The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 14. First damage
We completed the previous article in the first shots of the Asama, sounded in 12.20, about a couple of minutes before the Russian ships left the Korean territorial waters. However, absolute accuracy is hardly possible here, but still our compatriots believed that they had gone beyond the limits of neutral waters only two minutes later. Immediately after the start of the battle, between the 12.20 and 12.22, “Varyag” and “Koreyets” brought the revs up to the corresponding speed of the 7 nodes (apparently, for this they had to slow down, but this is not accurate) and approximately at 9-10 nodes in view of the current, we moved further along the fairway.
At about the same time (12.20-12.22), the flagship cruiser Naniwa was removed from the anchor. The flagship believed that they did it in 12.22, but at the same time indicated that it was done simultaneously with the first salvo of the “Assam”, and the armored cruiser started the battle two minutes earlier. Speed brought to 12 nodes, guns left port made to fire.
By the way, here the Japanese reports have known contradictions: the commander of "Takachiho" Murakami claims that his cruiser was off the anchor and made his turn in 12.25, while the report of the commander of "Naniva" reports: "Started movement following Chiyoda with the speed of 12 nodes ". This phrase can hardly be interpreted in the sense that “Naniwa” followed Chiyoda, because neither domestic nor Japanese combat schemes show the moment when Naniwa would follow Chioda in the wake.
Accordingly, the phrase “Battle Report” should be understood in such a way that “Naniwa” made a move after “Chiyoda” did it, but it “does not fit” with the report of its commander ...
In fact, reading the “Battle Reports” of the Japanese, we will find many similar inconsistencies, some of which we mention in our series of articles. However, one should not see in these discrepancies evil intent, or the desire to confuse someone: the whole point is that the perception of the reality of people in battle varies greatly, and they, alas, often see (and then describe in reports) not quite and not at all) what actually happened. This is not to mention the fact that often this or that time is indicated very roughly, or with rounding to the nearest 5 minutes.
12.22 - “Varyag” came out of the territorial waters and fired back at “Asam”, using armor-piercing shells (apparently, they were the commanders of “Varyag” who fired the whole battle). For the Korean, the distance to the Japanese ships was still too great. And then an event occurred that is interpreted by many as evidence of the lack of professionalism of Russian officers. The fact is that the junior navigator of Varyag, midshipman Alexei Nirod, who is responsible for determining the distance to the enemy, incorrectly measured the distance to Asama, specifying the 45 cables, while according to Japanese data, the distance was only 37-38 cables ( 7 000 m).
Most likely, it was the Japanese who were right - although they managed to achieve the first hit only through 15 crumpled after opening fire, but their first volley went to the “Varyag” “with a small flight”. In fact, the word “flight” was used here in a very peculiar way, because the descriptions imply that the shells fell in front of the Varyag’s nose, that is, from the point of view of the Asama’s gunners, this was not a flight, but a shortfall. But, obviously, a small one, so that the Japanese estimate of the distance between “Asama” and “Varyag” at the beginning of the battle looks much more accurate than the Russian one.
So, everything seems to be clear - midshipman A.M. Nirod made a gross mistake by giving the distance by 20% more than the actual. But what is interesting is that judging by the description of V. Kataev, on the Koreyts, it was also believed that Asamu was separated from the gunboat near the 45 cable: “the distance was reported - it turned out to be over 45 cable”. In the Korean logbook, we can also read: “The battle was at a distance of 45 cable and our shells did not reach the enemy.” However, the description of the battle itself is very short and blurry, so it’s not even clear what time the mention of the 45 cable belongs, either by the time of the whole battle before the Varyag turn back, to the anchorage, or specifically by that moment. However, in the report of the commander of the "Korean" GP. Belyaev said quite unambiguously: "At 11 and three-quarters of one o'clock in the afternoon, when the mile departed from the anchor position on the 4, the Japanese opened fire from the 45 cable distance."
In other words, it seems that the distance in 45 from cable to “Asama” was determined on both “Varyag” and “Koreyets”. Of course, the gunboat could have also been mistaken, but it is surprising that two ships almost simultaneously made an error with the same error.
Now recall that the distances to the Japanese were determined using a Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometer: without going into a detailed description of his work, we note that in order to correctly determine the distance, it was necessary to know the exact height of the target, that is, the distance from the waterline to the tops of the masts. Only in this case the micrometer made it possible to calculate the distance correctly. And therefore, having set out to understand whether AM Is really Nirod made a mistake in determining the distances, it is necessary to check how correctly the Russian reference books indicated the height of the armored cruiser “Asam”. After all, it is obvious that if it is indicated incorrectly, then this would perfectly explain the reason for the “synchronous” error of the Varyag and the Korey in determining the distance to the Japanese cruiser at the beginning of the battle. However, such work, unfortunately, is beyond the limits of the author’s potential in this article.
12.24 Immediately after shooting from the anchor, “Naniwa” turned to the left, and lay down on a roughly parallel “Varyag” course, following the same direction as the “Varyag”. At the time of the turnaround, when Varyag was in the direction of 3 rumba (approximately 17 hail) on the left side, they began to shoot from 152-mm gun No. 2 at 6 800 distance. However, as the military report from the commander of Naniwa reads: it did not allow us to fire for the sake of defeat ”- this remark seems to us extremely interesting.
As we said earlier, the "Asama" was moving in the same direction as the "Varyag", and their courses were close to parallel, that is, the armored Japanese cruiser left the Russian, holding the latter on an acute stern angle. The exact speed of “Asama” is currently unknown, but in the “Battle Report” its commander, Yashiro Rokuro, indicated that the distance to “Varyag” was not increased, which allows us to assume the speed of “Asam” was 10-12 nodes. In other words, in the first minutes of the battle, Ya. Rokuro sought to maintain a distance of about 7 000 m. I must say that 152-mm guns "Nanivy" did not differ from 152-mm guns "Asam" - they were all six-inch Armstrong, with a barrel length in 40 calibers and range 9 140 m. Thus, technically, these guns could easily reach the "Varyag" from 6 800 - 7 000 m, but ... nevertheless, the commander of "Nanivy" believed that at these distances shooting at defeat is impossible. Perhaps this means that "Asama" preferred to engage in battle with the "Varyag" at a distance with which his 152-mm guns cannot provide accurate shooting even by Japanese standards, and in fact the Russian commanders in fact were also worse prepared, besides, they didn’t have scopes ...
As for the “Naniwa”, its commanders made several sighting shots, but “Varyag” disappeared behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and the Japanese flagship was forced to cease fire.
12.25 - Takachiho, Akashi and Niitaka took off the anchor, presumably the first two cruisers raised anchors between 12.20-12.25. Chiyoda, as we have said, reported that it was a move in 12.25, but this is most likely a mistake. Most likely, “Niitaka” was the last to leave the anchor, which, moreover, made a move three minutes later, in 12.28. At this time, the Japanese cruisers were observed with the "Varyag" is not the best way, as they were obscured by. Phalmido
The actions of the Japanese ships were such - since “Naniwa” still in 12.20 raised the signal “Follow the destination in accordance with the order”, “Takachiho” started its implementation. It was about the order number XXUMX, in which Sotokichi Uriu appointed the following disposition for the ships of his squadron:
In other words, this was the case - “Asame” should have been located somewhere closer to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and it was assumed that his presence would make it impossible for the Russian ships to bypass the island of Marolles from the north, and thus send Varyag and Koreets to the Eastern Channel - on the way to it, in the narrowness between . Marolles and Yung Hung Do were located at the Soobol islands (Humann, located approximately 9 miles from Phalmido), where the breaking through ships were to meet the Naniwa and Niitaka with miniseries. And if by some miracle the Russians managed to break through past them, then, approximately in 4 miles towards the eastern channel, three other cruisers would have waited for them (at Changso Island - Cat).
Accordingly, having withdrawn from the anchor, "Takachiho" moved toward Fr. Changso - this course almost completely coincided with the course of “Varyag” and “Koreyets”, that is, “Takachiho”, as well as “Asama”, had to take the fight at a break - however, it was too far to “Varyag” so that the Takachiho gunners could take part in the battle, nevertheless, the battle flag was raised in the 12.25. Akashi followed Takachiho, while Chiyoda, although he made no attempt to join the Takachiho wake, walked in the same direction, towards Humann-Cat.
As for the Russian ships, then at 12.25 (probably, at a signal from the Varyag), the Koretz opened fire from the right-hand 203-mm gun. The first shot gave a big undershoot, the second one, set at maximum range, also lay down undershoot, and the fire was crushed, not wanting to waste meaningless ammunition.
On the one hand, the range of domestic 203-mm guns mounted on the Korean, with a maximum angle of elevation 12 hail. 38 cabling was supposed to be - that is how the Japanese determined the distance from "Asama" to "Varyag". But, most likely, they made a little mistake and the true distance was somewhat more (not for nothing that the first volley did not reach the Russian cruiser), and besides, shooting in pursuit has its own characteristics. As you know, at long distances it is necessary to take a lead on a moving ship, but if the distance to the retreating target ship is equal to the firing range limit, then it’s impossible to take a lead, and during the flight of the projectile, the target manages to move forward, causing the projectile not to fall into it. . Therefore, the shortfalls of the “Koreyets” do not refute the measurements of the “Assam” - if the rangers of the armored cruiser were wrong, then their error was hardly significant.
12.28 "Niitaka", finally, made a move and went for "Nanivoy", but fell behind, and was able to take his place in the ranks only after 6 minutes.
12.30 On Nanive, Chiodé’s order to join Asame’s wake is raised. Thus, S. Uriu formed a new tactical group, not envisaged by order No. XXUMX, while (judging by the text of the report of the rear admiral, simultaneously with the order "Chiodo") S. Uriu ordered Asame to act independently.
12.34 "Niitaka", finally, entered the wake of the "Naniwe" and is preparing to shoot the left side, but the fire has not yet opened. It should be noted that in the interval from 12.20 to 12.35, that is, in the first quarter of an hour of the battle, only Vseag was fired at Varyag, and Naniwa also fired several sighting shots. The rest of the Japanese cruisers did not open fire yet, and no one fired at the Korean.
As we said, from the beginning of the battle, "Asama" was going almost parallel to "Varyag" course, but it was almost that - the courses nevertheless converged, although at a very small angle. In addition, the "Asama" probably gradually accelerated to 15 bonds (this was the speed indicated by I. Rokuro in his "Battle Report") and began to pull ahead: this led to the aft angle, on which Varyag was located, becoming too sharp, so that most of the artillery "Asama" was turned off from the battlefield. This could not please the commander of the armored cruiser, and he "turned to the right, opened fire with the starboard artillery" - perhaps it happened just somewhere in 12.34-12.35., Because the "Military report" Ya. Rokuro reports that the first hit in "Varyag" (12.35) took place already after the "Asama" opened the starboard shooting.
The problem is that according to other data (N. Chornovil with reference to "The Russo-Japanese War: British naval attaches reports" Battery Press, 2003. Pp6-9) reports that getting from "Asama" in 12.37 to the bridge "Varyag ”(By which the midshipman AM Nirod was killed) was produced from the left stern gun. Obviously, it could not have fired at 13.37 if, by that time, the Asama had already turned its starboard to the Russian ships. Thus, we can reliably say only that around this time, the Asama began to turn right, but when he turned enough to put in effect the starboard artillery, alas, it is impossible to say for sure.
12.35 Many interesting events took place at once, the exact sequence of which, apparently, is no longer possible to determine.
The first is “Asama” striving to get into “Varyag”. 203-mm projectile enters the shkantsy directly behind the stern guns, it was recorded on the “Asam” as “getting into the area of the stern bridge” and noted a strong fire.
Interestingly, the Varyag logbook and the memoirs of V.F. Rudnev does not describe the consequences of the rupture of this projectile, the description of the damage to the Varyag begins with the next hit, which damaged the front bridge and killed the midshipman A.M. Nyroda. But then in the logbook gives a detailed description of getting into the stern, causing a fire:
There is an assumption that the above passage is a description of the first hit in the "Varyag". The violation of the sequence is explained by the fact that the ship itself could not be clearly seen from the Varyag's conning tower and could have completely failed to record the time of the explosion in the stern, causing shells that hit a difference of several minutes (and getting into the bridge two minutes later, 12.37) and "swapped" in the description. The author of this article is inclined to the same opinion, but it should be noted that, perhaps (although unlikely, but more on that later), the fragment quoted above could relate to another cruise hit that happened ten minutes later in 12.45, and almost same place.
The second is that Chiyoda entered the battle. According to the “Battle Report” of its commander, Murakami Kakuiti, the fire was fired from the bow and stern 120-mm guns, as well as guns of the same caliber of the left side, while the distance to the Varyag was 6 000 m. However, given that Chiyode did not record hits in the cruiser, this distance could be determined incorrectly.
Thirdly, on Nanive, they raised a signal “Do not go far”, addressed to Takachiho. Obviously, S. Uriu no longer saw the point of building an “echeloned defense” against the Varyag breakthrough, placing his cruisers on several lines, preferring to “hold him in a vice” right after leaving the fairway to the reach.
And, finally, the fourth - at about the same time with the turn of “Asama”, “Varyag” turned to the left. The fact is that before this, “Varyag”, apparently, was somewhere closer to the middle of the fairway, possibly closer to its right side. As we have said, the courses and speeds of the Asama and Varyag were close to parallel, but they nevertheless converged and led to the fact that the steering angle (aft for the Japanese and nasal for the Russians) became more and more acute - turning it to the left increased it for "Varyag" and, apparently, allowed to enter into battle 152-mm guns, located in the stern of the cruiser. At the same time, the new course "Varyag" could not lead to an accident, as the Russian cruiser was close enough to leave the fairway: following the new course, he did not "crash" into his left border, but went to the reach. Judging by the Japanese descriptions, since 12.35 there was an increase in fire from the cruiser, so we can reasonably assume that the whole Varyag was able to open fire only on 12.35, and before that he fired only 3, possibly 4 nasal guns.
12.37 - the second hit in the "Varyag" - 152-mm projectile with "Asam" hit the right wing of the front bridge. It is interesting that the “Battle Report” of the commander of “Asama” does not mention him, this hit was observed and recorded on the “Naniwa”. The description of this hit in the Varyag logbook looks like this:
Surprisingly, this record was the reason for numerous “revelations” of Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev “on the Internet” and not only. One complaint was that this text was the first description of a Japanese hit, and many found it based on this that hitting the bridge “Varyag” was the first hit for the fight. And if so, then the phrase “one of the first shells hit the cruiser” is false (it was necessary to write “first hit”) and aims to give the reader an impression of many hits, while at that time it was only only one thing.
However, as we can see, this point of view is refuted by the “Battle Report” of the commander of “Asama”, who recorded the first hit in “Varyag” in the area of the stern bridge two minutes earlier and noted the severe fire that it caused. At the same time, judging by the fact that the description of hitting shkantsy (cited above) in the logbook of the Varyag is set after, and not before the description of hitting the bridge, and the exact time of hitting is not indicated, most likely indicates that on the cruiser, they simply did not understand their sequence and were not sure which of them had happened before. Hence, the indication “one of the first projectiles,” by the way, is absolutely fair, because it was the second one that hit the bridge.
Another claim was made by one of the most detailed critics of V.F. Rudnev, historian N. Chornovil in his "Review at Cape Chemulpo", and such a casuistry is fully worthy of being quoted by us completely:
Let us leave aside the fact that “two years later” V.F. Rudnev did not need any protection at all for the simple reason that both he and the cruiser Varyag had long been considered generally accepted heroes, and it was unlikely that at least something could shake it. Even if, we repeat, even if under the spitz it was already retroactive to find the behavior of the Varyag commander in the 27 battle of January 1904 g inappropriate, nobody would dethrone the national hero. We'd better pay attention to the fact that the words “caught in a cruiser” actually disappeared for the first time not in the memoirs of V.F. Rudnev two years later, and already from the report of Vsevolod Fedorovich to the Manager of the Marine Ministry of 5 in March of 1905 g, that is, he was composed much earlier than his memories.
It would seem that this only confirms the point of view of N. Chornovil. But the fact is that, as we will see later, both reports of Vsevolod Fyodorovich: both the first one, made in hot pursuit in the name of the Steward, and the second one, made more than a year after the battle for the Manager of the Navy Department, quite accurately describe the damage of the cruiser received by him before the passage of traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). And if so, then what's the point of VF? Rudnev mislead someone regarding the time of hits? After all, if a number of shells hit the cruiser in the interval from 12.20 to 12.40, are there many differences in what specific time they hit? The only meaning of such a statement (about the death of Count AM Nyrod at the very beginning of the battle) would have to justify the bad shooting of the “Varyag” - they didn’t get there, because “the main long-distance meter” died, but the fact is that in his second report and memoirs VF Rudnev describes very large losses for the Japanese, so there can be no talk of any bad shooting (and therefore its justification). In general, a similar lie VF. Rudnev did not win anything at all, so is it worth blaming him for her then?
And if you look at things impartially, the phrase “One of the first shells of the Japanese who got into the cruiser” is read in two ways - on the one hand, V.F. Rudnev did not say anything superfluous here and his words are true, but on the other hand it can be understood as if several shells hit the cruiser, and only one of them describes the cruiser’s logbook. Thus, removing Vsevolod Fyodorovich from the second report and the memoirs of “those who got into the cruiser”, on the contrary, ruled out the possibility of an erroneous interpretation, which suggests that these same shells fell into the cruiser more than described.
But there is one more thing to note. The fact is that the study of the reports and memoirs of V.F. Rudnev's incontrovertible evidence - their author was completely devoid of literary talent. Without a doubt, Vsevolod Fedorovich, like any educated person of that era, was able to articulate his thoughts clearly and concisely on paper, but ... and only. His report to the governor was almost the literal extract from the Varyag logbook, the report to the Head of the Navy Ministry was almost a complete copy of the Head of the report, with some details added, and the memories again look no more than an expanded copy of the report to the Head of the Navy Department. The author of this article, who, by the nature of his profession, had a lot to do with documents and people, their components, knows from personal experience that it is very difficult for people of such a warehouse to give an exhaustive written description of an event. Even knowing exactly how everything happened in reality, it is difficult for them to put it on paper so as not to miss anything and at the same time avoid ambiguous interpretations of what was written.
But back to the battle of "Varyag".
12.38 Cruiser and gunboat remained a few minutes in order to get aboard Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). We briefly summarize what happened during these 18 minutes of the battle:
1. The cruiser of the Japanese squadron did not try to block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and in three groups ("Asama" and "Chiyoda", "Naniwa" and "Niytaka", "Takachiho" and "Akashi") went towards the eastern channel. At the same time, their courses were almost parallel to the one followed by the Russian ships, but they were going in the same direction, while the Varyag and the Koreyets were approaching Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese were moving away from him. And only at the end of the first minutes of the fight 18 "Asama" began to turn around.
2. Thanks to this maneuver of the Japanese and the low speed of the Russian squad in the first 15 minutes, the Varyag fought with only one Japanese cruiser out of six - the Asama, which turned out to be the closest to him. Then Chiyoda joined the armored cruiser of the Japanese and developed intensive fire on Varyag, but he participated in the battle for only three minutes to 12.38. “Naniwa” gave several sighting shots, and, not having achieved any success, he disappeared behind Fr. Phalmido, other cruisers did not open fire at all.
3. Russian ships have almost overcome the most unpleasant place for them - the Chemulpo fairway, and with minimal losses for themselves: “Varyag” received 2 hits, “Korean” - not one. Now the cruiser and the gunboat went "to the operating room," that is, to a very wide reach, where they could fight not only with fire, but also with maneuver. Of course, here they fell under the concentrated fire of the Japanese squadron, but this, in any case, should have happened once.
And here Vsevolod Fedorovich gave an order, which, in the author’s opinion, became the culmination of stories "Varyag": it is there that hide the answers to the numerous questions raised by opponents of the official point of view on the 27 battle of January 1904.
Продолжение следует ...
At about the same time (12.20-12.22), the flagship cruiser Naniwa was removed from the anchor. The flagship believed that they did it in 12.22, but at the same time indicated that it was done simultaneously with the first salvo of the “Assam”, and the armored cruiser started the battle two minutes earlier. Speed brought to 12 nodes, guns left port made to fire.
By the way, here the Japanese reports have known contradictions: the commander of "Takachiho" Murakami claims that his cruiser was off the anchor and made his turn in 12.25, while the report of the commander of "Naniva" reports: "Started movement following Chiyoda with the speed of 12 nodes ". This phrase can hardly be interpreted in the sense that “Naniwa” followed Chiyoda, because neither domestic nor Japanese combat schemes show the moment when Naniwa would follow Chioda in the wake.
Accordingly, the phrase “Battle Report” should be understood in such a way that “Naniwa” made a move after “Chiyoda” did it, but it “does not fit” with the report of its commander ...
In fact, reading the “Battle Reports” of the Japanese, we will find many similar inconsistencies, some of which we mention in our series of articles. However, one should not see in these discrepancies evil intent, or the desire to confuse someone: the whole point is that the perception of the reality of people in battle varies greatly, and they, alas, often see (and then describe in reports) not quite and not at all) what actually happened. This is not to mention the fact that often this or that time is indicated very roughly, or with rounding to the nearest 5 minutes.
12.22 - “Varyag” came out of the territorial waters and fired back at “Asam”, using armor-piercing shells (apparently, they were the commanders of “Varyag” who fired the whole battle). For the Korean, the distance to the Japanese ships was still too great. And then an event occurred that is interpreted by many as evidence of the lack of professionalism of Russian officers. The fact is that the junior navigator of Varyag, midshipman Alexei Nirod, who is responsible for determining the distance to the enemy, incorrectly measured the distance to Asama, specifying the 45 cables, while according to Japanese data, the distance was only 37-38 cables ( 7 000 m).
Most likely, it was the Japanese who were right - although they managed to achieve the first hit only through 15 crumpled after opening fire, but their first volley went to the “Varyag” “with a small flight”. In fact, the word “flight” was used here in a very peculiar way, because the descriptions imply that the shells fell in front of the Varyag’s nose, that is, from the point of view of the Asama’s gunners, this was not a flight, but a shortfall. But, obviously, a small one, so that the Japanese estimate of the distance between “Asama” and “Varyag” at the beginning of the battle looks much more accurate than the Russian one.
So, everything seems to be clear - midshipman A.M. Nirod made a gross mistake by giving the distance by 20% more than the actual. But what is interesting is that judging by the description of V. Kataev, on the Koreyts, it was also believed that Asamu was separated from the gunboat near the 45 cable: “the distance was reported - it turned out to be over 45 cable”. In the Korean logbook, we can also read: “The battle was at a distance of 45 cable and our shells did not reach the enemy.” However, the description of the battle itself is very short and blurry, so it’s not even clear what time the mention of the 45 cable belongs, either by the time of the whole battle before the Varyag turn back, to the anchorage, or specifically by that moment. However, in the report of the commander of the "Korean" GP. Belyaev said quite unambiguously: "At 11 and three-quarters of one o'clock in the afternoon, when the mile departed from the anchor position on the 4, the Japanese opened fire from the 45 cable distance."
In other words, it seems that the distance in 45 from cable to “Asama” was determined on both “Varyag” and “Koreyets”. Of course, the gunboat could have also been mistaken, but it is surprising that two ships almost simultaneously made an error with the same error.
Now recall that the distances to the Japanese were determined using a Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometer: without going into a detailed description of his work, we note that in order to correctly determine the distance, it was necessary to know the exact height of the target, that is, the distance from the waterline to the tops of the masts. Only in this case the micrometer made it possible to calculate the distance correctly. And therefore, having set out to understand whether AM Is really Nirod made a mistake in determining the distances, it is necessary to check how correctly the Russian reference books indicated the height of the armored cruiser “Asam”. After all, it is obvious that if it is indicated incorrectly, then this would perfectly explain the reason for the “synchronous” error of the Varyag and the Korey in determining the distance to the Japanese cruiser at the beginning of the battle. However, such work, unfortunately, is beyond the limits of the author’s potential in this article.
12.24 Immediately after shooting from the anchor, “Naniwa” turned to the left, and lay down on a roughly parallel “Varyag” course, following the same direction as the “Varyag”. At the time of the turnaround, when Varyag was in the direction of 3 rumba (approximately 17 hail) on the left side, they began to shoot from 152-mm gun No. 2 at 6 800 distance. However, as the military report from the commander of Naniwa reads: it did not allow us to fire for the sake of defeat ”- this remark seems to us extremely interesting.
As we said earlier, the "Asama" was moving in the same direction as the "Varyag", and their courses were close to parallel, that is, the armored Japanese cruiser left the Russian, holding the latter on an acute stern angle. The exact speed of “Asama” is currently unknown, but in the “Battle Report” its commander, Yashiro Rokuro, indicated that the distance to “Varyag” was not increased, which allows us to assume the speed of “Asam” was 10-12 nodes. In other words, in the first minutes of the battle, Ya. Rokuro sought to maintain a distance of about 7 000 m. I must say that 152-mm guns "Nanivy" did not differ from 152-mm guns "Asam" - they were all six-inch Armstrong, with a barrel length in 40 calibers and range 9 140 m. Thus, technically, these guns could easily reach the "Varyag" from 6 800 - 7 000 m, but ... nevertheless, the commander of "Nanivy" believed that at these distances shooting at defeat is impossible. Perhaps this means that "Asama" preferred to engage in battle with the "Varyag" at a distance with which his 152-mm guns cannot provide accurate shooting even by Japanese standards, and in fact the Russian commanders in fact were also worse prepared, besides, they didn’t have scopes ...
As for the “Naniwa”, its commanders made several sighting shots, but “Varyag” disappeared behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and the Japanese flagship was forced to cease fire.
12.25 - Takachiho, Akashi and Niitaka took off the anchor, presumably the first two cruisers raised anchors between 12.20-12.25. Chiyoda, as we have said, reported that it was a move in 12.25, but this is most likely a mistake. Most likely, “Niitaka” was the last to leave the anchor, which, moreover, made a move three minutes later, in 12.28. At this time, the Japanese cruisers were observed with the "Varyag" is not the best way, as they were obscured by. Phalmido
The actions of the Japanese ships were such - since “Naniwa” still in 12.20 raised the signal “Follow the destination in accordance with the order”, “Takachiho” started its implementation. It was about the order number XXUMX, in which Sotokichi Uriu appointed the following disposition for the ships of his squadron:
“-“ Naniwa ”and“ Niitaka ”carry a combat patrol in a position to N from the islands of Soobol (Humann).
- “Asama” takes the most advantageous position for it to Е1 / 4S from Herido island
- “Takatiho”, “Akashi” and “Chiyoda” jointly carry out a military patrol at the island of Changso (Cat)
- “Chihaya” carries a military patrol overseas Moktocto island
In the case of the exit of the enemy ships, "Asama" attacks them, and "Naniwa" and "Niitaka" support his attack. If this line of attack is broken by the enemy, then Takatiho and other ships will attack it at the second line of attack.
The 9 squadron of destroyers, if necessary, goes to Masanpo Bay of Asanman Bay and fills with coal and water from the Kasuga Maru, and then, along with the 14 squadron of destroyers, takes up a position next to the flagship. ”
- “Asama” takes the most advantageous position for it to Е1 / 4S from Herido island
- “Takatiho”, “Akashi” and “Chiyoda” jointly carry out a military patrol at the island of Changso (Cat)
- “Chihaya” carries a military patrol overseas Moktocto island
In the case of the exit of the enemy ships, "Asama" attacks them, and "Naniwa" and "Niitaka" support his attack. If this line of attack is broken by the enemy, then Takatiho and other ships will attack it at the second line of attack.
The 9 squadron of destroyers, if necessary, goes to Masanpo Bay of Asanman Bay and fills with coal and water from the Kasuga Maru, and then, along with the 14 squadron of destroyers, takes up a position next to the flagship. ”
In other words, this was the case - “Asame” should have been located somewhere closer to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and it was assumed that his presence would make it impossible for the Russian ships to bypass the island of Marolles from the north, and thus send Varyag and Koreets to the Eastern Channel - on the way to it, in the narrowness between . Marolles and Yung Hung Do were located at the Soobol islands (Humann, located approximately 9 miles from Phalmido), where the breaking through ships were to meet the Naniwa and Niitaka with miniseries. And if by some miracle the Russians managed to break through past them, then, approximately in 4 miles towards the eastern channel, three other cruisers would have waited for them (at Changso Island - Cat).
Accordingly, having withdrawn from the anchor, "Takachiho" moved toward Fr. Changso - this course almost completely coincided with the course of “Varyag” and “Koreyets”, that is, “Takachiho”, as well as “Asama”, had to take the fight at a break - however, it was too far to “Varyag” so that the Takachiho gunners could take part in the battle, nevertheless, the battle flag was raised in the 12.25. Akashi followed Takachiho, while Chiyoda, although he made no attempt to join the Takachiho wake, walked in the same direction, towards Humann-Cat.
As for the Russian ships, then at 12.25 (probably, at a signal from the Varyag), the Koretz opened fire from the right-hand 203-mm gun. The first shot gave a big undershoot, the second one, set at maximum range, also lay down undershoot, and the fire was crushed, not wanting to waste meaningless ammunition.
On the one hand, the range of domestic 203-mm guns mounted on the Korean, with a maximum angle of elevation 12 hail. 38 cabling was supposed to be - that is how the Japanese determined the distance from "Asama" to "Varyag". But, most likely, they made a little mistake and the true distance was somewhat more (not for nothing that the first volley did not reach the Russian cruiser), and besides, shooting in pursuit has its own characteristics. As you know, at long distances it is necessary to take a lead on a moving ship, but if the distance to the retreating target ship is equal to the firing range limit, then it’s impossible to take a lead, and during the flight of the projectile, the target manages to move forward, causing the projectile not to fall into it. . Therefore, the shortfalls of the “Koreyets” do not refute the measurements of the “Assam” - if the rangers of the armored cruiser were wrong, then their error was hardly significant.
12.28 "Niitaka", finally, made a move and went for "Nanivoy", but fell behind, and was able to take his place in the ranks only after 6 minutes.
12.30 On Nanive, Chiodé’s order to join Asame’s wake is raised. Thus, S. Uriu formed a new tactical group, not envisaged by order No. XXUMX, while (judging by the text of the report of the rear admiral, simultaneously with the order "Chiodo") S. Uriu ordered Asame to act independently.
12.34 "Niitaka", finally, entered the wake of the "Naniwe" and is preparing to shoot the left side, but the fire has not yet opened. It should be noted that in the interval from 12.20 to 12.35, that is, in the first quarter of an hour of the battle, only Vseag was fired at Varyag, and Naniwa also fired several sighting shots. The rest of the Japanese cruisers did not open fire yet, and no one fired at the Korean.
As we said, from the beginning of the battle, "Asama" was going almost parallel to "Varyag" course, but it was almost that - the courses nevertheless converged, although at a very small angle. In addition, the "Asama" probably gradually accelerated to 15 bonds (this was the speed indicated by I. Rokuro in his "Battle Report") and began to pull ahead: this led to the aft angle, on which Varyag was located, becoming too sharp, so that most of the artillery "Asama" was turned off from the battlefield. This could not please the commander of the armored cruiser, and he "turned to the right, opened fire with the starboard artillery" - perhaps it happened just somewhere in 12.34-12.35., Because the "Military report" Ya. Rokuro reports that the first hit in "Varyag" (12.35) took place already after the "Asama" opened the starboard shooting.
The problem is that according to other data (N. Chornovil with reference to "The Russo-Japanese War: British naval attaches reports" Battery Press, 2003. Pp6-9) reports that getting from "Asama" in 12.37 to the bridge "Varyag ”(By which the midshipman AM Nirod was killed) was produced from the left stern gun. Obviously, it could not have fired at 13.37 if, by that time, the Asama had already turned its starboard to the Russian ships. Thus, we can reliably say only that around this time, the Asama began to turn right, but when he turned enough to put in effect the starboard artillery, alas, it is impossible to say for sure.
12.35 Many interesting events took place at once, the exact sequence of which, apparently, is no longer possible to determine.
The first is “Asama” striving to get into “Varyag”. 203-mm projectile enters the shkantsy directly behind the stern guns, it was recorded on the “Asam” as “getting into the area of the stern bridge” and noted a strong fire.
Interestingly, the Varyag logbook and the memoirs of V.F. Rudnev does not describe the consequences of the rupture of this projectile, the description of the damage to the Varyag begins with the next hit, which damaged the front bridge and killed the midshipman A.M. Nyroda. But then in the logbook gives a detailed description of getting into the stern, causing a fire:
“Continuously followed by shells, a fire was launched on the shkanzah, which was put out by the efforts of the auditor Michman Chernilovsky-Sokol, whose former dress was torn with splinters; the fire was very serious, as the cartridges with smokeless powder were burning, the deck and whaleboat No. 1. The fire came from a projectile that exploded on the deck while being hit: 6-dm guns Nos. VIII and No. IX and 75-mm gun № 21, 47-mm guns №№ 27 and 28.
There is an assumption that the above passage is a description of the first hit in the "Varyag". The violation of the sequence is explained by the fact that the ship itself could not be clearly seen from the Varyag's conning tower and could have completely failed to record the time of the explosion in the stern, causing shells that hit a difference of several minutes (and getting into the bridge two minutes later, 12.37) and "swapped" in the description. The author of this article is inclined to the same opinion, but it should be noted that, perhaps (although unlikely, but more on that later), the fragment quoted above could relate to another cruise hit that happened ten minutes later in 12.45, and almost same place.
The second is that Chiyoda entered the battle. According to the “Battle Report” of its commander, Murakami Kakuiti, the fire was fired from the bow and stern 120-mm guns, as well as guns of the same caliber of the left side, while the distance to the Varyag was 6 000 m. However, given that Chiyode did not record hits in the cruiser, this distance could be determined incorrectly.
Thirdly, on Nanive, they raised a signal “Do not go far”, addressed to Takachiho. Obviously, S. Uriu no longer saw the point of building an “echeloned defense” against the Varyag breakthrough, placing his cruisers on several lines, preferring to “hold him in a vice” right after leaving the fairway to the reach.
And, finally, the fourth - at about the same time with the turn of “Asama”, “Varyag” turned to the left. The fact is that before this, “Varyag”, apparently, was somewhere closer to the middle of the fairway, possibly closer to its right side. As we have said, the courses and speeds of the Asama and Varyag were close to parallel, but they nevertheless converged and led to the fact that the steering angle (aft for the Japanese and nasal for the Russians) became more and more acute - turning it to the left increased it for "Varyag" and, apparently, allowed to enter into battle 152-mm guns, located in the stern of the cruiser. At the same time, the new course "Varyag" could not lead to an accident, as the Russian cruiser was close enough to leave the fairway: following the new course, he did not "crash" into his left border, but went to the reach. Judging by the Japanese descriptions, since 12.35 there was an increase in fire from the cruiser, so we can reasonably assume that the whole Varyag was able to open fire only on 12.35, and before that he fired only 3, possibly 4 nasal guns.
12.37 - the second hit in the "Varyag" - 152-mm projectile with "Asam" hit the right wing of the front bridge. It is interesting that the “Battle Report” of the commander of “Asama” does not mention him, this hit was observed and recorded on the “Naniwa”. The description of this hit in the Varyag logbook looks like this:
“One of the first shells of the Japanese who fell into the cruiser destroyed the right wing of the front bridge, caused a fire in the navigator's cabin and interrupted the forerunners, and the junior navigator, who determined the distance, Michman Count Alexei Nirod, was killed and all range finders of station No. 1 were killed or wounded. After this shot, the shells began to fall into the cruiser more often, and the non-flying shells were torn when they hit the water and showered with splinters and destroyed superstructures and lifeboats. ”
Surprisingly, this record was the reason for numerous “revelations” of Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev “on the Internet” and not only. One complaint was that this text was the first description of a Japanese hit, and many found it based on this that hitting the bridge “Varyag” was the first hit for the fight. And if so, then the phrase “one of the first shells hit the cruiser” is false (it was necessary to write “first hit”) and aims to give the reader an impression of many hits, while at that time it was only only one thing.
However, as we can see, this point of view is refuted by the “Battle Report” of the commander of “Asama”, who recorded the first hit in “Varyag” in the area of the stern bridge two minutes earlier and noted the severe fire that it caused. At the same time, judging by the fact that the description of hitting shkantsy (cited above) in the logbook of the Varyag is set after, and not before the description of hitting the bridge, and the exact time of hitting is not indicated, most likely indicates that on the cruiser, they simply did not understand their sequence and were not sure which of them had happened before. Hence, the indication “one of the first projectiles,” by the way, is absolutely fair, because it was the second one that hit the bridge.
Another claim was made by one of the most detailed critics of V.F. Rudnev, historian N. Chornovil in his "Review at Cape Chemulpo", and such a casuistry is fully worthy of being quoted by us completely:
“In the cruiser logbook, shortly after the battle, V.F. Rudnev describes it like this: "One of the first shells of the Japanese who got into the cruiser destroyed the right wing of the front bridge." That is - the Japanese shot and after some time began to fall. Here among the first (actually - the first) and it was hit. But over the 2 of the year V.F. Rudnev significantly changed his “line of defense”. Here is how the same event is given in his memoirs: "One of the first Japanese shells hit the cruiser, destroyed the upper bridge." Here the impact is attributed to the first Japanese shells in general. The Japanese started shooting at 11: 45? That's when it was hit! This simple reception V.F. Rudnev is trying to create the impression that long before Fr. Iodolmi, “Varyag” has long suffered from Japanese fire ... Already had a lot of damage ... He was not fully combat-ready ... "
Let us leave aside the fact that “two years later” V.F. Rudnev did not need any protection at all for the simple reason that both he and the cruiser Varyag had long been considered generally accepted heroes, and it was unlikely that at least something could shake it. Even if, we repeat, even if under the spitz it was already retroactive to find the behavior of the Varyag commander in the 27 battle of January 1904 g inappropriate, nobody would dethrone the national hero. We'd better pay attention to the fact that the words “caught in a cruiser” actually disappeared for the first time not in the memoirs of V.F. Rudnev two years later, and already from the report of Vsevolod Fedorovich to the Manager of the Marine Ministry of 5 in March of 1905 g, that is, he was composed much earlier than his memories.
It would seem that this only confirms the point of view of N. Chornovil. But the fact is that, as we will see later, both reports of Vsevolod Fyodorovich: both the first one, made in hot pursuit in the name of the Steward, and the second one, made more than a year after the battle for the Manager of the Navy Department, quite accurately describe the damage of the cruiser received by him before the passage of traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). And if so, then what's the point of VF? Rudnev mislead someone regarding the time of hits? After all, if a number of shells hit the cruiser in the interval from 12.20 to 12.40, are there many differences in what specific time they hit? The only meaning of such a statement (about the death of Count AM Nyrod at the very beginning of the battle) would have to justify the bad shooting of the “Varyag” - they didn’t get there, because “the main long-distance meter” died, but the fact is that in his second report and memoirs VF Rudnev describes very large losses for the Japanese, so there can be no talk of any bad shooting (and therefore its justification). In general, a similar lie VF. Rudnev did not win anything at all, so is it worth blaming him for her then?
And if you look at things impartially, the phrase “One of the first shells of the Japanese who got into the cruiser” is read in two ways - on the one hand, V.F. Rudnev did not say anything superfluous here and his words are true, but on the other hand it can be understood as if several shells hit the cruiser, and only one of them describes the cruiser’s logbook. Thus, removing Vsevolod Fyodorovich from the second report and the memoirs of “those who got into the cruiser”, on the contrary, ruled out the possibility of an erroneous interpretation, which suggests that these same shells fell into the cruiser more than described.
But there is one more thing to note. The fact is that the study of the reports and memoirs of V.F. Rudnev's incontrovertible evidence - their author was completely devoid of literary talent. Without a doubt, Vsevolod Fedorovich, like any educated person of that era, was able to articulate his thoughts clearly and concisely on paper, but ... and only. His report to the governor was almost the literal extract from the Varyag logbook, the report to the Head of the Navy Ministry was almost a complete copy of the Head of the report, with some details added, and the memories again look no more than an expanded copy of the report to the Head of the Navy Department. The author of this article, who, by the nature of his profession, had a lot to do with documents and people, their components, knows from personal experience that it is very difficult for people of such a warehouse to give an exhaustive written description of an event. Even knowing exactly how everything happened in reality, it is difficult for them to put it on paper so as not to miss anything and at the same time avoid ambiguous interpretations of what was written.
But back to the battle of "Varyag".
12.38 Cruiser and gunboat remained a few minutes in order to get aboard Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). We briefly summarize what happened during these 18 minutes of the battle:
1. The cruiser of the Japanese squadron did not try to block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and in three groups ("Asama" and "Chiyoda", "Naniwa" and "Niytaka", "Takachiho" and "Akashi") went towards the eastern channel. At the same time, their courses were almost parallel to the one followed by the Russian ships, but they were going in the same direction, while the Varyag and the Koreyets were approaching Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese were moving away from him. And only at the end of the first minutes of the fight 18 "Asama" began to turn around.
2. Thanks to this maneuver of the Japanese and the low speed of the Russian squad in the first 15 minutes, the Varyag fought with only one Japanese cruiser out of six - the Asama, which turned out to be the closest to him. Then Chiyoda joined the armored cruiser of the Japanese and developed intensive fire on Varyag, but he participated in the battle for only three minutes to 12.38. “Naniwa” gave several sighting shots, and, not having achieved any success, he disappeared behind Fr. Phalmido, other cruisers did not open fire at all.
3. Russian ships have almost overcome the most unpleasant place for them - the Chemulpo fairway, and with minimal losses for themselves: “Varyag” received 2 hits, “Korean” - not one. Now the cruiser and the gunboat went "to the operating room," that is, to a very wide reach, where they could fight not only with fire, but also with maneuver. Of course, here they fell under the concentrated fire of the Japanese squadron, but this, in any case, should have happened once.
And here Vsevolod Fedorovich gave an order, which, in the author’s opinion, became the culmination of stories "Varyag": it is there that hide the answers to the numerous questions raised by opponents of the official point of view on the 27 battle of January 1904.
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