The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality

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So, in December 1903, about a month before the outbreak of hostilities, the Varyag was sent from Port Arthur to Chemulpo (Inchon). More precisely, “Varyag” went there twice: for the first time he went to Chemulpo 16 December, returning back six days later (and on the way after shooting the shield at Enkurter’s rock), and then, January 27, V.F. Rudnev received the order of the Steward to go to Inchon and remain there as a senior stationary. Having replenished supplies, “Varyag” next day went to sea and arrived in the afternoon of December 29 1903 to its destination.

I would like to mention a lot of questions that have arisen and will arise among people interested in the naval history regarding the actions of Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev before the fight, which took place on 27 in January of 1904.



1. Why vf Rudnev did not prevent the landing of Japanese troops in Chemulpo?

2. Why did the ships of foreign powers in the Chemulpo roadstead ignore the rights of sovereign and neutral Korea by their actions?

3. Why did “Varyag” alone or together with “Korean” not make an attempt to break through the night before the battle?

4. Why vf Rudnev did not accept the battle on Chemulpo raid, but tried to go to sea?

For a start it is worth refreshing in your memory what at that time was the state of Korea. Professor of International Law at the Royal Maritime College in Greenwich, T. Lawrence, a contemporary of those distant events, spoke of it this way:

“Practically Korea has never been and has never been accepted as a fully independent state in the sense understood by international experts. Russia, in its opposition to Japan, was based on the constant formal recognition of Korea’s independence, not hesitating to exert any pressure until the present war with the Seoul court. In 1895-1904, there was a diplomatic duel between her and Japan on Korean soil, when the conflict of the art of diplomacy changed into an armed conflict. It was a struggle for full and permanent influence, and regardless of which side gained the upper hand at one time or another, in fact, Korea has never been truly independent. ”


How right was the British professor? We will not make a deep excursion into the history of Korea, but recall that the last time this power struggled somewhat effectively against foreign invasion (by the way, it was Japan) in the seven-year war of 1592-1598. Lovers fleet remember her well in the victories of the Korean fleet, led by Admiral Lee Songsin and used unusual co-axial warships.



Nevertheless, Korea could not defend its own independence on its own - the Chinese army and navy helped it to do it (strictly speaking, it was more likely to say about the fights on land that the Koreans helped the Chinese). It must be said that the Japanese did not set Korea as the goal of their conquest, but all of China, all they needed from Korea was to let the Japanese troops pass, which it did not provide, since it was afraid (probably more than just) to be captured without war. In this sense, China’s aid to Korea was well founded — the Chinese understood the true goals of the Japanese conquerors perfectly.

Without a doubt, in that war the Koreans fought valiantly, especially it should be noted the broad partisan movement that arose after their army was defeated, but long-term hostilities undermined the forces of this not too numerous nation. As a result, Korea suffered severely from the Manchurian invasions of 1627 and 1636-37. and could not reflect any of them, and the conditions of peace imposed on her actually made her a Manchurian protectorate. All would be fine, but as a result of the Manchurian expansion, the latter displaced the ruling China by the Ming dynasty by their own Qing dynasty and gradually conquered the Chinese provinces that retained the loyalty of Ming. So, in fact, Korea has become a protectorate of China. Somehow, the ruling Korean elite did not intend to get out of this position, recognizing China as a kind of “elder brother”, and taking a course towards isolation from the outside world.

At the same time, the Japanese did not like this state of affairs very much - they perceived Korea as a pistol aimed at Japan. This, however, was not surprising, because the Korean Strait, which divided these two countries, had a minimum width of just 180 kilometers. In other words, the Korean Strait for Japan was, on the one hand, the same as the English Channel for England (despite the fact that Japan had no powerful fleet), and on the other, a springboard for expansion into China, from which the Japanese never thought to refuse.



Therefore, as soon as the Japanese again felt themselves strong enough for expansion, they force weapons forced Korea (1876 d) to sign a very lucrative trade agreement for it, which, although formally recognized the independence of Korea, contained a number of points that an independent state could in no way accept — for example, the right of extraterritoriality (the jurisdiction of the Korean courts of Japanese nationals on the territory of Korea). Following this, similar treaties were concluded with leading European powers.

I must say that at the dawn of its relationship with the West, Japan itself was in a similar (to some extent) position, but it had ambitions and political will to defend its independence and be an independent power, but the Koreans have forces not turned out. Accordingly, Korea quickly turned into a battlefield of interests of other powers — she could not and could not defend her own. European countries, by and large, were not too interested in Korea, which allowed Japan to increase its influence and impose a new peace treaty (1882 g) on ​​the Korean leadership, which actually doomed the latter to vassalit against Japan. In other words, Korea has managed to become a vassal of two powers hostile to each other!

The absolute weakness and incapacity of the Korean leadership, the inability and unwillingness to uphold the interests of the country (including economic ones) led to a logical result: the artisans went bankrupt, because they could not withstand competition with cheap foreign goods, and food prices rose, since it was in exchange for them most goods and imported into the country. As a result, a peasant uprising began in 1893, including the eradication of the dominance of foreigners in Korea. The Korean government, having previously demonstrated its complete inconsistency in the fight against “external threats”, could not also cope with the “internal threat” and turned to China for help. China sent troops to suppress the rebels, but, of course, it did not suit Japan, immediately sent almost three times more troops to Korea than China did. This resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. to which, in essence, led the political incapacity of Korea, but, funnyly, Korea itself did not participate in it (although the fighting took place on its territory), declaring neutrality ... As a result of the war won by Japan, Korea finally had to enter the orbit of Japanese politics. But then the European powers intervened (the so-called "Triple intervention)? who absolutely did not like the similar gain of Japan. The result came out geopolitically completely unsatisfactory for the sons of Mikado - they were forced to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, confining themselves to indemnity, and as a result, territorial gains honestly conquered by Japanese weapons were obtained by Russia and (to a lesser extent) Germany. At the same time, Russia immediately declared itself as a serious player on the Korean field, having begun to exert a serious influence on the state of affairs in this “independent” power.

In other words, Korea, formally preserving sovereignty, absolutely could not solve anything in foreign policy or internal, all that its leadership lacked was attempts to maneuver between China, Russia and Japan, to which, however, due to the insignificance of the state Nobody paid any attention to the Korean authorities. Without a doubt, in the era of the "triumph of humanism" and "the nation’s original right to self-determination", the words of the English scientist T. Lawrence may seem cruel:

“Just as a person who does not care about preserving his honor has little hope that his neighbors will support him, so a state that does not use strength to defend its neutrality should not expect a crusade in its defense from other neutral States. "


But they do not become less fair than they are. Without justifying the aggressive, predatory actions of China, Japan and Western countries (including Russia) towards Korea, we must not forget the absolute submission of the Korean authorities to any form of violence against their country - and what kind of sovereignty or neutrality can we talk about?

Accordingly, any agreements with Korea in those times were not considered by any of the countries that concluded them, as something necessary for execution - any actions on the territory of Korea were undertaken without taking into account the interests of Korea itself, only the positions of other countries that “play” were taken into account in Korean territory - China, Japan, Russia, etc. This, of course, today looks completely immoral, but we see that the Korean leadership itself, which is completely incapable and not even trying to resist the arbitrariness of other countries, is largely to blame. Therefore, it should be clearly understood that the question of whether it is necessary to counteract the Japanese landing, or not, was considered by Russia, as well as other countries, only from the standpoint of its own interests, but not in any way the interests of Korea: no respect for it, nor for it Neutrality, neither Russia nor any other countries had absolutely.

What were the interests of Russia?

Let us recall one simple truth - in the event of war with Japan, the latter would have to be transported across the sea and supply the army with a sufficiently large size, the soldiers had to go to hundreds of thousands of people. All this was possible only in the case of the establishment of Japanese supremacy at sea. And the Japanese, we must pay tribute to them, made the most titanic efforts in the shortest possible time, ordering from the leading world powers and building the most powerful fleet in the region.

As is known, these efforts of the Yamato sons did not go unnoticed, and the Russian Empire opposed them with its largest shipbuilding program, after which its fleet secured superiority over the Japanese in the Far East: however, the implementation of this program was overdue - the Japanese were faster. As a result, their fleet took the lead and was the strongest in Asia - at the beginning of 1904, when the Russian-Japanese war began, the Russians had seven squadron battleships against six Japanese: however, all Japanese ships were built (by British standards) as 1-class battleships while the Russian “battleships-cruisers” “Peresvet” and “Victory” were created in many respects equivalent to the English battleships of the 2 class and were weaker than the “first-class” battleships. Of the remaining five Russian ships, three (of the “Sevastopol” type) roughly matched their two oldest Japanese ships “Yashima” and “Fuji” in their combat qualities, and in addition, the newest battleships Retvisan and Tsesarevich came very recently, and not managed to raft the rest of the squadron, while the Japanese ships were a fully trained unit.


Battleships Petropavlovsk, Poltava and Sevastopol in the Port Arthur East Basin


Thus, despite the formal superiority in numbers, in fact, the Russian squadron battleships were weaker than the Japanese. In the armored cruisers, the superiority of the United Fleet was altogether overwhelming - they had 6 such ships in the fleet, and two more (Nissin and Kasuga) sailed under the protection of the Royal Navy to Japan. The Russian squadron had all the 4 cruisers of this class, of which three were ocean raiders, and were not very suitable for squadron battles, unlike the Japanese, created for squadron combat. The fourth Russian armored cruiser “Bayan”, although intended for service with the squadron and had very good booking, was almost twice as inferior to any Japanese cruiser in combat power. Also, the Russian squadron was inferior to the Japanese in armored cruisers and destroyers.

Thus, the Russian naval forces in 1904 were at the peak of their weakness in relation to the Japanese fleet, but the “window of opportunity” for the Japanese quickly closed. They have already used their financial resources, and the arrival of new large ships in addition to the above listed should not be expected in the near future. And the Russians in Port Arthur already had a detachment of Virenius with the battleship Oslyabya, five squadron battleships of the Borodino type were built with might and main in the Baltic, of which four were able to appear in the Far East in 1905 year. There is no doubt that the Japanese would put off the war for a year, and they would no longer have to deal with superior forces, but they understood this very well in St. Petersburg. In an amicable way, the task of Russian diplomacy would be to prevent war in 1904, when Russia was still relatively weak. And of course, if for the sake of this good purpose it was necessary to sacrifice such an ephemeral entity as the sovereignty of Korea, then, beyond any doubt, this should have been done. Of course, the Russian Empire supported the independence of Korea, but this very independence of Russia was needed only to limit Japanese influence, strengthening its own - and nothing more.

There was one more important question - strictly speaking, the entry of Japanese troops into Korea did not at all mean a war with Russia, everything depended on what goals the Japanese government would pursue. Of course, this could be the first step towards a war with Russia (as it actually happened), but with the same success another option was possible: Japan occupies part of Korea and thus puts Russia before the fact of expanding its influence on the continent and then he will wait for the response of his “northern neighbor”.

While during 1903 there were verbose and completely fruitless Russian-Japanese negotiations, our politicians, together with the Sovereign-Emperor, were inclined to take this opinion. The “Historical Commission Report” states:

“Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw the main object of the aggressive Japanese policy only in the seizure of Korea, which, in his opinion, as can be seen from the course of the negotiations, should not yet be the cause of the inevitable clash with Japan. On the same day of January 16, 1904 in Arthur received some directives defining a political environment in which the actions of Russian forces at sea would become necessary. For personal information, the Vicar was informed that “in the case of the landing of the Japanese into South Korea or along the eastern coast, on the southern side of the Seoul parallel, Russia will look through its fingers, and this will not be the cause of the war. The northern border of the occupation of Korea and the establishment of a neutral zone were to be determined by negotiations in St. Petersburg until the resolution of this issue, the landing of the Japanese to Chemulpo was allowed, inclusively. ”


A few days before the start of the war, Nicholas II gave the following instructions to the Vicar:

“It is desirable that the Japanese, not we, open military operations. Therefore, if they do not begin actions against us, then you should not prevent them from landing in South Korea or on the east coast to Genzan, inclusive. But if on the western side of Genzan their fleet, with or without a landing force, moves north through the thirty-eighth parallel, then you are given to attack them, without waiting for the first shot from their side. ”


It should be noted that domestic diplomats hoped until the last moment that the war could be avoided, and made certain efforts: 22 January 1904 r Russia notified the Japanese envoy of readiness to make so big concessions that, according to R.M. Melnikova: “A sense of justice was awakened even by England:“ If Japan is not satisfied now, then no country will consider it necessary to support it, ”said the British Foreign Minister.” Even in the severance of diplomatic relations that occurred at the initiative of Japan, in St. Petersburg they saw not the beginning of the war, but the next, albeit risky, political maneuver. Thus, the general direction of Russian diplomacy (with the warm approval of Nicholas II) was to avoid war at almost any cost.

As for Korea itself, everything is short and clear with it: January 3 1904 Her government issued a statement that in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, Korea would observe neutrality. Interestingly, the Korean emperor, realizing the precariousness of his position (more precisely, the complete absence of any basis for it), tried to turn to England so that the latter would contribute to the emergence of a system of international treaties designed to respect the independence and sovereignty of Korea. It seemed to be reasonable, because unlike Russia, China and Japan, the “mistress of the seas" had no significant interests in Korea, and therefore was not interested in the struggle for influence on her territory, but had enough influence to the above three countries, to listen to her opinion.

But, of course, England’s Korean sovereignty was completely unnecessary. The fact is that England was worried about Russia's gain in the Pacific, and the Foreign Office was well aware of who the Russians were building their cruisers against. Providing Japan with an opportunity (for its money) to strengthen its fleet in British shipyards and push it with Russia was certainly politically and economically advantageous for “foggy Albion”. England was completely uninterested in resolving the knot of Korean contradictions in a peaceful way. On the contrary! And therefore it would be very difficult to imagine the British, who are defending Korean sovereignty from Japan, and, strictly speaking, from Russia too. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England responded with meaningless, formal replies to the memorandums of Emperor Kojon.

Other European countries, like Russia, were not worried about the sovereignty or neutrality of Korea, but only their own interests and the well-being of their citizens in its territory. As a matter of fact, these were the tasks that should have been solved (and, as we will see later, were solved) by foreign station ships in Chemulpo.

In Japan, they didn’t stand on ceremony with questions of Korean sovereignty. They proceeded from what Moriyama Kaysaburo said later: “a neutral state that does not have the strength and the will to defend its neutrality is unworthy of respect”. The landing of the Japanese troops in Korea can and should be viewed as a violation of Korean neutrality, but no one did - it is interesting that if foreign stationary commanders did protest about the possible attack of "Varyag" on a neutral raid, then the landing of the Japanese troops in Korea they did not consider anything reprehensible at all, and given the reaction of the Korean authorities to it, it was not. On the night of 26 on 27 in January, 1904 r landed at Chemulpo, and in the morning of January 27 (apparently before the “Varyag” battle), the Japanese envoy to Korea, Hayashi Gonsuke, told the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Li Ji-Yong:

“The government of the Empire, wanting to protect Korea from Russian encroachments, landed an advance detachment of about two thousand people and urgently brought them into Seoul in order to avoid the invasion of Russian troops in the Korean capital and its transformation into a battlefield, as well as to protect the Korean emperor. When passing through the territory of Korea, Japanese troops will respect the power of the Korean emperor and do not intend to harm his subjects. ”


And what, the Korean emperor Kodzhon somehow protested against all this? Yes, it did not happen at all - having received the same evening news of the successful operations of the United Fleet at Port Arthur and Chemulpo, he "expressed his protest" against the neutrality of Korea ... by immediately sending a Russian envoy from Korea.

In order not to return to this topic in the future, we will immediately consider the second aspect of the violation of Korea’s neutrality by the Japanese, namely, their threat of fighting in the Chemulpo roadstead, that is, in a neutral port. Here, the decisions of the Japanese also cannot be interpreted in two ways: the orders of the Japanese command and the preparation of the landing operation crowned the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (signed by the Prime Minister of Japan ”No. XXUMX:

“1. During the war, Japan and Russia are allowed to use the right to declare war in the territorial waters of Korea and the coastal waters of the Chinese province of Shengjing.
2. In the territorial waters of China, with the exception of the area specified in paragraph 1, the right to declare war is not permitted, except in cases of self-defense or other exceptional circumstances. ”


In other words, if on land the “trampling” of the neutrality of Korea could be covered up with a “fig leaf” of “defense against the threat of Russia”, then the attack of Russian ships in neutral waters was an obvious violation. Accordingly, Japan ... simply decided not to recognize the neutrality of Korea at sea, without declaring war with it. It should be noted that this step was very unusual, but not in such a way that it completely contradicts the then existing international laws.

By the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, Japan had signed and committed itself to implement the Geneva Convention 1864, the Paris Declaration of the Law of the Sea 1856, the Hague Conventions 1899, but the fact is that in all of these documents the rules of neutrality were not yet codified. In other words, the maritime legislation of those years did not contain exhaustive norms on the rights and obligations of neutral and belligerent states. As far as the author of this article could figure out, such rules existed mainly in the form of customs, adopted by European countries, and these customs, Japan, no doubt, violated. But the fact is that even the most wonderful custom is still not a law.

And again - among European states, the custom of neutrality was maintained by the power of the state that declared it. In other words, declaring neutrality, the state not only expressed its political position, but also undertook to protect neutrality declared by it with its own armed forces from anyone who violated this neutrality: in this case, a violation of neutrality led to armed conflict, and then to war. There is no doubt that in such a case the world community would consider the state that violated neutrality as the aggressor, and the state that defended the neutrality declared by it was his victim even if the state was forced to use force to protect the declared neutrality. But all of this could not have had anything to do with Korea - not to try to prevent force, but at least to simply protest against the landing of the Japanese troops or the actions of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron against the Russian ships on Chemulpo’s raid turned out to be much higher than their forces. As is well known, Korean officials were completely silent.

It should be noted that, following the results of the events in Chemulpo, a rather lively international discussion arose, following which the Hague Convention 1899 received a new edition - a number of additional sections were added to it, including “Rights and obligations of neutral states in a naval war”.

And so, summarizing the above, we come to the following:

1. It was completely unprofitable for the Russian empire to defend the Korean neutrality with military force, at least until the Russian-Japanese war began;

2. The Russian empire did not bear any reputational, image or other losses, refusing to protect Korean neutrality. No damage to the honor of the Russian arms, the betrayal of the Korean brothers, etc., etc. it did not happen and could not happen;

3. Under no circumstances, V.F. Rudnev did not have the right to decide on opposing the Japanese landing on his own - it was absolutely not his level, not the level of the squadron chief or even the Steward - having joined the battle with the Japanese ships, he, in his own way, would have started a war between Japan and Russia, was at that time the prerogative of the carrier of the supreme power, that is, Nicholas II;

4. Had vf Rudnev tried, with arms in his hands, to oppose the Japanese landing, he would thus violate the will and desires of Nicholas II, expressed to them in telegrams to the Governor;

5. But the funny thing is that if Vsevolod Fyodorovich would fight, then ... with the highest probability he would be accused of violating the neutrality of Korea, because it was to him that the dubious honor of the first shot on a neutral raid would belong to him;

6. In addition to all of the above, it must also be noted that a battle on a neutral raid would endanger the foreign stationary forces standing there, which would lead Russia to political complications with the countries they represented. It would be completely not politically and simply unwise.

All of the above does not take into account the fact that, having entered the battle with the Japanese squadron, V.F. Rudnev would directly violate the instructions given to him. However, I must say that this point of view today is subject to revision, so let's dwell on it in a bit more detail.

The official history in the person of the “Report of the Historical Commission” quotes the points of the instructions received by V.F. Rudnev:

1. Perform the duties of a senior stationary officer, being at the disposal of the envoy in Seoul Pavlova;

2. Not to impede the landing of Japanese troops, if such happened before the declaration of war;

3. Maintain good relations with foreigners;

4. Lead the landing and guard mission in Seoul;

5. Do as you see fit in all circumstances;

6. In no case do not leave Chemulpo without an order, which will be transferred in one way or another.

However, a slight hitch arose: the fact that the historical commission itself did not have this document, and she quotes these points directly from the book of V.F. Rudnev (the above instructions should be followed by a note: “A copy of the description of the Varyag battle at Chemulpo, transferred to the temporary use of Rear Admiral VF Rudnev”). On the other hand, the text of the order of the squadron chief was preserved, but there is no clause in it prohibiting the landing of the Japanese troops. This gave grounds for today's revisionists, in particular N. Chornovil, to assert that this clause is a figment of V.F. Rudnev, but in fact he did not receive such instructions.

What I would like to say about this. The first is in the book of V.F. Rudnev first gives the full quotation of the text of the order of the Chief of the squadron, then stated: “Before leaving Arthur, additional instructions were received” without specifying the officer from whom they received and then the above points are already listed. And a natural question arises - did the revisionists in general (and N. Chornovil in particular) see the order of the squadron as a separate document, or did they read it from the text of the commander "Varyag" book? If they were able to find this document, this is fine, but if not, then why does the same N. Chornovil consider it possible to believe one quote by V.F. Rudneva, but do not believe the other?

The second. The text of the order of the Chief of the squadron contains (including) the following indication:

“I draw attention to the fact that before changing the state of affairs, with all your actions, you should keep in mind the existence of as yet normal relations with Japan, and therefore should not show any hostile relations, but rather keep in touch with the right people measures so as not to arouse suspicion by any measures. On the most important changes in the political situation, if any, you will receive a notification from the envoy or from Arthur and the corresponding orders. ”


Generally speaking, even this passage is already a direct order not to do anything that could worsen relations with the Japanese, until the occurrence of special circumstances. And it is separately stipulated that the commander of the “Varyag” cannot decide when these circumstances will come, but should wait for the appropriate notification from the envoy or from Port Arthur, and act only in accordance with the orders attached to these notifications.

Third. There is nothing strange that the documents themselves did not live up to our days - we should not forget that the “Varyag”, in fact, was flooded on the Chemulpo raid, and Port Arthur, where copies of VF’s orders could be kept. Rudnev, was surrendered to the enemy.

Fourth. Far from the fact that the controversial paragraph of instructions ever existed in writing at all - the fact is that V.F. Rudnev could simply have a conversation with the same Squadron Chief, who clarified the content of his order (all points of the instructions are mentioned in one way or another).

And finally, the fifth - an instruction prohibiting VF Rudnev with arms in his hands to prevent the Japanese landing, fully fit into the logic of the desires and actions of those in power - the Steward, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even the sovereign-emperor.

According to the author of this article, the foregoing irrefutably indicates that V.F. Rudnev was not supposed to have and had no right to prevent the Japanese from landing. Perhaps the only thing that could justify such actions was if V.F. Rudnev received from a reliable source of information that Russia and Japan are in a state of war. But, of course, there was nothing like that. As we know, the landing at Chemulpo took place in time, simultaneously with the attack of Port Arthur by the Japanese destroyers, with which, in fact, the war began and it was clear that VF would learn about it at that very moment. Rudnev could not.

What is really funny from the point of view of Korean neutrality, V.F. Rudnev did not have the right to bombard Japanese troops and 27 in January, when Sotokichi Uriu notified him of the start of hostilities. In this case, "Varyag" would have opened fighting, standing in a neutral port, and would have shot at the territory of Korea, destroying its property. But there would be no military sense in this either - firing around the city, not knowing exactly where the Japanese troops were stationed, would have resulted in civilian casualties with a minimum of damage to the Japanese.

So, we see that VF Rudnev had no right to interfere with the Japanese landing. But did he have a similar opportunity if he nevertheless wanted to do this?

Продолжение следует ...
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  1. Cat
    +4
    9 August 2018 06: 03
    Just thank you! I read it with pleasure!
    Sincerely, Kitty!
  2. +3
    9 August 2018 06: 19
    Good afternoon, Andrey. I do not quite agree with your conclusions! You yourself indicated that before the onset of special circumstances, Rudnev did not have the right to do anything. So, a special circumstance can and should even be attributed to the severance of diplomatic relations about which Rudnev was notified. And it is unlikely that the Japanese would have decided to attack the Varangian in the raid, otherwise they would have received complications with all the powers holding their ships there
    1. +6
      9 August 2018 06: 35
      I am sorry, but Rudnev was not notified of the severance of diplomatic relations. He heard rumors that he turned to the messenger, he did not confirm. And we will analyze the possibility of a battle in the raid a little later :)
      In addition, the severance of diplomatic relations is not a declaration of war, but Rudnev couldn’t have shot the first
      1. +3
        9 August 2018 07: 22
        I didn’t know well, but the attack on the Korean should be higher than the roof, since this was a direct act of aggression by the Japanese
        1. Cat
          +4
          9 August 2018 08: 50
          What is the point of guessing! Would it be in place of Rudnev - Marinesco, Drake, Ushakov, Nelson, perhaps everything turned out differently. No one has canceled a sound initiative! But alas, history has no syllable declension !!!
          1. -1
            9 August 2018 09: 16
            Hmm, and again everything rests on the incompetence of Rudnev as the commander of a warship. Apparently as the head of the port he would have looked better
          2. BAI
            +5
            9 August 2018 10: 11
            No one has canceled a sound initiative!

            A sound initiative should be supported by appropriate capabilities. Otherwise, it will be, to put it mildly, not rational.
        2. +5
          9 August 2018 12: 42
          Quote: Nehist
          I didn’t know well, but the attack on the Korean should be higher than the roof, since this was a direct act of aggression by the Japanese


          And the attack of the second Pacific squadron on the British fishing trawlers (mistaken for destroyers) - this is without a doubt an act of Russian aggression against Britain? and should Britain immediately send the fleet of the mother country and attack the second Pacific squadron? :))
          Joker.
        3. +4
          9 August 2018 13: 07
          Quote: Nehist
          I didn’t know well, but the attack on the Korean should be above the roof

          We’ll get to him :))) I suppose in the next article
      2. avt
        0
        10 August 2018 11: 47
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In addition, the severance of diplomatic relations is not a declaration of war, but Rudnev couldn’t have shot the first

        good
        This resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. to which, in essence, Korea’s political incapacity led, but, funny enough, Korea itself did not participate in it (although hostilities were fought on its territory), declaring neutrality ... Based on the results of the war won by Japan, Korea finally had to enter the orbit of Japanese politics.
        Actually, if the memory serves, the Japanese there, appointed "the imperial surname, in the same way as they later did with Mandzhou go.
        At the same time, Russia immediately declared itself to be a serious player on the Korean field, having begun to exert a serious influence on the state of affairs in this “independent” state.
        No. Never had - late and tight! Everything was seized there not only politically, but also on business on land, and in the literal sense, the Japanese bought up strategically necessary plots of land, or completely blocking at least any active movement.
        1. It was completely unprofitable for the Russian empire to defend the Korean neutrality with military force, at least until the Russian-Japanese war began;
        Actually, the alternative is the declaration of war by Japan by Russia.
        Quote: Nehist
        I didn’t know well, but the attack on the Korean should be higher than the roof, since this was a direct act of aggression by the Japanese

        Yeah - it was posted on the Internet, for review by the world community, Rudnev did not even see it - he forgot to buy a computer. wassat
        1. 0
          10 August 2018 12: 28
          Yeah, the Korean was on the other side of the galaxy. wassat
        2. avt
          0
          10 August 2018 14: 30
          Cool, but the comment disappeared in the new edition of the site - there was an emoticon ....
    2. +6
      9 August 2018 12: 45
      Quote: Nehist
      Good afternoon, Andrey. I do not quite agree with your conclusions! You yourself indicated that before the onset of special circumstances, Rudnev did not have the right to do anything. So, a special circumstance can and should even be attributed to the severance of diplomatic relations about which Rudnev was notified. And it is unlikely that the Japanese would have decided to attack the Varangian in the raid, otherwise they would have received complications with all the powers holding their ships there


      With dill, we have a deep dip in relations — what is the reason for the commanders of the Russian Navy or for the commanders of the units to independently make decisions about an attack by the enemy?
      What a tyrant you are my friend! :)
      1. +3
        9 August 2018 14: 32
        This is you tyrant !!! The attack of the British trawlers occurred at night and no one saw whose flag they hoisted on these boats! A Korean was flying a military flag in the daytime! So do not confuse warm with soft! Further, where did you see the gap in dip relations with Ukraine? At least keep an eye on modern surroundings
        1. +2
          9 August 2018 17: 25
          Quote: Nehist
          The attack of the British trawlers occurred at night and no one saw whose flag they hoisted on these boats!

          Just the case when ignorance does not relieve responsibility
          1. +1
            9 August 2018 19: 49
            But this is the case that is really a coincidence in contrast to the Korean attack
            1. 0
              13 August 2018 11: 53
              Quote: Nehist
              But this is the case that is really a coincidence in contrast to the Korean attack


              Was the Korean fired from guns repeatedly? Could a torpedo launch be an unintended attack? Technically, yes.
              That is, there was still a moment of uncertainty - to open artillery fire - this was to take on great responsibility.
        2. 0
          13 August 2018 11: 48
          Quote: Nehist
          Further, where did you see the gap in dip relations with Ukraine? At least keep an eye on modern surroundings

          Are you talking to me?
          Too lazy to look at the website of the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow?
          https://russia.mfa.gov.ua/ru/embassy/diplomats
          R.M. Nimchinsky - Chargé d'affaires of Ukraine in the Russian Federation
          O.V. Timush - Counselor-envoy

          Back in 2015: The Ukrainian ambassador in Moscow was recalled for consultations, only consuls remained to work, said the speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Yevgeny Perebynis.

          The absence of an ambassador is a break in diplomatic relations (one of the forms).
          This does not mean the beginning of a military conflict in any way - it is precisely the severance of diplomatic relations, the absence of direct relations (possibly through third countries).
  3. BAI
    +3
    9 August 2018 10: 09
    V.F. Rudnev had no right to prevent the Japanese landing. But did he have such an opportunity if he still wanted to do it?

    Even without Vanganova, it can be argued that the next part will show: Rudnev did not have such an opportunity.
  4. +5
    9 August 2018 11: 44
    That is, an unmotivated attack on the koretok "Korean" is a bun or something? This is a bellie incident))) And Rudnev, in my opinion, is just a servant, not far-sighted. Maybe Andrei, will you tell us about the destroyer supposedly drowned by the Varangian? In other matters, I always read your articles with respect and interest.
    1. +1
      9 August 2018 12: 37
      Quote: Conductor
      That is, an unmotivated attack on the koretok "Korean" is a bun or something? This is a bellie incident))) And Rudnev, in my opinion, is just a servant, not far-sighted. Maybe Andrei, will you tell us about the destroyer supposedly drowned by the Varangian? In other matters, I always read your articles with respect and interest.


      There is the concept of a neutral port and the presence of inpatients, which was a deterrent to the "accounting" of this neutrality.
      Since the raid is very close, any accidental hit on a warship of a neutral power, the commanders could regard because of their courage or "political instinct" - that is, The Japanese admiral chose to avoid the risk of damage to the warships of the neutral powers - it was extremely unprofitable for them to wage war with two states.

      Without a doubt, if the warships of the neutral powers were not on the roadstead, the Varangian would be attacked immediately and undoubtedly sunk - regardless of the concept of a "neutral port".
      But the Japanese admiral received his instructions and "acted according to the European standards" putting forward an ultimatum, threatening to attack the Russian ships right on the roads if they did not leave before 12 o’clock.
      1. +2
        9 August 2018 14: 40
        Gg at any time that then that now neutrality is confirmed by force of arms! If you do not have the strength, then everyone does not care about your neutrality, which incidentally happened to Korea. And yes, the commander of a warship has the right to make independent decisions study the charter
    2. +3
      9 August 2018 13: 06
      Quote: Conductor
      That is, an unmotivated attack on the cannon "Korean" is it a bun or something? This is a casus belli)))

      We’ll definitely get to this :))) You see, it’s impossible to fit the entire evidence base on Varyag into one article in principle, therefore I cannot answer all questions with one article. But the Korean’s exit and subsequent events will be analyzed in a detailed manner. And about the destroyer, by the way, too :)))
      1. +4
        9 August 2018 14: 34
        By the way, regarding the destroyers, dear Andrei. After the return of the "Varangian" and "Korean" to the raid, the Japanese destroyers set off in that direction. When they joined the Uriu squad, the destroyer commander briskly reported that the forces entrusted to him had sunk the cruiser and the gunboat.
        1. +2
          9 August 2018 17: 32
          Hello, dear Valentine!
          Quote: Comrade
          When yes they joined the Uriu squad, the commander of the destroyer briskly reported

          Why take us, adversaries, :)))))) I have to say, I really liked another story of a Japanese eyewitness that happened with Takachiho and Naniva at the transition to Chemulpo, I will quote her in the next article :)
      2. +1
        9 August 2018 14: 41
        Andrei, I always wait for your articles and read it with pleasure, and I advise my son to read it. It’s just that this bodyagi with an attack on the “Korean” and a torpedo attack on him is just some kind of darkness. We are waiting for the destroyers. The Japas do not mention drowning anything in battle, something like the phrase "They shot a lot, but scared only the fish"
        1. 0
          9 August 2018 17: 47
          Quote: Conductor
          It's just that this bootlegger with an attack on the “Korean” and a torpedo attack on him is just some kind of darkness.

          Well, I'll take a searchlight more powerful :)))))
          1. 0
            9 August 2018 18: 09
            From the Chelyabinsk will)))
          2. +2
            11 August 2018 18: 54
            Andrey, you love the history of the fleet. I am convinced that if you say that Rudnev could not accept the battle, then this is so and you have good arguments.
            Unfortunately, some authors signed up to the fact that Rudnev agreed with the Japanese in advance: on such a date I will make a dozen shots, and you will answer the same to me. We’ll shoot at idle, otherwise we’ll hit still.
            Your only reproach: wait a long time, but I want it faster
            1. +1
              13 August 2018 15: 40
              Quote: vladcub
              Andrey, you love the history of the fleet.

              Yes sir! hi
              Quote: vladcub
              Unfortunately, some authors signed up to the fact that Rudnev agreed with the Japanese in advance

              wassat Yes, the paper will endure, alas
              Quote: vladcub
              Your only reproach: wait a long time, but I want it faster

              The fact is that more than one article per week can not be spread in any case (on one topic), there is nothing to be done, unfortunately.
    3. +2
      9 August 2018 21: 26
      Quote: Conductor
      That is, an unmotivated attack on the cannon "Korean" is it a bun or something? This is a casus belli)))

      Of course, yes. And the first and second. But after all, the entire leadership of the Republic of Ingushetia, including the "great martyr", did not want this very "blaze" in 1904. Unlike Japan.
      In general, the situation in the Far East in 1904-m reminded me of something on the western border in 1941-m: everything is clear, not "not to succumb to provocations."
  5. +3
    9 August 2018 12: 30
    1. It was completely unprofitable for the Russian empire to defend the Korean neutrality with military force, at least until the Russian-Japanese war began;
    2. The Russian empire did not bear any reputational, image or other losses, refusing to protect Korean neutrality. No damage to the honor of the Russian arms, the betrayal of the Korean brothers, etc., etc. it did not happen and could not happen;
    3. Under no circumstances, V.F. Rudnev did not have the right to decide on opposing the Japanese landing on his own - it was absolutely not his level, not the level of the squadron chief or even the Steward - having joined the battle with the Japanese ships, he, in his own way, would have started a war between Japan and Russia, was at that time the prerogative of the carrier of the supreme power, that is, Nicholas II;
    4. Had vf Rudnev tried, with arms in his hands, to oppose the Japanese landing, he would thus violate the will and desires of Nicholas II, expressed to them in telegrams to the Governor;
    5. But the funny thing is that if Vsevolod Fyodorovich would fight, then ... with the highest probability he would be accused of violating the neutrality of Korea, because it was to him that the dubious honor of the first shot on a neutral raid would belong to him;
    6. In addition to all of the above, it must also be noted that a battle on a neutral raid would endanger the foreign stationary forces standing there, which would lead Russia to political complications with the countries they represented. It would be completely not politically and simply unwise.


    That is, there are adults - who have to chew on the elementary - Good you, Andrei, a person :)

    You patient person is a thankless task to chew every nonsense, why the ship’s commander has no right to open fire, without notice of the beginning of hostilities, the order of the immediate superior or superior commander (the list is not large enough). And also observe the norms of international agreements (on neutral ports and territorial waters).
    In one case, the commander has open fire - if the ship was attacked either by actions threatening the ship (for example, deliberate ramming, boarding, dangerous approaching, blocking the move, etc.), or threatening the team if warning shots didn’t help .
    Again, basic knowledge.
    By the way, the political situation in Korea on the eve of the war is well laid out - the neutrality of Korea (of that time) is something ephemeral. If China’s ports were seized “in concession” for hundreds of years, then Korea was not perceived as a “neutral” state at all - such meaningless declarations.
    1. +8
      9 August 2018 13: 04
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      That is, there are adults - who have to chew on the elementary - Good you, Andrei, a person :)

      Yeah :))) That's why I write about Varyag: meeeleeeenoooo, in the most detailed way. This is a very difficult topic, many have already made up their minds on it, and to change it it is necessary ... let's say, write VERY fundamentally, without missing no trifles :)))) Well, nothing - I knew what I was up to :)))))
      1. +2
        9 August 2018 13: 33
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: DimerVladimer
        That is, there are adults - who have to chew on the elementary - Good you, Andrei, a person :)

        Yeah :))) That's why I write about Varyag: meeeleeeenoooo, in the most detailed way. This is a very difficult topic, many have already made up their minds on it, and to change it it is necessary ... let's say, write VERY fundamentally, without missing no trifles :)))) Well, nothing - I knew what I was up to :)))))

        You are a wonderful popularizer and know how to present complex things of world politics at that time.
        There, the presence of the British inpatient also played a role (an ally of Japan under the 1902 treaty).
        1. +1
          9 August 2018 14: 53
          For reference, Neutrality in a naval war is governed by the XIII Hague Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Neutral Powers in the event of a naval war of 1907, so I repeat once again at the time of the events described there were no international law
          1. +3
            9 August 2018 16: 03
            Quote: Nehist
            For reference, Neutrality in a naval war is governed by the XIII Hague Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Neutral Powers in the event of a naval war of 1907, so I repeat once again at the time of the events described there were no international law


            Not only:
            Among the first attempts to supplement the practice of applying marine customs by the contractual norms that had developed by the beginning of the century was the adoption of Declarations on the Rights and Obligations of Neutral States during the Naval War of 1780., the main provisions of which were further embodied in the Paris Declaration of 1856, signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Prussia and Austria at the conclusion of peace at the Paris Congress, convened after the Crimean War, and subsequently adopted by almost all maritime powers, including Spain, USA and Mexico.
            see Paris, April 4/16, 1856. Declaration on the Principles of Maritime International Law.

            The declaration was executed in the form of a multilateral treaty, which enshrined four provisions of the law of the sea relating to the war at sea:
            - the prohibition of privateering;
            - the inviolability of neutral cargo on enemy ships (with the exception of military smuggling);
            - the inviolability of enemy cargo on neutral ships (with the exception of military smuggling);
            - On the effectiveness of the blockade.

            Of course, the Hague Convention of 1907 and the London Declaration of the Law of the Sea War of 1909 described in more detail the rights and responsibilities of the parties.
        2. +2
          9 August 2018 18: 22
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          You are a great promoter

          Thank you for your kind words, and I'm glad that you finally gave me a definition (this is a continuation of our discussion then). I’m also glad that our points of view coincided here: I also consider myself a popularizer, not a historian, and I never claimed to be a historian, but I always reserved the right to personally interpret certain historical events based on information obtained by real historians, of course. hi
          Maybe someday I will find a treasure, financial issues will stop bothering me and I will become a real historian tongue
          1. 0
            13 August 2018 12: 05
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            You are a great promoter

            Thank you for your kind words, and I'm glad that you finally gave me a definition (this is a continuation of our discussion then). I’m also glad that our points of view coincided here: I also consider myself a popularizer, not a historian, and I never claimed to be a historian, but I always reserved the right to personally interpret certain historical events based on information obtained by real historians, of course. hi
            Maybe someday I will find a treasure, financial issues will stop bothering me and I will become a real historian tongue


            Anyone who knows how to work with documents and analyze sources, and put statistics on the shelves can be a historian. Working in the archives is a green melancholy, you are already seeing "grains separated from the chaff".
            But a popularizer - not every historian can become.

            We must very carefully discern the line between guesses and sources and it is interesting to write - you, dear Andrei, do very well.

            I read and re-read many sources of your articles with new understanding and attitude, to find it in your articles is a huge time saving - I sincerely thank you for the enormous work done.
            Deeply delved into the specifics of the fleet 1890-1945.
      2. +5
        9 August 2018 13: 51
        I’m afraid that it’s not so easy to convince people who have already made up their minds. angry take at least the nightly of the mentioned VP.
        1. +3
          9 August 2018 15: 53
          Do not remember in vain, otherwise it will register here laughing
        2. +2
          9 August 2018 17: 48
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          take at least the nightly of the mentioned VP.

          Well, colleague, there’s a clinical case, there, you know, alternative historical medicine is powerless :))))
        3. +3
          10 August 2018 01: 06
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          take at least the nightly of the mentioned VP.

          Ha! Just think, Vadim ... You try to convince the Passerby to convince at least something, this is really a "fruit". I remember that Andrei and I just dedicated the article "Varyag" to him specially. Nice were the days ..
      3. 0
        9 August 2018 14: 37
        Andrey You are mistaken! At that time, the law of the sea was not yet regulated by any laws, it was more of a tradition and each ship commander interpreted them as they saw fit, there are plenty of examples to take the same gunboat policy
        1. +1
          9 August 2018 17: 49
          Quote: Nehist
          Andrey You are mistaken! At that time, the law of the sea was not yet regulated by any laws

          Well, some laws were just the same, but about neutrality - yes, there weren't. But how can I be mistaken in this if I wrote exactly this in the article? :)
  6. +1
    9 August 2018 12: 37
    Even from this article, they made Rudnev a hero a traitor. The Japanese then lifted the ship. Maybe there were some miscalculations of Rudnev, but he had no choice.
    1. +2
      9 August 2018 14: 46
      Or maybe the choice was for Varyag to make his way through, but the Korean would remain in the raid? Busse’s cautoranga (I don’t remember exactly), Makarov acquitted him when he left our second destroyer.
      1. Cat
        +6
        9 August 2018 15: 42
        Rudnev is not a hero and not a traitor. Rudnev is just a mediocre, average officer. A man of his time and era, moderately brave, cowardly and competent.
        So Andrei is right in one thing, it makes no sense to pour mud on Captain Varyag, but to say that he made all the language does not turn.
        My opinion is close to the classic:
        - Rudnev showed caution - having lost time and initiative;
        - upon receipt of the ultimatum, the latter acted simply decently in relation to other stations. When he went out to meet the squadron;
        - he refused to abandon the Korean, counting on his 8 "gun;
        - he fought bravely, but I don’t know if it was sensible or not;
        - the mistake was to flood the Varangian in the raid.
        In relation to the sailors, I believe that they just accomplished the feat.
        Could someone do more than Rudnev? I think an extraordinary person - perhaps! Mediocrity - definitely not.
        Sincerely, Kitty!
  7. +1
    9 August 2018 17: 19
    however, all Japanese ships were built (by British standards) as 1st class armadillos, while the Russian “battleship cruisers” “Relight” and “Victory” were created in many respects equivalent to the English 2nd class armadillos and were weaker than the “first-ranking” armadillos "Armadillos.


    The English classification was created primarily for the English fleet, the Russian fleet is difficult to adjust to this system. Different tasks.
    In addition, the battleship "Renown" was planned to arm the 12 with inch guns, but the lack of readiness of the latter did not allow this.
    1. +2
      9 August 2018 17: 53
      Quote: 27091965i
      The English classification was created primarily for the English fleet, the Russian fleet is difficult to adjust to this system. Different tasks.

      Why customize? Ours closely monitored England and believed that building battleships on the 1,5-2,5 thousand tons easier than the British would be able to achieve approximately the same result, that is, to get ships with combat efficiency, if not equal, then of the same order. Therefore, our EDB can be considered a domestic analogue, not in the sense that copies, but in the sense that they solved similar problems.
      Quote: 27091965i
      In addition, the battleship "Renown" was planned to arm the 12 with inch guns, but the lack of readiness of the latter did not allow this.

      All the same, it was a ship for colonial service, and in the British classification it was considered second-class - and Peresvet was made just for them.
      1. +1
        9 August 2018 18: 07
        Talbot versus Relight, no way. 5 (for some reason) 152 and 6 120 mm versus 4 254 and 11 152 mm (we don’t take a trifle)
        1. +2
          9 August 2018 20: 40
          Quote: Conductor
          Talbot versus Relight, no way.

          Sir, but what is Talbot here? :)
      2. +1
        9 August 2018 21: 55
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Therefore, our EDB can be considered a domestic analogue, not in the sense that copies, but in the sense that they solved similar problems.


        In England, it was believed that our counterparts would fight based on bases or in their coastal waters, the British battleships would be on the open sea for a longer period of time and fight not only there, but also in the coastal waters of the enemy, the discussion of the classification system lasted longer years, change it or leave the old one.
  8. +4
    9 August 2018 18: 00
    Good afternoon. Gentlemen, I think it’s not worth kicking Rudnev once again, he didn’t do something, he didn’t take the initiative ... and so on. Just remember that it is flesh from the flesh of the system that has developed in more than one year. The main and unique culprit of the tragedy, uncle Nikolai, “the prince of Tsushima” with a company who plundered the naval budget, and how many sticky little sticks there (of course, sent the “lion's share” to prince Tsushima), one god knows. This swamp did not want to move even when under the very nose slipped a dish in the form of two newest armored cruisers - the future Nissin and Kassuga. In the slides mentioned by the respected Author. Even did not try to intercept these ships, at least just so that the Japanese did not get. Rozhdestvensky’s answer is very eloquent and indicative.
    Russia is an absolute monarchy and all responsibility is on Nicholas, his relatives and entourage. So that it makes no sense to blame the rank and file.
    1. +1
      9 August 2018 18: 23
      Quote: Oleg Kolsky 051
      This swamp did not want to move even when under the very nose slipped a dish in the form of two newest armored cruisers - the future Nissin and Kassuga.

      In fact, the swamp beneath the Spitz was not just stirring - it was seething. It actually came to an end, but ...
      April 11, 1905 1500 sailors of the Black Sea Fleet arrived in Libau, intended to equip the "exotic cruisers". The confidence in the acquisition of cruisers was so strong in the fleet that the official name “Separate detachment of special-purpose cruisers” was established behind the future formation, according to which in April 1905 the orders of N. A. Beklemishev were given. Among other options for the name of the detachment in official correspondence, there were the “Detachment of Special Purpose Vessels,” “The Second Separate Detachment of the Pacific Fleet,” and even the “Fourth Pacific Fleet Squadron.” But the established name testified that now, taking into account the events of the Russo-Japanese War, the "exotic cruisers" may have been intended not only for the Pacific Fleet.
      However, in the midst of preparation, on May 8, 1905, Nicholas II ordered F.K. Avelan to end the operation.
      © S. A. Gladkikh. Exotic cruisers. collection "Gangut" issue 36, 37
      The main problem was precisely that the fleet wanted to do everything by itself. As a result, the seafarers worked out the technical and financial part - but not the diplomatic one.
      ... at the beginning of the XNUMXth century, the acquisition of warships by belligerents from neutral states was prohibited by international law, therefore the only way to implement such a deal was to search for an intermediary trading company and an intermediary country that would agree to make a fictitious purchase for themselves, and then transfer the ships Of Russia. In order to avoid open violation of international law, the purchase had to be made by a private company, supposedly without any state involvement. And since warships could not be privately owned (privateering was also prohibited at that time), at the final stage of the operation, that is, when transporting ships to Russia, the use of the national flag of the intermediary state was required, which, therefore, should not be officially declare your neutrality regarding the Russo-Japanese conflict. Moreover, it was desirable that the intermediary company was not registered in the territory of the intermediary state.

      Why didn’t you connect the Foreign Ministry from the very beginning? PMSM, the point may be that Spitz already had a negative experience of cooperation with the Pevchesky Bridge - it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not taking into account any proposals of the fleet, that imposed on him Port Arthur, which was previously recognized as naval practically unsuitable for basing.
      Inter-agency strife had an extremely negative impact on the fate of the planned operation. In the absence of a “united government”, there were fundamental differences of opinion between the leaders of the Maritime Ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The long absence of a unified management of the operation also contributed to its breakdown. Trying to personally coordinate efforts to acquire cruisers, Nicholas II hesitated in the struggle of departmental interests, often making conflicting decisions. When A. M. Abaza was finally appointed the sole leader of the operation, the moment was already missed, and he himself clearly did not correspond to the status of the assigned mission.
      1. +2
        9 August 2018 18: 58
        Good evening. You see, I wrote about 1903. And when it struck, they clearly moved. And they made unsuccessful efforts to purchase ships. But time has already passed.
        1. +2
          9 August 2018 20: 32
          Quote: Oleg Kolsky 051
          Good evening. You see, I wrote about 1903.

          But in the pre-war period, everything was felled on the priest-king:
          Russia also had a chance to acquire these cruisers, but the country's naval leadership refused to buy for several reasons, citing the emperor’s order issued in 1901 to carry out military shipbuilding only in Russia.

          PMSM, the same thing happened before the REV as before the Second World War - for some reason, the military and political leadership decided that the adversary would not attack until the completion of the rearmament programs. And if so, then why buy foreign cars with non-standard weapons for the RIF. When the situation grew tense, it was already too late.
          1. +3
            9 August 2018 20: 39
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And if so, then why buy foreign cars with non-standard weapons for the RIF.

            Exactly hi
            1. +1
              9 August 2018 21: 10
              Are you talking about Trijomf and Swiftshur?
              1. +3
                10 August 2018 16: 07
                Nobody would sell Wakanto and Ocupanto to us. No need to build illusions.
            2. 0
              9 August 2018 23: 27
              Good night Andrey from Chelyabinsk. Let me find out, when do you plan to broadcast the Blucher ending?
              1. +1
                10 August 2018 01: 29
                Quote: Oleg Kolsky 051
                Good night Andrey from Chelyabinsk.

                Same to you!
                Quote: Oleg Kolsky 051
                Let me find out, when do you plan to broadcast the Blucher ending?

                Eeee ... sorry, I don’t understand. According to Blucher, the topic has long been closed
                1. 0
                  10 August 2018 05: 24
                  And I apologize until I scored- "the cruiser Blucher, part 3", laid out only two parts.
                  Sorry, my jamb.
      2. +3
        10 August 2018 00: 49
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Why didn’t you connect the Foreign Ministry from the very beginning?

        Sorry, Alexey, that I’m getting up, but it hurts an interesting topic, the purchase of cruisers. From a year ago, several months I collected, wherever possible, materials on this topic, the conclusion suggests itself - the purchase was impossible.
        To begin with, the American government tried to solve a similar problem, the purchase of "exotic cruisers," during the Spanish-American War, which involved serious forces. The New York firm "Flint & Co" acted as an intermediary - in the spring of 1898 the head of the firm, Charles R. Flint, negotiated with the governments of Chile and Argentina on the purchase of armored cruisers "O'Higgins", "San Martín "and" Garibaldi ". By the way, the same firm was later hired by Russia to negotiate with Latin Americans.

        So what ? Nothing came of it, and after all, you can’t write off the sticks in the wheels of the British, as you sometimes find in domestic sources.
        There the problem is in the correlation of the forces of the fleets of Chile and Argentina, and the hypothetical sale of one or another ship, the existing balance of forces (reverently guarded by both sides) violated, which is why nothing came of either the Americans or ours.
        But the Japanese succeeded at one time, fighting with China, they managed to acquire the cruiser "Esmeralda" from Chile, however, having paid exorbitantly for it.
        1. avt
          0
          10 August 2018 11: 51
          Quote: Comrade
          From a year ago, several months I collected, wherever possible, materials on this topic, the conclusion suggests itself - the purchase was impossible.

          Well, actually, in one of the issues of Gangut, this topic was fairly well laid out.
          1. +3
            10 August 2018 14: 08
            The issue of selling warships to Chile and Argentina is much broader than it might seem after reading the article you mentioned.
            Without the involvement of American and Latin American sources, we will never understand why, in fact, Russia couldn’t buy “exotic cruisers”.
            By the way, the Gladkikhs did not say a word about how Japan impeded the implementation of the transaction, and what mechanisms were used by it.
            That is why the article in Gangut, for all its merits, cannot claim to be a full disclosure of the topic.
        2. 0
          10 August 2018 16: 30
          Quote: Comrade
          There the problem is in the correlation of the forces of the fleets of Chile and Argentina, and the hypothetical sale of one or another ship, the existing balance of forces (reverently guarded by both sides) violated, which is why nothing came of either the Americans or ours.

          PMSM, the Americans simply hid too early - 4 years before Chile and Argentina ran into boats. smile
          However, in May, July and December 1902, a series of agreements were concluded between Argentina and Chile, establishing the parity of the naval forces, and paragraph 3 of the December treaty stipulated that ships built by both parties could not be transferred to another power except with the permission of the British king.
          1. +8
            10 August 2018 18: 00
            For both Americans and Russians, there was a formal reason for refusing to sell ships. But the true factors lie elsewhere.
            If we take our case, then, in addition to what has already been said about the balance of power, we need to add a few words about the Japanese, who bought large quantities of agricultural products for the army in Argentina. This is on the one hand, and on the other, a corresponding lobby in the government of the country. Well, what did Argentina gain from selling us cruisers, in monetary terms?
            But nothing, nobody was going to overpay them. What did Argentina lose? An excellent customer who could contact other suppliers of beef and fodder.
            In addition, we will not forget about close naval cooperation.
            Everyone has heard of Togo's English observers, but few have heard of Argentinean observers. I repeat, the price of the issue, in the case of a sale, is low, and Argentina had something to lose in relations with Japan.
            1. +5
              10 August 2018 18: 19
              Hmm, I never thought about that. But indeed, it is for us Argentina somewhere near the edge of the world, and for Japan, Latin America, consider nearby.
              1. 0
                10 August 2018 22: 22
                Japan? Very far! But England is very close.
              2. +4
                11 August 2018 05: 02
                Hmm, never thought about that.

                So do I. But before starting work on the "Russian" Garibaldians "in battle", I collected a lot of material on the topic of Russia's acquisition of "exotic" cruisers. Thus, I discovered that the Japanese and Argentines had close naval cooperation, stretching so far that an Argentine naval attaché was present on Mikasa during the Battle of Tsushima. And after the battle, the Japanese allowed him to take fragments of the punched armor plates from the ships of the Togo detachment to Argentina as souvenirs, and they are now exhibited in one of the museums in Buenos Aires.
                When it came to the possible sale of Russian cruisers, the Japanese had conversations with the Argentine leadership. Omitting the details, the Japanese showed both a stick and a carrot there.
                Yes, when ours tried to buy a cruiser, in the negotiations the Argentines insisted that Chile, in the event of a deal being concluded, somewhere to share their "Capitán Prat", whatever it is, but a battleship. Like, we will sell the cruiser to Russia, well, but we have nothing to oppose to your "Capitán Prat" in this case.
                So there was a combination of factors unfavorable for us (including those listed in the article of the collection "Gangut" and at Krestyaninov's), so it did not "grow together".
                1. 0
                  11 August 2018 17: 20
                  Can I find out the sources? The first time I hear about Argentina's interest in the REV.
        3. 0
          10 August 2018 22: 19
          Quote: Comrade
          The conclusion suggests itself - the purchase was impossible.

          But the Japanese then bought them ..
        4. 0
          11 August 2018 19: 57
          The Japanese fascinated the Britons? Okay Rossi sell did not meet the interests of England, and the United States?
  9. +3
    10 August 2018 02: 00
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Maybe someday I will find a treasure, financial issues will stop bothering me and I will become a real historian


    God bless you, Andrey in all your endeavors! hi
    And with the treasure too. wink
    Thanks for all. I look forward to an article with an analysis of the battle, I began to sleep poorly. I wish you success and good luck. hi
  10. 0
    10 August 2018 18: 54
    The article doesn’t cover the topic of the fault of Kramp and Nikloss. laughing
    But essentially
    1. Of course, Rudnev could not, on his own initiative, attack the Japanese.
    2. But the Japanese made a stupid puncture - the destroyers attacked the Koreans without a direct order, and if Rudnev were more decisive, the situation could have gone differently (or even if Belyaev managed to get into the destroyers, a battle would have begun in which Rudnev was drawn out of will. however, the question is still). Instead, Rudnev lost time and gave the Japanese an apology.
    3. The puncture of the Japanese was all the more serious because the commander of the Japanese squadron, Admiral Uriu, not only did not have an order to attack the Russian ships, but also had an order if Russian warships were found in Chemulpo, not to land in port, but in Asanman Bay, which was much more inconvenient for the Japanese.
    4. Uriu, having learned from the commander who had left Chemulpo in the evening Chioda about the indecision and other features of Rudnev, from which he concluded that the Russians would not attack the landing, directly violated the order given to him and ordered him to land at the port.
    And here this blunder of the destroyers is an attack on the Korean, a great reason for the attack of the Japanese in the most uncomfortable place for them, on a narrow raid. If Rudnev had at least a third of Admiral Uriu’s determination, the landing would be disrupted, and Uriu would be waiting for the seppuk very soon, for a direct violation of the command order. But the Japanese admiral showed determination and won. But Rudnev is not.
    5. Uriu did not have an order to attack the Russian ships — in this he too, having ascertained the character of Rudnev from Commander Chioda, showed great decisiveness — let me remind you that he should have avoided this.
    6. Taking into account the fact that Rudnev himself determined the speed of the Varyag at 13 knots, the alleged breakthrough was an open attempt to simply "cover the backside."
    7. Varyag’s breakthrough from the port was utter stupidity, even if Varyag could provide full speed - in any case, the ship would be under shelling by the Japanese for several hours - and it would be enough to damage one pipe - and Varyag would not leave. But if the Varangian did not give full speed, the exit was just a show to the public.
    8. The smartest thing Rudnev could do was stay in the port. Uriu obviously would not be profitable to bring their ships to the port for battle, since they would be alternately under fire from two Russian ships that blocked the narrow entrance from the raid into the port from a short distance - and the Japanese would surely have significant losses, and the raid was blocked for a long time by the flooded ships - so Uriu would wait for the same seppuk for breaking the order. It is known that Uriu did not plan to do this stupidity - to give a squadron battle in the roadstead at the port entrance. Uriu was planning an attack on Russian ships by the destroyers - and in this case, the Korean and the Varyag had great chances to win. Yes, Uriu would not be able to block the port for long, as this cut off the Japanese landing force.
    I am looking forward to the next part smile
    1. 0
      10 August 2018 18: 55
      I typed an hour, where did the rest go ?! request
    2. +5
      11 August 2018 00: 40
      Quote: Avior
      The article doesn’t cover the topic of the fault of Kramp and Nikloss.

      Ahh ... well why. There, at the end of the article, a postscript in small letters: "The Crump plant must be destroyed" :))))))) Is it really gone when the site was redesigned? :)))))
    3. 0
      13 August 2018 13: 40
      Quote: Avior
      The smartest thing Rudnev could do was stay in the port. Uriu obviously would not be profitable to bring their ships to the port for battle, since they would be alternately under fire from two Russian ships that blocked the narrow entrance from the raid into the port from a short distance - and the Japanese would surely have significant losses, and the raid was blocked for a long time by the flooded ships - so Uriu would wait for the same seppuk for breaking the order.


      What prevents Uriu from firing at the Varangian in the raid - being in the ship's way of the fairway?
      - Nothing but the danger of hitting neighboring ships in the raid, which is extremely undesirable for him, since Japan has only to declare itself as an equal world power.
      And to start this statement with shelling ships in the raid is not a good start - all the more, there is a ship of Great Britain, the accidental hit of which threatens to break the Japanese-British naval agreement.
      Therefore, the Japanese sought to follow the rules of the naval war and traditions. They also respected the neutrality of other courts. They provided care for the wounded in the framework of the Geneva Convention on land war, the work of the International Red Cross, etc.
      Politics - at that time, Japanese politicians did not want to be considered barbarians - everything will change in 1934.
  11. +3
    10 August 2018 19: 32
    I type in a new short-for some reason, the essence has disappeared from the commentary. how can this be?

    1. Of course, Rudnev did not have the right to attack the Japanese.
    2. But the Japanese themselves made a gross mistake - destroyers attack the Korean without the order of Admiral Uriu.
    3. This mistake was all the more serious since Uriu had a direct order - if Russian ships were to be in Chemulpo, the landing should be carried out not in the port, but in a much less convenient bay.
    4. Uriu, having learned from Commander Chioda who had left Chemulpo in the evening about the indecision and other features of Rudnev, made a bold decision to land at the port.
    If something went wrong, Uriu would be waiting for seppuku. But it went wrong - the commanders of the Japanese destroyers without the order of Uriu attacked the Korean. Rudnev received an iron case for an answer, and if he had at least a fifth of Uriu's determination, the Japanese landing would be frustrated. But Rudnev did not find her, he ran to find out, to look for intermediaries and gave the Japanese time to correct their gross blunder, which could for them in general and Uriu in particular become fatal. I don’t know, it would have influenced Rudnev’s decisiveness if Belyaev drowned the Japanese destroyers, but you don’t know this anymore, the Korean didn’t get into them.
    5. The smartest thing that Rudnev could do when he received an ultimatum was not to leave the port. Uriu could not enter the squadron for battle in the port, since Russian ships would block the narrow entrance to the port from the raid and the Japanese would be in a very disadvantageous position, undoubtedly, some of them would be seriously damaged or even sank in the raid, cutting off the Japanese landing. Uriu, who not only did not have an order to attack Russian ships, but, on the contrary, had an order to avoid contact with them, as you know, was not going to do this - he planned to attack the Russian ships in the port only with the help of destroyers, which gave Rudnev a great chance of success .
    6. "Breakthrough" Rudnev is a frank attempt to "cover the backside." If the Varyag had a course of 13 knots, as Rudnev writes, then such a "breakthrough" is sheer absurdity and stupidity, unless, of course, there was no idea to turn back after the first hits. But even if the Varyag could give full speed, he would have been under fire from the Japanese for several hours, and the likelihood of such damage, which would reduce his speed, was enormous - almost one hundred percent. It was enough to damage the pipe, for example.
    7. The foreigners, having received an ultimatum, were quite ready to leave the port, but Rudnev decided to leave, although he had every opportunity not to do so. Moreover, when a couple of days later the Japanese were presented with claims for this case, they said that the Russians left the port voluntarily What are the claims to the Japanese? All the writings that allegedly Rudnev’s absence from the port would have quarreled Russia with someone is in favor of the poor.
    8. What would happen if the Varangian did not leave the port? It’s very simple - if the Varangian and the Korean were able to fend off the Japanese destroyers, in a couple of days Uriu would let them go, as they cut off the Japanese landing from other forces of the Japanese — and for this they wouldn’t stroke the head.
    But Uriu showed courage and decisiveness, although he risked his head, and Rudnev turned out to be an ordinary servant who cares about his career and pension sad Gone, how it goes.
    I look forward to the next part, Andrei writes meticulously and thoughtfully, there is something to read, although it is not always possible to agree wink
    1. +1
      10 August 2018 19: 38
      .... Gone, how it goes.
      I look forward to the next part, Andrei writes meticulously and thoughtfully, there is something to read with great interest, although it is not always possible to agree with the conclusions wink
      -----
      here again the last paragraph was gone request
    2. +2
      11 August 2018 00: 37
      Quote: Avior
      But it went wrong - the commanders of the Japanese destroyers without the order of Uriu attacked the Korean. Rudnev received an iron case for an answer, and if he had at least a fifth of Uriu's determination, the Japanese landing would be frustrated

      For the time being, I’ll say only one thing - the next article (I’ve just completed) is just about Uriu’s actions and the episode with Korelok. And I’ll tell you, as a professional daughter of an officer, it’s not so simple as you write :)))))
      Quote: Avior
      What would happen if the Varangian did not leave the port? It’s very simple - if the Varangian and the Korean were able to fight off the Japanese destroyers, in a couple of days Uriu would let them go, as they cut off the Japanese landing from other forces of the Japanese - and for this Uriu would not be stroked on the head

      Yes, this option sounded more than once, we will definitely analyze it
    3. 0
      13 August 2018 13: 55
      Quote: Avior
      7. The foreigners, having received an ultimatum, were quite ready to leave the port, but Rudnev decided to leave, although he had every opportunity not to do so. Moreover, when a couple of days later the Japanese were presented with claims for this case, they said that the Russians left the port voluntarily What are the claims to the Japanese? All the writings that allegedly Rudnev’s absence from the port would have quarreled Russia with someone is in favor of the poor.


      Without a doubt, if Rudnev had not left, neutral vessels would have left and Varyag would certainly have been attacked on an even narrower raid and undoubtedly with more serious consequences - since it was even easier to concentrate fire on a stationary ship on the raid.
      Only he would be sunk like a cowardly ship with a fearful commander and crew.
      The opposite happened - the ship left - took the battle with the superior enemy, suffered losses and sank his ship, then unable to continue the battle - and this is a completely different scenario!
      No wonder the foreign press of that period praised the actions of the commander and crew of the cruiser.
      Even the enemy.
  12. -1
    10 August 2018 23: 27
    Quote: Avior
    The smartest thing that Rudnev could do when he received an ultimatum was not to leave the port.

    And it was possible to jump out, the Japs would rivet the anchor chains, turn around at the first shots and leave again.
    And get out then, send three destroyers for slaughter.
    1. 0
      11 August 2018 17: 22
      That is yes. Three destroyers in broad daylight had little chance of survival.
      1. -1
        11 August 2018 20: 47
        Yes, even everyone would climb together in the fairway, it would be interesting
      2. 0
        13 August 2018 14: 20
        Bit and night
        Quote: Saxahorse
        That is yes. Three destroyers in broad daylight had little chance of survival.


        Well, who would send them in the afternoon ...
        And at night and in a much more fortified raid, the Japanese achieved good success - for example, in the battle for Weihaiwei:
        The next night, February 4, 10 Japanese destroyers (2nd and 3rd detachments) again secretly went to Weihaiwei. While the two gunboats diverted the attention of the Chinese patrols, the destroyers walked around the boom barrier from the south, while two destroyers flew onto the rocks and, having received damage, turned back. Two more destroyers hit the bon, but managed to jump over the moorings at full speed. After waiting for the moon to set, the first detachment of four destroyers went unnoticed around the line of Chinese patrol vessels (destroyers and armed boats) and went to the anchorage of the main forces of the Bayan Navy.

        The Chinese ships did not expect an attack, the Japanese distinguished them well, thanks to the brightly burning portholes. The destroyers marched directly to the flagship battleship Dingyuan, which stood out against the sky with its tall masts. However, at this moment, the second detachment of destroyers, taking the wrong course, went to the Chinese patrol vessels, from which they immediately opened fire from small-caliber quick-shooters and hand weapons. Fire was also fired from large ships.

        Only two destroyers broke through to the Chinese flagship, but due to icing of the torpedo tubes only half of their torpedoes could be launched into it.
        One of them hit the Dingyuan aboard near the stern. On the battleship, they managed to pull up the waterproof partitions, but a strong leak opened in them, the ship began to sink into the water. The Dingyuan was taken to the shore, where after a few hours he sank to the bottom. The deck of the battleship remained above the water, and he could continue to fire from the turret guns.
        The Japanese lost two destroyers and 15 killed. One destroyer was shot from cannons (the crew managed to switch to other vessels), the second (No. 22, from a couple participating in the Dingyuan attack) collided with a Chinese boat when leaving, damaged the helms and flew onto the rocks (the team drowned or froze in the morning the Chinese captured the remaining five crew members). The Japanese took two more heavily damaged destroyers in tow.

        The next night, February 5, the Japanese repeated the attack, which now involved 4 destroyers from the elite 1st detachment (2 destroyers turned back due to damage).
        This time, the Chinese were expecting an attack. Admiral Ding personally stood guard at the Jiyuan cruiser. Floodlights rummaged through the bay. Despite all the measures taken, the Japanese managed to round the boom from the south, bypass patrols and approach the Chinese squadron unnoticed.

        Two destroyers, including the armored Kotaka, attacked and torpedoed the armored cruiser Laiyuan.
        Ten minutes after the torpedo explosion, the Laiyuan rolled over and sank, leaving a bottom on the surface.

        Two other destroyers torpedoed the Weiyuan training ship, which sank in shallow water.
        In their report, the Japanese reported the defeat of other Chinese ships, including both armadillos and another cruiser.


        So at night in the raid without a move, it was not possible to fend off the destroyers.
        1. 0
          14 August 2018 22: 57
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          Well, who would send them in the afternoon ...

          Well, Uriu was about to send :) If the Varangian didn’t leave at 12 o’clock at 16 o’clock, they would have been attacked by destroyers in the roads. What Uriu warned foreign captains about.

          That would be instructive. Varyag would have managed to give every possible move, the boilers already began to breed from 11 o’clock and even Russian artillerymen from six-inch guns rarely smeared at 300-800 meters.
    2. 0
      13 August 2018 13: 59
      Quote: Koshnitsa
      Quote: Avior
      The smartest thing that Rudnev could do when he received an ultimatum was not to leave the port.

      And it was possible to jump out, the Japs would rivet the anchor chains, turn around at the first shots and leave again.
      And get out then, send three destroyers for slaughter.


      Just destroyers in a narrow raid have some advantage - to launch a torpedo and maneuver them more conveniently than a bulky cruiser.
      Moreover, the Japanese have already carried out similar operations, defeating the Chinese fleet in the raid - they had experience in such operations.
  13. 0
    23 December 2020 00: 54
    The logic is amazing: by firing at transports with troops, Rudnev would have violated blah-blah-blah. And by firing at the "Korean" the Japanese did not violate anything, although the attack on the warship was always a casus belli.

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