Military Review

The sunset of the nuclear triad? Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces

83

Nuclear weapons are the stronghold of the world



Since its inception, nuclear weapon (NF), which later evolved into a thermonuclear one (hereinafter referred to as the collective term "nuclear weapons"), has become an essential element of the armed forces of the leading countries of the world. At present, there is no alternative to nuclear weapons; mankind has not yet invented anything more destructive.

Nuclear weapons, if only one power had it in sufficient quantities, would provide it with total military superiority over any other countries. Such a situation could well have developed in the middle of the XNUMXth century, when the United States of America was the sole owner of nuclear weapons, without hesitation using it at the end of World War II against Japanese cities. Only the intellectual and industrial power of the USSR, which made it possible to create its own nuclear weapons as soon as possible, did not allow the United States to unleash a third world war.

The sunset of the nuclear triad? Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces

Hiroshima after being hit by an American nuclear bomb

Nowadays, only nuclear weapons are the main factor holding back the start of the third world war. No matter how much the pacifists hate nuclear weapons, it is impossible to deny this fact: if there weren’t nuclear deterrence, a third world war would most likely have happened a long time ago, and it is not known how many global wars would have followed. Pretending to be the "world gendarme" the United States does not risk attacking North Korea with nuclear weapons - they don’t even put their nose in it, while other countries that do not have nuclear weapons were subjected to ruthless bombing and were defeated.


With North Korea, the United States is afraid to do the same as with Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria and many other countries.

There is a key condition that allows nuclear weapons to carry out the deterrence function: this is nuclear parity between the leading world powers, Russia (USSR) and the USA, which ensures guaranteed mutual destruction of opponents in the event of a nuclear war. Guaranteed mutual destruction implies, of course, not the complete destruction of the enemy’s state and the death of the entire population, and certainly not the death of all living things on planet Earth, as some people dream of, but causing such damage that will significantly exceed the benefits that the aggressor will receive from the outbreak of war.


The most important requirement for a nuclear arsenal is to ensure the possibility of a retaliatory or retaliatory strike if the enemy was the first to launch a nuclear strike, hoping to suddenly destroy the enemy’s nuclear weapons at the expense of surprise and win the war. This problem is solved in several ways. The first method is the creation of an effective missile attack warning system (SPRN), the decision to strike back, and a reliable control system that allows the command to launch to launch nuclear carriers. The second is to increase the survival rate of nuclear weapons carriers due to camouflage and / or ability to withstand the enemy’s blow.

To understand the relevance of the various elements of the nuclear triad, we consider its existing and promising components for their resistance to the disarming strike of the enemy.

Strategic Nuclear Triad


The principle of "do not put all your eggs in one basket" is more than applicable to nuclear weapons. In leading world powers, in Russia (USSR) and in the USA, strategic nuclear forces (SNF) over time began to include three main components - a ground component, including mine or mobile missile systems, an air component, including strategic bombers with nuclear bombs and / or cruise missiles and an offshore component, with nuclear missiles deployed on nuclear submarines. The PRC has a more or less full-fledged nuclear triad; the remaining members of the nuclear club are content with two or even one component of the nuclear triad.


Strategic Nuclear Triad of Russia

Each component of the nuclear triad has its advantages and disadvantages. And each country in its own way sets priorities in their development. In the USSR, the ground component of strategic nuclear forces — Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) —was traditionally the strongest, was the United States. The United States relied heavily on the naval component of strategic nuclear forces. In the UK, only the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces remained; in France, the main component is the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces; there is also a limited development aviation component. Each component of the strategic nuclear forces has its advantages and disadvantages. It is necessary to make a reservation right away that it is precisely the stability of the strategic nuclear forces components that are considered in the conditions of the enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike.

Air component of strategic nuclear forces


Historically, the air (aviation) component of the strategic nuclear forces emerged first. It was from the bombers that atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was with the help of bombers with nuclear bombs that the United States planned to deliver a massive nuclear strike against the USSR under the plans of Chariotir (1948), Fleetwood (1948), SAK-EVP 1-4a (1948), "Dropshot" (1949) and others.

From the point of view of survivability, the air component of the strategic nuclear forces is the most vulnerable to a sudden disarming strike by the enemy. Bombers (missile bombers) at aerodromes are extremely vulnerable to both nuclear and conventional weapons. The time for their preparation for the flight is quite long, and it is difficult to keep them in constant readiness for departure. The only way to ensure the survival of the air component of the strategic nuclear forces, in the event of an enemy disarming strike, is to shift the aircraft on a shift basis in the air with nuclear weapons on board, which was occasionally carried out during the Cold War. However, this is too costly from an economic point of view: fuel is wasted, aircraft resources are consumed, the alternation of takeoffs and landings can lead to a failure of nuclear charges. In addition, there is always the risk of an accidental accident over your territory and a fall in nuclear charges, followed by radiation contamination of the area. So on-duty bombers in the air can be considered the exception rather than the rule.


The American B-52 bomber and the Soviet Tu-95 bomber are the basis of the air component of the strategic nuclear forces of the USA and the USSR during the Cold War

The appearance of supersonic (Tu-22M3, Tu-160 B-1) or subtle (B-2) bombers does not change the situation, or even exacerbates it, since the requirements for their basing conditions, the complexity of preparing for departure, and the cost of flight hours are higher.

Also, the air component of the strategic nuclear forces is extremely vulnerable to air defense systems, enemy fighters and interceptors at the stage of striking. The emergence of a “long arm” - long-range cruise missiles (CR), did not fundamentally change the situation. Carrier survival has increased, but the low (subsonic) Raman speed makes them a fairly easy target compared to ballistic missiles. The adoption of aeroballistic missiles could change the situation, but their parameters are likely to be inferior to the parameters of land and sea ballistic missiles due to the weight and size limitations imposed by the capabilities of aircraft carriers. However, with a disarming strike, all this is unimportant.

One of the promising weapons systems designed for nuclear deterrence is considered the Burevestnik cruise missile with a nuclear power plant. On the one hand, the declared unlimited range makes it possible to virtually eliminate carrier damage (launch can be carried out over your territory or at the border), reduce the probability of the missile itself by bypassing the air defense / missile defense zones. On the other hand, the Petrel, regardless of whether it is subsonic (99%) or supersonic, will be extremely vulnerable to any enemy air defense systems. You can be sure that in the event of a conflict, when the enemy himself will be its initiator, all forces will be involved, they will raise AWACS aircraft, balloons, airships and unmanned aerial vehiclesable to search for air targets. Naturally, such a level of combat readiness will be maintained not a day or two - in a nuclear war, the stakes are extremely high. Therefore, it is highly likely that the enemy will be able to detect most of the CR Petrel, after which their destruction will not be difficult.


KR "Petrel"

Based on this, the “Petrel” is more likely a first strike, since it allows in peacetime, at the time of the least readiness of the enemy, to inflict a relatively covert strike on unpredictable routes of extension of the Kyrgyz Republic.

There is no reliable information on the media of KR "Petrel". In principle, an unlimited flight range makes the deployment of the Burevestnik airborne aircraft pointless - the range will not increase, and the risk of a carrier accident appears. Most likely, taking into account the US withdrawal from the agreement on limiting the deployment of medium and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the KR Petrel is likely to be deployed on land carriers.

Ground component of strategic nuclear forces


The ground component of the strategic nuclear forces, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), appeared second after the aircraft. For the USSR, its appearance for the first time did not mean a hypothetical, but a real possibility of a nuclear strike against the United States. The first ballistic missiles required lengthy preparations for launch, were located on open areas, and in fact were no less vulnerable than bombers at airfields.

Subsequently, ground-based strategic nuclear forces developed in several directions. The main thing was the placement of ICBMs in highly protected mines, from which they can be launched in the shortest possible time. Another direction in the development of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces was the creation of mobile missile systems on automobile and railway chassis.


ICBM in the mine, military railway missile system (BZHRK), mobile soil missile system (PGRK)


Each type of land-based nuclear weapon has its advantages and disadvantages. Shelled in highly protected mines of ICBMs are protected from the actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups, are invulnerable to high-precision conventional weapons, and not every nuclear charge can disable them. Their main drawback is that their coordinates are precisely known, and modern high-precision nuclear warheads are likely to destroy them.

The main advantage of mobile complexes is their secrecy and uncertainty of location. When located at the base, PGRK and BZHRK are as vulnerable as airplanes at airfields. But after entering the patrol route, it is much more difficult to detect and destroy them. PGRK's main survival factor is the unpredictability of patrol routes, and the BZHRK is quite capable of getting lost in a huge number of similar trains, at least with the existing level of enemy reconnaissance equipment.

Since each type of ground-based component of the strategic nuclear forces has its own advantages and disadvantages, then, guided by the above-mentioned principle (“do not put all your eggs in one basket”), both stationary - mine and mobile complexes are adopted. The newest prospective ground-based element of nuclear deterrence should be the Sarmat ICBM, which should replace the heavy Voyevoda (Satan) RS-28M36 ICBM. The promising heavy Sarmat ICBM should provide for the abandonment of about ten warheads and a significant set of means to overcome missile defense. Also, to overcome missile defense, a promising ICBM can strike at a gentle suborbital flight path, including through the south pole.


ICBM RS-28 Sarmat

Another means of overcoming missile defense should be the Avangard hypersonic guided warhead (UBB), which performs a flight along a complex flight path. At the initial stage, the Avangard UBB is planned to be deployed on the outdated and currently not available ICBMs UR-100N UTTH, but in the future they will be replaced by Sarmat. At one Sarmat ICBM, it is planned to deploy three UBB Avangard.


UBB "Vanguard"

The most modern mobile complex is the RS-24 Yars PGRK with three warheads. It was planned that the RS-24 Yars PGRK would be replaced or supplemented by the RS-26 Rubezh PGRK, but this project was closed in favor of deploying the Avangard UBB on the UR-100N UTTH ICBM. Also, on the basis of the Yars ICBM, the development of the Barguzin BZHRK was carried out, but at the moment these works are also completed.


PGRK RS-26 "Frontier"

How vulnerable is the ground component of strategic nuclear forces to a sudden disarming strike by an adversary? If we talk about mine complexes, the adoption of new ICBMs does not fundamentally change the situation. On the one hand, there is high security, on the other hand, there are known coordinates and vulnerability to high-precision nuclear charges. An additional element that increases the likelihood of ICBM survival in the mine can be a missile defense missile defense system, such as the one developed by the Mozyr development center. But any missile defense requires a guidance system based on radar or optical weapons. It can be assumed that during the attack of protected missile silos, the enemy will carry out high-altitude blasting of one or several warheads in such a way that electromagnetic and light radiation will destroy the missile defense systems immediately before other warheads enter the mine.

In a more threatened situation are PGRK. The USA and NATO countries are actively developing their satellite constellations. At the moment, commercial companies are actively mastering large-scale production of satellites designed to be deployed in a low reference orbit (DOE) and provide global Internet connectivity, as well as creating cheap reusable launch vehicles for their launch. Plans include the deployment of thousands or even tens of thousands of satellites to the DOE. At the end of 2019, 120 satellites were launched, in 2020 it is planned to launch 24 Starlink satellites, if there are 60 satellites in each launch, then their total number in orbit, taking into account the previously launched ones, will be 1560, which is more than the number of satellites of all countries of the world at the end of 2018 (less than 1100 satellites).


Satellite cassette, a chain of 60 deployable satellites, and the planned satellite network of the Starlink project Ilona Mask

Even if these commercial satellites are not used for military purposes (which is doubtful), the experience and technologies obtained as a result of their development will allow the U.S. armed forces to develop and deploy a huge network of reconnaissance satellites operating in the form of a single distributed antenna with a huge aperture. Potentially, this will allow the adversary to monitor PGRK in real time and provide guidance on them with high-precision conventional and nuclear weapons, reconnaissance and sabotage groups. At the same time, neither jamming (the enemy may have optical reconnaissance equipment) to deploy false targets will help. The stability of PGRC to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion is not comparable to that of a silo-based ICBM. In the event that the PGRK lose the secrecy factor, their combat stability in the case of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy will tend to zero, therefore, the creation of such complexes will lose its meaning.

The BZHRK will have a slightly greater chance of hiding from the "all-seeing eye" - there is a chance to get lost in a huge number of freight and passenger trains. But this will depend on the resolution and continuity of control of the territory of the Russian Federation by the enemy’s space reconnaissance equipment. If it will be possible to continuously monitor in 24/365 mode, with a resolution that allows you to track individual train trains in the parking lots, then the survival of the BZHRK will be a big question.

Conclusions


The air (aviation) component can only be considered as a means of a first strike, its role in nuclear deterrence is minimal. As a means of deterrence, the aviation component can only be considered against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons, or that possess a small amount of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Based on this, strategic bombers can be used more effectively for delivery conventional means of destruction of land and sea targets. It must be understood that the orientation of strategic aviation towards the use of conventional means of defeat does not preclude the possibility of their use as carriers of nuclear weapons, it only sets priorities differently.

In the future, the ground component of strategic nuclear forces may lose mobile systems, since their main advantage (stealth) may be at risk due to a significant increase in the effectiveness of enemy space reconnaissance equipment.

It is unlikely that it will be possible to significantly increase the security of silo-based ICBMs, the only way to increase the likelihood of ICBM survival in the event of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy is to increase their number and at the same time territorial distribution over the largest possible territory, in essence, an extensive development path.

The most important condition for ensuring a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy in the event of a sudden disarming strike is the effective functioning of the SPRN and the entire chain that ensures decision-making and the issuance of a command to launch a nuclear strike. We will discuss this and the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces in the next article.
Author:
Photos used:
tvzvezda.ru, russian.rt.com, army-news.ru, popmech.ru, topwar.ru
Articles from this series:
Power conversion
The militarization of space is the next step for the United States. SpaceX and lasers in orbit
Strategic conventional weapon. Damage
Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons
Reusable rockets: an economical solution for a quick global strike
Planning hypersonic warheads: projects and prospects
83 comments
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  1. Same lech
    Same lech 28 December 2019 05: 18
    +2
    At the moment, commercial companies are actively developing large-scale production of satellites designed for deployment in low reference orbit (NOU) and provide global Internet connection

    And if in the event of a conflict undermine a dozen large warheads filled with metal debris in this orbit, what will happen to all this space infrastructure? The Chinese conducted such an experiment with their satellite ... they put the whole world on their ears .. hehe experimenters.
    Presumably, satellites for various purposes will cease to function normally.
    1. Vladimir_2U
      Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 05: 43
      +8
      Inattentively you read the article, it deals with a SUDDEN disarming strike! It will be too late to clear the orbit after it.
      "At the same time, neither jamming (the enemy may have optical reconnaissance means) to deploy decoys will help." Optics can probably be fought in peacetime, from covering the time and place of deployment with smoke, to irradiating ALL lasers undeclared as optical, lasers flying over our territory. For nefig.
      1. Same lech
        Same lech 28 December 2019 05: 47
        +10
        Inattentively you read the article, it deals with a SUDDEN disarming strike!


        What is the suddenness here when our air defense and missile defense systems of the over-the-horizon radars are saturated ... over 6000 km missile launch is detected.
        The suddenness here may be due to short- and medium-range missiles ... here the flight time goes in a matter of minutes ... that’s where the main danger is for our country ... on average, I think 10-15 minutes.
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 05: 51
          +4
          Quote: The same LYOKHA
          over 6000 km discover missile launch
          It’s a pity our radars are in our territory, and 6000 km is already not a launch distance, but a middle section of the trajectory (approximately)
          Quote: The same LYOKHA
          an average of 10-15 minutes I think
          And here I am about whether it’s too late to throw an orbit. )))
          1. Same lech
            Same lech 28 December 2019 05: 54
            +4
            It’s a pity our radars are in our territory

            It’s just good ... all our radars located on the territory of the former Soviet republics were disabled for political reasons ... it’s dangerous to build your own on the territory of the natives ... you can lose this overnight.
            1. Vladimir_2U
              Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 05: 57
              +4
              I mean, there is only time for a retaliatory strike and that remains when launching the enemy ICBMs.
              1. Same lech
                Same lech 28 December 2019 05: 59
                +2
                So you need to look for new effective methods and ways of pressure on the enemy so that he does not dare to launch a nuclear attack in our country ... there is still time ... we will not die alive.
                1. Vladimir_2U
                  Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 06: 00
                  +1
                  Exactly! Holiday greetings!
                2. Operator
                  Operator 28 December 2019 16: 12
                  +1
                  The presence / absence of reconnaissance satellites of the enemy does not in any way affect the ability of the Strategic Missile Forces to deliver a retaliatory strike, since the readiness time for launch for silo ICBMs is 1 minute, for PGRK - 5 minutes - with a minimum flight time of the enemy IRBM and SLBM of at least 10 minutes (detection of the "Container" radar station from the first second of launch), enemy ICBMs - 35 minutes (detection of the "Voronezh" radar station 20 minutes before arrival at the target).

                  The Peresvet anti-satellite complex is nothing more than a means of playing on the enemy's nerves during a threatened (special) period.
              2. D16
                D16 28 December 2019 09: 21
                0
                time only for a retaliatory strike and remains

                What else do you need time for? To notarize a will? laughing
                and then, when launching an enemy ICBM.

                And how else can a massive disarming strike be delivered and how to do it without an appropriate period of preparation and escalation of tension. And during this period, the missile carriers will be ready in the strip, as during the Caribbean crisis, and PGRK will sprawl in the forests.
                In general, another storm in a glass.
                1. Vladimir_2U
                  Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 09: 36
                  +1
                  You did not seem to read the article.
                  1. D16
                    D16 28 December 2019 09: 44
                    0
                    I read your fantasies about the chef. Everything is gone, the plaster is removed, etc.
                    You did not answer the question, why do you need more than 10-15 minutes to launch a retaliatory strike and how to prepare for a massive disarmament so that no one would know about it.
                    1. Vladimir_2U
                      Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 09: 46
                      +1
                      I completely agree with
                      Quote: SVD68
                      SVD68 (Victor) Today, 09:43

                      0
                      Quote: D16

                      And how else can a massive disarming strike be delivered and how to do it without an appropriate period of preparation and escalation of tension.

                      Who needs a period of escalation of tension and why?
                      1. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 09: 54
                        -4
                        Right now, Trump will risk the life of his grandchildren and the existence of America as such, and at your own peril and risk will play roulette by betting alllol . Do not tell my slippers. And what two know, everyone knows.
                      2. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 09: 58
                        +3
                        Quote: D16
                        Right now, Trump will risk the lives of his grandchildren

                        Where is the guarantee that no evlanko like Clintonsha will come to power? Which in the face has never been received in my life.
                      3. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 10: 22
                        -3
                        Where is the guarantee that no evlanko like Clintonsha will come to power?

                        The guarantee is the American electoral system and the lack of technical ability in the first place. No need to scare a hedgehog with a bare ass. laughing
                    2. Vladimir_2U
                      Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 09: 53
                      0
                      Those. no time is required for passing a signal about a missile attack, no time is required for deciding on a reciprocal strike, no time is needed for preparation for launching missiles. Do you think all this happens instantly as soon as the marks of enemy missiles appeared on the screens?
                      Quote: D16
                      how to prepare for applying a massive disarmament so that no one would know about it
                      This blow will not be delivered with "axes"; it is not even required to put all SSBNs into the sea for this. Why do you think the Americans left the INF Treaty? Are you aware of the flight time of the Pershing-2?
                      1. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 10: 03
                        0
                        Those. no time is required for passing a signal about a missile attack, no time is required for deciding on a reciprocal strike, no time is needed for preparation for launching missiles. Do you think all this happens instantly as soon as the marks of enemy missiles appeared on the screens?

                        Missiles in silos are on alert and they do not have to be prepared for many decades now. It is only necessary to make a decision. But this is rather a political issue. Who did not have enough 10 minutes, that will not be enough even a week.
                        What do you think the Americans from the INF Treaty came out

                        To drag China into it, it just turns out to be shitty.
                        About the flight time of Pershing 2 in the know?

                        Do you know that even then it was food for the S-300V?
                      2. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 10: 24
                        0
                        Quote: D16
                        Do you think all this happens instantly as soon as the marks of enemy missiles appeared on the screens?
                        Missiles in silos are on alert and they do not have to be prepared for many decades now. It is only necessary to make a decision. But this is rather a political issue. Who did not have enough 10 minutes, that will not be enough even a week.
                        That is, according to yours, the first two points are not needed at all, and preparation of the launch is just instantaneous. Are you aware that flight missions have been introduced into our missiles for a very long time, just before launch? I will be very happy if this is not so, but Gorby and Yeltsin introduced this procedure and especially emphasized, such as safety in the event of an accidental launch, lyalyalya. Also, a hypothetical system "Perimeter", developed from a good life?
                        Quote: D16
                        Who did not have enough 10 minutes, that will not be enough even a week
                        A powerful cowboy argument, to whom six was not enough, 36 is not enough, only he was talking about shots, not about time.
                        Quote: D16
                        To drag China into it, it just turns out to be shitty.
                        It never occurred to me that this could just be a cover?
                        Quote: D16
                        Do you know that even then it was food for the S-300V
                        Pershing 2 is NOT a tactical missile.
                      3. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 10: 40
                        0
                        That is, in your opinion, the first two points are not needed at all, and the launch preparation is just instantaneous.

                        The current through the wires moves very quickly, and the operators on alert are trained and motivated guys. They have been taught this for many years.
                        Do you know that flight missions in our missiles have been introduced for a very long time just before launch?

                        Do you see technical problems to do this in advance? Me not. But we do not discuss political issues here.
                        only he was talking about shots, not about time

                        From this, he does not lose relevance.
                        It never occurred to me that this could just be a cover?

                        Cover for what? I saw only the launch of the ax from the ground-launched launcher whipped up and the launch of the target rocket from the launch pad. A la Von Braun. Impressed lol .
                        Pershing 2 is NOT an operational tactical package.

                        I'm in the courier. (C) smile Nevertheless, he had the addiction to brake up to 3 swoops during the descent.
                2. SVD68
                  SVD68 28 December 2019 09: 43
                  +2
                  Quote: D16

                  And how else can a massive disarming strike be delivered and how to do it without an appropriate period of preparation and escalation of tension.

                  Who needs a period of escalation of tension and why?
                  1. D16
                    D16 28 December 2019 09: 48
                    -2
                    Primarily for domestic consumption. Secondly, one must be prepared in case something goes wrong and a retaliatory strike does happen. Given the state of their strategic nuclear forces, the probability of this is infinitely high.
                    1. SVD68
                      SVD68 28 December 2019 09: 54
                      +2
                      For domestic consumption, escalation has been going on for several years. And a weak retaliatory blow to the cities will bring Western society to the required state of mind - a thirst to destroy the bloodthirsty Russian villains. Is everything ready.
                      1. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 10: 08
                        -2
                        Something weak? I have not yet seen a reason to write off silos and nuclear submarines. And they are quite enough that the living would envy the dead.
                      2. SVD68
                        SVD68 28 December 2019 10: 18
                        +1
                        Regarding the ICBMs, I agree with the silos.
                        But the situation with the SSBN is a concern. Most are at the berths, i.e. defenseless. And 1-2 on duty are tracked by the Americans right at the exit to combat duty.
                      3. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 10: 24
                        -2
                        I don’t know how new, but pr. 667BDRM can shoot from the moorings from the surface.
                      4. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 10: 33
                        -1
                        This is if they have time, although what I mean, in your opinion, the launch of missiles occurs immediately after the suspicion of a missile strike.
      2. KCA
        KCA 28 December 2019 06: 33
        +8
        A massive SUDDLE strike is simply impossible, it is impossible to bring hundreds, or even thousands of objects with the means of delivering this strike to full combat readiness, it is possible to ensure almost complete secrecy at one or two sites, but almost if several days before the strike is completely isolated the personnel inside the facility, depriving the telephone and the Internet, but this in itself will arouse suspicion and strengthen control over these facilities, and will return to full alert all means of detection and counteraction
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 06: 35
          0
          About several days you exaggerate and much, as well as about the impossibility of doing this with hundreds of objects.
          1. KCA
            KCA 28 December 2019 09: 16
            +1
            Am I greatly exaggerating? In Syria, the launching of Axes is being prepared for weeks, scouts and AWACS are circling for days, although after a salvo 70% of the missiles disappear somewhere, and then all of Russia should be crushed and preparation is not necessary? How can you hide the preparation for war at a missile base or airfield? First of all, the security will increase significantly, the running around, the movement of transport, aviation will begin, but the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense is only direct in our country and knows how to thwart the poisoning of the Skripals and get caught in the murder of a Georgian terrorist, will not notice anything at all and will not count a finger to his nose?
            1. Vladimir_2U
              Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 09: 20
              0
              Quote: KCA
              In Syria, launching Axes for weeks
              ))) In Syria, they hysterical for weeks before the launches, but the carriers were moving there and here. By the way, a disarming nuclear strike will not be carried out with Axes, God forbid, of course.
              1. D16
                D16 28 December 2019 10: 18
                -1
                a disarming nuclear strike not with Axes, will be carried out

                That's right, they have not existed for a long time, nuclear axes. And not foreseen. laughing
                By the way, let me take a look than?
                1. Vladimir_2U
                  Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 10: 58
                  0
                  Quote: D16
                  By the way, let me take a look at what?

                  Have you already started mowing like a fool? The "nuclear triad" doesn't tell you anything?
                  Quote: D16
                  That's right, they have not existed for a long time, nuclear axes. And not foreseen
                  Well, yes, warheads of 200, or how much kg of explosives PGRK there is nothing, of course.
                  1. D16
                    D16 28 December 2019 11: 28
                    0
                    Have you already started mowing like a fool? The "nuclear triad" doesn't tell you anything?

                    I have a certificate (s) laughing So which component with the exception of ICBMs will disarm us? B-52? laughing
                    Well, yes, warheads of 200, or how much kg of explosives PGRK there is nothing, of course.

                    1. Since when did axes begin to work on moving targets.
                    2. Where are you going to throw axes from? Since you write such clever articles with pictures, you probably know the approximate areas of PGRK deployment lol .
                    1. Vladimir_2U
                      Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 11: 43
                      -2
                      It’s a pity, but already started to write some stupidity
                      Quote: D16
                      So which component with the exception of ICBMs will disarm us
                      SSBN does not require hope decryption?
                      Quote: D16
                      Since when did axes begin to work on moving targets
                      PGRK doesn’t work right away, it’s not me, but you, who started writing about Axes.
                      Quote: D16
                      Since you write such clever articles with pictures
                      Have you confused me with the author of the article? "Struck by your failure, sir!" - as it were, two famous meme characters tell you. Arguing with you is completely fruitless.
                      1. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 12: 00
                        0
                        SSBN does not require hope decryption?

                        That is, Trident D5 ceased to be an ICBM? And how long?
                        PGRK doesn’t work right away, it’s not me, but you, who started writing about Axes.

                        Even the location of the PGRK is much further than two thousand versts from the areas of possible ax placement. You are going to apply them according to PGRK. Moreover, with a heavy warhead in conventional design:
                        Warhead at 200 or how many kg of explosives PGRK there is nothing, of course.
                        (C)
                        Note: I did not suggest it! (with) laughing
                        Did you confuse me with the author of the article?

                        Sorry. For some reason, I decided that you are the author of this scarecrow. I apologize again. request
                        The argument with you is completely barren.

                        When there is no argument, any argument is futile.
                      2. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 12: 20
                        -1
                        Quote: D16
                        You are going to apply them according to PGRK. Moreover, with a heavy warhead in conventional design

                        Quote: Vladimir_2U
                        This blow will not be delivered with "axes"; it is not even required to put all SSBNs into the sea for this
                        Where are the words about hitting the Axes? There are words about the impossibility of such a strike.
                        Quote: D16
                        That is, Trident D5 ceased to be an ICBM
                        That is, Trident is launched from silos? And is not the basis of the marine part of the US triad?
                        Quote: D16
                        1. Since when did axes begin to work on moving targets.
                        And these are not my words.
                        You declare the impossibility of a sudden disarming strike against us, you actually declare the possibility of an instant launch of missiles in our counter-strike, ignoring the loss of time for making a decision about warning, time for the actual notification, time for making a decision on launching missiles, time for preparation to launch missiles (even if you imagine that a silo from a silo starts instantly, which is not so obvious, it just takes a couple of minutes to bring the PGRK into combat position) without giving any intelligible arguments ENTOV for it. Really:
                        Quote: D16
                        When there is no argument, any argument is futile
                        .
                      3. D16
                        D16 28 December 2019 13: 38
                        -1
                        Where are the words about hitting the Axes? There are words about the impossibility of such a strike.

                        I have given you your words about the impact of 200kg warhead on the PGRK.
                        That is, Trident is launched from silos? And is not the basis of the marine part of the US triad?

                        Intercontinentality is determined not by the type of start, but by range. According to all the canons of Trident D5, like Bulava or Sineva are sea-based ICBMs. By the way, they still have a minimum launch range. The same important characteristic.
                        You declare the impossibility of a sudden disarming strike against us, you actually declare the possibility of an instant launch of missiles in our counter-strike, ignoring the loss of time for making a decision about warning, time for the actual notification, time for making a decision on launching missiles, time for preparation to launch missiles (even if you imagine that a silo from a silo starts instantly, which is not so obvious, it just takes a couple of minutes to bring the PGRK into combat position) without giving any intelligible arguments ENTOV for it.

                        Yes. And all the processes you listed will be done by different people not sequentially, but simultaneously. Just do not understand the meaning of the alert. Why spoil people last ten minutes of life?
                      4. Boa kaa
                        Boa kaa 28 December 2019 17: 36
                        +3
                        Quote: D16
                        And all the processes you listed will be done by different people not sequentially, but simultaneously. Just do not understand the meaning of the alert.

                        1. In the Strategic Missile Forces, and then on the Strategic Missile Forces, the KSBU was introduced, which issued a control signal to start prelaunch missile weapons for combat use. Preparation is in the machine. Operators only control the correctness and sequence of operations.
                        2 minutes? Go offline OS. And those on duty - to launch towards the flying / falling BB of the adversary. This is a lot! Here 10-5 minutes - the edge for DS ... and 7 minutes - a luxury!
                        3. The bottleneck is the issuance of a command from Cheget to use nuclear weapons. (To figure out on 3 when 1 panics is hard!)
                        So, the main thing is not to oversleep the beginning, otherwise Perimeter will carry out "work on mistakes".
                        AHA.
        2. SVD68
          SVD68 28 December 2019 10: 02
          0
          What are hundreds and thousands of objects? ICBMs and so on combat duty, i.e. on alert. Half SSBNs and so on combat duty. What else is needed? Fit a pair of Ohio with cr to the SSBN bases.
        3. bk0010
          bk0010 28 December 2019 17: 21
          -1
          A massive SUSPENDED strike is entirely possible by US submarine missile carriers from the North Sea. Moreover, the flight time will be the same as that of the RSD in Europe.
      3. Mikhail m
        Mikhail m 6 January 2020 20: 29
        0
        Quote: Vladimir_2U
        it deals with a SUDDEN disarming strike!
        Well, if we consider the war as an exchange of nuclear strikes, then surprise can be ensured, although there can be doubts about this. But preparing the country for the outbreak of war, mobilization, increasing combat readiness, withdrawing forces from reserves, etc. intelligence cannot view by definition. So talking about surprise is for the poor. Retaliatory strike will be guaranteed. And partners, hopefully, do not suffer from suicide complexes. Especially after the response statements by decision centers.
    2. Svetlana
      Svetlana 28 December 2019 10: 24
      -2
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      And if in the event of a conflict undermine a dozen large warheads stuffed with metal debris in this orbit, what will happen to all this space infrastructure?

      There is a better way - to simultaneously explode on the moon 3 shallow penetrating penetrating thermonuclear munitions at a depth of 20 meters below the lunar surface at the vertices of an equilateral triangle with an edge of 200 m. The power of each of the three is 10..30 Mt, depending on the mass of the payload that the super-heavy launch vehicle can take and deliver to near-moon orbit. After synchronous blasting from the barycenter of an equilateral triangle of epicenters, a cumulative jet will fly out in the direction of the geostationary orbit at a speed of 5..10 km / s, consisting of lunar soil. The total volume of lunar soil in the cumulative stream will be 200 * 200 * 200 = 8 * 10 ^ 6m3 (a cube with an edge of 200m). This cumulative stream will reach the geostationary orbit in 10 hours and riddle all the satellites on it. Recently, the super-heavy launch vehicle project was redone - a universal adapter module was added, for docking not only with manned, but also with unmanned payloads. According to some reports, the Americans have already begun to guard the moon)
      1. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 11: 02
        0
        Brilliant, be our brilliant a mechanic, a strategist!)))
      2. Winnie76
        Winnie76 28 December 2019 14: 24
        0
        Quote: Svetlana
        The total volume of lunar soil in the cumulative stream will be 200 * 200 * 200 = 8 * 10 ^ 6m3 (a cube with an edge of 200m). This cumulative stream will reach the geostationary orbit in 10 hours and riddle all the satellites on it.

        Not otherwise, I calculated the AI ​​stream laughing
  2. asv363
    asv363 28 December 2019 06: 32
    0
    You can be sure that in the event of a conflict, when the enemy himself will be its initiator, all forces will be involved, they will raise to heaven AWACS aircraft, balloons, airships and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of searching for air targets.

    Alexei, dear, what balloons and airships are you talking about? They are bought in bulk in the US Department of Defense ?!
    1. Shopping Mall
      28 December 2019 08: 21
      +3
      Quote: asv363
      Alex,


      Andrei hi

      Quote: asv363
      You can be sure that in the event of a conflict, when the enemy himself will be its initiator, all forces will be involved, they will raise to heaven AWACS aircraft, balloons, airships and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of searching for air targets.
      What balloons and airships are you talking about? They are bought in bulk in the US Department of Defense ?!


      First, the United States has a draft project, JLENS, I mentioned it in the article Ensuring the operation of air defense systems on low-flying targets without involving the Air Force https://topwar.ru/157292-obespechenie-raboty-zrk-po-nizkoletjaschim-celjam-bez-privlechenija- aviacii-vvs.html, by the way, we also have similar projects Revival of airships. Airships as an important part of the 157696st century armed forces https://topwar.ru/XNUMX-vozrozhdenie-dirizhablej-dirizhabli-kak-vazhnaja-chast-vooruzhennyh-sil-xxi-veka.html

      Secondly, as I think, the United States does not yet see a significant threat from the CD for itself. we have few of them. If, for example, the PRC acquires a couple of thousand KR on alert, on carriers capable of reaching the target in the United States, or we make 100-500 "Petrels", then the United States will easily intensify work to protect its territory, and most likely balloons and / or radar airships will be deployed. The same can be said about the UAV.
      1. alstr
        alstr 28 December 2019 09: 29
        0
        About easy - it is said loudly, because Americans themselves recognize the problems of airspace control. It is enough to recall a couple of catastrophes of light-engine aviation, when the fallen were simply not found or found after a long search.
        Yes, and the same Mexican border flies a lot of things from drug lords.

        Perhaps a mass salvo can be traced, but single missiles may well miss (especially if they fly along desert routes).
      2. Cympak
        Cympak 28 December 2019 09: 36
        +1
        Another problem is that you can only shoot the Petrel during a threatened period to the north and east. In the west, the sky is controlled by NATO air defenses in the south, Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan and China, which, obviously, will strongly oppose a nuclear missile with radioactive exhaust flying in their skies.
        Starting through the North Pole is also limited, as this direction is densely blocked by the NORAD radar field. In the east, Americans and Japanese can unroll the curtain of AUG, AWACS and Aegis destroyers.
        An extremely expensive (due to a nuclear reactor) and questionable weapon efficiency is obtained by this "Petrel".
      3. asv363
        asv363 28 December 2019 09: 46
        +1
        Quote: AVM
        Quote: asv363
        Alex,


        Andrei

        Andrey, I apologize for my own carelessness. Since 2012, this has not happened.

        Quote: AVM
        First of all, the USA has a draft project, JLENS, I mentioned it in the article Ensuring the operation of air defense systems on low-flying targets without involving the Air Force https://topwar.ru/157292-obespechenie-raboty-zrk-po-nizkoletjaschim-celjam-bez-privlechenija- aviacii-vvs.html

        Thank you, I read the article by reference in today's article, as well as the comments on it. I did not work with balloons, but for about three years I had the opportunity to fix the mast extensions to the ground with my own hands. A tedious task, although the design was rigid. How and by what outfit of forces it is possible to fix the balloon and align the canvas of the antennas fixed on it - I can not imagine. In addition, the time for filling the balloon with helium or hydrogen is not known. Sailing will decently interfere. I think so - let's leave the fix idea to the Americans.
      4. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 10: 00
        0
        Andrey, greetings, how do you like this? "In this case, neither jamming (the enemy may have optical reconnaissance means) to deploy decoys will help. " Optics can probably be fought in peacetime, from covering the time and place of deployment with smoke, to irradiating ALL lasers undeclared as optical, flying over our territory with lasers.
        1. Shopping Mall
          28 December 2019 10: 33
          0
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          Andrey, greetings, how do you like this? "In this case, neither jamming (the enemy may have optical reconnaissance means) to deploy decoys will help. " Optics can probably be fought in peacetime, from covering the time and place of deployment with smoke, to irradiating ALL lasers undeclared as optical, flying over our territory with lasers.


          Good afternoon!

          Fumes themselves are a unmasking factor, either Russia’s floor will have to smoke, and it’s unstable - wind, precipitation. The problem with camouflage will always be that we will not reliably know whether they see us or not, how many sensors are there - IR, UV, TV, yes + radar, we can only guess.

          As for laser blinding, there will most likely be problems of international law, they will say that all satellites are with optics, is this not forbidden?
          1. Vladimir_2U
            Vladimir_2U 28 December 2019 10: 44
            -1
            Quote: AVM
            Smokes themselves are a unmasking factor
            Well, here you can smoke whenever you want, absolutely irregularly, well, of course, with radio-opaque mixtures, for sure there are those in the composition of tank smoke grenades, for example, counteraction by IR, UV, TV, yes + radar is implemented. Of course, without a lot of spare and false positions, smoke is pointless, but for the PGRC along the route they are probably already full. Of course, under the cover of fumes, you can change the position of the PGRK, or you can not change it, let them break their heads.
            Quote: AVM
            As for laser blinding, there will most likely be problems of international law, they will declare that all satellites with optics are not forbidden
            Well, or not demanding something, but simply highlighting, even without irreversible destruction. By the way, Peresvet is not very clear why on duty. )))
          2. Boa kaa
            Boa kaa 28 December 2019 18: 06
            0
            Quote: AVM
            As for laser blinding, there will most likely be problems of international law,

            Having removed their head, they do not cry through their hair! (C)
            Andrew! The right thing is, what mr is right when the question of life and death is at stake? Even in peacetime, the Union did not hesitate to "blind" spies in low orbits ... And you about the pre-war time ... Or do you think that Peresvety was assigned to the PGRK for beauty?
    2. Cympak
      Cympak 28 December 2019 09: 44
      0
      mass production of radar airships can be deployed quickly and easily. They will be relatively inexpensive, in contrast to the "Petrel", which is also not bought in bulk by the RF Ministry of Defense. Why "Petrel" and "Poseidon"? Let's blow up dirty bombs on our borders, if anything. We, as the guarantor said, still go to heaven, and let the enemies suffer ...
      1. Boa kaa
        Boa kaa 28 December 2019 18: 16
        +1
        Quote: Cympak
        Let’s blow up dirty bombs on our borders, if anything.

        Stop raving! You better "pollinate" your apartment with Dichlorvos so that the cockroaches in your head will die! fool
        Quote: Cympak
        Why "Petrel" and "Poseidon"?

        But the Shobes were bulo! - the stubborn Maydan would say ...
        But we are in Russia, therefore, for the particularly quick-witted: to ensure the country's defense capability and discourage the Yankees and K * from adventures of a planetary scale ... (and further on the price list!) yes
  3. Alexander X
    Alexander X 28 December 2019 10: 02
    +1
    Well, speaking about silo-based missiles, for some reason no one assumes that silos with "trompe l'oeil" can be made "milen". And then you have to get to all the mines in order to destroy the real one. But "where to find all the teeth," missiles? This means that the return is inevitable, even only from the mines. Likewise with mobile complexes. Who knows where the rocket is being transported, and where is the mass and size blank ... So the answer will come from here as well ...
    1. Shopping Mall
      28 December 2019 10: 34
      +2
      Quote: Alexander X
      Well, speaking about silo-based missiles, for some reason no one assumes that silos with "trompe l'oeil" can be made "milen". And then you have to get to all the mines in order to destroy the real one. But "where to find all the teeth," missiles? This means that the return is inevitable, even only from the mines. Likewise with mobile complexes. Who knows where the rocket is being transported, and where is the mass and size blank ... So the answer will come from here as well ...


      With PGRK, I think it’s possible, only expensive cars, to simulate you have to use the entire convoy - security, mine clearance, etc.

      But I don’t know the mines, do we control them mutually under the START treaties?
      1. Firelake
        Firelake 28 December 2019 17: 20
        0
        It is forbidden to build new ones
        1. Vadim237
          Vadim237 28 December 2019 23: 37
          -1
          Do not worry another year or two and the USA will leave START 3 - and Russia will follow, and then the agreement on not placing weapons in outer space will sprinkle.
  4. Old Orc
    Old Orc 28 December 2019 11: 54
    0
    Well, at least the fourth leg was agreed and cut off. This is me about the deployment of nuclear weapons in space and on space objects. Although, judging by everything that is happening, this restriction will be removed soon.
  5. Basarev
    Basarev 28 December 2019 12: 52
    0
    As you can see, the ground and air components are highly endangered. What about the sea? I roughly pose questions to the resilience of submarines, but are there surface strategic ships?
    1. Firelake
      Firelake 28 December 2019 17: 21
      -1
      Disguise problems. It’s easier to drown.
  6. Undecim
    Undecim 28 December 2019 15: 17
    +1
    The most important condition for ensuring a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy in the event of a sudden disarming strike is effective functioning of the SPRN and the whole chain that ensures decision-making and issuance of a nuclear strike command
    The author, apparently without suspecting it, raised one of the most important problems.
    If you look at professional analytics such as Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and not agitprop of the VO level and similar foreign ones, it turns out that the main concern in the United States is not the Avangards and Poseidons, which are so admired by the common man, but doubts about the effectiveness and reliability of An early warning system, which lacks such a full-fledged "component" as a global space satellite early warning system. According to the United States, this could lead to "false positives" with corresponding disastrous consequences.
    1. SVD68
      SVD68 28 December 2019 17: 59
      -1
      Quote: Undecim

      The author, apparently without suspecting it, raised one of the most important problems.
      If you look at professional analytics such as Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and not agitation prop level of VO and similar foreign

      It is clear that the main problem of the first disarming strike for the United States is that there is still no means capable of hitting silos before ICBMs are launched from them. Therefore, under the guise of "professional analytics", an operation of psychological control of the enemy is being carried out in order to force the Russian leadership to abandon the doctrine of a retaliatory strike. And yes, this, of course, is not VO level agitprop.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 28 December 2019 18: 25
        -1
        Who about what, and lousy about the bath. Have you ever read my comment?
        1. SVD68
          SVD68 28 December 2019 19: 31
          0
          I read this argument several years ago. All of it is directed against the doctrine of a reciprocal strike - they say that the mistakes of the SPRN, like any complex system, are inevitable and can only be corrected by increasing the time to make a decision. And why do the Americans need to increase the time to make a decision, I wrote above.
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 28 December 2019 19: 41
            0
            I don’t know where and what argument you read, but in my comment about the increase in the time to make a decision there is not a word. It specifically addresses the satellite constellation of the SPRN. Or does the presence of satellites in the system increase the decision-making time?
    2. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa 28 December 2019 18: 34
      +3
      Quote: Undecim
      According to the US, this could lead to "false positives" with corresponding disastrous consequences.

      1. Our Kulibins and industrial companies are working on the space component of the SPRN, and, as promised, by the year 25 they will.
      2. The satellite of the Eye-1 system is the primary link raising the alarm, so to speak. And then comes the classification by ground means, by the same Daryal and Voronezh with Don ... Therefore, the Yankees are not worrying about that ... They would rather look after those who have access to the nuclear button. And then you read about nariks and do not care and it becomes uncomfortable somehow ...
  7. Operator
    Operator 28 December 2019 15: 45
    -1
    Strange argumentation by the author - as soon as so right away laughing

    The Burevestnik supersonic missile launcher is a means of a second, not a first strike, since it will arrive at the target at best 5 hours later (or actually two or three times later) due to the multiple flight time compared to ballistic missiles. But this is one of its three advantages - at the moment the CD enters the enemy's air defense / missile defense zone, its radars and radio stations will be blocked by vast zones of ionized air from nuclear explosions of ballistic missile warheads (the second advantage of the Petrel is a launcher in the form factor large-tonnage container, the third advantage is an unlimited flight range, which allows you to reach distant targets with a maximum ammunition load on board).

    Optical reconnaissance satellites depend on cloudiness and are easily disabled wholesale and retail by the Peresvet laser complex. Radar reconnaissance satellites are extremely few in number due to their mass-dimensional characteristics and control a narrow strip of the earth's surface (~ 16 km) to achieve the required resolution (~ 1 m), which allows each satellite to determine the coordinates of only two to three dozen PGRK (out of the total availability hundreds of units) in one flight over their patrol areas. The viewing interval between satellite flights is from 6 to 8 hours, during which the PGRKs are displaced at a distance of 200-300 km.

    Mine ICBMs are in one-minute readiness, which allows them to launch in a retaliatory strike long before the arrival of enemy ballistic missiles, even in the event of a counter-force strike by the Tridents along a gentle trajectory from the Sea of ​​Japan with an approach time of 10-15 minutes. Moreover, the presence of the enemy's strategic nuclear submarines in the seas coastal with Russia will be known in advance, and the fact of a mass launch of SLBMs directly near the borders of the Russian Federation will be recorded within the first minute by all types of radars from the "Container" and "Sunflower" to the "Voronezh" and SAM S-300/400/500.

    Therefore, nuclear weapons retain their absolute status, despite attempts to somehow defend themselves against it, especially in the case of massive use of nuclear weapons (accessible only to the Russian Federation, the USA, China, Britain and France) with high-altitude nuclear explosions blocking the ABM system and others special measures.
  8. Old26
    Old26 28 December 2019 17: 24
    +4
    The PRC has a more or less full-fledged nuclear triad; the remaining members of the nuclear club are content with two or even one component of the nuclear triad.

    I’ll clarify a bit. A full-fledged STRATEGIC nuclear triad exists in the USA, Russia, and with a stretch of China. The others sometimes have it, but not strategic. Take the same India. There is a marine nuclear component (although the range is relatively small), there is a ground component (most developed), and there is an air component (not strategic, but with a fairly good radius)
    Israel has the same thing. But Britain and France have only two components. In the DPRK, one can generally assume that one.

    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    What is the suddenness here when our air defense and missile defense systems of the over-the-horizon radars are saturated ... over 6000 km missile launch is detected.

    The range of 6000 km does not mean that the missile is detected at such a distance

    Quote: Alexander X
    Well, speaking about silo-based missiles, for some reason no one assumes that silos with "trompe l'oeil" can be made "milen".

    Because 50 years ago we agreed not to do this. Neither we nor them. And not to increase the number of additional mines. So far, everyone follows this agreement, because like any medal, the agreement has two sides. We will make "a million" shafts, and the adversary will just sit and watch? Or will do it too. A couple of millions?
  9. Alien From
    Alien From 28 December 2019 17: 24
    +1
    Thanks to the author. Interesting!
  10. bk316
    bk316 28 December 2019 17: 36
    +3
    While the triad fully justifies its purpose,
    and if there is a withdrawal from all treaties and rearmament of the US Army, then I can tell you THAT will deliberately provide a disarming strike.
    All you need is to put nuclear weapons into orbit in sufficient quantities. Flight time will be tens of SECONDS. However, pay attention no one does.
    Because the deterrence factor is needed on both sides. So everything will be fine. laughing
    Holiday greetings....
  11. Doctor
    Doctor 28 December 2019 21: 19
    +1
    Covered in highly protected ICBM mines ....... the coordinates are well known and modern high-precision nuclear warheads are likely to destroy them.


    This statement appears regularly, taken from somewhere unclear.
    Yes, the coordinates are known, but with all the favorable conditions, for example, the adversary needs about 25 minutes to reach Tatishchevo. And there, from the decision is made to the launch of the rocket, a maximum of 8 minutes.

    Sheltered in highly protected mines of ICBMs are protected from the actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups ....


    But this can be a problem.
  12. Operator
    Operator 28 December 2019 23: 18
    0
    Quote: SVD68
    it is directed against the doctrine of retaliation

    Absolutely right - warheads of ICBMs are perfectly recognized with the help of Voronezh over-the-horizon radars 17-20 minutes before arrival to the targets, and SLBMs fired at a short distance, and MRBMs - with the help of over-the-horizon container radars from the very moment of launch in 10 15 minutes before arrival at the targets.

    SPRN satellites increase the time to detect the launch of ICBMs to 35-40 minutes and do not increase the time to detect the launch of SLBMs at short distances and launch the ballistic missile defense.

    It is an indicator of detecting a SLBM launch at a short distance and launching an SLBM that is critical in calculating the required time to launch a counter-strike. So the SPRN satellites are out of business.
  13. Poplar
    Poplar 28 December 2019 23: 50
    +1
    "It can be assumed that when attacking protected missile silos, the enemy will carry out high-altitude detonation of one or more warheads in such a way that electromagnetic and light radiation will disable the missile defense guidance system immediately before other warheads enter the mine."
    Purely amateurish speculation. And light and electromagnetic radiation does not have such a large radius of effective action. A missile defense system that will allow enemy warheads to go so far is called anything but an ABM system.
  14. wert111
    wert111 29 December 2019 01: 36
    +4
    The "shooter" first takes a very high risk. With a relative equality in the number of warheads and launch vehicles, the initiator should send a greater number of them to the enemy's launchers. And they are usually in desert areas, far from large agglomerations and infrastructure. And this is without a guarantee that it will amaze them, if not all, then at least more. But the "responder" may not bother with the search for empty mines of the enemy in the desert, but immediately hit the infrastructure, cities, ports, etc. And in fact, the initiator may suffer much more seriously than the respondent!
    It turns out that the first "disarming" strike is advisable only with guaranteed destruction of 80-90% of targets. Considering the geography and size of Russia, it is not realistic to cover several hundred launchers in one moment! Overseas, I think they understand this, and at least in the current situation, no one will twitch ...
  15. Greenhorn
    Greenhorn 29 December 2019 08: 46
    +1
    Pretending to be the "world gendarme" the United States does not risk attacking North Korea with nuclear weapons - they don’t even poke their nose there, while other countries that do not possess nuclear weapons were subjected to ruthless bombing and were defeated.

    The United States does not poke its nose there not because they are afraid of Kimov’s nuclear weapons (the real effectiveness of which is still in question), but because there is nothing to take from the Holodrans.
  16. Alisher
    Alisher 29 December 2019 16: 39
    0
    Or you can go the Chinese way: mobile installations in underground tunnels. 10 meter underground shields go fast. The main thing is to have several exits to the surface and parallel paths underground. Well, a few installations should wander there. At a depth of 100 meters, even in non-solid rock, such as limestone, a small piece of the tunnel from a direct hit will be destroyed. Hermodores opening before installation and immediately closing behind it can cut off the blast wave. The chance to get into the launcher is very small, it cannot be tracked, and the destruction of the outputs will not lead to the destruction of the launchers, which is fraught if at least one exit remains intact.
    Mb it is technically possible to launch a rocket through a mine from a depth of 30-50 meters from a mobile installation, from an equipped underground position (officially - Wentshacht).
    If this violates the contract, then let them enter the tunnels only when leaving for duty. There is probably no prohibition of passage through tunnels for mobile launchers.
  17. faterdom
    faterdom 29 December 2019 22: 11
    +1
    Quote: Cympak
    In the west, the sky is controlled by NATO air defense in the south of Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan and China, which, obviously, will be sharply opposed to a nuclear missile with radioactive exhaust flying in their skies.

    Someone ask them? Like Kim Japanese, who always protest the next day.
    And, by the way, who misunderstood: China has been proposed a system of SPRN, joint with us, so it will cover a much larger space, including in our interests. And the Americans really didn’t like it ... Why, interestingly, because a thing is purely defensive, not offensive even with any oblique interpretation?
  18. the same doctor
    the same doctor 30 December 2019 09: 41
    0
    If we have 100 missile defense missiles, this does not guarantee the country's security. But even a hundred Strategic Missile Forces warheads ensure that the enemy does not attack.
    .
    However, for defense purposes, units with separable warheads are of little use. With the same number of warheads, the number of targets for the attacking side unreasonably decreases. Under the conditions of BSU, it is much easier to destroy 100 mines than to hit 10000 false and true positions, despite their less security.
    .
    To create false positions, we must withdraw from START. To create 3 thousand light monoblock ICBMs - similarly.
    .
    The most optimal war scenario. The enemy BSU destroys the silos known to the States, airfields and submarines. Otherwise, as long as this is not possible, they will not attack. In response, a couple of thousand unknown to the States light ICBMs fly, destroying their cities. The advancing enemy troops and military facilities in the near abroad are overwhelming with TNW and OTR. Next comes the chronic phase of the conflict: the most important military targets of the enemy are being tracked, from where attacks can be inflicted on us, which are hit by precision weapons.
    .
    A promising rocket should be small - 10-15 tons in weight to fit in any wagon. The warhead is purely uranium, which can be stored for half a century without maintenance. Superprecision is not needed. These missiles will go into retaliation against areal targets because after the BSU the enemy's mines are already empty. The most convenient location for retaliatory missiles will be arched warehouses. Already today, the installation of "ventilation hatches" in new and existing warehouses should be prescribed. And it doesn't matter that there will be several hundred new missiles in the trucks - amers will have to consider all such warehouses as a threat. You can also place rockets on road wagons. They can even be liquid. After blinding enemy satellites, the preparation time and camouflage of starting positions become insignificant. If we bring the number of targets for BSU up to 10-20 thousand, then there may not be a war.
    1. agond
      agond 9 January 2020 23: 12
      0
      Quote: also a doctor
      The most convenient location for retaliation missiles will be arched warehouses

      The most convenient place can only be the bottom of the sea or ocean, if we assume that a liquid-fueled rocket can be stored under environmental pressure, and why not if the microcircuits of projectiles with programmable detonation can withstand an overload of up to 60000 g. If a liquid-propellant rocket is placed in a container filled with liquid, for example, alcohol and it fills all the voids in it, then the rocket can withstand water pressure at a depth of 5-6 kilometers, the rocket will start after the container floats to the surface, the start signal must be transmitted from a special submarine repeater, or unmanned PA. The enemy's search for such containers with ballistic or cruise missiles at the declared depths is obviously not promising, even if they are not more than 500 km from the coast. And if the containers are buried in the bottom, then it will be impossible to find them even knowing the coordinates, up to a kilometer, by the way, container "handlers" only need to know the coordinates with an accuracy of only 100 km. After the launch of the rocket, it will determine its position by the stars itself and correct its course. that is, there will be no exact information ss coordinates in principle. Naturally, all equipment tends to deteriorate over time, therefore, to control the contents of the container, once a quarter, a pop-up ball (the size of a tennis ball) with a transmitter is thrown out. Having floated to the surface, the ball transmits an encoded radio signal about its condition on a specific date. Intercepting the signal by the enemy or even getting into his hands of the transmitter itself will not help.
  19. Romanov_1942
    Romanov_1942 26 January 2020 13: 37
    0
    Only such, steam, with the generation of steam by a laser, a rocket (patent No. 94073) and an all-round apparatus (Patent application) without infrared radiation and an apparatus that can move with water for a long time can go unnoticed by the enemy.