The interaction of ground-based air defense missile systems and airplanes

В the first part We considered the problem of over-saturation of air defense (AD) through the massive use of air attack weapons (EAS). In many ways, this problem is solved by the use of missiles with active radar homing heads (ARGSN) as part of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), as well as the use of a small radius of a large number of low-cost short-range anti-aircraft missiles as part of the short-range anti-aircraft missiles. comparable to the cost of IOS.

Unfortunately, ground-based air defense systems are not only faced with the problem of exceeding its ability to intercept targets. One of the most important components is the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and aviation Air Force.

The sad fate of ground defense

Article "The most ineffective weapons" Several examples are given of how groups of ground defense defended by enemy aircraft (by the way, earlier the author made several other conclusions).

Operation "Canyon Eldorado", 1986 year. The airspace over Tripoli was covered by French-made 60 systems of the Krotal air defense missile system, seven C-75 battalions (42 launchers), twelve C-125 complexes designed to combat low-flying targets (48 PU), three battalions of the Kvadrat mobile air defense missile systems ( 48 PU), 16 mobile OSR "Osa" and 24 launchers deployed in the territory of the country long-range anti-aircraft complexes C-200 "Vega".
The strike group of 40 aircraft broke through to all the designated targets, having lost only one bomber from the fire of the air defense system.

Operation "Canyon Eldorado"

Operation Desert Storm, 1991 year. A large number of Soviet-made air defense missiles, supplemented by French radars and Roland air defense systems, were present in Iraq’s armament. According to the American command, the Iraqi air defense system was notable for its high organization and complex radar detection system covering the most important cities and objects in the country.
During the six weeks of the Iraqi air defense, 46 combat aircraft were shot down, most of which were victims of heavy machine guns and MANPADS. This gives less than one thousandth of a percent of 144 000 aviation sorties.

Operation Allied Force, the bombing of Serbia, 1999 year. The FRY was armed with the 20 obsolete C-125 and 12 CMS more modern "Cube-M", as well as around 100 mobile systems "Strela-1" and "Strela-10", MANPADS and the system of the barrage anti-aircraft artillery.
According to the NATO command, their aircraft bombed 10 484. The only loud incident happened on the third day of the war: the “invisible” F-117 was shot down near Belgrade. The second confirmed trophy of the Serbian air defense was the F-16 "Block 40". Also destroyed several UAV RQ-1 Predator and allegedly several dozen cruise missiles.

Can these incidents be considered an example of the fact that ground defense is ineffective and unsustainable without air support? Most likely no. If we take the first two examples, Libya and Iraq, then we can doubt the statements of the US Air Force about their high level of organization and combat training. Creating a layered defense is one of the most difficult tasks, and the Arab states have always had problems with combat training and with the coordinated work of the military. Suffice it to recall examples of the Arab-Israeli wars, when, after the first cases of the destruction of an air defense system by enemy aircraft, the rest of the crews began to throw combat posts at the slightest sign of an air attack, leaving the air defense system to the enemy “to be torn apart”.

In general, several factors can be distinguished as a result of which the air defense system in the above cases suffered a defeat:

- The low level of preparation of calculations ZRK, and for the Arab states, you can still add sloppiness in the service;
- even if any calculation of the air defense missile system was well prepared, there are doubts that in the above-mentioned countries measures were implemented to test air defense operations throughout the country;
- used by the air defense system for one or two generations inferior to the weapons of the enemy. Yes, the enemy could also use not only the latest aircraft, but also relatively old equipment, but the core of the air force, which carried out the suppression of air defense, consisted of the most modern military equipment;
- in the first part (“The air defense breakthrough by exceeding its ability to intercept targets: solutions”) we have taken out of the brackets of the electronic warfare system (EW), assuming approximately the same impact that they will have on the part of ground defense, and on the side of aviation of equal capabilities of opponents. In the given examples of the destruction of ground-based air defense, only the EW of the defending side was “bracketed”, and the attackers used it as much as possible;
- well, and probably the most important argument - there were a lot more of them (the attackers). The weight categories of the defenders and the attackers are too unequal. The NATO bloc was created to counter such a powerful adversary as the USSR. Only in the case of a full-scale non-nuclear military conflict between NATO and the USSR (or rather with the organization of the Warsaw Pact) would it be possible to reliably assess the role of ground defense in the conflict, to understand its advantages and disadvantages.

Thus, we can conclude that Libya, Iraq, the FRY lost, not because the ground defense was useless, but because the outdated air defense missile systems, with poorly trained crews, acted against the “system of systems” - the enemy, completely surpassing them in combat training, the quantity and quality of the weapons used, acting according to a single plan, with a single goal.

Suppose that Libya, Iraq or the FRY abandoned ground defense, and instead purchased an equivalent in number of combat aircraft. Would this change the outcome of the confrontation? Definitely not. And it doesn’t matter if these aircraft were made by Russia / USSR or Western countries, the result would be the same, all these countries would have been defeated.

But perhaps their air defenses were unbalanced, and would having an aviation component help them confront the US / NATO? Let's look at examples of this interaction.

The interaction of air defense missile systems and combat aviation

In the USSR, the development of the interaction of different types of troops was taken very seriously. The joint work of air defense and air forces was worked out at such full-scale exercises as Vostok-81, 84, Granit-83, 85, 90, West-84, Center-87, Lotos, Spring-88 , 90 ”,“ Autumn-88 ”and many others. The results of these exercises in the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and combat aircraft were disappointing.

In the process of conducting exercises, shelled up to 20 – 30% of their aircraft. So, at the command and staff exercises (KSHU) “Zapad-84”, the air defense forces of two fronts shot at 25% of their fighters, at KSU “Autumn-88” - 60%. At the tactical level, the air defense system, as a rule, gave the command to fire all air objects falling into the fire zones of anti-aircraft missile units, which completely violated the security of their aircraft, that is, in fact, their aircraft were fired much more than indicated in the analysis materials.

The combined use of air defense systems and the Air Force in local conflicts confirms the danger of "friendly fire" for its own aviation.

Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 with a small total number of fighters, six MiG-21 aircraft were shot down by their own air defense weapons.
In the 1973 war of the year in the Middle East in Egypt and Syria, 83 was destroyed by its aircraft and helicopter, the total loss of aviation from its air defense weapons amounted to 30 percent.
In the Syrian Air Force, from 7 to 11 in June 1982, 68 aircraft and 18 helicopters were shot down by 12 lost aircraft and 8 helicopters with their anti-aircraft weapons.
In the war in the Persian Gulf, the American Patriot air defense system shot down two of its F-18 and Tornado aircraft (with virtually no Iraqi aircraft in the air).
And finally, the last case, when in the Russian VKS operation in Syria, the S-200 air defense system was shot down by the Russian Il-20 aircraft.

Is it possible to assume that in the event of a full-scale conflict Russia / NATO, without the use of nuclear weapons, the situation will change for the better?

On the one hand, high-performance controls have appeared that allow to combine information of ground defense and Air Force aircraft, on the other hand, in a situation where in the sky, in addition to dozens of enemy aircraft and hundreds of guided munitions and false targets, there will also be own aircraft this taking into account the active use of EW by both parties, the losses from friendly fire are not only possible, but practically inevitable, and the percentage of losses is unlikely to be smaller than at the command-staff control, conducted in the USSR.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that, based on open information about military exercises being conducted, it is impossible to draw a conclusion about the development of full-scale interaction of ground defense and air force planes in the modern Russian armed forces.

Well, let us assume, in view of the above, we removed tactical aircraft from the zone of work of the echeloned defense, but how then to solve the problem of the curvature of the earth’s surface and uneven terrain?

DRLO and ZRK airplanes

One of the ways to ensure the ability of ground-based air defense systems to "see" low-flying targets at a great distance is to pair them with an airborne early warning aircraft. Considerable time and flight altitude will make it possible to detect EAS at a great distance and transmit their coordinates to the air defense system.

In practice, there are several problems. Firstly, we have very little DRLO airplanes: 14 A-50 in the ranks and 8 in storage, as well as 5 upgraded A-50. Supposedly, in option A-50U, all the aircraft of Russia of this type that are in Russia should be modernized. To replace the A-50 developed a new aircraft DRLO A-100. At the moment, A-100 is being tested, the timing of its adoption is not reported. In any case, many of these planes, unfortunately, are unlikely to be purchased.

Secondly, the resource of any aircraft is limited, and the hour of flight is extremely expensive, respectively, to ensure the possibility of constant “hovering” of the DRLO aircraft over the ZRK positions does not work out, and to attract DRLO aircraft occasionally means to indicate the enemy a convenient time to attack.

Thirdly, at the moment neither the A-50, nor the A-100 is declared to be able to interface with ground-based air defense missile systems, with the possibility of issuing target designation to them. In addition, even if such improvements will be implemented, the radar of the DRLO aircraft will be able to target only SAMs with ARGSN or thermal (infrared, IR) homing.

DRLO A-50 and A-100 A-XNUMX

The DRLO Ka-31 helicopter is also not suitable for collaboration with the air defense missile system, both because of the outdated filling and the lack of pairing with the air defense missile system, and because there are only two units in the Russian Navy. By the way, X-NUMX Ka-14 helicopters were supplied to the Indian Navy and X-NUMX Ka-31 helicopters in the Chinese Navy.

Ka-31 helicopters of the Russian Navy and the Indian Navy

As a derogation, we can say that even without taking into account the needs of ground-based air defense and naval air defense fleet (Navy), the Russian Air Force is in dire need of an inexpensive modern AWACS aircraft, such as the American E-2 Hawkeye, the Swedish Saab 340 AEW & C, the Brazilian Embraer R-99 or the Yak-44 carrier-based AWACS aircraft developed in the USSR.

Starting from the upper left image, clockwise - American E-2 Hawkeye, Swedish Saab 340 AEW & C, Brazilian Embraer R-99, model of carrier-based AWACS aircraft Yak-44

What conclusions can be drawn?

Based on the examples given, it cannot be unequivocally stated that modern, layered air defense is guaranteed to be destroyed without the support of aviation. The presence of modern military equipment and professionally prepared calculations can radically change the situation. Combined with the ability to repel massive strike of SVO, which are described in the first part, ground defense is fully capable of creating for the enemy zone A2 / AD.

The most important criterion is the comparability of opponents for technical excellence and the number of weapons and military equipment used. In the end, as the seventeenth-century French marshal said. Jacques d'Estamp de la Ferte: "God is always on the side of the big battalions."

The interaction of ground-based air defense missile systems and combat aviation is an extremely complex organizational and technical measure. Presumably, the simultaneous operation of ground-based air defense missile systems and fighters, within the range of missiles of the air defense missile systems, can lead to large losses of their aircraft from "friendly fire." The situation can be aggravated with the massive use of EW by both parties.

Airborne early warning aircraft are too expensive and few in number in order to “tie” them to the air defense missile system, according to the available information, existing airborne early warning aircraft in the Russian Federation have no possibility of issuing target designation to air defense missile systems (Information on the absence of the possibility of issuing a target designation of the air defense system is unconfirmed).

To eliminate losses from "friendly fire", the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and air force planes must be separated in space and in time. In other words, if the ground defense conducts combat work, i.e. reflects the enemy air raid, it is necessary to prevent the presence of its aircraft in the zone of reach of ground-based air defense systems.

How much will this affect the ability of the air defense system to repel an enemy attack? First of all, it is necessary to understand that the very presence of combat aviation will not allow the enemy to form a strike force, optimizing it only for the attack of ground-based air defense systems. To exert pressure on the enemy of its aviation, it is not necessary to enter the zone protected by the air defense system. Airplanes of the enemy's air force can be attacked in advance, before entering the ground defense zone, or the threat of a retaliatory strike can be created on the departure route when the air group has fired at the air defense missile system and has already lost some of the planes.

The threat of a counterstrike on the nomination route to attack the air defense system or retaliatory strike after its completion will force the enemy to change the composition and armament of the air group, optimizing them both for the destruction of the air defense system and for countering aviation, which will reduce the total capabilities of the air group to solve both tasks. This, in turn, will simplify both the work of ground-based air defense missile systems and their own combat aircraft. If the enemy optimizes its air group for air combat, its own combat aviation can use ground-based air defense zones to cover, forcing the enemy or risk coming under fire, or spend more fuel on a safe route around the ground-based air defense.

Thus, the presence of focal echeloned anti-aircraft defense, which has the ability to repel massive enemy strikes and mobile air groups built around DRLO airplanes, will allow creating a flexible and effective air defense of the country, with minimal risk of losing its aircraft from the “friendly fire” of the air defense system.

We can discuss the possibility of destroying low-flying EHVs without using air support for ground and ship-based air defense missile systems, in the next article.

Comments

[YOUR]

I don’t know how it is now, but in my time all the KP ZRBR were combined ZRV and IA. And the automated control systems were Vector, Senezh capabilities not only for automated control of a part of antiaircraft defense, but also the ability to control fighter aircraft.

[alstr]

Moreover, in our city in St. Petersburg, in addition to ZRV and IA, the air defense missile system is also included in the air defense system.
A regular mode of operation is still C-300 - this is actually the mode of issuing DD from a higher-level CP (CP regiment).
And already KP regiment through various control centers (for example, Baikal) can receive DD from ANY sources.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: alstr

Moreover, in our city in St. Petersburg, in addition to ZRV and IA, the air defense missile system is also included in the air defense system.
A regular mode of operation is still C-300 - this is actually the mode of issuing DD from a higher-level CP (CP regiment).
And already KP regiment through various control centers (for example, Baikal) can receive DD from ANY sources.

The question is how the performance of target designation is implemented.

One option is that the DRLO aircraft detects a target before the radar system of the air defense system, transmits its coordinates to the air defense system, after which it is detected, escorted and guided by the radar systems of the air defense system. In this case, if the target is below the radar's level of visibility, it will not be able and must wait for the SAM to wait until it approaches the line of sight. Sense from such a pairing a little.

Another option is when the AWACS aircraft issues target designation directly to air defense missile systems with ARGSN. In this case, low-flying targets can be attacked at a great distance. This is how the US Navy can now hit low-flying targets through interaction with the Hawkeye AWACS aircraft.

[YOUR]

Primary information is sent to the processing station of the RTV control system, then it is transferred to the automatic control system of the air defense system and here it is the same and which air defense systems are connected to the specific control system.

[samaravega]

Please do not wishful thinking. Neither the E-2C, nor the more advanced E-2D Hawkeye, nor even the E-3 Avax of any modifications can direct missiles directly, even from the AGRSN, even if launched from aircraft (AIM-120), even from ships (although on American ships, SAMs with AGRSN have not yet been recorded, even the "standards" of either PRGSN or RK). It is impossible to transfer the control center to the missile defense system from the AWACS aircraft: the air defense missile system with the AGRSN is displayed by the radio corrector from the aircraft that carried out the launch to the point where its AGRSN, which has limited capabilities, is able to detect the target, the SAM with the PRGSN goes to the radar reference signal reflected from the target. How can an AWACS aircraft be "crammed" into any of these schemes? What opportunities then open up for the enemy RTR and EW? At least, nowhere in the world is such research ordered or financed by the military. The AWACS aircraft does not transfer to the Central Command not even the air defense missile system, but the air defense command, otherwise interaction and unity of command are disrupted. And the aiming of missiles at a target located beyond the radio horizon (below or further) was worked out and brought to practical use even in the S-200 air defense system by completely different methods (read the textbook of the USSR Air Defense Forces from 1968).

[fsb_buzuk]

And what exactly is the 1968 textbook called?

[samaravega]

"Anti-aircraft missile system S-200 (composition, principle of operation and combat capabilities)." I was wrong with the year - 1969.

[Flash]

As far as I know, the combination of the KP IA and ZRV was used only in the country's air defense forces.
There was also an IA Air Force front-line fighter, as a rule, induced from regimental KP, regimental OBU. And here the problem of interaction, for example, with air defense and air defense of ground forces could be quite acute.
For example, in the GSVG there was a combined KP - RIC and Central Air Defense Bureau and KP Air Force. Again, how effective this turned out to be, in which case, is unknown
The network has good reviews OBUshnikov about working with Senezh, Vector almost never met.

[vitinka]

A nasto togda sistema svoij-cuzoij? Ili ona ne dlja etogo dumana?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: vitinka

A nasto togda sistema svoij-cuzoij? Ili ona ne dlja etogo dumana?

The operation of EW equipment can disrupt the work of one-on-one systems The United States in Iraq shot down their F-18 and the system of others did not interfere.

[Sasha_rulevoy]

Quote: vitinka

A nasto togda sistema svoij-cuzoij?

I will assume that in combat conditions when the radio silence mode is important, they do not use it. Your radar has illuminated you, and you immediately begin to broadcast in non-directional mode in the VHF range.

[riwas]

I think, in this vein, it is of interest not only to use AWACS aircraft, but also a flying missile guidance station.
Read more in my article:
http://www.sinor.ru/~bukren/istrib_1.htm

[mark1]

"Is it possible to assume that in the event of a full-scale Russia / NATO conflict, without the use of nuclear weapons, the situation will change for the better?"
In this case, we unequivocal kirdyk. Even just the amount stupidly crush any quality.
"the resource of any aircraft is limited, and the flight hour is extremely expensive,"
Recall amerkana AWACS in 80-e which almost months (in shifts) hung over Europe when there was such a need
"The Russian Air Force is in dire need of an inexpensive modern AWACS aircraft, such as the American E-2 Hawkeye,"
true truth
"Thus, the presence of focal layered air defense,"
Focal air defense, it is the middle of the 20 of the 20th century — it is necessary to restore the country's air defense.
ZY A lot of copy-paste - at least rearrange words (or is it all yours?)

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: mark1

"Is it possible to assume that in the event of a full-scale Russia / NATO conflict, without the use of nuclear weapons, the situation will change for the better?"
In this case, we unequivocal kirdyk. Even just the amount stupidly crush any quality.

Quote: mark1

"the resource of any aircraft is limited, and the flight hour is extremely expensive,"
Recall amerkana AWACS in 80-e which almost months (in shifts) hung over Europe when there was such a need

So they have money and these AWACS ...

Quote: mark1

"Thus, the presence of focal layered air defense,"
Focal air defense, it is the middle of the 20 of the 20th century — it is necessary to restore the country's air defense.

The country's air defense is just the sum of the centers of ground-based air defense missile systems and aviation mobility. Put so many SAMs to close the entire territory is unrealistic. Here is the density of the radar cover is yes.

Quote: mark1

ZY A lot of copy-paste - at least rearrange words (or is it all yours?)

Kopipasta from someone else's article is highlighted as a quote, the rest of the text is about 10%, everything else is mine.

[mark1]

Quote: AVM

Kopipasta from someone else's article is highlighted as a quote, the rest of the text is about 10%, everything else is mine.

Well, yours is so yours, I just asked.

Quote: AVM

To put so many air defense systems to close the entire territory is unrealistic.

Quite right, the task is being solved in conjunction with air defense aviation, but the European part of the country, by large and medium heights, is completely solvable even during the Soviet era (judging in the Moscow District), and with new opportunities ...

[Avior]

It would seem that in confirmation of his ideas, the author should cite cases of successful use of air defense systems based on the air defense system, and he cites the opposite examples, in order to criticize them, it turns out.

the most important argument - they (the attackers) were much more. The weight categories of the defenders and the attackers are too unequal.

And the attackers will always be more, even with full equality in the forces and capabilities of the opponents. Just because they can concentrate efforts. Add to this the suddenness of the attack, and understand why aviation has great advantages.
You have a focal defense of 100 objects; the attackers will attack the 5-10 of them and get a tenfold advantage in forces.
And then on to the next 10. Either 20 or 30- in any case, the advantage of the attackers will be provided.
And for Russia with its vast territory and a large number of important objects, this is more than relevant, and for any other country with a large territory and a developed economy that requires protection from the attack of many objects.
Further. Somehow, the author first asserts that it is impossible to constantly use ARLO due to the loss of a resource, and then writes

mobile air groups built around DRLO planes

So will DRLO hang in the air constantly or not?
If so, their resource will be spent.
If not, how will they intercept the enemy? How do you know about the attack?
And about the fact that they will attack during the withdrawal, is that well, all of ours have already been bombed, and we ran to give the change?
Yes, and airfields and aviation for the enemy will always be in priority objectives, if aviation is not destroyed on the ground, then it will be a simple matter to take out of its runways for the duration of the withdrawal.
The conclusion is simple - in modern conditions, air defense cannot be based on ground-based air defense systems, especially focal ones. Such air defense will come down only against the "Papuans". And overseas partners in terms of technology, quantity and experience of its use are far from the Papuans.
No matter how remarkable the characteristics of ground-based complexes are, and the Russian air defense systems are "ahead of the rest" in this - they are not a wunderwaffe, they will be crushed by the concentration of efforts and the suddenness of the attack.
The air defense system during the period of danger must be based on warning systems and aviation.
And here, cheap AFDLO planes and fighters cannot do in any way, in my opinion.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Avior

It would seem that in confirmation of his ideas, the author should cite cases of successful use of air defense systems based on the air defense system, and he cites the opposite examples, in order to criticize them, it turns out.

Only in the case of a full-scale non-nuclear military conflict between NATO and the USSR (or rather with the organization of the Warsaw Pact) would it be possible to reliably assess the role of ground defense in the conflict, to understand its advantages and disadvantages.

Quote: Avior

the most important argument - they (the attackers) were much more. The weight categories of the defenders and the attackers are too unequal.

And the attackers will always be more, even with full equality in the forces and capabilities of the opponents. Just because they can concentrate efforts. Add to this the suddenness of the attack, and understand why aviation has great advantages.
You have a focal defense of 100 objects; the attackers will attack the 5-10 of them and get a tenfold advantage in forces.
And then on to the next 10. Either 20 or 30- in any case, the advantage of the attackers will be provided.
And for Russia with its vast territory and a large number of important objects, this is more than relevant, and for any other country with a large territory and a developed economy that requires protection from the attack of many objects.

It is necessary to understand the difference in the word "more." It's one thing 2000 modern aircraft against 50 obsolete aircraft and 50 obsolete separate air defense missile systems, another 2000 modern aircraft against 1000 modern aircraft and 500 modern air defense systems of different classes, acting as one.

Quote: Avior

Further. Somehow, the author first asserts that it is impossible to constantly use ARLO due to the loss of a resource, and then writes

mobile air groups built around DRLO planes

So will DRLO hang in the air constantly or not?
If so, their resource will be spent.
If not, how will they intercept the enemy? How do you know about the attack?
And about the fact that they will attack during the withdrawal, is that well, all of ours have already been bombed, and we ran to give the change?

Most of the aircraft on the airfields, of course, part of the DRLO aircraft with cover in the air in threatened directions. In the next article we will talk about other methods of early detection, in addition to the early warning system.

Quote: Avior

Yes, and airfields and aviation for the enemy will always be in priority objectives, if aviation is not destroyed on the ground, then it will be a simple matter to take out of its runways for the duration of the withdrawal.

To do this, they must be covered with a powerful focal air defense on the basis of the air defense system.

Quote: Avior

The conclusion is simple - in modern conditions, air defense cannot be based on ground-based air defense systems, especially focal ones. Such air defense will come down only against the "Papuans". And overseas partners in terms of technology, quantity and experience of its use are far from the Papuans.
No matter how remarkable the characteristics of ground-based complexes are, and the Russian air defense systems are "ahead of the rest" in this - they are not a wunderwaffe, they will be crushed by the concentration of efforts and the suddenness of the attack.
The air defense system during the period of danger must be based on warning systems and aviation.
And here, cheap AFDLO planes and fighters cannot do in any way, in my opinion.

PMSM main thing - a reasonable combination of what the article and speech.

Thus, the presence of focal echeloned anti-aircraft defense, which has the ability to repel massive enemy strikes and mobile air groups built around DRLO airplanes, will allow forming a flexible and effective air defense of the country’s territory

[Avior]

other 2000 modern aircraft against 1000 modern aircraft and 500 modern air defense systems of different classes, acting as one.

actually from this example it is clear that you yourself understand that the basis of air defense should be aviation, and not ground-based air defense systems.

part of the DRLO aircraft with cover in the air on threatened directions

yeah how about

Secondly, the resource of any aircraft is limited, and the hour of flight is extremely expensive, respectively, to ensure the possibility of constant “hovering” of the DRLO aircraft over the ZRK positions does not work out, and to attract DRLO aircraft occasionally means to indicate the enemy a convenient time to attack.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Avior

other 2000 modern aircraft against 1000 modern aircraft and 500 modern air defense systems of different classes, acting as one.

actually from this example it is clear that you yourself understand that the basis of air defense should be aviation, and not ground-based air defense systems.

The air force must pay special attention, plus they are also in the fact that they are more versatile, but without a powerful air defense system, as you said, they will be shot at airfields.

Quote: Avior

part of the DRLO aircraft with cover in the air on threatened directions

yeah how about

Secondly, the resource of any aircraft is limited, and the hour of flight is extremely expensive, respectively, to ensure the possibility of constant “hovering” of the DRLO aircraft over the ZRK positions does not work out, and to attract DRLO aircraft occasionally means to indicate the enemy a convenient time to attack.

It is one thing to single out one DRLO aircraft for each air defense center that will hover over it like a hula hoop, another is to control the conditional front line in the distance. When a threat is detected, the DRLO plane departs, and then it all depends on where the enemy is flying.

Well, about the resource:

The Russian Air Force is in dire need of an inexpensive modern AWACS aircraft, such as the American E-2 Hawkeye, the Swedish Saab 340 AEW & C, the Brazilian Embraer R-99 or the Yak-44 carrier-based AWACS aircraft developed in the USSR.

[Avior]

The air force must pay special attention, plus they are also in the fact that they are more versatile, but without a powerful air defense system, as you said, they will be shot at airfields.

the question is what is the basis and what is the complement.
the basis is aviation.

It is one thing to single out one DRLO aircraft for each air defense center that will hover over it like a hula hoop, another is to control the conditional front line in the distance. When a threat is detected, the DRLO plane departs, and then it all depends on where the enemy is flying.

that is why aviation has an advantage over ground-based air defense systems.

As for the DRLO, there was still a project on some of the An.
But both the Yak-44 and An were planned for deck use.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Avior

As for the DRLO, there was still a project on some of the An.
But both the Yak-44 and An were planned for deck use.

Hockey, too, but it does not prevent others from using it as a ground, Israel, for example - http://www.airwar.ru/history/locwar/bv/drlo/drlo.html

I haven’t found the cost of E-3, but PMSM Hockey should be cheaper in 3-5.

[Avior]

well, it’s more likely that they didn’t do it.
neither deck nor land.

[voyaka uh]

"It would seem that in support of his ideas, the author should cite
cases of successful use of air defense systems based on air defense missile systems "////
----
The author promotes the correct idea that without intensive support
their fighter-interceptors ANY missile defense
deceived and crushed. Or just break through it to the rear.
Because, air defense (of any density) is passive. Complexes are easily detected
from satellites, and the enemy comes up with an effective plan to deceive them,
"disarmament" (launchers are empty) and, if necessary, destruction.

[bk0010]

The idea is not entirely correct. Recall past articles. What was it talking about? The fact that the destruction of an object covered by an air defense system requires a group of attack aircraft, a group of EW aircraft, a group of demonstration actions, as well as all sorts of scouts, tankers, flying CPs, etc. That is, a big big top and high costs for a bunch of expensive missiles. What is required to destroy an object not covered by air defense? One plane and a pair of smart bombs of 500 kg each. At the same time, this aircraft can at the same time destroy 7 more objects: now they carry 8 tons each, and 2 * 500 kg of bombs will be enough for a heap of objects to stop active activity. Suppose, instead of an air defense system, we cover an object with aviation. The trick is that dedicated planes will have to be on duty around it in the air to provide real cover for the object, otherwise they simply will not have time to get there for protection. Even the on-duty couple from the airfield may not be in time: it all depends on the detection, and a low-altitude breakthrough is guaranteed to increase the detection time (unlike the Stelts). For a long time, neither the pilots nor the technicians can stand it. Yes, and what can the covering pair (less is impossible, and more can be blocked at the price of air defense systems many times) will be able against such a big top? They will also be knocked down. Conclusion: in air defense both air defense systems and fighters are needed.
In general, it amuses me how the same situation is interpreted differently for aviation and for tanks. After all, many say "tanks are not needed: the first ATGM will burn them." But no one says "planes are not needed, the first air defense system will burn them" or "what's the point with these ATGMs, they will be found by regimental reconnaissance means, artillery will smash, even if someone survives under a shrapnel umbrella, then the ATGM itself will be deceived by the Shtora, shot down by an active protection or not pierce the armor. All you need is a tank! "

[voyaka uh]

"Conclusion: air defense needs both air defense systems and fighters" ////
-----
We are talking about the same thing. Both types of defense are needed:
active and passive. Interceptors should not circle over
objects. They must drive away heavily loaded with bombs ahead of time and
rockets fighter-bombers. F-16 loaded with tons
bombs cannot lead an air battle. He will either turn back or
dump the load anywhere and then enter the battle. In any of these
options interceptor task completed.

[samaravega]

I apologize for writing a comment just today, I didn't get to the article earlier. With regard to the load and destroyed objects (even theoretically): 8 tons except for machines of the B-52, Tu-95, Tu-160 and V-1B types, all the others, even the Tu-22M and Chinese H-6, are taken only for overload, with a serious decrease in flight characteristics, primarily range, maneuverability and speed. More than 2 UABs (we have 500 kg each, although in reality they weigh a little more, for IS, 1.500 kg each for Su-24M type machines, in which they still surpass the Su-34, or 554 kg each for the F-16 and "stealthy" and 907 kg each for F / A-18, "Tornado" and more serious machines), no one takes on "board". Accept more than 2 UABs and destroy more than one object for a modern fighter-bomber (frontline bomber) are not allowed by the fuel supply, range and aiming time of the UAB (UR). Even a MiG-27 could actually be dropped by a Chugunin at 2 - 4 points, but without additional aiming and control of the results. So 8 tons and 7 objects are from Münghausen.

[vnord]

Operation Desert Storm, 1991 ... But it’s nothing that Shevardnadze passed all the codes for the Soviet air defense systems to the Aram, and the French too ..

[Avior]

what kind of codes?

[Zakhar345]

He also passed codes in Yugoslavia Libya Syria

[Falcon5555]

It is necessary to distribute the transmitting and receiving antennas. Many cheap radiating, scattered around the area, disguised, one destroyed - the other is turned on. All with uninhabited cabins.

[Avior]

modern airborne AFARs with a mapping mode can find them even without radiation.

[Falcon5555]

Right. But I think that in the populated area there will be a lot of things - metal, transport, buildings. "Cartographers" still need to figure out where what is in their blurry pictures. Again, you can put layouts. You need to move everything frequently. And these "boards" should, of course, try to shoot down in wartime before they map everything. There are other problems as well - communication, for example. Satellites. But confrontation is confrontation.

[Shahno]

// In the end, as the French marshal of the XNUMXth century said. Jacques d'Estamp de la Ferte: “God is always on the side of the big battalions //
But what about the six-day war and the doomsday war ..?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Shahno

// In the end, as the French marshal of the XNUMXth century said. Jacques d'Estamp de la Ferte: “God is always on the side of the big battalions //
But what about the six-day war and the doomsday war ..?

What can you do, the Arabs ...
Exceptions only prove the rule.

[uyry]

Everything is somehow mixed and cutlets and flies and plates and napkins! Today, a clear definition has occurred - air defense aviation is the main force, air defense of the subordinate force is time! Everything depends on the organization of interaction of these two forces — these are two! What is the main task of SV air defense today-to pin down the enemy’s forces at a certain milestone, to force the adversary’s aircraft to occupy the echelon favorable for the strike of our IA. Yes, it is fatal for the air defense of the SV, but thanks to this sacrifice you can overcome the superior enemy in the air. Remember during the Second World War on 30 enemy aircraft shot down, only one was in the air defense of the NE. And this ratio will only increase. Today, the anti-aircraft defense is designed to provide a favorable atmosphere in the air for a massive introduction into the battle of IA. Yes, AWACS aircraft are needed, but today it is necessary to introduce UAVs with the air defense function (i.e., carriers of explosive missiles), and they will be controlled by the MiG-31, Su-35 and the promising MiG-IA. One IA aircraft will attack the enemy in the cloud of air defense drones, using its own detection and guidance tools, using its own guidance data, this complex will already be able to withstand both oversaturation and electronic warfare and enemy fire. An UAV makes all air defense systems move to the sky, becoming more dynamic, more unpredictable, for the enemy. Today, the anti-aircraft defense is tied tightly to its OP. and SP, and this is deadly in the upcoming battle. Recent events in Syria, clearly demonstrate the inferiority of stationary SPs and OPs, in reality it was always-delayed by OPs or SPs — you're all dead. A deeper penetration of aviation air defense and ground-based means is necessary, they should become one organism, with a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities, with high-speed communication with powerful automated combat control circuits, with a single early warning and guidance system.

[alstr]

I want to point out some errors in the reasoning:
1. The main objective of air defense is to prevent an attack on the protected object / area.
2. Based on 1, it is not at all necessary to shoot down planes or IOS - it is enough that they either miss or turn around.
In this sense, for the same WWII there were several thwarted attacks on an object for any downed plane (moreover, hardly anyone will tell you specific figures, since such statistics were not kept for anti-aircraft gunners. Partially and incompletely). And nothing really changed.

The triumph of the air defense system can be considered Vietnam, where a combination of air defense systems, anti-aircraft artillery and artillery was ensured the actual victory of Vietnam.
Moreover, for a certain period of time, the very presence of an air defense system or missile launch made it possible to disrupt the attack of several planes (there were even cases when several planes fell during the launch of one missile - one was shot down by a missile, the others by pilot error)

3. An essential role in the air defense system now and in the future will be played by electronic warfare systems, since This is the cheapest way to prevent the destruction of a protected object. For some reason everyone forgets about him.

but it’s correctly noted that the era of drones begins. And in the near future, it is this niche that will seriously develop both for means of attack and for means of defense.

[uyry]

In Korea, we demonstrated a novelty with which the enemy did not have a fighting technique. Today they present us with a gift in the form of UAVs (drones) and now we do not have an equivalent answer. Now answer, how can you scare a drone? After all, the man-pilot is afraid and mistaken, here’s the answer to 2. I completely agree with the 1st, but as a rule this is the second task, and the first is just to survive the first massive and combined attack of concentrated enemy air attack means, try to inflict him unacceptable damage in forces and means, in order to use the pause to regroup forces and means, to try to maximize the results of the first raid. If there will be a defeat of air defense systems, then there will be no one to protect the object / area, there will be a gain of superiority in the air. Therefore, I see the main objective of the air defense of the air forces in the destruction of enemy attack means, and not allowing on-board weapons to be used in the zone. And EW is good with a clear distribution of zones and heights of responsibility, with a powerful long arm-IA, because with poor coordination you can dazzle yourself and your missiles. My opinion is SV air defense: with mobile balloons equipped with means of destruction on ropes, they force the enemy to rise to a convenient height, reconnaissance equipment must be lifted on stable platforms to increase the detection horizon of the enemy’s aircraft. Do the same with SNR (the second plus is the separation of the hardware and the antenna economy, reducing the likelihood of a calculation defeat). UAVs equipped with outboard equipment, for explosive missiles, with control and launch equipment, without search and guidance equipment, assembled under the direct control of a MiG-31 gunner or similar, destroy enemy’s aircraft at the far border of the zone of possible use of weapons by the enemy. all electronic warfare equipment must enter, because the previous battle gave a ton of information to the electronic warfare equipment and they switch from reconnaissance mode to suppression mode. And only after that ground-based weapons of destruction enter the battle, in all its glory of zoning, separation and overlapping of the zones of destruction, while all electronic means and false targets should be included on the ground, including microwave and PCT stoves for transmission. Today it’s time to move the far border of the affected area to the level of 1000 km

[samaravega]

I have already commented on you, but in another article, albeit on the same topic. Still, I ask you to decide: are you talking about the air defense of the ground forces or the air defense of the country? They have completely different targets, they have to hit completely different airborne weapons, respectively, they must be organized and equipped in completely different ways. Once again I have to repeat: that cruise missiles, that "drones" do not pose a serious threat to the ground forces, tk. capable of effectively hitting only stationary targets (CR), or stationary or completely not covered by means (primarily) RTR and electronic warfare, as well as (secondly) air defense ("drones"). Which of the "targets" is a motorized rifle or tank regiment (brigade) conducting combat operations, maneuvering on the ground and using camouflage means, RTR, electronic warfare, air defense?
If we are talking about the country's air defense and the protection of stationary objects that provide vital activity (hydroelectric power plants, thermal power plants, nuclear power plants, factories, cities, etc.), then you need to understand that the "drones", which are now used as shock, are intended for completely different purposes and these objects are unlikely to be reached, and if they get there, they are unlikely to be incapacitated. I don’t take a hydroelectric power plant or a nuclear power plant with structural protection included in the project, what will two Hellfires do, for example, with the Progress plant in my native Samara? This is the standard "shock drone" download. And this "drone" still needs to fly and aim using control signals from the CP. This is where the expanse for RTR and electronic warfare, not to mention air defense. As for air defense balloons, air defense UAVs, missiles launched from UAVs and guided from the MiG-31. I remember a story 20 years ago. At that time I still had a car produced by AvtoVAZ. I come to the "autodoctor", whom I still trust. I say: "let's tuning, shmuning, bigger wheels," squander "the engine, etc. A competent answer:" the institute designed it (a car, even a VAZ). Are you smarter? "All these questions (balloons, airships, UAVs) have long been studied by the military of different countries (not only the USSR, USA, but also Great Britain, France, Germany, China, Israel, India, Taiwan, Indonesia, etc.). A worthy application has been found for them, everything else is "tuning", "shmuning" from amateurs.

[uyry]

Following your logic, nothing new should appear, and the Russian proverb, everything new, this well-forgotten old, is unknown to you. I’ll try to disagree with you, and the balloons and airships have been tested, but precisely in the tasks in which they tried to use them. You can look at the list of countries you have indicated, but not worth it. In different countries, in different ways, even a rifle shoots, not to mention the work of the brain. Regarding the answer of the Zhiguli repair master, as you asked the question, he answered you (there is no sense for Pontus, but it is always possible for sports). In terms of air defense of the SVD, yes, I mean precisely the SV, and not the object, and the air defense countries have long been engaged in space. And how much will the tank army take in the concentration region? -Much more than any nuclear power plant and hydroelectric power station, and even a large city, together with the adjacent region. By the way, the MiG-6 has a guidance and control function for aircraft in 31 units, bypassing the extra shoulder of ground launchers. I would very much like to look at the ground-based maneuvers of the tank army with the means of the attached and supporting units, and your real decision to disguise and cover the electronic warfare in the area of ​​concentration — I’m 200% sure I wouldn’t cope. How Americans use cruise missiles and drones, MLRS and aviation should be considered, for example, in recent wars (probably only you have missiles launched in marching columns, and the headquarters are controlled from UAZs, and there are no engineering structures in the tank army - some sort of amateurish raid , on your part in matters of air defense SV) My message is simple - the future war will develop in the air theater. Aviation, rocket technology with a long range of destruction and high accuracy, UAVs have unambiguously become the main means of achieving victory over the enemy. Air defense SV is obliged to develop in the direction of increasing the detection range and defeat in control automation, reducing reaction time, and most importantly in intellectual interaction with all the means of struggle against an air enemy. G.K. Zhukov.

[samaravega]

I cannot comment on your last statement, there is nothing. Open the freely available parts of the BUSV, find the term "concentration area" there, see what the company is like in it and think about what the CD can do to it?

[uyry]

If you operate units before the company, then you should not operate not only on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, but also on something larger with MANPADS.

[samaravega]

If you operate armies, give me tactical standards for them. Even the old Soviet BUSVs from the battalion and up are still secret. I referred you to the official document, which is in the public domain - the USP, concerning the company. You did not deign to READ even the 3rd part of the BUSV (name: "platoon, squad, tank"), otherwise you would not write about the "concentration area", because there is no such term in official documents (and the BUSV is the current terms "federal law" for the commander of the corresponding level)! As for the occupied area, camouflage, etc. Trained ground forces are so strong because "every soldier knows his own maneuver." Perhaps a tank army occupies an area corresponding to a large city. But since each company is commanded by about a ram like me, in accordance with the algorithm of actions of the commander, who is taught in any military school, upon arrival in any area (!) I begin my actions with dislocation, engineering support (in common parlance, "digging in" ), the organization of the system of fire, camouflage and security. Only then (although in accordance with the BUSV this is no less important) water supply, food, refueling, replenishment of ammunition, etc. All commanders work according to this algorithm, including the regiment commander (brigade commander). (I have not studied the BUSV link above and am not sure that it exists, but the principles are the same).
Look at the standards for deployment, distances, intervals of equipment and personnel in defense, on the offensive, during the preparation and execution of the march. After that, you can write about the damage that KR can bring SV. I have to repeat myself: without UBC, KR for NE do not present any real threat! Example: NATO operation against Yugoslavia. The second, but more important example: NEVER neither the Americans, nor the British, nor ours (in Syria) set the SV targets for the KR.

[uyry]

Following your logic, there are no headquarters in divisions and armies, there are no missile units, there are no warehouses, and of course there are no strong points (this, since you stubbornly do not want to place 600-1000 tanks and + up to 5000 vehicles, on the ground, with an extremely limited number of routes extension and points of parking and rest). Are you so naive that you consider the use of enemy IOS, including both the Kyrgyz Republic and the MLRS and aviation and drones with UAVs, not practical? Then answer for yourself what Rokossovsky did in the operation Citadel? Did he hit all types of guns in the areas where the enemy was concentrated? Perhaps you will be digging in the area of ​​concentration, but as a rule they prepare the materiel for the offensive, give the last instructions on the extension routes to the line of formation of military formations with the subsequent transition to the attack, replenish material resources, work out interaction on the ground at the borders of the zone of responsibility, put tasks on time and lines of attack. And instead of digging, they are engaged in disguise in compliance with the radio silence mode. This is the time of the highest voltage of the air defense of the air defense, otherwise there will be no one to attack. But try to imagine that an hour before the adversary’s attack destroys your communications center, it’s like WWII, they break through the defenses, get to the line, and then there’s a confusion, it’s not known what further and in which direction the tanks will shoot at the shooting range from the enemy’s side . And who will protect the engineering structures (bridges) from the IOS in the area of ​​responsibility of the corps or division, judging by your logic, the country's air defense, is it really that serious?

[samaravega]

As for Rokossovsky, counter-training was carried out not only by his troops, but also by Vatutin's troops. But there is no consensus on the results. According to German archival documents, they did not even notice her, although even pedantic Germans often "forgot" about failures. But she did not seriously affect anything. The Germans achieved great successes on the southern face not because Vatutin was more stupid, but because in the south they were objectively stronger than in the north, and Hausser's tankmen were much better trained and prepared than their brothers from the Wehrmacht.
Everything that you write about headquarters, warehouses, etc. takes place. But, I have to repeat, all this is made mobile in SV. For mobile targets, it is the KR (in the version "tomahawk" and derivatives, with the TERKOM or NAVSTAR system) and "stealthy" do not pose a threat due to restrictions imposed by control systems (for KR) and search and sighting (for "stealthy"). For mobile, and even dispersed and at least trying to disguise targets, you will have to work with conventional aviation, using UR, KAB and "chugunin", using PPS operating on radiation, etc. And this is a completely different story.
A concrete example: the multi-day bombing of Yugoslavia affected the civilian infrastructure, but did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army, the multi-day bombing of Iraq in the first war affected the command and control and communications throughout the country, but did not at all interfere with the RG divisions. They (the division) had to then "iron" the A-10, "Apaches" and "cobras", which affected the level of losses of these aircraft.
As for who will protect what, there is a long-ready answer to this: there are air defense assets attached to the battalion, there are regular air defense assets of the regiment, the same in the division, etc. If there is a desire, I can paint the staff of the respective units and units. The country's air defense forces have nothing to do with it.

[uyry]

You. You think in vain that the pilots are so brave. The first raids will always be UAVs and believe me it is much cheaper than an aviation outfit and definitely more efficient. And for what purposes it is the combat control system that determines how to beat Amers. And as for what and how it affects, I’ll say simply, if 300 kg of warhead warms, then the head starts working after half an hour, and 10-20 kg is much easier. Do not console yourself with hopes that the adversary will save the KR, MLRS, UAVs, no, he will save aviation, that's for sure. The methodology of recent wars is the destruction of targets without entering the zone of destruction by the enemy. And in Yugoslavia, so you know, on the third day of the bombing of the army, there simply were no more, minor foci of resistance, like flashes that flared up, then rotted out, but it was already agony. And as for the Citadel, the point is not whether the missions were achieved or not by the artillery raid, but that, as opposed to your thoughts, a blow by all means to the places where the enemy’s groups are concentrated, before it is deployed in military formations, it’s a very promising business. So that the air defense of the SV has exactly the same tasks as the target air defense, only everything is dynamic and in an extremely limited time, and even with poorly established interaction with the covert troops and with the IA and RTV. The old disease, a connection, is also called the difference in location on the ground - with its own air defense, with its own infantry, with its own artillery, etc. And if we add here commanders-tyrants and non-killed headquarters, then it’s just rubbish. This is me about today's cheers-patriotism and the miracle of military air defense in the form of a shell of all S-s. In addition to 300, and TOR - everything else is raw with a short MTBF, one hope for Shilki, Wasps and S-10 (just kidding of course). And about the guidance, you don’t worry much, nobody canceled the backlight and forced guidance for the Kyrgyz Republic, and for this you will need the F-22 and F117 and Avax, except for the aircraft guides that will operate UAVs and reapers. Conclusion - I can’t agree with your idea of ​​the air defense missile defense tasks today, it makes no sense for the enemy to lose pilots and aviation in the initial period of gaining superiority in the air, and therefore the first strike on the ground forces will be unambiguously delivered by missiles, long-range MLRS, UAVs, - and this means, if the SV-70 air defense does not work, XNUMX% of the defeat of troops and equipment in the concentration regions will be provided, and there are not so many of these areas in the western or eastern theater of operations. Note Nato doesn’t rush aviation to our borders, but pulls the KR and MLRS, but the ABM proves once again the correctness of my conclusions.

[samaravega]

Sorry, the impression is that you have little understanding of what you are writing about. What is the backlight mode for the CD? What is Forced Aim Mode? There are missiles with a semi-active laser seeker, but they are carried by F-16, F-15E, A-10, helicopters and for launch they enter the air defense zone. F-117, I already wrote, is removed from service. The F-22 will not "highlight" anything, the use of emitting means is contraindicated by the very concept of "stealth". You can, of course, hang the laser control station on it, spoiling the "stealth", they say a good hammer is obtained from a microscope. Already tired of writing that the CD, especially the drones that easily "fight off control" of electronic warfare means, do not pose a serious threat to mobile targets, tk. CANNOT DISCOVER THEM AND HIT. MLRS are also intended for firing at targets with known coordinates, preferably areal. So the enemy will have to climb and take risks, like ours in Syria. Or bomb with a "carpet" from 9.000 m (again, like ours in Syria). You can estimate the effectiveness of such bombing on tanks yourself.
Where did you get such information on the losses of the Serbs? Send a link, or the name of the book.

[uyry]

You judge the working hours of the Kyrgyz Republic by the press, I had to try it personally. Do not cycle on an illiterate description of technology and how to control it. Always proceed from the concept of goal-value, this principle is true from the time of the Second World War, to this day. And the electronic warfare system is exactly the doll with which nobody really knows where to stick it today, it seems to be necessary, but its own go out, and it’s impossible to use it separately. If you doubt the work of NATO intelligence, I can say that it works many times better today than ours, and therefore it will not be difficult for the adversary to reveal the plan of our former firefighters and ladies in admiral's uniform. F-117 today in the amount of two air groups located in Iraq and working in Syria, possibly will work in Iran. The target can be illuminated from the ground, but the guidance from the F-22 and F117 aircraft, and since everything will be at altitude, neither the electronic warfare system nor the ground-based detection system are capable of fighting, this is stated by the theory of radio wave propagation space. And forget about mobility in the initial district — you will be shot first if you unmask the district with your climbing over ravines and kosurams. Ours in Syria would be glad not to get into trouble, but the military-industrial complex had enough money for two launches of the Kyrgyz Republic. And for Serbs, just a service.

[samaravega]

Once again, I ask you to explain how you can highlight a target for a missile with TERK or NAVSTAR? I have already written about others, with backlight, I will not repeat. Have tried the operating modes of the CD with your own eyes - write. No secret information is needed, just physical principles (there is such a science - physics). About the F-117 in Syria, as it is now fashionable to say - "fake", and a low-level. The Americans and the British (special forces) tried the illumination from the ground against the "Scud-B" in Iraq. I have to repeat myself again - "stealthy people" with such illumination can work, but the principles of stealth are violated. Therefore, the F-16, F-15E, Tornado worked. The result is low efficiency, casualties among the special forces. It turned out to be more effective with artillery and aviation to plant mines "drop-in" on possible routes for the advancement of Iraqi launchers, since these launchers moved at night. I practiced mobility in the initial area during exercises in the SA, as well as in Dagestan and Ichkeria (there really were no exercises, I had to crawl along the ORIGINAL Frontier). I wouldn't crawl, I wouldn't write anything now, I would stay there. Regarding the Serbs and the "theory of propagation of radio waves in space", this is the same for you as for managing armies - purely from experience. Well thank you.

[uyry]

TERKOM or NAVSTAR

[samaravega]

Thanks for the given table, but I saw nothing new in it. Unfortunately, there is no information in it, which of them (RC) are intended to destroy what targets (for example, the RC is equipped with ARGSN for hitting sea targets, but they cannot be used against ground targets) + from it (tables) breathes a "journalistic" approach. For example: "RL millimeter wave". RL can be active, semi-active, passive. The question is of principle. For example, "highlighting a target" can (and should) be done only for a semi-active one. The range plays a second role, it determines the purpose of the CD. For example, the aforementioned millimeter allows you to distinguish a small-sized target of the "tank" type on the ground. But any coin has two sides. Distinguishing small-sized targets, such a GOS (active) has a small "field of view" and poorly "sees" or "does not see" at all through smoke, fog, rain, snow. Accordingly, the indicated CR needs a very accurate targeting and is completely inapplicable, for example, against ships. Not to mention the fact that one of its ARGSN is more expensive than a tank. The same is true for the "laser seeker". Plus, some information generally sins against the truth. For example: ASMP "ANN for relief correction of millimeter wave radar + IR seeker". The ASMP is the only French air-to-ground missile to carry an SBS (nuclear). France is the only developed country that has not adopted TERCOM missiles. Perhaps I missed the information, and they still delivered TERKOM. But why on a rocket with SBS RL and IR seeker? She doesn't need such precision. Moreover, these two GOS are combined with difficulty. Check the source. With regard to foreign weapons, I recommend Foreign Military Review.

[uyry]

It seems that our dialogue has entered the phase of a deaf conversation with the radio. In your logic, just talk about anything and everything at once. Try to comment on what you know, not what you know. The table was given to you with only one thought, so that you understand that all KR and UAVs from the manufacturer’s factory are multi-channel in control and the variations in their application are very wide. Now interpolate what you read, into what I previously wrote. And if you know at least a little of the basics of the combat employment of the air defense forces of the SV-all your unnecessary questions will disappear.

[samaravega]

DATA! So far from you only "blah blah blah". Name at least one "multichannel" rocket. I'm just writing exactly what I know. You do not cite a single source, do not answer any specific question, do not refute any of my arguments with facts. Example: refute my statement about the absence of GOS on the ASMP SD (with facts and references). No - it's you radio "a la Vova Fabulous".

[faterdom]

There is also a factor, such as when the same strong aggressor, with the same, if not greater superiority in aviation and in air defense generations, is nevertheless afraid to start a war ...
Yes, yes, I'm about the DPRK.
Well, against Russia, all these factors need to be multiplied: the best air defense in the world is not known about electronic warfare, but it is developing and has already been effectively tested in combat conditions, there are high-precision strike weapons in the arsenal, well, plus, such a small cherry on the cake is a nuclear arsenal, which no one can neutralize.
It is in these areas that it is imperative to work, because the weak point of the aggressor's aviation is that it needs to take off from somewhere and land somewhere. But we do not promise her that. Whether it is an aircraft carrier, or our former airfields in the Baltics and Poland, Ramstein or Aviano ... In any attempt at a massive strike against our air defense systems, the task of repelling this raid is of course important. But ... this factor should cool all the "Wishlist" before making decisions, and not after.
This does not deny all the aspects set forth in the article, but I draw attention to the incorrectness of comparing us with Iraq, Libya or Yugoslavia. Let’s better look from the side at Kim Jong-un - for now, at this stage, he seems to have solved the security task of his country.

[uyry]

Dear Andrey! You should not console yourself with hopes and engage in cap-breaking, at least once, for our country it has cost tens of millions of lives and 50% of the destruction of the economy. The war for resources has been, is and will be, and with our state it is already in full swing, only for the time being it has not entered the hot phase. The ruling elites of the world lost fear, they do not remember the horrors of the Second World War and the use of nuclear weapons in Japan. Leading economies of the world, built on debt instruments, are driven into a corner, from which the only way out is war. Only she will write off all her debts and cut the Gordian knot of accumulated social and economic problems. Are you sure that today, if necessary, an order will be issued to retaliate with the use of nuclear weapons, judging where the children, houses and money of our ruling elite are, I’m not sure. Here is the simplest answer for you, to your cherry, I'm afraid not on the cake.

[Viknt]

There was a time when tanks were the main striking force, this led to the rapid development and growth of anti-tank weapons. It got to the point that the tanks considered an anachronism, stopped their production and closed the factories. Now the main scarecrow is the STS, which involves the search and creation of means to counter this threat. Destroy an air target is not just a problem, the problem is the timely detection and target designation. In principle, there is no technical difficulty in creating an arbitrarily large number of ground-based (mobile) relatively cheap means (points) of passive airspace control comparable to the number of airborne targets. The creation of a reconnaissance, target designation, and air-launched missile guidance station based on a light transporter suggests itself.

[uyry]

Yes, we have the A-50 and A-100 complex. However, I recall that in the north and north-east direction, the territory of Russia was closed only three years ago, this is a question about there are no problems. Time, speed, a long arm is what put aviation and missile systems in a number of extremely inconvenient and dangerous means of struggle. Well, if it’s about the ease of shooting down air-launched missiles, then using various defense techniques, for one LA, the consumption of 4 to 6 missiles at the far border of the affected area is about 300. The question is how many years and the state will spend on the production of the required number of missiles of all types and all the complexes? The answer is never, for we must switch to pasture. That's where the dog is buried, the economy is extremely weak, and it seems that our elite is not going to change anything. This is your answer to the STS horror stories. And then, like in a fairy tale, there are pouting cheeks, winning orders, medals, and even though they couldn’t release a single new transport aircraft, they couldn’t even repeat the AN-24 (26), and they produced as many CRs as they could launch barely enough with three ships and one submarine. Our probable enemy’s SVN fleet totals about -18000 units. And we are 1500-1600 airplanes and as many ground-based air defense units - and if we remove the obsolete from the register, then the alignment is clearly not in our favor.

[Viknt]

You are right in many ways, nonetheless. The reflection of solitary, massive and raids in a full-scale war has some differences with the use of appropriate means not only of defense, but also of attack.

[uyry]

Then you need to start first

[Viknt]

You need to start on time.

[samaravega]

Thank you, the article is interesting, the whole series is focused and interesting, but I have to point out some inaccuracies.
1. Not a single AWACS aircraft in the world can and should not direct a single missile by definition. They have different tasks, respectively, completely different radars, etc. The control center from it to the air defense system should ideally not do the same - if this is a "big" war, how many air defense systems (starting with the regiment's anti-aircraft battery and higher) will be in the control zone of the AWACS aircraft? Taking over the leadership of them is a task for a serious headquarters on the ground. So, the Central Command goes to the air defense command post (army, front, division - depending on what forces are involved), already further - to the air defense unit (subunit) and to the air defense system. At the end of the Union, the air defense automatic control systems were created, which did such work in automatic mode and even ensured the compatibility of the automatic control systems of the country's air defense forces and the air defense forces of the ground. As now - I do not know. Shooting missiles "over the horizon" - so far from the area of ​​"dreams" that our S, that the American Patriots must "see" the target by a multifunctional station, otherwise there is no interception. The technical capabilities of the Aegis and the "standards" in theory make it possible to "see" and direct the missile from one ship, and launch it from another, but the Americans have not advanced beyond several experimental firing, perhaps, they do not see the point, because Aegis, for all its advancement, is inferior even to Patriot in terms of the number of target channels. Due to certain technical solutions incorporated into it during its creation, it is "not cured".
2. I don’t know how the A-50, but the Ka-31 was originally made under the automated control system, with automatic data processing, “tie-in” of target traces and transmission of information to the command post. That is why it has a small crew. And his equipment is newer than that of the "clean" A-50. So it is exactly compatible with the air defense command post. True, it was made for the fleet, maybe it is compatible with the Lumberjack, but not compatible with the Polyana? I don’t know, but the equipment of the Oko complex is designed exclusively to work with a ground (shipborne) automated control system and its integration into the air defense system is a matter of communication.
3. In terms of "friendly fire" I completely agree, even in the 08.08.08 war. the main losses of our aviation were from our own and Ossetian MANPADS. Well done in this regard, the Jews. I have never met official statements, but judging by the heap of information, they have long been "separating" their aircraft and air defense systems far enough from each other.

[swzero]

in all examples of the opposition of air defense and means of attack described by the author, the latter were ahead of the first by 1-2 generations. modern swp opposed hopelessly outdated air defense. Therefore, all further conclusions can be safely ignored.
Well, it is worth noting that the development of air defense and spv is not linear. Air defense develops more intensively. The air defenses of the 80s have chances against modern swp, but the swp of the 80s have chances against sovoyomnoy air defenses