Pre-war structure of the armored troops of the Red Army

In this article we will consider some features of the organization of domestic tank forces in the prewar period. Initially, this material was conceived as a continuation of the cycle “Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers,” which would illustrate changes in attitudes to the organization, role and place of the Red Army armored troops in the pre-war and war years, against the background which evolved T-34. But the article turned out to be too voluminous, without going beyond the framework of the pre-war years and not even reaching the "Thirty-Four", and therefore the author decided to offer it to dear readers as a separate material.


It should be noted that the armored troops, before 1929, were called mechanized troops, and since December, 1942 - armored and mechanized troops, before the war had a very complex and constantly changing structure. But in brief its description could be reduced to the following. In the structure of the armored troops troops, two directions are clearly visible:

1. Creation of units and subdivisions for direct interaction with rifle and cavalry divisions;

2. Creation of large mechanized formations capable of independently solving tasks in operational interaction with large all-arms associations, such as the army or the front.

So, as part of the solution of the first task, a large number of individual tank companies, battalions, mechanized squadrons, automobile armies and regiments were formed, which, as a rule, were normally part of rifle and cavalry divisions or brigades. These compounds could not be in the divisional staff, but could exist separately, as a means of strengthening them, attached to the period of the operation. As for the second task, to solve it, beginning with 1930, mechanized brigades were formed, and from 1932, mechanized corps.

The mechanized corps was based on two mechanized brigades, each of which had 4 tank battalions, a self-propelled artillery division, machine-gun and sapper battalions, reconnaissance and chemical companies. In total, the team had 220 tanks, 56 armored vehicles, 27 guns. In addition to the mechanized brigades of the indicated composition, the mechanized corps included a rifle-machine gun brigade and many support units: reconnaissance battalion, chemical battalion, communications battalion, combat engineer battalion, anti-aircraft artillery division, company of regulation and technical bases. It is also interesting that the mechanized brigades that are part of the mechanized corps had their own states that were different from the individual mechanized brigades.

However, the teachings of 1932-34. showed that such mechanized corps proved to be too cumbersome and difficult to manage, which is why in 1935 their states were reformed.


Tanks of the 45 th mechanized corps on Kiev maneuvers, 1935


Their basis was still composed of two mechanized brigades, but now a new composition. The fact is that by that time it was already realized the need to unify them in composition with individual mech-brigades, but, oddly enough, it wasn’t possible at the time. The number of tanks in these compounds has decreased, while the T-26 tanks were excluded from the corps of mechanized brigades and now they were staffed exclusively with BT. However, as can be understood from the descriptions, the corps mech-brigade still remained not equivalent to a separate connection of the same type.

As for the rest of the units and subunits, the mechanized corps retained the rifle-machine-gun brigade, but most of the supporting subunits were withdrawn from them - only the communications battalion and the reconnaissance tank battalion remained. The number of tanks in the mechanized corps according to the state is now 463 units (there used to be more, but it is not clear to the author how). In total, the mechanized corps consisted of 384 BT, as well as 52 flamethrower tank and 63 tank T-37.

In general, the unbalanced compound, which had, in addition to a multitude of tanks, armored vehicles, motorcycles, but had almost no guns (20 units in total) and motorized infantry. Cars on such a mechanized corps relied 1 444 pcs. In total, starting with 1932, 4 of such mechanized corps was formed.

In 1937, the next round of upgrades took place. First, all the mechanized brigades of the Red Army began to be gradually renamed tank (the process was delayed until 1939 g), and were now divided into light and heavy tank brigades. Their staff and the number of military equipment has changed. The number of tanks increased from 157 to 265 combat and 36 training tanks in brigades equipped with T-26, or 278 combat and 49 training for brigades on BT. Now the tank brigade had to include the 4 battalion of tanks (54 of tank and 6 SAU in each), as well as one reconnaissance and motorized rifle battalion, not including support units. Only now it was possible to unify the composition of corps and individual tank brigades, now the number of tanks in one mechanized corps was 560 combat and 98 training.

But then the strange began.

It would seem that the Red Army is gradually getting on the right path: on the one hand, starting to form large independent tank formations, and on the other, gradually realizing that they should not be purely tank, but also have their own mobile artillery and motorized infantry. And suddenly, taking a step forward, the leadership of the army takes two steps back:

1. Established in July, 1939 g, the commission for revising the organizational structure of the troops, although it proposes to preserve tank brigades and mechanized corps, it calls for the exclusion of motor-rifle and rifle-brigade brigades and battalions from their composition.

2. In October, 1939 was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and USSR CP, a plan for the reorganization of the Red Army, according to which the mechanized corps was proposed to be disbanded, and again the need to remove the motorized rifle and machine-gun units for the staff of the tank brigade.



It can be assumed that the reason for the abandonment of the motorized infantry is associated primarily with a small number of available vehicles. As we have said, in the state of the same mechanized corps was laid almost 1,5 thousand cars, and this is very much. Recall that the German tank division of the sample 1941 g, having a staff of 16 932 people, that is, surpassing the Soviet mechanized corps arr. 1935 was one and a half times the number of soldiers and officers, had 2 147 cars in the state. But in fact the cars were the eternal Achilles' heel in the Red Army, they were never enough, and it can be assumed that in the brigades and mechanized corps the actual number was much lower than the regular number.

Most likely, a situation arose when the available fleet simply did not even have enough to service the existing tanks, and there was nothing to carry the motorized infantry, as a result of which, in fact, the mechanized corps and brigades were only partially motorized units. That is, the same team could select from its composition a mobile group, but was not completely mobile. Hence the desire of members of the commission to "save" it from infantry in order to ensure mobility of at least tank battalions in its composition.

As for the disbanding of the mechanized corps, there are no mysteries, perhaps not. By the time the final decision was made on them, and it happened on November 21 1939, the 20 mechanic corps (or rather, the tank corps) managed to war on Khalkhin Gol, and the 15 th and 25 took part in the “Liberation campaign” to Western Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, the Red Army had the opportunity to test the real combat capability and mobility of its higher tank formations and, alas, the results were disappointing. It turned out that with the existing level of communication and combat training, as well as the actual capabilities of the tank corps headquarters, the management of three brigades at the same time is very difficult, and the structure is too cumbersome. This may seem strange, but in terms of the pace of advancement, the 25 tank corps in Belarus and Ukraine managed to lose not only cavalry, but even infantry formations. At the same time, individual tank brigades showed significantly better results.

Very often, the author of this article had to deal with online discussions from such a point of view that in 1939 there was a downsizing of the armored troops in the USSR, and that the mechanized corps were abandoned in favor of tank brigades. But this, of course, is wrong, because until the very end of the 30s of the last century, it was the separate mechanized (later - tank) brigades that formed the backbone of the Red Army tank forces.

For example, in 1938-39. the Red Army included at least 28 tank brigades (as many mechanized brigades received new numbers when changing their name), but only 8 of them were included in the mechanized corps. Thus, in addition to the 4 mechanized corps as part of the Red Army, there were at least 20 tank brigades, but most likely they were still 21. According to other sources, the number of individual tank brigades reached 28 by the end of 1937, which, however, is somewhat doubtful, but by May 1940 there were already 39.

In other words, despite the presence of mechanized corps and not taking into account the mass of tanks in the rifle and cavalry divisions, the main type of formation of the Red Army armored troops was a tank brigade, and in this respect the decision to disband the tank corps did not change anything. In addition, it must be borne in mind that according to the decision adopted in November of 1939, instead of the four tank corps to be disbanded, the Red Army should have received 15 motorized divisions.



The number of new connections should have been 9 000 people. (originally planned for a thousand more, but when they started to form, it was already 9 thousand) in peacetime. This was not too different from the states of the mechanized corps, in which, by the state of 1935, in peacetime there should have been 8 965 people. personnel. However, if the mechanized corps had a brigade structure, the mechanized division consisted of 4 regiments, including tank, artillery and two rifle regiments. Thus, with approximately equal number of personnel, the number of tanks in the motorized division in comparison with the mechanized corps was reduced from 560 to 257 units, but the number of motorized infantry and artillery increased significantly.

In other words, the motorized division of 1939 was very close to such a perfect tool of tank warfare, which was the German tank division of the 1941 sample. Yes, of course, the German TD had even more personnel - almost 17 thousand people. against 12 thousand people. Soviet MD in the state of wartime, and there were even fewer tanks in it - from 147 to 229. But, nevertheless, the new Soviet compound, apparently, was much closer to the ideal combination of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry than any similar tank compound of any country in the world in 1939.

But how then did it turn out that later, instead of perfecting such a successful type of tank formation, the Red Army moved along the path of forming giant mechanized corps, which included 3 divisions and more 1000 tanks?

Apparently, the following has happened.

The first. I must say that the motorized divisions, depending on the point of view, were either a little late to be born, or, on the contrary, were far ahead of their time. The fact is that their advantage was universality, that is, they had enough tanks, artillery and motorized infantry for independent and effective combat operations. But alas, the general level of training of the personnel of the Red Army in 1939 simply did not allow to fully benefit from the benefits that the theory of the motorized division could in theory provide. The Finnish War "excellent" showed that the Soviet infantry of that time was poorly trained and did not know how to act either jointly with tanks or with artillery, and the latter did not have a high level of interaction with each other. Such a completely intolerable situation was caused by gaping gaps in combat training, and besides, the Red Army experienced a severe personnel shortage in the part of competent officers of all levels and junior commanders. Here, by the way, it’s not the mythical Stalinist repressions that should be blamed, but the fact that for a long time the number of armed forces of the Soviet Union did not exceed 500 000 people, and of those, a significant number were territorial troops. Only at the end of the 30-s, efforts were made to expand the army, but there was no personnel reserve for this. In other words, to bring four regiments into one division is one thing, but to ensure that they become a combat-ready tool capable of 100% to reveal their potential - this is completely different. At the same time, the Red Army had neither commanders nor headquarters capable of effectively managing such a division, and a large deficit of commanders of its individual units and divisions, not to mention the rank and file Red Army soldiers.

The second. The formation of motorized divisions turned out to be very “blurred” by the Soviet-Finnish “winter war” of the 1939-1940, as they were already started in December of 1939, that is, during the hostilities. Thus, the motorized divisions could not, simply did not have time to properly show themselves in battle - they were simply not ready.

And finally, the third - the Soviet-Finnish war revealed large gaps in the organization of the USSR tank forces, which demanded immediate elimination, but could not be resolved by simply building up the motorized divisions of the above state.

As mentioned above, in the 30s of the last century, it was considered essential to saturate the rifle and cavalry divisions with tanks, which were attached to tank formations from a tank company or battalion up to the regiment. This, again, turned out to be theoretically absolutely correct, but at the same time a premature solution.

Without a doubt, the presence of a trained and combat-ready tank battalion as part of an infantry division significantly increased its capabilities both in defense and in offensive. But for this, in addition to the approved staff of the division and the supply of a certain number of tanks with crews to it, it was necessary:

1. From somewhere take the commanders of divisions and officers of divisional headquarters, well acquainted with the capabilities and needs of the tank battalion entrusted to their command, and the tanks themselves. That is, it was not enough to give the infantry division commander a certain amount of armored vehicles, it was also necessary to teach him to use this armored equipment.

2. Create conditions for the operation of tanks - that is, at a minimum, equip locations, create maintenance services, arrange for the timely supply of spare parts, etc.

3. Create conditions for the normal combat training of tanks as part of infantry and cavalry divisions.

So, in fact, none of the above points have been fulfilled. The Red Army had a chronic shortage of at least some knowledgeable commanders of rifle divisions. Many of those who occupied these positions in their qualifications could not even effectively command a purely infantry formation, and here also tanks ... what tanks, when a significant part of the officers at the radio station looked askance? Of course, this does not mean that there were absolutely no divisions in the Red Army capable of effectively leading divisions with attached tanks, but there were just too few of them.

At the same time, even tankers who came to serve in divisions (combatants and below) often had gaps in education, and did not really know how to organize maintenance of complex equipment, did not have experience in building interaction with infantry and artillery, did not know how to organize combat training . And if they were able, then, often, they were confronted with the fact that for this they simply did not have enough hardware - spare parts for maintenance, etc.

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And all this together led to the fact that tank units in infantry formations were, but there was almost no sense in that, the divisional troops did not know how to use tanks in battle, the hardware transferred to rifle divisions was simply not used, so as not to develop a resource, or quickly broke down, if someone still tried to conduct serious training. And therefore the conclusion made by the results of the “winter war” by the armored subcommittee (20 of April 1940) is absolutely not surprising:

“Based on the use in the combat conditions that existed before and the newly created formations: separate tank battalions of the division, MSD of separate tank companies in the page regiments, tank regiments of the division, the commission considers these organized units to be completely unviable. Such organizational forms lead only to the complete dispersal of combat vehicles, their incorrect use (up to the protection of headquarters and rear services), the impossibility of their timely restoration, and sometimes the impossibility of using them. ”


It was a very unpleasant fiasco. In fact, it was said that a significant part of all tanks set up in the Red Army cannot be used for its intended purpose, and if everything is left as it is, it will lead to wear and loss without a noticeable increase in the combat capability of rifle and cavalry units. What did the subcommission propose?

“All separate tank battalions of rifle and motorized rifle divisions, separate light-tank regiments and divisions, with the exception of 1 and 2 OKA and personnel cavalry divisions, disband and create tank brigades ... ... categorically prohibit any formation of tank units, except tank brigades . When there is a need for tanks, send them only by whole brigades. ”


Did this mean that the analysis of the fighting showed the optimality of the brigade for the tank forces? Not. As we know, nothing like that happened. On the contrary, it turned out that tank brigades, being purely tank units, cannot operate effectively without the support of infantry and artillery (we will not recall the Air Force). For example, 17-19 December 1939. The 20 heavy tank brigade, armed with T-28, unsuccessfully tried to break through the Finnish fortified Summa-Hotinen. The problem was that, although the 20 TBR was supposed to support the 50 th rifle corps, in fact he could not do this - it all came down to episodic and weak support of the advancing infantry tanks.

Pre-war structure of the armored troops of the Red Army

Wounded tanks 20-th brigade after the offensive


In other words, if the rifle divisions did not know how to use tank companies and battalions in their composition, then where did they get the ability to interact with the tank brigade given during the operation? At the same time, the tankers had neither artillery nor motorized infantry; in order to conduct full-fledged military operations, they had to rely only on tanks, which naturally led to their great losses and periodic disruption of combat missions.

It can be assumed that the members of the subcommission saw and understood this perfectly well, so they did not want to abandon the motorized divisions at all. 1939 d. Their recommendations were:

“Save the existing organization of motorized divisions. To form 3 — 4 of such divisions according to the state of peacetime, to test them in exercises and combat operations in various directions, and then to make the appropriate clarification for the new formations. ”


In other words, it turned out like this. In 1940, the tank brigade was the most efficient unit of the Red Army armored troops. Companies, battalions, regiments handed over to infantry and cavalry units demonstrated low efficiency, larger mechanized corps were too sluggish and poorly managed, and motorized divisions had not yet had time to prove themselves. At the same time, the tank brigade, although it was definitely not the ideal of a tank brigade, was still a mastered, understandable for the army unit, which they learned to control, maintain, in peacetime, train and use in battle.

Hence, the commission’s natural and absolutely sensible proposal: to withdraw all (more precisely, almost all) tanks from rifle divisions and unite them into brigades. And, at the same time, in practice, to continue the search for a more optimal connection of the armored troops, to whom the motorized division had just appeared. And only then, when the structure, staff and management issues of such a division will be worked out, it will be possible to gradually re-form the armored troops into new units. In the Red Army, in general, there were no other reasonable options, because leaving tanks in separate companies / battalions in rifle divisions further meant only wasting money on their maintenance, and forming a mass of motorized divisions that could The tanks displayed in this way were impossible. And the same T-26 for motorized divisions did not fit. In addition, of course, no one interfered with the further use of newly formed brigades in order to directly support rifle corps.

Nevertheless, the development of domestic tank forces took a different path - 27 in May 1940. The People's Commissar of Defense, together with the Chief of General Staff, sent a report to the Politburo and SNK with a proposal to form tank divisions consisting of two artillery and motorized rifle regiments. , and anti-aircraft artillery division, and again return to the mechanized or tank corps. It is difficult to say what caused this decision: on the one hand, the idea of ​​creating compounds with more than 1 000 tanks, according to the memoirs of Marshal M.V. Zakharov, voiced by none other than I.V. Stalin. But, according to all the same memories, this was done at the end of May, when NGOs and the Chief of Staff worked out the idea of ​​forming tank divisions and corps with might and main, so Joseph Vissarionovich was hardly the initiator of this process.

Most likely, the leadership of the Red Army was impressed by the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht and the shock power of its tank divisions and corps. At the same time, in one German tank division, as of 1939, there was a 324 tank (the unbundling began in 1940 g and further), respectively, two such divisions, combined into a hull, gave almost 700 tanks in total. So it was in reality, but it was difficult to say what information the leadership of the Red Army in May 1940 r had - unfortunately, domestic intelligence greatly exaggerated the possibilities of the German tank industry. But in any case, the German tank corps, even in terms of its real strength, seemed much more powerful and dangerous than the separate tank brigades or motorized divisions. It is possible that this is what led to the desire of our commanders to get an equivalent "tank fist."

Nevertheless, the report of NKO from 27 in May 1940 was rejected: the structure of the tank forces needed to be finalized in order to meet the staff of the Red Army at the level of 3 410 thousand, which the government approved. The proposals were redone, and the new states of the mechanized corps approved 6 July 1940 by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1193-464ss. The same resolution established the states for the tank division, and for the motorized one, the staff was approved by the resolution of the NKO No. 215ss adopted by 22 in May 1940.



All in all, the mechanized corps should have included the 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions and, besides them, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion. In addition, by the same decree, each MK secured one airborne unit consisting of two short-range bomber and one fighter regiment. The latter, however, was not fulfilled.

In this form, the MC and existed until the Great Patriotic War, the changes in the structure were minimal. Thus, for example, according to the decree No. 1193-464ss, the tank division should have counted 386 tanks, but then its staff was slightly changed, and in fact their number increased to 413, but later it was reduced to 375 units.

In total, 1940 decided to create 8 mechanized corps. To this end, a new structure of armored troops was introduced, which included the creation of 18 tank, 8 motorized divisions, as well as 25 tank brigades, not counting the attached units to other units. In this case, 16 tank and 8 motorized divisions were intended to form 8 mechanized corps, 2 tank divisions became separate, and tank brigades were considered as a means of reinforcing rifle corps. This plan was even over-fulfilled: at the end of 1940, the Red Army had: 9 mechanized corps, cn 2 separate tank divisions, 3 motorized rifle divisions, aN, 40 tank brigades T-26, 5 tank brigades BT, 20 motorized brigades, ach, ach, a, ma, ach, ach, a, a, a, ma, a, a, a, a, a, 87, a, a, a, a, a), 18 a), 15, 15, 15 a, a) a, a. cavalry divisions, 3 armored divisions of mountain cavalry divisions, as well as other, smaller units that had tanks.

I must say that until this time, the formation of mehorpus looked reasonable and logical. First, they were created on the basis of existing compounds, so they immediately turned out to be “full-blooded”, that is, saturated with both technology and personnel. And, moreover, numerous brigades were also retained in the armored troops, whose task was to provide direct support to the infantry corps. But then the leadership of the Red Army, alas, changed the sense of proportion and, starting in the spring of 1941, it began to form the 21 MK, in order to bring the total number to 30. But they had to be created practically from scratch, and as a result, almost any remaining equipment was transferred to them. And including, of course, that which had separate tank brigades.

As a result of such approaches, the following happened: first, rifle divisions were deprived of tank support, and among the newly formed formations such strange formations appeared as, for example, the 40-Tank Division, whose tank fleet consisted of 19 T-26 and 139 T -37.

In other words, the development of the Red Army automobile armored troops in the 30s was characterized by a polar shift in priorities. If at the beginning of the 30s the main priority was to saturate the rifle and cavalry units with tank units, closer to the beginning of the war the infantry was practically deprived of such support, and the main role was played by the giant mechanized corps. The mechanized (later - tank) brigades at the beginning of the 30s represented the main type of tank formation, intended for independent solution of tasks in operational interaction with other branches of the military, that is, in fact, was the main tool of tank war. But in the 1940 year, tank brigades became a means of supporting rifle corps instead of tank battalions withdrawn from rifle divisions, and then almost completely disappeared from the tank forces. In this case, the reason for this disappearance was not the denial of the utility of the tank brigade, but the priority of the pre-war formation of a huge number of mechanized corps. The service and combat use of tank brigades were well developed, but at the same time, many in the leadership of the Red Army were well aware that a tank brigade was not the optimal mix for a modern tank war. That is why all 30-s continued the search for other compounds, larger than the tank brigade, but at the same time combining in themselves tanks and motorized artillery and infantry. Thus, the mechanized corps of the 1932-35 model were created, which were abandoned in favor of the motorized divisions, and then re-established the mechanized corps, but at a completely different organizational level.
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  1. polpot April 2 2019 05: 47 New
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    Thanks, very interesting.
    1. vladimirZ April 2 2019 07: 13 New
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      But then the leadership of the Red Army, alas, changed the sense of proportion, and since the spring of 1941 it began to form another 21 MKs in order to bring their total number to 30. But they had to create them practically from scratch, and as a result they were transferred almost any remaining equipment. And including, of course, the one possessed by individual tank brigades.
      - from article

      The creation of 30 unreasonable floppy, poorly managed 1000 tank mechanized corps, without the appropriate support of motorized infantry - the "activity" at that time of General G.K. Zhukov.
      He didn’t have enough elementary literacy to make an arithmetic calculation that there weren’t so many tanks in the USSR, and the capabilities of tank factories weren’t able to give them even in a year.
      After the war, in order to justify himself in the catastrophic defeat of the 1941 Red Army, Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that the tanks of the Red Army were bad, "outdated", "gasoline" and burned like candles.
      1. kvs207 April 2 2019 07: 49 New
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        But what, the production of tanks stopped or what? At the beginning of the war, the Red Army included about 25 thousand tanks. I agree that this is a payroll, but nonetheless.
        1. vladimirZ April 2 2019 08: 04 New
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          But what, the production of tanks stopped or what? At the beginning of the war, the Red Army included about 25 thousand tanks. I agree that this is a payroll, but nonetheless.
          - kvs207 (Valery)

          30 mechanized corps of 1000 tanks, how many tanks are needed?
          The answer in the problem is 30 thousand tanks.
          Was there such a number of tanks in the Red Army at that time, including obsolete, exhausted, unrepairable ones? Did not have.
          Even if you take the figure of 25 thousand tanks indicated by you (the total number of all), but in fact less, then there is a deficit of 5000 tanks for them - 5 mechanized corps ?!
          How could one plan this in the inevitable expectation of a war? Illiteracy is elementary, resulting in the defeat, blood and lives of millions of soldiers with the outbreak of war. It is on the conscience of the leadership of the Red Army - Zhukov and Tymoshenko.
          1. ser56 April 2 2019 14: 00 New
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            Quote: vladimirZ
            Illiteracy is elementary,

            In the memorial, the GKZh wrote that he did not know the possibilities of industry ... this is the beginning. GS what? bully
            1. pogis April 2 2019 17: 32 New
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              Hitler didn’t know either, oh-oh, !!!!
          2. vladcub April 2 2019 16: 36 New
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            "How could one plan this in the inevitable expectation of a war?" In 1940, a team-game game was held in the NPO. Zhukov played for the “blue” and completely defeated the “red.” The victory of the “blue” (Germans) was ensured by the massive use of tank corps. Here, under the influence of this game, they decided to increase the number of buildings. In addition to the lack of tanks, the "strange" to put it mildly, the layout of the General Staff played a role. For example, a tank corps certified in western Ukraine, and its fuel and lubricants depot was in Maykop. How do you like this layout?
            1. pogis April 2 2019 17: 25 New
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              France! It was after this that a decision was made with the destruction of all the results of previous KSHU and the formation of ANOTHER 20 CASES! My personal opinion is if the T-34 HAD armor-piercing shells .......
            2. aglet April 3 2019 22: 04 New
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              Quote: vladcub
              For example, a tank corps certified in western Ukraine, and its fuel and lubricants depot was in Maykop. How do you like this layout?

              tank corps stationed in Ukraine, and there he received fuel from his corps depots in the same Ukraine. and he supplied him with fuel at the Maykop refinery, in tanks, by rail. Well, there was no oil and refineries in Ukraine, and therefore the building could not receive fuel from exactly, or Chernivtsi
            3. Alexey RA April 4 2019 14: 57 New
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              Quote: vladcub
              In addition to the lack of tanks, the "strange" to put it mildly, the layout of the General Staff played a role. For example, a tank corps certified in western Ukraine, and its fuel and lubricants depot was in Maykop. How do you like this layout?

              This is not the layout of the General Staff, but the crude reality given by our industry.
              According to the plans of the General Staff, all the fuel of the district was to be stored on the territory of the district in the fuel and lubricant warehouses, separated in depth - from small supply depots of the border to large bases in the rear of the district.
              In reality, the industry said - damn. There are no tanks in the required quantities, no pipes, no cement. Implementation of the plan was spread over several years. Until that time, extraterritorial storage of district fuel and lubricants was widely practiced in the warehouses of oil refineries, from which the existing capacities of the districts were replenished.
        2. Potter April 2 2019 08: 24 New
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          In order to participate in hostilities, the tank must not only be released by industry, it must be combat ready. That is, it is serviceable, equipped with a trained crew, provided with material supplies and repair facilities, and much more. The number of combat-ready vehicles in 1941 was significantly less than those released by industry.
          And according to the performance characteristics, it must correspond to the tanks of a potential enemy. Tanks MS-1 (T-18), T-27 tankettes, T-37 and T-38 tanks, early versions of the BT and T-26 do not correspond to this. And only these cars of the first years of release - about 10000 pieces.
          1. ser56 April 2 2019 14: 01 New
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            Quote: Potter
            early versions of the BT and T-26 do not correspond to this

            and the German T-1 correspond? and there are 800 of them ... bully
            1. anzar April 2 2019 19: 05 New
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              and the German T-1 correspond? and there are 800 of them ...

              Potter’s colleague probably meant "early versions of the BT and T-26"By this time they couldn’t move anymore. In general, a small percentage of" list "Soviet tanks could move well, especially new models)))
        3. BAI
          BAI April 2 2019 09: 40 New
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          The formation of the buildings was planned to be completed by the summer of 1943. Yes, and the T-34 and KV-1 by this time would have already released more than by the summer of 1941. Therefore, there was then a standard excuse - they did not have time to rearm the army.
      2. Bull Terrier April 2 2019 10: 43 New
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        all somehow miss the point all the time that at the end of 30 it occurred to someone to start creating a large fleet with some wild plans and stupidly taking funds for the same release of new tanks. But there is simply a huge amount of analysis that Soviet tank plants could produce much more. but someone needed 15 battleships and 15 cruisers apart from everything else for 8 years to rivet.
        1. vladcub April 4 2019 08: 28 New
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          I don’t know who exactly was the author of the idea, but Stalin allegedly said this: "Tsarist Russia built large ships, and we must surpass Tsarist Russia." Most likely this is not an exact quote, but the meaning is this.
          Kuznetsov’s memoirs somehow blurryly speak of the pre-war period and plans for the construction of the fleet, apparently because of N. C’s “faithful Leninist”
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 4 2019 13: 56 New
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            The author of the idea was just Vissarionych, but there everything was built not to overtake and overtake. The powerful fleet of the USSR was needed, and strongly
      3. strannik1985 April 2 2019 11: 52 New
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        These MK readiness is scheduled until 1943 inclusive. The question is not in the number of MKs, the question is why did the NGS decide that from February to the fall of 1941 the USSR was not in danger?
      4. Alexey RA April 2 2019 13: 07 New
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        Quote: vladimirZ
        He didn’t have enough elementary literacy to make an arithmetic calculation that there weren’t so many tanks in the USSR, and the capabilities of tank factories weren’t able to give them even in a year.

        And who said that in a year there will be a war? BTV reform plans were calculated until 1943.

        And the second question is that you have an adversary near you, capable of producing 18-20 thousand tanks a year. At least, intelligence with the tenacity of a woodpecker hammering you with these numbers. Enough for you eight MK to fight off such an enemy? And isn’t it better now to form additional MKs on the "training" equipment, so that when the industry gives out "battle" tanks, for them there would already be units and formations tactically trained and coordinated at least on the training equipment?
      5. Krasnodar April 2 2019 13: 13 New
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        Zhukov did not think that the war would begin so quickly. Now we are strong in hindsight, and then he created the infastucture of new parts, ready to absorb new technology.
      6. yehat April 3 2019 16: 03 New
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        General G.K. Zhukov.
        He lacked basic literacy

        Zhukov just had enough literacy and not only to estimate the quantity.
        he knew very well that it was logistically unrealistic to keep a 1000 tank unit battle-worthy.
        I want to remind you that it was Zhukov who canceled the planning of pink ponies at the General Staff and insisted on a radical revision of the supply of parts upward.
        1. chenia April 3 2019 18: 12 New
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          Quote: yehat
          Zhukov just had enough literacy and not only to estimate the quantity.
          he knew very well that it was logistically unrealistic to keep a 1000 tank unit battle-worthy.


          Ну Firstly this association (operational). Later TA and more tanks had.
          Secondly what the hell to deploy 21 MK with muddy OShS
          thirdwho interfered with the formation at the training ground with subsequent conclusions.
          Well fourthly, well, if such a competent one, like the Germans, did not make 2 tank regiments, less often 3 battalion regiments. As the head of the General Staff, he is primarily responsible for the OSh ..
          1. yehat April 3 2019 22: 00 New
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            4. we had completely different technical support schemes, therefore the number of tanks was different. In addition, the Germans managed to form and train a sufficient number of motorized support units, but the Red Army had big problems with this - in fact there was neither adequate materiel nor personnel. We did not have a sufficient number of armored personnel carriers, nor fast tractors, nor mobile artillery, nor normal mobile anti-aircraft mounts.
            1. chenia April 3 2019 22: 44 New
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              I already wrote on the topic. where is the critical link MK. It’s TP — to make it already four-battalion is absurd (usually a regiment of 2-3 battalions, a brigade of 4-7, a division of 9-12 according to the type of troops), and this is without the appropriate strapping for the brigade (combat and rear support units).
              If they copied as with the Germans, it was necessary to the end. And there TP is mainly two-battalion. There is my post. where due to changes in the OSH TP in the MK becomes up to 600 tanks.
              And the rest, the creation of MK is a very correct decision.

              Well, to replicate an unverified formation, how so? And who is to blame? Here and Meretskov and Zhukov head to head .....
              And their fault in the collapse of BT component of the Red Army is absolute, and the initial period of the Second World War is their "merit."
            2. vladcub April 4 2019 08: 33 New
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              BTR, mobile artillery and normal mobile anti-aircraft mounts before 1945 in sufficient quantities so we did not have
          2. Alexey RA April 4 2019 15: 05 New
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            Quote: chenia
            thirdly, who prevented the formation from being fired at the training ground with subsequent conclusions.

            No one bothered. And the exercises on the practical testing of the capabilities of the MK in the offensive, defense and on the march were appointed by Zhukov in the fall of 1941 - only by this time the Red Army would have received the first equipped and coordinated mechanized corps. In less than a year, it was impossible to get a ready-made MK for practical exercises.
            Quote: chenia
            secondly what the hell to deploy 21 MK with muddy OShS

            An attempt to save time on tactical training and coordination even to the battalion. It’s easier to change the finished OSH than to form a building from scratch, and the personnel will be somehow prepared.
            Quote: chenia
            and fourthly, well, if I’m so literate as the Germans, I didn’t do 2 tank regiments, less often 3 battalion regiments.

            And here it is necessary to look - what information our intelligence provided on the Panzerwaffe OShs. That is, what the General Staff knew about German tank regiments.
            1. chenia April 4 2019 21: 27 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              No one bothered. And exercises on the practical verification of the capabilities of the MK in the offensive, defense and on the march were appointed by Zhukov in the fall of 1941


              I am aware, but a year (before the war) there is an unproven staff. I mean that already in the autumn of 1940 Meretskov was to drive him away. I know how changes were introduced to the state (in my time) - after making a preliminary decision 5 years later, after theoretical justifications and experimental runs (art division in TP). So this is just a regiment unit.
              MK is primarily a powerful offensive machine. To make a tool is not one, and I have never used it, and continue to replicate, here it is strange.

              Quote: Alexey RA
              An attempt to save time on tactical training and coordination even to the battalion


              Well no. It’s immediately clear that they’re not even close to the power supply. Even on the basis of some part of another type of troops (meaning a place of permanent deployment), the amount of work to create a specific MTB (refueling, technical maintenance premises, a park, shooting ranges, tank tracks, training classes, etc.) does not allow even a primitive BP I'm not talking about personnel, those who should carry it out (with this expansion, part of them are not tankers at all).
        2. aglet April 3 2019 22: 15 New
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          Quote: yehat
          Zhukov just had enough literacy and not only to estimate the quantity.
          he knew very well that it’s logistically unrealistic to keep 1000 tank units operational

          “But already in July 1940, on the basis of information received from France, the mechanized corps were re-created as a tank formation of the Red Army to“ deeply shock the enemy’s front. ”According to the state of 1941, each mechanized corps had 36 personnel, 080 tanks of various types (of which 1 heavy, 031 medium, 126 BT-420, 316 T-7 and 44 chemical, 26 floating) "- who was then the chief of the General Staff, do not remind?
          1. yehat April 4 2019 08: 41 New
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            Quote: aglet

            "But in July 1940, on the basis of information received from France, the mechanized corps were re-created

            were not created. formation began, which they planned to finish only by the summer of 41 years.
            but in fact - I looked somewhere in the internet, the acquisition of such a part by competent trained officers takes 3 years, but this was not taken into account at all. by the summer of 41, officers of the mechanized corps had not yet received the proper experience of maneuvering, nor tactical.

            which is curious, after the defeat of the mechanized corps, the remnants were divided into brigades and began to act much more efficiently - a good example of Katukov.
            1. aglet April 4 2019 13: 56 New
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              [quote = yehat] were not created. formation began, which they planned to finish only by the summer of 41 years [/ quote]
              “On June 9, 1940, the People’s Commissar of Defense approved a plan for the formation of new mechanized corps with a special staff. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were formed. Instead of fully equipping the existing ones in February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the formation of new armored and mechanized troops, providing for the creation of another 21 corps (later the formation of one mechanized corps was canceled.) And from April 1941 their formation began. It was not possible to fully equip all 29 mechanized corps by June 1941. Already by February 22 A 1941 as part of the mechanized corps there were 14 tanks "is from an Internet. [quote = yehat] [quote = aiguillette]
              which is curious, after the defeat of the mechanized corps, the remnants were divided into brigades and began to act much more efficiently - a good example of Katukov. [/ quote]
              just tanks left only for the brigades, of course, for them the tasks were different, simpler, and therefore acted more successfully
              1. Alexey RA April 4 2019 15: 13 New
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                Quote: aglet
                just tanks left only for the brigades, of course, for them the tasks were different, simpler, and therefore acted more successfully

                A common misconception.
                After the abandonment of the tank divisions, NPO only in 1941 planned to form 120 tank brigades. The tanks planned for them would be enough for 30 tank divisions. But all the same, brigades were formed.
                Based on the instructions of the State Defense Committee:
                1. To form according to the states according to Appendix No. 1 to January 1, 1942 120 separate tank brigades (7 KV tanks, 20 T-34 or T-50 tanks and 64 T-60 tanks each).
                2. The formation of individual tank brigades should be carried out as follows:
                1) 3 separate tank brigades - in the month of August 1941
                2) 15 separate tank brigades - in the month of September 1941.
                3) 30 separate tank brigades - in the month of October 1941.
                4) 35 separate tank brigades - in the month of November 1941.
                5) 37 separate tank brigades - in the month of December 1941.
                © Order of the NCO No. 0063 of August 12, 1941 “On the Formation of Separate Tank Brigades”
                1. aglet April 4 2019 15: 42 New
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                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  The tanks planned for them would be enough for 30 tank divisions. But they still formed brigades

                  the conditions of use changed, the tanks were mostly light, the tasks were solved — only infantry support — just for the brigade. the tank division needed much more medium and heavy tanks than the brigade, and they simply weren’t. because the brigades formed
    2. Jura 27 April 5 2019 17: 06 New
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      The author of the post and the authors of comments do not understand the main reason for the creation of 30 mechanized corps. It is not a matter of Zhukov’s and IVS’s “arithmetic” errors, which ended — one, about three classes of central vocational schools, and the second half-educated DS.

      The main reason is the adoption of spring 41g. plan to defeat the GG by striking powerful tank formations. In terms of the number of tanks, there was no mistake; 8 combat corps of the first stage of the western military forces (excl. 11MK and 9MK) were fully equipped and could be used for the first strike in July. After some time has passed since the start of the war and the depletion of these MKs, other MKs that were understaffed during the war and manned by MKs not from the western districts (e.g. 5MK and 7MK) would have entered the battle, at the second stage, from the milestone reached. that in 1945 the USSR had only five tank armies, with fewer tanks and self-propelled guns than the MK in 41g.
      In addition, Zhukov and the IVS were realistic in terms of the reliability of Soviet technology, assign 1000 tanks to MK, 900 will leave the parks, and 750 will reach the battlefield, and this will turn out to be a TA mod. 1944 by the number of BTT.

      Of course, for effective defense, MKs were not suitable, unlike TBR and MD, and therefore they were destroyed. Pavlov’s report was called “The use of mechanical connections (after the fact of MK) in modern offensive operations and the introduction of MK into a breakthrough”, i.e. it’s not defense of the MK, against breaking through tank and mechanized formations of the enemy and not a mechanized corps strike on the flank of the advancing enemy.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 5 2019 17: 22 New
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        Quote: Jura 27
        The author of the post and the authors of comments do not understand the main reason for the creation of 30-ti mechanized corps.

        Yura, please tell us what the author of the post considers the main reason for the creation of 30 MK. The author of the post is very interesting.
        1. Jura 27 April 6 2019 03: 47 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Quote: Jura 27
          The author of the post and the authors of comments do not understand the main reason for the creation of 30-ti mechanized corps.

          Yura, please tell us what the author of the post considers the main reason for the creation of 30 MK. The author of the post is very interesting.

          The fact of the matter is that in your "high flow", the main reason is not indicated, so I expressed it in one sentence, without any turbidity.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 6 2019 13: 16 New
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            Quote: Jura 27
            The fact of the matter is that in your "high flow", the main reason is not indicated, so I expressed it in one sentence, without any turbidity.

            So, Yura, it turned out that the author is not that he "does not understand", but "did not indicate", and these are two big differences. This is the first, and the second is that the article is not at all devoted to the reasons for organizing additional tank corps. You, probably, could notice it, but the text turned out to be too complicated for you, it is not clear why you call it “muddy”
            And finally, the third - just once again, you managed to express in one sentence not the “main reason for creating the mechanized corps”, but your complete misunderstanding of this very reason.
            Quote: Jura 27
            The main reason is the adoption in the spring of 41. plan, to defeat GG, by striking powerful tank formations.

            I have not read a more vague description of the pre-war domestic plans
  2. Kote Pan Kokhanka April 2 2019 06: 12 New
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    Dear Andrey from Tankograd, thank you so much for me. You opened up on the more expected side! And then ships, ships !!!
    hi
  3. Nehist April 2 2019 07: 37 New
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    Great article !!! The Red Army came to the concept of balancing the TC earlier than the enemy, but alas, the security capabilities did not meet the objectives. In the Wehrmacht, this idea was picked up later, but due to the fact that they had more combat experience, they brought their TDs to an optimal state and only by the end of 42 years, significantly reducing the number of tanks and saturating TD to the limit with means of amplification.
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka April 2 2019 11: 47 New
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      For a long time I did not oppose you!
      In fact, you are right, but if you dig deeper, you should pay attention to the fact that the Germans were simply more consistent - each time reforming their tank forces after military companies.
      Moreover, all this did not prevent them from making organizational mistakes. For example, the saturation of the SS Leib Standard Fuhrer division with an extra 200 Panthers, thereby reducing its effectiveness.
      About the throwing of a military German chimera at the end of the war with the use of the Mouse or the Tigers, I basically will not say anything,
      Regards, Vladislav!
      1. Nikita_Shmik April 3 2019 11: 40 New
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        It was even funnier there. Panthers gathered in the normal such part of the qualitative gain - the 39th tank regiment. However, the higher headquarters decided that the 200 newest tanks were somehow small, and combined the 39th with the tank regiment of Great Germany, and in order not to overload the headquarters of the Reich’s largest division, they subordinated the 10th tank brigade.
        The only problem is that its headquarters had to be formed altogether from scratch and a few days before the start of the offensive.
        As a result, this gigantic tank fist was left almost without control and on the very first day of battles did not achieve almost anything, except for large losses.
        1. Alexey RA April 4 2019 15: 44 New
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          Quote: Nikita_Shmik
          The only problem is that its headquarters had to be formed altogether from scratch and a few days before the start of the offensive.

          In fact, at the beginning of the headquarters offensive, the brigade did not have.
          The decision to form a brigade was made literally in the last days before the Citadel. The officers appointed to the headquarters of the 10th Tank Brigade did not even have time to arrive at the front before the offensive, there was also no necessary equipment, which was vital for the normal functioning of the headquarters. Several vehicles were "borrowed" from the "panther" battalions and one of the Great Germany was shared by one mittlerer Kommandopanzerwagen (a mobile command post based on the Sd. Kfz.251 armored personnel carrier).
          © Tomzov / Ulanov
          The result was not long in coming - two Panther battalions on the second day of battles for higher headquarters simply disappeared.
          As for the Panther, one thing is certain for sure - if one of the officers of the 48th shopping mall knew the mysterious story of the “disappearance of the Norfolk Regiment,” then it must have recalled it that day, and more than once. In the book of negotiations of the headquarters of the 48th shopping mall after mentioning that at about 05:00 “Panthers” are near Yarki farm, only complaints about the lack of communication follow. Could not establish contact with the "headquarters" of Decker and formally subordinate to him von Strachwitz. In fact, the connection with the 39th Tank Regiment disappeared and did not restore until the afternoon - all this time the Panthers, in the best traditions of the Kipling cat, “walked on their own”.
  4. kvs207 April 2 2019 07: 55 New
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    The author, as always, is a plus.
    At the beginning of my interest in military affairs in general, and in tank forces in particular, there always arose a certain dissonance when I looked at the full-time structure of the TBR in the late 30s and during the war, when the TBR was essentially a tank regiment. However, even then (the 70s), the authors did not conceal the shortcomings of the tank forces OSH at the beginning. Great Patriotic War.
  5. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 08: 27 New
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    Good morning, dear Andrey!

    The surprise for the Soviet command, which became the main cause of disasters, was the pace of German operations, which made it unacceptable not to be able to coordinate maneuver and combat units, not to have normal communications, to ignore the disorganization of the rear, etc. With this arrangement of the brains of the Soviet command, tanks could be united even into legions, even into squadrons - the result would not have changed much.
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka April 2 2019 11: 36 New
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      Good morning Andrey Shmelev!
      The question is backfill, and which of the raging allies, having met at one time with a high rate of military operations of the German army, was ready for it? Poland, France, Norway, Denmark? All of the above countries showed resistance from 5 days to a month. Or a vaunted British army?
      I think if Britain and the United States had a common land border with Nazi Germany, then the outcome of the invasion of their territory would be logical!
      In addition, the Germans general was not ready for a high pace, recall only hysterical telegrams to Guderian, demanding to stop, dig in, etc.
      So with the "brains" of the Soviet command in 1938-1941 it was exactly the same as in the heads of their colleagues from France, Britain and other countries.
      In my personal opinion, contrary to the opinion of observers, it is even possible to have more than future allies. Since it is poor and poor, at first 4 years were won, and then against all odds they won !!!
      Anticipating the cries of the victorious “intelligentsia”, VICTORY was one and the whole SOVIET PEOPLE was the WINNER in the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR !!!
      We will never know whose stroke of the pen on the map, the shell, the bullet, the labor promise or the peasant sheaf of wheat was extreme, breaking the ridge of the fascist reptile, but this does not mean that it was not !!!
      Regards, Kote!
      1. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 12: 48 New
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        and who of the raging allies, having met at one time with a high rate of military operations of the German army, was ready for him


        Good morning, dear colleague!

        No one was there. But do not forget that the French and tanks had less than in the USSR, and the draft contingent, and territory. The question "general efficiency per kilogram of gold, a ton of steel, a thousand people, a square kilometer of territory" was the topic of a book that I quit (I didn’t have time) to write a few years ago, slowly sat down to finish it - I don’t know, maybe still a couple of years, but this question is extremely controversial and complex, is not yet ready to give a final opinion.

        I do not dispute the thesis of the decisive victims of the Soviet people in the name of Victory.

        Yours!
      2. ser56 April 2 2019 14: 09 New
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        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        I think if Britain and the United States had a common land border with Nazi Germany, then the outcome of the invasion of their territory would be logical!

        we have experience of an air attack on Britain - they fought back ... but they didn’t prepare for the tank because of the strait and how to blame them for it ... request
        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        but this does not mean that it was not !!!

        if not a secret - what did you want to say? repeat
      3. vladcub April 4 2019 08: 42 New
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        Namesake, I agree with you: the same shaves with tanks were not intelligible. Apparently, out of habit, the main opponents are not Europeans with a modern army, but Papuans with flintlocks
    2. ser56 April 2 2019 14: 04 New
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      Quote: Andrei Shmelev
      even in squadrons - the result would not have changed much.

      why so? when the troops of the Red Army were correctly used, the Germans fled in 41g, the same Manstein near Soltsy ...
      1. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 14: 06 New
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        when correctly used the troops of the Red Army


        so I write:
        made it unacceptable not to be able to coordinate the maneuver and battle of the units, not to have a normal connection, to ignore the disorganization of the rear, etc.


        this is for almost all other cases) well, Manstein is also a bit overkill)
  6. Potter April 2 2019 08: 28 New
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    The search for the optimal structure of tank (mechanized) troops in the Red Army was difficult. In fact, it was only in 1943 that the full-time structure of the tank and mechanized corps was worked out, corresponding to the conditions of military operations. Thank you for the article.
  7. MBRSS April 2 2019 08: 28 New
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    The T-35 in the photo is where, in the sense of where? Or is it computer graphics?
    1. igordok April 2 2019 12: 51 New
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      Military festival "Battlefield". What year, I don’t know.

      Found out here. http://klinok-peresvet.ru/content/13-voennyj-festival-pole-boya-chast-3-na-pole-tanki-grokhotali
      1. MBRSS April 2 2019 13: 10 New
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        Igor, thanks. Ofiget, he is also on the go.
        1. igordok April 2 2019 13: 12 New
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          I’m definitely not sure, but it seems like a remake using the "native" parts.
          1. igordok April 2 2019 13: 41 New
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            Video about him.
  8. DesToeR April 2 2019 09: 19 New
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    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    The surprise for the Soviet command, which became the main cause of disasters, was the pace of German operations, which made it unacceptable not to be able to coordinate maneuver and combat units, not to have normal communications, to ignore the disorganization of the rear, etc.

    So this is the essence of any offensive operation - a surprise! If the enemy is allowed to coordinate the maneuver, success is unlikely.
    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    With this arrangement of the brains of the Soviet command, tanks could be united even into legions, even into squadrons - the result would not have changed much.

    22.06.1944/XNUMX/XNUMX, exactly three years after the start of Operation Barbarossa, what was the “brain structure” of the German command? Was the surprise for them the pace of advance of the Soviet troops in the operation "Bagration"? Answer: the "surprise" was such that it was already necessary to collect their "legions" and "squadrons" in Poland. Maybe not only in the "brain" was the case?
    1. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 10: 00 New
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      The German command sorely lacked horses, cars, spare parts, gasoline - the vast majority of the Wehrmacht lost its former mobility. The device of brains remained the same. However, it was also a surprise for them that the Soviet army was capable of rapid offensive maneuvers in such proportions
  9. BAI
    BAI April 2 2019 09: 33 New
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    in the spring of 1941, it began to form another 21 MKs in order to bring their total number to 30

    Moreover, these 30 corps were often meant when explaining the reasons for the failure of 1941, they said: "The army was not equipped and not formed until the end."
  10. DesToeR April 2 2019 10: 06 New
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    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    The German command sorely lacked horses, cars, spare parts, gasoline - the vast majority of the Wehrmacht lost its former mobility.

    You are not talking about the Red Army sample of June 1941? No?
    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    The device of brains remained the same.

    "Warfare is simple and quite accessible to the sound mind of a person. But it’s difficult to fight."
    1. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 10: 29 New
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      I'm talking about the Wehrmacht after 1941. And before the war, the Red Army did not have to deal with gigantism, but had eight thousand fully-combat-ready tanks in well-functioning and equipped units. The same goes for two artillery regiments in each division. First spawned without measure, and then staged a "cry of Yaroslavna"
  11. chenia April 2 2019 11: 11 New
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    The author needs to be more careful with the terms-connection. unit and division has a clear link to the formation.

    Further I will not trace the entire evolution of the development of BTV, I will focus on the pre-war.

    At the level of associations, MK is a brilliant combination of units (2TD and 1 MSD) with combat support units, (another question about the number is 9-12 MK, but not 30)
    Compound-TD more interesting to us is also a normally balanced compound (2 TP and 1 MP).
    (by the way, German TDs (after France) with 1 TP, already garbage, and worked well until the resistance of the defense was weak, and then this was a brake on the offensive).

    And here is a TP with 4 battalions, 5 tanks each (one TB with 4 tanks in platoons). It was difficult to manage formation (both at the unit level and in units). And because of that. that we didn’t have time to “drive out” the MK during the exercises, we did not accept the digestible and manageable structure of this unit before the war (we later reached it during the fighting).

    If the TP were 3 x battalion, 3 tanks each in platoons, then the TP had 94-96 tanks (well, as it will become later), TD-190 tanks (main) + combat support tanks -20-30). In addition, 1/4 less TB (and this is less frame blur).
    Then MK would have about 600 tanks (and not for a thousand), well, hence the controllability and rear support.

    And about the (moto) infantry in the TP is not scary, if necessary, they could attach from the MP.



    But in the battalion of infantry rifle corps 4 battalions, 4 (even 5) tanks in platoons is justified. If necessary
    SD was attached to tanks - battalion, or even assault. This is how TB will later become in SMEs and its tasks. It was just that at that time it was impossible to organize a BP in tank units (and in artillery, too) in part of another kind of troops (though Alexey RA will argue that in the formations of the military branch the BP was not pure and would be right.)
  12. Alexey RA April 2 2019 11: 34 New
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    So it was in reality, but it was difficult to say what information the leadership of the Red Army had in May 1940 - unfortunately, Russian intelligence greatly exaggerated the capabilities of the German tank industry.

    But it is well known - what information did the leadership of the Red Army have in June 1941: see. "Report of the Chief of the GABTU KA on the organization, armament and means of combat of the BT and MV KA and foreign armies".
    In short, reconnaissance burned the Nipadezzi: the Panzerwaffe, it turns out, had both regular tank divisions with half a thousand tanks, and heavy tank divisions armed with TTs, serially produced in factories of occupied Czechoslovakia and France, and heavy tanks with armor under a hundred millimeters and 105 mm guns.

    Ours at creation of TD arr. In 1940 they took as an example a tool that was tested in practice - the Wehrmacht's pan-heart disease. The trouble was that we didn’t take the real OSH, but the one that the intelligence brought to us — moreover, the old model, before the French campaign (the reform of 1940 overslept).
    1. Alexey RA April 2 2019 11: 50 New
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      Just for reference, what the USSR knew about the French campaign:
      During the attack on France, the Germans used heavy tanks weighing 32 tons, weapons: one 105 mm gun, one 77 mm gun and 4 to 5 machine guns. Team of 7 people. Width is more than 2 meters. Combat speed up to 18 kilometers. A total of 10 motorized divisions (400 tanks) participated in the offensive, of which only 2-3 had 1 regiment of heavy tanks (in the heavy division, 1 regiment of light and medium tanks — 250 units and a heavy regiment — 150 tanks).

      Intelligence again “failed” and informed the Soviet command that the Germans deployed 90 divisions on the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg borders, including 15 armored and motorized divisions, and even 40 divisions on the French border (for the 10th May 1940, according to intelligence, the Germans had more than two hundred divisions). Acting under the cover of approximately nine thousand combat aircraft, widely applying “new military techniques and methods” and “new offensive means (heavy tanks, motorcycle units, dive bombers, airborne landing forces)”, German troops “penetrated deep into France as soon as possible,” reached the coast of northern France and thereby separated the Belgian group of allies from the main forces of France, surrounded the Belgian group of allies with up to 60-70 divisions ”, however, losing two thousand b of warplanes and about half a million people killed and wounded. “Only in the vicinity of Rotterdam was an airborne landing of 15 thousand people armed with machine guns, light guns, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks.” The Wehrmacht, according to Soviet intelligence, hacked the fortifications of the Maginot Line with heavy tanks armed with 100 mm cannons (although the data on the fighting mass of heavy tanks varied - according to some sources, the German heavy tanks T5 and T6 weighed 60 tons , other sources were limited to “only” 32 tons). According to the same valiant intelligence, no less than 2-3 German tank divisions had one regiment of heavy tanks, however, other sources reported the creation of two divisions of 35-ton heavy tanks. German motorcyclists, according to the comrades of the Stirlitz, rolled out in the fields and roads of Belgium and northern France in groups of up to sixty thousand people.
      © Ulanov / Shein
      1. anzar April 2 2019 19: 38 New
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        The German motorcyclists ... rolled out ... in groups of up to sixty thousand people

        Vaiyy, I never read this "novel"! That intelligence "was mistaken" (say with tanks) knew, but in order to come up with something, it is not enough to be Tukhachevsky))). Particularly amused that in heavy. tanks turns "Width is more than 2 meters"))
        Separately, the question is how to believe this nonsense. Stalin believed this, but there was no information about the German attack.
        1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 16 New
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          Quote: anzar
          Separately, the question is how to believe this nonsense. Stalin believed this, but there was no information about the German attack.

          You see what’s the matter ... it’s with the current baggage of knowledge that most intelligence reports seem nonsense. And at that time in the initial it was: the best army in Europe, the winner of the last world war, who was sitting behind an impregnable line of fortifications, was utterly defeated in a couple of weeks. Here you will inevitably begin to believe in the impossible. Moreover, the Germans had both airborne assault forces and motorized infantry.
          And on the other hand - how can you believe the information about the German attack, if in the spring of 1941 one of the reliable sources reports the attack three times - and cancels this information three times?
          1. anzar April 3 2019 13: 48 New
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            ..in spring 1941, one of the reliable sources three times reports an attack ...

            What can you do, unexpected operation for the Germans "Marita")) and the transfer of dates. But the question is not the date, but the confidence of Stalin that Germany will not attack in 41g, and even in the 42nd! Because of this belief in an “ally,” he allowed himself pranks in the Balkans (Sable action).
            1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 15: 27 New
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              Quote: anzar
              But the question is not the date, but the confidence of Stalin that Germany will not attack in 41g, and even in the 42nd!

              But for this again, I need to say thanks to the intelligence service, which regularly reported that the Reich would not fight on two fronts, and until final resolution of the British question there will be no attack. ICH, these messages were not refuted.
              The solution to the British question is best carried out only in the summer - so as not to fall under the curtains in the Channel. And it will take the whole season. So for 1941 you can not worry.
              In addition, the war of the Reich with the USSR for the leadership of the USSR was seen as total - but practically no preparations were made for such a war in the Reich. Who knew that the USSR in the Reich was considered a colossus with feet of clay, the victory over which does not require mobilization of the economy and the strain of all efforts.
    2. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 12: 52 New
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      The trouble was that we didn’t take the real OSH, but the one that the intelligence brought to us - and the old one,


      I fully support the previous speaker
  13. Alexey RA April 2 2019 11: 46 New
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    But then, the leadership of the Red Army, alas, changed the sense of proportion, and since the spring of 1941 it began to form another 21 MKs in order to bring their total number to 30.

    What do you do? Intelligence continues to escalate:
    The average production capacity of the main tank factories in Germany ranges from 70 to 80 tanks per month.
    The total production capacity of 18 German factories currently known to us (including the Protectorate and the Governor General) is estimated at 950 - 1000 tanks per month.
    Bearing in mind the possibility of rapidly deploying tank production on the basis of existing automotive tractor factories (up to 15-20 plants), as well as increasing the production of tanks at plants with their well-established production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks per year .
    With the use of French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10.000 tanks per year ...

    Head of Intelligence
    General Staff of the Red Army
    Lieutenant General Golikov

    ICH, Golikov did not fantasize, but gave an absolutely true assessment - not of actual production, but of the mobilization potential of the German tank industry.
    1. anzar April 2 2019 20: 08 New
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      Golikov did not fantasize ...

      And how can you get it?
      The total production capacity of the 18 German factories currently known to us (including the Protectorate and the Governor General) is determined in 950 - 1000 tanks per month.
      .
      With the use of French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10.000 tanks per year ...

      It doesn’t hurt you that (according to the report) the possibilities of ALL plants in Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic ... appreciated)) equal to the French of the "undecided part" alone?
      I hope he was shot later?
      1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 21 New
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        Quote: anzar
        Does it hurt you that (according to the report) the possibilities of ALL plants in Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic ... appreciated)) equal to the French only the "unopened part"?

        Read on:
        Bearing in mind the possibility of rapid deployment of tank production on the basis of existing automobile tractor plants (up to 15-20 plants), as well as an increase in the production of tanks at plants with their well-established production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks per year.

        950-1000 tanks per month - this is the productivity of tank factories before the mobilization of production. After mobilization, German factories can issue 1500-1700 tanks per month or 18000-20000 tanks per year. And after all they issued it - under Speer.
        1. anzar April 3 2019 14: 00 New
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          After mobilization, German factories can issue 1500-1700 tanks per month or 18000-20000 tanks per year

          But due to something else necessary (tractors ...) - it’s Soviet, not German style)) But the question is not in the kids, but in the owls. "planning". Even if an adversary can produce 100 tanks a year, does this mean that you will accept official documents requiring the same from you? Religious belief in the independent power of the decisions of the Central Committee ... And the fleet?
          And after all they gave out - under Speer

          Nda, when the fuel was gone. Let's go the Soviet way)))
          1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 15: 48 New
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            Quote: anzar
            But due to something else needed (tractors ...) - it's Soviet, not German style))

            And what to do - all the information during processing passes through a set of representations of the processor, which inevitably introduces distortions. So we decided that the Germans could sacrifice tractors for tanks (although the Germans themselves did not think so).
            Quote: anzar
            Even if an adversary can produce 100 tanks a year, does this mean that you will accept official documents requiring the same from you? Religious belief in the independent power of the decisions of the Central Committee ...

            Why independent power? Ordering equipment for the expansion of such production was in full swing. And GABTU's requests for industry were quite sane:
            To increase the combat readiness of mechanized troops and to provide the Red Army with armored vehicles and property, it is necessary:
            1. Request the Government:
            a) oblige the People's Commissariats of Industry to immediately begin the expansion of tank building;
            b) approve the tank building program for 1942 in the amount of 18500 tanks and for 1943 - 36500 tanks.
            2. To provide the ARGK and KAPs artillery with powerful tractors, build a new plant for the production of tractors “Voroshilovets” up to 2500 per year and a second factory for the production of tractors of the type “S-2” - 10000 per year.
            3. Transfer the tractor plants STZ, KhTZ, ChTZ and workshop “200” of plant No. 183 to multi-shift work. The Voroshilovets, S-2, ChTZ-65 and STZ-5 tractors produced by industrial plants are fully transferred to NPOs.
            4. Proceed immediately to the production of cross-country vehicles with 2 to 3 driving axles, for the acquisition of mechanized troops by them.
            5. Increase the supply of VMS trucks to 70-80% of the total number of trucks supplied by NPOs.
            6. To increase the supply of automotive spare parts from 112,5 million rubles to 207 million rubles, of which: automobile from 74,5 million rubles to 144 million rubles and tractor ChTZ and STZ from 38 million rubles to 63 million. rubles.
            7. To expand the production of tank spare parts, especially those in short supply, for which:
            a) In the system "Glavavtotktorodetal" select the main plants and special shops for manufacturing
            spare parts for the BT, T-26 tank and the M-5 and M-17 engines.
            b) To oblige the People’s Commissariat of General Engineering to organize the production of spare parts T-27 and T-37 at the plants of the People’s Commissariat.
            c) To oblige the People's Commissariat of Heavy Engineering to organize the production of spare parts for T-28 at the plants of the People's Commissariat.
            d) Build in 1942-1943. three new factories for the production of spare parts for new types of machines
            with a common issue that meets the needs of NPOs.
            8. To allocate NPOs for the second half of 1941, 430000 sets of tires.
            9. To expand the production of mobile repair shops of type “A” to 3000 and type “B” to 2000 pcs. in year.
            10. To request the Government to expedite the decision to deploy mobile repair bases for NPOs by industry.
            11. To oblige industry to produce in 1941 samples of tanks armed with anti-aircraft guns for mechanized corps.
            © Fedorenko
            1. anzar April 3 2019 22: 03 New
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              And what to do - all the information during processing passes through a set of representations of the processing

              This is so of course (----- centrism), the question is, however, on a scale. It turned out again that the best is the enemy of the good)), they thought they would prepare for the extreme variant, but merged into the normal one ...
              And GABTU's requests for industry were quite sane:

              I doubt that in everything, it’s rather what I was talking about — a set of Wishlist (like with a fleet up to 48 g.) Maybe something will come true, but if not, we are not to blame, we demanded, "planned" ... Here:
              4. Proceed immediately to the production of cross-country vehicles with 2 to 3 driving axles, for the acquisition of mechanized troops by them.

              And they tried to do all the 30s ... apparently there was no one to demand immediately))
              b) To oblige the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Engineering ... To oblige the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Engineering ... 10. To request (!) The government to accelerate ...

              As well as all that is needed ahead. n. Polikhayev))
              Just kidding, they tried of course, but the "measure" is a dialect. category)))
              1. Alexey RA April 4 2019 16: 37 New
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                Quote: anzar
                That is:
                4. Proceed immediately to the production of cross-country vehicles with 2 to 3 driving axles, for the acquisition of mechanized troops by them.

                And they tried to do all the 30s ... apparently there was no one to demand immediately))

                In fact, there are no Wishlist and Manilovism here - Fedorenko only asks to put the 63 model in the GAZ-1940 series as soon as possible.
    2. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 20: 59 New
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      Golikov did not fantasize, but gave an absolutely true assessment - not of actual production, but of the mobilization potential of the German tank industry.


      it's like I have a tap at home. Philip Ivanovich calculated the potential water flow and began to ring that in the last hour I had spilled the whole house to the basement, inclusive, and it ... was closed

      Philip Ivanovich estimated potential) wassat
      1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 29 New
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        Quote: Andrei Shmelev
        it's like I have a tap at home. Philip Ivanovich calculated the potential water flow and began to ring that in the last hour I had spilled the whole house to the basement, inclusive, and it ... was closed

        No. This, like, Philip Ivanovich decided that you want to flood his apartment so that to the ceiling - because otherwise Philip Ivanovich will not move. Philip Ivanovich calculated the consumption of all the taps, taking into account the additional cut-in + hose from the neighboring apartment - and began to slowly prepare for the inevitable (because he does not earn much, he will not be able to quickly prepare, and tapping the taps is not fast and noticeable).
        And you decided that you do not need to flood to the ceiling - Philip Ivanovich we have a colossus with feet of clay, and he will have enough to knee - and for this, ordinary taps are enough. smile
  14. Bigriver April 2 2019 11: 50 New
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    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    ... The Red Army before the war did not have to deal with gigantism, but had eight thousand fully-combat-ready tanks in well-functioning and well-equipped units. The same goes for two artillery regiments in each division. First spawned without measure, and then staged a "cry of Yaroslavna"

    "Juice" of afterglow.
    Brits and the United States suffered too many tanks in formations, to the detriment of artillery and motorized infantry. And what a surprise winked
    It was by 1943 that both those and others had also worked out suitable organizational staffs. What is it for? Probably everywhere were Zhukovs, Meretskovs and Tymoshenko. smile
    1. Andrey Shmelev April 2 2019 20: 35 New
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      "Juice" of afterglow.


      this is basic everyday life logic, sir:
      why buy a family of 100 Cossacks (I'm talking about the "T-37", etc.), if there’s nowhere to live (this is about the state of communication, rear, etc.),
      maybe a couple of Sportazhs will be enough to spend the rest on an apartment (three months ago) is this about the everyday analogy?
      1. Bigriver April 3 2019 09: 24 New
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        Quote: Andrei Shmelev
        "Juice" of afterglow.

        this is basic everyday life logic, sir:

        So this logic cheated on everyone: the USSR, England, USA, Germany.
        There was not a single country in WWII that would once come up with an organizational staff, did not change him many times during the war.
        1. Andrey Shmelev April 3 2019 16: 30 New
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          So this logic cheated on everyone


          but the degree of error was different. crowds T-37 all-bust for any logic
  15. strannik1985 April 2 2019 12: 06 New
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    E. Belash in the book "Tanks of the interwar period. Combat use." wrote that 25 TC was able to make marches of 120 km per day for 2-3 days, after a day was required. The rear areas, and not the combat units of the corps, were behind, including because the military commanders entered the breakthrough along one route, which caused traffic jams and traffic delays.
  16. wooja April 2 2019 12: 25 New
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    The fantasies of the leadership of the Red Army surpassed ..., Comrade Stalin was definitely right in repressing the command staff, the problem is that the unrepressed and rehabilitated did not differ much in quality, the war is a great teacher ... but it takes expensive
    1. CTABEP April 2 2019 18: 26 New
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      Yeah, but according to the results of the repressions, it turned out that if you shoot all the commanders and half the battalion commander-brigade commanders and appoint yesterday’s battalion commanders in their place, then it will work out

      the strongest personnel shortage for competent officers at all levels


      But the German army in 1941 was strong precisely trained officer personnel. Therefore, when in two years the Soviet command staff (and the rank-and-file sergeant by the way, too) flabbed and taught the war, and the Germans, on the contrary - a significant part of non-commissioners and officers (often serving back in the Reichsheer) died - then it turned out that the Germans were quite can beat. Well, of course, industry started to flourish - after 2 months the war, the territory of France began to end, and in Russia the troops of the Wehrmacht were just getting close to Moscow. Thanks to the campaign of 1939 - it made it possible to change the territory for so much necessary at that time.
      1. wooja April 2 2019 18: 42 New
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        This question is really muddy, historians are trying to get around it, unlike any kind of publicists ..., the quality of the spacecraft’s command staff was very low and, unfortunately, there was no similarity of the Reichswehr to the USSR ..., the inheritance inherited from the empire - military officers but not professionals, and after Trotsky's emigration they were expelled from the army ..., commanders like Tukhachevsky with exorbitant ambitions, and proletarian-party nominees. It was surprising to learn that the military career in the empire was very unpopular among the Russian nobility, the Germans served ... and where did they find themselves after the revolution ...?
      2. anzar April 2 2019 19: 18 New
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        only according to the results repression and it turned out that if you shoot all the commanders ...

        Dear STAVER, your comment is correct, only what kind of repression? After all, a respected author wrote that they are "mythical")))
        Probably inaccurately expressed. Yeah, and mythologists are not the same now)))
      3. Alexey RA April 3 2019 16: 54 New
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        Quote: CTABEP
        Yeah, but according to the results of the repressions, it turned out that if you shoot all the commanders and half the battalion commander-brigade commanders and appoint yesterday’s battalion commanders in their place, then it will work out
        the strongest personnel shortage for competent officers at all levels

        A strong personnel shortage is obtained if you prepare a reserve of commanding staff of 20-40 peacetime personnel divisions (there is no more money) - and then immediately deploy an army of 200 divisions.
        In the armed forces of the United States and Britain, there was no repression ... well, almost none. A staff shortage was worse than ours.
        1. strannik1985 April 3 2019 19: 41 New
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          The strongest personnel shortage will be, if we plan the number of BTV in 1939 ~ 94 thousand people, and since February 1941 the staff number of BTV war-time 1 million 65 thousand people. In fact, the burden of mass deployment of the MK fell on one spring draft, tank brigades and seconded from other parts.
        2. CTABEP April 5 2019 21: 36 New
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          Only now the strength of the US Army in 1939 was 174 thousand people. It is logical, as it were, that there were not enough officers when it was deployed to 11+ million.
  17. DesToeR April 2 2019 12: 29 New
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    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    I'm talking about the Wehrmacht after 1941.

    So I tell you about the Wehrmacht AFTER 1941. About the Wehrmacht, which did not receive a devastating blow without a mobile deployment. About the Wehrmacht, which has already fought for 3 years and well studied its opponent. But that's how it happens even in such "greenhouse" conditions ...
    Quote: Andrei Shmelev
    But the Red Army before the war had to be engaged not in gigantism

    Not well, the “Land of Soviets” was almost “buried” almost 30 years ago, and the adherents remained. Well then give out advice after 79 years from those very events. The experience he knows comes with experience, and with all countries and peoples without exception. Something about the 5 millionth mobilized army of the French such crying is not heard. The modern European army, which "fought" with the Wehrmacht for almost a year, scattered in a month. In the "brains" then these Frenchmen were!
    1. CTABEP April 2 2019 18: 27 New
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      The French army forever remained in the forests near Verdun; after the WWII, the French did not recover.
  18. Undecim April 2 2019 12: 53 New
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    I must say that the armored forces, until 1929 called the mechanized forces, and from December 1942 - the armored and mechanized forces,
    Until 1929, the Armored Forces of the Red Army existed.
    In 1929, with the creation of the Central Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, the troops were called mechanized.
    Since 1932, with the release of the temporary instruction "Driving and Combat of Independent Mechanized Units", the name mechanized troops has been fixed.
    From 1934 to 1942 - armored troops.
    From 1942 to 1954 - armored and mechanized troops.
  19. ser56 April 2 2019 13: 57 New
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    In general, it’s very good and informative, thanks to the author! He continues the line to restore a more or less real picture of the Red Army in the 30s, which is very good! drinks
    However, they cut an eye of absurdity like:
    "a large number of separate tank companies, battalions, mechanized squadrons, auto-armored divisions and regiments were formed, which, as a rule, were part of the staff of rifle and cavalry divisions or brigades. connections"to the regiment these are parts ... request
    the "self-propelled artillery division" didn’t seem to have been self-propelled guns then, except for a small number on the basis of the T-26 ... maybe on a mech pull?
    "But alas, the general level of training of the Red Army personnel in 1939" is probably all the same the middle and higher command staff of the Red Army? And here are the rank and file and sergeants? and leitechs ...
    "necessary to saturate tanks with rifle and cavalry divisionswhich were attached to tank formations from a tank company or battalion and up to the regiment. This, again, turned out to be theoretically absolutely correct, but at the same time a premature decision. "
    if about infantry you can still agree with the reservations, then about cavalry - no! This is the creation of shock mobile units, where instead of motorized infantry - cavalry, it is very reasonable, as the Second World War showed ...
    "Yes, and the same T-26s were not suitable for motorized divisions." T-1 and T-2 were quite suitable, maybe something else interrupted the dancers? repeat
    "But then the leadership of the Red Army, alas, changed the sense of proportion" how politely you ... bully It is a pity the author does not pronounce the names of the initiators, first of all, the GKZh ...
    "As a result of such approaches, the following happened: firstly, the infantry divisions were deprived of tank support," and secondly, no ... laughing I would put the smearing of resources in the first place, which led to the opposite result ... request
    “In other words, the development of the armored forces of the Red Army in the 30s was characterized by a polar change of priorities.” This is probably a consequence of the change of leadership personnel after the 37-38 cleanup ... Pavlov absolutized the tanks, in fact denied the role of the interaction of labor on the battlefield, especially tanks with artillery and infantry request
    1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 58 New
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      Quote: ser56
      Pavlov absolutized tanks, in fact, denied the role of the interaction of labor on the battlefield, primarily tanks with artillery and infantry

      PAULOV. You can’t take away Pavlov’s interaction from Voronov while they’re bosses, just as you can’t take away and separate the interactions of artillery and tanks. This is the first. The second - you are here, comrade Voronov, raised a good question about the interaction of infantry and artillery. Keep in mind that every tanker considers it a shameful thing for himself if he knows less than an infantryman on infantry and combined arms issues. We do not need such a tanker.
      VOTE. Correctly.
      PAVLOV- I ask you to keep this in mind. The field infantry charter in tank units is studied more than the tank charter, because the tank must be adapted to the actions of the infantry. And I ask you not to look at the tankman so that flamethrower tanks can set the task: "Go 7 km ahead and burn the enemy in the forest" - or say: "We will bombard your company with bombs if you don’t guard us when we go to dinner or to the bath. "
      © Meeting on the results of the Special Economic Fund.
  20. Undecim April 2 2019 14: 11 New
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    The mechanized corps was based on two mechanized brigades, each of which had 4 tank battalions, self-propelled artillery division, machine gun and sapper battalions, reconnaissance and chemical companies. In total, the brigade had 220 tanks, 56 armored vehicles, 27 guns. In addition to the mechanized brigades of the specified composition, the mechanized corps included a small arms and machine gun brigade and many support units: reconnaissance battalion, chemical battalion, communications battalion, combat engineer battalion, anti-aircraft artillery division, company of regulation and technical bases.
    About self-propelled artillery. In 1930, an experimental mechanized regiment was formed, which was transformed in May 1930 as an experiment into a mechanized brigade, which until 1932, when the formation of mechanized corps began, was singular.
    In the beginning, it had 60 tanks, 32 tankettes, 17 armored vehicles, in 1931 it was strengthened and consisted of a reconnaissance group (regiment), which included a battalion of tankettes and divisions - armored, machine-gun and artillery; strike group (regiment) (two tank battalions and two divisions of self-propelled artillery); transported infantry battalion; artillery group (three artillery divisions and air defense divisions). The brigade had 4700 personnel, 119 tanks, 100 tank wedges, 15 armored vehicles, 63 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 32 self-propelled guns, 16 howitzers and 44 anti-aircraft guns.
    In this case, it is clear that the mention of "divisions of self-propelled artillery" is purely theoretical, since at that time there was no self-propelled artillery in the Red Army, despite the development of such since 1920.
    The next time, the combination of "self-propelled artillery" appeared in relation to the states of mechanized corps in 1942.
    Before the Great Patriotic War in 1934-1935 in the Red Army received 99 units. SU-1-12 (76-mm regimental gun model 1927 mounted on GAZ-AAA or Moreland trucks).
    In 1935, an assembly batch was made of 24 SU-5-2 (122-mm howitzer model 1910/30 on the T-26 chassis), which entered service with the tank units of the Red Army. SU-5 was used in hostilities near Lake Hasan in 1938 and during the Polish campaign in September 1939.
    Therefore, in the states of the mechanized corps created in 1932, self-propelled artillery does not appear.
    By a decision of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council of March 11, 1932, 11 and 45 mechanized corps were formed on the base of the 11th rifle division and in the SVR on the basis of the 45th rifle division.
    They consisted of two mechanized brigades of T-26 and BT tanks (three tank battalions, a small-machine gun battalion, artillery battalion, combat engineer battalion, anti-aircraft machine gun company), reconnaissance, combat engineer, flamethrower battalions, anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and a traffic control company, base and air squad.
    The Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (since June 1992 the Russian State Military Archive). In two volumes. Volume 2. Guide. 1993. MANAGEMENT, HEADLINES OF AUTO-ARMED COMPANIES AND PARTS
    Page 274.
  21. vladcub April 2 2019 16: 09 New
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    It is traditionally believed that all leapfrog with the disbandment of tank corps in the 30s was on Pavlov's conscience: he mistakenly evaluated the use of tanks in Spain. Somehow he was impressed by the lack of tanks in Spain and he artificially increased the number of tanks by the disbandment of tank corps.
    Molotov did not confirm this version in conversations. But how really?
    1. Alexey RA April 2 2019 17: 16 New
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      Quote: vladcub
      It is traditionally believed that all leapfrog with the disbandment of tank corps in the 30s was on Pavlov's conscience: he mistakenly evaluated the use of tanks in Spain. Somehow he was impressed by the lack of tanks in Spain and he artificially increased the number of tanks by the disbandment of tank corps.

      And how can you increase the number of tanks by disbanding the structure? Indeed, at the same time, the superstructure over the brigades is simply removed, and the number of tanks remains the same.
      Pavlov demanded something else - to subjugate all tanks to tankers and take them away from the infantry. And he was right - it came to senility at the same Special Forces Council when it was necessary to pull out brigades to form special battalions in order to give them to rifle divisions that already had battalions in the state. Because "their" SD tanks were for the most part faulty, and the remaining ones were only enough to guard the headquarters, artillery and rear of divisions.
      PAULOV. Unfortunate fate befell us in the Red Army - and during any war befall - our division tanks. You will excuse my harshness, but I must say bluntly: all that was stated that tanks were necessary in order to teach interaction, today it turned out to be a bluff, no interaction was taught. More than 7 thousand tanks are scattered across divisions and they did not play any role. They were helpless. Battalions of the rifle division, twin T-37 tanks with T-26 - Kutzai organization, low-power T-37 tanks are not able to walk on Malomalsky mud. These battalions, part of the infantry divisions, had no effect. And let them say, let me correct, if I incorrectly say that they were most often turned to the guard of the headquarters of regiments and divisions.
      VOTE. Correctly.
      PAULOV. But this amounts to about 7 thousand tanks. The same battalions that operated from the brigade, they always acted correctly and did the most, because the actions of these battalions were constantly monitored by the headquarters of the brigades.

      © Meeting on the results of the SPS
      And Pavlov also struggled with pulling out tank units.
      What am I talking about? In addition to the fact that it is now necessary to restore all tank brigades and make appropriate reorganizations, having urgently restored tank brigades, at least at the expense of tanks of rifle divisions. Today, in the Kiev Military District, there are 14 tanks in four tank brigades. The war sold them apart, tank brigades scattered. I have to say bluntly, if there will be mobilization now, our KOVO brigades are not ready. The tanks of these brigades are now returning from the Leningrad Military District. This practice of pulling should be stopped. And I will seek, I must directly declare, while I am the commander of this kind of troops, so that no more units are destroyed, if you need tanks, let them take the whole part.


      As for MK arr. 30s, then for them the Polish campaign became the nail in the lid of the coffin when, when trying to use the mechanized corps not at the training ground, but in a real combat situation, it suddenly turned out that this structure poses a huge danger to its own troops. Simply put, the mechanized corps was unable to provide fuel supplies on the march on its own - and its equipment stood up, blocking the roads. To clear the cork, the intervention of the whole marshal was required. As a result, the mechanic corps of the 30s was considered a bulky and low-combat structure.
      1. Town Hall April 2 2019 17: 41 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        As a result, the mechanic corps of the 30s was considered a bulky and low-combat structure.


        How many tanks were in the mechanized corps of the 30s and how many were in the mechanized corps born in 40/41?
        1. Alexey RA April 2 2019 18: 26 New
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          Quote: Town Hall
          How many tanks were in the mechanized corps of the 30s and how many were in the mechanized corps born in 40/41?

          So between the disbandment of the MK-30 and the formation of the MK-40 was the French campaign. As a result of which it suddenly turned out that the Germans had tank divisions of 300-400 tanks (according to intelligence) and tank groups from these divisions could quickly transfer and advance. And ours immediately wanted the same miracle for themselves.
          1. Town Hall April 2 2019 22: 14 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            And ours immediately wanted the same miracle


            I don’t catch the logic. What do the Germans have to do with their tanks? The mechanized corps of 500 tanks was disbanded at the end of the 39th due to the fact that they cannot be controlled and are not operational .... And after 6 months, we will create a mechanized corps of 1000 tanks. Did the strategies from the General Staff live in another world or what? Or is it just that the leadership has changed - the new people's commissar and the new chief of staff?. And on their conscience the whole subsequent rout
            1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 39 New
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              Quote: Town Hall
              I don’t catch the logic. What do the Germans have to do with their tanks? The mechanized corps of 500 tanks was disbanded at the end of the 39th due to the fact that they cannot be controlled and are not operational .... And after 6 months, we will create a mechanized corps of 1000 tanks.

              Everything is correct. Just in these 6 months, the Germans showed in practice that large tank structures should not be bulky and uncontrollable at all. And ours decided to recreate the mechanized corps, but with a completely different OSH - close to the one that has shown its effectiveness.
              That's just, in the absence of a real OShS of German compounds, our built OShS new MK according to intelligence, and even with improvements.
              1. Town Hall April 3 2019 10: 46 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                And ours decided to recreate the mechanized corps


                Firstly, it should be recognized that the USSR did not have intelligence as such at that time. And there was a gathering of some kind of wild rumors and tales. They did not know elementary things.


                Secondly, the knowledge that U. Bolt can run a hundred-meter race in 9,5 seconds does not mean that I can do it straight away, when I know for sure that my limit is 15 seconds. And to make plans from a hangover that I will give out 9,5 seconds is not even stupidity but worse
                1. Alexey RA April 3 2019 11: 41 New
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                  Quote: Town Hall
                  Firstly, it should be recognized that the USSR did not have intelligence as such at that time. And there was a gathering of some kind of wild rumors and tales. They did not know elementary things.

                  These things are elementary for us in our time. At that time, the OSH of compounds was such a secret thing that, for example, in the USSR real OShs were not used even when training future commanders.
                  Quote: Town Hall
                  Secondly, the knowledge that U. Bolt can run a hundred-meter race in 9,5 seconds does not mean that I can do it straight away, when I know for sure that my limit is 15 seconds. And to make plans from a hangover that I will give out 9,5 seconds is not even stupidity but worse

                  So we have not just the knowledge that a hundred-meter race can be run in 9,5 seconds. In addition to this, we partially have knowledge - what was done to achieve this result. True, as it turned out, knowledge is - Caruso in a rehash of Rabinovich.
          2. chenia April 3 2019 20: 38 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            And ours immediately wanted the same miracle for themselves.

            And rightly so!
            Only it was necessary to rivet.
            The Germans have two, rarely three battalion, TPs (though in the company there are 4 platoons each). and there was a superstructure (2TPs were organizationally part of the TBR - after France the team halved, and a new TD was built on the basis of the TP), I must say the Germans worsened the capabilities of TDs and MKs, respectively (but at first it rolled, the strength of our troops in most cases was weak).

            The fact that the Germans really were not ready for war is the result of the failure of the Barbarossa, and this is when they chose the most opportune moment to strike.

            The guilt of our generals is obvious, even if they assumed. that in 1941 there will be no war, then the formation of another 21 MK with untested OSH is generally stupidity (I focus on the word-untested).
            A little doubt, but suddenly we will not slip through, and have a bunch of MKs who have never been to the exercises. That is, an unknown formation put into circulation.
            And time was - the end of 40, the beginning of 41.
            And then what led to- we lost the BT component (especially due to the loss of TBR in the SC).
      2. vladcub April 2 2019 17: 59 New
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        The fact that Pavlov did not correctly evaluate the use of tank brigades in Spain is quite common.
        "Artificially increased the number of tanks" my cant: I wanted to say: "the number of tank units", but "hurried and made people laugh"
      3. strannik1985 April 3 2019 03: 37 New
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        There was no problem in the TC, the Tyulenev group did not have army rear facilities until September 13, the only communications division was from the cavalry, there were no means of guarding the headquarters, and there was no headquarters either. During the advance into the depths of Western Ukraine, it turned out to get fuel and lubricants from the supply station once, in the future, due to the considerable distance from our troops (150-200 km), sending cars with containers was not possible.
  22. vladcub April 2 2019 16: 41 New
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    Quote: ser56
    Quote: vladimirZ
    Illiteracy is elementary,

    In the memorial, the GKZh wrote that he did not know the possibilities of industry ... this is the beginning. GS what? bully

    In a conversation with Chuev (?), Molotov said: “Believe Zhukov less,” and he probably knew what he was talking about.
    1. ser56 April 2 2019 17: 17 New
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      Quote: vladcub
      He said: "Believe Zhukov less," but he probably knew what he was talking about.

      and what looks better that the GKZH is not competent or lying? bully
      1. vladcub April 2 2019 17: 44 New
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        The question is of course interesting, but the answer?
        1. ser56 April 3 2019 11: 06 New
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          the answer is simple - you cannot appoint a person with 2 classes of general education and military courses to such a position ... request
      2. Alexey RA April 2 2019 19: 24 New
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        There is a third option - and he definitely said just that?
        And that was already attributed to Zhukov a way to mine minefields by sending soldiers to them.
        1. Town Hall April 2 2019 22: 28 New
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          Quote: Alexey RA
          There is a third option - and he definitely said just that?
          And that was already attributed to Zhukov a way to mine minefields by sending soldiers to them.


          ".. I will say more. Recalling how and what we, the military, demanded of industry in the very last peaceful months, I see that sometimes we did not fully take into account all the real economic opportunities of the country. Although from our, so to speak, departmental point of view, we and were right.

          For example, objective circumstances limited the proposals of the People’s Commissar of Defense to expand the mass production of the latest aircraft, tanks, artillery tractors, trucks, communications and other military equipment "

          Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and Thoughts
  23. evgic April 2 2019 17: 53 New
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    Bravo to the author. It is rare to see so deeply worked out material on VO
  24. bone1 April 2 2019 20: 37 New
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    The topic is interesting, it’s fun to read how the author is trying to reasonably and touchingly explain the idiocy of the Soviet leadership in organizing tank formations — then mechanized corps — disband mechanized brigades — armored divisions and mechanized divisions — tank corps again (and in such prohibitive quantities that collecting tanks with the entire spacecraft — they weren’t enough to equip, not to mention new types of tanks (when would they have been configured so much?) - with the beginning of the war, the corps were disbanded again, eventually they reached the brigades of 20-40 tanks, at 42 they began to form corps again adding to the tank brigade of infantry divisions !! - figuratively speaking until mid-1942 stubbornly hammered nails smartphone-43 have guessed that this hammer best, and to 44 have guessed that the hammer is better to keep the handle.
    1. wooja April 2 2019 21: 30 New
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      true remark .... and very sad, because everything was even sadder, and even the war and victory did not dispel it much. The repressions did not reduce the combat capability of the spacecraft, there was nothing special to lower there ..., with the personnel it was very bad.
      1. bone1 April 2 2019 21: 51 New
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        And you, too, bring this fable-the people are dark, illiterate, done with a finger in the trash, the bad commanders cannot read the map and the technicians don’t know ... -can you better ask those who dabbled in such an organization? -Who gave orders to untested samples launch into production in unmeasured quantities? -who planned the war and deployed troops? -Who controlled the spacecraft when the front commanders were looking for the army? -What to immediately blame the people, with a sore head?
        1. wooja April 2 2019 22: 00 New
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          On the contrary ... we defend the people if it weren’t for everyone to lay down, but you can’t replace qualifications and professionalism with party slogans and calls ... and the 1st Chechen one has already been forgotten ... and what happened before the Second World War ... ?
          1. bone1 April 2 2019 22: 46 New
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            Are you again your “qualification and professionalism” of one? -Commander? -Or military party elite?
            1. wooja April 3 2019 00: 28 New
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              is it hard to accept ...? such was the level of both the military party elite and commanders .... and the political instructor with the right to cancel the order of the commander from a company and higher ... and with the right to be shot,
              1. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 09 New
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                I’m not going to accept, the old thing, smear responsibility for the whole people — and it seems that the leadership is not to blame — for all this organizational idiocy that the company and battalion commanders were doing?
                1. wooja April 3 2019 19: 23 New
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                  The leadership is never to blame ... and the people offend sin ... the dead do not have a shame ... I myself could not believe it ... but the scale of the staff and organizational mess was incredible, and this is in the army. The company and the battalion commanders won that war - those who survived in 41-42 are not generals ..., the colonels won the war, those who became them ...,
                  1. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 27 New
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                    Why are you snouting and dung?
                    1. wooja April 3 2019 19: 33 New
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                      unfortunately in .... there was everything, for 15 years to rise from scratch is not easy ...., and the fluctuations of the party line did not help much, but thank God this line was.
                      1. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 38 New
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                        Zeros were people? -Well.
                      2. wooja April 3 2019 19: 43 New
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                        Oh well......
                      3. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 44 New
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                        If only the authorities do not offend.
                      4. wooja April 3 2019 19: 49 New
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                        and this too ..., political correctness, it’s better not to mess with bossy cockroaches ..., not everyone has died out.
                      5. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 51 New
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                        And dress in a warmer way and carefully cross the road
                      6. wooja April 3 2019 19: 52 New
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                        Thank you for your kind wishes
  • Alexey RA April 3 2019 10: 53 New
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    Quote: Bone1
    then dissolve the mechanized corps

    The legacy of the 30s with their window dressing in exercises. How it came to real application - it turned out. that the MK-30 is not combat-efficient.
    Quote: Bone1
    then tank and mechdivisions of the division tank corps again

    French campaign. When the Germans proved in practice that large tank formations should not be bulky and uncontrollable at all. So ours decided to make their own MKs on the basis of the OSH that has proved its effectiveness in practice.
    Quote: Bone1
    -with the beginning of the war, the corps were again disbanded, eventually they reached the brigades of 20-40 tanks-

    There was not enough time for the formation and coordination of MK. There was no time for reorganization of the defeated tank divisions, their training and combat coordination. So they decided to plug the holes with “ready-made campaign groups” that did not require months to form.
    Quote: Bone1
    -in 42 they began to form corps again with the addition of infantry divisions to tank brigades !! -

    The Germans licked - there were infantry divisions in their motorized corps, and army infantry corps in the tank armies.
    1. bone1 April 3 2019 19: 21 New
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      Did you reasonably explain it? - looked at those, then looked at these, stupidly licked at the third — did you actually have your brains? —Or forgot to ask the fourth? —And what kind of answers “it turned out. That the MK-30 is incapable” -well, practice has shown-improve the structure-to disperse why then? -and then create it again? -and if the MK-40 also turns out to be inefficient? -and MK42 is that a new organization based on combat experience? - "There is no time for the formation and coordination of MK enough ..... decided to plug the holes with "ready-made campaign groups" -so there might not be enough time to form lkovyh-divisions can battalions and companies of the fight? (in the army instead 10SD-100-120 with the battalion commander, and the commander of all at once).
      1. Alexey RA April 4 2019 17: 13 New
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        Quote: Bone1
        Like, you reasonably explained? - looked at those, then looked at these, stupidly licked at the third — do you actually have your brains? —Or forgot to ask the fourth?

        And where to get your experienced brains from? Where did we have the combat experience of using large mechanical joints?
        We just made MK-30 with our brains. After that, they decided not to reinvent the wheel.
        Quote: Bone1
        "it turned out. that the MK-30 is poorly equipped" - well, practice has shown, improve the structure, disperse why?

        In the case of MK-30, improving the structure means changing the OSh from the level of the battalion. That is - the formation is practically from scratch.
        Quote: Bone1
        -and if MK-40 is also ineffective?

        You really do not see the difference between creating an OSB from scratch and copying someone else's OSB working in practice? The initial structure, the data on which were taken as the basis for the creation of the MK-40, worked out "well" in Poland and France. I.e, generally it is initially operational.
        1. bone1 April 4 2019 17: 46 New
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          Apparently people like you there laughing - "decided not to reinvent the wheel" and to break it fuck laughing - “Improving the structure means changing the OSh from the level of the battalion” - how? —all though the battalions spared — and the rest was all a rotten broom — commanders into the infantry, equipment (above the battalion — in the trash) –– and forward –– we start copying wise Germans from scratch laughing
  • Zheglov Igor April 3 2019 17: 12 New
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    This article by Andrey from Chelyabinsk is apparently the answer to the recently published book by A. Yanovsky “On the approaches to the great war” (see https://zsbooks.ru/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=120), where everything these questions, and not only these, are dealt with in much more detail, and, besides, a huge additional material is given that clarifies the essence of the matter where Andrei from Chelyabinsk just wonders. But the saddest thing is that he does not say a word about the most important thing - why there was, as he puts it, a “turn in strategy”, and what would happen if this turn were not, what would the USSR face during the Great Patriotic War. The initial chapters of Yanovsky’s book were published here: https://work-way.com/blog/2018/05/07/na-podstupah-k-bolshoj-vojne/
    I suppose we should wait for a response from Yanovsky to the author of this article.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 3 2019 18: 08 New
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      Quote: Igor Zheglov
      This article by Andrei from Chelyabinsk is probably the answer to the recently published book by A. Yanovsky

      No, I am not familiar with this book. In general, if I'm going to argue with someone, I usually try to point it out.
  • PilotS37 April 10 2019 10: 40 New
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    Many thanks to the author!
    I guess what mountain of documents he had to shovel ...
    Great article!