TV "Panther": Wehrmacht "thirty-four"?
Collision with the latest Soviet tanks forced the Germans to radically revise their tank building programs. As you know, the largest tank that the Wehrmacht had at the beginning of World War II was the T-IV modification F (not to be confused with the F2!) weighing only 22,3 tons, and the Germans sincerely believed that a combat vehicle of this weight would be quite enough. The T-III and T-IV fit perfectly into the concept of blitzkrieg, as understood by the German generals, and the latter did not look for more. Of course, progress did not stand still, and the German designers of Daimler-Benz (Daimler-Benz), Krupp (Krupp) and MAN (MAN) worked on a new medium tank project, but its weight should not exceed 20 tons.
In principle, the military did not mind getting a heavier tank to break through enemy defenses, but they did not feel much need for it. The latter was expressed both in the absence of a somewhat intelligible technical task, and in the fact that no one seriously demanded results from manufacturers. E. Aders, at that time one of the leading German designers of Henschel tank technology, had been working on a 30-ton “breakthrough tank” since 1937, but in 1941 this tank was infinitely far from completion. In fact, there were only two prototypes that did not even have their own turret, although one of them was nevertheless hoisted with a T-IV turret. Booking "heavy tank" did not exceed 50 mm.
The T-34 and KV, for all their shortcomings, were an extremely unpleasant surprise for the German armed forces. It was quite obvious that excellent visibility and ergonomics still cannot fully compensate for the relatively weak armor and armament of the "triples" and "fours". As a result, work on the "20-ton" and "30-ton" tanks was curtailed, and new tasks were set on the agenda of German designers - in the shortest possible time, Henschel and Porsche firms (Porsche) they were supposed to create a heavy tank weighing 45 tons, and Daimler-Benz and MAN received an order for a medium tank weighing 35 tons. The heavy tank later became the famous Tiger, but history we will look at its creation some other time. The theme of the material offered to your attention is a medium tank, the design task of which was given the code name “Panther”.
The fact is that the combat vehicle created according to the “Panther project”, according to the initial idea of the Wehrmacht leadership, was supposed to solve the same tasks that were assigned to the “thirty-four” in the Red Army. In other words, before meeting with the T-34, the German generals armed their tank divisions with T-III and T-IV and were quite satisfied with them. The German strategy was blitzkrieg, which provided for the rapid destruction of the enemy army by dissecting it and surrounding large military masses, followed by forcing the latter to surrender. To do this, the German army needed powerful mobile troops capable of waging a mobile war, and deep operations behind enemy lines. The basis of these troops were tank divisions, and until the very invasion of the USSR, their tanks, "triples" and "fours", quite effectively solved the entire range of tasks facing them.
But the appearance of a tank with a 76,2-mm cannon and armor that protected well from the standard 37-mm anti-tank "mallet", which and 50-mm artillery systems pierced from the second to the third, made the capabilities of the T-III and T-IV insufficient. The Germans had the opportunity to get acquainted with the T-34 both on the battlefields and in a non-combat situation, since a considerable number of “thirty-fours” got to them either completely undamaged or with minimal damage. Thus, the Germans were able to perfectly study the design of the T-34, to see both the strengths and weaknesses of this tank of ours. And, not surprisingly, they wanted to get a tank that would organically combine the advantages of Soviet and German medium armored vehicles, while not having their shortcomings. More specifically, they wanted a medium tank with a powerful 75 mm gun, armor equal to that of the T-34 (i.e. anti-ballistic by 1941 standards), as well as a relatively spacious and ergonomic interior for five crew members. And with a good review, of course.
Dear M.B. Baryatinsky, in his monograph “Panther, the steel cat of the Panzerwaffe,” points to a 75-mm artillery system ordered by the Wehrmacht from Rheinmetall, capable of penetrating 140 mm of armor at a distance of a kilometer, and it was precisely such a weapon that was eventually installed on “ Panther."
In 1941, things with 75-mm anti-tank guns in Germany were as follows: in 1938-39. Rheinmetall and Krupp received technical specifications and an order to create a promising 75-mm artillery system. And they were not too in a hurry with their creation, since in 1940 the same Rheinmetall had only a non-firing prototype gun ready, which, by the way, was recognized as the best. However, it turned into a full-fledged artillery system only in 1942 - we are talking, of course, about the wonderful German Pak 40, but for all its merits, of course, it could not penetrate 140-mm armor at a distance of 1000 m. Even with a sub-caliber projectile. And so, in July 1941, the Wehrmacht generals came to the conclusion that even this promising, but not yet created, gun was no longer good enough for the latest medium tank. As a result, the tank analogue of the towed Pak 40 - KwK 40 with a barrel length of 43 and 48 calibers, was received by German self-propelled guns and T-IVs, and for the Panther, an enchanting KwK 42 artillery system was made.
KwK 40 L48 (that is, with a barrel length of 48 calibers) gave a 6,8 kg projectile an initial velocity of 790 m / s, and this was much, much more than the usual universal "three-inch": for example, the domestic F-34, which was armed with T -34, reported 6,3 kg. projectile only 655 m / s. But the long-barreled KwK 42 L70 sent a 6,8 kg projectile flying at a speed of 925 m / s! As a result, according to the tabular values, the KwK 40 at a distance of a kilometer pierced 85 mm with a caliber armor-piercing and 95 mm with a sub-caliber projectile, while the KwK 42 - 111 and 149 mm, respectively! Judging by the generally accepted data, the KwK 42 surpassed even the 88-mm cannon of the Tiger tank in terms of armor penetration at a distance of about 2 km, where the capabilities of their shells were approximately equalized (the Tiger caliber projectile pierced a little less, and the sabot - a little more than 75-mm "Panthers"), in other sources you can find the figure 2 m.
The author has already written that for a real battle, it is not so much the tabular armor penetration that matters, but the range of a direct shot. And, although the author does not have exact data on the KwK 42, it is quite obvious that in this parameter it surpassed both the KwK 40 and domestic 76,2-mm artillery systems.
In the last quarter of a century, if not more, the armor scheme of the T-34 has come under intense criticism. In the USSR, rational angles of inclination of armored plates were considered an absolute boon and advantage of the "thirty-four", but then many claims were discovered. Among which, for example, there were allegations that such a slope of the armor, of course, can provide a ricochet of enemy ammunition, but only if the caliber of this ammunition is not more than the thickness of the armor plate. From this point of view, the rational angles of the 40-45 mm T-34 mod. 1940 lost its meaning already in the confrontation with 50 mm guns, not to mention 75 mm.
Maybe, of course, it is so, but the opinion of the Germans on this issue is interesting. Having the opportunity to see for themselves the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 armor protection and knowing full well that the new Soviet tanks are armed with a 76,2 mm cannon, they determined sufficient protection for their promising tank from 40 mm armor plates with rational angles of inclination.
Subsequently, during the creation of the tank, the armor was strengthened, but how? Consider booking "Panther" in comparison with the T-34 arr. 1940
As you can see, the Panther's forehead is much better protected. The frontal part (upper) is 85 mm thick and located at an angle of 55 degrees. It was a practically indestructible defense against Soviet artillery of 76,2 mm caliber and below at any reasonable distance. The same can be said about the lower armored piece, which had the same angle of inclination, but a smaller thickness - 65 mm. The T-34 has the same angles of the upper and lower parts - 60 and 53 degrees, but their thickness is only 45 mm. The forehead of the tower of the Panther is 100 mm, and the mask of the gun is even 110 mm, while the T-34 has only 40-45 mm.
Another advantage of the German tank is the bottom armor. If for the T-34 it was 16 mm in the nose and 13 mm further, then for the Panther it was 30 and 17 mm, respectively. Obviously, this somewhat improved mine protection, although it is difficult to say how much.
At the same time, oddly enough, the sides and stern of the Panther are worse protected than those of the T-34. If you look at the diagram from top to bottom, we see that the thickness of the side of the German tank turret is 45 mm, the inclined hull plate is 40 mm and the vertical hull plate is 40 mm, while the T-34 has the corresponding thicknesses of 45, 40 and 45 mm. It seems that the superiority is quite insignificant, but the angles of inclination of the Panther's armor are less rational - 25 degrees. for armor plates of the tower and 30 deg. for the body, while the T-34 has 30 and 40 degrees. respectively. In addition, in the T-34 of a later release (the same age as the Panther), the inclined armor plates of the hull side received reinforcement up to 45 mm. As for the stern of the brainchild of the "gloomy Aryan genius", there the Panther was protected by 40 mm armor at an angle of 30 degrees, and the T-34 - by 40 mm armor at an angle of 42-48 degrees.
At the prototype stage of the future Panther, 2 approaches collided - Daimler-Benz "adopted" the Soviet scheme, according to which both the engine and transmission were located in the stern of the tank, while the rear wheels were driving. At the same time, MAN specialists proposed a traditional German layout: the engine was in the stern, and the gearbox, etc., was in the nose, while the front wheels were the leading ones.
The battle of opinions led to the creation of the so-called “Panther Commission”, which concluded that the traditional German scheme, although much more complex, is still better.
As for the engine, the “Daimler men” were going to install a diesel of their own design on a tank, but the gasoline engine was much more acceptable for Germany. First of all, for the reason that diesel fuel for the most part was absorbed by submarines kriegsmarine, and therefore was in a fair deficit. As a result, the Panther received a 700-strong Maybach.
In general, the management of the Panther after the eradication of inevitable childhood diseases was quite convenient and comfortable for the driver. But it cannot be said that the T-34 mod. 1943 there were some significant problems with this.
So, the German designers have done a tremendous work on the bugs and created a real masterpiece, combining the advantages of the German and Soviet tank design schools.
At a direct shot distance, the Panther hit the T-34 in any projection, while its forehead protection could hardly be penetrated by any Soviet 76,2-mm gun, and it was they that formed the basis of the Red Army anti-tank guns. At the same time, the sides and rear of the Panther were defended a little worse than the T-34. The Germans managed to combine rational armor angles with a spacious fighting compartment, comfortable for five crew members: of course, excellent German optics were also available. Not that the T-XNUMX was categorically inferior to the Panther here, our sights were very good, but the German ones were still better.
That's just the weight of this miracle of engineering reached 44,8 tons, as a result of which the Panther can no longer be spoken of as a medium tank, which, in essence, is the key drawback of the Panther project. In an effort to create a perfect medium tank, the German designers actually turned it into a heavy one. Which, in fact, was the cause of a number of shortcomings of this "Panzerwaffe cat".
The first of them is a large height, reaching 2 mm.
The fact is that under the German scheme, the torsion bars and the propeller shaft were placed between the bottom of the tank and the floor of the fighting compartment, which was not required for the T-34, in which both the engine and transmission were located in the stern. In other words, the Germans had to sort of raise the fighting compartment and supplies, including fuel and ammunition, above the bottom of the tank in order to make room for the torsion bar and shaft there, and this, of course, made the German tank higher. On the one hand, it seems to be not such a big problem, this height of the tank. But this is if we forget that the range of a direct shot of any gun is the greater, the higher its target.
The second drawback is the "chess" chassis, which has become a real curse for German tankers.
The Germans came up with it in order to provide a heavy tank with a good ride, and they achieved this. But such a chassis, which consisted of many rollers, was extremely heavy, much heavier than usual, and besides, extremely inconvenient to use, because in order to get to the rear rows of rollers, it was necessary to remove the front ones. To be more precise, in order to remove only one inner row roller, it was necessary to dismantle from a third to a half of the outer row rollers. And, of course, the example that wanders from one publication to another is canonical: about how the mud and snow that clogged during the movement of the Panther between the skating rinks froze at night to such an extent that they blocked the rotation of the rinks, causing the tank to lose the ability to move.
It must be said that Soviet and American tanks of comparable weight - the IS-2 (46 tons) and the M26 "Pershing" were deprived of such an innovation and, nevertheless, coped with their tasks quite well. Yes, the movement of the Panther was certainly smoother than those of these tanks, but what advantages could this give in battle? Now, if the German designers managed to ensure such smoothness at which it would be possible to conduct aimed fire on the move - then yes, in this case, of course, one could say that "the game is worth the candle." However, nothing of the kind happened - like the tanks of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Panther could shoot accurately (that is, not only shoot, but also hit) only from a place. In general, the smoothness of the German tanks, both the Panther and the Tiger, was bought at an excessively high price - it was clearly not worth it. And the post-war experience of tank building confirmed this with all evidence - despite the fact that the chassis of German tanks were very well studied, the "chess" scheme did not become further widespread.
The third drawback of the tank was the low maintainability of the transmission in the field. As mentioned above, the Germans deliberately went to complicate the design in favor of quality, and the Panther's transmission was good - while it worked. But as soon as she failed, due to combat damage, or due to internal breakdowns, the tank needed factory repairs. Trying to fix the Panther in the field was possible... but extremely difficult.
But, of course, the most important drawback of the Panther was that in the course of designing it turned from a medium to a heavy tank. “Why is this drawback so critical?” the reader may ask: “Modern main battle tanks have a mass of over 40 and 50 tons, but the same domestic T-90 weighs 46,5 tons and feels great at the same time!”.
That's true, but the problem is that today's level of technology and economies is slightly different from what existed during the Second World War. And the first answer to the question why a heavy tank of the period of the Great Patriotic War cannot become the main one is the limited technical resource of it.
On the one hand, it seems to be somehow unfair to reproach the Panther for a capricious transmission, because in principle it was quite good: some Panthers, according to German tankers, managed to overcome up to 1 km on their own, without requiring major repairs . But it was still an exception, which only confirmed the rule that both the engine and transmission of the tank suffered from numerous "childhood diseases", which took the Germans about a year to eliminate. And the combination of a difficult-to-repair design with its well-known capriciousness obviously led to the fact that the Panther, in fact, turned out to be not a very suitable tank for maneuver warfare, for deep tank raids.
The second fundamental drawback of a heavy tank, which they are trying to force to play in an uncharacteristic “weight category”, is that a heavy tank, being much larger, more complex and more expensive than a medium one, a priori in those years could not be produced in the quantities necessary to saturate tank divisions with them. . This is true for absolutely all countries, including, of course, Germany.
I must say that the "Panther" was conceived precisely as the main battle tank, which was supposed to replace the T-III and T-IV in the tank units of the Wehrmacht. But the complexity and high cost led to the fact that, despite the fact that as many as 4 companies (MAN, Daimler-Benz, MNH and Henschel) were engaged in the production of Panthers, it was impossible to provide a sufficient number of them. And Heinz Guderian, who at that time served as the chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, after consultations with the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, was forced to moderate his appetites: only one battalion of each tank regiment was to be equipped with Panthers. Of course, these plans have been adjusted.
In total, from February 1943 to February 1945, inclusive, the Germans, according to Muller-Gillebrand, produced 5 Panthers, not counting various equipment based on it. I must say that these data are not absolutely accurate, but nevertheless. But the T-IV for the same period produced 629 units. "triples", the release of which was curtailed - 7 units. Thus, in the indicated period, a total of 471 Panthers and three-rubles with fours were produced, which in theory it was supposed to replace, and it turns out that the Panthers were produced only a little more than 714% of the total output of these three cars since the start of Panther production.
Over the same period, the total release of the T-34-76 and T-34-85 was 31 804 machines.
Thus, the Panthers, on the one hand, could not become a full-fledged medium tank in any way - it was simply impossible to produce them in the quantities required for this. But as a heavy tank, they also had significant drawbacks.
First, it is, of course, booking. In 1942-43. the Germans launched the serial construction of a heavy tank with anti-shell armor - we are talking, of course, about the "Tiger", which, thanks to 80-100 mm armor protecting the forehead and sides of the tank, was less vulnerable to anti-tank and field artillery shells. The "Tiger" could very successfully push through the enemy's defenses: it could be stopped, disabled by breaking, say, a caterpillar, but it was extremely difficult to inflict really heavy damage on it. That is why, according to some reports, on the Kursk Bulge, each "Tiger" was knocked out 1,9 times on average - but after that, having received field repairs, it returned to service.
But the Panther could not boast of such a thing - the protection of its sides met the requirements of a medium tank, in 1943 it, of course, could not be considered anti-shell. And during the breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which was being built with a “focal” anti-tank defense, capable of conducting crossfire on advancing tanks from several positions, it could not, of course, turn to all of them with its almost invulnerable frontal projection. In other words, ceteris paribus, the Panthers, when breaking through the enemy defenses, would have suffered significantly greater losses than the Tigers.
Secondly, this is the caliber of the gun - although the 75-mm KwK 42 was quite enough for anti-tank battles, it is no longer enough to destroy the entire range of targets that a heavy tank should fight. Yes, and about the armor penetration of the Germans, it seems, vague doubts tormented.
That is why, at the beginning of 1943, as a further direction for the development of the Panthers, they saw bringing the thickness of the side armor to 60 mm and installing an even more powerful 88-mm KwK43 L / 71 gun than on the Tiger (Panther II project).
In general, the following can be said about the Panther - German military design thought produced a very strange tank. Too large and complex to become the main combat vehicle of tank divisions, too capricious for "deep operations", not armored enough to break into enemy defenses, while it was able to effectively destroy any armored vehicles of the USSR and allies until the very end of the war.
And here, according to the author of this article, lies the secret of the effectiveness of the Panthers. If we take an analysis of the use of these tanks, made by our specialists during the war years, we will see that:
In other words, the Germans, in fact, in the offensive used the "Panthers" not as tanks, but as self-propelled artillery installations, the actions of which were provided by the usual "triples" and "fours". And in defense, the Panthers were an excellent anti-tank self-propelled guns: realizing the direction of the main attack, the Germans could always prepare and meet ours at pre-prepared positions, “head on”, shooting it from afar, preventing it from entering for an attack from the flank.
In other words, the Panthers, for a number of the above reasons, did not meet the requirements of modern maneuver warfare at that time, the strategy and tactics of deep operations. But at the moment when the Wehrmacht began to receive them in somewhat large quantities, there was no longer any talk of any deep operations - after the Kursk Bulge, where the Panthers made their debut, the Wehrmacht finally and irrevocably lost the strategic initiative and could only defend itself, only snarling counterattacks. In Germany, the issue of mobile defense was on the agenda, and for her, the Panther turned out to be almost an ideal tank. Expensive and complex, but still not as much as the Tiger, which means it was produced in noticeably large quantities, with noticeably better mobility than the Tiger, with an excellently protected frontal projection, with excellent armor penetration of the 75-mm gun, According to its performance characteristics, the Panther was remarkably suitable for the role of an anti-tank self-propelled gun - a mobile reserve for the defending troops.
In other words, the Panther was almost the perfect tank ... for an army losing the war.
To be continued ...
"Panther" ausf D
In principle, the military did not mind getting a heavier tank to break through enemy defenses, but they did not feel much need for it. The latter was expressed both in the absence of a somewhat intelligible technical task, and in the fact that no one seriously demanded results from manufacturers. E. Aders, at that time one of the leading German designers of Henschel tank technology, had been working on a 30-ton “breakthrough tank” since 1937, but in 1941 this tank was infinitely far from completion. In fact, there were only two prototypes that did not even have their own turret, although one of them was nevertheless hoisted with a T-IV turret. Booking "heavy tank" did not exceed 50 mm.
The T-34 and KV, for all their shortcomings, were an extremely unpleasant surprise for the German armed forces. It was quite obvious that excellent visibility and ergonomics still cannot fully compensate for the relatively weak armor and armament of the "triples" and "fours". As a result, work on the "20-ton" and "30-ton" tanks was curtailed, and new tasks were set on the agenda of German designers - in the shortest possible time, Henschel and Porsche firms (Porsche) they were supposed to create a heavy tank weighing 45 tons, and Daimler-Benz and MAN received an order for a medium tank weighing 35 tons. The heavy tank later became the famous Tiger, but history we will look at its creation some other time. The theme of the material offered to your attention is a medium tank, the design task of which was given the code name “Panther”.
Is it correct to compare the Panther with the T-34?
The fact is that the combat vehicle created according to the “Panther project”, according to the initial idea of the Wehrmacht leadership, was supposed to solve the same tasks that were assigned to the “thirty-four” in the Red Army. In other words, before meeting with the T-34, the German generals armed their tank divisions with T-III and T-IV and were quite satisfied with them. The German strategy was blitzkrieg, which provided for the rapid destruction of the enemy army by dissecting it and surrounding large military masses, followed by forcing the latter to surrender. To do this, the German army needed powerful mobile troops capable of waging a mobile war, and deep operations behind enemy lines. The basis of these troops were tank divisions, and until the very invasion of the USSR, their tanks, "triples" and "fours", quite effectively solved the entire range of tasks facing them.
But the appearance of a tank with a 76,2-mm cannon and armor that protected well from the standard 37-mm anti-tank "mallet", which and 50-mm artillery systems pierced from the second to the third, made the capabilities of the T-III and T-IV insufficient. The Germans had the opportunity to get acquainted with the T-34 both on the battlefields and in a non-combat situation, since a considerable number of “thirty-fours” got to them either completely undamaged or with minimal damage. Thus, the Germans were able to perfectly study the design of the T-34, to see both the strengths and weaknesses of this tank of ours. And, not surprisingly, they wanted to get a tank that would organically combine the advantages of Soviet and German medium armored vehicles, while not having their shortcomings. More specifically, they wanted a medium tank with a powerful 75 mm gun, armor equal to that of the T-34 (i.e. anti-ballistic by 1941 standards), as well as a relatively spacious and ergonomic interior for five crew members. And with a good review, of course.
Artillery
Dear M.B. Baryatinsky, in his monograph “Panther, the steel cat of the Panzerwaffe,” points to a 75-mm artillery system ordered by the Wehrmacht from Rheinmetall, capable of penetrating 140 mm of armor at a distance of a kilometer, and it was precisely such a weapon that was eventually installed on “ Panther."
KwK 42 along with a gun Spark
In 1941, things with 75-mm anti-tank guns in Germany were as follows: in 1938-39. Rheinmetall and Krupp received technical specifications and an order to create a promising 75-mm artillery system. And they were not too in a hurry with their creation, since in 1940 the same Rheinmetall had only a non-firing prototype gun ready, which, by the way, was recognized as the best. However, it turned into a full-fledged artillery system only in 1942 - we are talking, of course, about the wonderful German Pak 40, but for all its merits, of course, it could not penetrate 140-mm armor at a distance of 1000 m. Even with a sub-caliber projectile. And so, in July 1941, the Wehrmacht generals came to the conclusion that even this promising, but not yet created, gun was no longer good enough for the latest medium tank. As a result, the tank analogue of the towed Pak 40 - KwK 40 with a barrel length of 43 and 48 calibers, was received by German self-propelled guns and T-IVs, and for the Panther, an enchanting KwK 42 artillery system was made.
KwK 40 L48 (that is, with a barrel length of 48 calibers) gave a 6,8 kg projectile an initial velocity of 790 m / s, and this was much, much more than the usual universal "three-inch": for example, the domestic F-34, which was armed with T -34, reported 6,3 kg. projectile only 655 m / s. But the long-barreled KwK 42 L70 sent a 6,8 kg projectile flying at a speed of 925 m / s! As a result, according to the tabular values, the KwK 40 at a distance of a kilometer pierced 85 mm with a caliber armor-piercing and 95 mm with a sub-caliber projectile, while the KwK 42 - 111 and 149 mm, respectively! Judging by the generally accepted data, the KwK 42 surpassed even the 88-mm cannon of the Tiger tank in terms of armor penetration at a distance of about 2 km, where the capabilities of their shells were approximately equalized (the Tiger caliber projectile pierced a little less, and the sabot - a little more than 75-mm "Panthers"), in other sources you can find the figure 2 m.
The author has already written that for a real battle, it is not so much the tabular armor penetration that matters, but the range of a direct shot. And, although the author does not have exact data on the KwK 42, it is quite obvious that in this parameter it surpassed both the KwK 40 and domestic 76,2-mm artillery systems.
Reservation
In the last quarter of a century, if not more, the armor scheme of the T-34 has come under intense criticism. In the USSR, rational angles of inclination of armored plates were considered an absolute boon and advantage of the "thirty-four", but then many claims were discovered. Among which, for example, there were allegations that such a slope of the armor, of course, can provide a ricochet of enemy ammunition, but only if the caliber of this ammunition is not more than the thickness of the armor plate. From this point of view, the rational angles of the 40-45 mm T-34 mod. 1940 lost its meaning already in the confrontation with 50 mm guns, not to mention 75 mm.
Maybe, of course, it is so, but the opinion of the Germans on this issue is interesting. Having the opportunity to see for themselves the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 armor protection and knowing full well that the new Soviet tanks are armed with a 76,2 mm cannon, they determined sufficient protection for their promising tank from 40 mm armor plates with rational angles of inclination.
Subsequently, during the creation of the tank, the armor was strengthened, but how? Consider booking "Panther" in comparison with the T-34 arr. 1940
Panthers reservation scheme
As you can see, the Panther's forehead is much better protected. The frontal part (upper) is 85 mm thick and located at an angle of 55 degrees. It was a practically indestructible defense against Soviet artillery of 76,2 mm caliber and below at any reasonable distance. The same can be said about the lower armored piece, which had the same angle of inclination, but a smaller thickness - 65 mm. The T-34 has the same angles of the upper and lower parts - 60 and 53 degrees, but their thickness is only 45 mm. The forehead of the tower of the Panther is 100 mm, and the mask of the gun is even 110 mm, while the T-34 has only 40-45 mm.
Another advantage of the German tank is the bottom armor. If for the T-34 it was 16 mm in the nose and 13 mm further, then for the Panther it was 30 and 17 mm, respectively. Obviously, this somewhat improved mine protection, although it is difficult to say how much.
At the same time, oddly enough, the sides and stern of the Panther are worse protected than those of the T-34. If you look at the diagram from top to bottom, we see that the thickness of the side of the German tank turret is 45 mm, the inclined hull plate is 40 mm and the vertical hull plate is 40 mm, while the T-34 has the corresponding thicknesses of 45, 40 and 45 mm. It seems that the superiority is quite insignificant, but the angles of inclination of the Panther's armor are less rational - 25 degrees. for armor plates of the tower and 30 deg. for the body, while the T-34 has 30 and 40 degrees. respectively. In addition, in the T-34 of a later release (the same age as the Panther), the inclined armor plates of the hull side received reinforcement up to 45 mm. As for the stern of the brainchild of the "gloomy Aryan genius", there the Panther was protected by 40 mm armor at an angle of 30 degrees, and the T-34 - by 40 mm armor at an angle of 42-48 degrees.
Engine, transmission, chassis
At the prototype stage of the future Panther, 2 approaches collided - Daimler-Benz "adopted" the Soviet scheme, according to which both the engine and transmission were located in the stern of the tank, while the rear wheels were driving. At the same time, MAN specialists proposed a traditional German layout: the engine was in the stern, and the gearbox, etc., was in the nose, while the front wheels were the leading ones.
The battle of opinions led to the creation of the so-called “Panther Commission”, which concluded that the traditional German scheme, although much more complex, is still better.
As for the engine, the “Daimler men” were going to install a diesel of their own design on a tank, but the gasoline engine was much more acceptable for Germany. First of all, for the reason that diesel fuel for the most part was absorbed by submarines kriegsmarine, and therefore was in a fair deficit. As a result, the Panther received a 700-strong Maybach.
In general, the management of the Panther after the eradication of inevitable childhood diseases was quite convenient and comfortable for the driver. But it cannot be said that the T-34 mod. 1943 there were some significant problems with this.
For all the good you need to pay
So, the German designers have done a tremendous work on the bugs and created a real masterpiece, combining the advantages of the German and Soviet tank design schools.
At a direct shot distance, the Panther hit the T-34 in any projection, while its forehead protection could hardly be penetrated by any Soviet 76,2-mm gun, and it was they that formed the basis of the Red Army anti-tank guns. At the same time, the sides and rear of the Panther were defended a little worse than the T-34. The Germans managed to combine rational armor angles with a spacious fighting compartment, comfortable for five crew members: of course, excellent German optics were also available. Not that the T-XNUMX was categorically inferior to the Panther here, our sights were very good, but the German ones were still better.
That's just the weight of this miracle of engineering reached 44,8 tons, as a result of which the Panther can no longer be spoken of as a medium tank, which, in essence, is the key drawback of the Panther project. In an effort to create a perfect medium tank, the German designers actually turned it into a heavy one. Which, in fact, was the cause of a number of shortcomings of this "Panzerwaffe cat".
The first of them is a large height, reaching 2 mm.
The fact is that under the German scheme, the torsion bars and the propeller shaft were placed between the bottom of the tank and the floor of the fighting compartment, which was not required for the T-34, in which both the engine and transmission were located in the stern. In other words, the Germans had to sort of raise the fighting compartment and supplies, including fuel and ammunition, above the bottom of the tank in order to make room for the torsion bar and shaft there, and this, of course, made the German tank higher. On the one hand, it seems to be not such a big problem, this height of the tank. But this is if we forget that the range of a direct shot of any gun is the greater, the higher its target.
Frontal projections "Panther" and T-34
The second drawback is the "chess" chassis, which has become a real curse for German tankers.
The Germans came up with it in order to provide a heavy tank with a good ride, and they achieved this. But such a chassis, which consisted of many rollers, was extremely heavy, much heavier than usual, and besides, extremely inconvenient to use, because in order to get to the rear rows of rollers, it was necessary to remove the front ones. To be more precise, in order to remove only one inner row roller, it was necessary to dismantle from a third to a half of the outer row rollers. And, of course, the example that wanders from one publication to another is canonical: about how the mud and snow that clogged during the movement of the Panther between the skating rinks froze at night to such an extent that they blocked the rotation of the rinks, causing the tank to lose the ability to move.
It must be said that Soviet and American tanks of comparable weight - the IS-2 (46 tons) and the M26 "Pershing" were deprived of such an innovation and, nevertheless, coped with their tasks quite well. Yes, the movement of the Panther was certainly smoother than those of these tanks, but what advantages could this give in battle? Now, if the German designers managed to ensure such smoothness at which it would be possible to conduct aimed fire on the move - then yes, in this case, of course, one could say that "the game is worth the candle." However, nothing of the kind happened - like the tanks of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Panther could shoot accurately (that is, not only shoot, but also hit) only from a place. In general, the smoothness of the German tanks, both the Panther and the Tiger, was bought at an excessively high price - it was clearly not worth it. And the post-war experience of tank building confirmed this with all evidence - despite the fact that the chassis of German tanks were very well studied, the "chess" scheme did not become further widespread.
The third drawback of the tank was the low maintainability of the transmission in the field. As mentioned above, the Germans deliberately went to complicate the design in favor of quality, and the Panther's transmission was good - while it worked. But as soon as she failed, due to combat damage, or due to internal breakdowns, the tank needed factory repairs. Trying to fix the Panther in the field was possible... but extremely difficult.
But, of course, the most important drawback of the Panther was that in the course of designing it turned from a medium to a heavy tank. “Why is this drawback so critical?” the reader may ask: “Modern main battle tanks have a mass of over 40 and 50 tons, but the same domestic T-90 weighs 46,5 tons and feels great at the same time!”.
That's true, but the problem is that today's level of technology and economies is slightly different from what existed during the Second World War. And the first answer to the question why a heavy tank of the period of the Great Patriotic War cannot become the main one is the limited technical resource of it.
On the one hand, it seems to be somehow unfair to reproach the Panther for a capricious transmission, because in principle it was quite good: some Panthers, according to German tankers, managed to overcome up to 1 km on their own, without requiring major repairs . But it was still an exception, which only confirmed the rule that both the engine and transmission of the tank suffered from numerous "childhood diseases", which took the Germans about a year to eliminate. And the combination of a difficult-to-repair design with its well-known capriciousness obviously led to the fact that the Panther, in fact, turned out to be not a very suitable tank for maneuver warfare, for deep tank raids.
The second fundamental drawback of a heavy tank, which they are trying to force to play in an uncharacteristic “weight category”, is that a heavy tank, being much larger, more complex and more expensive than a medium one, a priori in those years could not be produced in the quantities necessary to saturate tank divisions with them. . This is true for absolutely all countries, including, of course, Germany.
I must say that the "Panther" was conceived precisely as the main battle tank, which was supposed to replace the T-III and T-IV in the tank units of the Wehrmacht. But the complexity and high cost led to the fact that, despite the fact that as many as 4 companies (MAN, Daimler-Benz, MNH and Henschel) were engaged in the production of Panthers, it was impossible to provide a sufficient number of them. And Heinz Guderian, who at that time served as the chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, after consultations with the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, was forced to moderate his appetites: only one battalion of each tank regiment was to be equipped with Panthers. Of course, these plans have been adjusted.
In total, from February 1943 to February 1945, inclusive, the Germans, according to Muller-Gillebrand, produced 5 Panthers, not counting various equipment based on it. I must say that these data are not absolutely accurate, but nevertheless. But the T-IV for the same period produced 629 units. "triples", the release of which was curtailed - 7 units. Thus, in the indicated period, a total of 471 Panthers and three-rubles with fours were produced, which in theory it was supposed to replace, and it turns out that the Panthers were produced only a little more than 714% of the total output of these three cars since the start of Panther production.
Over the same period, the total release of the T-34-76 and T-34-85 was 31 804 machines.
Thus, the Panthers, on the one hand, could not become a full-fledged medium tank in any way - it was simply impossible to produce them in the quantities required for this. But as a heavy tank, they also had significant drawbacks.
First, it is, of course, booking. In 1942-43. the Germans launched the serial construction of a heavy tank with anti-shell armor - we are talking, of course, about the "Tiger", which, thanks to 80-100 mm armor protecting the forehead and sides of the tank, was less vulnerable to anti-tank and field artillery shells. The "Tiger" could very successfully push through the enemy's defenses: it could be stopped, disabled by breaking, say, a caterpillar, but it was extremely difficult to inflict really heavy damage on it. That is why, according to some reports, on the Kursk Bulge, each "Tiger" was knocked out 1,9 times on average - but after that, having received field repairs, it returned to service.
But the Panther could not boast of such a thing - the protection of its sides met the requirements of a medium tank, in 1943 it, of course, could not be considered anti-shell. And during the breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which was being built with a “focal” anti-tank defense, capable of conducting crossfire on advancing tanks from several positions, it could not, of course, turn to all of them with its almost invulnerable frontal projection. In other words, ceteris paribus, the Panthers, when breaking through the enemy defenses, would have suffered significantly greater losses than the Tigers.
Secondly, this is the caliber of the gun - although the 75-mm KwK 42 was quite enough for anti-tank battles, it is no longer enough to destroy the entire range of targets that a heavy tank should fight. Yes, and about the armor penetration of the Germans, it seems, vague doubts tormented.
That is why, at the beginning of 1943, as a further direction for the development of the Panthers, they saw bringing the thickness of the side armor to 60 mm and installing an even more powerful 88-mm KwK43 L / 71 gun than on the Tiger (Panther II project).
In general, the following can be said about the Panther - German military design thought produced a very strange tank. Too large and complex to become the main combat vehicle of tank divisions, too capricious for "deep operations", not armored enough to break into enemy defenses, while it was able to effectively destroy any armored vehicles of the USSR and allies until the very end of the war.
And here, according to the author of this article, lies the secret of the effectiveness of the Panthers. If we take an analysis of the use of these tanks, made by our specialists during the war years, we will see that:
“The tactics of using Panther tanks has the following features:
a) tanks are used in combat mainly along roads or in the area of roads;
b) Panther tanks are not used separately, but as a rule they are escorted by groups of medium tanks T-III and T-IV;
c) Panther tanks open fire from long distances, using their advantage in artillery armament, trying to prevent our tanks from approaching;
d) during the attack, the “panthers” move in one direction, without changing course, trying to use their advantage in frontal defense;
e) during the defense, Panther tanks act from ambushes;
f) when the "Panthers" depart, they are reversing to the nearest cover in reverse, trying not to substitute the sides under artillery fire. "
a) tanks are used in combat mainly along roads or in the area of roads;
b) Panther tanks are not used separately, but as a rule they are escorted by groups of medium tanks T-III and T-IV;
c) Panther tanks open fire from long distances, using their advantage in artillery armament, trying to prevent our tanks from approaching;
d) during the attack, the “panthers” move in one direction, without changing course, trying to use their advantage in frontal defense;
e) during the defense, Panther tanks act from ambushes;
f) when the "Panthers" depart, they are reversing to the nearest cover in reverse, trying not to substitute the sides under artillery fire. "
In other words, the Germans, in fact, in the offensive used the "Panthers" not as tanks, but as self-propelled artillery installations, the actions of which were provided by the usual "triples" and "fours". And in defense, the Panthers were an excellent anti-tank self-propelled guns: realizing the direction of the main attack, the Germans could always prepare and meet ours at pre-prepared positions, “head on”, shooting it from afar, preventing it from entering for an attack from the flank.
In other words, the Panthers, for a number of the above reasons, did not meet the requirements of modern maneuver warfare at that time, the strategy and tactics of deep operations. But at the moment when the Wehrmacht began to receive them in somewhat large quantities, there was no longer any talk of any deep operations - after the Kursk Bulge, where the Panthers made their debut, the Wehrmacht finally and irrevocably lost the strategic initiative and could only defend itself, only snarling counterattacks. In Germany, the issue of mobile defense was on the agenda, and for her, the Panther turned out to be almost an ideal tank. Expensive and complex, but still not as much as the Tiger, which means it was produced in noticeably large quantities, with noticeably better mobility than the Tiger, with an excellently protected frontal projection, with excellent armor penetration of the 75-mm gun, According to its performance characteristics, the Panther was remarkably suitable for the role of an anti-tank self-propelled gun - a mobile reserve for the defending troops.
In other words, the Panther was almost the perfect tank ... for an army losing the war.
To be continued ...
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