The loss of Soviet and German armored vehicles in 1943 year. Kursk arc
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. In 1941, the “thirty-four” possesses ultimatum-powerful armor and a cannon in comparison with any armored vehicles of Nazi Germany. However, these advantages were largely balanced by the well-known "blindness" - the lack of surveillance, the lack of a fifth crew member, the complexity of management, as well as the mass of "childhood illnesses". In addition, the average Soviet tank the crews were trained much worse than the German ones, who had gained combat experience in Poland and France, and the units and formations lost both in experience and in communication, and in the ability to correctly combine the actions of infantry, artillery and tanks.
In 1942, the superiority of the T-34 in artillery and armor was maintained, while the tank gradually got rid of "childhood diseases", and the tank forces acquired the combat experience they needed. But the Germans were not idle, and by the end of the year they were able to saturate the troops with long-barreled 50-mm and 75-mm guns, with which they also began to arm their tanks and self-propelled guns. This created a known inconvenience for the Germans, but as a result, by the beginning of 1943, the T-34 had lost the honorary title of a tank with anti-bullet booking.
In the first half of the 1943, the T-34 received, finally, major upgrades, such as high-quality air filters, a commander's turret, a new gearbox, etc., which turned the thirty-four into a very advanced tank for maneuvering war and deep operations. According to the author, which he justified in the previous article, on the totality of the combat qualities of the T-34 arr. 1943 was fully consistent with the German medium tank T-IVH. The “thirty-four”, of course, was inferior to the “four” in a “head-on” duel situation, because the very powerful 75-mm cannon of the German tank and partial booking of the frontal projection of the 80-mm hull with armor gave it undeniable advantages in such a battle. However, even in such a situation, the superiority of the German tank was not absolute, since its tower and part of the frontal projection of the hull could well have been punctured with solid armor-piercing "blanks" T-34. However, the war is not at all confined to head-on tank combat, and in many other aspects T-IVH was inferior to T-34 - due to weak armor booking, top of hull and bottom, it was much more vulnerable to the effects of small-caliber anti-tank artillery artillery, infantry anti-tank weapons and min. At the same time, the T-34 had a long travel range at one refueling station, and finally became quite reliable and relatively easy to operate with a tank suitable for deep operations.
Thus, it can be said that from about June 1943 of the T-34 with the 76,2-mm gun reached the peak of its development.
By the beginning of 1943, the troops received a very considerable number of T-34s. In total, at the beginning of this year, the Red Army had 7,6 of thousands of medium tanks, and it is obvious that the bulk of them were precisely the T-34 of various years of release. A very large number, taking into account the fact that the Germans had a total number of armored vehicles at the beginning of the same year reached about 8 thousand units, which included light vehicles, and far from all of them were on the eastern front. During 1943, the army received 23,9 thousand medium tanks, including approximately 15,6 thousand made up "thirty-four". A total of 1943 plants produced 15 696 of these tanks, but perhaps not all of the released ones managed to get into parts, but they could be transferred a certain number of "Thirty-four", produced in 1942 g. However, this will not affect the statistics seriously .
Thus, we can state that in tank forces the situation improved in all respects - here both mass production, and high-quality improvement of tanks, and improvement of staff structures, in the form of formation of tank and mechanized corps of quite adequate personnel, and on their basis - tank armies . The first can be considered an analogue of the German tank and motorized divisions, the second - tank corps. In addition, of course, the fighters and commanders gained a rich military experience.
And, nevertheless, our tank losses in 1943 were significantly higher than the German ones. If we take the statistics provided by Müller-Hillebrand, it turns out that this year, on all fronts, the 8 988 tanks and SAU of all types were irretrievably lost. At the same time, the losses of the Red Army were about 23,5 thousand tanks and SPG.
As mentioned earlier, these figures are not equivalent, since in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army the accounting of losses was carried out in different ways. In our irretrievable losses, both non-combat losses and a portion of return losses are “sitting”, in cases when the decommissioned tank required a major overhaul or restoration. And here it remains to blame on the inaccuracies of historians. For example, G.F. Krivosheev, in the book “The Great Patriotic War. Book of losses "indicates that the losses of Soviet armored vehicles in the table below are irrevocable
But he also points out that in the “Received” column revenues of armored vehicles from factories, Lend-Lease and returned to troops from major repairs and after restoration are taken into account. At the same time, with respect to the loss graph it is indicated that it contains both combat and non-combat losses. But it is abundantly clear that “Losses” also includes tanks that have gone down for major repairs or restoration, since otherwise the balance simply would not converge.
Well, the Germans have nothing of this, or if there is, it is far from being in full. Why? If we try to reduce the Muller-Hillebrand figures to the balance, we will see that the balance does not beat in both directions: that is, for one tank the calculated residues are lower than the actual ones, for others - higher. It is possible that these are simply inaccurate figures, but most likely this is due to the lack of accounting for the disposal and return of armored vehicles from major repairs.
Nothing Muller-Hillebrand says about the losses of captured tanks, and those in the German army was a lot even on the Kursk Bulge. Accordingly, when recalculated according to the German method, the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns will significantly decrease, and vice versa - the calculation according to the Soviet method will lead to a significant increase in German losses.
All this is true, but for a correct comparison it is necessary to take into account other factors - now “in favor” of the Germans. In 1943, their troops were very fierce battles in Africa, and then capitulated in Tunisia, which naturally led to noticeable losses, including in tanks. And then there was the landing in Sicily and other battles in which the Germans, naturally, also suffered tank losses - and all this should be taken away from the total number of losses, since, for comparison, we need only those losses that the Germans suffered on the Soviet German front. In addition, in one of the previous articles of this cycle, the author made a very reasonable assumption that 1943 took into account a significant part of the losses of the “Panzervaffe”, which they actually suffered earlier, during the 1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad.
Thus, it is extremely difficult, if you can, to find out how much a reliable ratio of the losses of tanks and ACS of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front. But in any case, it can be stated that the Red Army lost tanks and self-propelled guns much more than the Wehrmacht and the SS. The loss ratio of 2: 1 is probably close to the truth, but it is possible that the affairs of the Red Army were even worse.
And then, of course, a natural question arises: if the organization, combat experience and materiel (in the form of T-34) of the Soviet armored forces came close to the German Panzervaffe, then where did the difference in losses come from?
The Kursk Arc and its individual episodes, such as the Battle of Prokhorovka, are still the subject of fierce disputes between military lovers stories. And one of the reasons for such a dispute is the irretrievable loss of tanks and self-propelled guns that the parties suffered.
Of course, in the format of a journal article, it is definitely impossible to give a comprehensive assessment of the Soviet and German losses of armored vehicles, but still some observations should be made. More or less weighted estimates give the 4: 1 ratio in favor of the Germans - a number of sources refer to irretrievable losses in 6 000 tanks and self-propelled artillery systems from us and 1 500 - from Panzerväff. Where did these numbers come from?
According to G.F. Krivosheev, in the Kursk defensive, Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operations conducted during July-August 1943, the Red Army lost the 6 064 tank and SAU. Müller-Hillebrand reports that the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht’s technology in July-August were 1 738 machines. Of course, the places in which the Germans lost their tanks were not at all confined to these three operations, since the Donbass, Donetsk and Chernigov-Poltava operations began in August, and our allies invaded Sicily, but still the main casualties in armored vehicles, Of course, the Germans suffered precisely at Kursk. In addition, here again played the factor of late write-off of fascist tanks for scrap (they were often transferred to the account in the column “requires major repairs” and were written off only later, which is noted by a number of domestic and foreign researchers). Again, one should be aware of the incompatibility of numbers - in the 6 064 tank and SAU from GF. Krivosheeva got the equipment, descended on major repairs and restoration.
And then questions begin. The fact is that the battle of Kursk for us consisted of the 3 battles listed above: the Kursk defensive, the Oryol and the Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive. The Germans under the operation "Citadel", in fact, understood only part of the Kursk defensive operation. The latter lasted for 19 days, from 5 to 23 in July 1943 g: the Germans only understand the period from 5 to 17 in July by the operation “Citadel”. If we assume that the Wehrmacht and the SS have irretrievably lost 1 500 tanks and self-propelled guns in all three operations, it is obvious that their losses during the period of Operation Citadel were significantly lower.
And here there is a big stumbling block between a number of sources, as well as our official history and revisionists. Previously, it was generally accepted that the German units were drained of blood during the "Citadel", and for a long time they lost their combat effectiveness. This is confirmed by such an eminent German author as Kurt Tippelskirkh, who, after describing attempts to “cut off” the Kursk salient, points out: “After a few days, it became clear that the German troops that had suffered irreparable losses failed to achieve their goal.”
However, revisionists see the question differently. They indicate that the Germans, according to various sources, concentrated for the operation “Citadel” 2 500 - 2 700 tanks and SPG, or even a bit more. At the same time, the irretrievable loss in armored vehicles during its implementation amounted to a few hundred machines on the strength of. For example, according to German researchers Zetterling and Frankson, who worked in the archives of Germany, the irrevocable losses of the South group from the 5 to 17 of July on the southern face of the army were 172 tanks and 18 SAUs, that is, 190 machines in total. This is confirmed by the German general Heinrici, indicating the irretrievable loss in the 193 machine.
However, our compatriot A.S. did not agree with such assessments. Tomzov, who personally arrived in the archives of Germany and studied German documents. In contrast to Zetterling and Frankson, he took into account the fact that the Germans often first gave the wounded armored vehicles the status of “needs a major overhaul,” and was written off for scrap later. Following the “fate” of the German tanks, he concluded that, taking into account the machines written off later, the real irrevocable losses of the armored vehicles of Army Group South during the period from 5 to 17 in July were not 190-193, but 290 machines, that is, real irrevocable losses Germans were about one and a half times higher than calculated ones.
But even if we take the figure in 290 tanks as a basis, it still turns out that the Soviet troops could only scratch the tank units of the Army “South” group, which, by the lowest estimate, had about 1,500 tanks and SPGs. After all, it turns out that irretrievable losses amounted to no more than 20% of their original number!
And this, according to revisionists, indicates that in fact during the operation “Citadel” the German “Panzervaffe” did not suffer significant damage, and the Germans stopped the operation solely under the influence of the Allies landing in Sicily and the need to transfer tank units to Italy. This is confirmed by the fact that the "defeated" Germanic tank forces subsequently, in the same 1943, fought very effectively against the advancing Soviet forces. And this same point of view is confirmed by such a prominent German commander as E. Manstein, who reports that the German troops under his command were fully capable of completing the Citadel, and if not to achieve complete success with the environment, then at least break the Soviet opposing forces. army, and if it were not for Hitler, who ordered the withdrawal of troops ...
Strangely enough, but in the opinion of the author of this article, both the revisionists and the “traditionalists” are right at the same time. Most likely, the revisionists are absolutely right that the irretrievable losses of German armored vehicles during Operation Citadel (that is, from 5 to 17 in July) are relatively small. But they completely mistakenly believe that the combat effectiveness of tank forces is determined by the irretrievable losses of tanks and SPGs.
In fact, of course, the combat capability of tank forces in terms of materiel is determined not by their irretrievable losses, but by the amount of equipment left in the ranks. And here the Germans were not doing too well, because the same General Heinrici cites data that the German army lost 1 612 tanks and SPG in the "Citadel" operation, of which 323 was irretrievable. Given that the Germans, according to various sources, at the beginning of the operation had from 2 451 to 2 928 units. armored vehicles (interestingly, the upper limit is given not by Soviet historiography, but by Glanz), it turns out that by July 17 they had 35-45% units in combat-ready state. armored vehicles from the original number. And if we take the most common figure in 2 700 machines as a basis, then 40%. Generally speaking, according to the rules of military science, a compound that has suffered a loss in excess of 50% is considered overwhelmed.
Thus, the irretrievable losses of the Germans are really small - from 323 to 485 cars, if the amendment of the respected A.S. Tomazova is true both for the 9th army, advancing from the north, and that the real irretrievable losses were about one and a half times higher than what follows from the operational German reports. But it is just as true that by July 17th the tank units of the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and to a considerable extent lost their offensive potential.
Losses of the Soviet army during the Kursk defensive operation according to G.F. Krivosheev made 1 614 tanks "irrevocably", that is, in this figure are sitting and combat, and non-combat losses, as well as not only destroyed tanks, but also requiring major repairs. That is, logically speaking, if we compare the Soviet and German tank losses, the numbers of 1 614 Soviet tanks against 1 612 German give a much more accurate picture than 1 614 against 323-485 units. irretrievably lost German tanks and SPGs.
Of course, such a comparison will also not be correct, because in 1 612 units. German losses "sit" including machines that failed, but do not require major repairs, and those in 1 614 tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR are not taken into account. On the other hand, we must not forget that the USSR lost 1 614 tanks in the period from 5 to 23 in July, and the German losses are limited to 17 in July.
But in any case, one thing can be sure firmly - although the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns (irretrievable plus returnable) during Operation Citadel may have been somewhat superior to German ones, but not by times, and certainly not by orders of magnitude. They were quite comparable, despite the individual blunders of the Red Army commanders, which led to heavy losses. The largest of these mistakes was the battle of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12 and led to unreasonably high losses of Soviet tanks.
Absolutely worthless, and here's why. Based on the level of irretrievable losses from their general level, according to General Heinrici, or according to updated data, according to A.S. Tomazov, we see that the Germans in the operation “Citadel” irrevocably lost 20-30% of the total loss of armored vehicles. That is exactly the amount of 323-485 of “non-returnable” tanks and self-propelled guns on the total number of German losses in 1 612 machines. It can be assumed that in other battles the percentage of irretrievable losses of German tanks was at the same level, that is, 20-30% of the total number of irretrievable and returnable losses.
At the same time, the irretrievable losses of Soviet armored vehicles averaged 44%, and in some operations 1943-44. could reach 65-78%.
Dear readers probably already understood what was the matter. Let us imagine that the German Panzer Division and the Soviet Panzer Corps entered the battle for the possession of a certain village of New Vasyuki. Both of them are pretty battered in previous battles, and have retained 100 tanks and SPGs. The battle went on all day, and in the evening the parties retreated to their original positions, while the Soviet and German units lost their tanks destroyed by 50.
What conclusions can be drawn from the results of such a fight? Obviously, the battle ended in a draw. Both sides did not fulfill the combat mission, but at the same time prevented the enemy from doing so, and suffered equal losses. So, we can say that the Soviet corps and the German division demonstrated approximately equal martial art.
But from 50 of the wounded Soviet tanks, 20 was completely destroyed, and from German 50 only 10. That is, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet and German armored vehicles are related as 2: 1. And so it turns out that, although in reality the parties were equal in their fighting qualities, but an assessment of irretrievable losses will show that the German division fought twice as good as the Soviet corps!
The same is the case with the Kursk battle. When a person who is interested in military history sees the ratio of irretrievable loss of roughly 4: 1 in favor of panzervaffe, he will naturally conclude that Hitler's troops are overwhelmingly superior to the material part and skill. But if we dig a little deeper, we will see that the ratio of irretrievable losses in fact was not at all four to one, but much better for the Soviet troops, and the general level of losses gives a completely different ratio. Therefore, we need to understand that when we look at the ratio of irretrievable losses for any period of hostilities, or in a particular battle, we see ... it is the ratio of irretrievable losses, but not the ratio of the combat qualities of the parties.
But still, why did the Soviet irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in total losses be 44%, and German - about 30%, that is, one and a half times less? We will talk about this in the next article.
In 1942, the superiority of the T-34 in artillery and armor was maintained, while the tank gradually got rid of "childhood diseases", and the tank forces acquired the combat experience they needed. But the Germans were not idle, and by the end of the year they were able to saturate the troops with long-barreled 50-mm and 75-mm guns, with which they also began to arm their tanks and self-propelled guns. This created a known inconvenience for the Germans, but as a result, by the beginning of 1943, the T-34 had lost the honorary title of a tank with anti-bullet booking.
In the first half of the 1943, the T-34 received, finally, major upgrades, such as high-quality air filters, a commander's turret, a new gearbox, etc., which turned the thirty-four into a very advanced tank for maneuvering war and deep operations. According to the author, which he justified in the previous article, on the totality of the combat qualities of the T-34 arr. 1943 was fully consistent with the German medium tank T-IVH. The “thirty-four”, of course, was inferior to the “four” in a “head-on” duel situation, because the very powerful 75-mm cannon of the German tank and partial booking of the frontal projection of the 80-mm hull with armor gave it undeniable advantages in such a battle. However, even in such a situation, the superiority of the German tank was not absolute, since its tower and part of the frontal projection of the hull could well have been punctured with solid armor-piercing "blanks" T-34. However, the war is not at all confined to head-on tank combat, and in many other aspects T-IVH was inferior to T-34 - due to weak armor booking, top of hull and bottom, it was much more vulnerable to the effects of small-caliber anti-tank artillery artillery, infantry anti-tank weapons and min. At the same time, the T-34 had a long travel range at one refueling station, and finally became quite reliable and relatively easy to operate with a tank suitable for deep operations.
Thus, it can be said that from about June 1943 of the T-34 with the 76,2-mm gun reached the peak of its development.
By the beginning of 1943, the troops received a very considerable number of T-34s. In total, at the beginning of this year, the Red Army had 7,6 of thousands of medium tanks, and it is obvious that the bulk of them were precisely the T-34 of various years of release. A very large number, taking into account the fact that the Germans had a total number of armored vehicles at the beginning of the same year reached about 8 thousand units, which included light vehicles, and far from all of them were on the eastern front. During 1943, the army received 23,9 thousand medium tanks, including approximately 15,6 thousand made up "thirty-four". A total of 1943 plants produced 15 696 of these tanks, but perhaps not all of the released ones managed to get into parts, but they could be transferred a certain number of "Thirty-four", produced in 1942 g. However, this will not affect the statistics seriously .
Thus, we can state that in tank forces the situation improved in all respects - here both mass production, and high-quality improvement of tanks, and improvement of staff structures, in the form of formation of tank and mechanized corps of quite adequate personnel, and on their basis - tank armies . The first can be considered an analogue of the German tank and motorized divisions, the second - tank corps. In addition, of course, the fighters and commanders gained a rich military experience.
The loss ratio in 1943
And, nevertheless, our tank losses in 1943 were significantly higher than the German ones. If we take the statistics provided by Müller-Hillebrand, it turns out that this year, on all fronts, the 8 988 tanks and SAU of all types were irretrievably lost. At the same time, the losses of the Red Army were about 23,5 thousand tanks and SPG.
As mentioned earlier, these figures are not equivalent, since in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army the accounting of losses was carried out in different ways. In our irretrievable losses, both non-combat losses and a portion of return losses are “sitting”, in cases when the decommissioned tank required a major overhaul or restoration. And here it remains to blame on the inaccuracies of historians. For example, G.F. Krivosheev, in the book “The Great Patriotic War. Book of losses "indicates that the losses of Soviet armored vehicles in the table below are irrevocable
But he also points out that in the “Received” column revenues of armored vehicles from factories, Lend-Lease and returned to troops from major repairs and after restoration are taken into account. At the same time, with respect to the loss graph it is indicated that it contains both combat and non-combat losses. But it is abundantly clear that “Losses” also includes tanks that have gone down for major repairs or restoration, since otherwise the balance simply would not converge.
Well, the Germans have nothing of this, or if there is, it is far from being in full. Why? If we try to reduce the Muller-Hillebrand figures to the balance, we will see that the balance does not beat in both directions: that is, for one tank the calculated residues are lower than the actual ones, for others - higher. It is possible that these are simply inaccurate figures, but most likely this is due to the lack of accounting for the disposal and return of armored vehicles from major repairs.
Nothing Muller-Hillebrand says about the losses of captured tanks, and those in the German army was a lot even on the Kursk Bulge. Accordingly, when recalculated according to the German method, the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns will significantly decrease, and vice versa - the calculation according to the Soviet method will lead to a significant increase in German losses.
All this is true, but for a correct comparison it is necessary to take into account other factors - now “in favor” of the Germans. In 1943, their troops were very fierce battles in Africa, and then capitulated in Tunisia, which naturally led to noticeable losses, including in tanks. And then there was the landing in Sicily and other battles in which the Germans, naturally, also suffered tank losses - and all this should be taken away from the total number of losses, since, for comparison, we need only those losses that the Germans suffered on the Soviet German front. In addition, in one of the previous articles of this cycle, the author made a very reasonable assumption that 1943 took into account a significant part of the losses of the “Panzervaffe”, which they actually suffered earlier, during the 1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad.
Thus, it is extremely difficult, if you can, to find out how much a reliable ratio of the losses of tanks and ACS of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front. But in any case, it can be stated that the Red Army lost tanks and self-propelled guns much more than the Wehrmacht and the SS. The loss ratio of 2: 1 is probably close to the truth, but it is possible that the affairs of the Red Army were even worse.
And then, of course, a natural question arises: if the organization, combat experience and materiel (in the form of T-34) of the Soviet armored forces came close to the German Panzervaffe, then where did the difference in losses come from?
Two words about Kursk Bulge
The Kursk Arc and its individual episodes, such as the Battle of Prokhorovka, are still the subject of fierce disputes between military lovers stories. And one of the reasons for such a dispute is the irretrievable loss of tanks and self-propelled guns that the parties suffered.
Of course, in the format of a journal article, it is definitely impossible to give a comprehensive assessment of the Soviet and German losses of armored vehicles, but still some observations should be made. More or less weighted estimates give the 4: 1 ratio in favor of the Germans - a number of sources refer to irretrievable losses in 6 000 tanks and self-propelled artillery systems from us and 1 500 - from Panzerväff. Where did these numbers come from?
According to G.F. Krivosheev, in the Kursk defensive, Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operations conducted during July-August 1943, the Red Army lost the 6 064 tank and SAU. Müller-Hillebrand reports that the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht’s technology in July-August were 1 738 machines. Of course, the places in which the Germans lost their tanks were not at all confined to these three operations, since the Donbass, Donetsk and Chernigov-Poltava operations began in August, and our allies invaded Sicily, but still the main casualties in armored vehicles, Of course, the Germans suffered precisely at Kursk. In addition, here again played the factor of late write-off of fascist tanks for scrap (they were often transferred to the account in the column “requires major repairs” and were written off only later, which is noted by a number of domestic and foreign researchers). Again, one should be aware of the incompatibility of numbers - in the 6 064 tank and SAU from GF. Krivosheeva got the equipment, descended on major repairs and restoration.
And then questions begin. The fact is that the battle of Kursk for us consisted of the 3 battles listed above: the Kursk defensive, the Oryol and the Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive. The Germans under the operation "Citadel", in fact, understood only part of the Kursk defensive operation. The latter lasted for 19 days, from 5 to 23 in July 1943 g: the Germans only understand the period from 5 to 17 in July by the operation “Citadel”. If we assume that the Wehrmacht and the SS have irretrievably lost 1 500 tanks and self-propelled guns in all three operations, it is obvious that their losses during the period of Operation Citadel were significantly lower.
And here there is a big stumbling block between a number of sources, as well as our official history and revisionists. Previously, it was generally accepted that the German units were drained of blood during the "Citadel", and for a long time they lost their combat effectiveness. This is confirmed by such an eminent German author as Kurt Tippelskirkh, who, after describing attempts to “cut off” the Kursk salient, points out: “After a few days, it became clear that the German troops that had suffered irreparable losses failed to achieve their goal.”
However, revisionists see the question differently. They indicate that the Germans, according to various sources, concentrated for the operation “Citadel” 2 500 - 2 700 tanks and SPG, or even a bit more. At the same time, the irretrievable loss in armored vehicles during its implementation amounted to a few hundred machines on the strength of. For example, according to German researchers Zetterling and Frankson, who worked in the archives of Germany, the irrevocable losses of the South group from the 5 to 17 of July on the southern face of the army were 172 tanks and 18 SAUs, that is, 190 machines in total. This is confirmed by the German general Heinrici, indicating the irretrievable loss in the 193 machine.
However, our compatriot A.S. did not agree with such assessments. Tomzov, who personally arrived in the archives of Germany and studied German documents. In contrast to Zetterling and Frankson, he took into account the fact that the Germans often first gave the wounded armored vehicles the status of “needs a major overhaul,” and was written off for scrap later. Following the “fate” of the German tanks, he concluded that, taking into account the machines written off later, the real irrevocable losses of the armored vehicles of Army Group South during the period from 5 to 17 in July were not 190-193, but 290 machines, that is, real irrevocable losses Germans were about one and a half times higher than calculated ones.
But even if we take the figure in 290 tanks as a basis, it still turns out that the Soviet troops could only scratch the tank units of the Army “South” group, which, by the lowest estimate, had about 1,500 tanks and SPGs. After all, it turns out that irretrievable losses amounted to no more than 20% of their original number!
And this, according to revisionists, indicates that in fact during the operation “Citadel” the German “Panzervaffe” did not suffer significant damage, and the Germans stopped the operation solely under the influence of the Allies landing in Sicily and the need to transfer tank units to Italy. This is confirmed by the fact that the "defeated" Germanic tank forces subsequently, in the same 1943, fought very effectively against the advancing Soviet forces. And this same point of view is confirmed by such a prominent German commander as E. Manstein, who reports that the German troops under his command were fully capable of completing the Citadel, and if not to achieve complete success with the environment, then at least break the Soviet opposing forces. army, and if it were not for Hitler, who ordered the withdrawal of troops ...
Who is right?
Strangely enough, but in the opinion of the author of this article, both the revisionists and the “traditionalists” are right at the same time. Most likely, the revisionists are absolutely right that the irretrievable losses of German armored vehicles during Operation Citadel (that is, from 5 to 17 in July) are relatively small. But they completely mistakenly believe that the combat effectiveness of tank forces is determined by the irretrievable losses of tanks and SPGs.
In fact, of course, the combat capability of tank forces in terms of materiel is determined not by their irretrievable losses, but by the amount of equipment left in the ranks. And here the Germans were not doing too well, because the same General Heinrici cites data that the German army lost 1 612 tanks and SPG in the "Citadel" operation, of which 323 was irretrievable. Given that the Germans, according to various sources, at the beginning of the operation had from 2 451 to 2 928 units. armored vehicles (interestingly, the upper limit is given not by Soviet historiography, but by Glanz), it turns out that by July 17 they had 35-45% units in combat-ready state. armored vehicles from the original number. And if we take the most common figure in 2 700 machines as a basis, then 40%. Generally speaking, according to the rules of military science, a compound that has suffered a loss in excess of 50% is considered overwhelmed.
Thus, the irretrievable losses of the Germans are really small - from 323 to 485 cars, if the amendment of the respected A.S. Tomazova is true both for the 9th army, advancing from the north, and that the real irretrievable losses were about one and a half times higher than what follows from the operational German reports. But it is just as true that by July 17th the tank units of the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and to a considerable extent lost their offensive potential.
And what about the Red Army?
Losses of the Soviet army during the Kursk defensive operation according to G.F. Krivosheev made 1 614 tanks "irrevocably", that is, in this figure are sitting and combat, and non-combat losses, as well as not only destroyed tanks, but also requiring major repairs. That is, logically speaking, if we compare the Soviet and German tank losses, the numbers of 1 614 Soviet tanks against 1 612 German give a much more accurate picture than 1 614 against 323-485 units. irretrievably lost German tanks and SPGs.
Of course, such a comparison will also not be correct, because in 1 612 units. German losses "sit" including machines that failed, but do not require major repairs, and those in 1 614 tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR are not taken into account. On the other hand, we must not forget that the USSR lost 1 614 tanks in the period from 5 to 23 in July, and the German losses are limited to 17 in July.
But in any case, one thing can be sure firmly - although the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns (irretrievable plus returnable) during Operation Citadel may have been somewhat superior to German ones, but not by times, and certainly not by orders of magnitude. They were quite comparable, despite the individual blunders of the Red Army commanders, which led to heavy losses. The largest of these mistakes was the battle of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12 and led to unreasonably high losses of Soviet tanks.
Irreversible loss of armored vehicles as an indicator of the ability to fight
Absolutely worthless, and here's why. Based on the level of irretrievable losses from their general level, according to General Heinrici, or according to updated data, according to A.S. Tomazov, we see that the Germans in the operation “Citadel” irrevocably lost 20-30% of the total loss of armored vehicles. That is exactly the amount of 323-485 of “non-returnable” tanks and self-propelled guns on the total number of German losses in 1 612 machines. It can be assumed that in other battles the percentage of irretrievable losses of German tanks was at the same level, that is, 20-30% of the total number of irretrievable and returnable losses.
At the same time, the irretrievable losses of Soviet armored vehicles averaged 44%, and in some operations 1943-44. could reach 65-78%.
Dear readers probably already understood what was the matter. Let us imagine that the German Panzer Division and the Soviet Panzer Corps entered the battle for the possession of a certain village of New Vasyuki. Both of them are pretty battered in previous battles, and have retained 100 tanks and SPGs. The battle went on all day, and in the evening the parties retreated to their original positions, while the Soviet and German units lost their tanks destroyed by 50.
What conclusions can be drawn from the results of such a fight? Obviously, the battle ended in a draw. Both sides did not fulfill the combat mission, but at the same time prevented the enemy from doing so, and suffered equal losses. So, we can say that the Soviet corps and the German division demonstrated approximately equal martial art.
But from 50 of the wounded Soviet tanks, 20 was completely destroyed, and from German 50 only 10. That is, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet and German armored vehicles are related as 2: 1. And so it turns out that, although in reality the parties were equal in their fighting qualities, but an assessment of irretrievable losses will show that the German division fought twice as good as the Soviet corps!
The same is the case with the Kursk battle. When a person who is interested in military history sees the ratio of irretrievable loss of roughly 4: 1 in favor of panzervaffe, he will naturally conclude that Hitler's troops are overwhelmingly superior to the material part and skill. But if we dig a little deeper, we will see that the ratio of irretrievable losses in fact was not at all four to one, but much better for the Soviet troops, and the general level of losses gives a completely different ratio. Therefore, we need to understand that when we look at the ratio of irretrievable losses for any period of hostilities, or in a particular battle, we see ... it is the ratio of irretrievable losses, but not the ratio of the combat qualities of the parties.
But still, why did the Soviet irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in total losses be 44%, and German - about 30%, that is, one and a half times less? We will talk about this in the next article.
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