The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
I would like to mention a lot of questions that have arisen and will arise among people interested in the naval history regarding the actions of Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev before the fight, which took place on 27 in January of 1904.
1. Why vf Rudnev did not prevent the landing of Japanese troops in Chemulpo?
2. Why did the ships of foreign powers in the Chemulpo roadstead ignore the rights of sovereign and neutral Korea by their actions?
3. Why did “Varyag” alone or together with “Korean” not make an attempt to break through the night before the battle?
4. Why vf Rudnev did not accept the battle on Chemulpo raid, but tried to go to sea?
For a start it is worth refreshing in your memory what at that time was the state of Korea. Professor of International Law at the Royal Maritime College in Greenwich, T. Lawrence, a contemporary of those distant events, spoke of it this way:
How right was the British professor? We will not make a deep excursion into the history of Korea, but recall that the last time this power struggled somewhat effectively against foreign invasion (by the way, it was Japan) in the seven-year war of 1592-1598. Lovers fleet remember her well in the victories of the Korean fleet, led by Admiral Lee Songsin and used unusual co-axial warships.
Nevertheless, Korea could not defend its own independence on its own - the Chinese army and navy helped it to do it (strictly speaking, it was more likely to say about the fights on land that the Koreans helped the Chinese). It must be said that the Japanese did not set Korea as the goal of their conquest, but all of China, all they needed from Korea was to let the Japanese troops pass, which it did not provide, since it was afraid (probably more than just) to be captured without war. In this sense, China’s aid to Korea was well founded — the Chinese understood the true goals of the Japanese conquerors perfectly.
Without a doubt, in that war the Koreans fought valiantly, especially it should be noted the broad partisan movement that arose after their army was defeated, but long-term hostilities undermined the forces of this not too numerous nation. As a result, Korea suffered severely from the Manchurian invasions of 1627 and 1636-37. and could not reflect any of them, and the conditions of peace imposed on her actually made her a Manchurian protectorate. All would be fine, but as a result of the Manchurian expansion, the latter displaced the ruling China by the Ming dynasty by their own Qing dynasty and gradually conquered the Chinese provinces that retained the loyalty of Ming. So, in fact, Korea has become a protectorate of China. Somehow, the ruling Korean elite did not intend to get out of this position, recognizing China as a kind of “elder brother”, and taking a course towards isolation from the outside world.
At the same time, the Japanese did not like this state of affairs very much - they perceived Korea as a pistol aimed at Japan. This, however, was not surprising, because the Korean Strait, which divided these two countries, had a minimum width of just 180 kilometers. In other words, the Korean Strait for Japan was, on the one hand, the same as the English Channel for England (despite the fact that Japan had no powerful fleet), and on the other, a springboard for expansion into China, from which the Japanese never thought to refuse.
Therefore, as soon as the Japanese again felt themselves strong enough for expansion, they force weapons forced Korea (1876 d) to sign a very lucrative trade agreement for it, which, although formally recognized the independence of Korea, contained a number of points that an independent state could in no way accept — for example, the right of extraterritoriality (the jurisdiction of the Korean courts of Japanese nationals on the territory of Korea). Following this, similar treaties were concluded with leading European powers.
I must say that at the dawn of its relationship with the West, Japan itself was in a similar (to some extent) position, but it had ambitions and political will to defend its independence and be an independent power, but the Koreans have forces not turned out. Accordingly, Korea quickly turned into a battlefield of interests of other powers — she could not and could not defend her own. European countries, by and large, were not too interested in Korea, which allowed Japan to increase its influence and impose a new peace treaty (1882 g) on the Korean leadership, which actually doomed the latter to vassalit against Japan. In other words, Korea has managed to become a vassal of two powers hostile to each other!
The absolute weakness and incapacity of the Korean leadership, the inability and unwillingness to uphold the interests of the country (including economic ones) led to a logical result: the artisans went bankrupt, because they could not withstand competition with cheap foreign goods, and food prices rose, since it was in exchange for them most goods and imported into the country. As a result, a peasant uprising began in 1893, including the eradication of the dominance of foreigners in Korea. The Korean government, having previously demonstrated its complete inconsistency in the fight against “external threats”, could not also cope with the “internal threat” and turned to China for help. China sent troops to suppress the rebels, but, of course, it did not suit Japan, immediately sent almost three times more troops to Korea than China did. This resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. to which, in essence, led the political incapacity of Korea, but, funnyly, Korea itself did not participate in it (although the fighting took place on its territory), declaring neutrality ... As a result of the war won by Japan, Korea finally had to enter the orbit of Japanese politics. But then the European powers intervened (the so-called "Triple intervention)? who absolutely did not like the similar gain of Japan. The result came out geopolitically completely unsatisfactory for the sons of Mikado - they were forced to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, confining themselves to indemnity, and as a result, territorial gains honestly conquered by Japanese weapons were obtained by Russia and (to a lesser extent) Germany. At the same time, Russia immediately declared itself as a serious player on the Korean field, having begun to exert a serious influence on the state of affairs in this “independent” power.
In other words, Korea, formally preserving sovereignty, absolutely could not solve anything in foreign policy or internal, all that its leadership lacked was attempts to maneuver between China, Russia and Japan, to which, however, due to the insignificance of the state Nobody paid any attention to the Korean authorities. Without a doubt, in the era of the "triumph of humanism" and "the nation’s original right to self-determination", the words of the English scientist T. Lawrence may seem cruel:
But they do not become less fair than they are. Without justifying the aggressive, predatory actions of China, Japan and Western countries (including Russia) towards Korea, we must not forget the absolute submission of the Korean authorities to any form of violence against their country - and what kind of sovereignty or neutrality can we talk about?
Accordingly, any agreements with Korea in those times were not considered by any of the countries that concluded them, as something necessary for execution - any actions on the territory of Korea were undertaken without taking into account the interests of Korea itself, only the positions of other countries that “play” were taken into account in Korean territory - China, Japan, Russia, etc. This, of course, today looks completely immoral, but we see that the Korean leadership itself, which is completely incapable and not even trying to resist the arbitrariness of other countries, is largely to blame. Therefore, it should be clearly understood that the question of whether it is necessary to counteract the Japanese landing, or not, was considered by Russia, as well as other countries, only from the standpoint of its own interests, but not in any way the interests of Korea: no respect for it, nor for it Neutrality, neither Russia nor any other countries had absolutely.
What were the interests of Russia?
Let us recall one simple truth - in the event of war with Japan, the latter would have to be transported across the sea and supply the army with a sufficiently large size, the soldiers had to go to hundreds of thousands of people. All this was possible only in the case of the establishment of Japanese supremacy at sea. And the Japanese, we must pay tribute to them, made the most titanic efforts in the shortest possible time, ordering from the leading world powers and building the most powerful fleet in the region.
As is known, these efforts of the Yamato sons did not go unnoticed, and the Russian Empire opposed them with its largest shipbuilding program, after which its fleet secured superiority over the Japanese in the Far East: however, the implementation of this program was overdue - the Japanese were faster. As a result, their fleet took the lead and was the strongest in Asia - at the beginning of 1904, when the Russian-Japanese war began, the Russians had seven squadron battleships against six Japanese: however, all Japanese ships were built (by British standards) as 1-class battleships while the Russian “battleships-cruisers” “Peresvet” and “Victory” were created in many respects equivalent to the English battleships of the 2 class and were weaker than the “first-class” battleships. Of the remaining five Russian ships, three (of the “Sevastopol” type) roughly matched their two oldest Japanese ships “Yashima” and “Fuji” in their combat qualities, and in addition, the newest battleships Retvisan and Tsesarevich came very recently, and not managed to raft the rest of the squadron, while the Japanese ships were a fully trained unit.
Thus, despite the formal superiority in numbers, in fact, the Russian squadron battleships were weaker than the Japanese. In the armored cruisers, the superiority of the United Fleet was altogether overwhelming - they had 6 such ships in the fleet, and two more (Nissin and Kasuga) sailed under the protection of the Royal Navy to Japan. The Russian squadron had all the 4 cruisers of this class, of which three were ocean raiders, and were not very suitable for squadron battles, unlike the Japanese, created for squadron combat. The fourth Russian armored cruiser “Bayan”, although intended for service with the squadron and had very good booking, was almost twice as inferior to any Japanese cruiser in combat power. Also, the Russian squadron was inferior to the Japanese in armored cruisers and destroyers.
Thus, the Russian naval forces in 1904 were at the peak of their weakness in relation to the Japanese fleet, but the “window of opportunity” for the Japanese quickly closed. They have already used their financial resources, and the arrival of new large ships in addition to the above listed should not be expected in the near future. And the Russians in Port Arthur already had a detachment of Virenius with the battleship Oslyabya, five squadron battleships of the Borodino type were built with might and main in the Baltic, of which four were able to appear in the Far East in 1905 year. There is no doubt that the Japanese would put off the war for a year, and they would no longer have to deal with superior forces, but they understood this very well in St. Petersburg. In an amicable way, the task of Russian diplomacy would be to prevent war in 1904, when Russia was still relatively weak. And of course, if for the sake of this good purpose it was necessary to sacrifice such an ephemeral entity as the sovereignty of Korea, then, beyond any doubt, this should have been done. Of course, the Russian Empire supported the independence of Korea, but this very independence of Russia was needed only to limit Japanese influence, strengthening its own - and nothing more.
There was one more important question - strictly speaking, the entry of Japanese troops into Korea did not at all mean a war with Russia, everything depended on what goals the Japanese government would pursue. Of course, this could be the first step towards a war with Russia (as it actually happened), but with the same success another option was possible: Japan occupies part of Korea and thus puts Russia before the fact of expanding its influence on the continent and then he will wait for the response of his “northern neighbor”.
While during 1903 there were verbose and completely fruitless Russian-Japanese negotiations, our politicians, together with the Sovereign-Emperor, were inclined to take this opinion. The “Historical Commission Report” states:
A few days before the start of the war, Nicholas II gave the following instructions to the Vicar:
It should be noted that domestic diplomats hoped until the last moment that the war could be avoided, and made certain efforts: 22 January 1904 r Russia notified the Japanese envoy of readiness to make so big concessions that, according to R.M. Melnikova: “A sense of justice was awakened even by England:“ If Japan is not satisfied now, then no country will consider it necessary to support it, ”said the British Foreign Minister.” Even in the severance of diplomatic relations that occurred at the initiative of Japan, in St. Petersburg they saw not the beginning of the war, but the next, albeit risky, political maneuver. Thus, the general direction of Russian diplomacy (with the warm approval of Nicholas II) was to avoid war at almost any cost.
As for Korea itself, everything is short and clear with it: January 3 1904 Her government issued a statement that in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, Korea would observe neutrality. Interestingly, the Korean emperor, realizing the precariousness of his position (more precisely, the complete absence of any basis for it), tried to turn to England so that the latter would contribute to the emergence of a system of international treaties designed to respect the independence and sovereignty of Korea. It seemed to be reasonable, because unlike Russia, China and Japan, the “mistress of the seas" had no significant interests in Korea, and therefore was not interested in the struggle for influence on her territory, but had enough influence to the above three countries, to listen to her opinion.
But, of course, England’s Korean sovereignty was completely unnecessary. The fact is that England was worried about Russia's gain in the Pacific, and the Foreign Office was well aware of who the Russians were building their cruisers against. Providing Japan with an opportunity (for its money) to strengthen its fleet in British shipyards and push it with Russia was certainly politically and economically advantageous for “foggy Albion”. England was completely uninterested in resolving the knot of Korean contradictions in a peaceful way. On the contrary! And therefore it would be very difficult to imagine the British, who are defending Korean sovereignty from Japan, and, strictly speaking, from Russia too. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England responded with meaningless, formal replies to the memorandums of Emperor Kojon.
Other European countries, like Russia, were not worried about the sovereignty or neutrality of Korea, but only their own interests and the well-being of their citizens in its territory. As a matter of fact, these were the tasks that should have been solved (and, as we will see later, were solved) by foreign station ships in Chemulpo.
In Japan, they didn’t stand on ceremony with questions of Korean sovereignty. They proceeded from what Moriyama Kaysaburo said later: “a neutral state that does not have the strength and the will to defend its neutrality is unworthy of respect”. The landing of the Japanese troops in Korea can and should be viewed as a violation of Korean neutrality, but no one did - it is interesting that if foreign stationary commanders did protest about the possible attack of "Varyag" on a neutral raid, then the landing of the Japanese troops in Korea they did not consider anything reprehensible at all, and given the reaction of the Korean authorities to it, it was not. On the night of 26 on 27 in January, 1904 r landed at Chemulpo, and in the morning of January 27 (apparently before the “Varyag” battle), the Japanese envoy to Korea, Hayashi Gonsuke, told the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Li Ji-Yong:
And what, the Korean emperor Kodzhon somehow protested against all this? Yes, it did not happen at all - having received the same evening news of the successful operations of the United Fleet at Port Arthur and Chemulpo, he "expressed his protest" against the neutrality of Korea ... by immediately sending a Russian envoy from Korea.
In order not to return to this topic in the future, we will immediately consider the second aspect of the violation of Korea’s neutrality by the Japanese, namely, their threat of fighting in the Chemulpo roadstead, that is, in a neutral port. Here, the decisions of the Japanese also cannot be interpreted in two ways: the orders of the Japanese command and the preparation of the landing operation crowned the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (signed by the Prime Minister of Japan ”No. XXUMX:
2. In the territorial waters of China, with the exception of the area specified in paragraph 1, the right to declare war is not permitted, except in cases of self-defense or other exceptional circumstances. ”
In other words, if on land the “trampling” of the neutrality of Korea could be covered up with a “fig leaf” of “defense against the threat of Russia”, then the attack of Russian ships in neutral waters was an obvious violation. Accordingly, Japan ... simply decided not to recognize the neutrality of Korea at sea, without declaring war with it. It should be noted that this step was very unusual, but not in such a way that it completely contradicts the then existing international laws.
By the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, Japan had signed and committed itself to implement the Geneva Convention 1864, the Paris Declaration of the Law of the Sea 1856, the Hague Conventions 1899, but the fact is that in all of these documents the rules of neutrality were not yet codified. In other words, the maritime legislation of those years did not contain exhaustive norms on the rights and obligations of neutral and belligerent states. As far as the author of this article could figure out, such rules existed mainly in the form of customs, adopted by European countries, and these customs, Japan, no doubt, violated. But the fact is that even the most wonderful custom is still not a law.
And again - among European states, the custom of neutrality was maintained by the power of the state that declared it. In other words, declaring neutrality, the state not only expressed its political position, but also undertook to protect neutrality declared by it with its own armed forces from anyone who violated this neutrality: in this case, a violation of neutrality led to armed conflict, and then to war. There is no doubt that in such a case the world community would consider the state that violated neutrality as the aggressor, and the state that defended the neutrality declared by it was his victim even if the state was forced to use force to protect the declared neutrality. But all of this could not have had anything to do with Korea - not to try to prevent force, but at least to simply protest against the landing of the Japanese troops or the actions of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron against the Russian ships on Chemulpo’s raid turned out to be much higher than their forces. As is well known, Korean officials were completely silent.
It should be noted that, following the results of the events in Chemulpo, a rather lively international discussion arose, following which the Hague Convention 1899 received a new edition - a number of additional sections were added to it, including “Rights and obligations of neutral states in a naval war”.
And so, summarizing the above, we come to the following:
1. It was completely unprofitable for the Russian empire to defend the Korean neutrality with military force, at least until the Russian-Japanese war began;
2. The Russian empire did not bear any reputational, image or other losses, refusing to protect Korean neutrality. No damage to the honor of the Russian arms, the betrayal of the Korean brothers, etc., etc. it did not happen and could not happen;
3. Under no circumstances, V.F. Rudnev did not have the right to decide on opposing the Japanese landing on his own - it was absolutely not his level, not the level of the squadron chief or even the Steward - having joined the battle with the Japanese ships, he, in his own way, would have started a war between Japan and Russia, was at that time the prerogative of the carrier of the supreme power, that is, Nicholas II;
4. Had vf Rudnev tried, with arms in his hands, to oppose the Japanese landing, he would thus violate the will and desires of Nicholas II, expressed to them in telegrams to the Governor;
5. But the funny thing is that if Vsevolod Fyodorovich would fight, then ... with the highest probability he would be accused of violating the neutrality of Korea, because it was to him that the dubious honor of the first shot on a neutral raid would belong to him;
6. In addition to all of the above, it must also be noted that a battle on a neutral raid would endanger the foreign stationary forces standing there, which would lead Russia to political complications with the countries they represented. It would be completely not politically and simply unwise.
All of the above does not take into account the fact that, having entered the battle with the Japanese squadron, V.F. Rudnev would directly violate the instructions given to him. However, I must say that this point of view today is subject to revision, so let's dwell on it in a bit more detail.
The official history in the person of the “Report of the Historical Commission” quotes the points of the instructions received by V.F. Rudnev:
1. Perform the duties of a senior stationary officer, being at the disposal of the envoy in Seoul Pavlova;
2. Not to impede the landing of Japanese troops, if such happened before the declaration of war;
3. Maintain good relations with foreigners;
4. Lead the landing and guard mission in Seoul;
5. Do as you see fit in all circumstances;
6. In no case do not leave Chemulpo without an order, which will be transferred in one way or another.
However, a slight hitch arose: the fact that the historical commission itself did not have this document, and she quotes these points directly from the book of V.F. Rudnev (the above instructions should be followed by a note: “A copy of the description of the Varyag battle at Chemulpo, transferred to the temporary use of Rear Admiral VF Rudnev”). On the other hand, the text of the order of the squadron chief was preserved, but there is no clause in it prohibiting the landing of the Japanese troops. This gave grounds for today's revisionists, in particular N. Chornovil, to assert that this clause is a figment of V.F. Rudnev, but in fact he did not receive such instructions.
What I would like to say about this. The first is in the book of V.F. Rudnev first gives the full quotation of the text of the order of the Chief of the squadron, then stated: “Before leaving Arthur, additional instructions were received” without specifying the officer from whom they received and then the above points are already listed. And a natural question arises - did the revisionists in general (and N. Chornovil in particular) see the order of the squadron as a separate document, or did they read it from the text of the commander "Varyag" book? If they were able to find this document, this is fine, but if not, then why does the same N. Chornovil consider it possible to believe one quote by V.F. Rudneva, but do not believe the other?
The second. The text of the order of the Chief of the squadron contains (including) the following indication:
Generally speaking, even this passage is already a direct order not to do anything that could worsen relations with the Japanese, until the occurrence of special circumstances. And it is separately stipulated that the commander of the “Varyag” cannot decide when these circumstances will come, but should wait for the appropriate notification from the envoy or from Port Arthur, and act only in accordance with the orders attached to these notifications.
Third. There is nothing strange that the documents themselves did not live up to our days - we should not forget that the “Varyag”, in fact, was flooded on the Chemulpo raid, and Port Arthur, where copies of VF’s orders could be kept. Rudnev, was surrendered to the enemy.
Fourth. Far from the fact that the controversial paragraph of instructions ever existed in writing at all - the fact is that V.F. Rudnev could simply have a conversation with the same Squadron Chief, who clarified the content of his order (all points of the instructions are mentioned in one way or another).
And finally, the fifth - an instruction prohibiting VF Rudnev with arms in his hands to prevent the Japanese landing, fully fit into the logic of the desires and actions of those in power - the Steward, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even the sovereign-emperor.
According to the author of this article, the foregoing irrefutably indicates that V.F. Rudnev was not supposed to have and had no right to prevent the Japanese from landing. Perhaps the only thing that could justify such actions was if V.F. Rudnev received from a reliable source of information that Russia and Japan are in a state of war. But, of course, there was nothing like that. As we know, the landing at Chemulpo took place in time, simultaneously with the attack of Port Arthur by the Japanese destroyers, with which, in fact, the war began and it was clear that VF would learn about it at that very moment. Rudnev could not.
What is really funny from the point of view of Korean neutrality, V.F. Rudnev did not have the right to bombard Japanese troops and 27 in January, when Sotokichi Uriu notified him of the start of hostilities. In this case, "Varyag" would have opened fighting, standing in a neutral port, and would have shot at the territory of Korea, destroying its property. But there would be no military sense in this either - firing around the city, not knowing exactly where the Japanese troops were stationed, would have resulted in civilian casualties with a minimum of damage to the Japanese.
So, we see that VF Rudnev had no right to interfere with the Japanese landing. But did he have a similar opportunity if he nevertheless wanted to do this?
Продолжение следует ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
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