The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 10. Night
In previous articles, we examined the reasons why Russian stationary soldiers, the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreyets were not entitled, and physically could not somehow effectively interfere with the force of the Japanese landing at Chemulpo. Let us now consider the variant around which many copies were broken on the margins of the Internet battles of amateur historians - the night breakthrough of the “Varyag”.
To do this, let us recall the chronology of those distant events, from the moment they left the Korean Koreans raid in the second half of January 26 and the night from January 26 to January 27:
15.40 - The Koreon gunboat is anchored to go to Port Arthur;
15.55 - A Japanese squadron is seen on the Koreans;
16.35 - “Korean” is deployed in order to return to Port Arthur, and during the circulation is attacked by a torpedo. On the ship struck alarm;
16.37 (tentatively) A second torpedo was fired on the ship. The commander of canlodka G.P. Belyaev ordered to open fire, but immediately canceled his order, nevertheless, two shots from the 37-mm cannon were fired;
16.40-16.50 (tentatively) - Chiyoda and Takatiho entered the Chemulpo raid;
16.55 "Korean" anchored on Chemulpo raid, in 2,5 cable on the stern of "Varyag";
16.55-17.05 (tentatively) four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad enter the raid and occupy the positions - Aotaka and Hari in 500 from Varyag and Koreyts, respectively, Hato and Tsubame - hiding behind foreign ships, but in full readiness to attack. "Chiyoda" took a position closer to the city pier, on the place where the transports were supposed to go. Where the Takachiho was located, the author of this article, unfortunately, does not know, presumably his position was between the marina and the Varyag. At about the same time, G.P. Belyaev arrived to report on the "Varyag". That is, V.F. Rudnev found out about the Koreyts mine attack almost simultaneously with his approach to the position of Japanese destroyers.
I must say that the sources in the descriptions of how the ships stood on the Chemulpo road, have significant differences. For example, in many cases it is indicated that two Japanese destroyers hid behind foreign stationary forces, but, for example, V. Kataev gives a scheme according to which all four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad stood opposite Varyag and Koreyets
On the other hand, the diagram shows “Naniwa”, about which it is reliably known that on the night from 26 to 27 in January she was not in the raid, but about. Phalmido It must be said that usually maneuvering ships is one of the most controversial aspects stories wars at sea - it often happens that when comparing the maneuvering schemes of a single battle that were drawn by the parties involved in it, it often seems that we are talking about two completely different battles, therefore, to be surprised at such discrepancies, or to look for some hidden meaning is completely unnecessary;
17.05-17.10 - Assam, Naniwa, Niitaka, Akashi and assault forces are entering the Chemulpo raid. "Asama" took a position in 27 cable south of "Varyag", thereby controlling both Russian stationers and the entrance to the Chemulpo raid. The remaining three cruisers make a "lap of honor", bypassing the raid around the perimeter of the anchorage;
A small remark: so, by the time Japanese transports appeared on the raid, the Varyag and Koreets were already “under the supervision” of two destroyers, located 2,5 cable from Russian ships, and they could come to their aid at any time two. The transports entered the raid, escorted by four cruisers and immediately went to the pier, where they were under the cover of "Chiyoda" and "Takachiho." The three other armored Japanese cruisers, leaving the transports, moved along the raid, that is, in order to start acting, they did not even need to anchor or unfasten the anchor chain. While the transports were moving toward the marina, the main artillery “argument” of Sotokichi Uriu, the Asama armored cruiser, took an excellent position. It is not known whether this was a deliberate decision of the Japanese commander, but the distance of 27 cable separating the Russian stationers from the Asama was optimal for the armored cruiser. On the one hand, the Asama’s commandos at such a distance would easily shoot at targets anchored, and even if V.F. Rudnev set in motion, he could not quickly develop high speed, remaining a good target. At the same time, high-explosive shells of the Japanese would inflict terrible damage on the “Varyagu” and “Korean” not having armored protection of the sides and guns. At the same time, all Asama’s vulnerabilities (engine and boiler rooms, 152 mm and 203 mm guns, etc.) on 27 cable were perfectly protected from the Varyag and Koreits armor-piercing shells: the main armor belt , the casemates and towers of the Japanese ship were protected by 152-178 mm Harvey armor, equivalent in armor resistance to approximately 129-151 mm Krupp armor. At the same time, on 27 cable armor penetration of a 152 mm Russian projectile was 50-55 mm from a force, 203 mm was hardly more than 100 mm. And Asama was very well protected from high-explosive shells, much better than Russian ships, and not to mention the fact that, due to the scanty content of explosives in the shells, we can probably say that there were no high-explosive shells on the Varyag in general, but there were two varieties of armor-piercing ... However, the latter is known to us, and officers of the Russian Imperial fleet, alas, they did not know then.
Of course, in such conditions, the attempt of the Russian stationaries to fight could not lead to any success - there is no doubt that if they tried to open fire, both the Varyag and Koreets would be instantly destroyed by torpedoes of the destroyers and the concentrated fire of the Japanese cruisers. And there was no reason to open fire - the incident with the “Korean” was resolved safely for Russian sailors, but St. Petersburg was to decide whether to use it as a “casus belli” or not. It would seem that everything is clear here and there is no place for ambiguous interpretations: nevertheless, some dear readers of “VO” do not agree with this.
They reproach VF Rudnev, that he did not rush to prepare the cruiser for battle, just from the Koreans reported on the appearance of the Japanese squadron that the cruiser should be kept under steam, that the Koreans should be immediately reported that the Japanese were attacking him, that the torpedo attack was a declaration of war, and, if so, the Varyag should have immediately fought with the Japanese ships entering the raid. Well, let's suppose for a second that the attack of the Koreytsa can be considered the beginning of a war (this is not true, but let's assume). What should the actions of “Varyag” be in this case, if its commander had decided to fight?
Unfortunately, those who adhere to the above point of view usually forget one small detail. The fact is that the Koreets was attacked outside of neutral waters, and the cruiser Varyag was on a neutral raid. That is, even if a war broke out between the Russians and the Japanese, Varyag still did not have the right to fight in the Chemulpo raid. It would be a violation of the neutrality of Korea, which meant nothing, but it would endanger the foreign stationary personnel standing there, which meant a lot. The problem was that the Japanese, attacking the Korean, were, in general, in their own right - if they were guilty of something, it was only that they began fighting without declaring war. However, they did not violate any maritime laws and customs relating to the neutrality of third countries. But if the "Varyag" opened fire, it would be a gross violation. Thus, if Varyag found it possible to begin hostilities, he should not open fire on the Japanese, until he leaves the raid. Do I have to explain that, having entered the fairway, the Varyag would have driven itself into a trap, since there it would have become an excellent target for destroyers who could accompany him from the moment the Varyag was removed from the anchor unhindered (neutral raid!) And that the best way to uselessly destroy the cruiser, probably, did not exist? It would have been somehow even more justified if, by sinking the cruiser, it was possible to block the fairway leading to Chemulpo. But he was not so narrow - the death of "Varyag" on the fairway would at best complicate the movement of ships and vessels, but could not stop it.
At the same time, the Varyag commander was prohibited from hindering the landing of the Japanese troops. Accordingly, V.F. Rudnev, accepting the report of G. B. Belyaev, ordered Varyag and Koreans to be ready to repel a mine attack, which he confined himself to - and was absolutely right about that. Realizing that the Japanese would not attack his ships on a neutral raid, Vsevolod Fyodorovich tried to act by diplomatic means. What came out of this, we will still consider, and now we will return to chronology:
17.30 - The landing has begun. It must be said that landing troops directly on the pier did not allow depth, so three Japanese vehicles (and not four, as indicated in some sources) arose about two miles from the coastline. Each transport had on board specially prepared barges, with the help of which the soldiers were transported to the shore. In this they were helped by steam boats brought to Chemulpo in advance, and the boats of the Japanese who lived in this city. At about the same time (or, perhaps, a little later), the three Japanese armored cruisers completed their “circle of honor” in the raid and split up - Akashi joined Chiodo and Takachiho guarding the transports, and Naniwa and “Niitaka” left the raid and went to the east of Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), thus standing between the islands of Phalmido and Herido;
In addition, I would like to note a certain discrepancy in the sources: for example, in the “Work of the Historical Commission” it is indicated that the landing of troops began only in 19.20. Perhaps this should be explained by the fact that 17.30 is the time to start preparation for landing, that is, the launch of barges, the approach of steam boats, etc., while 19.20 is the beginning of the actual crossing of troops. You can also assume something else - the fact is that the Japanese in their sources give time along the Kyoto meridian, that is, their own Japanese, while the Russians use local time - in the case of Chemulpo, the difference is 34 minutes. Because of this, there is confusion in some works, if suddenly someone mistakenly uses Japanese and Russian time to describe events;
18.40 - “Naniwa” and “Takachiho” met at Fr. Phalmido with the destroyers of the 14 squad;
The armored cruiser “Asama” left the Chemulpo raid after sunset and joined the “Naniwa” and “Niitake”. Unfortunately, the exact time of his departure from the raid is unknown;
02.30 (January 27) - The landing of the amphibious assault is complete. Total landed 3 000 soldiers;
05.45 - Two of the three Japanese transports, the Dayren-Maru and the Otaru-Maru, completed loading of the landing craft;
06.00 - Dairen-Maru and Otaru-Maru were removed from the anchor and went to Asanman Bay. (Again, “The Work of the Historical Commission” indicates that this happened in 05.15). The third transport, Heidze-Maru, was delayed in settling economic affairs and left the raid only on 10.00;
07.00 - “Takachiho”, “Akashi” and 9-th detachment of destroyers left the Chemulpo raid and went to Fr. Phalmido At the same time, the commander of the last remaining Japanese crew ship Chiyoda arrived on the British cruiser Talbot in order to notify his commander, Commodore Bailey, about the start of hostilities between Russia and Japan;
09.23 "Chiyoda" left Chemulpo raid. After just a few hours, “Varyag” and “Korean” will engage in battle with the Japanese squadron.
As a matter of fact, only the above data perfectly characterizes the complete impossibility of the night breakthrough of the “Varyag” and the “Korean”, or, if you like, one “Varyag” without the “Korean”. One could discuss this as some kind of theoretical option based on post-knowledge, but only under one condition - that on the night of the breakthrough the Japanese squadron would concentrate somewhere near the entrance to the fairway on the Chemulpo raid, for example, on the island of Herido, or Phalmido. But the fact is that “Varyag” and “Koreyets” essentially stood all night under the supervision of Japanese destroyers, who could easily torpedo them still standing, while trying to remove from the anchor (which could not be done at once), and about what breakthrough can we talk at all? Nevertheless, in order to avoid any understatement, we will now analyze in detail the information that Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev possessed in the evening of January 26 and on the night of January 27, and consider whether he, or any other commander in his place, could decision to breakthrough.
So what actually happened on January 26 on 1904? The Japanese were obviously going to disembark at Chemulpo, if it was a freelance, then in any case the situation envisaged by the order. V.F. Rudnev had clear instructions on this: do not interfere. However, at the same time an extraordinary event happened - the Korean was attacked, however, the Japanese did not achieve anything and did not try to continue the fighting. In this situation, the commander of "Varyag" orders to be ready to repel the attack, while he himself is trying to deal with what happened - through diplomatic channels. In other words, Vsevolod Fedorovich goes to the senior Chemulpo in the roadstead - Commodore Bailey, the commander of the Talbot cruiser and has a conversation with him. According to the results of the negotiations, the Englishman immediately goes to negotiations with the Japanese, and then visits the cruiser Varyag, where VF tells. Rudnev on their results. And here comes one ... let's say, a very controversial episode. Question one - to whom did the British Commodore go? The “Work of the Historical Commission” states that Bailey visited Naniwa and had a conversation with Rear Admiral Uriu, while Japanese sources irrefutably testify that Bailey arrived at Takachiho and spoke with his commander, Mori Itibee. Apparently, such a discrepancy occurred due to an incorrect interpretation: we re-read again, like V.F. Rudnev describes Commodore Bailey’s words:
That is, Vsevolod Fyodorovich writes about the visit of an Englishman to the senior Japanese commander, and, probably, one of the Commission members decided that since among the Japanese the most senior was S. Uriu, then Bailey visited him. But “Naniwi” was not in the evening at Chemulpo’s raid, and besides, even if by some miracle he returned there, Commodore Bailey couldn’t refer to Sotokichi Uriu as “the senior commander of the ships who stood at the raid”, because in this case, the Japanese rear admiral would be senior.
And now let's see how the conversation with the British Commodore, in the opinion of the Japanese side. To do this, we study the report of the captain of 1 rank Mori Itibee to his immediate commander Sotokichi Uriu, which was written by the commander of "Takachiho":
As we can see, the report by Mori Itibee is far more different than VF’s description of this conversation. Rudnev. Consequently, someone here is obviously cunning, but who exactly? To do this, we recall the famous Latin dictum "Is fecit cui prodest" ("Made the one who benefits"). So, was there any reason for the commander of "Takachiho" to somehow alter the words of Commodore Bailey? Yes, it did not happen at all, because relations with England were extremely important to Japan, and therefore Mori Itibee should have conveyed the meaning of his conversation with the English commander to Sotokichi Uriu as authenticly as possible. Therefore, we can safely assume that the Japanese captain of the 1 rank does not lie. Remains V.F. Rudnev and Commodore Bailey: But the question is, why would Vsevolod Fedorovich pervert the words of the British commander?
In essence, the report from M. Itibee shows the following: the Japanese commander assures Bailey that unless the Russians open fire first, then no battle will take place, and that the incident with the Korean is some kind of mistake. Such a statement underlines the correctness of the VF decision. Rudnev - in accordance with the orders he received, the landing of the Japanese in Chemulpo should not be hindered and not amenable to provoke the Japanese. In other words, if Bailey had conveyed exactly to V.F. Rudnev, the content of the conversation, then Vsevolod Fedorovich had no reason to somehow embellish its content.
But Commodore Bailey ... oh, that's another thing. Strictly speaking, the British had many interests in this matter. First - England, in fact, was an unofficial ally of Japan, so Bailey tried to help the Japanese. If someone doubts this thesis, then it is enough to read the text of the urgent message on Naniwa, which was made by captain of the 1 rank Murakami after visiting Telbot on 22.30 on January 26: “According to information received from the commander of the English cruiser, 8 February (26 of January) the Russian ships "Koreyets" went out from the anchorage to go to Port Arthur. In addition, the English commander said that there is information that the ship “Sungari” was loaded with secret documents of the Russian diplomatic mission in Korea and at February 10 on the morning of February 9 (January 27) this ship should leave the raid and go to Port Arthur ". That is, in fact, the brave Commodore was spying for the Japanese.
Secondly, of course, the commander of Talbot was extremely interested in the Japanese not doing any harm to British interests, and not spoiling relations with the powers whose stationary officers were present at Chemulpo raid. Japan was seen by the British as a force capable of crushing Russian sea power in the Far East, and the British did not need at all that this force was somehow hampered by scandals with the United States, France or Italy. Accordingly, Bailey’s tasks were as follows:
1. Assist S. Uriu in achieving his goals (unimpeded landing of troops), provided that they do not do anything bad for Europeans in Korea;
2. Do not allow shooting on the roadstead, during which someone from foreign stationery could suffer.
In this case, of course, Bailey could not be aware of the orders of VF. Rudnev, prohibiting the latter to interfere with the Japanese landing. And now let's see what exactly turned out to be embellished in the presentation of the conversation of Bailey and the commander of "Takachiho" in the statement of V.F. Rudneva:
1. Bailey appears in her as an indomitable champion of the neutrality of Chemulpo’s raid, ready to shoot at anyone who breaks it. That is, he will not even regret his Japanese ally (hint: what can we say about the Russian cruiser!);
2. Bailey allegedly specifically agreed with the Japanese commander that he did not consider the landing of Japanese troops a violation and would not accept it as a pretext for opening fire ("You can land the troops, since this is your business and does not concern us").
Another aspect of interest is that there was no exaggeration regarding the torpedo attack of the Korean. But the fact is that by informing Vsevolod Fedorovich exactly the words of the Japanese commander, Bailey also demonstrated his position on this incident: it’s all that needs to be clarified, and in general it is a dark matter, and maybe nothing at all happened. That is, the English Commodore made it clear to V.F. Rudnev, that he does not consider the actions of the Japanese against the "Korean" to be any "casus belli", and will not accept them as an excuse for any aggressive actions of the Russian stationary. With all this, naturally, Commodore Bailey did not express his own personal position, but spoke like a full-fledged representative of Foggy Albion - that is, in fact, he brought to the notice of the Russian commander the official position of England, which she would take in the unfolding events. .
Of course, we can not say for sure that it was Bailey who perverted the negotiations with the commander of "Takachiho". But we see that those “exaggerations” that VF recorded. Rudnev, in his report and in his memoirs, fits perfectly into the goals that the Talbot commander could and should pursue. And because such a hypothesis looks closest to the truth.
And now let's try to take the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, when he had to decide on the actions of his ships for the next night. The Japanese attacked the Korean with torpedoes, but why and why? There was no declaration of war, and the Japanese did not report such a thing. The commander of "Takachiho" also did not clarify this issue. It is possible that this was an attempt to destroy the "Korean", while no one sees it. But maybe this is really some kind of mistake, for example, caused by the fact that the “Korean” and the Japanese transports with the landing force were too close to each other?
In other words, the situation was completely unclear. Whether the Japanese have already decided to go to war with Russia, and now they were just waiting for the chance to destroy the Russian ships, not daring, however, to do it in a neutral raid. Either the Japanese were not at all looking for an open conflict with the Russian Empire, and the situation with the attack of the “Korean” is only a consequence of the nervousness of the performers. They had to worry: if, for example, S. Uriu received an order to land troops in Korea, he could not help but understand that it was a violation of her neutrality, and who knows how the Russians will behave in this situation? The situation was tense, and perhaps the Japanese destroyers just lost their nerves?
Of course, this kind of “mistakes” cannot simply be “unleashed on the brakes”; one cannot allow other ships to fire torpedoes at our ships with impunity. But, as we said earlier, in such cases, the “leadership of the country” was to determine the “measure of punishment” in such cases.
So, either the Japanese land troops in Korea, but the war with us does not want, or they are already fighting with us, we just do not know. If the first is true, and the Japanese want only to protect their transports from possible encroachments on the Russians, then no special actions from V.F. Rudnev is not required because nothing threatened his ships on the roadstead and he had orders to the Japanese not to interfere. But the attempt to leave could lead to an unnecessary collision, because the movement of Russian ships could be misinterpreted by the Japanese, and provoke them to attack. But even if it would be possible to leave, how would it look from the outside? The Japanese did not look for fights with the Russians, but the station commanders were so afraid of only one kind of Japanese warships that they fled at night in panic, leaving their diplomatic mission?
In other words, if we assume (we are still on the site of Vsevolod Fedorovich) that the Japanese were only going to land the troops, but not to fight with Russia, then VF Rudnev did not win anything at all, attempting to leave Chemulpo raid at night. Well, if this is still a war, and the only thing that still keeps Sotokichi Uriu from an attack by open force is the presence of foreign stationary in the raid?
Well, then the position of the Russian ships was worth describing as hopeless. "Varyag" and "Koreyets" are anchored by the Japanese destroyers, who not only were located at a distance that did not allow to miss the anchored ship, but with the onset of darkness, they directed their torpedo tubes at Russian stationary. This fact is confirmed by Japanese memoirs, one of the staff officers S. Uriu, captain of 3 rank Moriyama Kaysaburo, recalled: "On Russian ships after our destroyers stood in front of them, and in the evening they turned the torpedo tubes in their direction, they spent the whole night in dismay without closing my eyes. " In this case, any attempt to withdraw anchor at night will lead to an immediate attack. But what if the Japanese commanders nevertheless decide to respect the "neutrality of the Chemulpo raid" and do not begin to open fire first? But the four 9 squadrons that were seen on the raid of the destroyer simply go along with the Varyag and the Koreans to exit from the raid, and outside neutral waters, they will immediately destroy them at the exit of the fairway torpedoes. And if, after this attack, someone goes to the bottom not as quickly as the loyal subjects of the Mikado would like, then the artillery of “Assam” “Naniwa” and “Niytaki”, of course, will quickly finish the job.
Well, what happens if "Varyag", spitting on Bailey's warning, starts the battle first? Raise the pair, in the hope that the Japanese destroyers do not attack right away, but will wait until the Russians give way. Rivet anchor chains to give this very course as quickly as possible. And - even before the Varyag and the Koreyets move from their places, bring down a hail of shells from all the guns standing next to the destroyer. Aotaka and Hari were relatively small destroyers, with a normal tonnage of 152 tonnes - theoretically, dagger fire at close range (500 meters!) Could crush them and send them to the bottom so quickly that the latter wouldn’t have time to use torpedoes, though it would be very small. And then ... Then it remained only to pray to Nicholas the Wonderworker that the second pair of Japanese destroyers did not have time to catch up with the Russian ships heading for the exit from the raid, or so that they could sink these two destroyers, shooting them while leaving, having managed not to get a random projectile to foreign stationary against which the Japanese will attack. Praying that the commanders of “Asama” (that this cruiser had left after sunset, on the Varyag) did not know) would oversleep everything and would not open fire on the desperately firing Russians - and that alone would be enough to stop both Russian ship. In general, even if a uniform miracle happened, and Varyag and Koreans could somehow deal with the Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad, they would not have had a chance to break through Asama, and even Suddenly it was possible - then, at the exit from the fairway, Naniwa and Niytaka would be waiting for them, and who knows how many destroyers would be with them? These Japanese ships did not even have to compete with the Varyag in the relics of artillery - it was enough to hear a cacophony on the roadstead, to send several destroyers to the fairway from Fr. Phalmido, who would have destroyed the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" torpedoes, while they walked in the dark and in narrowness.
In general, in short, there were no chances for a night break (based on the information that VF Rudnev had). Given what we know today - it was not even more so. Yes, “Asama” actually left the raid, joining “Naniwa” and “Niytaka” between the islands of Herido and Phalmido, but the 14 unit of the destroyers, who was quite capable of “taking warm ones” and “Varyag”, also came there, and "Korean" right on the fairway. Usually, the alternatives of the Varyag nightbreak are reduced to that recipe to quietly separate couples, enter the fairway, give it a full turn to the 23 node, and then slip past the peaceful Japanese squadron - and then look for the wind in the field. Usually, after dubbing the aforesaid, calculations of the speed with which the Varyag could go along the fairway begin, disputes what maximum speed it can develop ...
But in fact, there are two completely immutable facts that kill a similar alternative in the bud. Fact one: Chemulpo “Varyag” could not escape without shooting except under an escort of four Japanese destroyers, and this is only if the latter did not attack the Russians right away, that is, due to circumstances beyond the control of Russian sailors. But in this case, the Varyag and Koreets would have been destroyed when leaving the fairway, or maybe directly on it, because the flooding of both Russian ships would not block access to Chemulpo, but only to a certain degree made it difficult. The second fact is that the Japanese were not asleep at all - in fact, Sotokichi Uriu was afraid not only of “Varyag” with “Korean”, but also of the approach of additional Russian forces from Port Arthur. Therefore, the ships he had withdrawn from the raid to the island of Phalmido were not so much locked up by our stationary personnel at Chemulpo, as they were preparing to fight with possible Russian reinforcements. It is clear that with such initial data, there are no “peacefully sleeping Japanese crews”, on ships “with undiluted fire in the boilers” and “not ready to break the anchor” was not and could not be.
And, finally, in the case of the start of firing on the raid, Russian ships would be accused of violating neutrality. Of course, the launch of torpedoes is not silent - in the torpedo tubes of those years they were thrown out by a special powder expelling charge, but it gave far less noise than a gunshot and almost did not give a flash. So even if Varyag really opened fire after it was attacked by a Japanese destroyer (for example, while shooting from the anchor), then and then, with almost 100% probability, the senior officer in the raid Commodore Bailey “Appointed” guilty VF Rudneva. And if at the same time, and God forbid, one of the stationaries would suffer, then the actions of the commander of the Varyag could lead to extreme diplomatic complications (up to the war) with the injured power.
Thus, we see that the attempt at night breakthrough:
1. Could not be successful;
2. It could easily have led to a completely useless loss of Russian ships with minimal damage to the Japanese, or without it at all;
3. It would most likely lead to diplomatic complications.
Thus, the nightly breakthrough had no benefits over the daytime, and was, in fact, the worst alternative, because during the day, at least, it was possible to leave the raid and not fear an international incident.
Articles from this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
To do this, let us recall the chronology of those distant events, from the moment they left the Korean Koreans raid in the second half of January 26 and the night from January 26 to January 27:
15.40 - The Koreon gunboat is anchored to go to Port Arthur;
15.55 - A Japanese squadron is seen on the Koreans;
16.35 - “Korean” is deployed in order to return to Port Arthur, and during the circulation is attacked by a torpedo. On the ship struck alarm;
16.37 (tentatively) A second torpedo was fired on the ship. The commander of canlodka G.P. Belyaev ordered to open fire, but immediately canceled his order, nevertheless, two shots from the 37-mm cannon were fired;
16.40-16.50 (tentatively) - Chiyoda and Takatiho entered the Chemulpo raid;
16.55 "Korean" anchored on Chemulpo raid, in 2,5 cable on the stern of "Varyag";
16.55-17.05 (tentatively) four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad enter the raid and occupy the positions - Aotaka and Hari in 500 from Varyag and Koreyts, respectively, Hato and Tsubame - hiding behind foreign ships, but in full readiness to attack. "Chiyoda" took a position closer to the city pier, on the place where the transports were supposed to go. Where the Takachiho was located, the author of this article, unfortunately, does not know, presumably his position was between the marina and the Varyag. At about the same time, G.P. Belyaev arrived to report on the "Varyag". That is, V.F. Rudnev found out about the Koreyts mine attack almost simultaneously with his approach to the position of Japanese destroyers.
I must say that the sources in the descriptions of how the ships stood on the Chemulpo road, have significant differences. For example, in many cases it is indicated that two Japanese destroyers hid behind foreign stationary forces, but, for example, V. Kataev gives a scheme according to which all four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad stood opposite Varyag and Koreyets
On the other hand, the diagram shows “Naniwa”, about which it is reliably known that on the night from 26 to 27 in January she was not in the raid, but about. Phalmido It must be said that usually maneuvering ships is one of the most controversial aspects stories wars at sea - it often happens that when comparing the maneuvering schemes of a single battle that were drawn by the parties involved in it, it often seems that we are talking about two completely different battles, therefore, to be surprised at such discrepancies, or to look for some hidden meaning is completely unnecessary;
17.05-17.10 - Assam, Naniwa, Niitaka, Akashi and assault forces are entering the Chemulpo raid. "Asama" took a position in 27 cable south of "Varyag", thereby controlling both Russian stationers and the entrance to the Chemulpo raid. The remaining three cruisers make a "lap of honor", bypassing the raid around the perimeter of the anchorage;
A small remark: so, by the time Japanese transports appeared on the raid, the Varyag and Koreets were already “under the supervision” of two destroyers, located 2,5 cable from Russian ships, and they could come to their aid at any time two. The transports entered the raid, escorted by four cruisers and immediately went to the pier, where they were under the cover of "Chiyoda" and "Takachiho." The three other armored Japanese cruisers, leaving the transports, moved along the raid, that is, in order to start acting, they did not even need to anchor or unfasten the anchor chain. While the transports were moving toward the marina, the main artillery “argument” of Sotokichi Uriu, the Asama armored cruiser, took an excellent position. It is not known whether this was a deliberate decision of the Japanese commander, but the distance of 27 cable separating the Russian stationers from the Asama was optimal for the armored cruiser. On the one hand, the Asama’s commandos at such a distance would easily shoot at targets anchored, and even if V.F. Rudnev set in motion, he could not quickly develop high speed, remaining a good target. At the same time, high-explosive shells of the Japanese would inflict terrible damage on the “Varyagu” and “Korean” not having armored protection of the sides and guns. At the same time, all Asama’s vulnerabilities (engine and boiler rooms, 152 mm and 203 mm guns, etc.) on 27 cable were perfectly protected from the Varyag and Koreits armor-piercing shells: the main armor belt , the casemates and towers of the Japanese ship were protected by 152-178 mm Harvey armor, equivalent in armor resistance to approximately 129-151 mm Krupp armor. At the same time, on 27 cable armor penetration of a 152 mm Russian projectile was 50-55 mm from a force, 203 mm was hardly more than 100 mm. And Asama was very well protected from high-explosive shells, much better than Russian ships, and not to mention the fact that, due to the scanty content of explosives in the shells, we can probably say that there were no high-explosive shells on the Varyag in general, but there were two varieties of armor-piercing ... However, the latter is known to us, and officers of the Russian Imperial fleet, alas, they did not know then.
Of course, in such conditions, the attempt of the Russian stationaries to fight could not lead to any success - there is no doubt that if they tried to open fire, both the Varyag and Koreets would be instantly destroyed by torpedoes of the destroyers and the concentrated fire of the Japanese cruisers. And there was no reason to open fire - the incident with the “Korean” was resolved safely for Russian sailors, but St. Petersburg was to decide whether to use it as a “casus belli” or not. It would seem that everything is clear here and there is no place for ambiguous interpretations: nevertheless, some dear readers of “VO” do not agree with this.
They reproach VF Rudnev, that he did not rush to prepare the cruiser for battle, just from the Koreans reported on the appearance of the Japanese squadron that the cruiser should be kept under steam, that the Koreans should be immediately reported that the Japanese were attacking him, that the torpedo attack was a declaration of war, and, if so, the Varyag should have immediately fought with the Japanese ships entering the raid. Well, let's suppose for a second that the attack of the Koreytsa can be considered the beginning of a war (this is not true, but let's assume). What should the actions of “Varyag” be in this case, if its commander had decided to fight?
Unfortunately, those who adhere to the above point of view usually forget one small detail. The fact is that the Koreets was attacked outside of neutral waters, and the cruiser Varyag was on a neutral raid. That is, even if a war broke out between the Russians and the Japanese, Varyag still did not have the right to fight in the Chemulpo raid. It would be a violation of the neutrality of Korea, which meant nothing, but it would endanger the foreign stationary personnel standing there, which meant a lot. The problem was that the Japanese, attacking the Korean, were, in general, in their own right - if they were guilty of something, it was only that they began fighting without declaring war. However, they did not violate any maritime laws and customs relating to the neutrality of third countries. But if the "Varyag" opened fire, it would be a gross violation. Thus, if Varyag found it possible to begin hostilities, he should not open fire on the Japanese, until he leaves the raid. Do I have to explain that, having entered the fairway, the Varyag would have driven itself into a trap, since there it would have become an excellent target for destroyers who could accompany him from the moment the Varyag was removed from the anchor unhindered (neutral raid!) And that the best way to uselessly destroy the cruiser, probably, did not exist? It would have been somehow even more justified if, by sinking the cruiser, it was possible to block the fairway leading to Chemulpo. But he was not so narrow - the death of "Varyag" on the fairway would at best complicate the movement of ships and vessels, but could not stop it.
At the same time, the Varyag commander was prohibited from hindering the landing of the Japanese troops. Accordingly, V.F. Rudnev, accepting the report of G. B. Belyaev, ordered Varyag and Koreans to be ready to repel a mine attack, which he confined himself to - and was absolutely right about that. Realizing that the Japanese would not attack his ships on a neutral raid, Vsevolod Fyodorovich tried to act by diplomatic means. What came out of this, we will still consider, and now we will return to chronology:
17.30 - The landing has begun. It must be said that landing troops directly on the pier did not allow depth, so three Japanese vehicles (and not four, as indicated in some sources) arose about two miles from the coastline. Each transport had on board specially prepared barges, with the help of which the soldiers were transported to the shore. In this they were helped by steam boats brought to Chemulpo in advance, and the boats of the Japanese who lived in this city. At about the same time (or, perhaps, a little later), the three Japanese armored cruisers completed their “circle of honor” in the raid and split up - Akashi joined Chiodo and Takachiho guarding the transports, and Naniwa and “Niitaka” left the raid and went to the east of Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), thus standing between the islands of Phalmido and Herido;
In addition, I would like to note a certain discrepancy in the sources: for example, in the “Work of the Historical Commission” it is indicated that the landing of troops began only in 19.20. Perhaps this should be explained by the fact that 17.30 is the time to start preparation for landing, that is, the launch of barges, the approach of steam boats, etc., while 19.20 is the beginning of the actual crossing of troops. You can also assume something else - the fact is that the Japanese in their sources give time along the Kyoto meridian, that is, their own Japanese, while the Russians use local time - in the case of Chemulpo, the difference is 34 minutes. Because of this, there is confusion in some works, if suddenly someone mistakenly uses Japanese and Russian time to describe events;
18.40 - “Naniwa” and “Takachiho” met at Fr. Phalmido with the destroyers of the 14 squad;
The armored cruiser “Asama” left the Chemulpo raid after sunset and joined the “Naniwa” and “Niitake”. Unfortunately, the exact time of his departure from the raid is unknown;
02.30 (January 27) - The landing of the amphibious assault is complete. Total landed 3 000 soldiers;
05.45 - Two of the three Japanese transports, the Dayren-Maru and the Otaru-Maru, completed loading of the landing craft;
06.00 - Dairen-Maru and Otaru-Maru were removed from the anchor and went to Asanman Bay. (Again, “The Work of the Historical Commission” indicates that this happened in 05.15). The third transport, Heidze-Maru, was delayed in settling economic affairs and left the raid only on 10.00;
07.00 - “Takachiho”, “Akashi” and 9-th detachment of destroyers left the Chemulpo raid and went to Fr. Phalmido At the same time, the commander of the last remaining Japanese crew ship Chiyoda arrived on the British cruiser Talbot in order to notify his commander, Commodore Bailey, about the start of hostilities between Russia and Japan;
09.23 "Chiyoda" left Chemulpo raid. After just a few hours, “Varyag” and “Korean” will engage in battle with the Japanese squadron.
As a matter of fact, only the above data perfectly characterizes the complete impossibility of the night breakthrough of the “Varyag” and the “Korean”, or, if you like, one “Varyag” without the “Korean”. One could discuss this as some kind of theoretical option based on post-knowledge, but only under one condition - that on the night of the breakthrough the Japanese squadron would concentrate somewhere near the entrance to the fairway on the Chemulpo raid, for example, on the island of Herido, or Phalmido. But the fact is that “Varyag” and “Koreyets” essentially stood all night under the supervision of Japanese destroyers, who could easily torpedo them still standing, while trying to remove from the anchor (which could not be done at once), and about what breakthrough can we talk at all? Nevertheless, in order to avoid any understatement, we will now analyze in detail the information that Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev possessed in the evening of January 26 and on the night of January 27, and consider whether he, or any other commander in his place, could decision to breakthrough.
So what actually happened on January 26 on 1904? The Japanese were obviously going to disembark at Chemulpo, if it was a freelance, then in any case the situation envisaged by the order. V.F. Rudnev had clear instructions on this: do not interfere. However, at the same time an extraordinary event happened - the Korean was attacked, however, the Japanese did not achieve anything and did not try to continue the fighting. In this situation, the commander of "Varyag" orders to be ready to repel the attack, while he himself is trying to deal with what happened - through diplomatic channels. In other words, Vsevolod Fedorovich goes to the senior Chemulpo in the roadstead - Commodore Bailey, the commander of the Talbot cruiser and has a conversation with him. According to the results of the negotiations, the Englishman immediately goes to negotiations with the Japanese, and then visits the cruiser Varyag, where VF tells. Rudnev on their results. And here comes one ... let's say, a very controversial episode. Question one - to whom did the British Commodore go? The “Work of the Historical Commission” states that Bailey visited Naniwa and had a conversation with Rear Admiral Uriu, while Japanese sources irrefutably testify that Bailey arrived at Takachiho and spoke with his commander, Mori Itibee. Apparently, such a discrepancy occurred due to an incorrect interpretation: we re-read again, like V.F. Rudnev describes Commodore Bailey’s words:
“I came as the senior commander of the ships on the roads, to you as the senior Japanese commander, to warn you:
1. We are standing on the raid of the nation, which declared neutrality, therefore, the raid is absolutely neutral and no one has the right to shoot or mine anybody. I declare to you that the ship that will do this, no matter what nation, I will start shooting first. (The Japanese were extremely surprised, even asked: “How will you shoot at us? - Yes, I will, since I’m completely ready to open fire”);
2. You must make an order according to your detachment and make it known. (The Japanese agreed, but asked: “What if the Russians start firing?”. The English commander reiterated his commitment to take responsibility for the ships of the international squadron);
3. You must allow all boats to the shore, where there should be no obstacles to disembark;
4. You can land the troops, as this is your business and does not concern us;
5. In case of a misunderstanding with any nation, I ask you to come to my ship, I will invite the commander of the same nation and will deal with it myself;
In conclusion, when asked by the commander about shooting mines at Koreans, the Japanese replied that they did not know about the incident, that this was a misunderstanding and probably nothing even happened. ”
1. We are standing on the raid of the nation, which declared neutrality, therefore, the raid is absolutely neutral and no one has the right to shoot or mine anybody. I declare to you that the ship that will do this, no matter what nation, I will start shooting first. (The Japanese were extremely surprised, even asked: “How will you shoot at us? - Yes, I will, since I’m completely ready to open fire”);
2. You must make an order according to your detachment and make it known. (The Japanese agreed, but asked: “What if the Russians start firing?”. The English commander reiterated his commitment to take responsibility for the ships of the international squadron);
3. You must allow all boats to the shore, where there should be no obstacles to disembark;
4. You can land the troops, as this is your business and does not concern us;
5. In case of a misunderstanding with any nation, I ask you to come to my ship, I will invite the commander of the same nation and will deal with it myself;
In conclusion, when asked by the commander about shooting mines at Koreans, the Japanese replied that they did not know about the incident, that this was a misunderstanding and probably nothing even happened. ”
That is, Vsevolod Fyodorovich writes about the visit of an Englishman to the senior Japanese commander, and, probably, one of the Commission members decided that since among the Japanese the most senior was S. Uriu, then Bailey visited him. But “Naniwi” was not in the evening at Chemulpo’s raid, and besides, even if by some miracle he returned there, Commodore Bailey couldn’t refer to Sotokichi Uriu as “the senior commander of the ships who stood at the raid”, because in this case, the Japanese rear admiral would be senior.
And now let's see how the conversation with the British Commodore, in the opinion of the Japanese side. To do this, we study the report of the captain of 1 rank Mori Itibee to his immediate commander Sotokichi Uriu, which was written by the commander of "Takachiho":
"In 21.00 8 February (26 January old style, auth.) On the" Takachiho "arrived commander of the English cruiser Talbot, who, as the eldest in the raid foreign ships, told me the following:" I am sure that you respect the neutrality of the port Incheon (Chemulpo) and you will not open fire here or take any other actions that would pose a threat to the ships of foreign powers located here. ” In response, I assured him that as long as the Russian ships did not take hostile actions against us in the raid, there was no threat to foreign ships. The English commander asked me: "For what reason did your torpedoes launch a torpedo attack of the Russian ship Korets today and did this information correspond to reality?" I replied that I still do not have accurate information on this subject and cannot confirm whether it was in fact or not. He did not say a word and did not ask about the landing of our troops, but only expressed the hope that the presence of our troops in Inchon would not be the reason for any unrest or misunderstanding. At the end of the conversation, the commander of the English cruiser stressed that there were close friendly relations between Japan and England, which must continue to be strengthened. After that, he left our ship and went to the “Varyag” to meet with his commander, after which he passed through the officer sent to him from “Takachiho”: “The commander of the“ Varyag ”categorically stated that in order to avoid any incidents, he does not intend in any way to prevent the landing of the Japanese troops. ”
As we can see, the report by Mori Itibee is far more different than VF’s description of this conversation. Rudnev. Consequently, someone here is obviously cunning, but who exactly? To do this, we recall the famous Latin dictum "Is fecit cui prodest" ("Made the one who benefits"). So, was there any reason for the commander of "Takachiho" to somehow alter the words of Commodore Bailey? Yes, it did not happen at all, because relations with England were extremely important to Japan, and therefore Mori Itibee should have conveyed the meaning of his conversation with the English commander to Sotokichi Uriu as authenticly as possible. Therefore, we can safely assume that the Japanese captain of the 1 rank does not lie. Remains V.F. Rudnev and Commodore Bailey: But the question is, why would Vsevolod Fedorovich pervert the words of the British commander?
In essence, the report from M. Itibee shows the following: the Japanese commander assures Bailey that unless the Russians open fire first, then no battle will take place, and that the incident with the Korean is some kind of mistake. Such a statement underlines the correctness of the VF decision. Rudnev - in accordance with the orders he received, the landing of the Japanese in Chemulpo should not be hindered and not amenable to provoke the Japanese. In other words, if Bailey had conveyed exactly to V.F. Rudnev, the content of the conversation, then Vsevolod Fedorovich had no reason to somehow embellish its content.
But Commodore Bailey ... oh, that's another thing. Strictly speaking, the British had many interests in this matter. First - England, in fact, was an unofficial ally of Japan, so Bailey tried to help the Japanese. If someone doubts this thesis, then it is enough to read the text of the urgent message on Naniwa, which was made by captain of the 1 rank Murakami after visiting Telbot on 22.30 on January 26: “According to information received from the commander of the English cruiser, 8 February (26 of January) the Russian ships "Koreyets" went out from the anchorage to go to Port Arthur. In addition, the English commander said that there is information that the ship “Sungari” was loaded with secret documents of the Russian diplomatic mission in Korea and at February 10 on the morning of February 9 (January 27) this ship should leave the raid and go to Port Arthur ". That is, in fact, the brave Commodore was spying for the Japanese.
Secondly, of course, the commander of Talbot was extremely interested in the Japanese not doing any harm to British interests, and not spoiling relations with the powers whose stationary officers were present at Chemulpo raid. Japan was seen by the British as a force capable of crushing Russian sea power in the Far East, and the British did not need at all that this force was somehow hampered by scandals with the United States, France or Italy. Accordingly, Bailey’s tasks were as follows:
1. Assist S. Uriu in achieving his goals (unimpeded landing of troops), provided that they do not do anything bad for Europeans in Korea;
2. Do not allow shooting on the roadstead, during which someone from foreign stationery could suffer.
In this case, of course, Bailey could not be aware of the orders of VF. Rudnev, prohibiting the latter to interfere with the Japanese landing. And now let's see what exactly turned out to be embellished in the presentation of the conversation of Bailey and the commander of "Takachiho" in the statement of V.F. Rudneva:
1. Bailey appears in her as an indomitable champion of the neutrality of Chemulpo’s raid, ready to shoot at anyone who breaks it. That is, he will not even regret his Japanese ally (hint: what can we say about the Russian cruiser!);
2. Bailey allegedly specifically agreed with the Japanese commander that he did not consider the landing of Japanese troops a violation and would not accept it as a pretext for opening fire ("You can land the troops, since this is your business and does not concern us").
Another aspect of interest is that there was no exaggeration regarding the torpedo attack of the Korean. But the fact is that by informing Vsevolod Fedorovich exactly the words of the Japanese commander, Bailey also demonstrated his position on this incident: it’s all that needs to be clarified, and in general it is a dark matter, and maybe nothing at all happened. That is, the English Commodore made it clear to V.F. Rudnev, that he does not consider the actions of the Japanese against the "Korean" to be any "casus belli", and will not accept them as an excuse for any aggressive actions of the Russian stationary. With all this, naturally, Commodore Bailey did not express his own personal position, but spoke like a full-fledged representative of Foggy Albion - that is, in fact, he brought to the notice of the Russian commander the official position of England, which she would take in the unfolding events. .
Of course, we can not say for sure that it was Bailey who perverted the negotiations with the commander of "Takachiho". But we see that those “exaggerations” that VF recorded. Rudnev, in his report and in his memoirs, fits perfectly into the goals that the Talbot commander could and should pursue. And because such a hypothesis looks closest to the truth.
And now let's try to take the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, when he had to decide on the actions of his ships for the next night. The Japanese attacked the Korean with torpedoes, but why and why? There was no declaration of war, and the Japanese did not report such a thing. The commander of "Takachiho" also did not clarify this issue. It is possible that this was an attempt to destroy the "Korean", while no one sees it. But maybe this is really some kind of mistake, for example, caused by the fact that the “Korean” and the Japanese transports with the landing force were too close to each other?
In other words, the situation was completely unclear. Whether the Japanese have already decided to go to war with Russia, and now they were just waiting for the chance to destroy the Russian ships, not daring, however, to do it in a neutral raid. Either the Japanese were not at all looking for an open conflict with the Russian Empire, and the situation with the attack of the “Korean” is only a consequence of the nervousness of the performers. They had to worry: if, for example, S. Uriu received an order to land troops in Korea, he could not help but understand that it was a violation of her neutrality, and who knows how the Russians will behave in this situation? The situation was tense, and perhaps the Japanese destroyers just lost their nerves?
Of course, this kind of “mistakes” cannot simply be “unleashed on the brakes”; one cannot allow other ships to fire torpedoes at our ships with impunity. But, as we said earlier, in such cases, the “leadership of the country” was to determine the “measure of punishment” in such cases.
So, either the Japanese land troops in Korea, but the war with us does not want, or they are already fighting with us, we just do not know. If the first is true, and the Japanese want only to protect their transports from possible encroachments on the Russians, then no special actions from V.F. Rudnev is not required because nothing threatened his ships on the roadstead and he had orders to the Japanese not to interfere. But the attempt to leave could lead to an unnecessary collision, because the movement of Russian ships could be misinterpreted by the Japanese, and provoke them to attack. But even if it would be possible to leave, how would it look from the outside? The Japanese did not look for fights with the Russians, but the station commanders were so afraid of only one kind of Japanese warships that they fled at night in panic, leaving their diplomatic mission?
In other words, if we assume (we are still on the site of Vsevolod Fedorovich) that the Japanese were only going to land the troops, but not to fight with Russia, then VF Rudnev did not win anything at all, attempting to leave Chemulpo raid at night. Well, if this is still a war, and the only thing that still keeps Sotokichi Uriu from an attack by open force is the presence of foreign stationary in the raid?
Well, then the position of the Russian ships was worth describing as hopeless. "Varyag" and "Koreyets" are anchored by the Japanese destroyers, who not only were located at a distance that did not allow to miss the anchored ship, but with the onset of darkness, they directed their torpedo tubes at Russian stationary. This fact is confirmed by Japanese memoirs, one of the staff officers S. Uriu, captain of 3 rank Moriyama Kaysaburo, recalled: "On Russian ships after our destroyers stood in front of them, and in the evening they turned the torpedo tubes in their direction, they spent the whole night in dismay without closing my eyes. " In this case, any attempt to withdraw anchor at night will lead to an immediate attack. But what if the Japanese commanders nevertheless decide to respect the "neutrality of the Chemulpo raid" and do not begin to open fire first? But the four 9 squadrons that were seen on the raid of the destroyer simply go along with the Varyag and the Koreans to exit from the raid, and outside neutral waters, they will immediately destroy them at the exit of the fairway torpedoes. And if, after this attack, someone goes to the bottom not as quickly as the loyal subjects of the Mikado would like, then the artillery of “Assam” “Naniwa” and “Niytaki”, of course, will quickly finish the job.
Well, what happens if "Varyag", spitting on Bailey's warning, starts the battle first? Raise the pair, in the hope that the Japanese destroyers do not attack right away, but will wait until the Russians give way. Rivet anchor chains to give this very course as quickly as possible. And - even before the Varyag and the Koreyets move from their places, bring down a hail of shells from all the guns standing next to the destroyer. Aotaka and Hari were relatively small destroyers, with a normal tonnage of 152 tonnes - theoretically, dagger fire at close range (500 meters!) Could crush them and send them to the bottom so quickly that the latter wouldn’t have time to use torpedoes, though it would be very small. And then ... Then it remained only to pray to Nicholas the Wonderworker that the second pair of Japanese destroyers did not have time to catch up with the Russian ships heading for the exit from the raid, or so that they could sink these two destroyers, shooting them while leaving, having managed not to get a random projectile to foreign stationary against which the Japanese will attack. Praying that the commanders of “Asama” (that this cruiser had left after sunset, on the Varyag) did not know) would oversleep everything and would not open fire on the desperately firing Russians - and that alone would be enough to stop both Russian ship. In general, even if a uniform miracle happened, and Varyag and Koreans could somehow deal with the Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad, they would not have had a chance to break through Asama, and even Suddenly it was possible - then, at the exit from the fairway, Naniwa and Niytaka would be waiting for them, and who knows how many destroyers would be with them? These Japanese ships did not even have to compete with the Varyag in the relics of artillery - it was enough to hear a cacophony on the roadstead, to send several destroyers to the fairway from Fr. Phalmido, who would have destroyed the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" torpedoes, while they walked in the dark and in narrowness.
In general, in short, there were no chances for a night break (based on the information that VF Rudnev had). Given what we know today - it was not even more so. Yes, “Asama” actually left the raid, joining “Naniwa” and “Niytaka” between the islands of Herido and Phalmido, but the 14 unit of the destroyers, who was quite capable of “taking warm ones” and “Varyag”, also came there, and "Korean" right on the fairway. Usually, the alternatives of the Varyag nightbreak are reduced to that recipe to quietly separate couples, enter the fairway, give it a full turn to the 23 node, and then slip past the peaceful Japanese squadron - and then look for the wind in the field. Usually, after dubbing the aforesaid, calculations of the speed with which the Varyag could go along the fairway begin, disputes what maximum speed it can develop ...
But in fact, there are two completely immutable facts that kill a similar alternative in the bud. Fact one: Chemulpo “Varyag” could not escape without shooting except under an escort of four Japanese destroyers, and this is only if the latter did not attack the Russians right away, that is, due to circumstances beyond the control of Russian sailors. But in this case, the Varyag and Koreets would have been destroyed when leaving the fairway, or maybe directly on it, because the flooding of both Russian ships would not block access to Chemulpo, but only to a certain degree made it difficult. The second fact is that the Japanese were not asleep at all - in fact, Sotokichi Uriu was afraid not only of “Varyag” with “Korean”, but also of the approach of additional Russian forces from Port Arthur. Therefore, the ships he had withdrawn from the raid to the island of Phalmido were not so much locked up by our stationary personnel at Chemulpo, as they were preparing to fight with possible Russian reinforcements. It is clear that with such initial data, there are no “peacefully sleeping Japanese crews”, on ships “with undiluted fire in the boilers” and “not ready to break the anchor” was not and could not be.
And, finally, in the case of the start of firing on the raid, Russian ships would be accused of violating neutrality. Of course, the launch of torpedoes is not silent - in the torpedo tubes of those years they were thrown out by a special powder expelling charge, but it gave far less noise than a gunshot and almost did not give a flash. So even if Varyag really opened fire after it was attacked by a Japanese destroyer (for example, while shooting from the anchor), then and then, with almost 100% probability, the senior officer in the raid Commodore Bailey “Appointed” guilty VF Rudneva. And if at the same time, and God forbid, one of the stationaries would suffer, then the actions of the commander of the Varyag could lead to extreme diplomatic complications (up to the war) with the injured power.
Thus, we see that the attempt at night breakthrough:
1. Could not be successful;
2. It could easily have led to a completely useless loss of Russian ships with minimal damage to the Japanese, or without it at all;
3. It would most likely lead to diplomatic complications.
Thus, the nightly breakthrough had no benefits over the daytime, and was, in fact, the worst alternative, because during the day, at least, it was possible to leave the raid and not fear an international incident.
Articles from this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
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