The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 13. First shots
The battle of the "Varangian" in the literature is described in sufficient detail, but nevertheless we will try to maximize the details of the events that took place over time, including a description of the damage that the Varangian received as they were received. We will use Japanese time, which differs from Russian in Chemulpo, for 35 minutes: for example, Asama opened fire on the Varyag at 11.45 in Russian and at 12.20 in Japanese time. Why so unpatriotic? The only way to unify with the battlefield scheme is that there are a huge number of them "on the Internet", but one of the very high-quality ones is the one presented by respected A.V. Polutov in his book "The landing operation of the Japanese army and fleet in February 1904 in Incheon, ”and in it the author adheres to Japanese time.
11.45 "All up, with an anchor off!".
11.55 "Varyag" and "Korean" were removed from the anchor and went past the English and Italian cruisers to the exit from the raid. "Korean" followed the "Varyag" in the wake, behind the cruiser by about 1-1,5 kablontov.
12.00 Fired an alarm.
12.05 Sotokichi Uriu receives a message from Chiyoda that Varyag and Koreets have left the raid and are moving along the fairway.
12.10 Information “Chiyoda” confirms the cruiser “Asama”.
It must be said that the Japanese commander did not expect such a turn of events at all, and in general, it should be noted the strange behavior of S. Uriu before the start of the bout. The fact is that the Rear Admiral drew up a battle plan in case the Varyag broke into the sea - without going into details, which we will consider later, let us just say that S. Uriu intended to build his ships in three echelons in such a way that the breakthrough " Varyag "had to deal consistently with each of them. This plan was set out and communicated to the commanders of the Japanese ships by order No. XXUMX, part of which is devoted to the actions of the Japanese squadron in the event that the Russian stationaries remain in the roadstead, we have already quoted earlier.
So, strictly speaking, if you already decided, and yes even an order from afar, it would be logical to take positions in advance, very early in the morning. Indeed, after the delivery of the ultimatum of V.F. Rudnev should have expected the exit of the Russian ships at any moment. It would be difficult to do this after the release of “Varyag”, because, for example, from Fr. Harido, around which the Japanese ships stood, and to the islands of Humann (Sobal), where the position of Nanivi and Niitaki was assigned, the distance is about 8 miles, while from the Varyag berth to O Phalmido (Yodolmi) - no more xnumx miles Accordingly, there was no way, finding the Russian cruiser on the fairway, to have time to anchor and reach the position, especially since S. Uriu expected from “Varyag” a speed of at least 6,5 nodes (the author was mentioned that the Japanese commander believed that Russian cruiser will break one, without the gunboat). It is obvious that Naniwa and Niitaka did not have the opportunity to develop such speed, so the plan of S. Uriu could be fulfilled only with the advance deployment. Nevertheless, the Japanese ships remained at anchor near the island of Harido. Then, on 20, the commander of "Chiyoda" Murakami arrived on the flagship cruiser, where he reported to the rear admiral:
Apparently, this finally convinced S. Uriu that the Russians would not go for a breakthrough, so he immediately ordered the commanders of the ships not to be promoted to the positions indicated in order No. XXUMX to his special order. But it did not follow: instead, S.Uriu summoned the commander of “Hayabus” (the destroyer of the 30 squadron) in order to clarify with him the plan of attack of “Varyag” and “Koreyets” in Chemulpo raid ... And suddenly , he is told that the Russian ships are going for a breakthrough.
12.12 Two minutes later, after confirming “Asamy” that “Varyag” and “Koreyets” are on the fairway, Sotokichi Uriu orders an emergency withdrawal from the anchor. The commanders of Hayabus and Chiyoda were forced to hastily leave the Naniwa and return to their ships. Cruisers had no time to raise anchors - the anchor chains had to be riveted, only to make a move faster. Naturally, the Japanese rear admiral’s plan, set forth in order No. XXUMX, “ordered to live long” —he could no longer be executed, so S. Uriu had to improvise on the go.
And what is interesting: all this confusion caused by the unexpected appearance of “Varyag”, the Japanese official historiography “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji describes this:
It seems to be not deceived in anything, but the general impression is that S. Uriu acted according to plan - meanwhile, there was nothing like that.
12.15 On the "Asam" riveted anchor chain.
12.12-12.20 One event has occurred, the exact time of which is unknown. V.F. Rudnev, in a report to the head of the Marine Ministry, describes him like this: “The admiral offered to give up with a signal, but did not receive a reply that the Japanese took for neglect of them.”
It is authentically known that Sotokichi Uriu treated Vsevolod Fedorovich with great respect - they did not raise any signal with an offer to surrender to Naniwa. This fact served as a reason to reproach VF Rudneva in a conscious lie: they say history on the offer of surrender and proud refusal came up with the commander of the "Varyag" for wit. To refute this statement, the author of this article can not. However, it should be borne in mind that around 12.12, already after the emergency order was ordered from the anchor, but before the opening of the fire, the Japanese flagship raised “Prepare for battle. Battle flags raise. " In addition, they raised on “Naniwa” “to follow the destination in accordance with the order” (this order was noticed and accepted for execution on “Takachiho” just in 12.20). It should also be noted that at that moment the distance between Varyag and Naniwa was quite large (according to the report of the Naniwa commander - 9 000 m or approximately 48,5 cables), and besides, Naniwa, apparently, partially closed "Asama". So it is not too surprising that the Russians, seeing that the Japanese flagship is raising numerous signals, read not what was actually raised, but what they expected to see - not the first, and not the last case in a combat situation. In other words, this phrase of the report, of course, could be a deliberate lie, but with the same success could be the result of a conscientious delusion. However, it is also possible that at Varyag they decided at all that this was a signal for surrender without even starting to disassemble it - just from the consideration “what else can they raise at the beginning of the battle?”.
12.20 "Asama" made a move and, at the same time, began sighting on the "Varyag" from a distance of 7 000 m (about 38 cable). The battle of 27 on January 1904 began. At this time, the “Asama” seemed to leave from the “Varyag”, having the latter on the sharp stern corners on the left, and the direction to the “Varyag” was such that the bow tower of the 203-mm guns could not act. According to V. Kataev, “Varyag” at the time of opening the fire saw “Asamu” on the right course angle 35 hail.
12.22 "Varyag" went beyond the territorial waters of Korea and opened fire back. However, in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22 a very interesting event took place, which is interpreted in quite different ways in different sources.
A.V. Polutov claimed that after the discovery of fire, “Varyag” increased the course (literally: ““ Varyag ”immediately answered, and increased the course”). Considering the fact that a respected historian was describing the battle according to Japanese sources, this can be considered the point of view of the Japanese side, but there is a nuance. A.V. Polutov provided translations of the “Battle Reports” - that is, reports of Japanese commanders on the fight, as well as a telegram from S. Uriu describing the 27 battle of January 1904, but they did not contain any reports on the increase in the speed of the Varyag after he opened fire. "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji also does not contain anything like that. We in no case blame AV Half-heartedly in misinformation, we simply state that the source from which he took this information remains unclear to us.
On the other hand, V. Kataev in the book Korean in the Glory of Varyag. Everything about the legendary gunboat "writes that after the shells of the first Japanese volley fell," By a signal from the cruiser, the speed was reduced to 7 nodes. " Alas, V. Kataev also does not report from which source this information is taken, at the same time neither the reports or memoirs of V.F. Rudnev, neither “The Work of the Historical Commission”, nor the watch logs of both Russian ships (at least in the form available to the author of this article) do not report anything of the kind.
Thus, we have the statements of two respected historians who directly contradict each other, but at the same time we cannot confirm their words by sources. Who to believe? On the one hand, the work of A.V. Polutova is distinguished by a much deeper study of certain issues than is usually done by V. Kataev, and, frankly, the description of the 27 battle of January 1904 in the V. Kataev’s editorial board contains a number of errors that are absent in AV Polutova. But on the other hand, A.V. Polutov directly informed that he gives a description of the battle on the basis of Japanese documents, and this has its drawbacks - in a battle from fairly long distances, the actions of the enemy often seem to be completely different from what they really are.
Let's try to figure it out on our own, especially since the speed of the Varyag, which is going to break through, has long been a matter of discussion. As we said earlier, from the Varyag parking lot to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) was no more than 6,5 miles - considering that the cruiser made a move in 11.55 and taking into account the fact that, according to the watch journal “Varyag”, the traverse of Phalmido was made in 12.05 in Russian and, accordingly, in 12.40 in Japanese of time, the cruiser and the gunboat spent as much as 45 minutes to overcome this distance, that is, their average speed did not exceed 8,7 nodes. It should be borne in mind that we are not talking about the speed of Varyag and Koreans proper, since they were “helped” by a strong current, the speed of which probably reached the 4 nodes at the raid and reached the 3 nodes at. Phalmido In other words, the average speed of 8,7 nodes calculated by us is the sum of the speed of the ships and the current. However, as far as the author is aware, the direction of this flow did not quite coincide with the direction of the movement of the Varyag and the Korey, rather, it “pushed” the ships into the starboard at an angle of approximately 45 degrees from the stern. Thus, the Russian ships received additional acceleration on the one hand, but on the other they needed to take to the left in order not to be pulled down by the right side of the fairway, which reduced their speed relative to that which they would have developed in calm water, with the same machine speeds. Therefore, it is rather difficult to say exactly what kind of “own” speed the “Varyag” and “Korean” had and what the accompanying current gave them. But for our purposes this is not necessary, since to assess the maneuvering of Russian ships you need to know the “speed relative to land”, and not the reasons for which it was caused. Therefore, hereinafter we (unless explicitly stated otherwise) speaking about the speed of “Varyag” and “Korean”, we will have in view not the speed that the machines informed them, but the total, that is, given by both the machines and the current.
So, “Varyag” changed its speed in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22 and just about the same time came out of the territorial waters. That is up about. Phalmido had to walk about 3 for miles, and he went to 12.40 aboard the island, which means that the cruiser took 3-18 minutes to overcome the 20 miles. This corresponds to the average speed of 9-10 nodes and is very similar to the description of V. Kataev, who reported on the order from Varyag to keep the speed of 7 nodes. The fact is that the speed of ships in those years was measured by the number of revolutions of their cars, and the team from Varyag, of course, should not be understood as “keeping the speed of 7 nodes relative to about. Phalmido ", and how to" give the momentum to the machines corresponding to the speed of 7 nodes. " It was these 7 nodes, and plus the speed of the flow, that the very same 9-10 nodes that the Varyag and Koreets sent along the fairway to Fr. Phalmido
Since the 9-10 nodes calculated by us are larger than the average speed on the entire 8,7 route of nodes, it seems that AV is right. Polutov, and the cruiser after the first shots of the "Assam" still increased speed. But, nevertheless, in the opinion of the author of this article, V. Kataev is right after all, and Varyag is right after he’s fired at him, but he slowed down, but the point is this.
Given that the cruiser needed to go about 3,5 miles to the border of territorial waters, and it covered this distance in 25-27 minutes, its average speed was 7,8-8,4 knot. In 11.55, “Varyag” just left the anchor: only 10 minutes have passed since the “Anchor to be removed” order. If someone doubts, let us remember that in order to make a move later 8 minutes after the order, “Asame” needed to rivet the anchor chain - on the “Varyag”, as we know, nothing like this was done. Accordingly, in the 11.55, the Russian cruiser had just started moving, and in fact he needed time to accelerate: and it is unlikely that he immediately, even before leaving the raid, developed the aforementioned speed. Most likely, “Varyag” slowly defiled past “Talbot” and “Elba”, and only then began to accelerate, that is, he did some part of his way to the border of territorial waters at a speed lower than the 7,8-8,4 node, and then accelerated over these meanings. This is supported by the presentation of V. Kataev, who claims that even before the start of the battle, the Koreytsa machine had developed 110 revolutions per minute, that is, a gunboat of some kind was going at the maximum speed for itself (in the test tests of the Korey developed 114 rpm.).
Here, however, the question arises. Passport speed "Koreans" - 13,5 nodes, and if he developed such a speed only through the machines, then it turns out that the gunboat was on the fairway (taking into account the additional speed of the flow) on 16-16,5 nodes? Of course not, but the fact is that we don’t know what the maximum speed Korean Koren 27 could develop in January 1904. On tests, with a displacement of 1 213,5 tons, the boat developed an 114 node at an average of 13,44 turns, but it was 17 years before the events described, and, most likely, the displacement of the Koreyts before the battle was much more than the tests were carried out (the ship’s total displacement under the project was 1 335 t, and what was it in reality on the day of the battle?) Therefore, it is very likely that immediately after withdrawal from yak “Varyag” and “Koreyets” moved very slowly, then, after leaving the raid, gradually accelerated, possibly to 13,5-14 nodes, but then, going beyond the limits of territorial waters and joining the battle, they slowed down to 9-10 nodes and that is how they went to traverse about. Phalmido
It must be said that all this reconstruction is entirely on the author’s conscience, dear readers may accept his version, or may not. The only fact for which you can vouch firmly, is that from the beginning of the battle and to the abeam, Fr. Phalmido "Varyag" and "Korean" went at a speed of no more than 9-10 nodes.
Movement with such a low speed was one of the many reasons for reproaching Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev that he didn’t intend to break into the sea and didn’t want to conduct a serious fight at all, but only wanted to designate a breakthrough, to slightly retreat and quickly retreat, to save the honor of the uniform, and at the same time to risk life at the minimum. Those who tend to blame VF Rudnev, in neglect of duty, seems to be quite right in saying that at such a speed they go anywhere, but not for a breakthrough. Those who continue to consider Vsevolod Fedorovich a worthy commander usually appeal to opponents that it would be wrong to develop a high speed on a narrow fairway, and even in a combat situation, since it would be easy to run aground. As an example, the French cruiser “Admiral Gadon” is usually described as having crashed on the rocks near about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in a completely peaceful environment, as well as the accident of the Tsubame destroyer, who was trying to pursue the Koreyian at full speed on the day of his failed departure to Port Arthur.
Usually these examples are counter-arguments, referring to Chiyoda's launch at sea from 25 to 26 on January 1904, because if the Russian cruiser took 45 minutes in broad daylight to get from Chemulpo raid to Fr. Phalmido, then the Japanese ship - only 35 minutes on a dark, moonless night (Chiyoda was anchored in 23.55). And this is despite the fact that “Chiyoda” only once passed this fairway, while the navigator of “Varyag”, E.A. Berens went to them 5 once - three times on the cruiser and twice - on the Korean. All of the above, in the opinion of many lovers of the history of naval fleets, is precisely the evidence that the Varyag, having the wish of its commander, could move along the fairway much faster.
What can be said in response to this? Yes, indeed, there is a fact - the cruiser "Chiyoda", having in its "asset" only one single passage through the fairway, really passed the second time from the raid to about. Phalmido for 35 minutes. Moonless night And, apparently, his commander and navigators gained the necessary experience during this exit, as well as an understanding of the dangers of following the Chemulpo channel at relatively high speeds. Nothing else can explain the fact that after a little more than a day, the same “Chiyoda”, released on the morning of January 27 (on the day of the battle with “Varyag”) from the same raid, was able to join S.Uriu's squadron only two hours after leaving the raid. Just read the “Battle Report” of the cruiser commander: “In 08.30, February 9 (January 27 old style) left Chemulpo’s anchorage and in 10.30 joined the 4 combat squad off the island of Philip” - the latter is next to Fr. Harido, in 3 miles from Fr. Phalmido, and the squadron S. Uriu was located between these three islands. In other words, having once passed the Chemulpo channel on 12, perhaps even 13 nodes in the dark, the commander of Chiyoda Murakami did not even want to repeat the previous “record” in the morning light ...
It is quite probable that, with a certain success, the Chemulpo channel would have been able to slip through the day and on the 20 nodes, the theoretical prerequisites for this, probably, were. But at the same time, according to the author, the movement at speeds greater than 12, the maximum - 13 nodes represented a danger to the ship going into battle. Even a short-term loss of control could lead to the fact that the cruiser will go beyond the fairway and sit on the stones.
Thus, we have two common versions: V.F. Rudnev did not develop high speed, because he did not want to engage in a decisive battle, and that VF Rudnev did not develop high speed, because he was afraid to put the "Varyag" on the stones. With all due respect to those who express it, the author of this article believes that both of them are wrong.
More precisely: we will never know what Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev thought when performing this or that action, deed. However, the author of this series of articles is ready to offer a third one, in addition to the existing two versions, internally consistent and fully explaining the behavior of the Varyag commander. This will not prove that the first two versions are wrong (again, we will never know the true motives of Vsevolod Fedorovich), but, according to the author, his version will at least have the same right to life as the others.
V.F. Rudnev was the commander of the 1 rank combat ship, and, of course, being a professional military man, he had to somehow plan a future battle. Any planning comes from assumptions about what will be achieved, and how the enemy will act in the upcoming battle. The goal of the Japanese was completely clear - to destroy the Russian stationary. But there were several ways in which this could be achieved. The first, and easiest, Japanese squadron could simply “plug” the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido That is, the first 6 miles from the Chemulpo raid, Russian ships were doomed to go along a rather narrow channel, on the island, this channel would lead Russian ships to a fairly wide reach. So Sotokichi Uriu could easily arrange his ships so as to block the exit from the fairway, concentrating the fire of his six cruisers on it. In this case, for the “Varyag” and the “Korean” going to the breakthrough, everything would have ended very quickly.
As is known, the side salvo of six Japanese cruisers totaled 4 * 203-mm, 23 * 152-mm and 9 * 120-mm guns. And it would be possible to counter them with perhaps no more 4 guns from the Varyag and one, possibly two Korean Koren 203 guns - moving along the fairway towards the Japanese ships could not be fired with full onboard volleys. Given the level of training of the Varyag artillerymen, it would have been easy to predict the outcome of such a confrontation.
But on the other hand, reach in about. Phalmido was narrow, and concentrating 6 cruisers there so that they could fire on the fairway at the same time would be a very difficult task. The ships of the Japanese would have to either maneuver the smallest course, or even anchor at all, and then the Russian stationery had the opportunity, having developed a large course, to quickly get close to the enemy.
If the Japanese used similar tactics, then V.F. Rudnev would not have gained anything by walking along the fairway at a slow speed - on the contrary, the only way to inflict any harm on the enemy would be to quickly get close to him, at a distance from which the Russian commandos are (very fast!) the deaths of the "Varangian" and "Korean" could provide a somewhat significant number of hits in Japanese ships. In such a collision, the gunboat could do much harm to the Japanese - if they focus their fire on the most dangerous Varyag and let the Korean come closer, even a few hits of heavy 203-mm shells could cause minor damage (with the exception of Asama) ) Japanese cruisers. Of course, today we know that, taking into account the quality of Russian shells, such calculations could not be justified, but the Russian naval officers were confident in their weapons and then they could hardly have thought otherwise.
In other words, if S. Uriu chose the tactics of blocking the exit from the fairway by superior forces, then Varyag and Koreans should have reached a breakthrough jointly, and then, convinced of the enemy’s intentions, developed full speed in order to move closer with him.
The second option was to disperse the squadron in the reach, and S. Uriu wanted to do so, but he did not succeed. On the "Varyag" saw the Japanese cruisers, mobbing at about. Harido, it was clear that they were not dispersed, so we will not consider such a disposition of the Japanese forces.
And, finally, the third reasonable tactic “for the Japanese” was to defeat the Russian ships on the way out. In order to understand this, let's spend some time on the geography of the “battlefield”. Alas, in all battle schemes, usually only a small fragment of it is transmitted, the breathtaking fairway from Chemulpo and oh. Phalmido, where, in fact, the hostilities unfolded, but in order to deal with the situation in which Varyag landed, a larger map was needed. Of course, there are lots, like, for example, this one, but not everyone will have the patience to deal with such a detailed map.
Therefore, we will proceed more simply and give a brief description of the possible routes for the Varyag to break into the sea. So, first, as we said earlier, the “Varyag” needed to overcome the fairway separating the Chemulpo raid from the reach starting at about. Phalmido - for this the cruiser needed to go 6 miles from the beginning of the fairway (and, approximately, 6,5 miles from the place of its anchorage), and then the "Varyag" went to a fairly wide reach. But on this breakthrough "Varyag" just started.
Very primitive, this reach can be described as a triangle stretching from south-west to north-east, while its base was in the south-west, and the top rested on o. Phalmido in the northeast. Three channels departed from the base of the triangle, with which it was possible to go to sea - the West, the Flying Fish Channel and the East Channel. In the middle of this triangle there was a rather large island (on the map above it is designated as Marolles, although the author does not vouch for the first two letters), and in order for Varyag to go to one of these straits, it had to go around this island with north or south. Around the island from the north one could take the shortest route to the Western Canal or the Flying Fish Channel, but to get to the Eastern Channel, one had to bypass the island from the south.
Flying Fish and East-West were relatively shallow for breakthrough “Varyag” and were intended for light-tonnage vessels.
So, S. Uriu ships were located at about. Harido, that is, near the top of our triangle-reach. And if they had found the Varyag on the fairway, made a move and would have gone roughly parallel to the breaking through Varyag course towards the island of Marolles, they would have put the Russian ships in a completely hopeless situation. The fact is that in this case the Varyag would have been at their stern, on sharp course corners and on it could have “worked” the artillery of all six Japanese cruisers, which during such a movement would not be hampered. In this case, "Varyag" would have to catch up with S. Uriu's squadron. The Varyag could not break through bypassing Marolles from the north - the Japanese squadron cut off the road to it, it only remained to go around Marolles from the south and try to break through the East Strait into the sea. But from about. Phalmido to Marolles - about 9 miles, and, bypassing Marolles from the south, "Varyag" had to go through the narrowness between Marolles and Yung Hung Do island, which did not exceed 3 miles.
Suppose Varyag gives 20 nodes in the fairway and goes for a breakthrough. The Japanese, seeing the Russian cruiser on the fairway, head for Marolles ahead of the Varyag on 15-3 miles at speeds in 4 nodes. To the isles Humann (Soobol), which are right between Marolles and Yung Hung Do, the Russians go 12-13 miles, and Varyag on 20 nodes will make this way in 35-40 minutes. It’s only 9 miles to go to Humann before the Japanese, and after 35-40 minutes they will be on these islands at the same time as Varyag. That is, it turns out that if S. Uriu chooses to fight on a withdrawal, and the Varyag rushes into a breakthrough on 20 nodes, then the Russian cruiser will first have to go 30-40 minutes under the fire of most (if not all) of the cruisers S. Uriu, but then it will be in the three-mile strait at the same time as the Japanese squadron. And even if, by some miracle, an armored-deck Russian cruiser can survive such a neighborhood, then 6 miles from the Humann islets before the start of the Eastern Strait, even if some Japanese cruisers start lagging behind, then they can still fire “Asama” will be able to “accompany” the “Varyag” without any problems while moving with it side by side. Hardly anyone on the Varyag doubted that the Japanese armored cruiser could develop 20 units ...
In general, with such a Japanese tactic, Varyg had no chances; worse, an attempt at an “20-nodal” breakthrough led to a rather fast and, in general, senseless death of a cruiser. But in order to make war longer and sell your life at a higher price, you had to act differently: you should not chase after the Japanese squadron, but you had to let it go ahead. Did the Japanese go to Marolles? Good riddance, in this case, "Varyag" should reduce the course and try to pass under the stern of the Japanese ships. It would not have helped to break through, but at least in this case the Japanese could no longer shoot the Varyag with the whole squadron, because their trailers would interfere with the lead, and the Varyag could reach the end artillery of the entire board. The chances of a breakthrough are zero, the chances of winning are zero, but the possibility of holding out longer and inflicting more damage on the Japanese gave such an option.
That's just for this it was necessary not to fly, headlong, on 20 nodes on the enemy squadron, but rather go slower than the Japanese cruisers and skip them ahead.
What did Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev saw when the Japanese opened fire? The fact that their cruisers are still immobile, with the exception of the “Assam”, which leaves from Father Palmido and leads into battle, turning astern to the Russian ships. That is, apparently, S. Uriu still preferred to fight on a withdrawal, as their strongest ship retreats. But, on the other hand, the rest of the Japanese cruisers have not yet shown their intentions, and it would be nice to let them do this even before reviewing them will override Fr. Phalmido
In other words, by slowing down, Vsevolod Fedorovich solved several tactical tasks at once. He could still watch the armored decks of the Japanese cruisers for some time in order to determine their intentions precisely when they finally made their turn. But at the same time, the distance to the “Naniwa” and others was too great for aimed shooting, so, slowing down the speed of V.F. Rudnev did not risk falling under the concentrated fire of the entire squadron - and so it actually happened. Well, then, as the distance was reduced, between “Varyag” and “Korean” on the one hand, and “Naniwa”, “Chiyoda”, “Takachiho”, “Niitaka” and “Akashi” would have turned to Fr. Thus, for some time the fight with the Japanese squadron would have been reduced to a fight between Varyag and Asami, and this would also be in the interests of the Russian ships - although not fighting a whole squadron to fight, again, this is a chance to hold out longer, inflict Japanese more damage. And if the Japanese flagship, without sorting out at what speed the Varyag is making a breakthrough, still leads its ships to the Marolles, then there is a good chance after leaving because of Fr. Phalmido pass under the stern ... In addition, one could expect that the gunners of "Assam", believing that the "Varyag" was flying at all pairs, and not expecting such a small speed from him would not immediately understand what was happening, and they would take wrong sight (which, again, really happened!). And finally, the 9-11 nodes, this is just the standard speed of Russian ships in pre-war firing. It is clear that the commanders of "Varyag" are not too skillful, so at least give them the opportunity to shoot at the usual conditions for themselves - perhaps, and get into someone ...
In other words, there are many reasons to reduce the course after “Asama” determined its intentions by bringing “Varyag” to the sharp aft corner - and none of them is connected with the desire to “keep away from the battle” or “not engage in a decisive battle. " But what would VF give? Rudnev 20 nodal jerk? Well, the Varyag would have flown at full speed due to Fr. Phalmido on the Japanese squadron, which just took off from the anchors and they would have shot him point-blank. The rapprochement with the enemy cruisers made some sense only if the Koreans could also develop 20 nodes and "fly out of the island" along with the Varyag, then his 203-mm guns could say their weighty word. But “Korean” couldn’t do anything of this kind, he couldn’t even support the “Varyag” that rushed forward with fire, because he would be disturbed by Fr. Phalmido In the end, heroically rushing forward, V.F. Rudnev would have put his unit in pieces under defeat, not giving him a chance to cause damage to the enemy. And today, numerous critics would write about the tactically illiterate headache — Rudnev, who for the sake of external effects (what a heroic tug on the enemy on a cruiser, whose mechanisms breathe for incense, and even through a narrow fairway!) Shamefully “leaked” the battle .. .
All of the above indisputably testifies to one thing - the movement of Varyag and Koreans at a speed of 9-10 nodes at the beginning of the battle is tactically literate, and at that moment, perhaps, the only right decision aimed primarily at causing the Japanese damage while minimizing your losses.
To be continued ...
11.45 "All up, with an anchor off!".
11.55 "Varyag" and "Korean" were removed from the anchor and went past the English and Italian cruisers to the exit from the raid. "Korean" followed the "Varyag" in the wake, behind the cruiser by about 1-1,5 kablontov.
12.00 Fired an alarm.
"Varyag" and "Koreyets" go to battle
12.05 Sotokichi Uriu receives a message from Chiyoda that Varyag and Koreets have left the raid and are moving along the fairway.
12.10 Information “Chiyoda” confirms the cruiser “Asama”.
It must be said that the Japanese commander did not expect such a turn of events at all, and in general, it should be noted the strange behavior of S. Uriu before the start of the bout. The fact is that the Rear Admiral drew up a battle plan in case the Varyag broke into the sea - without going into details, which we will consider later, let us just say that S. Uriu intended to build his ships in three echelons in such a way that the breakthrough " Varyag "had to deal consistently with each of them. This plan was set out and communicated to the commanders of the Japanese ships by order No. XXUMX, part of which is devoted to the actions of the Japanese squadron in the event that the Russian stationaries remain in the roadstead, we have already quoted earlier.
So, strictly speaking, if you already decided, and yes even an order from afar, it would be logical to take positions in advance, very early in the morning. Indeed, after the delivery of the ultimatum of V.F. Rudnev should have expected the exit of the Russian ships at any moment. It would be difficult to do this after the release of “Varyag”, because, for example, from Fr. Harido, around which the Japanese ships stood, and to the islands of Humann (Sobal), where the position of Nanivi and Niitaki was assigned, the distance is about 8 miles, while from the Varyag berth to O Phalmido (Yodolmi) - no more xnumx miles Accordingly, there was no way, finding the Russian cruiser on the fairway, to have time to anchor and reach the position, especially since S. Uriu expected from “Varyag” a speed of at least 6,5 nodes (the author was mentioned that the Japanese commander believed that Russian cruiser will break one, without the gunboat). It is obvious that Naniwa and Niitaka did not have the opportunity to develop such speed, so the plan of S. Uriu could be fulfilled only with the advance deployment. Nevertheless, the Japanese ships remained at anchor near the island of Harido. Then, on 20, the commander of "Chiyoda" Murakami arrived on the flagship cruiser, where he reported to the rear admiral:
"At the time I left the anchorage on the Russian ships, the situation remained unchanged, and by all indications they are not going to leave the anchorage of Incheon."
Apparently, this finally convinced S. Uriu that the Russians would not go for a breakthrough, so he immediately ordered the commanders of the ships not to be promoted to the positions indicated in order No. XXUMX to his special order. But it did not follow: instead, S.Uriu summoned the commander of “Hayabus” (the destroyer of the 30 squadron) in order to clarify with him the plan of attack of “Varyag” and “Koreyets” in Chemulpo raid ... And suddenly , he is told that the Russian ships are going for a breakthrough.
12.12 Two minutes later, after confirming “Asamy” that “Varyag” and “Koreyets” are on the fairway, Sotokichi Uriu orders an emergency withdrawal from the anchor. The commanders of Hayabus and Chiyoda were forced to hastily leave the Naniwa and return to their ships. Cruisers had no time to raise anchors - the anchor chains had to be riveted, only to make a move faster. Naturally, the Japanese rear admiral’s plan, set forth in order No. XXUMX, “ordered to live long” —he could no longer be executed, so S. Uriu had to improvise on the go.
And what is interesting: all this confusion caused by the unexpected appearance of “Varyag”, the Japanese official historiography “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji describes this:
“After receiving a signal of the exit of the Russian courts, Admiral Uriu immediately ordered the ships of his detachment to take their assigned places. When the order was executed and all were in full readiness, the Russian ships had already passed the northern tip of Fr. Yodolmi.
It seems to be not deceived in anything, but the general impression is that S. Uriu acted according to plan - meanwhile, there was nothing like that.
12.15 On the "Asam" riveted anchor chain.
12.12-12.20 One event has occurred, the exact time of which is unknown. V.F. Rudnev, in a report to the head of the Marine Ministry, describes him like this: “The admiral offered to give up with a signal, but did not receive a reply that the Japanese took for neglect of them.”
It is authentically known that Sotokichi Uriu treated Vsevolod Fedorovich with great respect - they did not raise any signal with an offer to surrender to Naniwa. This fact served as a reason to reproach VF Rudneva in a conscious lie: they say history on the offer of surrender and proud refusal came up with the commander of the "Varyag" for wit. To refute this statement, the author of this article can not. However, it should be borne in mind that around 12.12, already after the emergency order was ordered from the anchor, but before the opening of the fire, the Japanese flagship raised “Prepare for battle. Battle flags raise. " In addition, they raised on “Naniwa” “to follow the destination in accordance with the order” (this order was noticed and accepted for execution on “Takachiho” just in 12.20). It should also be noted that at that moment the distance between Varyag and Naniwa was quite large (according to the report of the Naniwa commander - 9 000 m or approximately 48,5 cables), and besides, Naniwa, apparently, partially closed "Asama". So it is not too surprising that the Russians, seeing that the Japanese flagship is raising numerous signals, read not what was actually raised, but what they expected to see - not the first, and not the last case in a combat situation. In other words, this phrase of the report, of course, could be a deliberate lie, but with the same success could be the result of a conscientious delusion. However, it is also possible that at Varyag they decided at all that this was a signal for surrender without even starting to disassemble it - just from the consideration “what else can they raise at the beginning of the battle?”.
12.20 "Asama" made a move and, at the same time, began sighting on the "Varyag" from a distance of 7 000 m (about 38 cable). The battle of 27 on January 1904 began. At this time, the “Asama” seemed to leave from the “Varyag”, having the latter on the sharp stern corners on the left, and the direction to the “Varyag” was such that the bow tower of the 203-mm guns could not act. According to V. Kataev, “Varyag” at the time of opening the fire saw “Asamu” on the right course angle 35 hail.
12.22 "Varyag" went beyond the territorial waters of Korea and opened fire back. However, in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22 a very interesting event took place, which is interpreted in quite different ways in different sources.
A.V. Polutov claimed that after the discovery of fire, “Varyag” increased the course (literally: ““ Varyag ”immediately answered, and increased the course”). Considering the fact that a respected historian was describing the battle according to Japanese sources, this can be considered the point of view of the Japanese side, but there is a nuance. A.V. Polutov provided translations of the “Battle Reports” - that is, reports of Japanese commanders on the fight, as well as a telegram from S. Uriu describing the 27 battle of January 1904, but they did not contain any reports on the increase in the speed of the Varyag after he opened fire. "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji also does not contain anything like that. We in no case blame AV Half-heartedly in misinformation, we simply state that the source from which he took this information remains unclear to us.
On the other hand, V. Kataev in the book Korean in the Glory of Varyag. Everything about the legendary gunboat "writes that after the shells of the first Japanese volley fell," By a signal from the cruiser, the speed was reduced to 7 nodes. " Alas, V. Kataev also does not report from which source this information is taken, at the same time neither the reports or memoirs of V.F. Rudnev, neither “The Work of the Historical Commission”, nor the watch logs of both Russian ships (at least in the form available to the author of this article) do not report anything of the kind.
Thus, we have the statements of two respected historians who directly contradict each other, but at the same time we cannot confirm their words by sources. Who to believe? On the one hand, the work of A.V. Polutova is distinguished by a much deeper study of certain issues than is usually done by V. Kataev, and, frankly, the description of the 27 battle of January 1904 in the V. Kataev’s editorial board contains a number of errors that are absent in AV Polutova. But on the other hand, A.V. Polutov directly informed that he gives a description of the battle on the basis of Japanese documents, and this has its drawbacks - in a battle from fairly long distances, the actions of the enemy often seem to be completely different from what they really are.
Let's try to figure it out on our own, especially since the speed of the Varyag, which is going to break through, has long been a matter of discussion. As we said earlier, from the Varyag parking lot to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) was no more than 6,5 miles - considering that the cruiser made a move in 11.55 and taking into account the fact that, according to the watch journal “Varyag”, the traverse of Phalmido was made in 12.05 in Russian and, accordingly, in 12.40 in Japanese of time, the cruiser and the gunboat spent as much as 45 minutes to overcome this distance, that is, their average speed did not exceed 8,7 nodes. It should be borne in mind that we are not talking about the speed of Varyag and Koreans proper, since they were “helped” by a strong current, the speed of which probably reached the 4 nodes at the raid and reached the 3 nodes at. Phalmido In other words, the average speed of 8,7 nodes calculated by us is the sum of the speed of the ships and the current. However, as far as the author is aware, the direction of this flow did not quite coincide with the direction of the movement of the Varyag and the Korey, rather, it “pushed” the ships into the starboard at an angle of approximately 45 degrees from the stern. Thus, the Russian ships received additional acceleration on the one hand, but on the other they needed to take to the left in order not to be pulled down by the right side of the fairway, which reduced their speed relative to that which they would have developed in calm water, with the same machine speeds. Therefore, it is rather difficult to say exactly what kind of “own” speed the “Varyag” and “Korean” had and what the accompanying current gave them. But for our purposes this is not necessary, since to assess the maneuvering of Russian ships you need to know the “speed relative to land”, and not the reasons for which it was caused. Therefore, hereinafter we (unless explicitly stated otherwise) speaking about the speed of “Varyag” and “Korean”, we will have in view not the speed that the machines informed them, but the total, that is, given by both the machines and the current.
So, “Varyag” changed its speed in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22 and just about the same time came out of the territorial waters. That is up about. Phalmido had to walk about 3 for miles, and he went to 12.40 aboard the island, which means that the cruiser took 3-18 minutes to overcome the 20 miles. This corresponds to the average speed of 9-10 nodes and is very similar to the description of V. Kataev, who reported on the order from Varyag to keep the speed of 7 nodes. The fact is that the speed of ships in those years was measured by the number of revolutions of their cars, and the team from Varyag, of course, should not be understood as “keeping the speed of 7 nodes relative to about. Phalmido ", and how to" give the momentum to the machines corresponding to the speed of 7 nodes. " It was these 7 nodes, and plus the speed of the flow, that the very same 9-10 nodes that the Varyag and Koreets sent along the fairway to Fr. Phalmido
Since the 9-10 nodes calculated by us are larger than the average speed on the entire 8,7 route of nodes, it seems that AV is right. Polutov, and the cruiser after the first shots of the "Assam" still increased speed. But, nevertheless, in the opinion of the author of this article, V. Kataev is right after all, and Varyag is right after he’s fired at him, but he slowed down, but the point is this.
Given that the cruiser needed to go about 3,5 miles to the border of territorial waters, and it covered this distance in 25-27 minutes, its average speed was 7,8-8,4 knot. In 11.55, “Varyag” just left the anchor: only 10 minutes have passed since the “Anchor to be removed” order. If someone doubts, let us remember that in order to make a move later 8 minutes after the order, “Asame” needed to rivet the anchor chain - on the “Varyag”, as we know, nothing like this was done. Accordingly, in the 11.55, the Russian cruiser had just started moving, and in fact he needed time to accelerate: and it is unlikely that he immediately, even before leaving the raid, developed the aforementioned speed. Most likely, “Varyag” slowly defiled past “Talbot” and “Elba”, and only then began to accelerate, that is, he did some part of his way to the border of territorial waters at a speed lower than the 7,8-8,4 node, and then accelerated over these meanings. This is supported by the presentation of V. Kataev, who claims that even before the start of the battle, the Koreytsa machine had developed 110 revolutions per minute, that is, a gunboat of some kind was going at the maximum speed for itself (in the test tests of the Korey developed 114 rpm.).
Here, however, the question arises. Passport speed "Koreans" - 13,5 nodes, and if he developed such a speed only through the machines, then it turns out that the gunboat was on the fairway (taking into account the additional speed of the flow) on 16-16,5 nodes? Of course not, but the fact is that we don’t know what the maximum speed Korean Koren 27 could develop in January 1904. On tests, with a displacement of 1 213,5 tons, the boat developed an 114 node at an average of 13,44 turns, but it was 17 years before the events described, and, most likely, the displacement of the Koreyts before the battle was much more than the tests were carried out (the ship’s total displacement under the project was 1 335 t, and what was it in reality on the day of the battle?) Therefore, it is very likely that immediately after withdrawal from yak “Varyag” and “Koreyets” moved very slowly, then, after leaving the raid, gradually accelerated, possibly to 13,5-14 nodes, but then, going beyond the limits of territorial waters and joining the battle, they slowed down to 9-10 nodes and that is how they went to traverse about. Phalmido
It must be said that all this reconstruction is entirely on the author’s conscience, dear readers may accept his version, or may not. The only fact for which you can vouch firmly, is that from the beginning of the battle and to the abeam, Fr. Phalmido "Varyag" and "Korean" went at a speed of no more than 9-10 nodes.
Movement with such a low speed was one of the many reasons for reproaching Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev that he didn’t intend to break into the sea and didn’t want to conduct a serious fight at all, but only wanted to designate a breakthrough, to slightly retreat and quickly retreat, to save the honor of the uniform, and at the same time to risk life at the minimum. Those who tend to blame VF Rudnev, in neglect of duty, seems to be quite right in saying that at such a speed they go anywhere, but not for a breakthrough. Those who continue to consider Vsevolod Fedorovich a worthy commander usually appeal to opponents that it would be wrong to develop a high speed on a narrow fairway, and even in a combat situation, since it would be easy to run aground. As an example, the French cruiser “Admiral Gadon” is usually described as having crashed on the rocks near about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in a completely peaceful environment, as well as the accident of the Tsubame destroyer, who was trying to pursue the Koreyian at full speed on the day of his failed departure to Port Arthur.
Usually these examples are counter-arguments, referring to Chiyoda's launch at sea from 25 to 26 on January 1904, because if the Russian cruiser took 45 minutes in broad daylight to get from Chemulpo raid to Fr. Phalmido, then the Japanese ship - only 35 minutes on a dark, moonless night (Chiyoda was anchored in 23.55). And this is despite the fact that “Chiyoda” only once passed this fairway, while the navigator of “Varyag”, E.A. Berens went to them 5 once - three times on the cruiser and twice - on the Korean. All of the above, in the opinion of many lovers of the history of naval fleets, is precisely the evidence that the Varyag, having the wish of its commander, could move along the fairway much faster.
What can be said in response to this? Yes, indeed, there is a fact - the cruiser "Chiyoda", having in its "asset" only one single passage through the fairway, really passed the second time from the raid to about. Phalmido for 35 minutes. Moonless night And, apparently, his commander and navigators gained the necessary experience during this exit, as well as an understanding of the dangers of following the Chemulpo channel at relatively high speeds. Nothing else can explain the fact that after a little more than a day, the same “Chiyoda”, released on the morning of January 27 (on the day of the battle with “Varyag”) from the same raid, was able to join S.Uriu's squadron only two hours after leaving the raid. Just read the “Battle Report” of the cruiser commander: “In 08.30, February 9 (January 27 old style) left Chemulpo’s anchorage and in 10.30 joined the 4 combat squad off the island of Philip” - the latter is next to Fr. Harido, in 3 miles from Fr. Phalmido, and the squadron S. Uriu was located between these three islands. In other words, having once passed the Chemulpo channel on 12, perhaps even 13 nodes in the dark, the commander of Chiyoda Murakami did not even want to repeat the previous “record” in the morning light ...
It is quite probable that, with a certain success, the Chemulpo channel would have been able to slip through the day and on the 20 nodes, the theoretical prerequisites for this, probably, were. But at the same time, according to the author, the movement at speeds greater than 12, the maximum - 13 nodes represented a danger to the ship going into battle. Even a short-term loss of control could lead to the fact that the cruiser will go beyond the fairway and sit on the stones.
Thus, we have two common versions: V.F. Rudnev did not develop high speed, because he did not want to engage in a decisive battle, and that VF Rudnev did not develop high speed, because he was afraid to put the "Varyag" on the stones. With all due respect to those who express it, the author of this article believes that both of them are wrong.
More precisely: we will never know what Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev thought when performing this or that action, deed. However, the author of this series of articles is ready to offer a third one, in addition to the existing two versions, internally consistent and fully explaining the behavior of the Varyag commander. This will not prove that the first two versions are wrong (again, we will never know the true motives of Vsevolod Fedorovich), but, according to the author, his version will at least have the same right to life as the others.
V.F. Rudnev was the commander of the 1 rank combat ship, and, of course, being a professional military man, he had to somehow plan a future battle. Any planning comes from assumptions about what will be achieved, and how the enemy will act in the upcoming battle. The goal of the Japanese was completely clear - to destroy the Russian stationary. But there were several ways in which this could be achieved. The first, and easiest, Japanese squadron could simply “plug” the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido That is, the first 6 miles from the Chemulpo raid, Russian ships were doomed to go along a rather narrow channel, on the island, this channel would lead Russian ships to a fairly wide reach. So Sotokichi Uriu could easily arrange his ships so as to block the exit from the fairway, concentrating the fire of his six cruisers on it. In this case, for the “Varyag” and the “Korean” going to the breakthrough, everything would have ended very quickly.
As is known, the side salvo of six Japanese cruisers totaled 4 * 203-mm, 23 * 152-mm and 9 * 120-mm guns. And it would be possible to counter them with perhaps no more 4 guns from the Varyag and one, possibly two Korean Koren 203 guns - moving along the fairway towards the Japanese ships could not be fired with full onboard volleys. Given the level of training of the Varyag artillerymen, it would have been easy to predict the outcome of such a confrontation.
But on the other hand, reach in about. Phalmido was narrow, and concentrating 6 cruisers there so that they could fire on the fairway at the same time would be a very difficult task. The ships of the Japanese would have to either maneuver the smallest course, or even anchor at all, and then the Russian stationery had the opportunity, having developed a large course, to quickly get close to the enemy.
If the Japanese used similar tactics, then V.F. Rudnev would not have gained anything by walking along the fairway at a slow speed - on the contrary, the only way to inflict any harm on the enemy would be to quickly get close to him, at a distance from which the Russian commandos are (very fast!) the deaths of the "Varangian" and "Korean" could provide a somewhat significant number of hits in Japanese ships. In such a collision, the gunboat could do much harm to the Japanese - if they focus their fire on the most dangerous Varyag and let the Korean come closer, even a few hits of heavy 203-mm shells could cause minor damage (with the exception of Asama) ) Japanese cruisers. Of course, today we know that, taking into account the quality of Russian shells, such calculations could not be justified, but the Russian naval officers were confident in their weapons and then they could hardly have thought otherwise.
In other words, if S. Uriu chose the tactics of blocking the exit from the fairway by superior forces, then Varyag and Koreans should have reached a breakthrough jointly, and then, convinced of the enemy’s intentions, developed full speed in order to move closer with him.
The second option was to disperse the squadron in the reach, and S. Uriu wanted to do so, but he did not succeed. On the "Varyag" saw the Japanese cruisers, mobbing at about. Harido, it was clear that they were not dispersed, so we will not consider such a disposition of the Japanese forces.
And, finally, the third reasonable tactic “for the Japanese” was to defeat the Russian ships on the way out. In order to understand this, let's spend some time on the geography of the “battlefield”. Alas, in all battle schemes, usually only a small fragment of it is transmitted, the breathtaking fairway from Chemulpo and oh. Phalmido, where, in fact, the hostilities unfolded, but in order to deal with the situation in which Varyag landed, a larger map was needed. Of course, there are lots, like, for example, this one, but not everyone will have the patience to deal with such a detailed map.
Therefore, we will proceed more simply and give a brief description of the possible routes for the Varyag to break into the sea. So, first, as we said earlier, the “Varyag” needed to overcome the fairway separating the Chemulpo raid from the reach starting at about. Phalmido - for this the cruiser needed to go 6 miles from the beginning of the fairway (and, approximately, 6,5 miles from the place of its anchorage), and then the "Varyag" went to a fairly wide reach. But on this breakthrough "Varyag" just started.
Very primitive, this reach can be described as a triangle stretching from south-west to north-east, while its base was in the south-west, and the top rested on o. Phalmido in the northeast. Three channels departed from the base of the triangle, with which it was possible to go to sea - the West, the Flying Fish Channel and the East Channel. In the middle of this triangle there was a rather large island (on the map above it is designated as Marolles, although the author does not vouch for the first two letters), and in order for Varyag to go to one of these straits, it had to go around this island with north or south. Around the island from the north one could take the shortest route to the Western Canal or the Flying Fish Channel, but to get to the Eastern Channel, one had to bypass the island from the south.
Flying Fish and East-West were relatively shallow for breakthrough “Varyag” and were intended for light-tonnage vessels.
So, S. Uriu ships were located at about. Harido, that is, near the top of our triangle-reach. And if they had found the Varyag on the fairway, made a move and would have gone roughly parallel to the breaking through Varyag course towards the island of Marolles, they would have put the Russian ships in a completely hopeless situation. The fact is that in this case the Varyag would have been at their stern, on sharp course corners and on it could have “worked” the artillery of all six Japanese cruisers, which during such a movement would not be hampered. In this case, "Varyag" would have to catch up with S. Uriu's squadron. The Varyag could not break through bypassing Marolles from the north - the Japanese squadron cut off the road to it, it only remained to go around Marolles from the south and try to break through the East Strait into the sea. But from about. Phalmido to Marolles - about 9 miles, and, bypassing Marolles from the south, "Varyag" had to go through the narrowness between Marolles and Yung Hung Do island, which did not exceed 3 miles.
Suppose Varyag gives 20 nodes in the fairway and goes for a breakthrough. The Japanese, seeing the Russian cruiser on the fairway, head for Marolles ahead of the Varyag on 15-3 miles at speeds in 4 nodes. To the isles Humann (Soobol), which are right between Marolles and Yung Hung Do, the Russians go 12-13 miles, and Varyag on 20 nodes will make this way in 35-40 minutes. It’s only 9 miles to go to Humann before the Japanese, and after 35-40 minutes they will be on these islands at the same time as Varyag. That is, it turns out that if S. Uriu chooses to fight on a withdrawal, and the Varyag rushes into a breakthrough on 20 nodes, then the Russian cruiser will first have to go 30-40 minutes under the fire of most (if not all) of the cruisers S. Uriu, but then it will be in the three-mile strait at the same time as the Japanese squadron. And even if, by some miracle, an armored-deck Russian cruiser can survive such a neighborhood, then 6 miles from the Humann islets before the start of the Eastern Strait, even if some Japanese cruisers start lagging behind, then they can still fire “Asama” will be able to “accompany” the “Varyag” without any problems while moving with it side by side. Hardly anyone on the Varyag doubted that the Japanese armored cruiser could develop 20 units ...
In general, with such a Japanese tactic, Varyg had no chances; worse, an attempt at an “20-nodal” breakthrough led to a rather fast and, in general, senseless death of a cruiser. But in order to make war longer and sell your life at a higher price, you had to act differently: you should not chase after the Japanese squadron, but you had to let it go ahead. Did the Japanese go to Marolles? Good riddance, in this case, "Varyag" should reduce the course and try to pass under the stern of the Japanese ships. It would not have helped to break through, but at least in this case the Japanese could no longer shoot the Varyag with the whole squadron, because their trailers would interfere with the lead, and the Varyag could reach the end artillery of the entire board. The chances of a breakthrough are zero, the chances of winning are zero, but the possibility of holding out longer and inflicting more damage on the Japanese gave such an option.
That's just for this it was necessary not to fly, headlong, on 20 nodes on the enemy squadron, but rather go slower than the Japanese cruisers and skip them ahead.
What did Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev saw when the Japanese opened fire? The fact that their cruisers are still immobile, with the exception of the “Assam”, which leaves from Father Palmido and leads into battle, turning astern to the Russian ships. That is, apparently, S. Uriu still preferred to fight on a withdrawal, as their strongest ship retreats. But, on the other hand, the rest of the Japanese cruisers have not yet shown their intentions, and it would be nice to let them do this even before reviewing them will override Fr. Phalmido
In other words, by slowing down, Vsevolod Fedorovich solved several tactical tasks at once. He could still watch the armored decks of the Japanese cruisers for some time in order to determine their intentions precisely when they finally made their turn. But at the same time, the distance to the “Naniwa” and others was too great for aimed shooting, so, slowing down the speed of V.F. Rudnev did not risk falling under the concentrated fire of the entire squadron - and so it actually happened. Well, then, as the distance was reduced, between “Varyag” and “Korean” on the one hand, and “Naniwa”, “Chiyoda”, “Takachiho”, “Niitaka” and “Akashi” would have turned to Fr. Thus, for some time the fight with the Japanese squadron would have been reduced to a fight between Varyag and Asami, and this would also be in the interests of the Russian ships - although not fighting a whole squadron to fight, again, this is a chance to hold out longer, inflict Japanese more damage. And if the Japanese flagship, without sorting out at what speed the Varyag is making a breakthrough, still leads its ships to the Marolles, then there is a good chance after leaving because of Fr. Phalmido pass under the stern ... In addition, one could expect that the gunners of "Assam", believing that the "Varyag" was flying at all pairs, and not expecting such a small speed from him would not immediately understand what was happening, and they would take wrong sight (which, again, really happened!). And finally, the 9-11 nodes, this is just the standard speed of Russian ships in pre-war firing. It is clear that the commanders of "Varyag" are not too skillful, so at least give them the opportunity to shoot at the usual conditions for themselves - perhaps, and get into someone ...
In other words, there are many reasons to reduce the course after “Asama” determined its intentions by bringing “Varyag” to the sharp aft corner - and none of them is connected with the desire to “keep away from the battle” or “not engage in a decisive battle. " But what would VF give? Rudnev 20 nodal jerk? Well, the Varyag would have flown at full speed due to Fr. Phalmido on the Japanese squadron, which just took off from the anchors and they would have shot him point-blank. The rapprochement with the enemy cruisers made some sense only if the Koreans could also develop 20 nodes and "fly out of the island" along with the Varyag, then his 203-mm guns could say their weighty word. But “Korean” couldn’t do anything of this kind, he couldn’t even support the “Varyag” that rushed forward with fire, because he would be disturbed by Fr. Phalmido In the end, heroically rushing forward, V.F. Rudnev would have put his unit in pieces under defeat, not giving him a chance to cause damage to the enemy. And today, numerous critics would write about the tactically illiterate headache — Rudnev, who for the sake of external effects (what a heroic tug on the enemy on a cruiser, whose mechanisms breathe for incense, and even through a narrow fairway!) Shamefully “leaked” the battle .. .
All of the above indisputably testifies to one thing - the movement of Varyag and Koreans at a speed of 9-10 nodes at the beginning of the battle is tactically literate, and at that moment, perhaps, the only right decision aimed primarily at causing the Japanese damage while minimizing your losses.
To be continued ...
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