The cruiser "Varangian". Fight at Chemulpo 27 January 1904 year. Part 2. But why crump?

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So, we completed the article on the fact that the contract for the construction of a squadron battleship and X-NUMX-class armored cruiser was concluded with Charles Crump out of the competition, and, most importantly, even before the said Charles Crump could present these projects ships. Instead, “Preliminary specifications” were attached to the contract, which in many ways simply repeated some of the general requirements of the “Design Program” that we listed in the previous article (displacement, speed, armament, range and coal stock as a percentage of normal displacement). They were added the number of crew, information on stocks of provisions, as well as some technical details, alas, are few and, as we shall see, poorly and incorrectly formulated.

But even this specification was not the final document. As follows from the contract, after Charles Crump returns to America, he must, "complying with preliminary specifications and following the most modern practice regarding details," and, of course, "by mutual agreement" formulate and prepare final specifications. And then on the basis of their design of the cruiser.

At the same time, the “Preliminary Specification” contained a number of flaws, such as:

1. Vagueness of language;

2. Discrepancies in the Russian and English texts of the document;

3. Arithmetic errors and clerks;

4. Direct deviations from the requirements of the ITC.

The description of the basic errors of the “Pre-specification” is given by R.M. Melnikov in the book "Cruiser" Varyag "":

1. While the MTC required the installation of Belleville boilers, the specification allowed the installation of boilers of a different system — Niclossa — on the cruiser. This was a direct violation of the instructions of the ITC;

2. As we said earlier, in Russian navy the contracted speed of the ships was supposed to develop on natural draft, but forced blast was allowed for the "Varyag" (though with some limitations, but nonetheless);

3. The specification indicated the standard form of the cruiser's driving performance for a maximum speed of twelve hours. In the contract, this requirement was replaced by two runs of six hours;

4. The technical requirements and the design of the main and auxiliary mechanisms of the “armored cruiser in the 6 000 t”, according to the conditions of the competition, were to meet the best world standards. However, in a contract with an American industrialist, this requirement mysteriously changed to "compliance with the level reached by the Kramp plant." In other words, according to the contract, it turned out that if Crump did not do something before, then he does not have to, and if the Russians want to get it, please, but only for an additional fee. Subsequently, this item was widely used by Charles Crump to its own advantage: for example, the Maritime Department was forced to pay for electric drives for auxiliary mechanisms separately;

5. According to the Russian text of the contract, the armor deck was to be made of armor used on "the best ships of this type." However, the English text kept the “small” amendment: “the best ships of the fleet of the United States”. All the most modern types of armor (i.e., quenched using the Krupp method and extra-soft nickel steel) were not used in the US Navy, which allowed Charles Crump to “shake out” the additional payment for booking the Varyag and the battleship Retvisan when the MTC began to insist on the use of these types of reservations;

6. It was not stipulated that the contract price includes the supply of a number of types of equipment and devices, such as: general ship dynamos, electric motors, electric lighting, telephones, loud battle bells and bells;

7. In the case when the ship for the domestic fleet was built abroad, its armament was often not included in the contract price - the duty to supply it remained with the Maritime Office. In this case, the weapons were ordered at domestic factories and paid for separately, respectively, its cost was not included in the contract. In such cases, the delivery was subject to guns, torpedo tubes, ammunition for them, and related devices and devices, such as spotlights. But in the case of Charles C. Krump's contract, the MTC was surprised to find that all devices for servicing guns and supplying ammunition, such as: rails, elevators, electric motors and dynamos, which were usually related to the duties of the plant, must be paid for by the Maritime Office separately;

8. The draft of the future cruiser was recognized as one of the most important parameters - its excess relative to contractual "punished" with specially stipulated fines (the first six inches - for free, but further on 21 thousand dollars for each next inch (25,4 mm)). Accordingly, the specification set the maximum size of the draft - 5,9 m. Everything would be fine, but the English text of the contract provided for the draft already 6,1 m (20 feet), and the Russian (which is an obvious misprint) - 26 feet or 7,93 m. That is one of the most important parameters of the cruiser I received three different limit values ​​in the text, one of which was so large (7,93 m) that it could not be reached under any conditions. Naturally, the possibility of subsequently demanding reasonable precipitations or of fining Charles Crump’s firm for failing to comply with such a requirement was thereby completely excluded;

9. The metacentric height, which according to the requirements of the ITC was supposed to be at least 0,76 m, in the contract and Specification mysteriously "changed the sign to the opposite" - according to these documents it should have been no more than 0,76 m .;

10. The English text of the specification contained an enlarged summary of the scales: the body and the devices — 2900 t; power plant - 1250 t; weapons - 574 t; supply and supplies - 550 t; coal - 720 t. In the Russian text, this summary was for some reason absent.

In general, it can be stated that the contract with the firm of Charles Crump was drafted extremely illiterate and to the great advantage of the latter.

You can, of course, refer to the fact that the contract was required to prepare very quickly ... but why? Where was the rush? What benefits did this contract give us? Perhaps Charles C. Crump offered some extremely favorable prices for his products? Not at all - according to the contract, the cost of the cruiser was estimated at 2 138 000 dollars (4 233 240 rubles), while, for example, the cost of the Askold cruiser (project winning the 1898 G contest) was only 3,78 million rubles. . - of course, we are talking about ships without weapons and military supplies. That is not only that the contract for the construction of “Varyag” had a lot of “holes” that allowed Charles Crump to “legally” increase the cost of construction, as well as the initial price was significantly (approximately 12%) higher than that of the winning bidder. competitor!

However, there is a nuance that has been repeatedly discussed by lovers of the naval stories on specialized sites. The fact is that “Varyag” really seems very expensive, even at a contract price, that is, without taking into account subsequent surcharges. However, the squadron battleship Retvizan, which was contracted to build Charles Crump, had a contract value (with armor, but without armament) 4 328 000 dollars. (also with reservation, but without weapons) was 30 280 000 francs or 5 842 605 US dollars.



In other words, Retvizan seemed to cost much less for the Russian treasury than the Tsarevich, and wasn’t this the advantage of C. Crump’s commercial offer? Even such an idea was expressed that the relatively high cost of the Varyag became a form of compensation for the extremely cheap squadron battleship that the Americans undertook to build.

The version of dumping prices is certainly a very interesting and logical point of view that could explain a lot. Unfortunately, in the near future, this version does not look right, and there are three reasons for this.

The first is that, most likely, the cost of contracts Retvizana and Tsesarevich "includes a different amount of structures. We know that the tower installations of Retvizan were made in Russia, at the same time all eight towers (two of the main and six medium caliber) of the squadron battleship Tsesarevich were designed and built in France. And here an interesting question arises - whether the cost of developing tower installations was included in those same 5 842 605 US dollars of the contract price of the "Tsarevich"? I must say that we are talking about a very large amount - ordering tower 305-mm units for Retvisan cost 502 thousand rubles, or more than 253 thousand dollars. How much did the Cesarevich 152-mm unit cost, the author, unfortunately , doesn't know, but it is known that 6 152-mm towers of the squadron battleship Slava were totally more expensive than its two 305-mm towers by 18,6% (632 and 537 thousand rubles, respectively). Applying the same proportion to the cost of the Retvizan towers, and converting rubles to dollars at the then 1,98 rub / dollar rate, we understand that eight Tsesarevich towers could cost more than 550 thousand dollars.

Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have an exact answer to the question whether the cost of tower installations was included in the contract price of Tsearevich, but at the same time such arguments show that it is impossible to compare the contractual values ​​of Retvisan and Tsesarevich this requires a detailed analysis of all specifications of both ships. At the same time, indirect data confirm the hypothesis presented by the author.

The fact is that in "most loyal report of the Navy Department of 1897-1900 years." Are the total price of battleships "Crown Prince» (14 004 286 rub.) And "Retvizan» (12 553 277 rub.) "To the mechanisms armor , artillery, mines and combat supplies. " If we exclude from these figures the contractual values ​​of Tsesarevich and Retvizan, adding to the latter the total amount of supercontract payments that the Maritime Office paid to C. Crump for this ship (489 839 dollars, not counting supercontract payments for Varyag, of course) , and transferring dollars to rubles at the rate of 1,98 rubles for a dollar, it turns out that the cost of weapons and combat reserves of the "Tsarevich" was 2 435 928 thousand rubles, and Retvizana - 2 954 556 rubles.

Obviously, if the cost of the towers of the “Cesarevich” had been “bracketed” to the contract value, then it should have been taken into account in the “armament” column, because otherwise it would have no place to be. But in this case, guns, ammunition, etc. + 8 turret installations "Tsesarevich" should cost much more than almost the same number of artillery barrels and ammunition and two 305-mm towers "Retvisan." We see the opposite - the cost of armament of Retvizan is higher than that of the Tsarevich, and the difference (518 628 rubles) is suspiciously similar to those 502 thousand rubles that the Maritime Office paid to the Metal Plant for a couple of twelve-inch towers.

And from this it follows that (most likely!) The contract value of the “Tsesarevich” included a battleship with all tower installations, while two 305-mm towers did not enter into the contract value of Retvisan, as they were made in Russia. Of course, this increased the contract value of the first and cheapened the second.

However, they are not the same towers ... The fact is (and this is the second of the reasons we mentioned above) that Retvisan and Tsesarevich, despite the similar displacement, are very different types of warships, because Tsesarevich, with its turret The middle artillery and the heaped up sides, of course, has a much more complex structure than a ship of American construction. After all, the cost of the tower is one thing, and in order for this tower to work, it should be provided with all necessary types of energy (electricity) and many more different works should be done, and in a very specific French building. In comparison with towers, the casemate placement of medium-caliber guns is technologically many times simpler.

Of course, the fact that the contract value of the Retvizan building was determined in 30 months, and the Tsarevich value in 46 months, can be interpreted as a “special” attitude to French suppliers (as is well known, General-Admiral had a certain weakness for everything French), but, according to the author, the understanding of the ITC is much closer to the truth, that the “Tsarevich” is much more laborious to manufacture than the “Retvisan”.

This view is confirmed by the figures for the tonnage cost (that is, their cost per ton of normal displacement, taking into account weapons and combat reserves) of the squadron battleship Victory and Prince Suvorov. Both were built in Russia, at the Baltic Shipbuilding Plant in St. Petersburg, and the difference in the periods of their construction is not too large (Victory was laid on 2 a year before Suvorov) in order to significantly affect the cost of ships. But the victorious “cost” of the “Victory” was 752 RUB / t, while the “Prince Suvorov” - 1 024 RUB / t. At the same time, Pobeda was a battleship of classical architecture, and its average artillery was located in dungeons, while Suvorov was a domestic copy of Tsesarevich. As we see, the tonnage value of “Suvorov” by as much as 36,17% exceeds that of “Victory”, which indicates a significantly greater complexity of building battleships of the “French” type.

Summarizing the above, we can with a high degree of probability say that the lower price of Retvizan relative to Tsesarevich is not connected with the generosity of Mr. C. Crump, but because the Retvizan project was constructively much simpler than the French battleship. That is, it is quite possible that if we ordered the French not the “Tsarevich”, but a ship similar to the “Retvizan”, then the French could build it for a price quite comparable to that proposed by C. Crump.



But finally denies the version of the cheapness of American ships activity of the state controller, senator T. I. Filippov. He studied the contracts for the supply of Retvizan and Varyag and other documents on this transaction, discovered the errors contained in them, which caused large supercontract payments, and found this to be the most significant violations of Russian interests. Having identified all this, T.I. Filippov demanded an explanation from the Maritime Ministry. Obviously, if these shortcomings had such an rational and advantageous explanation for the treasury as the low initial cost of the ships, it would undoubtedly be presented. Instead, P. P. Tyrtov and V. P. Verkhovsky wrote the answer for more than five months and did not indicate anything like it in it — according to R. M. Melnikov, this document: "was replete with inconclusive excuses and, being a typical example of a formal defense of the" honor of the uniform ", did not contain any substantive explanations."

So, the argument in favor of the cost of construction disappears too - what remains? Maybe deadlines? But the fact is that the contract terms for the construction of “Varyag” were not too different from those of “Askold” - 20 and 23 of the month, respectively. That is, the Americans really took to build a cruiser a little faster, but only a three-month gain clearly did not justify concluding a non-competitive contract.

As we see, there were no objective reasons for concluding a contract with the firm of C. Crump before the competition, but perhaps there were some subjective ones? Indeed, there were such reasons.

To begin with, the William Cramp & Sons Shipbuilding Company looked like a real leviathan against the background of other European companies that entered the competition for the construction of a "1st rank cruiser of 6 tons." Let us take a closer look at the Germania company (Schiff- und Maschinenbau AG "Germania"), which won the competition (and built the Askld armored cruiser for the Russian fleet). Her shipyard at the time of participation in the competition had no more than a thousand people, while the company had no experience in building large warships according to its own designs. Moreover, the history of "Germany" was a series of bankruptcies and commercial failure.

This company was established in 1867 g under the name "North German Shipbuilding Company" ("Norddeutsche Schiffbaugesellschaft") and achieved some success and recognition - for example, in 1876 g it was built on "Hohenzollern" - yes, that is the most famous Hohenzollern, the personal yacht of Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, despite this highest reputational success, only three years later (in 1879 r), the company went bankrupt.

Then it was bought by a corporation engaged in the production of steam engines in Berlin (already with 1822 D), but this did not help - now the “happy buyer” started having financial problems. As a result, a new company was founded on the basis of the existing shipyard in 1882 g, under the name known to us by “Schiff- und Maschinenbau AG" Germania ", and it has established itself as a good destroyer builder. Alas, financial troubles continued to haunt the enterprise, and in Germany, 1896 was acquired by Krupp - from that moment its expansion began, but at the same time in size and 1898 g (that is, for the duration of the competition) “ Germany ”was, by the standards of the shipbuilding industry, a small enterprise.

The Italian company Ansaldo did not go far from “Germany” - by the time the competition was held, the entire 1250 man worked on it, and although she had successfully built two armored cruisers (“Garibaldi” and “Cristobal Colon”), she also had no experience in building large warships on their own projects.

In general, it can be stated that the competition of the Russian Empire did not arouse the interest of the “pillars” of the shipbuilding industry of the Old World - third-party European firms responded to the call to design and build. But the company of Charles Crump ...

The story of "William Crump and Sons" began in 1828, when Charles-Crump's father, William Crump, built a small shipbuilding workshop.

The cruiser "Varangian". Fight at Chemulpo 27 January 1904 year. Part 2. But why crump?

Left - the founder of the company William Kramp, on the right his son Charles


The company gradually grew, and after the US civil war began to receive orders from the United States government and built wooden ships for 8 for it. Since then, the company has regularly created something out of the ordinary.
The largest US non-tower battleship (armored frigate "New Ironsides"). The first American ship with the car "compound". The first US transatlantic liners. A year after the death of the company's founder, William Kramp, in 1880, the number of workers and employees of the company was 2 300 people, and the company itself was the largest shipbuilding company in the USA. Before 1898, William Kramp and Sons built three battleships (Indiana, Massachusetts and Iowa) and completed the fourth (Alabama). In addition, the company handed over to the US Navy armored cruisers Brooklyn and New York, two Columbia armored cruisers, as well as Newark, Charleston, Baltimore ... The same Germany built large ships one battleship and one armored cruiser. 1898 6 people worked at the Crump shipyards to 000, that is, about three times more than in the shipyards of “Germany” and “Ansaldo” combined.


Panorama of the Crump shipyard from the Retvizan under construction


But that's not all. Without a doubt, the name and reputation of the company mean a lot, but it was extremely important that the Maritime Department already placed its orders in the shipyards "William Crump and Sons." In 1878, Kramp’s workers repaired the Cruiser’s body and clipper’s machines, and apparently did it well, because next year Charles Cruz gets a contract for as many as four 2-grade cruisers, three of which ( "Asia" and "Africa") should have been converted from civilian courts, and "Zabiyaku" should have been built from scratch. Kramp was contacted later on - in 1893, he repaired the “Dmitriy Donskoy” cruiser mineboats.

Charles Crump was known not only among the officers of the Naval Department: 1879, at the exhibition in Paris, he was presented to Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich. Incidentally, he was extremely surprised that Charles Crump, owning such a solid company, did not have shipbuilding education and was, in fact, self-taught - but this could hardly spoil the American reputation, given the brilliant successes that the company had achieved under his leadership.

Thus, without a doubt, Admirals of the Navy Department Charles Crump was represented by the owner of one of the leading shipbuilding companies in the world, who already worked for the Russian fleet, and this undoubtedly played a role in their receipt of an order for Retvisan and Varyag. But ... the fact is that another thing is also true: as a result of interaction with the firm “William Crump and Sons”, the Navy had a “pleasure” to make sure ... how to say it more politely? "A little" adventurous nature of its owner. Let us return briefly by the time when Crump and Sons received a contract for the 2 rank cruiser.

So, 8 February 1878 g, at the end of the next Russian-Turkish war, and with the direct participation of England, Russia was forced upon by the unsuccessful for it San Stefano peace treaty. In response, the Maritime Office blew dust from the cruising war against Britain plan - it was a very interesting plan developed in 1863, in which the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans were cut into 15 sectors, in each of which Russian cruiser. A huge advantage of this plan was a very thought-out system for providing these cruisers - it was planned to deploy a whole network of supply vessels, etc. In general, the plan was good for everyone, except for one - fifteen cruisers from Russia at that time was not. And so, in order to quickly replenish their number, an “expedition to America” was undertaken to acquire and convert four suitable US civilian ships into cruisers. However, for the “cruiser №4” the tasks were very different from the other three - in it the Maritime Department wanted to see not only a raider, but also a high-speed reconnaissance officer in a squadron capable of performing a stationary role in peacetime. In other words, the cruiser was supposed to become small (within 1200 t), but rather fast (15 nodes under the machine and 13 under the sails). At the same time, coal consumption at full speed should not exceed 23 t / day. They did not find a suitable civilian vessel for such requirements, so it was decided to build a ship, ordering it from one of the US shipbuilding firms.
So - I must say that the best conditions for the construction of the cruiser No. XXUMX, which later became Zabiyakoy, were offered to the Boston shipyard, which, when all other Russian requirements were met, was taken to ensure speed in 4 units and offered the lowest price for the ship - 15,5 thousand dollars. However, Charles Crump played into the hands of the fact that he had previously received a contract for the conversion of three ships in the cruisers "Europe", "Asia" and "Africa". At the same time, Charles Crump undertook to build a ship that fully met the specified “technical task” in the required time frame.

In June, the 1878 g of the “Cruiser No. 4” was laid, and the 22 of February, the 1879 of the Zabijaka, with more than two months late from the schedule, went on trial trials, of which Charles Crump created the real show. The cruiser easily reached its maximum speed in 15,5 knots, having surpassed the contract half a knot, and its average speed was 14,3 knots. Of course, there were newspapermen on board the ship, and the ship’s unexpectedly high performance literally blew up, as it is now fashionable to say, the “information space” - the New York Herald spoke of “Bully” in a superlative way, and the solid magazine American Thorn and in general, he managed to declare that "the ship is superior to any military cruiser built in the world."


Cruiser "Bully"


Newspapers, not being professionals, overlooked one of the most important nuances - “Zabiyaka” went on a run not just underloaded, but totally underloaded. At the design displacement in 1 236 t, in which he was to be tested, C. Crump brought the cruiser into mileage only in the displacement 832 t. A huge amount of necessary equipment and other goods, as well as weapons on the ship was not yet, and was not taken ballast, which could compensate for these weights. Of course, shipbuilders of other countries also sinned with similar methods, but ... by a third of the displacement ?!

Of course, it was impossible for the Russian officers who exercised control and acceptance of the ship to “rub in their glasses”. And in fact Charles Crump passed the ship:

1. With a two-month late;

2. With submerging at 1 foot - it must be said that under the terms of the contract, when the ship’s draft, which is more than a foot draft, the Navy had the right to refuse the cruiser altogether;

3. With a maximum speed in 14,5 knots - that is, half a node below the contract;

4. And, finally, with the consumption of coal and a half times greater than it was supposed under the terms of the contract.

In essence, it was possible to say that the ship should not have been taken to the treasury at all, but ... despite the failure to reach the contractual conditions, the ship still turned out to be not so bad, and the Russian cruisers were urgently needed. Therefore, it was decided not to leave the “Bullock” by C. Crump, and the cruiser eventually raised the St. Andrew’s flag. But still the enterprise of C. Crump in this case did not justify the hopes placed on him (to be fair, we’ll clarify that William Crump and Sons did much better with the re-equipment of "Europe", "Asia" and "Africa".

However, attention is drawn to the financial policy of C. Krump. As we have said, the Boston shipyard proposed to build a cruiser with a speed of 15,5 bonds. for 250 thousand dollars, Charles Crump also asked for the construction of the "cruiser №4" 275 thousand dollars, that is, 25 thousand dollars more. However, this amount did not satisfy Charles Crump at all, and therefore during construction, he resisted the nuances that were not stipulated by the contract and managed to get over-contract payments in the amount of 50 662 dollars! Thus, the total cost of “Zabiyaki” was aimed at 325,6 thousand dollars, which is more than 30% more than the initial price of the Boston shipyard.

But in the year 1879 it was found who would short the appetites of the American industrialist. The maritime agency fully agreed and confirmed both 275 thousand dollars of the initial price and 50,6 thousand dollars of payments over the contract. And then, with an unwavering hand and pointing out the relevant paragraphs, recovered from Charles Crump for all the violations committed by him with fines totaling 158 thousand dollars. As a result of this negotiation, “Bully” for which only 167 thousand 662 was paid dollars was perhaps the cheapest overseas acquisition of the Russian Imperial Navy in the history of its existence.

Thus, as we have said before, his thoroughness and reputation spoke in favor of the enterprise of Charles Crump. But the history of the construction of the Bully Hero clearly showed that despite all its “regalia”, Charles Crump would not disdain to increase his own profit in any way and it does not matter whether this method is legal and fair or not.

Such “uncleanliness”, of course, does not mean that you can’t have anything to do with Charles Crump’s firm. In business, there is generally no honesty in the biblical understanding of the word. The honesty that can be expected from a businessman is the fulfillment of a contract signed with him in accordance with each of his clauses. If the contract is scrupulously executed, but the customer did not receive what he wanted, then these are the problems of the customer, who should learn to formulate his requirements more clearly. Accordingly, the story of “Bully-Eaters” irrefutably testified that with Charles Crump one should have kept his ears open and be extremely attentive and careful in all matters and in the wording of any document signed with him.

At the same time, there were many ways in which one could conduct business with Charles Crump. Without a doubt, it would be best to accept his project and consider it the ITC on a general basis with the projects of other companies that sent their proposals to the competition. But no one forbade entering into an agreement out of competition with him - only in this case it was necessary first to get developed project from C. Crump, coordinate it with ITC and only then finally approve both the decision to order Charles Crump's ships and the cost of acquiring them. In this case, all the advantages would remain on the side of the Maritime Department and the ITC, and Charles Crump would have to play the role of “what would you like?” To the last, without too much lifting the prices. And then, after the project had been developed and agreed by the parties, it turned out to be much more difficult for Charles Crump to bargain for over-contract payments or other relief measures. Alas, instead, what was done was done, and we see no single reason justifying such a strange haste in a deal with a American industrialist.

Thus, we can only congratulate Mr. Charles Crump on an extremely successful deal for his company.

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126 comments
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  1. +1
    4 June 2018 05: 55
    Very detailed.
    There are interesting sources that give such a detailed picture of the financial ins and outs of ships.
    1. +4
      4 June 2018 10: 20
      Quote: Olgovich
      There are interesting sources that give such a detailed picture of the financial ins and outs of ships.

      In general, there are few of them - the contract value of the Varyag is reflected in many places, including Melnikov’s. The contract values ​​of the battleships and Askold can be found in the corresponding issues of MK, and I took it from an article by our esteemed Valentine (Comrade). The total cost of the battleships and cruisers is "From a comprehensive report on the naval department for 1897-1900." Value for the towers - "Glory Undefeated Hero of Moonsund" by Vinogradov. About the bully - there is a very interesting monograph by N. A. Pakhomov "Cruiser II rank" Bully. 1878-1904. "
      Well, something like this, about :)
      1. +1
        4 June 2018 12: 38
        Thank you. hi
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In general, there are few of them - the contract value of the Varyag is reflected in many places, including Melnikov’s. The contract values ​​of the battleships and Askold can be found in the corresponding issues of MK, and I took it from an article by our esteemed Valentine (Comrade). The total cost of the battleships and cruisers is "From a comprehensive report on the naval department for 1897-1900." Value for the towers - "Glory Undefeated Hero of Moonsund" by Vinogradov. About the bully - there is a very interesting monograph by N. A. Pakhomov "Cruiser II rank" Bully. 1878-1904. "
        Well, something like this, about
  2. +3
    4 June 2018 06: 30
    This part of the work, in comparison with the first, already looks much more serious ...
  3. +5
    4 June 2018 07: 01
    "- How are you doing at home?
    - They steal ... "
    The pockets of the ranks of the Maritime Department were decently heated. And since there are exceptions to any rule, the Treaty with Kramp has become such an exception in the construction of ships abroad for Russia. There is also a Boyar negotiated for Denmark, but it was built with high quality. As a result, capitalism again showed its mercantile grin, and Russia received the goods in beautiful packaging, but of poor quality. The only question is how much ... I think in the future the author will show it. For one of the whales, on which all the arguments about missed opportunities under Chemulpo rest, is precisely the Varyag CMU
    Andrei Nikolaevich, undoubtedly a plus !!! Your statement of personal opinion is much more interesting than the arguments of many historians good
    PS If you could manage to release your articles with a collection on topics close to the RNE, then if he came to Belarus, you would get out of the ground drinks hi
    1. avt
      +4
      4 June 2018 08: 24
      Quote: Rurikovich
      PS If you could manage to release your articles with a collection on topics close to the RNE, then if he came to Belarus, you would get out of the ground

      Print on a color printer, good illustrations are good, and distribute to the people. bully A good monograph is planned good .
      1. +2
        4 June 2018 22: 14
        Quote: avt
        Print on a color printer, good illustration good

        Eeeee, nooooo ... This is samizdat. But a brand-new little book smelling of typography in one’s hands is a buzz. Yes
    2. +3
      4 June 2018 10: 22
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I think in the future the author will show it.

      And where will he go .... The next article will be devoted to the design features of the Varyag :)))
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Andrei Nikolaevich, undoubtedly a plus !!! Your statement of personal opinion is much more interesting than the arguments of many historians

      Thank! :)))
  4. +1
    4 June 2018 08: 10
    The dumping price version is, of course, a very interesting and logical point of view that could explain a lot.
    In the book of V. Kataev, the Varyag legend of the Russian fleet isIs it not a sharp buildup of the forces of the Japanese fleet that caused the order of the ships of Trump ships. Thank you for analyzing the reasons and conditions for ordering ships to Trump, something was a discovery for me.
    1. +1
      5 June 2018 12: 17
      Quote: Amurets
      Isn’t the sharp buildup of the forces of the Japanese fleet the reason for ordering ships Trump. For the analysis of the reasons and conditions for ordering ships Trump Thanks, something for me was a revelation.

      Trump? Oh how))) Apparently then his Russian (still tsarist) intelligence took it on a hook))))
  5. +2
    4 June 2018 08: 24
    Thus, we can only congratulate Mr. Charles Crump on an extremely successful deal for his company.

    IMHO, the ears and beard of the admiral general and in this story stick out quite clearly ...
  6. +4
    4 June 2018 09: 31
    Andrei dug very deeply into the history of shipyards and the reasons for choosing one or another.
    I completely agree that the free ship building capacities can be provided either by the New World or by small European shipyards with the corresponding quality and risks (terms, quality of execution, bankruptcy risks). In this regard, the choice of the Kramp shipyards - does not look strange.
    As for the contracts:
    to be extremely attentive and accurate in all matters and in the wording of any document signed with him.


    And not only with him.
    The more detailed the specification, the more accurate its performance under the contract.
    Unfortunately, there are attempts to formulate the mission in general by the military, respectively, the shipyards proceed from their capabilities (as with Kramp’s armor). The military wanted armor according to the Krupp method - this was not reflected in the contract - they were counted.
    If the armament is manufactured and installed outside the shipyard, then the installation of the feed mechanisms should have been negotiated separately.
    That is, this is not the reason for the "cunning Krampe", it is the reason for the poor financial literacy of the customer representatives who signed the contract.
    This also shows that the English specifications were not correctly translated into Russian.
    1. +1
      4 June 2018 11: 08
      Quote: DimerVladimer

      This also shows that the English specifications were not correctly translated into Russian.

      I get the impression that they were so specially transferred. Moreover, it must be understood that then English was known in high society well enough to notice obvious non-connections that are described (especially regarding boilers).
      Most likely someone received a good bribe.
      1. +1
        4 June 2018 13: 03
        Quote: alstr
        I get the impression that they’re so specially transferred

        Not caught - not a thief, of course, but .... very similar
  7. +4
    4 June 2018 10: 10
    “In general, it can be stated that the competition of the Russian Empire did not arouse the interest of the“ pillars ”of the Old World shipbuilding industry - primarily European third-party firms responded to the call to design and build. But Charles Crump's enterprise ...”
    This is on the one hand. But on the other hand, less than four months after signing the contract with Kramp, they signed contact with AG Vulcan Stettin for the construction of the Bogatyr cruiser according to the German project, which was a competition. Yes, and Askold at the Germaniawerft in Kiel was not particularly behind. And these cruisers were in no way inferior to the “Varyag” in anything.
    Maybe hurried yet with Kramp?
    1. +5
      4 June 2018 10: 35
      Quote: Curious
      This is on the one hand. But on the other hand, less than four months after signing the contract with Kramp, they signed contact with AG Vulcan Stettin for the construction of the Bogatyr cruiser according to the German project, which was a competition.

      Well, strictly speaking, “Bogatyr” was late for the contest, but he was recognized better than Askold.
      Quote: Curious
      Maybe hurried yet with Kramp?

      So I, in general, write about the fact that it would be better to let Kramp's project pass through the competition. Because what Krump drew as a result, most likely the competition would not have passed
      1. +1
        4 June 2018 11: 43
        So I, in general, write about the fact that it would be better to let Kramp's project pass through the competition. Because what Krump drew as a result, most likely the competition would not have passed


        Sources issued in Russia and abroad there are differences in the evaluation of the order of these ships. I will briefly describe a foreign one.

        Upon arrival in Russia, Kramp brought with him several projects. But at MTK, I ran into the French lobby. The US ambassador to Russia, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, intervened in the case, after which the ITC began a more detailed consideration of Kramp's proposals. Within several weeks, technical specifications were adjusted and supplemented, and the main provisions of the projects were worked out.

        According to the foreign version, the MTK took an active part in the development of these ships. If this is true, we got a joint project and we must blame ourselves.
        1. +1
          4 June 2018 11: 49
          Quote: 27091965i
          Upon arrival in Russia, Kramp brought with him several projects. But at MTK, I ran into the French lobby.

          I do not think this is legitimate - Krump proposed building an armadillo on the Iowa project, and a cruiser on the Kasagi project, which in no case was an acceptable solution.
          Quote: 27091965i
          According to the foreign version, the MTK took an active part in the development of these ships.

          Accepted - as an approving body (and a lot went by him), but not as a designer
          1. +3
            4 June 2018 12: 22
            Krump proposed building an armadillo according to the Iowa project .... that in no case was an acceptable solution

            Why did Iowa not please you? An eight-inch SK, even a blockage of boards (like Poltava) eats ... laughing
          2. +1
            4 June 2018 12: 30
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Accepted - as an approving body (and a lot went by him), but not as a designer


            The MTK adopted the main technical characteristics, apparently in a few weeks of discussion they and Kramp agreed on what ships should be built. By the way, Crump called the MTK "shipbuilders' inquisitors."

            I do not think this is legitimate - Krump proposed building an armadillo on the Iowa project, and a cruiser on the Kasagi project, which in no case was an acceptable solution.


            These ships did not correspond to the views of the MTK, although I like the Iowa as an armadillo.
      2. +2
        4 June 2018 12: 24
        I did not mean a project, but the interest of foreign firms. Moreover, the Tsar’s Kaiser was pushing the Tsar to the Far East, so the Germans were interested in assisting in the implementation of the program. Perhaps the king had to control the process and provide support at the level of personal contacts. Maybe Crump would not be needed.
      3. +1
        4 June 2018 12: 31
        [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] So, in general, I am writing that it would be better to pass Crump's project through the competition. Because what Crump drew as a result most likely the competition would not have passed [/ quote]

        So I have a feeling that Kramp promised to build a cruiser more powerful than the Kasagi and his Chitose sistership (which were also built at the Kramp shipyard and sons).
        Although there is an opinion that Crump [quote] [invited the Ministry of the Sea to take “Kasagi”, previously built by his company / quote] as a prototype.
        The construction of Japanese cruisers was previously carried out at the same shipyard where Varyag was later laid down (by the way, a very ambiguous name for an import-built ship).
        And in principle, if you compare the performance characteristics of Varyag and Kasagi - Varyag has a great speed and range.

        [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] Because what Kramp drew in the end most likely the competition would not have passed [/ quote]
        Compare Bogatyr and Varyag - with such a different purpose of the ships (especially in range) - well, which of the Bogatyr is a scout at its speed and range.
        Bogatyr’s project - [quote] on the basic design solutions, the project was a scaled-down armored cruiser Yakumo built by the Volcano for the Japanese fleet [/ quote] - also a shipyard that built the cruiser for the Japanese fleet.
        The trend however :)
        1. +3
          4 June 2018 13: 04
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          Compare Bogatyr and Varyag - with such a different purpose of the ships (especially in range) - well, which of the Bogatyr is a scout at its speed and range.

          So TK was one thing :)))))))))))
          1. 0
            5 June 2018 09: 50
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            So TK was one thing :)))))))))))

            For a scout at a squadron - the power reserve of the Bogatyr is less than 3000 miles (an economic move), what kind of "long-range scout" is he at a squadron? And the speed is somewhat lower. Of course, it is protected much better.
            But a scout - it should be a fast and with a large reserve of go-go ship - the Varangian was somewhat better correlated with this requirement than the Bogatyr type.
        2. +3
          4 June 2018 13: 16
          Compare Athlete and Varangian - at such various purposes ships ...

          What is a "different purpose"?
          Well, which of the Heroes is a scout at his speed ...

          And what about his speed? 12 hours even more than Varyag’s (without confusing him with Oleg)
          1. +2
            5 June 2018 11: 29
            Quote: anzar
            And what about his speed? 12 hours even more than Varyag’s (without confusing him with Oleg)


            The speed of the Athlete is 24.3 knots - this is the maximum speed in tests, the average is about 23,55 knots.
            Varangian 24,59 knots maximum. Tests July 2
            By the end of the tests, with a headwind, the Varyag reached a speed of 24,59 knots (with a machine power of 16 hp and a steam pressure of 198 atm).

            On September 21, in the morning, 12-hour progressive tests began in full swing. The depth of the cruiser on an even keel was 5,9 m; sea ​​swell - 2 points; lateral wind force - 3 points. In general, the tests went well, only in one of the boilers the pipe broke. The achieved average speed - 23,18 knots - exceeded the value of the contract. Cars developed a capacity of 14 hp. at a vapor pressure of 157 atm. The shaft speed was on average 17,5 rpm.

            That is, during the acceptance tests, the machines were not brought to full power - it was enough to achieve the contract speed. They took the cruiser - then do what you want - get to the maximum explore all the capabilities of the machines. On tests on July 2, a power of 16198 hp was achieved. with a design capacity of cars of 20000 hp - that is, the cruiser Varyag could develop and great speed if necessary.
            With a total capacity of 1350 tons of coal pits, the cruising range was 6136 miles (economic speed 10 knots), which significantly exceeded the design value - this value is crucial for the long-range reconnaissance.
        3. +2
          4 June 2018 15: 54
          Kramp promised to build a cruiser more powerful than Kasagi and his Chitose sistership (which were also built at the Kramp shipyard and sons).

          Not for fun, but for the sake of accuracy :)))
          The Chitose is built at Union Iron Works in California.
          1. +1
            5 June 2018 11: 30
            According to Wikki, it is.
      4. +4
        4 June 2018 19: 13
        Well, strictly speaking, “Bogatyr” was late for the contest, but he was recognized better than Askold.

        In "Overhaul" is not about "Askold" on the eve of the 1st World War — more pipes than guns? wink M-ya ... it was necessary to replicate Bayan. Still, a belt ... and 203. Yes, "Retvizan" in a commercial quantity, instead of the French.
  8. 0
    4 June 2018 11: 02
    And the question is: what does the "Varangian" have to do with it, and even more so, his "fight at Chemulpo" .... winked
    1. +6
      4 June 2018 11: 37
      Quote: Snail N9
      And the question is: what does the "Varangian" have to do with it, and especially his "fight at Chemulpo" .... winked

      I approach things thoroughly. If I write a description of the battle indicating the speed that the Varangian could develop, there will be a holivar about the Nikloss boilers, which will switch to Kramp, etc., I have already seen all this since 100500. Therefore, it makes sense in the article cycle to try to explain everything from TK to cruiser and contractor selection
      1. 0
        4 June 2018 11: 55
        And .... well, understandably, from the “rear”, then come in ... Do not forget to carefully go through the classics of the genre - “coal-steel quality”, “Nikloss’s boilers”, “sooty unjustified rangefinder sights”, “sagging lifting devices "artillery," about shells and shimoza "," the impossibility of maneuvering in a narrow bay "," the need to protect the slow-moving "Korean", "Rudnev's shell concussion", etc. wink
  9. +2
    4 June 2018 11: 13
    1. While the MTC required the installation of Belleville boilers, the specification allowed the installation of boilers of a different system — Niclossa — on the cruiser. This was a direct violation of the instructions of the ITC;

    What's the problem ? Nikloss boilers in comparison with Yarrow boilers or, in the words of N. G. Epifanov, Bellevil’s “favorite” MTK boilers with increased steam production and efficiency. True, they demanded careful observance of all routine maintenance, which our fleet, in general, never differed.
    But if not Nikloss’s boilers, then it would have been better if Yarrow’s boilers had been.
    For the Belleville boilers at the time of laying the Varangian were considered already obsolete. But on the other hand, the mistakes of the mechanics were most “forgiven”.
    1. +3
      4 June 2018 11: 33
      Here is from the memoirs of academician Alexei Nikolaevich Krylov.
      In September 1908, Rear Admiral A.A. Virenius reached the age limit and was promoted to vice admiral with dismissal from service.
      I was then appointed, etc. Chairman of the Maritime Technical Committee with the resignation of the chief inspector of shipbuilding.
      A number of characteristic episodes are associated with the further design of the ships.
      One of these episodes was that the turbines, without any change in their design, allowed forcing up to 45 hp, as long as the steam was supplied in sufficient quantities. Meanwhile, according to the technical conditions worked out by the mechanical department, it was supposed to install the same boilers on new battleships Bellevillewho stood on other ships of the fleet, most of whom died at Tsushima.
      When installed on battleships, these boilers, even when calculated with extreme voltage, could produce 32 hp of steam, at which the ship would develop 000¾ knots. Thus, there was no question of forcing, and there was a clear inconsistency: turbines can develop 21 hp, the ship is given such dimensions and contours so that it has a stroke of 45 knots, and boilers supposed to be installed can produce steam for only 000 hp, i.e. at 24¾ knots.
      The mechanical department of the committee rested on its own, and there was no way to rationalize it with reasonable arguments. I had to resort to tricks.
      According to the regulation on the Marine Technical Committee, the chairman of the committee had the right to convene joint meetings of several departments. At such meetings, he chaired himself and had the right to invite to participate in the meeting, except for committee members, and other specialists, whose presence he considered necessary.
      I wrote a letter to the fleet commander, then Rear Admiral P.O. von Essen, about the ridiculous situation that would itself have been eliminated if, instead of Belleville boilers, they had installed Yarrow boilers or the like, with proper reinforcement. For more than four years, such boilers have been working flawlessly on destroyers that were part of the fleet.
      I asked to send for participation in the meeting the flagship division mechanics and all those whom Essen considers necessary.
      I have known Essen since 1880 from the Naval Academy and was sure that my request would be best satisfied.
      Having thus prepared the composition of the participants in the meeting, I myself set out the situation and raised the question of installing Yarrow boilers with somewhat thickened tubes on the planned linear ships.
      The voice of the mechanical department of the committee was suppressed by the votes of the mechanics of the operating fleet, and all the fears and objections of the mechanical department were refuted by examples from current practice.
      After the debate, I, without voting myself, put the question to the vote. By a majority, as I recall, of twenty-three votes to three, the issue was resolved in the sense I wanted, then I added my voice to the majority opinion.
      The mechanical department was fooled, if I may say so in such a serious matter.
      A.P. Shershov excellently compiled a journal of the meeting, which I reported to the comrade of the Minister of the Sea who put forward the resolution: “I agree with the opinion of the chairman of the Marine Technical Committee.” The Minister approved this decision, and our battleships have been sailing with Yarrow boilers for 25 years, developing speeds more than expected.

      Something like that. It is a pity that thanks to the stupid stubbornness of the Mechanical Department of the Marine Technical Committee, which wanted to have boilers in the fleet, although it’s not a god knows what high characteristics, but are easy to maintain, our fleet in the Tsushima battle was with the boilers of Belleville.
      1. +3
        4 June 2018 11: 47
        Sorry, but 1908 year and 1898 when discussing the parameters of ships under the program "For the needs of the Far East" are two big differences.
        the use of Belleville on armadillos of the time of the REV is more than justified. By the way, among the Japanese, most ships of the line carried boilers of this type. Only on some light cruisers were Niklosy.
      2. 0
        4 June 2018 11: 58
        Quote: Seal
        Something like that. It is a pity that thanks to the stupid stubbornness of the Mechanical Department of the Marine Technical Committee, which wanted to have boilers in the fleet, although it’s not a god knows what high characteristics, but are easy to maintain, our fleet in the Tsushima battle was with the boilers of Belleville.

        I read a similar one in the book of Tsvetkov, the battleship October Revolution. But the first experience of training stokers and steam engine drivers to work on new equipment samples appeared only with the introduction of the Ocean training ship.
        "New significantly
        the sophisticated fleet technique required a new training base,
        what the "Ocean" has become. Two latest four-cylinder pa-
        level machines with a capacity of 5500 liters. s, seventeen water pipe
        boilers of the four most common systems:
        wily, Nikloss, Yarrow and Schultz allowed for a long
        training of really knowledgeable specialists
        "confidently control the mechanisms of the latest ships."
        Melnikov, the cruiser "Varyag".
    2. +1
      4 June 2018 11: 45
      Quote: Seal
      What's the problem ? Nikloss boilers compared to Yarrow boilers or, in the words of N. G. Epifanov, Bellevil’s “favorite” MTK boilers

      Excuse me, should I remind you who Epifanov is? Representative of Nicholas in Russia :)))
      Quote: Seal
      True, they demanded careful observance of all routine maintenance, which our fleet, in general, never differed.

      In fact, this is not entirely true. You could even say - completely wrong
    3. +1
      4 June 2018 12: 05
      For the Belleville boilers at the time of laying the Varangian were considered already obsolete. But on the other hand, the mistakes of the mechanics were most “forgiven”.

      Really?
      England EDB type "Duncan" bookmark 1899, armored cruisers type "Drake" bookmark 1899, armored deck type "Highflyer" 1897 year bookmarks. all with Belleville.
    4. +1
      4 June 2018 14: 16
      Quote: Seal
      For the Belleville boilers at the time of laying the Varangian were considered already obsolete. But on the other hand, the mistakes of the mechanics were most “forgiven”.

      Do not underestimate our mechanics. Remember the same "Victory":
      Looking at the personal engine personnel on the fleet ships during factory delivery tests, I am simply amazed at the almost complete inconsistency with regard to such complex and expensive mechanisms that they have to operate. The weakness and inconsistency of these personnel is almost a universal fact on the ships of our fleet ... Due to a complete misunderstanding of the control of fire, water, donkeys, automatic feeders, etc ... [Victory boilers were brought into] an amazingly damaged, rusted and unfavorable state .
      © assistant chief of the Baltic Plant mechanical engineer I.P. Pavlov
      Or "I’ll slander":
      Our ship is considered new, but everything on it, it can be said, is old ... we’ve only been sailing for three months, and we have to fix all the boiler fittings ... The authorities look at the car as an extra thing on the ship, and, moreover, a rough thing made of iron, cast iron
      © junior mechanic A. A. Bykov
      1. +1
        4 June 2018 15: 57
        By the way, yes, and what would happen to Yarou is clearly visible on the example of "pebbles" ... (Emerald, Pearl)
    5. +1
      4 June 2018 19: 19
      This "awl" and mechanics. And boilers. laughing
  10. +3
    4 June 2018 12: 13
    Dear Andrey, excellent material, it may be possible to add something, but don’t reduce anything ... By the way, I wonder why Belvili demanded specialization, but Belleville doesn’t have “competitors” (Askold and Bogatyr)! They also “convinced” MTK that such a cruiser would not work with Belleville.
  11. +1
    4 June 2018 12: 19
    Stupid question, why open gun mounts? Really no one understood that the calculations blew fragments? They could not cover with simple shields, no one would have noticed ten tons of overload.
    1. +2
      4 June 2018 13: 05
      Quote: demiurg
      Stupid question, why open gun mounts?

      You’ll laugh, but you’ve appreciated the experience of the Sino-Japanese war.
      1. +2
        4 June 2018 13: 23
        Calculations guns do not sweat, blown by the sea breeze? Yes, and the smoke is less, again the whole calculation from the bridge in sight, a freeloader immediately visible? laughing
        1. +2
          4 June 2018 15: 58
          No, it was believed that shields would increase the area affected.
      2. +4
        4 June 2018 14: 03
        Now, perhaps, from the point of view of some, I’ll say stupidity or tear someone’s patterns, but ...
        Let's look at typical panel installations of that time:

        And now attention, the question is: how can such a shield reliably protect the servant from the fragments of shells falling into the ship? In fact, the only protection he gives is from direct hits on the shield itself, and exclusively from bullets and small-caliber shells. Both the gun and the servant are not protected from defeat by close tears and splinters in any way, as well as from a direct hit by something with a caliber of 100mm or higher. These are not much later installations, where only the loading and the projectile carriers remained without shield protection. And if something is so that a servant is struck by fragments, is it worthwhile to fence a shield that gives purely symbolic protection? So, IMHO, the absence of shields on SK guns of that time is not without its logic - with such shields they are still not there, and the installation is heavier, which necessitates more powerful guidance mechanisms or complicates manual aiming horizontally.
        1. +3
          4 June 2018 14: 25
          And also such a shield protects against fragments and blast waves during short missions. Plus, even such a shield protects the most valuable person in the calculation, the gunner.
          1. +1
            4 June 2018 14: 28
            Protects ONLY from under-flying. When a projectile hits a ship near a cannon, no one is protected - there is no shield profile over the area, everyone is open to the effects of fragments. Such shields make sense for entrenched artillery, but not for a ship. The fact that calculations including switchboard installations were quickly knocked out in battle is a striking indicator - only casemate or tower installations were reliably protected.
        2. +1
          4 June 2018 14: 30
          Quote: arturpraetor
          So, IMHO, the absence of shields on SK guns of that time is not without its logic - with such shields they are still not there, and the installation is heavier, which necessitates more powerful guidance mechanisms or complicates manual aiming horizontally.


          I do not agree.
          Explosive shells appear in armament at the RPE, which detonate when they hit the surface of the water - with 6 "shells scattering fragments up to 30-40 meters (depending on the sensitivity of the fuse — that is, at what depth the shell exploded).
          That is, if the shell gave a shortage, then the open-standing calculation of the guns could be hit by fragments. Therefore, at first, shields for guns and turret installations were introduced on cruisers, protecting them from fragments and their ricochet.
          Cruisers who did not have shields were equipped with this weak defense.
          Of course, the shield protection only to a small extent protected the calculations from high-explosive shell fragments that were short-range and did not at all protect them from hits or ricochets of fragments.


          On water, similarly, the less depth the projectile plunged into, the greater the radius of fragment fragmentation.
          1. +1
            4 June 2018 15: 02
            Colleague, and you come in from the other side - the shield protection gives very little, only strictly from one direction, and adds weight, and noticeably, and the horizontal guidance at that time is EMNIP manual. And at the same time, the area of ​​damage increases. Because the voice against the shields could be very powerful, and these thoughts are not without logic - and the shields that really cost an increase in weight and area of ​​damage appeared closer to the PMW, providing protection from fragments from three directions (as with the 130 / 55-mm guns ) Yes there, no objections. And these shields ... Not a fig leaf, but close to that. Calculations deck guns still quickly knocked out.
        3. +2
          4 June 2018 15: 50
          "I’m now, perhaps from the point of view of some, I’ll say stupidity or tear someone’s patterns ...
          The Americans were also, apparently, of this opinion.

          So definitely better.
          1. +2
            4 June 2018 15: 52
            Only the Germans did not share such enthusiasm with Vulcan AG, and they designed it somewhat differently for Bogatyr.
          2. +1
            6 June 2018 16: 16
            Quote: Curious
            The Americans were also, apparently, of such an opinion


            This is until a shell explodes 5-10 meters from the side and splinters half the servants — everything is learned in battle.
            The smart learn from the mistakes of others, and the wise do not commit them.
        4. +2
          4 June 2018 19: 40
          So he, in fact, protects the scope and breech. Sight named after Perepelkin?
      3. +2
        4 June 2018 14: 54
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        You’ll laugh, but you’ve appreciated the experience of the Sino-Japanese war.

        Yeah ... in the UK, it was precisely on the example of the battle of Yalu (the shell hit the shield of the gun, broke it, and many members of the crew were struck by the resulting fragments) that the cannon shields of the deck guns were strongly criticized. Say, the shields do not protect the calculations, but on the contrary - increase the affected area of ​​the ship and cause explosions of shells that would otherwise fly by.
        At us, EMNIP, Admiral Makarov was the adversary of the gun shields - as part of his concept of "armored ships". For the same reason - an increase in the area affected.
        1. +3
          4 June 2018 16: 18
          True, during the REV, he had the intelligence to admit his conception was erroneous. And yes, Fisher adhered to the same concept, well, how can you not recall his battlecruisers! Large guns, minimum armor and maximum speed)))
    2. +1
      4 June 2018 19: 23
      Aerodynamics. wassat The speed with 2 shields on the tank drops from 23,5 to 23,499.
  12. +2
    4 June 2018 13: 01
    Rudnev just had to drown the Varangian on the way to Chemulpo, and that’s it! He would have disrupted the landing of Japanese troops, alas, a wartime commander was needed, and not an ordinary careerist !!! Who cares to read Doinikov or Chernov everything is painted in detail there!
    1. +3
      4 June 2018 13: 06
      Quote: burigaz2010
      Rudnev just had to drown the Varangian on the way to Chemulpo, and that’s it!

      I ask you not to run ahead of the engine, we’ll reach the “drowning”
      1. 0
        4 June 2018 17: 34
        Hello hello on the most important point Do you agree?
        1. +1
          4 June 2018 20: 01
          Quote: burigaz2010
          Hello hello on the most important point Do you agree?

          No
    2. +3
      4 June 2018 16: 03
      That's just the sailors who went to Incheon strongly disagree with these :)
      in short, the fairway there is more than a kilometer wide and even if “Varyag”, “Korean” and “Sungari” were flooded across it, dofiga would still remain.
      1. +2
        4 June 2018 16: 35
        Hmm, and here they recently claimed that the fairway is narrow not to maneuver ....
        1. +2
          4 June 2018 17: 17
          Quote: Nehist
          Hmm, and here they recently claimed that the fairway is narrow not to maneuver ....

          It does not interfere. The fairway is narrow for maneuvering the RC - the diameter of the Varyag circulation, EMNIP, is about 550 m. But at the same time, the length of the RC is not enough to cover the fair channel - for the length of the RC is several times less than the diameter of the circulation.
          1. +2
            4 June 2018 17: 40
            Yes, with such a radius of circulation, the Varangian could not turn around only in one case if he was walking strictly in the center of the fairway. And yes, on the night before the battle, Chioda went to the same channel completely blind using only the joint and, according to the ship's log, with 12 nodal speed
        2. +2
          4 June 2018 17: 43
          Colleague, you are not
          attentive, I argued
          The fairway in Incheon (or Chemulpo if you like) is not at all narrow. There is something about a kilometer in the narrowest part. But, on this fairway a lot of shallows. And that is characteristic, echo sounders at that far time have not yet been invented. Therefore, you can go along the fairway only when framing with coastal landmarks. And this is by no means a quick matter.
          Therefore, all of these: “why was going at such a low speed”, “why didn’t leave the“ Korean ”,“ why didn’t go at night ”, no more than talking in favor of the poor.
          1. +1
            4 June 2018 22: 30
            That is, the cruiser Chioda, as very poor in the blind, was reckoned to have passed this fairway on a dark night on a moonless night. Doesn’t you have any questions? And the Varangian could not repeat this trick? I don’t understand, of course, that the navigator Chioda subsequently rose to k1r and the navigator Varyag right up to the admiral ... Or maybe it's still in preparation? As a result, the matter is not in the Navigators - but in their Commanders, who were responsible for the battleship of the ship and crew ... the war showed who did what in peacetime ...
            1. +1
              5 June 2018 14: 48
              Sorry, but "Chioda" did this on 20 nodes? And you put a grudge on the rail that the Japanese did not set up signalman posts on the islands?
              Although I agree with your claim to Rudnev. Apparently, he didn’t remove enough chips from navigators ...
        3. +2
          5 June 2018 09: 39
          Quote: Nehist
          Hmm, and here they recently claimed that the fairway is narrow not to maneuver ....


          The circulation radius of a cruiser with a large elongation hull is very large.
          If the cruiser goes in the center of the ship's course, there will not be enough circulation for it to turn (500 m at the smallest, 670-800 m at the middle course). That is, in order to keep within the circulation in the ship’s passage, he or he needs to risk going to the edge of the ship’s passage before the maneuver or to reset the course, simplifying the task for the Japanese gunners.
          It was not easy to solve this problem (a turn in the ship's way) - the Japanese were on guard at the exit from the bottleneck. The Varangian stranded while turning.
          1. +2
            5 June 2018 10: 04
            For a reversal of speech does not go! It’s just that someone claimed that it’s impossible to even maneuver there. That refuted Chioda on a dark night, reckoning without any reference points.
            1. 0
              5 June 2018 14: 50
              Is it possible to quote?
              If you're talking about me, then I never wrote that cannot be maneuvered, I wrote that you can navigate only by framing with coastal landmarks, because echo sounders have not yet been invented.
              1. +1
                5 June 2018 23: 05
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                Is it possible to quote?
                If you're talking about me, then I never wrote that cannot be maneuvered, I wrote that you can navigate only by framing with coastal landmarks, because echo sounders have not yet been invented.

                About you can’t maneuver, neither related to you, but in general, so I’m sorry if I accepted it at my own expense. According to the ship's log, Chiod’s move is 12 knots. According to descriptions of contemporaries, the fairway in Icheon was not skirted
                1. 0
                  6 June 2018 11: 59
                  Then - oh feel
                  I also apologize.
      2. +2
        4 June 2018 17: 37
        Chief sailor, try to maneuver with heavily loaded ships in the narrowness of the bay!
        1. 0
          5 June 2018 14: 53
          Sorry, but with whom did you confuse me? :))
          I’m just for the fact that this is not a simple matter and the Americans who landed there after 45 years, were a little dumb from local conditions.
    3. +1
      4 June 2018 19: 25
      So ... Naniva left at night and the transport began to land at night too? And on the aisle at night .... FIG knows him.
  13. +2
    4 June 2018 16: 14
    In fact, the main thing was that the deadlines were running out wildly. As practice has shown, the first competition for cruisers lasting 15 months did not justify itself. Somewhere, information appeared that for participating projects but not accepted, they still paid a reward. Well, if you compare pricing, then Retvisan was cheaper than the same American Indiana and Massachusetts built by the same Kramp. Not everything is so simple for Nicholas’s boilers, the same French used them quite actively on the same EBRs Henry lV
    1. +2
      4 June 2018 17: 16
      Quote: Nehist
      Well, if you compare pricing, then Retvisan was cheaper than the same American Indiana and Massachusetts built by the same Kramp

      Yes, in general, no, not cheaper. - $ 6 million is less than 12 million rubles, Retvisan cost more. True, he will be bigger
      Quote: Nehist
      In the coppers of Nicholas, not everything is so simple

      Let's get to them - in the next article hi
    2. +1
      4 June 2018 17: 45
      Not everything is so simple for Nicholas’s boilers, the same French used them quite actively on the same EBRs Henry lV

      And even on the Courbet (their first dreadnoughts)
  14. +2
    5 June 2018 00: 15
    Thank you Andrey! What can I say - just brilliant! hi
  15. +5
    5 June 2018 04: 51
    But why crump?

    Because the cruiser was not enough just to build, it needed to be built quickly. And with this, the Germans who entered the competition, as the future showed, had problems. Obviously, in Russia, from the very beginning, they were perfectly aware of who they were dealing with (third-rate companies without experience), therefore, without further ado, they shook hands with Kramp.
    But this is in theory, which we immediately verify with practice.
    1) The Supervisory Commission arrived at the Kramp plant on 13 on July 1898, the countdown began 20 months allotted by the contract for the construction of the "Varyag". The cruiser was commissioned 22 September 1900 g. Thus, the construction took 26 (twenty six) months.
    2) The contract for the construction of Askold was signed on 4 on August 1898, the countdown began 23 months allocated for the construction of the cruiser. Askold was officially adopted on January 6 1902. Thus, the construction went 41 (forty-one) month.
    As you can see, Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, due to the lack of experience, was not expected to justify the high trust placed in it. laughing . Forty one month against twenty six - this is too much.
    Dear Andrey, it’s too late, so I will answer the armadillos in a day. It says everything is very clever (otherwise it doesn’t happen), but your humble servant will still sow a grain of doubt wink .
    1. 0
      5 June 2018 16: 16
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      Obviously, in Russia, from the very beginning, they were perfectly aware of who they were dealing with (third-rate companies without experience), therefore, without further ado, they shook hands with Kramp.

      I do not argue with this, because I myself came to the same conclusion
      Quote: Comrade
      As you can see, Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, due to the lack of experience, was not expected to justify the high trust placed in it.

      And here - I bet. Dear colleague, it is one thing to draw up a project, and quite another to build on a completed project. These are two completely different processes - and I do not have any evidence that the construction on my own project will be longer or shorter than the construction on someone else's - as long as the drawings are provided on time.
      As far as I know, Germany built very well. When armadillos of the Brandenburg type were built, 2 ships of this type were built by Vulcan, one was Germany and another was built at the imperial shipyard in Wilhelmshaven. And Germany showed the best result, overtaking even the Volcano.
      Quote: Comrade
      Forty-one months versus twenty-six is ​​too much.

      But this is not quite so :))))
      The Varangian was adopted on September 22, 1900, which is true, it is true, but after that he went to finish :))) And he entered the campaign only on January 2, 1901 - but, by and large, from the Hamburg account, and this was done for the sake of reverence for Kramp , and the cruiser himself stood at the factory wall until the end of February 1902 - he managed to leave only on March 10 of that year.
      At the same time, Askold was completely ready and operational on January 12 1902.
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear Andrey, it’s too late, so I will answer the armadillos in a day. Everything is written there very cleverly (otherwise you don’t have it)

      Thank you!
      Quote: Comrade
      but your humble servant will still sow a grain of doubt

      Come on, I look forward to it! :)))
      1. +2
        6 June 2018 01: 48
        My respect, dear Andrew!

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But this is not quite so :))))
        The Varangian was adopted on September 22 1900 g, which is true, then true, but after that he went to finish :))) And ... until the end of February 1902 g stood at the factory wall

        1) R. M. Melnikov: "The formal surrender of the" Varyag "took place on January 13 1901, the actual - later."
        2) V. I. Kataev: "By the beginning of next year (1901) I was able to leave the plant and go to the river bar." Then followed test trips along the Delaware Bay.
        As you can see, none of the two authors indicated exactly when, figuratively speaking, the last screw on the cruiser was twisted. If you, dear colleague, have another source, it will be interesting to take a look. In the meantime, I offer a compromise, let it be considered not 13, but 22 on January 1901.
        In this case, four months are added to 26, so Kramp took everything thirty months.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        At the same time, Askold was completely ready and operational on January 12 1902.

        I object. In the book of V. Ya. Krestyaninov and S. V. Molodtsov, the cruiser Askold says:
        “On 6 of January 1902, the official acceptance of Askold was over, but there were a number of works that were postponed for various reasons until coming to Russia; Among them, the most important was the installation of reinforcements of the outer side in the stern. Despite the imperfections, the selection committee decided to issue a certificate to the company to receive the last payment according to the contract, but with the reservation that everything unfinished due to lack of time, materials, adverse weather, inability and specified in the act will be eliminated at the expense of the company in Russian ports.
        During their stay in Kronstadt on the Askold ... they retrofitted the artillery cellars, conducted interphone pipes to the shell elevators, made and accepted a mine raft. Часть of these works, not executed in Kielpaid by the company. "
        So, as follows from the passage, deficiencies on the Askold were eliminated in Kronstadt in the summer. When exactly, it is not specified, but the text says that on 18 on June 1901 the cruiser was visited by Emperor Nicholas II. "Playing along with Askold, we will set 6 on June as the date of completion of all work, two weeks before the king’s visit so that he would not listen to the roar of hammers and did not encounter hard workers while visiting a ship accepted into the treasury.
        Then you need to add five to the 41 month, so that’s 46 (forty-six) months. Thus, the gap between the "Varangian" and "Askold" remains. But now this, taking into account the additional time to eliminate deficiencies, thirty months against forty six in favor of Crump.
  16. +1
    5 June 2018 15: 55
    "while Suvorov was a domestic copy of Tsesarevich."
    a strong statement, but not true ... Tsesarevich is nothing more than a prototype for the project of D.V. Skvortsova ....
    "with its medium artillery turret and littered sides, of course, it has a much more complex structure than an American-built ship." absolutely right, you can add a mine bulkhead, a full belt, etc.
    "But the overwhelming" cost "of" Victory "amounted to 752 rubles / ton, while the" Prince of Suvorov "- 1 rubles / ton."
    Gribovsky gives (p. 94) the full value of Cesarevich 14, 004 million rubles; the cheapest Eagle - 13, 404, dear Borodin - 14, 573 ... Suvorov 13, 841.
    With an actually normal displacement of about 14151 tons for Oryol it is 947 rubles / ton, for IA3 - 985, for Borodino - 1034, Tsesarevich - 1068 ....
    1. +1
      5 June 2018 21: 27
      Quote: ser56
      strong statement, but not true ...

      If you knew how the battleships of the Borodino type were designed, you would know that it is true :))
      Quote: ser56
      Gribovsky gives (p. 94) the full value of Cesarevich 14, 004 million rubles; the cheapest Eagle - 13, 404, dear Borodin - 14, 573 ... Suvorov 13, 841.
      With actually normal displacement of the order of 14151 tons for Oryol

      And I give you the document of the Ministry of the Sea :))))) This is a little more serious than Gribovsky.
      You are right in one thing - if you take the actual normal displacement, but the price will be different, that cost was considered from the design displacement.
      1. +1
        6 June 2018 08: 30
        Was it worth it to take the Cesarevich as a prototype? "Tsesarevich" belonged to the type of battleship of the "dumped" concept, which involved an active violation of the system, both of their own and that of the enemy, of turning the battle into what would later be called by the Americans, as applied to the air war, a "dog dump". Hence the reservation of the entire waterline, and medium-caliber artillery in tower installations. And, accordingly, technical and technological complication, an increase in construction time. For linear tactics, excessive complication. And one more point that some researchers lose sight of, and some not. In France, as in Germany, the metric system. In Russia, Great Britain, USA - inch. When reproducing the prototype created in the metric system in inches, it needs to be counted. For example, Bogatyr was counted as Oleg. As a result, an additional 600 tons. And how many tons would be added if they had not created the Borodino project, but counted the Tsesarevich?
        1. +1
          6 June 2018 11: 29
          Quote: ignoto
          Was it worth it to take the Cesarevich as a prototype? "

          No, it wasn’t worth it :))))
          1. +1
            6 June 2018 11: 33
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Quote: ignoto
            Was it worth it to take the Cesarevich as a prototype? "

            No, it wasn’t worth it :))))

            Should I wait for another series of articles on this topic?
            1. +3
              6 June 2018 12: 35
              Quote: Trapper7
              Should I wait for another series of articles on this topic?

              I don’t know :)))) Then Sergey attacked me and scolds me for daring to declare the Queens superior to the American standard battleships. And I kind of promised him at the end of the battlecruisers cycle to go through the American battleships. Plus, another Varangian, and if you take at the same time also for the EDB ....
              1. +1
                6 June 2018 18: 52
                It’s worth it ...
      2. +1
        6 June 2018 11: 39
        1) to begin with, understand the meaning of the word "copy", you generally have a bad term.
        2) of the living, no one knows how things went - however, this is described in books, if you are an expert on more than Gribovsky - prove ... bully
        3) I did not see the document ...
        4) Alas, our factories during the construction of the EDB sinned by overload. it's not crump ...
        1. +1
          6 June 2018 12: 24
          Quote: ser56
          To get started, understand the meaning of the word "copy", you generally have a bad term.

          (yawn) Will you say that I applied it incorrectly? Nude Nude.
          Quote: ser56
          of the living, no one knows how things went - however, this is described in books, if you are an expert on more than Gribovsky - prove ...

          Once again - you are presented with a document of the Ministry of the Sea. If the document is not a proof for you, but the proof of Gribovsky’s book (which, alas, in the part of the RNE in general sins with inaccuracies), then we write it down in the protocol.
          Quote: ser56
          I did not see the document ...

          Google to help, the name is given. However, I can lend a link if Google has already banned you
          1. +1
            6 June 2018 18: 06
            1) Yes. I affirm that you applied it incorrectly! Cesarevich is a prototype.
            2) Write an opera already ... Oh, historians ... bully
            3) That rudeness is peculiar to you - I already know ... hi
            1. +2
              7 June 2018 10: 53
              Quote: ser56
              Yes. I affirm that you applied it incorrectly! Cesarevich is a prototype.

              Your pursuit of academics would be fun if you finally learned not to tear words out of context.
              How were Borodino-type EDBs created? In short - they received a sketch from Lagan, admired, decided to build exactly the same, but there were no drawings and specifications. We decided to develop them ourselves and immediately buried ourselves in the fact that in the existing conceptual design we can not withstand the original performance characteristics. As a result, the Borodino development was an attempt to copy the French armadillo taking into account the capabilities of the domestic industry, which naturally led to the fact that our EDBs were very different from the French.
              So if I said that Borodino was a copy of Tsesarevich, then of course I would be wrong. But this is bad luck - I said that they were a “domestic copy”, and that’s completely different :)))))
              Quote: ser56
              Already write an opera ...

              What for? I'm not a composer. In addition, our operas do not read anonymous letters laughing
              Quote: ser56
              What is characteristic of your rudeness - I already know ...

              That is, Google still banned you? Sorry :)
              1. 0
                7 June 2018 18: 26
                “How were Borodino-type EDBs created?” Is well and briefly described by Gribovsky ...
                "As a result, the Borodino development was an attempt to copy the French battleship taking into account the capabilities of domestic industry, which naturally led to the fact that our EDBs were very different from the French." it was, but the result of the Cesarevich is a prototype, not a copy ...
                "Your desire for academics would be fun if you finally learned not to tear words out of context." my intrinsic academicism is immanent ... bully And I did not tear out the words out of context, but for a long time I persuaded you to admit the obvious - it finally happened, but again I am to blame ... hi
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                then of course I would be wrong. But this is bad luck - I said that they were a “domestic copy”, and that’s completely different :))

                is it so hard to admit the obvious? I note - the epithet "domestic" in your article is not ... however, the meaning of the combination of the words "domestic copy" is in itself strange ... why produce entities when there are established terms? http://gramota.ru
                "COPY, -and; g. [From Lat. Copja - abundance] 1. Exactly corresponding to the original reproduction of L. K. protocol. K. drawing. The picture was preserved in several copies. Take a copy of the work book, diploma. Make copies from manuscripts. "
                "PROTOTYPE, a; m. 1. Book. Original sample, prototype of someone, smth. In the future."
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                That is, Google still banned you? Sorry :)

                Is it your compensation for admitting a mistake? bully
                1. 0
                  7 June 2018 18: 38
                  Quote: ser56
                  there is no epithet "domestic" in your article ..

                  Wow! But the fact that?
                  while "Suvorov" was a domestic copy of "Tsesarevich"

                  Quote: ser56
                  why produce entities when there are established terms?

                  Because the term does not always reflect the essence. So, for example, a product can be very, very different from its prototype
                  Quote: ser56
                  Is it your compensation for admitting a mistake? bully

                  I told you the name of the document :)))) You can not find it, and this is my mistake? :)))
      3. 0
        6 June 2018 18: 10
        see below - Gribovsky’s figure from an official document - see Comrade’s message ...
  17. +1
    5 June 2018 22: 35
    Quote: Ser 56 - “But the overwhelming“ cost ”of“ Victory ”amounted to 752 rubles / ton, while the“ Prince of Suvorov ”- 1 rubles / ton."

    But is it worth comparing the "underbringer" "Victory" with a full-fledged ship of this class, "Prince Suvorov"? hi
  18. +3
    5 June 2018 23: 42
    Well, it was clear that Crump will get! :)
    Only now it is believed that a respected author, whose articles are certainly interesting to read, in this series either is not aware of the features of building other ships under this program (which is hard to believe, he is not the same person :), or he is biased towards Kramp.
    The competition, which the author presses on so much, was an empty formality, a way to determine who will be able to quickly build the required cruisers in general and whether anyone will undertake it at all. And the fact that Kramp, as having experience in building and designing large ships, offered his services - it was a great success for Russia, it is not surprising that a contract was urgently concluded with him without a tender, that he would not change his mind - and on the conditions of the Russian side - as the basis of the project at the request of the Russian side, Diana was taken (Kramp himself proposed Kasagi) - that is, Kramp proposed building a cruiser for Russia at the request of the Russian side, all the features during the construction were agreed upon, especially since Kramp was tested, he built really quickly, unlike Germans.
    The terms of the competition were announced in April, and by the end of May it had already been terminated ahead of schedule, choosing Askold's project as the first one, which more or less corresponded to the ideas about the required cruiser - then it was worth its weight in gold, the re-equipment was in full swing with the Japanese, ahead of them plans. And during this time it was necessary to prepare a project, send and submit it and evaluate it comprehensively! After the closing of the competition, they seized on Bogatyr - respected Andrey has every reason and blame the Germans for bribery (as with Askold, by the way, the competition was closed and the winner was selected ahead of schedule), and not only Krampa - the procedure for considering projects was violated in all three cases.
    In practice, it was not ready-made ship designs that were presented, but sketches that required significant improvements, but nevertheless, contracts were also concluded for them, as well as for Varyag, and for the same Askold, for example, there were no strength calculations, which affected later on insufficient strength of the body.
    Accusing Kramp of installing the “wrong” boilers, the author modestly omits that on all three cruisers, and not just on the Varyag, they were “wrong” precisely at the request of the ship builders!
    Moreover, Nikloss’s boilers, by the way, were previously tested on the brave gunboat Brave and showed good results (as well as on Retvisan later, by the way, on the Varyageno among the Japanese).
    The contracts concluded with the Germans as well as with Kramp allowed for very wide changes, which the builders used - for example, on Askold, the Russian side demanded to remove the fifth pipe, which created problems in the ship's handling and ensure seaworthiness with a high forecastle, but the Germans did not agree, they did In their own way, the Germans themselves reduced the number of waterproof partitions, etc.
    Dear Andrei writes about inconsistencies in the contract and surcharges because of this, there were similar problems with this shark of capitalism Kramp - the Germans were similar with the Germans - and on the same Askold the Germans were paid extra for another metal, just like Kramp, or, for example, had to to pay for the drawings of the Athlete stipulated by the contract for the subsequent construction of the series in Russia.
    The Varangian had, of course, flaws, but all three cruisers built to one degree or another had them.
    Here, for example, as the project was evaluated by Bogatyr, commander of Oleg in the Tsushima battle, Dobrotvorsky
    ... not at all warships. They are built along the length of the intelligence service and to destroy the enemy trade. If possible, they should evade the battle, taking advantage of the existing high speed for that. They are very narrow, long, and therefore little stable and clumsy. why can’t they be put in a battle line with squadron battleships. Cruisers for the protection of mechanisms have a thin, armored deck, but there is no side armor like squadron ships, and therefore every fragment, every tiny shell pierces them, pours water onto the armored deck and the cruisers, having lost stability, tumble.

    The guns on them are only 6-inch, 3-inch and 1¾-inch. They are protected, or rather their servants, by thin, steel shields, and on the cruiser “Oleg” some of them are still weak armor towers and casemates. A similar weight, piled on top for such a narrow vessel as Oleg, makes it more dangerous for battle than the most ordinary commercial steamships, because at least they will sink directly and slowly, and this somersault, instantly. Such cruisers are called: "hands with gloves, and the body is naked" and could be ordered only by those who knew that they would not have to fight on them.

    The author, of course, went to the battle in Chemulpo very far smile , but in my opinion, it would be more correct not to look for evidence of a possible bribery of Kramp, which no one has found for a hundred years, but to figure out how it turned out that, for example, they did not cope with boilers on the Varyag (unlike Khrabry or Retvisan) , and warhead-2 smile The Varangian, unlike Askold, shot past even during exercises.
    But, it seems, there is no fault of Kramp feel
    1. +3
      5 June 2018 23: 46
      Quote: Avior
      Accusing Kramp of installing the "wrong" boilers

      Sorry, did I blame him somewhere? :)))) I can only say one thing - just the next article is entirely devoted to the boilers :))))
      Quote: Avior
      The competition, which the author presses on so much, was an empty formality, a way to determine who will be able to quickly build the required cruisers in general and whether anyone will undertake it at all. And the fact that Kramp, as having experience in building and designing large ships, offered his services - it was a great success for Russia, it is not surprising that a contract was urgently concluded with him without a tender,

      In no case. The first - there wasn’t any “grab bags - the station leaves” then, at least not to such an extent - and this time.
      The second is how quickly you don’t conclude a contract with Kramp, anyway, he must first make a project and coordinate it with the ITC. And the presence / absence of a signed contract does not play a special role here. Yes, Kramp should have ordered the ships, but there was absolutely no need to escape to sign the contract, without even checking the copies.
      In this situation, the conditions are dictated by the buyer, not the seller. And we gave all the trump cards to Kramp
      Quote: Avior
      The terms of the competition were announced in April, and by the end of May it had already been terminated ahead of schedule, choosing Askold's project as the first one, which more or less corresponded to the ideas about the required cruiser - then it was worth its weight in gold

      You were mistaken - on July 3, a final meeting was held on the final discussion of the projects submitted to the competition by Nevsky Zavod (Russia), shipyards "Germany", "Schihau", "Hovaldswerke" (Germany) and "Ansaldo" (Italy). The project of the shipyard “Germany” in Kiel, belonging to the Krupp concern, was recognized as the best. The admiral general agreed with this opinion, and on his report on July 27 permission was received from Nicholas II to order the second cruiser Krupp. On August 4, the joint-stock company of shipbuilding and mechanical plants "Germany" and the Naval Ministry concluded a contract between themselves.
      1. +1
        7 June 2018 23: 45
        You are right of course with the date of the final meeting, but in any case the competition was obviously too short and purely symbolic and was terminated ahead of time, so that in violation of the rules, projects were accepted that Askold, that Bogatyr was generally out of competition.
        But in the case of Varyag, it was precisely in the contract with Kramp that Diana was officially approved by competition, so in the case of Kramp there are the least violations of the established order.
        The rest of the contracts with the Germans and Kramp were not very different - on the basis of primitive sketches, and not complete projects, with wide possibilities for rework as agreed, for which there were special groups of representatives of the maritime department in the USA, in Germany, and the Germans in the case of Askold allowed yourself to ignore the requirement of coordination, as in the case of bulkheads, and the various nuances and problems that you listed were no less with the Germans than with Kramp.
        All three contracts included fines for violation of the deadlines and large requirements for the ship, primarily in speed, and here Kramp was no different from the Germans. In general, there is no reason to single out relations with Kramp - he was the same as with the Germans.
        Sorry, did I blame him somewhere? :)))) I can only say one thing - just the next article is entirely devoted to the boilers :))))

        Yes, I immediately realized that both of these villains would be robbed of you laughing
        As for the haste, it certainly was, and the need for it was also undoubtedly, as was confirmed later, the Japanese basically completed their fleet rearmament program 2 years earlier than their own plans, not in 1905, but in 1903.
    2. +1
      6 June 2018 12: 20
      Dear colleague, is it possible to find out when the boilers of the Nikloss brothers system managed to show "good results"?
      Moreover, the Nikloss boilers, by the way, were previously tested on the gunboat Brave and showed good results.
      1. +1
        7 June 2018 23: 14
        Gunboat "Brave" and its boilers. You seem to be the author of this generally interesting article? wink
        Here's what the sources of this article say.
        Khromov V.V. Gunboat Brave
        the installation of exotic boilers, often criticized, was justified: it allowed for testing. Yes, and on the "Brave" Nikloss boilers did not show their "obstinate" character, and the boat sailed with them for almost 15 years.

        similarly in the source Balakin S.A. The battleship “Retvisan” to that article the experience of using boilers on Retvisan was also recognized as positive.
        Which, incidentally, for some reason was not reflected in that article.
        Of course, at the time of the decision on the use of boilers on the Varangian, the Brave had a little swim, and Retvisan was not there, nevertheless there was a completely positive experience of the French.
        And some breakdowns, they were in any boilers.
        Belleville boilers in any case required replacement.
        1. 0
          8 June 2018 12: 11
          Of course, at the time of the decision on the use of boilers on the Varangian, the Brave swam a little,

          Nope, at the time of the decision, the "Brave" was in the building, and his first trip happened only 1899 year.
          As for the “Retvisan”, then at the very first transition he had an emergency with a fatal outcome. And (as far as I know) not a single Russian ship after this same “positive experience” of Niklos boilers received.
      2. +1
        8 June 2018 00: 03
        I wrote unsuccessfully.
        Rather, it’s more correct
        "Nikloss’s boilers, by the way, were previously tested on the gunboat Brave and showed good results in the future"
        1. 0
          8 June 2018 12: 13
          It’s more correct, Niklos’s boilers were installed on the “Brave” gunboat, but no one began to wait for the results of operational tests.
          request
  19. +1
    6 June 2018 03: 31
    Dear Andrew,
    What benefits did this contract promise us? Perhaps C. Crump offered some extremely favorable prices for his products?

    For the sake of theoretical interest, we compare the value of “Tsesarevich” and “Retvisan”. We take the figures from the “The most comprehensive report on the naval department for 1897-1900”, and subtract from the total cost of the squadron battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan” the cost of their artillery weapons, mine weapons, as well as the cost of one set of artillery and mine weapons .
    The total cost of armadillos with vehicles and armor, but without weapons and ammunition:
    1) “Tsesarevich”: 14 004 286 rub. - 1 922 884,00 rub. = 12 081 402,00 rub.
    2) “Retvisan”: 12 553 277,00 rub. - 2 804 694,00 rub. = 9 748 583,00 rub.

    the argument for the cost of construction also disappears - what remains? Maybe a timeline?

    Price we compared two armadillos, speed the buildings of "Varyag" and "Askold" too (with the elimination of deficiencies thirty months против forty six in favor of Crump.). Now compare speed the construction of "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizana".
    1) "Tsesarevich": the signing of the contract - 8 July 1898 g., The signing of the act on the admission of an armadillo to the treasury - 18 August 1903 g. (sixty one month). If you count from the beginning of construction (6 May 1899 g.), Then it turns out 51 month. However, despite the adoption of the treasury, the artillery of the main caliber of the battleship could not operate, it was still necessary to eliminate imperfections, and this was additional time.
    2) “Retvisan”: signing of the contract - April 11 1898, started the company - March 10 1902 (49 months). If you count from the beginning of construction (autumn 1898 g.), Then it turns out 40 months.
    the fact that the contract cost of constructing Retvisan was determined in 30 months, and Tsesarevich in 46 months can be interpreted as a “special” attitude towards French suppliers, but, according to the author, the understanding of MTK is much closer to the truth, that the “Tsesarevich” is much more labor-consuming to manufacture than the “Retvisan”.

    In fact, the consent for such a period was a concession from Russia for Lagan’s consent to make a “discount” when discussing the cost of building the Tsesarevich. The practice in relations with French shipbuilders is well known, as R.Melnikov describes the situation when determining the construction period of the Bayan.

    The dumping price version is, of course, a very interesting and logical point of view that could explain a lot. Unfortunately, on closer inspection, this version does not look true

    The contract for the construction of the Tsesarevich (30 280 000,00 francs) was signed on July 8 1898, and the contract for the construction of Retvisan (4 358 000,00 dollars) was signed on April 11 of the same year, that is, three months earlier. Consequently, comparing the cost characteristics of the two battleships when discussing the dumping version by Kramp is incorrect. For Kramp in April could not know for how much in July A. Lagan would agree to build the “Tsesarevich”.
    1. 0
      6 June 2018 10: 04
      Quote: Comrade
      For the sake of theoretical interest, we compare the value of “Tsesarevich” and “Retvisan”.

      Dear colleague, I actually did this in an article. And I came to the conclusion that
      Quote: Comrade
      ) “Tsesarevich”: 14 rubles. - 004 286 1 rub. = 922 884,00 12 rub

      This is the cost of a ship with 8 towers, and
      Quote: Comrade
      Retvisan: 12 rubles. - 553 277,00 2 rub. = 804 rub.

      This is the cost of the ship without any towers, so such a comparison is incorrect
      In addition, the question of technical complexity remains, since the “Cesarevich” is, without a doubt, much more complicated than the “Retvisan”.
      1. 0
        6 June 2018 11: 13
        And why does Comrade Retvisan's armament cost more than 900 thousand? Because of the Russians, 12 "towers? (Added to the amount of arms deliveries, Lagan built the towers himself, and they were not included in the delivery amount? That is, two 12" towers MZ = 900 thousand rubles (with or without armor?)
        1. +2
          6 June 2018 11: 31
          Quote: anzar
          And why does Comrade Retvisan's armament cost more than 900 thousand?

          I came to slightly different figures, the cost of weapons and combat stocks "Tsesarevich" amounted to 2 thousand rubles., And "Retvizana" - 435 rubles. Moreover, their difference is remarkably similar to the cost of the Retvisan towers (928 thousand rubles)
          1. +3
            6 June 2018 13: 42
            Dear Andrew,
            The sums of weapons and one ammunition provided by your humble servant are official figures, while your figures are approximate.
            Hence the difference between my and your results. Two armadillos have different values ​​for both artillery and mine weapons. For example, a set of mine weapons at Retvisana is one hundred thousand more expensive than at Tsesarevich.
            It is possible that the cost of the Retvizan artillery armament includes the cost of the main caliber installations.
            If so, all the same, Lagan is outright losing to Kramp, for the difference will be one and a half million in favor of the American.
            Well, the construction dates speak for themselves.
            And the point here is not at all the complexity of Tsesarevich, but the fact that domestic sources never write about. But in the French Internet sector you can find interesting information.
            The French shipyard at that time (however, like the others) was shaken by powerful strikes. They also harassed Kramp, but he, unlike Lagan, effectively addressed these issues.
      2. +2
        7 June 2018 01: 13
        Dear Andrey!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        This is the cost of the ship without any towers, so such a comparison is incorrect

        You are right, I’ll fix it now.
        The total cost of armadillos with vehicles and armor, but without weapons and ammunition:
        1) “Tsesarevich”: 14 004 286 rub. - 1 922 884,00 rub. = 12 081 402,00 rub
        2) “Retvisan”: 12 553 277,00 rub. - 2 804 694,00 rub. + 502 000,00 RUB = 10 250 583,00 rub
        Thus, “Retvisan” is cheaper than “Tsesarevich” by 1 830 819,00 rub.
        It is important to note that the costs of the two battleships include not only the amounts agreed upon by the contracts, but also the over-contract payments that were paid during the construction of both ships.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In addition, the question of technical complexity remains, since the “Cesarevich” is, without a doubt, much more complicated than the “Retvisan”.

        This is a controversial issue, dear colleague, we do not know the number of man hours spent during the construction of these battleships.
        But we know that “Prince Suvorov” was built by the Baltic Plant for 38 (thirty eight) months. Let there be imperfections, add a few more, and at least all six months. It still looks decent against the backdrop of “Retvisan”, built for 40 months.
  20. +2
    7 June 2018 01: 44
    Summing up the summary, we can confidently, based on facts, say that Kramp built ships and fasterand cheaper their competitors. You can also talk about the pointlessness of giving a bribe by an American in such circumstances. Here you are, prince, “rollback”, give, I’ll build you a fast and cheap battleship laughing . And what is the economic sense for Crump?
    And we can only regret that we do not know the cost of artillery and mine weapons, as well as the cost of artillery and mine ammunition "Varyag" and "Askold", which deprives us of the opportunity correctly Compare the cost of building two cruisers.
    1. 0
      7 June 2018 10: 30
      Quote: Comrade
      Summing up the summary, we can confidently rely on the facts to say that Kramp built ships faster and cheaper than his competitors.

      Dear colleague, it’s actually not so easy about faster, and absolutely difficult - about cheaper. Let me set out the points
      1) We compare slightly different things - Kramp was given an armadillo and a cruiser, while we compare it with those companies that responded to the "cruising" competition - if we announced a competition for EBR, it is still unknown who would respond
      2) the fact that Tsesarevich is more expensive than Retvisan does not mean that Kramp built cheaper than the French, because he does not take into account the structural complexity of the ship. Classic EDBs with 152-mm artillery in casemates are much cheaper than turret "French" type - as an example I cited the Victory.
      Let's compare the value you received with the Retwisan to another French battleship without guns and military supplies from the same “all-present” report (I take the displacement from there, but I consider the sweaty ones myself, since the report is clearly minus coal reserves)
      Retvisan - 12 902 tons - 10 250 583,00 rubles. (794 rub / t)
      "Jena" - 12 728 tons 10 445 623 rubles. (820 rub / t)
      The yen is a casemate battleship, and as such is closer in type to Retvisan than the Cesarevich. The difference between Yen and Retvisan is that the first has a blockage of sides, the second does not, but that is, the Yen is more difficult to build, but at the same time the prices for both EDBs are quite comparable.
      That is, we see that the same tendency is observed in both the Russian and French fleets - an EDB with a tower deployment of an IC is more expensive than with a casemate. Accordingly, the fact that Retvisan is cheaper than Tsesarevich does not indicate that Kramp built cheaper - the ships are not uniform.
      1. +1
        7 June 2018 15: 41
        Dear Andrew,
        the course of your thoughts is understandable, however, should argue that you need to compare the cost of ships without armament and without ammunition, since the armament of the ship to the cost of construction is not relevant.
        As for the "Victory", it is similar here. It is necessary to take its value without weapons and without ammunition. And let's not forget that his weapons and ammunition are cheaper than the weapons and ammunition of "Prince Suvorov," for example.
        Hence, naturally, a lower price per ton. Now I’m writing from an iPhone, when I get to the computer, I’ll try to compare “Victory” and “Suvorov”. Although this is pointless, since the second has more armor than the first, and it is significantly more expensive than ordinary shipbuilding steel.
        This will result in the effect of the imaginary “cheapness” of the “Victory”. To be honest, you need to take not the “Victory”, but a full-fledged casemate battleship of domestic construction.
        1. 0
          7 June 2018 17: 37
          Quote: Comrade
          As for the "Victory", it is similar here. You need to take its value without weapons and without ammunition

          This is just a snap. The cost of weapons and ammunition:
          Victory - 2 290 614 rub.
          Suvorov is unknown, but Alexander has 2 with minor imperfections in electrical parts. Let it be up to 880 million rubles.
          Accordingly, Suvorov without weapons is more expensive than Victory with weapons :)))
          Thus, we
          Quote: Comrade
          Although pointless, since the second has more armor

          Dear colleague, alas, the same is true for Retvisan. Because the masses of armor were distributed as follows
          Peresvet type battleships - 2 965 t
          Retvisan - 3 300 t
          Armadillos of the Borodino type - 4 tons
          Thus, we have found with you one of the explanations why the Cesarevich should cost significantly more than Retvisan :)))) At the same time, I would like to note that it is not the only one, since it increased the cost of Victory armor by 1,5 times ( and not even minus the cost of structural steel) we will receive an amendment of not more than 700-750 thousand rubles.
          In other words - without weapons and armor, Victory is still much cheaper than Suvorov
          1. 0
            7 June 2018 18: 41
            an important element of the rise in price of Borodin residents is their developed electrification - dynamo power - 600 + 128 = 728 kW (Tsesarevich 420 + 134 = 554 kW), respectively, there were energy consumers, far from cheap - some fire control devices cost 19 rubles.
          2. +1
            8 June 2018 01: 53
            Dear Andrew,

            The argument that the “Tsesarevich” must certainly cost more than the “Retvisan”, since he has 6 '' guns installed in towers, and not in casemates, looks logical. But what if you try to verify this hypothesis with numbers on hand? We just take and remove from the “Cesarevich” these six towers.

            Their cost is the cost of the six towers of the battleship "Glory", rounded upwards (instead of 632 000,00 rubles, let it be 650 000,00 rubles). Instead, we don’t set the casemates, which obviously gives Tsesarevich an advantage over Retvisan, because the casemates cost money, and they are on Retvisan.
            With your permission, for convenience of perception and visualization, I have reduced the information on prices that appear in the discussion to a table.

            What is coming out? “Tsesarevich”, even without six 6 '' towers, still comes out more than a million rubles more expensive than “Retvisan”. 11 431 402,00 - 10 250 583,00 = 1 180 819,00 rub.
            1. 0
              8 June 2018 12: 48
              1) thanks - as always brief and to the point! love
              2) in your opinion - was the construction in France so expensive in principle, or was there a big kickback in total?
  21. +1
    7 June 2018 11: 18
    As always excellent
  22. +1
    7 June 2018 23: 50
    Regarding the cost of ships and other military equipment, in my opinion it’s impossible to compare figures like that, even if the projects are the same, completely different conditions, especially in different countries.
    What can I say, in the USSR the cost of T-34 at different plants was noticeably different.
    And even more so when it comes to different projects.
  23. +2
    8 June 2018 04: 01
    Dear Andrew,

    And here your humble servant brought together the key points of our discussion :-)
    The dumping price version is, of course, a very interesting and logical point of view that could explain a lot. Unfortunately, in a closer look, this version does not look true, and there are three the reasons.

    The first is that, most likely, the price of the Retvisan and Tsesarevich contracts includes a different volume of structures.
    And from this it follows that (most likely!) The contract price of the “Tsesarevich” included an armadillo with all tower installations, while two 305-mm towers were not included in the contract value of the Retvisan, since they were made in Russia. Of course, this increased the contract price of the first and cheaper - the second ..

    Is logical. To restore the status quo, we put on the Retvisan two main-caliber towers and remove six medium-caliber towers from the Cesarevich. Balance - "Tsesarevich" (11 431 402,00 rub.), "Retvisan" (10 250 583,00 rub.), total 1 180 819,00 rub. in favor of Crump.

    The point is (and this second from the reasons indicated above) that the Retvizan and Tsesarevich, despite the similar displacement, are very different types of warships, because the Tsesarevich has a much more complex structure than an American-built ship. Of course, the fact that the contract cost of constructing Retvisan was determined in 30 months, and Tsesarevich in 46 months can be interpreted as a “special” attitude towards French suppliers, but, according to the author, the understanding of MTK is much closer to the truth. that the “Cesarevich” is much more labor-consuming to manufacture than the “Retvisan”.

    В theories yes but on practice “Prince Suvorov” was built by the Baltic Shipyard at the same speed as the “Retvisan” (38 и 40 months respectively). So, the stones need not be thrown at Kramp, but thrown into Lagan :-)
    This point of view is also confirmed by the tonnage figures (that is, their cost per ton of normal displacement, taking into account armament and combat stocks) of the battleship “Victory” and “Prince Suvorov” totaled 752 rub / t, while “Prince Suvorov” - 1 024 rub / t ..

    But the cost of a ton of displacement "John Chrysostom", the estimated cost of which is 13 784 760, rubles, with a normal displacement of 12 738 tons will be 1 082,17 rub.
    So, the argument in favor of the cost of construction also disappears - what remains? Maybe a timeline?

    Certainly :-) "Varangian" was then built for thirty months while Askold, who left for Russia in the full sense of the word “unfinished,” for forty six :-)
    1. 0
      9 June 2018 13: 25
      Dear Valentine, I apologize, I can not answer in a timely manner. I believe that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow evening I can present my counterarguments :)))) hi
    2. 0
      11 June 2018 12: 20
      Dear Valentine, I welcome you!
      Quote: Comrade
      The argument that the “Tsesarevich” should certainly cost more than the “Retvisan”, since he has 6 '' guns installed in towers, and not in casemates, looks logical. But what if you try to verify this hypothesis with numbers on hand? We just take and remove from the “Cesarevich” these six towers.

      You can remove something, only here is what we get in the end?
      Dear colleague, let's take the “Ship List” - the cost of artillery weapons of “Retvizan” and “Tsesarevich” without supplies is 1,79 million and 1,1 million, respectively. We remove the towers “Retvisan - 502 thousand, we get 1,29 against 1,1 million. At the same time, the Putilov factory had to redo the machines (which did not fit into the French towers) for the French armadillo, which cost the treasury an additional 237 thousand rubles. If we assume that these costs are taken into account in the cost of armament, then it turns out that the artillery of Retvisan costs 1,29 million, and Tsesarevich - 0,9 million! The difference of 43% is almost one and a half times. How is this possible? Or, perhaps, all the same, these 237 thousand were written down on the value of the towers of the “Tsesarevich” (which would be logical, by the way)
      You mentioned that Retvisan’s torpedo tubes are more expensive, I looked at the Ship List - yes, Retvisan has 276 thousand TAs, and Tsesarevich’s only 127 thousand, but why? On the one hand, Retvisan has 6 TAs against 4 on Cesus, but the price difference is not 1,5, but 2,17 times. And recorded in the note "the cost of electric lighting is included in the price of the housing." 90 thousand rubles weapons were in the corps?
      Here are another 327 thousand rubles. differences in the price of ships.
      We look at the cost of art. the armament of Alexander the 3rd — 2 million rubles, at “Retvisan” - roughly 1,8 million. We have already said that the cost of weapons should include towers, and you know that the towers of the IC “Slava” cost more than 600 thousand. rub. And where are they? The difference is only 200 thousand rubles! But if you look at the weapons of Potemkin - 1,52 million rubles. and Alexander - 2,04 million, then something like this is beginning to be seen - the difference, of course, is only 480 thousand rubles, but “Potemkin still has more guns, and the construction of towers is more complicated (higher the maximum elevation angle) so everything is logical. But 200 thousand differences between “Retvisan” and “Alexander” - it’s not at all logical, there should be at least 600 thousand (SK towers!), And this can be explained only by one - Comrade Kramp simply refused to supply any equipment, usually listed in the cost of the corps, and we had to supply it ourselves, artificially lowering the price of the corps and increasing the cost of weapons, and the price of the issue was about 400 thousand rubles.
      Total 727 thousand rubles. the difference.
      Further. Serial towers were put on the Glory, the same, in general, as on previous EDBs, in them the cost of their development was either partially accounted (in proportion to the general series) or they are not there at all if the tower design was paid for separately. But the French developed the towers themselves, and the question is - how much did it cost? Why am I asking this - you say, “let's remove the cost of the towers” ​​- I agree, but why do we remove only the cost of manufacturing the towers? And the cost of their development in French? We are talking about hundreds of thousands of rubles - remember that we have redesigned the machines on the towers of Cesarevich stood at 237 thousand rubles, so the design of the tower itself is clearly more expensive!
      Add tower development costs - and
      Quote: Comrade
      The balance is “Tsesarevich” (11 rubles), “Retvisan” (431 rubles), total 402,00 rubles. in favor of Crump.

      Turns to zero. By the way! You wrote about the casemates!
      Quote: Comrade
      Instead of casemates we do not set, which obviously gives “Tsesarevich” an advantage over “Retvisan”, because the casemates cost money, and they are on “Retvisan”.

      In fact, casemates are another reason to pinch additional costs from Retvisan. But how? The cost of the towers did not include the cost of armor. At the same time, the total mass of the armor of Tsesarevich and Retvizan was comparable (and as if Tsesarevich had no more than this armor), but it was one thing to put a casemate out of ordinary armor plates, and it was quite another and more expensive to bend towers and barbets from them. So there’s no advantage “Tsesarevich is not here - this is Retvisan’s advantage.
      And if you recall the constructional excesses of the "Tsesarevich"? Huge Mars, littered with boards? After all, this also makes the construction more expensive ...
      In general, dear colleague, on closer inspection, he did not build Kramp cheaper.
      1. 0
        11 June 2018 13: 06
        And a little more about the speed of construction. Dear Valentin, as we have already said, all the data on the actual construction time is post factum, at the time of placing orders about “Germany” for example, they knew only that she built a battleship well and in a timely manner. That is, of course, there was every reason to believe that Kramp would cope faster, but this is the reputation that I mentioned - without a doubt, Kramp looked more reliable

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