The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
So, 29 January 1903 g "Varyag" arrived in Chemulpo (Inchon). Before the battle that took place on 27 in January of the next year, less than a month is left - what happened during these 29 days? Arriving at the place of duty, V.F. Rudnev quickly discovered and reported that the Japanese were preparing for the occupation of Korea. In materials historical Commission noted:
The same was reported by the Russian military agent in Japan, Colonel Samoilov, on January 9, on 1904, who reported on the freight of numerous steamboats, the mobilization of divisions, etc. Thus, the preparation of the occupation of Korea was not a secret for the Steward or for higher instances, but they remained silent - as we said in the previous article, Russian diplomats decided not to consider the landing of Japanese troops in Korea a declaration of war against Russia, as Nikolai II and notified the Vicar. It was decided that only the landing of the Japanese landings north of the 38 parallel was dangerous, and everything that was not read to the south (including Chemulpo) could not be read as such and did not require additional instructions for the stationary officers. We wrote more about this in the previous article, and now we only note once again that the refusal of armed opposition to the landing of the Japanese in Korea was accepted by far higher instances than the commander of Varyag, and the instructions he received completely forbade the Japanese to interfere.
But - back to the "Varyag". Without a doubt, the best way to avoid losing the cruiser and the gunboat "Koreyets" would be to withdraw them from Chemulpo, together with the Russian envoy to Korea A.I. Pavlov or without him, but this, unfortunately, was not done. Why is it so - alas, answer this question is very difficult, and you can only speculate. Without a doubt, if it was decided to assume that the Japanese landing in Korea would not lead to war with Russia, there was no reason for the Russian stationers to withdraw from Chemulpo - the Japanese are going to land, and let them. But the situation drastically changed when the Japanese broke off diplomatic relations: despite the fact that St. Petersburg believed that this was not yet a war, the risk to which the cruiser and the gunboat were subjected already clearly outweighed the benefits of our military presence in Korea.
As a matter of fact, events developed as follows: in 16.00 24 in January of 1904, a note about breaking up relations was officially received in St. Petersburg. What was important was the classic phrase: “Diplomatic relations with the Russian government now no longer have any value, and the government of the Japanese empire decided to break off these diplomatic relations” was supplemented with a very frank threat: “The government of the empire to defend its sovereignty and interests leaves he has the right to act on his own, considering it to be the best way to achieve these goals. ” This was already a real threat of war: but, alas, it was not taken into account.
The fact is that, for the reasons sounded earlier, Russia absolutely did not want war in 1904 and, apparently, did not want to believe in its beginning. Therefore, in St. Petersburg, they preferred to listen to Kurino, Japan’s envoy, who did not tire of repeating that the break in diplomatic relations was not yet a war, and everything could still be done for the better. As a result, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and Nicholas II), in fact, allowed themselves to ignore reality, hoping for mirages that the Japanese envoy drew to them and in which they really wanted to believe. Moreover, there was a fear that “our heroes in the Far East would not suddenly get carried away by any military incident” (as said by Foreign Minister Lamsdorf). As a result, a gross mistake was made, which may have ultimately destroyed “Varyag”: the Governor was notified of Petersburg on the very next day, January 25, but the second part of the Japanese note (about the “right to act as you see fit” ) in the message was omitted, and E.I. Alekseev did not find out about this.
Let's be frank - it’s far from a fact that, having received the text of a Japanese note in full, E.I. Alekseev would have taken measures to recall Varyag and Koreyts, and in addition, in order for these measures to succeed, it was necessary to act with lightning speed: it is well known that speed of action is one of the advantages of the Vicar E.I. Alekseeva was not included. But still there was some chance, and he was missed.
It is also interesting as E.I. Alekseev ordered the information he received: he informed the consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore about the rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan, informed the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers and the gunboat Manchuor, but informed neither the Port Arthur squadron nor the envoy in Korea A.I. . Pavlov, nor, of course, the commander of the "Varyag". One can only assume that E.I. Alekseev received the task "in no way provoke the Japanese" and, guided by the principle "as if something did not work out", he preferred not to report anything to the Arthur sailors. The author of this article, unfortunately, could not figure out when he learned about the break in diplomatic relations the squadron commander O.V. Stark and the Chief of the Naval Staff of the Vicar V.K. Witgeft. It is possible that they also received this information with a delay, so that, perhaps, N.O. Essen (expressed in his memoirs) that the inaction of the latter led to the untimely recall of Russian stationary in Chemulpo and Shanghai (there was a gunboat "Majur",) is not fully justified. But in any case, the news no longer about the break of diplomatic relations, but about the beginning of the war was sent to Chief for “Varyag” only on January 27, after the successful attack of the Japanese destroyers, who undermined “Retvisan”, “Tsesarevich” and “Pallada” and the day when Varyag entered its first and last fight. Of course, it was a belated warning.
And what happened at the time on the cruiser? Already on January 24 (on the day when St. Petersburg officially received a notice of a break in diplomatic relations), the foreign stationary commanders “secretly” informed Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev about this regrettable event. The commander of the Varyag immediately requested instructions from Admiral Vitgeft: “rumors of a break in diplomatic relations have reached; due to the frequent delay of dispatches by the Japanese, I ask you to tell us whether there was an order for us to take further actions, ”and a request to envoy A.I. Pavlov in Seoul: "I heard about the severance of diplomatic relations, please provide information." However, no reply was received from Port Arthur, and A.S. Pavlov answered:
Apparently, upon receipt of the answer VF. Rudnev went the first train to Seoul (25 left 1904 in the morning) and there, in the Korean capital, the last chance was missed to lead Russian stationary people from Chemulpo before the start of the war.
During the conversation, it quickly became clear that A.I. Pavlov, like V.F. Rudnev, a week has not received any answers to their requests, nor any new orders. All this reinforced the opinion that the Japanese intercepted and delayed the dispatches of the commander of the "Varyag" and the envoy of Russia in Korea: but how was it supposed to get out of this situation? V.F. Rudnev offered to take the envoy and the consul and immediately leave Chemulpo, however A.I. Pavlov did not support such a decision, citing the lack of appropriate instructions from his leadership. The envoy offered to send the gunboat "Koreyets" to Port Arthur with a report - according to A.I. Pavlov, the Japanese, in contrast to the telegrams, could not be intercepted by the Japanese, which means that they would be able to put two and two together in Port Arthur and send orders, say, the destroyer.
As a result, the commander of the Varyag, returning to the cruiser, on the same day on January 25 ordered the dispatch of the Korean in Port Arthur - according to his order, the gunboat was to leave Chemulpo in the morning of January 26. On the night of 25 on 26 in January, the Japanese Chiyoda stationary left the raid (strictly speaking, it would be better to write Chiyoda, but for the convenience of the reader, we will stick to the naming in the Russian-language literature). Unfortunately, for unexplained reasons, the "Korean" did not leave in the morning, as VF demanded. Rudnev, and was delayed until 15.40 26 January and, when trying to exit, was intercepted by the Japanese squadron, en route to Port Arthur.
We will not describe in detail the preparation and nuances of the landing operation that the Japanese were preparing. We only note that it was supposed to be produced at Chemulpo, but only if there were no Russian warships there, otherwise it was necessary to disembark not far from Chemulpo, in Asanman Bay. It was there that the general assembly of the Japanese ships that participated in the operation was appointed; it was there that the Chiyoda went from the Chemulpo raid. But 26 January 1904 g, when all the “actors” were assembled, the commander of the operation, Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu, realizing that the occupation of Seoul should be carried out as soon as possible, and having received information that Russian stationary officers behave as usual and do not take any threatening actions, decided to disembark at Chemulpo, which, of course, was not an example more convenient as a landing site than the Gulf of Asanman. Nevertheless, the Japanese, of course, had to reckon with the possibility of the intervention of the Russian ships - they should be neutralized as much as possible.
Sotokichi Uriu gathered the commanders of warships and captains of transport ships carrying troops, announced to them the plan of operation and brought to their attention his order number XXUMX. This order is very important for understanding what happened in the future, so we will give it in full. Although some items of order that are insignificant for our analysis could be omitted, but in order to avoid any speculation on this subject, we quote it without cuts:
1. The situation at the enemy as of 23.00 on January 25: in the Chemulpo bay the Russian ships Varyag and Koreets are still anchored;
2. The landing point of the expeditionary detachment is Chemulpo Bay, upon arrival at which the landing of troops should begin immediately;
3. If Russian ships meet outside the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, on the beam of Phalmido (Yodolmi - approx. auth) or to S from him, then they must be attacked and destroyed;
4. If the Russian ships do not take hostile actions against us at the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, we will not attack them;
5. Simultaneously with preparations for leaving the temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay, the detachment's forces are divided as follows:
- 1-th tactical group: (1) "Naniwa", (2) "Takachiho", (3) "Chiyoda" with the assigned 9-th detachment of the destroyers;
- 2-th tactical group: (4) "Asama", (5) "Akashi", (6) "Niytaka" with the 14-th detachment of the destroyers attached to it;
6. Actions on entering the anchorage to Chemulpo bay:
a) “Chiyoda”, “Takachiho”, “Asama”, 9-th detachment of destroyers, transport ships “Dairen-maru”, “Otaru-maru”, “Heidze-maru” go to the anchorage in Chemulpo bay;
b) The 9 detachment of destroyers, passing the island of Phalmido, moves forward and calmly, without causing suspicion from the enemy, enters the anchorage. Two destroyers rise to a point inaccessible to enemy fire, while the other two with a peace-loving air take up such a position next to Varyag and Korean, so that in an instant you can decide their fate - to live or die;
c) Chiyoda independently chooses a suitable place for itself and becomes anchored in it;
d) A detachment of transport ships, following in the wake of the "Asama", after the failure of the "Chiyoda" and "Takatiho", in the shortest possible time go to the anchorage and immediately begin unloading troops. It is advisable that they be able to enter the port during the high tide of the evening tide.
e) “Naniwa”, “Akashi”, “Niitaka” follow in the wake of the detachment of transport vessels, and then anchor to S from the island of Harido in line on the NE. The 14 th detachment of the destroyers, having finished receiving coal and water from the "Kasuga-Maru", is divided into two groups of two destroyers each. One group takes a position towards S from the island of Phalmido, while the other is located next to Naniwa. If at night the enemy begins to move from the anchorage to the open sea, then both groups must attack and destroy him.;
f) Before sunset, the Asama leaves the position next to the Incheon anchorage and proceeds to the Naniwa anchorage and anchors there;
7. If the enemy takes hostile actions against us, opens artillery fire or launches a torpedo attack, then we must attack and destroy him immediately, while acting in such a way as not to cause damage to ships and vessels of other powers;
8. Ships near the island of Herido, by the dawn of the next day go to the temporary anchorage in the Gulf of Asanman;
9. The ships and destroyers that are at the anchorage in the Gulf of Chemulpo, having made sure that the landing is fully completed, are moving to a temporary anchorage in the Gulf of Asanman;
10. “Kasuga-Maru” and “Kinsu-Maru”, having finished the bunkering of the destroyers of the 14 squadron with coal and water, anchor at the entrance to Masanpo Bay and do not open anchor lights at night, observing the blackout;
11. The destroyers carrying a military guard in Chemulpo Bay, finding that the enemy ships began to move from the anchorage to the open sea, immediately begin their pursuit and, when they turn out to S from the island of Phalmido, must attack and destroy them;
12. During parking, be ready for immediate shooting from the anchor, for which you need to prepare everything you need for riveting the anchor chains, keep the boilers under steam, and set up a reinforced signal and observation watch. ”
Thus, the plan of the Japanese admiral was very simple. He needed to land a landing party in Chemulpo, but without firing on the roadstead, which foreign stationery would have been extremely disapproving of. Accordingly, he was going to first enter the bay and take the Russian ships on sight, and only then carry on the raid transports with the landing force. If the Russians open fire, fine, they were the first to violate neutrality (as we said earlier, no one considered the landing of troops on Korean territory a violation of neutrality) and will be immediately destroyed by destroyers. If they try to get close to the transports, they will get under the scope not only of the destroyers, but also the cruisers, and if they try to shoot, they will be immediately destroyed again. If the Varyag and Koreets try to escape Chemulpo without firing, the destroyers will accompany them, and sink them with torpedoes as soon as they leave the raid, but even if the Russians manage to tear themselves off by some miracle, then pass by the blocked Japanese cruisers they still fail.
The most "funny" was that the torpedo attack of Russian ships with a probability of 99,9% foreign stationary would not consider a violation of neutrality. Well, two Russian ships unexpectedly exploded, who knows for what reason? No, of course, among the commanders of foreign ships were not crazy, unable to put two and two and understand whose hands this thing was. But, as we have said before, the European and American ships on the Chemulpo road did not defend Korean neutrality, but the interests of their countries and their citizens in Korea. Any actions of the Japanese, who did not threaten these interests, were indifferent to these stationaries. The war between Russia and Japan was the business of Russia and Japan, in which neither the Italians, nor the French, nor the Americans had any interest. Therefore, the destruction of Varyag and Koreans, provided that no one else was injured, would have caused only a formal protest from their side, and even then it is unlikely, because the British Talbot was considered the senior raid England’s interests in this war were entirely on Japan’s side. Rather, here we should have expected unofficial congratulations to the Japanese commander ...
In fact, S. Uriu was going to build a wonderful trap, but the man assumes, but God disposes, and at the very entrance to the raid his ships collided with the Korey who had gone to Port Arthur. It is rather difficult to describe what happened in the future, because domestic and Japanese sources completely contradict each other, and often also themselves. Perhaps, in the future we will make a detailed description of this collision in the form of a separate article, but now we confine ourselves to the most general overview - the blessing, a detailed explanation of all the nuances of the Korean maneuvering and the ships of the Japanese squad is not necessary for our purposes.
Canonical for Russian-language sources is the description presented in the “Work of the historical commission for the description of actions fleet in the war of 1904-1905 at the Naval General Staff. ” According to him, the “Korean” was anchored at 15.40, and after a quarter of an hour, at 15.55, they saw a Japanese squadron on it, which went in two wake columns. One of them was formed by cruisers and transports, with the leading ones being Chioda, Takachiho, and Asama, followed by three transports and the rest of the cruisers, and the second convoy consisted of destroyers. The "Korean" tried to pass them, but this was impossible, since the Japanese columns were heard to the sides, and the gunboat was forced to follow between them. At this time, Asama turned around across the course of the Korean, thus blocking access to the sea. It became clear that the Japanese squadron was not going to release the "Korean" at sea, and its commander G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid, where Japanese provocations would hardly have been possible. But at the time of the turn, the gunboat was attacked by torpedoes from destroyers, which, however, passed by, and one sank before reaching the side of the ship. G.P. Belyaev gave the order to open fire, and immediately canceled it, because the “Korean” was already entering the neutral raid Chemulpo, nevertheless one of the commandants managed to make two shots from a 37-mm gun. In general, everything is clear and logical, and the actions of the Japanese, although completely illegal, look consistent and logical. But Japanese reports make one seriously doubt this.
According to Japanese data, the ships S. Uriu first acted according to the previously outlined plan. The Japanese moved in the following order:
When the columns approached the traverse, Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), then the leading “Chiyoda” and “Takachiho”, separated from the main forces and, accompanied by the 9 squadron of the destroyers, increased their speed and moved forward - in accordance with the plan of the landing operation, they should be the first to enter the Chemulpo raid, so to target the Russian stationary. And when about. Phalmido walked about three miles by them, and unexpectedly, on the Japanese ships, they found the Koreet running towards them. Thus, a situation not envisaged by Order No. XXUMX has arisen.
If the "Korean" came out a little earlier and the meeting would have happened in Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese would simply destroy the Russian ship, as was provided by the order. But the meeting took place between Fr. Phalmido and the raid, the order did not regulate such a situation, and the intentions of the Korean were unclear. The Japanese were afraid that the gunboat was attacking the transports, so on Chiod and Takachiho they were prepared for battle - the gunners took their places from the guns, but bending down behind the bulwarks so that their militant preparations could not be seen as far as possible. When the advanced cruisers got close to the Korean, they saw that the Russian ship was not preparing for battle, on the contrary, a guard of honor was built on its deck. Whether the Koreets between the cruisers and the destroyers was at that moment cannot be reliably said - on the one hand, the distance between the Japanese cruisers and destroyers did not exceed the cable length 1-1,5, but on the other, the Koreans broke up with Chiode and Takachiho at a distance no more than 100 m, so that, in principle, could and wedge between those and others.
In any case, the “Koreyets” was between two detachments, one of which passed by him to the Chemulpo raid, and the second, led by Asam, was walking towards the Russian gunboat. There was some confusion on the Japanese transports, and then the armored cruiser left the formation, turning on 180 degrees, and went on a course parallel to what the Korean had to hold, in order to remain between the Russian canloon and the escort caravan. But then “Asama” turned back to the right - apparently, it was precisely this maneuver of him that was adopted by G.P. Belyaev for trying to block his access to the sea. The funny thing is that the commander of the "Assamy" did not think anything like that - according to his report, he turned to the right in order to avoid the torpedoes that, in his opinion, the Korean could have released on him.
Accordingly, G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid and turned back. We have already seen that the commanders of Chiyoda and Takachiho, convinced of the absence of aggressive intentions of the gunboat, went further in the direction of the raid in order to accomplish their task, but the commander of the 9 unit of the Japanese destroyers had a different opinion. He considered that Koretz could conduct reconnaissance in the interests of Varyag and that the Russians might be planning a strike. Therefore, having diverged from the Korean, he rebuilt from the wake column to the front, and then took the Korean in ticks: the destroyers Aotaka and Hato took a position from the left side of the Koreytsa, and Kari and Tsubame - from the right ... more precisely, they should have taken. The fact is that while executing the maneuver, Tsubame did not calculate, went beyond the fairway and jumped onto the stones, so that later the Koreets was accompanied by only three destroyers, while the torpedo tubes were put on alert.
And when the “Korean” began its turn back to Chemulpo, it turned out that the Russian ship went in the direction of the Japanese destroyers, trapped between it and the edge of the fairway. On the destroyer "Kari" decided that this creates a dangerous situation, but on the other hand, it gives an opportunity to do away with the "Korean", while none of the foreign stationary workers see it, and fired a torpedo, from which the "Korean" avoided. As the saying goes, “a bad example is infectious,” therefore, Aotaka and Hato immediately increased the speed and went to a rapprochement with the Korean, while Hato fired one torpedo, and Aotaka refused from an attack for unclear reasons. It can be assumed that the distance was to blame - at that moment, when the Korean went to Chemulpo’s raid, the distance between him and Aotaka was still about 800-900 m, which was far enough for a torpedo shot of those years.
In general, everything is as usual - the Russians have one pattern of maneuvering, the Japanese have a completely different picture, while the information on the consumption of ammunition also differs: the Russians believe that three torpedoes were fired according to the Koreans, the Japanese say that two that the "Korean" fired two artillery shots, the Japanese point out that the gunboat fired at all three of the destroyers involved in the attack (which, you see, it is extremely difficult to make two shells).
Separately, I would like to draw attention to the accident "Tsubame" - moving along the fairway, along which the Varyag and Koreyets will go into battle the next day, chasing the gunboat, which had 10-12 nodes of the course, the destroyer managed to end up on the rocks and to get damaged, losing one blade of the left screw and damaging the three blades of the right screw, which caused its speed to be limited by the 12 nodes now. True, the Japanese claim that they were chasing the Korean on the 26 nodes, but this is extremely doubtful for Tsubame - it flew onto the stones almost immediately after the turn, and hardly managed to pick up that speed (if at least one of the Japanese destroyers, which, again, somewhat doubtful). In general, it is unlikely that the small skirmish of the Russian gunboat and the Japanese destroyers can be called a battle, but no doubt the pitfalls of the Chemulpo channel have been most effective in it.
In any case, as soon as “Korenets” returned to Chemulpo's raid, the Japanese refused to attack, and “taking a peaceful look as possible” took the positions prescribed by them: “Aotaka” anchored in 500 from Varyag, “Kari” - at the same distance from the Koreyts, and the Hato and the Tsubame, who independently removed from the stones, hid behind the English and French ships, but, in accordance with order No. XXUMX, were ready to attack at any time.
And now let's consider this situation from the position of the commander of the cruiser Varyag. Here "Korean" leaves the waters of the raid and goes along the fairway into the sea, and then miracles begin. First, two Japanese cruisers, Chiyoda and Takachiho, enter the raid. Behind them, the returning Koreans suddenly appear - if they heard his shots on the Varyag, it is not clear, but they could not know about the attack with torpedoes.
In any case, it turned out that on the Varyag they either saw that the Korean was shooting, or they did not see it, and either they heard the shots, or they didn’t. In either of these cases, either Varyag saw that the Korean was shooting, but the Japanese didn’t shoot, or they heard two shots (which, for example, could well be warning), it was not clear who was shooting. In other words, nothing that they could see or hear on the Varyag cruiser did not require immediate intervention by armed force. And then the Japanese cruisers and the 4 destroyer entered the raid, taking up positions near the Russian ships, and only then, finally, VF Rudnev received information about the events.
At the same time, again, it is not entirely clear exactly when this happened - R.M. Melnikov reports that the "Koreyets", returning to the raid, approached the "Varyag" from which he briefly conveyed the circumstances of his meeting with the Japanese squadron, and then the gunboat anchored. At the same time, “The Work of the Historical Commission” does not mention this - it follows from its description that “Korean”, having entered the raid, anchored in 2,5 cable from “Varyag”, then G.P. Belov went to the cruiser with a report, and after 15 minutes after the anchorage of the gunboat was anchored, the Japanese destroyers took up positions - two ships each in the 2 cable from the Varyag and the Koreyets. It is obvious that in 15 minutes it was possible only to lower the boat and arrive at the Varyag, that is, the Russian ships were under the gun when GP. Belov only reported to V.F. Rudnev about the circumstances of the battle.
In general, despite the difference in interpretations, both sources agree on one thing - by the time Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev was aware of the attack undertaken by the Japanese destroyers:
1. "Korean" was already out of danger;
2. The 9 th detachment of the destroyers (and, probably, also the cruisers) are located in the immediate vicinity of the Varyag and the Koreans.
In this situation, for the Varyag cruiser, opening fire and joining the battle made absolutely no sense. Of course, if the “Korean” would be attacked, and they saw this on the “Varangian,” the cruiser should, having despised all danger, go to the rescue of the “Korean” and enter into an arbitrarily unequal battle. But by the time they learned about the Japanese attack on the cruiser, everything was already over, and the Korean was no longer needed to be saved. And after the fight they don’t wave their fists. As the old British proverb says, “A gentleman is not one who doesn’t steal, but one who doesn’t come across”: yes, the Japanese fired torpedoes at the “Korean”, but none of the foreign hospitals saw this and could not confirm it, but it means that there was only “word against word” - in diplomacy, it’s the same as nothing. It’s enough to recall the almost hundred-year confrontation between official Russian and Japanese history - the Russians claimed that the first shots in the war were Japanese torpedoes, the Japanese - that two 37-mm shells fired by “Korean”. And only recently, with the publication of Japanese reports, it became obvious that the Japanese were still the first to shoot, but who cares today, except for a few history buffs? But if the “Varangian” opened fire on the ships of Japan entering the raid, he, in the eyes of “the whole civilized world”, would be the first to violate Korean neutrality - whatever one may say, but at that time the Japanese had not yet begun landing and did nothing reprehensible on a neutral raid.
In addition, tactically, the Russian stationaries were in a completely hopeless situation - they stood in the roadstead under the sights of the Japanese ships and could be sunk by the destroyers at any moment. So, not only that the discovery of fire on the Japanese directly violated all received VF. Ore orders, violated Korean neutrality, spoiled relations with England, France, Italy and the United States, and still did not give anything in military terms, leading only to the rapid death of two Russian ships. Of course, there could be no talk of any destruction of the landing force here - this was impossible technically.
Speaking of diplomatic language, the following happened. The honor of the Russian flag obliged "Varyag" to defend any domestic ship or vessel that was attacked and to protect its crew (to fight with it) against any and any forces superior to the enemy forces. But no honor concept demanded that Varyag engage in combat with the Japanese squadron after the incident with the Korean was safely resolved (the Russian sailors did not suffer, and the immediate danger did not threaten them anymore). The attack of the Japanese destroyers, without any doubt, could become an incident of Belli, that is, a formal reason for declaring war, but, of course, this decision should not have been the commander of the Russian cruiser, but much higher authorities. In such situations, the duty of any member of the armed forces is not to rush to the attack with a sword at the ready, but to inform his leadership of the circumstances and continue to act according to their orders. We have already said that all the orders that VF received. Rudnev, just directly testified that Russia does not want war yet. At the same time, the “do-it-yourself” attack by the Japanese squadron would only lead to giving Japan a wonderful reason to enter the war at a convenient time for her, to the immediate death of two Russian warships with virtually no chance of harming the enemy and to diplomatic complications with European countries.
The concept of honor for a military person is extremely important, but it is equally important to understand the limits of the obligations imposed by it. For example, it is known that during the Second World War, when the USSR bled to death in the fight against Nazi Germany, the armed forces of Japan more than once and not two carried out various kinds of provocations that could well be the reason for declaring war. But the USSR absolutely did not need a war on two fronts, so our armed forces had to endure, although, one should think, the troops who were present at such provocations openly “itched their hands” to respond to the samurai the way they deserved it. Can our troops and fleet be blamed for cowardice or lack of honor, on the grounds that they did not open fire in response to Japanese provocations? Did they deserve such reproaches? Obviously not, and in the same way Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev doesn’t deserve reproof that on January 26 1904 the ships under his command did not engage in a hopeless battle with the Japanese squadron.
Продолжение следует ...
“Cap. 1 p. Rudnev announced in Port Arthur about the construction by the Japanese of food warehouses in Chemulpo, at the Jong Tong-no station and in Seoul. According to the reports cap. 1 p. Rudnev, the total amount of all Japanese food supplies already reached 1 000 000 pounds, and 100 boxes were delivered to the cartridges. The movement of people was continuous, in Korea there were already up to 15 thousands of Japanese, who disguised themselves as Japanese and in a short time before the war settled throughout the country; The number of Japanese officers in Seoul reached 100, and although the Japanese garrisons in Korea remained officially unchanged, the actual number of garrisons was significantly higher. At the same time, the Japanese openly delivered to Chemulpo scows, tugboats and steam boats, which, as reported by the commander of the cr. "Varyag" clearly indicated extensive preparations for amphibious operations ... All these preparations too clearly indicated the inevitable occupation of Korea by the Japanese. "
The same was reported by the Russian military agent in Japan, Colonel Samoilov, on January 9, on 1904, who reported on the freight of numerous steamboats, the mobilization of divisions, etc. Thus, the preparation of the occupation of Korea was not a secret for the Steward or for higher instances, but they remained silent - as we said in the previous article, Russian diplomats decided not to consider the landing of Japanese troops in Korea a declaration of war against Russia, as Nikolai II and notified the Vicar. It was decided that only the landing of the Japanese landings north of the 38 parallel was dangerous, and everything that was not read to the south (including Chemulpo) could not be read as such and did not require additional instructions for the stationary officers. We wrote more about this in the previous article, and now we only note once again that the refusal of armed opposition to the landing of the Japanese in Korea was accepted by far higher instances than the commander of Varyag, and the instructions he received completely forbade the Japanese to interfere.
But - back to the "Varyag". Without a doubt, the best way to avoid losing the cruiser and the gunboat "Koreyets" would be to withdraw them from Chemulpo, together with the Russian envoy to Korea A.I. Pavlov or without him, but this, unfortunately, was not done. Why is it so - alas, answer this question is very difficult, and you can only speculate. Without a doubt, if it was decided to assume that the Japanese landing in Korea would not lead to war with Russia, there was no reason for the Russian stationers to withdraw from Chemulpo - the Japanese are going to land, and let them. But the situation drastically changed when the Japanese broke off diplomatic relations: despite the fact that St. Petersburg believed that this was not yet a war, the risk to which the cruiser and the gunboat were subjected already clearly outweighed the benefits of our military presence in Korea.
As a matter of fact, events developed as follows: in 16.00 24 in January of 1904, a note about breaking up relations was officially received in St. Petersburg. What was important was the classic phrase: “Diplomatic relations with the Russian government now no longer have any value, and the government of the Japanese empire decided to break off these diplomatic relations” was supplemented with a very frank threat: “The government of the empire to defend its sovereignty and interests leaves he has the right to act on his own, considering it to be the best way to achieve these goals. ” This was already a real threat of war: but, alas, it was not taken into account.
The fact is that, for the reasons sounded earlier, Russia absolutely did not want war in 1904 and, apparently, did not want to believe in its beginning. Therefore, in St. Petersburg, they preferred to listen to Kurino, Japan’s envoy, who did not tire of repeating that the break in diplomatic relations was not yet a war, and everything could still be done for the better. As a result, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and Nicholas II), in fact, allowed themselves to ignore reality, hoping for mirages that the Japanese envoy drew to them and in which they really wanted to believe. Moreover, there was a fear that “our heroes in the Far East would not suddenly get carried away by any military incident” (as said by Foreign Minister Lamsdorf). As a result, a gross mistake was made, which may have ultimately destroyed “Varyag”: the Governor was notified of Petersburg on the very next day, January 25, but the second part of the Japanese note (about the “right to act as you see fit” ) in the message was omitted, and E.I. Alekseev did not find out about this.
Let's be frank - it’s far from a fact that, having received the text of a Japanese note in full, E.I. Alekseev would have taken measures to recall Varyag and Koreyts, and in addition, in order for these measures to succeed, it was necessary to act with lightning speed: it is well known that speed of action is one of the advantages of the Vicar E.I. Alekseeva was not included. But still there was some chance, and he was missed.
It is also interesting as E.I. Alekseev ordered the information he received: he informed the consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore about the rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan, informed the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers and the gunboat Manchuor, but informed neither the Port Arthur squadron nor the envoy in Korea A.I. . Pavlov, nor, of course, the commander of the "Varyag". One can only assume that E.I. Alekseev received the task "in no way provoke the Japanese" and, guided by the principle "as if something did not work out", he preferred not to report anything to the Arthur sailors. The author of this article, unfortunately, could not figure out when he learned about the break in diplomatic relations the squadron commander O.V. Stark and the Chief of the Naval Staff of the Vicar V.K. Witgeft. It is possible that they also received this information with a delay, so that, perhaps, N.O. Essen (expressed in his memoirs) that the inaction of the latter led to the untimely recall of Russian stationary in Chemulpo and Shanghai (there was a gunboat "Majur",) is not fully justified. But in any case, the news no longer about the break of diplomatic relations, but about the beginning of the war was sent to Chief for “Varyag” only on January 27, after the successful attack of the Japanese destroyers, who undermined “Retvisan”, “Tsesarevich” and “Pallada” and the day when Varyag entered its first and last fight. Of course, it was a belated warning.
And what happened at the time on the cruiser? Already on January 24 (on the day when St. Petersburg officially received a notice of a break in diplomatic relations), the foreign stationary commanders “secretly” informed Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev about this regrettable event. The commander of the Varyag immediately requested instructions from Admiral Vitgeft: “rumors of a break in diplomatic relations have reached; due to the frequent delay of dispatches by the Japanese, I ask you to tell us whether there was an order for us to take further actions, ”and a request to envoy A.I. Pavlov in Seoul: "I heard about the severance of diplomatic relations, please provide information." However, no reply was received from Port Arthur, and A.S. Pavlov answered:
“Rumors of a rupture are being dissolved here by private individuals. No reliable evidence of this hearing has been received. It would be very desirable to see you, talk. "
Apparently, upon receipt of the answer VF. Rudnev went the first train to Seoul (25 left 1904 in the morning) and there, in the Korean capital, the last chance was missed to lead Russian stationary people from Chemulpo before the start of the war.
During the conversation, it quickly became clear that A.I. Pavlov, like V.F. Rudnev, a week has not received any answers to their requests, nor any new orders. All this reinforced the opinion that the Japanese intercepted and delayed the dispatches of the commander of the "Varyag" and the envoy of Russia in Korea: but how was it supposed to get out of this situation? V.F. Rudnev offered to take the envoy and the consul and immediately leave Chemulpo, however A.I. Pavlov did not support such a decision, citing the lack of appropriate instructions from his leadership. The envoy offered to send the gunboat "Koreyets" to Port Arthur with a report - according to A.I. Pavlov, the Japanese, in contrast to the telegrams, could not be intercepted by the Japanese, which means that they would be able to put two and two together in Port Arthur and send orders, say, the destroyer.
As a result, the commander of the Varyag, returning to the cruiser, on the same day on January 25 ordered the dispatch of the Korean in Port Arthur - according to his order, the gunboat was to leave Chemulpo in the morning of January 26. On the night of 25 on 26 in January, the Japanese Chiyoda stationary left the raid (strictly speaking, it would be better to write Chiyoda, but for the convenience of the reader, we will stick to the naming in the Russian-language literature). Unfortunately, for unexplained reasons, the "Korean" did not leave in the morning, as VF demanded. Rudnev, and was delayed until 15.40 26 January and, when trying to exit, was intercepted by the Japanese squadron, en route to Port Arthur.
Gunboat Korean
We will not describe in detail the preparation and nuances of the landing operation that the Japanese were preparing. We only note that it was supposed to be produced at Chemulpo, but only if there were no Russian warships there, otherwise it was necessary to disembark not far from Chemulpo, in Asanman Bay. It was there that the general assembly of the Japanese ships that participated in the operation was appointed; it was there that the Chiyoda went from the Chemulpo raid. But 26 January 1904 g, when all the “actors” were assembled, the commander of the operation, Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu, realizing that the occupation of Seoul should be carried out as soon as possible, and having received information that Russian stationary officers behave as usual and do not take any threatening actions, decided to disembark at Chemulpo, which, of course, was not an example more convenient as a landing site than the Gulf of Asanman. Nevertheless, the Japanese, of course, had to reckon with the possibility of the intervention of the Russian ships - they should be neutralized as much as possible.
Sotokichi Uriu gathered the commanders of warships and captains of transport ships carrying troops, announced to them the plan of operation and brought to their attention his order number XXUMX. This order is very important for understanding what happened in the future, so we will give it in full. Although some items of order that are insignificant for our analysis could be omitted, but in order to avoid any speculation on this subject, we quote it without cuts:
“Secret.
8 February 37 Meiji Year (26 January 1904 r old style - approx. auth.)
The board of the Naniwa flagship of Asanman Bay.
8 February 37 Meiji Year (26 January 1904 r old style - approx. auth.)
The board of the Naniwa flagship of Asanman Bay.
1. The situation at the enemy as of 23.00 on January 25: in the Chemulpo bay the Russian ships Varyag and Koreets are still anchored;
2. The landing point of the expeditionary detachment is Chemulpo Bay, upon arrival at which the landing of troops should begin immediately;
3. If Russian ships meet outside the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, on the beam of Phalmido (Yodolmi - approx. auth) or to S from him, then they must be attacked and destroyed;
4. If the Russian ships do not take hostile actions against us at the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, we will not attack them;
5. Simultaneously with preparations for leaving the temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay, the detachment's forces are divided as follows:
- 1-th tactical group: (1) "Naniwa", (2) "Takachiho", (3) "Chiyoda" with the assigned 9-th detachment of the destroyers;
- 2-th tactical group: (4) "Asama", (5) "Akashi", (6) "Niytaka" with the 14-th detachment of the destroyers attached to it;
6. Actions on entering the anchorage to Chemulpo bay:
a) “Chiyoda”, “Takachiho”, “Asama”, 9-th detachment of destroyers, transport ships “Dairen-maru”, “Otaru-maru”, “Heidze-maru” go to the anchorage in Chemulpo bay;
b) The 9 detachment of destroyers, passing the island of Phalmido, moves forward and calmly, without causing suspicion from the enemy, enters the anchorage. Two destroyers rise to a point inaccessible to enemy fire, while the other two with a peace-loving air take up such a position next to Varyag and Korean, so that in an instant you can decide their fate - to live or die;
c) Chiyoda independently chooses a suitable place for itself and becomes anchored in it;
d) A detachment of transport ships, following in the wake of the "Asama", after the failure of the "Chiyoda" and "Takatiho", in the shortest possible time go to the anchorage and immediately begin unloading troops. It is advisable that they be able to enter the port during the high tide of the evening tide.
e) “Naniwa”, “Akashi”, “Niitaka” follow in the wake of the detachment of transport vessels, and then anchor to S from the island of Harido in line on the NE. The 14 th detachment of the destroyers, having finished receiving coal and water from the "Kasuga-Maru", is divided into two groups of two destroyers each. One group takes a position towards S from the island of Phalmido, while the other is located next to Naniwa. If at night the enemy begins to move from the anchorage to the open sea, then both groups must attack and destroy him.;
f) Before sunset, the Asama leaves the position next to the Incheon anchorage and proceeds to the Naniwa anchorage and anchors there;
7. If the enemy takes hostile actions against us, opens artillery fire or launches a torpedo attack, then we must attack and destroy him immediately, while acting in such a way as not to cause damage to ships and vessels of other powers;
8. Ships near the island of Herido, by the dawn of the next day go to the temporary anchorage in the Gulf of Asanman;
9. The ships and destroyers that are at the anchorage in the Gulf of Chemulpo, having made sure that the landing is fully completed, are moving to a temporary anchorage in the Gulf of Asanman;
10. “Kasuga-Maru” and “Kinsu-Maru”, having finished the bunkering of the destroyers of the 14 squadron with coal and water, anchor at the entrance to Masanpo Bay and do not open anchor lights at night, observing the blackout;
11. The destroyers carrying a military guard in Chemulpo Bay, finding that the enemy ships began to move from the anchorage to the open sea, immediately begin their pursuit and, when they turn out to S from the island of Phalmido, must attack and destroy them;
12. During parking, be ready for immediate shooting from the anchor, for which you need to prepare everything you need for riveting the anchor chains, keep the boilers under steam, and set up a reinforced signal and observation watch. ”
Thus, the plan of the Japanese admiral was very simple. He needed to land a landing party in Chemulpo, but without firing on the roadstead, which foreign stationery would have been extremely disapproving of. Accordingly, he was going to first enter the bay and take the Russian ships on sight, and only then carry on the raid transports with the landing force. If the Russians open fire, fine, they were the first to violate neutrality (as we said earlier, no one considered the landing of troops on Korean territory a violation of neutrality) and will be immediately destroyed by destroyers. If they try to get close to the transports, they will get under the scope not only of the destroyers, but also the cruisers, and if they try to shoot, they will be immediately destroyed again. If the Varyag and Koreets try to escape Chemulpo without firing, the destroyers will accompany them, and sink them with torpedoes as soon as they leave the raid, but even if the Russians manage to tear themselves off by some miracle, then pass by the blocked Japanese cruisers they still fail.
The most "funny" was that the torpedo attack of Russian ships with a probability of 99,9% foreign stationary would not consider a violation of neutrality. Well, two Russian ships unexpectedly exploded, who knows for what reason? No, of course, among the commanders of foreign ships were not crazy, unable to put two and two and understand whose hands this thing was. But, as we have said before, the European and American ships on the Chemulpo road did not defend Korean neutrality, but the interests of their countries and their citizens in Korea. Any actions of the Japanese, who did not threaten these interests, were indifferent to these stationaries. The war between Russia and Japan was the business of Russia and Japan, in which neither the Italians, nor the French, nor the Americans had any interest. Therefore, the destruction of Varyag and Koreans, provided that no one else was injured, would have caused only a formal protest from their side, and even then it is unlikely, because the British Talbot was considered the senior raid England’s interests in this war were entirely on Japan’s side. Rather, here we should have expected unofficial congratulations to the Japanese commander ...
In fact, S. Uriu was going to build a wonderful trap, but the man assumes, but God disposes, and at the very entrance to the raid his ships collided with the Korey who had gone to Port Arthur. It is rather difficult to describe what happened in the future, because domestic and Japanese sources completely contradict each other, and often also themselves. Perhaps, in the future we will make a detailed description of this collision in the form of a separate article, but now we confine ourselves to the most general overview - the blessing, a detailed explanation of all the nuances of the Korean maneuvering and the ships of the Japanese squad is not necessary for our purposes.
Canonical for Russian-language sources is the description presented in the “Work of the historical commission for the description of actions fleet in the war of 1904-1905 at the Naval General Staff. ” According to him, the “Korean” was anchored at 15.40, and after a quarter of an hour, at 15.55, they saw a Japanese squadron on it, which went in two wake columns. One of them was formed by cruisers and transports, with the leading ones being Chioda, Takachiho, and Asama, followed by three transports and the rest of the cruisers, and the second convoy consisted of destroyers. The "Korean" tried to pass them, but this was impossible, since the Japanese columns were heard to the sides, and the gunboat was forced to follow between them. At this time, Asama turned around across the course of the Korean, thus blocking access to the sea. It became clear that the Japanese squadron was not going to release the "Korean" at sea, and its commander G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid, where Japanese provocations would hardly have been possible. But at the time of the turn, the gunboat was attacked by torpedoes from destroyers, which, however, passed by, and one sank before reaching the side of the ship. G.P. Belyaev gave the order to open fire, and immediately canceled it, because the “Korean” was already entering the neutral raid Chemulpo, nevertheless one of the commandants managed to make two shots from a 37-mm gun. In general, everything is clear and logical, and the actions of the Japanese, although completely illegal, look consistent and logical. But Japanese reports make one seriously doubt this.
Armored cruiser "Asama", 1902 g
According to Japanese data, the ships S. Uriu first acted according to the previously outlined plan. The Japanese moved in the following order:
The scheme is taken from the monograph by A.V. Polutova, “The landing operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Inchon”
When the columns approached the traverse, Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), then the leading “Chiyoda” and “Takachiho”, separated from the main forces and, accompanied by the 9 squadron of the destroyers, increased their speed and moved forward - in accordance with the plan of the landing operation, they should be the first to enter the Chemulpo raid, so to target the Russian stationary. And when about. Phalmido walked about three miles by them, and unexpectedly, on the Japanese ships, they found the Koreet running towards them. Thus, a situation not envisaged by Order No. XXUMX has arisen.
If the "Korean" came out a little earlier and the meeting would have happened in Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese would simply destroy the Russian ship, as was provided by the order. But the meeting took place between Fr. Phalmido and the raid, the order did not regulate such a situation, and the intentions of the Korean were unclear. The Japanese were afraid that the gunboat was attacking the transports, so on Chiod and Takachiho they were prepared for battle - the gunners took their places from the guns, but bending down behind the bulwarks so that their militant preparations could not be seen as far as possible. When the advanced cruisers got close to the Korean, they saw that the Russian ship was not preparing for battle, on the contrary, a guard of honor was built on its deck. Whether the Koreets between the cruisers and the destroyers was at that moment cannot be reliably said - on the one hand, the distance between the Japanese cruisers and destroyers did not exceed the cable length 1-1,5, but on the other, the Koreans broke up with Chiode and Takachiho at a distance no more than 100 m, so that, in principle, could and wedge between those and others.
In any case, the “Koreyets” was between two detachments, one of which passed by him to the Chemulpo raid, and the second, led by Asam, was walking towards the Russian gunboat. There was some confusion on the Japanese transports, and then the armored cruiser left the formation, turning on 180 degrees, and went on a course parallel to what the Korean had to hold, in order to remain between the Russian canloon and the escort caravan. But then “Asama” turned back to the right - apparently, it was precisely this maneuver of him that was adopted by G.P. Belyaev for trying to block his access to the sea. The funny thing is that the commander of the "Assamy" did not think anything like that - according to his report, he turned to the right in order to avoid the torpedoes that, in his opinion, the Korean could have released on him.
Accordingly, G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid and turned back. We have already seen that the commanders of Chiyoda and Takachiho, convinced of the absence of aggressive intentions of the gunboat, went further in the direction of the raid in order to accomplish their task, but the commander of the 9 unit of the Japanese destroyers had a different opinion. He considered that Koretz could conduct reconnaissance in the interests of Varyag and that the Russians might be planning a strike. Therefore, having diverged from the Korean, he rebuilt from the wake column to the front, and then took the Korean in ticks: the destroyers Aotaka and Hato took a position from the left side of the Koreytsa, and Kari and Tsubame - from the right ... more precisely, they should have taken. The fact is that while executing the maneuver, Tsubame did not calculate, went beyond the fairway and jumped onto the stones, so that later the Koreets was accompanied by only three destroyers, while the torpedo tubes were put on alert.
And when the “Korean” began its turn back to Chemulpo, it turned out that the Russian ship went in the direction of the Japanese destroyers, trapped between it and the edge of the fairway. On the destroyer "Kari" decided that this creates a dangerous situation, but on the other hand, it gives an opportunity to do away with the "Korean", while none of the foreign stationary workers see it, and fired a torpedo, from which the "Korean" avoided. As the saying goes, “a bad example is infectious,” therefore, Aotaka and Hato immediately increased the speed and went to a rapprochement with the Korean, while Hato fired one torpedo, and Aotaka refused from an attack for unclear reasons. It can be assumed that the distance was to blame - at that moment, when the Korean went to Chemulpo’s raid, the distance between him and Aotaka was still about 800-900 m, which was far enough for a torpedo shot of those years.
In general, everything is as usual - the Russians have one pattern of maneuvering, the Japanese have a completely different picture, while the information on the consumption of ammunition also differs: the Russians believe that three torpedoes were fired according to the Koreans, the Japanese say that two that the "Korean" fired two artillery shots, the Japanese point out that the gunboat fired at all three of the destroyers involved in the attack (which, you see, it is extremely difficult to make two shells).
Separately, I would like to draw attention to the accident "Tsubame" - moving along the fairway, along which the Varyag and Koreyets will go into battle the next day, chasing the gunboat, which had 10-12 nodes of the course, the destroyer managed to end up on the rocks and to get damaged, losing one blade of the left screw and damaging the three blades of the right screw, which caused its speed to be limited by the 12 nodes now. True, the Japanese claim that they were chasing the Korean on the 26 nodes, but this is extremely doubtful for Tsubame - it flew onto the stones almost immediately after the turn, and hardly managed to pick up that speed (if at least one of the Japanese destroyers, which, again, somewhat doubtful). In general, it is unlikely that the small skirmish of the Russian gunboat and the Japanese destroyers can be called a battle, but no doubt the pitfalls of the Chemulpo channel have been most effective in it.
In any case, as soon as “Korenets” returned to Chemulpo's raid, the Japanese refused to attack, and “taking a peaceful look as possible” took the positions prescribed by them: “Aotaka” anchored in 500 from Varyag, “Kari” - at the same distance from the Koreyts, and the Hato and the Tsubame, who independently removed from the stones, hid behind the English and French ships, but, in accordance with order No. XXUMX, were ready to attack at any time.
And now let's consider this situation from the position of the commander of the cruiser Varyag. Here "Korean" leaves the waters of the raid and goes along the fairway into the sea, and then miracles begin. First, two Japanese cruisers, Chiyoda and Takachiho, enter the raid. Behind them, the returning Koreans suddenly appear - if they heard his shots on the Varyag, it is not clear, but they could not know about the attack with torpedoes.
In any case, it turned out that on the Varyag they either saw that the Korean was shooting, or they did not see it, and either they heard the shots, or they didn’t. In either of these cases, either Varyag saw that the Korean was shooting, but the Japanese didn’t shoot, or they heard two shots (which, for example, could well be warning), it was not clear who was shooting. In other words, nothing that they could see or hear on the Varyag cruiser did not require immediate intervention by armed force. And then the Japanese cruisers and the 4 destroyer entered the raid, taking up positions near the Russian ships, and only then, finally, VF Rudnev received information about the events.
At the same time, again, it is not entirely clear exactly when this happened - R.M. Melnikov reports that the "Koreyets", returning to the raid, approached the "Varyag" from which he briefly conveyed the circumstances of his meeting with the Japanese squadron, and then the gunboat anchored. At the same time, “The Work of the Historical Commission” does not mention this - it follows from its description that “Korean”, having entered the raid, anchored in 2,5 cable from “Varyag”, then G.P. Belov went to the cruiser with a report, and after 15 minutes after the anchorage of the gunboat was anchored, the Japanese destroyers took up positions - two ships each in the 2 cable from the Varyag and the Koreyets. It is obvious that in 15 minutes it was possible only to lower the boat and arrive at the Varyag, that is, the Russian ships were under the gun when GP. Belov only reported to V.F. Rudnev about the circumstances of the battle.
In general, despite the difference in interpretations, both sources agree on one thing - by the time Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev was aware of the attack undertaken by the Japanese destroyers:
1. "Korean" was already out of danger;
2. The 9 th detachment of the destroyers (and, probably, also the cruisers) are located in the immediate vicinity of the Varyag and the Koreans.
In this situation, for the Varyag cruiser, opening fire and joining the battle made absolutely no sense. Of course, if the “Korean” would be attacked, and they saw this on the “Varangian,” the cruiser should, having despised all danger, go to the rescue of the “Korean” and enter into an arbitrarily unequal battle. But by the time they learned about the Japanese attack on the cruiser, everything was already over, and the Korean was no longer needed to be saved. And after the fight they don’t wave their fists. As the old British proverb says, “A gentleman is not one who doesn’t steal, but one who doesn’t come across”: yes, the Japanese fired torpedoes at the “Korean”, but none of the foreign hospitals saw this and could not confirm it, but it means that there was only “word against word” - in diplomacy, it’s the same as nothing. It’s enough to recall the almost hundred-year confrontation between official Russian and Japanese history - the Russians claimed that the first shots in the war were Japanese torpedoes, the Japanese - that two 37-mm shells fired by “Korean”. And only recently, with the publication of Japanese reports, it became obvious that the Japanese were still the first to shoot, but who cares today, except for a few history buffs? But if the “Varangian” opened fire on the ships of Japan entering the raid, he, in the eyes of “the whole civilized world”, would be the first to violate Korean neutrality - whatever one may say, but at that time the Japanese had not yet begun landing and did nothing reprehensible on a neutral raid.
In addition, tactically, the Russian stationaries were in a completely hopeless situation - they stood in the roadstead under the sights of the Japanese ships and could be sunk by the destroyers at any moment. So, not only that the discovery of fire on the Japanese directly violated all received VF. Ore orders, violated Korean neutrality, spoiled relations with England, France, Italy and the United States, and still did not give anything in military terms, leading only to the rapid death of two Russian ships. Of course, there could be no talk of any destruction of the landing force here - this was impossible technically.
Speaking of diplomatic language, the following happened. The honor of the Russian flag obliged "Varyag" to defend any domestic ship or vessel that was attacked and to protect its crew (to fight with it) against any and any forces superior to the enemy forces. But no honor concept demanded that Varyag engage in combat with the Japanese squadron after the incident with the Korean was safely resolved (the Russian sailors did not suffer, and the immediate danger did not threaten them anymore). The attack of the Japanese destroyers, without any doubt, could become an incident of Belli, that is, a formal reason for declaring war, but, of course, this decision should not have been the commander of the Russian cruiser, but much higher authorities. In such situations, the duty of any member of the armed forces is not to rush to the attack with a sword at the ready, but to inform his leadership of the circumstances and continue to act according to their orders. We have already said that all the orders that VF received. Rudnev, just directly testified that Russia does not want war yet. At the same time, the “do-it-yourself” attack by the Japanese squadron would only lead to giving Japan a wonderful reason to enter the war at a convenient time for her, to the immediate death of two Russian warships with virtually no chance of harming the enemy and to diplomatic complications with European countries.
The concept of honor for a military person is extremely important, but it is equally important to understand the limits of the obligations imposed by it. For example, it is known that during the Second World War, when the USSR bled to death in the fight against Nazi Germany, the armed forces of Japan more than once and not two carried out various kinds of provocations that could well be the reason for declaring war. But the USSR absolutely did not need a war on two fronts, so our armed forces had to endure, although, one should think, the troops who were present at such provocations openly “itched their hands” to respond to the samurai the way they deserved it. Can our troops and fleet be blamed for cowardice or lack of honor, on the grounds that they did not open fire in response to Japanese provocations? Did they deserve such reproaches? Obviously not, and in the same way Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev doesn’t deserve reproof that on January 26 1904 the ships under his command did not engage in a hopeless battle with the Japanese squadron.
Продолжение следует ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
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