyrgyzstan to the right part of the country. And quite stealthily.
  23. Old26 10 August 2019 15: 28 New
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    Quote: AVM
    There is also a Glonass correction, otherwise why put them on ships?

    There is of course. But krsmicheskaya navigation system is one of the subsystems for determining its location. For greater accuracy, there should be several such subsystems. And given the non-nuclear nature of warheads - this becomes mandatory. It’s one thing when a 100-200 kt warhead misses a hundred or two meters and quite another when a conventional BG 200-400 kg misses the same 200 meters. It can and will ruin an apartment building even having missed such a distance (but not a fact), but it will not destroy a point target. Yes, not even a point, but fortified

    Quote: AVM
    Nuclear powers are not considered targets, well, it’s written several times.

    Not considered.
    But there is a second side to the coin. Consider, as an example, not Russia, but the United States. Let the launchers of these conventional ICBMs be located at Vandenberg Air Base on the Pacific coast. Let such launchers be, for example, 20-30. It is unlikely that Russia, and the United States, will agree to a massive number of such conventional missiles. No one canceled the control issues
    So. in the USA they decided to deliver a non-nuclear strike by such forces (as you gave them the name SCS) against such a non-nuclear country as Iran. The launch team went and these conventional “minutemans” start to start in turn. After a couple of minutes, these launching ICBMs are detected by the satellite subsystem SPRN. Information goes to the control center. After another couple of minutes, these missiles appear on the screens of SPRN radars located in the Far East. But here is the most interesting. Missiles launched over Iran will have a trajectory passing through the North Pole. In Malaysia or Vietnam, the trajectory will be different and will not pass through the pole, moreover, the trajectory will be "away" from our territory. But in Iran - only across the pole. And what do you order to do the duty shift of the control center of the SPRN means when a dozen missiles launching in the direction of Russia are visible on the screen. Well, if a dozen, but not all 20 or 30 ... The reaction will be unequivocal. Launch of nuclear missiles in the direction of the United States.
    Of course, we can say that we can inform Russia of our intention to "punish Iran." But here options are possible.
    1. But will we not report this to Iran
    2. And we will be guaranteed that all of these 20-30 missiles are intended for Iran? and not for example 5 to Iran, but the rest to us. Yes, I remember the condition that the use of SCS is not considered against a nuclear power. But here flying dozens of ICBMs flying in the direction of the country will by no means add calm, despite all the assurances. There will always be a certain “What if?” And in this case, as they say, it is better to retake and send their nuclear missiles in response to them.
    Quite harsh guys with no sense of humor sit in the Central Administration. They say that these missiles passing through your territory are not against you, but will not make an impression on your neighbor Iran.


    Quote: AVM

    The issue of price is the criterion of cost / effectiveness, moreover, it can be considered in different ways:

    Missile for 100 000 shoots down aircraft for 1000 000 is it effective?
    A missile for 100 knocks a missile for 000, but does not allow to hit a protected object for 50, effectively ?.

    An airplane and an anti-aircraft missile are somewhat different though. Since the same plane for 1 million can carry several ammunition that will cause damage ten times the cost of the same salette and the same anti-aircraft missile.
    And the second is correct.
    BUT SCS is something else. To begin with, the conventional warhead on the same ballistic missile is nonsense.
    First and foremost. WEIGHT is such a warhead and the range to which it can be delivered. Take the same "Minuteman 3". at a distance of 12-13 thousand kilometers, it can deliver a combat load of 1,15 tons. Subtract the heat protection of the hull, the warhead hull itself - as a result, let 1 ton of explosives reach the target. What we have in the radius of destruction. Severe damage (not complete, but severe, that is, 50% of the walls are destroyed, ceilings, etc.) from such a charge will be within 60-80 meters. For an unprotected person, of course more. KVO at the same "Minuteman" is about 180-250 meters. In fact, it turns out that an apartment building such a warhead may destroy, but not a fortified target. And spending at the same time $ 7 million for a rocket to destroy a house is such an efficiency. Perhaps at small distances of 2000 or 3000 km, the efficiency will be higher, since the weight of the BG will be higher. But these are no longer strategic systems

    Quote: AVM
    It is clear that there are questions for the second example, but Israel and the United States are ready to shoot down cheaper ammunition with more expensive missile defense systems, compensating for the cost / effectiveness shortcomings with the power of their economy, but protecting their territory as much as possible.

    Not always paramount only the power of the economy. The same "Iron Dome" having a rocket of decent cost (many times its cost sometimes exceeds the cost of shot down ammunition) shoots only those ammunition that threaten the infrastructure and the population. Here, cost / efficiency has a different foundation. Saving the lives of people and infrastructure, kmk

    Quote: AVM
    I sincerely hope that there will be more of them, which is why I wrote - “of the order of one hundred or more cruise and anti-ship missiles of the type“ Caliber ”,“ Onyx ”(“ Yakhont ”),“ Zircon ”.

    Geometry cannot be fooled. If the diameter of the "Caliber" is 520 mm, and the "Onyx" is 720, then you want this or do not want more than 2,1 "Onyxes" in the shaft of diameters of 4 meters, do not enter this dimension. Like 7-8 "Caliber".
  24. Old26 10 August 2019 15: 29 New
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    Quote: AVM
    Let’s say an unauthorized launch was detected, how quickly will the aircraft refuel, arm the nuclear weapons, and fly into the air? PMSM by this time or it will all end, or nothing will start. The only way to secure missile-carrying bombers is by air watch, but it is monstrously expensive due to the consumption of their resource and fuel, and the limitation of warheads on the number of takeoffs and landings.

    What time, Andrey? If in a peaceful period, then the reaction to an unauthorized launch, and this implies the launch of a single missile, is usually different. Network hotline and both sides can find out what it is. System crash, crazy shift duty or what. Accordingly, knocking down a single missile with one or turning on the self-destruction mechanism for others is much simpler.
    If this is the pre-war period, shortly before the time "H", then the attitude to aviation will be different. It will be dispersed at aerodromes, and not located in a permanent location. Cars will be in readiness (2 or 1, not in the know). Dressed up. Perhaps already with suspended nuclear munitions and sometimes crews already sitting in cabins. How much the same regiment of strategists will take into the air - I don’t know, but it is almost certain that in a time much less than the enemy’s nuclear warhead will fall on the airfield.
    Or there will be a duty in the air. Yes, it’s expensive, monstrously expensive, but defense is not cheap. At least it will be cheaper than creating SCS ...

    Quote: AVM
    It was already, if we talk about the Kyrgyz Republic. If about the ICBMs, then there are questions, but as I wrote somewhere in the comments, one of the solutions is to place them in special zones, under the supervision of observers of interested parties - the United States, China, so that launch from this zone is not considered as the beginning of a global conflict + other mechanisms ..

    So far, it’s in relation to decision mechanisms and no

    Quote: AVM
    As I said, I generally have doubts about their expediency in a nuclear war, but they have no equal to solve the problems of a conventional war.

    As for the Tu-95, I’m not sure, maybe the Dagger needs some minimum speed to get to the “mode”. But if possible, then I am only FOR.

    Of course, the “weight” of strategic aviation is different now and in the 50s. Sometimes a conversation sometimes makes the Triad unnecessary, but so far this tool remains, and sometimes it is more flexible than missile forces. With regard to solving problems in non-nuclear wars, strategic aviation has shown that it is too early to write it off. Not a single more or less serious conflict could do without it

    As for the "Dagger", "Launch" speed would be necessary if the rocket would use a ramjet engine. But rocket - anyway. From the ground, the same Iskander reaches speeds of more than 6M. The speed of the carrier plays a role only on the final speed of the rocket, but in any case it will be hypersonic. Well, on the range of the rocket. But the supersonic speed of the carrier is "desirable, but not necessary." Sometimes a large radius of a subsonic aircraft will play a big role ....
  25. Old26 10 August 2019 15: 29 New
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    Quote: AVM
    I can not argue, but otherwise, I rely only on open sources ..

    And open sources say the same thing that I wrote.

    Quote: AVM
    Everything is possible, it is possible that something else will not happen, the Husky nuclear submarine or EM Leader, or Almaty - the economy will collapse, for example, but a little optimism will not hurt. Repeatingly, BZHRK with KR is the simplest percussion device. No shipyards, airbases are needed - only standard containers, standard railway cars and standard rockets. Technical risk is close to zero.

    40 wagons - the average figure, maybe more. It seems there were trains of 500-700 cars. It is necessary to build on something.

    Sometimes outwardly the simplest will not be. For BZHRK need points of permanent deployment. And for each composition - a separate PPD. And PPD is essentially a small railway station with its own infrastructure. Putting flight missions into such a number of winged arcades is a very difficult and time-consuming event. If you say that such BZHRK will shoot not on the move, but from the parking lot, then you will need a very large number of field starting positions equipped in the engineering and geodetic sense, so that the enemy does not know where such BZHRK is at any given time. And this is a huge cost. For example, I can say that for the divisions deployed in the USSR, the BZHRK was created around TWO field starting positions. Plus, traffic routes should be equipped not only with sensors of the navigation system, as already had BZHRK, but also a large number of places "sediment". For the BZHRK with ICBMs such places of "sludge" were not so relevant, but for the BZHRK with the Kyrgyz Republic - they were relevant. Especially if they will be so long in length (40 cars). He won’t be on the go all the time. it may turn out that at the right time it will not be at the right point.

    Quote: AVM
    Somehow it passed me, do not explain what kind of Leader? The next modification? .

    "evil tongues" say yes.

    Quote: AVM
    Quote: Old26
    General composition of strategic conventional forces
    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - four Borey-K SSBNs and / or 949AM SSBNs with 72-100 KR Caliber in each submarine; .

    "Little, still want, little ..."
    It plans only two boats (for the future) "Borey-K", and you already have their 4. Maybe you should cut the sturgeon in half?


    So now there will be 4 "loaves" of 949AM with 72 KP on each.

    Against 4 "loaves" I have nothing. Just the number of "Boreev-K" was announced as TWO corps

    Quote: AVM
    Quote: Old26
    General composition of strategic conventional forces
    Presumably, SCS may include:
    - Sixty Tu-95MS / IMS missile-carrying bombers with eight X-101 missiles each;

    The number of TU-95MS bombers suitable for modernization in the TU-95MS is Thirty
    In TU-65MS, X = 101 missiles will not fit due to the size of the bomb, and they do not plan to install pylons on them. And they will fly with the X-55СМ or ​​X-555


    It is possible that with the X-555, it doesn’t matter to me, the information is different, they write what will be on them X-101, then no ..

    Of the total number of TU-95MS bombers, part is in the modification of MS-8, part is in the modification of MS-16. The latter are newer. They are going to be converted into a modification of the TU-95MSM. But since the bomb bay on the TU-95 is too small for the X-101, and reworking it is to change the design of the fuselage - we went along the optimal path. These MSMs will have 4 twin pylons for the X-101. I honestly do not know whether they will carry the X-55CM or X-555 in the bomb bay either. On older ones (MS-8 version) their regular X-55SM or X-555 will be in the bomb bay

    Quote: AVM
    I wrote about this separate material Hypersonic "Dagger" on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction?
    - https://topwar.ru/153987-giperzvukovoj-kinzhal-na-tu-160-realnost-ili-vymysel.html

    I thought about the size of the compartment, 3-4 pieces should enter the compartment, respectively, 6-8 in two. There should not be anything on the outside. It seems that in the comments the people discussed this possibility.

    Regarding speed - there are speed / range flight profiles, but I could not find it depending on the load. It is possible that the sturgeon will have to be cut. The trick is that the Tu-160 is faster and more load-bearing anyway, there is nothing, the inevitable will not be in the near future.

    About 50 pcs., What can I say, let's say I believe the president and the government ....

    In length, the “dagger can and drags into the bomb bay. The question is, with its body diameter of about 90 cm (plus the aerodynamic planes of the rocket), and most likely 1 meter, the“ dagger ”is hardly possible to install on a rotary launcher. And IMHO them can be placed there exclusively “one above the other.” Which means that a maximum of 2 pieces will fit in the bomb bay

    It seems to be necessary for the president to believe. But how reliable is this?

    Quote: AVM


    Quote: Old26
    Everything seems to be. Out of breath. I do not even want to comment on the circles of missile defense bases and the lines of our ICBMs. Outwardly, according to the figure, they will be able to intercept something, if you do not take into account the range of the radars of these systems, and that in most cases they will shoot after that, even at the speed of the 2A block, the 14,5M is small in order to intercept ICBMs


    Circles are not mine, honestly taken from the network. It is clear that at maximum range they will not catch up. But then how else to draw, a range indicating the probability of interception? Yes, and the United States is constantly upgrading blocks ..

    I understood that, Andrey. I have always been touched by these circles of reach radius, and in this case, the radius of reach by American missile defense trajectories of our ICBMs. Without considering how far the radar of these air defense bases sees, in how many seconds, or rather tens of seconds (and sometimes even hundreds), the target - our missile will come out from behind the radio horizon. Whether it will be still a rocket or already a group of targets consisting of warheads and false targets, what will be the speed, the possibility of firing at oncoming intersecting or catch-up courses. In short, dozens of questions to which such schemes do not give any answer.

    Quote: AVM
    Thanks again for the informative comments.

    No problem