As we know, during the 26 of January, Sotokichi Uriu carried out an assault landing operation, which was actually carried out on the night of the 27, and he could (and should) have destroyed Korean and Varyag, if the Russian stationary met him outside neutral waters. But he did not have the right to destroy the Russian ships on a neutral raid; here he could fight with them only under one condition - if the Varyag or Koreets were the first to fire.
However, the situation changed in the evening of 26 in January of 1904, when in 20.30 S. Uriu received the previously quoted order No. 275: according to this document, he was allowed to ignore Korea’s neutrality at sea. Thus, Sotokichi Uriu got the right to start military operations directly on the Chemulpo raid, but nevertheless decided not to use it on the night of January 27 - he was embarrassed that foreign stationary officers were too close and could suffer. At the same time, possessing absolute superiority in forces, the Japanese rear admiral could afford to be slow - however, not excessive, since the version of the approach of Russian reinforcements from Port Arthur could not be completely discounted.
S. Uriu attached great importance to ensuring that everyone (and VF Rudnev, and the commanders of foreign stationary personnel) received notice of the start of hostilities in advance. A letter that he sent VF Rudnev was cited in various sources several times, but alas, not always correctly, therefore we will give his text in full:
"The ship of His Imperial Majesty" Naniwa "
Reid Chemulpo,
8 February 1904 city
Reid Chemulpo,
8 February 1904 city
Sir,
Since the Japanese government and the Russian government are currently in a state of war, I respectfully ask you to leave the port of Chemulpo with forces under your command until 12 hours of the morning of 9 February 1904 February. Otherwise, I will have to fight against you in the port.
I have the honor to be your humble servant,
S. Uriu (Signature)
Rear Admiral, Commander of the Japanese Imperial Squadron fleet.
To the senior officer of the Russian fleet on the spot. ”.
Recall that February 8 and 9 1904 r correspond to 26 and 27 January of the same year in the old style.
S. Uriu made an effort so that VF Rudnev received this message early in the morning, no later than January 07.00 27 (although he did not succeed in this). In addition, he prepared letters to the commanders of foreign stationaries: we will not cite the full text of this letter, but note that in it the Japanese rear admiral notified the commanders of the upcoming attack, and suggested that they leave the port in which the battle would be given. It is interesting that in the letter of V.F. Rudnevu S. Uriu suggested that he leave the port before 12.00, while he told the commanders of foreign stationary personnel that he would not attack Russian ships earlier than 16.00.
In 05.30 in the morning of 27 in January, S. Uriu sent a destroyer with the order to the commander "Chiyoda" to meet with all the commanders of foreign ships, and to give them the above-mentioned letters, in addition, the latter had to check with Commodore Bailey whether VF received. Rudnev "call to battle" from the Japanese admiral. The essence of the request was as follows: “To find out from the Talbot commander whether he knew, the Russian ship commander received a notification and if there is any doubt that it was delivered, ask him to provide kindness in delivering it on board the Russian ship” .
From 06.40 to 08.00, the steam boat from the Chiyoda carried S. Uriu's notifications to foreign stations, and, as soon as it was received, the commanders of the French and Italian cruisers immediately went to the Talbot. A short meeting was held, following which the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, captain of the 2 rank Sene, headed for the Varyag: Vsevolod Fyodorovich learned of the Japanese notification to the stationaries from him at 08.00. In 08.30 V.F. Rudnev invited G.P. Belyaev and informed him about the beginning of the war and new circumstances, while he himself went to the Talbot. And only there, on board the British ship, did the Varyag commander on 09.30 finally receive the ultimatum S. Uriu that we quoted above.
In essence, further events before the battle were utterly predictable, and we will not linger too much on them: as has been said many times before, Korea’s neutrality didn’t cost foreign commanders, they only defended the interests of their own powers at Chemulpo. And these interests, of course, did not include aggravation of relations with Japan, so it’s not surprising that the commanders of the English, French, Italian and American ships decided to leave the raid if Varyag did not enter the battle before the time specified in the notification.
The meeting of commanders was recorded (recall that the American commander was not present, he made his decision to leave the raid alone upon receipt of S. Uriu's notice), and in this protocol, under paragraph 2, it is written:
“In the event that the Russian military ships do not leave the raid, we decided to leave our parking area until 4 o'clock in the afternoon and anchor to the north, because in this position our ships may be damaged if the Japanese squadron attacks the Russian ships, regardless of our protest". However, in the very text of the protest, signed by the commanders of foreign stationery, nothing was said about the decision to leave the battlefield. However, all this made absolutely no difference, since along with the protest, Rear Admiral S. Uriu also sent the minutes of the commanders meeting, so the Japanese Rear Admiral knew all the same about their decision to leave the raid. And if it were otherwise, the Anglo-French-Italian protest did not stop being a mere formality: S. Uriu had quite enough opportunities to detect the departure of Talbot, Elba, Pascal and Vicksburg.
There is a lot of talk about the fact that the commander of the American gunboat did not sign this protest, in fact, he refused to participate in the meeting of station commanders at all (according to other sources, no one invited him to this meeting). But in fairness it should be noted that the commanders signed their protest after VF Rudnev announced that he would attempt a breakthrough. Thus, this protest was completely formal, in fact it was a reminder of S. Uriu that his actions should not damage the property of England, France and Italy. And the fact that the commander of "Vicksburg" W. Marshall did not participate in all this, hardly caused any damage to the honor of the American flag.
At the council of stationary commanders V.F. Rudnev announced that he would not stay in the raid, and he would come to a breakthrough, but he asked foreign stationary staff to accompany him before leaving the neutral waters. Why was this done? We will not describe in detail the locations of the water area where the battle between Varyag and Koreytsa with the Japanese squadron took place, but only recall that from the Chemulpo raid to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) led the fairway, which in the narrowest places had a width of a kilometer, or even slightly more. It was not too difficult to go through this channel in peacetime, but it would be difficult to maneuver at high speed (as shown by the Tsubame accident) and Russian ships caught under the concentrated fire of the Japanese squadron would have nothing to oppose to the enemy. The situation would be somewhat improved if Varyag and the Koreans could get closer to the island — a wide enough range followed him, in which S.Uriu's squadron was stationed in January 27. But at the same time, the territorial waters of Korea ended about three miles from about. Phalmido (and the island itself was approximately 6 miles from Chemulpo’s raid). In general, there were some chances that if the stationary officers carried out the Varyag and the Koreytsa to the border of the territorial waters, the Japanese would not have fired as soon as the Russian ships crossed it and opened fire only when the cruiser and the gunner the boat would be on the reach, that is, where they could still maneuver. Not that VF gave it. Rudnev has some chances, but ... still it was better than nothing. Of course, the station commanders denied him that request, and it would be strange to expect something different from them.
The decisions of the board of stationary commanders were quite shocked by V.F. Rudneva. According to eyewitnesses, he “went down the ladder of an English ship, in a heart-rending voice, said:“ They drove us into a trap and doomed to death! ”” - however, we must bear in mind that such evidence comes from Japanese sources, which ... in general, let's say, quite loosely interpret the mood of Russian sailors. Reading the Japanese memoirs, we may be surprised to find that on January 26, the Koreyans returned to Chemulpo because “they faced desperate brave men” - meaning the actions of the destroyers, whose valiant crews allegedly “embarrassed” the Russians that they fled from them. Although, in general, the Japanese attacked the cannon ship when it was already turning back, and it is obvious that it was not the actions of the 9 squadron of the destroyers that motivated it. And even if it were not so - it turns out that the Japanese sailors stopped the “Koreyets” by the force of their inflexible spirit, and not by the fact that this spirit was reinforced by a squadron of six cruisers and four destroyers who displayed aggressive intentions and immeasurably superior to the Russian ship in firepower .
Nevertheless, there is no smoke without fire; most likely, the Russian commander really did not expect such a decision: it tells us a great deal about how VF actually saw the situation. Rudnev. In order to understand this, it is necessary to make very great efforts to abandon the after-knowledge: we know that Chemulpo’s neutrality was ignored, and we understand why this happened. Therefore, it is strange to us: why could VF be surprised here? Rudnev? But let's imagine a similar situation somewhere in Manila - armored cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Pearls" arrive there after the Tsushima battle, and suddenly, out of place, the Japanese squadron, whose commander threatens to enter the harbor and they will drown everyone, and the Americans wash their hands ... It is not surprising that the Russian commanders would be shocked by this turn of events, and to you, dear reader, such an idea will seem altogether fantastic. So, apparently, Vsevolod Fedorovich was firmly convinced that despite the violation of the neutrality of Korea (the landing) the neutrality of the Chemulpo raid will be strictly observed (as, for example, the neutrality of the Philippines, where the Russian cruisers left after the Tsushima battle) when the opposite turned out, it was a big blow for him. V.F. Rudnev, until the very end, believed that the Russian ships remained safe while they were on Chemulpo’s roadstead, and offering the Russian envoy to Korea, Pavlov, to lead the ships away, was probably not afraid that Varyag and Koreans would destroyed, and the fact that the Japanese block them in the port. But the ultimatum of S. Uriu and the council of stationary commanders dispelled this illusion, so that V.F. Rudnev was faced with the necessity in the next few hours to lead his small detachment into battle against a many-times superior enemy.
Vsevolod Fedorovich had to make a choice where to take the fight - try to make an attempt to break through or stay in the Chemulpo roadstead, wait for the arrival of the Japanese ships and fight there. As we know, vf Rudnev chose the first, and today many lovers stories naval fleets accuse him of this, believing that, fighting in the roadstead, the Russian ship would have more chances of harming the enemy. The logic in this case is simple: if the "Varyag" remains on the roadstead, the roles change - now the Japanese will have to "crawl" along the narrow fairway, and they are unlikely to be able to bring more than two cruisers into battle simultaneously. A Russian cruiser could fight with them for some time, and then, when the Japanese were close enough, rush forward, and, or converge with the leading Japanese ships on a "pistol" (torpedo) shot, or even ram one of them. In any case, the battle would have turned out to be much more fierce, and the Varyag, having died in the fairway, would have hampered the movement of ships on it.
All of the above looks very, very reasonable, but only under one condition - that the ships Sotokichi Uriu will attempt to "break in" into the raid during the daytime. At the same time, we know quite reliably that the Japanese rear admiral did not at all plan to do anything of the kind. The fact is that in the morning, approximately on 09.00, 27 of January, all Japanese ships received order No. XXUMX signed by S. Uriu on the combat plans for the current day: including the actions of the forces subordinate to him in those cases, if “Varyag "And" Korean "will remain in the roads, and foreign stationary will be in their places, or the last will leave, leaving the Russian ships alone.
We will not quote this order in full, because it is large enough and includes also those actions that were already executed for the specified time. Those who wish to familiarize themselves with this text will be sent to the remarkable monograph of Polutov, “The landing operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Inchon” on p. 220, and here we quote only the seventh section of this order:
“If until February 13.00 9 Russian ships do not leave the anchorage, then the following action plan is accepted:
All ships take up positions next to the flagship. The flagship is located on the N from the Sable islands.
a) if the ships of the neutral powers remain at the anchorage, then in the evening a torpedo attack is made:
b) if only Russian ships and a small number of foreign ships and vessels are in the anchorage, an artillery attack is made by the forces of the entire detachment.
The attack on point “a” in the evening of February 9 is assigned to the 9 th detachment of the destroyers. The squad commander must pay special attention not to cause damage to foreign ships and vessels.
The 2 tactical group, together with the 14 detachment of the destroyers, occupies a position within sight of the Chemulpo anchorage, the 1 th tactical group occupies a position in the rear of the 2 tactical group.
In the event of an attack on point “b”, the 2-I tactical group approaches the anchorage and takes up a position at a distance of 4 thousand meters from the enemy, the 1-I tactical group takes a position in the rear of the 2-th tactical group. Each destroyer detachment keeps close to its tactical group and, having improved the favorable moment, attacks the enemy. ”
All ships take up positions next to the flagship. The flagship is located on the N from the Sable islands.
a) if the ships of the neutral powers remain at the anchorage, then in the evening a torpedo attack is made:
b) if only Russian ships and a small number of foreign ships and vessels are in the anchorage, an artillery attack is made by the forces of the entire detachment.
The attack on point “a” in the evening of February 9 is assigned to the 9 th detachment of the destroyers. The squad commander must pay special attention not to cause damage to foreign ships and vessels.
The 2 tactical group, together with the 14 detachment of the destroyers, occupies a position within sight of the Chemulpo anchorage, the 1 th tactical group occupies a position in the rear of the 2 tactical group.
In the event of an attack on point “b”, the 2-I tactical group approaches the anchorage and takes up a position at a distance of 4 thousand meters from the enemy, the 1-I tactical group takes a position in the rear of the 2-th tactical group. Each destroyer detachment keeps close to its tactical group and, having improved the favorable moment, attacks the enemy. ”
Recall that according to the order number 28 from February 8 (January 26) 1904, the 1-I tactical group included the Naniwa, Takachiho, Chiyoda and 9-th detachment of the destroyers, and the 2-I tactical group - respectively, "Asama", "Akashi" and "Niytaka" with the 14-th detachment of the destroyers.
What would happen if the Russian ships remained on the roads? It is very simple - according to point “in”, Japanese ships would enter the fairway leading to the Chemulpo raid, and ... would stop 4 kilometers (21,5 cables) from the Varyag. From this distance, the gunners of “Assamy”, under the protection of very decent armor, by the way, impenetrable either for Varyag 152-mm guns, or for Korean Korean 203-guns, would simply shoot the Russian armored cruiser as an exercise. It was hardly possible to count on the fact that under such conditions Varyag or Koreans could get close to Asama at the range of a torpedo shot, but even if the Russian ships made a similar attempt, they would have to enter the fairway, where there were Japanese ships - and when they would have come close enough (which is extremely doubtful, since they would have been shot earlier), the Varyag and Koreets attacked the destroyers, and everything would be over.
But S. Uriu could change his mind and conduct an attack according to the plan “a”. Then, with the onset of dusk, the destroyers of the 4 squad would enter the raid, and the 2 tactical group would move after them. In this case, “Varyag” would simply have nowhere to go: let's look again at the layout of the ships on the night from 26 to January 27 and pay attention to its scale.
We see that Chemulpo’s raid itself is very small - in essence, this is a water area about a mile wide, and two miles long. It is possible to go north, but this would mean that “Varyag” is hiding “under the skirt” of foreign stationery, such an action would be completely unacceptable from any position. It is impossible to confuse the Varyag with any stationary, because the Russian cruiser was the only ship that had four pipes, so his meeting with the destroyers is inevitable - there is no place to hide in the roadstead. And somehow energetically maneuvering in such a small water area is simply unrealistic. In other words, all hope is in cannons, but, having opened fire, the Varyag finally unmasks itself, becoming easy prey for both the destroyers and the commanders of the 1 tactical group of cruisers, who were assigned to follow the destroyers “by holding the anchorage in line of sight". It was possible, of course, to try simply to anchor and put up anti-torpedo nets, but the problem is that such an action will make the ship still, and does not guarantee complete protection from torpedoes. And you can shoot a still ship even in the twilight of the evening, even though waiting for the dawn.
Thus, we see that the tactics that the Japanese were going to adhere to did not leave the Varyag and the Koreans no chance if the ships would remain at Chemulpo’s roadstead. As for VF himself. Rudnev, his report gives a short and clear explanation of his reasons:
"The decision to go for a breakthrough and take the fight outside the raid considered more convenient on the following grounds:
1. A narrow raid made it impossible to maneuver;
2. Fulfilling the admiral's demand, there was a faint hope that the Japanese would let go of the skerries and give battle at sea; the latter was preferable, since in skerries one has to take certain courses and, therefore, it is impossible to use all means of defense and attack;
3. Destruction of the cruiser in the roads, without attempting to break through and taking the fight, absolutely could not take place; suggesting the possible death of a cruiser anyway, of course, it was necessary to inflict on the enemy the greatest possible harm, not sparing his life. ”
1. A narrow raid made it impossible to maneuver;
2. Fulfilling the admiral's demand, there was a faint hope that the Japanese would let go of the skerries and give battle at sea; the latter was preferable, since in skerries one has to take certain courses and, therefore, it is impossible to use all means of defense and attack;
3. Destruction of the cruiser in the roads, without attempting to break through and taking the fight, absolutely could not take place; suggesting the possible death of a cruiser anyway, of course, it was necessary to inflict on the enemy the greatest possible harm, not sparing his life. ”
In other words, we see that VF Rudnev believed that in the cramped conditions of the raid, without being able to maneuver, he would become easy prey for Japanese ships. Having examined the tactics that Sotokichi Uriu was going to adhere to, we understand that Vsevolod Fedorovich had all the reasons for such an opinion. At the same time, all the alternatives to combat in the raid, offered "on the Internet," are based on the fact that the Japanese squadron, by all means, will break into the raid under the fire of "Varyag" and "Koreyets." That this absolutely did not need to be done, and that it is enough just to shoot the Russian stationary, walking at a low speed (or stopping at all) on the fairway, while being able to parry any counter jerk of Russian ships by the destroyers, dear lovers of naval history, obviously, it's come. But on the other hand, Sotokichi Uriu knew this very well, and therefore we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Remaining on the raid, Varyag and Koreyets did not receive any advantages at all, but at the same time the Russian stationary officers risked senseless death if the Japanese conducted a successful attack by the destroyers on the night of 27 on 28 in January. The question of how high the likelihood of the Varyag and Koreans mines exploded in the night attack is beyond the scope of this series of articles, but it is assumed to be extremely high. The reasons that prompted the author to consider it as such will be set forth by him in a separate, off-cycle article on the nighttime attacks of the Japanese destroyers;
2. If the Japanese had undertaken a day-to-day artillery "assault", the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" would have been in a similar or even worse position than if they had tried to go along the fairway to the sea. Slowly moving along a raid, slowly moving along the fairway, in each of these cases they would represent an excellent target for the main "weapons"S. Uriu - Japanese armored cruiser, who would not even need to come close to them to destroy both ships.
3. At the same time, the output of Russian ships to the battle would be perceived by the public, the crews of foreign stationary officers, and others as a feat, and this is always important: at the same time, an attempt to fight in the raid, although it would hardly be the cause of the accusation of cowardice, would not allow to talk about the heroism of Russian sailors. If at the same time, due to some accident, civilians or European ships or vessels suffered, then this could be the basis for a serious international incident.
In fact, as we will see later, the commander of the Varyag had another, very weighty reason not to stay in the roads, but to go for a breakthrough. But the above is enough to make an unequivocal conclusion: the decision of V.F. Rudnev to make an attempt to break through should be regarded as the only correct one in the current situation - both from a military point of view and from the position of international politics.
Before the battle there was very little time. In 10.00, Vsevolod Fedorovich returned to Varyag after a meeting with the station commanders, and after only an hour and ten minutes, the command “All Upward, Shoot Anchor!” Sounded at 11.10. By this time, all the final preparations for the battle were ready - wooden furniture was sent overboard, and so on, and the Koretze also cut down the branches in order to make it difficult to determine the distance to the canlodka. Secret books, maps, orders, ciphers were burned. In 11.20, Varyag was removed from the anchor.
But before we proceed to the description of the battle, we note the entry in the logbook made in the morning before the battle and subsequently causing a lot of ridicule from the revisionists:
"07.00. All Japanese ships were anchored and headed for the sea." Morning tidy. Cleaned copper.
This is war - war, and dinner is on schedule! The ship is threatened with a quick death, and what else can the crew do, no matter how beloved of the Russian Imperial Navy, is a jerk! How can you not recall Lieutenant Livitin from Sobolev's remarkable work “Overhaul”, which, explaining to his younger brother, the midshipman, the particulars of the ship service, including why he, the future officer, is driven to scrape the deck, remarks: “There are things their meaninglessness. " The morning tidy, in the opinion of the “historians of the new wave”, testifies to the inertia and mossiness of the officers and commander of the “Varyag”, who did not find for their team more important business before the battle. All would be nothing, that's just:
1. In fact, the cleaning began in 07.00, and the commander of the French cruiser, who informed VF Rudnev about the upcoming Japanese attack and S. Uriu's demands on foreign stationary personnel, arrived at Varyag an hour later. That is, when they started cleaning, no one yet knew that after some four and a half hours the cruiser would go into battle;
2. Each commander is well aware of the rule: “what would a soldier not do, if only ...” was tired, in general. I must say that service on the Varyag in Chemulpo was not easy - it was cold (January!), There were no vacations on the beach, with provisions ... it is clear that no one was hungry, but there were interruptions in supplies. And then there is the whole squadron of Japanese with transports, how to understand all this is unclear. In general, it was perfectly correct to take a team with something, and the current, usual things were perfectly suited for this;
3. And, finally, for some reason it is forgotten that cleaning is one of the most important procedures for preparing a ship for battle. Let us recall the memoirs of Semenov (“Redemption”): “Or another: people who used to think of cleanliness as a fad of their bosses, who lived for a whole year, only" sweeping out the rubbish "suddenly understood its meaning, its necessity, when they were simply explained that the wounded man falls the deck, that, until they pick it up and carry it away, dirt can get into the wound, and it will be released that, because of an empty scratch, cut your hand or foot, otherwise you will not be able to save it from death. ”
To be continued!
Articles from this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 10. Night