The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
Nevertheless, in the period from the beginning of May to July inclusive, the Varyag was engaged in combat training. R.M. Melnikov mentions the presence of running gear problems (damage to the tubes) but does not specify them, so we will not talk about it either.
But from July 31, the cruiser gets back up for repair on the 2 month - until October October 1. Here it turns out that the 420 collectors of its boilers require the replacement of at least 40. It must be said that the Maritime Department preoccupied with the problem of collectors for the Nikloss boilers in the spring of 1902 r - having acquired two collectors as a model, it sent out proposals on the organization of their production in Russia to four plants: Franco-Russian, Baltic, Metallic and Putilov. All of them refused (only Putilovsky asked for 2 of the month for experiments and reflections), so it was decided to order collectors for Varyag abroad, but just then a tragedy occurred on the Retvizan squadron battleship. A pipe burst in one of the pots, scalded six people and three of them died.
A whole investigation was led in this regard, led by the chief inspector of the mechanical part fleet and the head of the mechanical department of MTK N.G. Nozikov. The result was a conclusion about the vicious design of Nikloss's boilers as a whole, and although N.G. Nozikov also gave recommendations with which one could reduce the chance of severe accidents, in their opinion, it was impossible to completely eliminate them.
The contract for the supply of collectors with water pipes was concluded only in December 1902 d - in addition to 30 collectors for Varyag (I wonder why only 30?) Also provided for the supply of 15 collectors for Retvizan, from which we can assume that similar problems.
Anyway, with the “Retvizan”, 1 of October “Varyag” started the sea trials. Two days later, an “epoch-making” event took place - during the preliminary tests, the rotation of the shafts was brought to 146 revolutions per minute, which corresponded to the speed (under normal load) 22,6 knots, and the ship withstood it. However, it should be understood that this speed was achieved only for a short time. But when October 19 cruiser tried to give full speed for a long time (gradually increasing the number of revolutions), the results were completely different. Before 100 revolutions, everything was fine, but 125 was only achieved by filling the bearings with water (to cool them). However, after five hours of travel, the dynamo-machine failed, leaving the ship without light, so the speed had to be reduced. Then, having repaired the dynamo, they again revolved up to 125, but after an hour and a little the bearing of the CVD of the left car began to warm up again and I had to resort to “water cooling” again. But in the late afternoon, because of the bursting of metal rings, the packing of the cylinder-shaft piston of the left car broke through and the cruiser could no longer hold the 125 revolutions, so that their number was reduced to 80. At night, the tube burst in the boiler # 11, three firemen received burns (fortunately - not fatal) ... In general, even the 20-nodal speed (corresponding to the rotation of the shafts at a speed of 125 rpm) was unattainable for the cruiser time.
The commission, which was present at the tests, came to the conclusion that, with the current state of the vehicles, the cruiser could not walk at high speeds and had to limit itself to the average. In addition, it was noted that at economic speed in 9 nodes, low-pressure cylinders develop only 54 hp power, which is not enough to rotate the crankshaft - on the contrary, he himself began to rotate the mechanisms of the machine, which, instead of smooth rotation, turned in jerks. In addition, the commission identified a list of measures that should be taken in order to ensure the cruiser's ability to walk at high speed - this required a new three-week repair ...
Vicar E.I. Alekseev was, of course, extremely dissatisfied with this state of affairs - he did not understand how the newest cruiser, having made the transition to the Far East "without any haste" and carrying a light (from the point of view of the load on its power plant) service, found himself in such regrettable condition . And indeed - during the 8 months of its stay on the Far (from March to October inclusive), the ship was in the repair and preparation for it of the 4 month, but at the same time in October could not keep 20 nodes for a long time. The governor proposed to bring the Varyag back to the armed reserve from 1 in November and repair it thoroughly, and then check its capacity with a full mileage of 250 miles.
However, the squadron commander had his own opinion on this matter - apparently, he understood that something had gone wrong, since such lengthy repairs of the cruiser do not have any effect. It is likely that OV Stark (who replaced N.I. Skrydlov in this post on October 9) suggested that the next bulkhead of all and all will not lead to success, and that it is necessary to “dig deeper” and identify the real reasons why the Varyag repairs do not lead to success. Therefore, he did not send the cruiser to be repaired, but ordered to form an extended commission and continue testing the ship.
The results were disappointing. The safe speeds of the cruiser were determined by 16 nodes - it should be understood that such speed was understood not as the state of the power plant, when everything goes fine (because on the Varyag now a sharp knock at the mechanisms was heard already at any speed), and this in which the knock became menacing and the heating of the bearings increased sharply.
The only advantage was that the work of the commission, in general, did not impede the combat training of the ship, which was conducted fairly intensively. So, on October 31, the Varyag demonstrated a very good result of counter-tack shooting, and the signal “Admiral is expressing its special pleasure” was raised on the files of the flagship cruiser “Russia”. The cruiser completed the 21 campaign on November 1902 g and prepared for new repairs - by this time the port had finished replacing the cylinder of the Petropavlovsk battleship machine (after which it easily showed the 16 nodes put to it on the passport).
It is also interesting that the Viceroy in his 16 report in December 1902 r praised the Varyag machine command and wrote that the cruiser’s malfunctions stem from a miscalculation in the draft of the machines — designed for full speed, they quickly became unusable, because time is the main mode of the course.
1903 has come the year. Almost a month and a half, from January 2 to February 15, repairs continued, and then the cruiser joined the campaign: but in fact, repairs were still going on. Now they did this - “Varyag” went out for a short time on running tests, after which there was a check and a reassembly of bearings. So, for example, 20 February in the presence of a commission composed of ship mechanics, walked on 12 4 nodes for an hour, briefly bringing the machine to 140 revolutions - this corresponded to the speed of 21,8 knots. in normal load, but considering the actual overload, the cruiser showed slightly more than 20 knots. In the course of further exits, it turned out that winter repair did not eliminate the main shortcomings of the cruiser’s power plant — bearings were also warming and knocking everything up and breaking the boiler tubes twice — five firemen were burned.
Well, on March 1, a significant event occurred - replaced by V.I. Beru arrived new cruiser commander - Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, forty-seven years old.
In what condition was the ship transferred to him?
Tests of the cruiser, which began in mid-February, continued until mid-April, that is, the cruiser 2 of the week was tested under the command of VI. Baer and a half months - under the command of V.F. Rudneva. Let us ask ourselves a question - could it have been that VF unprofessionalism? Rudnev somehow influenced the test results? Almost all tests of the cruiser power plant were carried out under the supervision of members of the commission of ship mechanics, and during their conduct, the chairman of the commission I.P. Ouspensky and from 2 to 5 mechanics from other ships. Accordingly, the likelihood that some erroneous orders V.F. Rudnev led to failures, strives for absolute zero - he simply would not be allowed to do them, and if the new commander had abused his power "first after God", this would certainly have been reflected in the conclusion of the commission. I.P. Ouspensky himself was the commander of the squadron battleship "Poltava" and forced him to silence V.F. Rudnev could not.
In addition, supporters of the point of view “Everything was fine with V.I.Bare, and then V.F. Rudnev and everything is broken. ”There is a logical contradiction of a psychological nature. The fact is that critics of the commander of “Varyag” usually depict him as a cowardly and “subtly feeling political moments” person. However, if V.F. Rudnev was, then what action would he take, taking under his command a cruiser, whose problems in cars and boilers have become the talk of the town? In the first place, the illiterate and cowardly careerist commander would hide behind the broad backs of the commission members, in no way disputing her actions and in everything listening to her recommendations. That is, such a person would be concerned first of all with the fact that, as it were, the blame for the malfunctions of the ship would not be laid on him, and what could be the best way for this, how not to delegate responsibility to the commission that happened so by the way?
Based on the foregoing, the author of this article concludes, being fully confident in him: the condition of the cruiser, as described in the conclusion of the commission of ship mechanics under the chairmanship of I.P. Ouspensky from 17 April 1903 g, in no way can be imputed to the claim V.F. Rudnevu. By the way, how was it actually?
In accordance with the conclusion, the cruiser could walk at medium speed, but no more than 16 nodes, it was briefly allowed to increase its speed to 20 nodes, but it was noted that Varyag could not maintain any long course on 20 nodes.
In other words, the long-term repair of the cruiser and its subsequent tests were considered unsuccessful, it was by their results that it was decided to engage engineer I.I. Gippius, who led the assembly of machines and boilers of the destroyers built here by the branch of the St. Petersburg Nevsky Plant. Without going into the details listed in one of the previous articles, we once again quote his conclusion:
Without a doubt, one can still argue for a long time about what caused such a deplorable state of the Varyag machines and boilers - the mistakes and marriage of the cruiser builder, C. Crump, or the illiterate operation of his cars and boilers, as well as unqualified repairs. The author of this article has already presented his point of view, according to which it is the Americans who are to blame, but, of course, recognizes the readers' right to different conclusions. However, regardless of the reasons that caused the inability of the ship to develop more 20 nodes, and then - for a short time, there is an absolutely reliable fact: Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev had a cruiser with such characteristics at its disposal, but did not bring the Varyag to them.
Further, alas, everything went on the thumb. As we said earlier, the cruiser trials continued until mid-April, and then the cruiser entered the campaign - but it was very brief for him, because after 2 of the month, 14 of June 1903, the ship re-entered the armed reserve for the next repair from which only 5 came out October. In fact, work on the cruiser continued further - the right machine was assembled only in the first half of the day on October 9 and at the same time the cruiser went to the first tests. The speed was brought to the 16 nodes (110 rpm), but again there was a case of heating the CVD bearing in the left car. Then ... then tests took place, the results of which supporters of the version that Chemulpo the cruiser could easily develop much more than the 20-nodal course like to quote.
So, the 16 of October cruiser during the 12-hour test without any problems was able to bring the speed to 140 (which, as we said earlier, corresponded to the speed of 21,8 knots in normal load), and then, on November 15, the cruiser for three hours kept 130 revolutions ( which gave a speed value in the range from 20 to 20,5 knots, again, with the ship’s normal displacement). It was these achievements of the cruiser's power plant that allowed the "subversors of the foundations" to declare that the Varyag in Chemulpo could easily give 21-22 speed knots, or even more.
But in fact, it was like that - yes, indeed 12-hour tests took place, but the fact is that during this time Varyag passed only 157 miles, in other words, its average speed in these tests barely exceeded 13 nodes . That is, the cruiser really reached 140 speed and, fortunately, it did not break anything, but this achievement was very short and did not indicate that the cruiser could go for such a long time with such speed. As for the November 15 tests, here, as a rule, R. M. Is quoted as saying by supporters of the version of the “high-speed Varyag in Chemulpo”. Melnikov: “Tests lasted only three hours, the speed was brought to 130 rpm,” but for some reason, they “forget” to quote the end of the sentence “... but then they subtracted to 50 — the bearings warmed up again.”
And besides, you need to understand that such crankshaft revolutions corresponded to the indicated speeds only at the displacement of the cruiser corresponding to the normal one, that is, 6 500 t. At the same time, in the conditions of the daily service, the Varyag could not have such a displacement - it is known that after the repair was completed, the cruiser accepted 1 330 t of coal and its displacement exceeded 7 400 t. Accordingly, with its normal loading with other supplies, in order to fit into the 6 500 t put on the passport, the cruiser should alo have on board no more than 400 tons of coal, which, of course, "to march and fight" was totally inadequate. Well, taking into account the actual displacement of the Varyag, its speed at 130-140 revolutions was barely more than 19-20 nodes.
More major repairs to the battle in Chemulpo "Varyag" did not pass. We also see how quickly the power plant of the cruiser fell into disrepair during operation, so we can assume that by the time of the battle with the Japanese squadron, the machines and Varyag boilers were in worse condition than during the October and November trials (V.F. Rudnev talked about 14 nodes, and in view of the above, this figure does not look unrealistic). However, we cannot know this firmly, however, in any case, the condition of the boilers and cruisers in Chemulpo could not be better than after the last repair.
Thus, in a 28 battle in January, 1904 g is the maximum that even theoretically one would expect from the Varyag power plant - this is the ability to confidently hold 16-17 nodes and briefly increase this speed to 20 nodes, but the latter is at risk of damaging mechanisms. Most likely, the capabilities of the cruiser were even lower.
And now, in order not to return to the question of the state of the Varyag machines and boilers and go over to the issues of its combat training and the circumstances of the battle in Chemulpo, we will try to formulate answers to the main questions and questions raised by readers during the reading of the cycle and their opinions.
As we have said many times before, the main reason for the failure of Varyag machines is its incorrect setting (steam distribution), which is why the economic speed of the ship and steam pressure below 15,4 atm. low-pressure cylinders ceased to rotate the crankshaft (they lacked energy), and instead they themselves began to be driven by the crankshaft. As a result, the latter received an uneven load that was not planned by its design, which led to a rapid failure of high and medium pressure ram bearings of the cylinder, and then a complete breakdown of the machine. The author of this article claimed that the plant of C. Crump was to blame for this kind of machines. However, a number of respected readers had the opinion that the Varyag team was to blame for such damage to the machines, as if it maintained the appropriate steam pressure in the boilers (that is, more than 15,3 atmospheres), there would be no problems. The objection that such pressure could not be maintained in the boilers of Nikloss without the risk of emergency situations, is relied on by such readers as untenable on the grounds that the Retvizan battleship, which also had Nicloss boilers, was not observed, and besides when the Varyag and Retvizan were among the Japanese, there were no complaints about the operation of their boilers.
It is worth mentioning the verdict of the ITC, compiled by him on the results of the report of the governor EI. Alekseeva and numerous reports and reports of technical specialists who participated in the examination and repair of the Varyag mechanical installation. In their opinion, even if the cruiser’s vehicles were fully operational, it would still not be possible to give the cruiser speed over 20 units, since it would be extremely dangerous for the firemen to maintain the steam output required for this by the Nikloss boilers. Back in 1902, the chief inspector of the mechanical part of the fleet, NG Nozikov did a great job of assessing the performance of Nikloss boilers in the fleets of various countries. In addition to accidents on the "Brave", "Retvzane" and "Varyag" N.G. Nozikov also studied the circumstances of the emergency situations of the Deside and Zeli gunboats, the battleship “Men”, the steamer “Rene-Andre” and several cruisers. He came to the conclusion that accidents in these boilers occur even “in the normal state of the water level in them, in the absence of its saltiness, and in the completely clean state of the water pipes, i.e. under conditions whereby Belvill water tube boilers and other systems work flawlessly. ”
To the question why the power plant “Retvizana” with Nikloss’s boilers and machines assembled by C. Crump’s plant turned out to be fully operational, should be answered like this: in fact, the state of Retvisan during its transition to Port Arthur requires additional study and analysis .
Unfortunately, domestic historians have not yet written detailed monographs on this ship. Usually, the only accident of “Retvizan” on going to Russia is mentioned, and then, as if, everything was fine. But, if so, why then at the end of 1902 r for the "Retvisan" 15 collectors were ordered for boilers? For reserve? This is extremely doubtful, because, as we know, Varyag required the replacement of 40 collectors, and all 30 was ordered and it was extremely difficult to assume that 15 collectors were bought for the battleship without any need. Rather, we can assume that we have ordered the very minimum for the repair required by the ship. We can also recall that R.M. Melnikov casually mentions problems with the valves of blowing boilers "Retvizana", in any way, however, without explaining the severity of these faults.
But the most important thing is that the unreconciled steam distribution of the Varyag cars does not at all imply the existence of the same problem on the Retvisan. In other words, it is quite possible that Retvizan’s machines worked perfectly under reduced vapor pressure, and the low pressure cylinders on them did not create the preconditions for loosening the cars that were on the Varyag. Thus, we can state that story Retvizan’s power plant is still waiting for its researchers, and the information we have about it does not refute and does not confirm the version of Charles Crump’s fault in the deplorable state of the Varyag cars. As for the operation of "Varyag" and "Retvizana" in Japan, it should be understood that we know absolutely nothing about it. Japan is a very closed in terms of information country, which does not like to “lose face”, describing its own failures in something. In fact, we only know that both the Varyag and the Retvizan were incorporated into the Japanese fleet and were exploited for some time in it, but that’s all about the condition or the capabilities of the power plants of these ships during the service "no information.
Sometimes, as an example of the reliability of the Nikloss boilers, it is indicated that the Japanese, raising the Varyag, which was flooded in Chemulpo, did not tow it to the shipyard, and the ship reached it using its own boilers. But at the same time, for example, Kataev indicates that the Japanese decided to switch to the “Varyag” under their own boilers only after they replaced the faulty hot-water pipes and collectors, that is, we can talk about major repairs of the boilers before switching, so there is nothing surprising in this not. It is also known that Varyag, after its lifting and long-term repairs in Japan, was able to develop an 22,71 node on tests, but it should be understood that the cruiser managed to achieve such speed only after a major overhaul of machines and mechanisms - for example, cylinder bearings were completely replaced high and medium pressure.
It should be understood that the Varyag cars were not initially vicious, they were, if one can put it that way, unfinished, not brought to mind, and their lack (steam distribution) could well be corrected. The problem of the Russian sailors was that they did not immediately understand the true causes of the problems of the cruiser’s vehicles, and for a long time (during the transitions to Russia and Port Arthur) they tried to eliminate the consequences - while they did this, the machines became completely upset. This does not indicate some inexperience of the ship’s machine crew - as I.I. Gippius, such repairs are beyond the competence of the crew. And, of course, if “Varyag” carried its service not in Port Arthur but, for example, in the Baltic, where there were adequate ship repair facilities, then his cars could be straightened. But Varyag was located in Port Arthur, whose capabilities were very, very limited, and therefore did not receive the required repairs: The Japanese most likely made such repairs, because the cruiser was able to show on the 22,71 tests. A completely different question - how long could he maintain such speed and how quickly did he lose this opportunity? After all, when the Varyag was bought out by Russia, the officers who examined it noted that the cruisers' boilers were in very poor condition and would last a maximum of a year or two, and then they should be changed. All the old problems encountered by Varyag were evident - there were cracks in the collectors, and tube deflection, and in addition, there was “some deflection of the propeller shafts”. By the way, the Japanese "were ashamed" to demonstrate the cruiser even at low speed, although the battleships (the former Poltava and Peresvet) were taken out to sea.
Accordingly, we must understand that the lack of information about breakdowns and other problems of power plants during the service of Retvizan and Varyag in Japan does not at all mean that such failures and problems have not arisen.
Another very reasonable objection to the author of this article was made about the statistics of cruiser repairs (for one running day it took almost the same amount of repair time) during his transition from the USA to Russia and then to Port Arthur. It consisted in the fact that such statistics make sense only in comparison with the results achieved by other ships, and this, no doubt, is true. Unfortunately, the author of this article managed to find information only on the armored cruiser “Bayan”, equipped with Belleville boilers, but it is also very “talking”.
"Bayan" was preparing to move to Port Arthur from the Mediterranean Sea, being near the island of Poros - there he waited for 40 days for the squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" and there, with him, made all the necessary preparations for the ocean passage. Unfortunately, it is not known how much work was done on the part of boilers and cars, whether their reassembly was done according to the model and similarity of how it was done at Varyag - but in any case, we can say that the commander of Bayan did everything necessary for the ocean passage.
After that, "Bayan" poisoned the way on the route of. Poros - Port Said - Suez - Djibouti - Colombo - Sabang - Singapore - Port Arthur. In total, the cruiser spent 35 days on the road and 20 - parked in the above points, on average a little more than 3 days for each, not counting Poros and Port Arthur. There is no information that the ship had to be engaged in repairing cars at these sites, on arrival at Port Arthur "Bayan" was quite combat-ready and did not require repair. The first information about the problems with his car appear 5 February 1904 g, after the start of the war and the participation of the cruiser in the battle 27 January. On February 5, the cruiser was supposed to go along with Askold to explore the Bond islands, but one of the bearings of the right machine got hot on Bayan, which was corrected during the four-day repair and the ship continued its military service.
“Varyag” was preparing to leave the Mediterranean Sea, being at the island of Salamis - we deliberately omit all his misadventures until this moment (the car’s bulkheads in Dunkirk and Algeria did not do anything like “Bayan”), because we’ll stop at Salamina IN AND. Baer received orders to leave the Mediterranean Sea and follow into the Persian Gulf. And we reliably know that the Varyag machine team for at least two weeks was engaged in the bulkhead of machines - they, most likely, had been doing this for longer, and we are talking about two weeks only because V.I. Rem asked them to additionally repair the power plant.
So, after entering the Persian Gulf and before coming to Colombo, the cruiser Varyag spent 29 running days at sea and 26 days at various stops. During this time, the cruiser had three accidents in the boilers and repeatedly repaired its own machines and boilers, not only in the parking areas, but also on the go (5 000 bulkhead of boiler tubes and evaporators in the Red Sea). However, upon arrival in Colombo V.I. Rem was forced to ask permission for a two-week delay for the next repair of the power plant. She was given to him. Then the cruiser went out to sea again, but again had a problem with heating the bearings of high-pressure cylinders, so after 6 the days of the sea passage rose in Singapore on 4 of the day, of which 3 was engaged in the bulkhead of machines, and then 6 of the transition to Hong Kong and a week of repair work in him. In order to get from Hong Kong to Nagasaki and from there to Port Arthur, it took 7 days at sea together, but on arrival at Port Arthur the cruiser immediately got into a six-week repair.
Thus, it is quite obvious that on the way to the Far East, “Varyag” under repair lasted longer than “Bayan” spent time on all the parking lots (regardless of what he was doing there) on the way to Port Arthur, despite the fact that armored cruiser to the destination came quite well.
Another interesting remark is also interesting - the history of the acceptance tests of the armored cruiser “Askold”. Here, the author’s respected opponents stress a lot of problems identified during the cruiser’s trials, guided by the following logic: since “Askold” had such significant difficulties, but he fought quite normally, it means that the “root of evil” was not in the design of the Varyag power plant, and in the abilities of his machine commands.
What can I say? Yes, indeed - “Askold” gave up tediously long and difficult, but ...
The first output took place on 11 on April 1901 of r - malfunction of the feed pumps, tube breaks in the boilers, strong vibrations, and all this at the speed of some 18,25 ties. The cruiser returned for revision. The next way out was 23 in May of the same year: representatives of the plant expected that the cruiser would demonstrate contract speed, but the Russian observers, having fixed the sound of the machines and vibration, interrupted the tests and returned the ship for revision. The release of June 9 showed that the mechanisms work better, and N.K. Reizenstein allowed the cruiser to go to Hamburg to continue testing. The ship in Hamburg docked, and then went to Kiel around the Jutland peninsula by the North Sea and the Danish Straits - the company's management wanted to test the cruiser during a longer voyage. In the North Sea, the cruiser walked under two cars at speeds of 15 bonds. It seems that everything turned out not so bad, but the tests of the ship are postponed for another month. Finally, 25 July "Askold" goes ... no, not at all for the final tests, but only for grinding bearings - the cruiser cars gave 90-95 turns of power, the result was not satisfied with the selection committee and the ship was sent back for revision.
And now, finally, the cruiser goes 19 August for preliminary tests - the speed of 23,25 knots is reached, and during 10 runs, the average speed was 21,85 knots. But the corrosive Russian doesn’t like something again, and “Askold” returns to eliminate comments on the operation of its mechanisms - this time very insignificant, but still. On September 6, “Askold” goes to the Danzig measuring mile and fulfills the terms of the contract - but in the cars a knock is heard and the glands float. The result - the cruiser returns for revision. After 9 days, the ship is allowed to be officially tested and passes and well - there are no complaints about its power plant.
Everything? Yes, nothing happened. November 3 cruiser goes to additional tests, shows everything that is necessary under the contract, the machines and mechanisms work without comment. And only then, finally, the selection committee is satisfied and announces the end of the running tests of "Askold".
And now let's compare this with the admissions tests of the Varyag. We will not list them all, but remember that during the final tests on the cruiser, the tube of one boiler was torn, the refrigerator began to drip the night after the tests, and the revision of the machines and boilers revealed a number of defects in the test field.
Thus, it is possible to talk about the fundamental difference in the approaches when carrying out the sea trials of “Askold” and “Varyag”. If the first was accepted by the commission only after its members were convinced that the contractual rates of speed were achieved with normal, not causing any complaints of the mechanisms, then for the second the basis for admission to the treasury was only the fact of reaching the contract speed. The fact that, at the same time, the Varyag boilers and machines demonstrated a very unreliable operation, alas, did not become a reason for the return of the cruiser for revision. In other words, the selection committee under the guidance of N.K. Reytsenshteyna "did not tear off" from the Germans until they eliminated the remarks on the reliability of the power plant "Askold", but the one who received the "Varyag" E.N. Schensnovich, alas, could not achieve this from Charles Crump. It is difficult to say what was to blame - the specifics of the contract signed with Charles Crump, or the direct oversight of the monitoring commission, but the fact remains: after all the modifications, the cars and boilers of Askold turned out to be quite reliable, but Varyag, alas, could not boast.
To be continued ...
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