Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. Return to brigades
In the article "Pre-war structure of the auto-armored forces of the Red Army" we focused on the formation of pre-war tank corps, which before the start of the war were gigantic formations, the basis of which was 2 tank and motorized divisions, plus parts of reinforcement and control. The staffing of such a mechanized corps was 36 people, it included 080 tanks of almost all types that were in service with the Red Army (KV-1, T-031, BT-1, T-34, flamethrower and amphibious tanks).
Alas, the majority of the most manned and combat-ready mechanized corps, which we had at the beginning of World War II, were lost during the border battle and the battles that followed. There were a lot of reasons for this, and we listed them in detail earlier:
1. The strategic initiative belonged to our enemy, while the USSR had no plans to repel such an invasion. The fact is that the war plan of the USSR envisaged the disruption of the deployment of the German army by forces deployed in border districts, but intelligence "overslept" and we had to repel the invasion of a fully mobilized and deployed enemy.
2. The superiority of the Germans in the number of personnel, the unfortunate disposition of our troops.
3. Worst training of the staffs and personnel of the Red Army, less combat experience in comparison with the Wehrmacht, a weak link, which made it extremely difficult to control the troops.
4. And finally, the organizational and technical reasons are the suboptimal composition of the mechanized corps, an insufficient number of vehicles and tractors in them, design flaws and “childhood diseases” of the newest T-34 and KV tanks, including in the small resource of these combat vehicles.
All this together determined the defeat of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war and the defeat of its mechanized corps. What next? It was quite obvious that such compounds did not justify themselves, and the attempt to form new mechanized corps does not make sense. But what should have come to replace them? The Red Army already had experience in creating tank and mechanized divisions of various composition, but nevertheless the choice was made in favor of tank brigades. The decree of the State Defense Committee No. GKO-570ss of 23 of August 1941 stated:
At the same time, a little earlier, 12 of August of the same year, the State Defense Committee issued the order No. 0063 “On the formation of separate tank brigades”, according to which 1 should have already formed 1942 of such connections in the period before 120 in January. Let us consider in more detail what went in the stead of the mechanized corps and the tank divisions.
The tank brigade had a new, not previously used staff: in fact, it was formed on the basis of two regiments, tank and motorized rifle, besides having anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, four companies — reconnaissance, motor, control and repair, brigade management and medical platoon. In other words, according to the original idea of the creators, the new tank brigade was a kind of “tank division in miniature”, which, however, lacked field artillery. As for the total number of the brigade of the “sample of August 1941”, there is a small mystery here, which the author, unfortunately, has not figured out.
The fact is that the number of personnel of a separate tank brigade was to be 3 268 people. At the same time, in the well-known to the author transcripts of the number of brigades by division, the number of the motorized regiment of the whole 709 people is indicated. This is too small for a regiment, and besides, by summing up its number with other units, we get the number of the brigade equal to 1 997 people. It remains for the author to assume that the idea of completing brigades with a full-fledged motorized regiment very quickly followed the path of all good intentions simply because of a shortage of vehicles, as a result of which they had to restrict themselves to a motorized battalion.
As for the tank regiment of the brigade, he, alas, was also a kind of "mechanized corps in miniature", because he had a tank of three different types in the 91 state. The regiment initially consisted of a battalion of light, medium and heavy tanks, and two battalions of light tanks, and included 7 KV, 20 T-34 and 64 T-40 or T-60, and the number of personnel reached 548 people. However, less than a month later, the 13 September 1941 g., The regiment was significantly reduced - now it included only 67 tanks, including battalions: 7 KV, 22 T-34 and 32 T-40 or T-60.
Alas, but even that turned out to be too much for our industry, and 9 in December, 1941 was waiting for another detachment of tank crews. The tank regiment disappeared - the 2 battalion took its place, each of which had 5 KV, 7 T-34 and 10 T-60 in its structure, and only 46 tanks were in the brigade from then on (there was an 2 tank of management in addition). The staff number of the brigade was reduced to 1 471 people.
But this was not the limit. The separate tank crew according to 15 approved February 1942, had the same 46 tanks, and the number of T-34 in the battalions increased from 7 to 10, and T-60, on the contrary, decreased from 10 to 8, but the number of motorized The battalion was reduced from 719 to 402 people. Thus, the staff number of the brigade again decreased, and amounted to 1 107 people. This number was the minimum for the tank forces of the Red Army, and in the future the number of tank brigades and larger units only increased. True, there existed in the Red Army tank brigades and a smaller number, but we are talking about specialized brigades intended for operations as part of cavalry corps. As a rule, they were assigned the same 46 tanks, but the heavy KVs were not included in it, as were the supporting units, including the motorized battalion and so on, since their functions were performed by the cavalry corps.
How justified was the decision to abandon armored and motorized divisions in favor of individual brigades? Reasoning from the point of view of the theory of tank war, this, of course, was a great setback in comparison with the pre-war formations. But in practice, apparently, it was the only correct decision in that situation.
As mentioned earlier, individual tank companies, battalions and regiments attached to rifle and cavalry divisions did not justify the hopes placed on them during the Soviet-Finnish war. Therefore, it was decided to abandon them, and to reduce equipment and personnel into separate tank brigades, whose task would be to support rifle and cavalry corps. At the same time, mechanized corps were formed to conduct a maneuverable war.
This was not the worst distribution of duties, but after 1941 g was decided in the winter to bring the number of mechanized corps to 30, there was categorically not enough tanks for their formation. Separate tank brigades were quite predictably transferred to new mechanized corps. But after such "brigade cannibalization", rifle and cavalry formations were left completely without tank support!
It was wrong, because both infantry and cavalry, of course, needed the support of armored vehicles, but where did it come from? As a result, in the very first days of the war, a significant part of the mechanized corps' forces were "pulled out" to support rifle divisions and died with them. That is, combat experience irrefutably showed that tank forces, in addition to large, "heavy" formations intended for maneuvering war, entering into a breakthrough, actions on the operational rear of the enemy armies and fronts, also needed infantry units.
Moreover - after the death of the main mechanized forces in the border battle and further, the task of supporting the task again came to the fore, and in the rush of the infantry divisions being formed - at least to give them greater combat stability. This, of course, did not mean at all that the Red Army was refusing to carry out deep operations on the enemy’s environment. As a matter of fact, already in the course of the battle near Moscow, the Soviet counteroffensive almost led to the encirclement of Army Group Center or its individual parts. For example, there was a moment when the last communication of the German 4 tank and 9 armies was the only Smolensk-Vyazma railroad. The Red Army lacked only a little bit ...
However, what was done was enough to bring the Wehrmacht to a crisis literally at all levels. Many military leaders demanded the immediate withdrawal of troops, since only this could save the personnel of Army Group Center. Kurt ph Tippelskirch, a German general whose memoirs are considered the “golden fund” historical literature about the Second World War, since they are distinguished by an amazing desire for impartiality, he spoke of this idea:
Translated into Russian, this means that neither the generals nor the Führer himself were confident of their own troops, and they seriously feared that the “organized withdrawal to previously prepared positions” would turn into a massive and uncontrolled flight. The situation was stabilized only by the resignation of the commander-in-chief of the land forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, whose place was taken by Hitler, and the army believed him unconditionally. And, of course, the famous “stop-order” “Not one step back!”, Which the German army received about six months earlier than the Red Army, since a similar order (No. XXUMX) was signed by I.V. Stalin only on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad.
Nevertheless, despite carrying out such a large-scale operation, as a result of which the Wehrmacht suffered the most sensitive defeat for the first time in its history, the main leitmotif of the Red Army was defensive battles, in which tank brigades were extremely popular as a means of supporting infantry divisions. In addition, as we said earlier, the brigade organization of tank troops was well known and mastered by the Red Army. But, in addition to all of the above, there were other arguments in favor of tank brigades.
The fact is that the tank division is, without a doubt, an extremely formidable force, the “top of the food pyramid” of the ground forces. But - only if it is competently controlled by correctly applying tanks, motorized or self-propelled artillery, anti-tank guns and motorized infantry in the right place at the right time. And the organization of such management is very difficult - it is the competence of the division commander and his staff, and the level of communication, and the level of interaction between the individual units. In other words, a tank division is an extremely formidable tool of war, but it is extremely difficult to manage. So, in 1941, we, apparently, still lacked the skill to use tank divisions, even if we had them - there was not enough training, the level of commanders, communications, everything.
In this respect, the career of one of the best Soviet commanders of the tank forces, Mikhail Yefimovich Katukov, is very indicative.
The war found him the commander of the 20-second tank division, which took part in the famous battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. Without a doubt, M.E. Katukov did not shame the honor rendered to him, but, on the other hand, it is impossible to say that the division under his leadership had achieved some amazing successes. Then, after Mikhail Efimovich withdrew the remnants of his unit from the encirclement, he received under his command the 4 Tank Brigade, which, as you know, brilliantly showed itself in the battle of Moscow and became the first brigade to deserve the Guards title.
In other words, at the beginning of the war, the division for M.E. Katukov, perhaps, was still too big, but the team - just right, it was there that he was able to prove himself perfectly and hone his skills. Then, in 1942 g, he was appointed commander of the tank corps and valiantly (although not always successfully) fought. Well, later, having received such an excellent experience, he superbly commanded the 1 tank army, distinguished in the battles of the Kursk and Sandomir bridgehead, and became under the guidance of M.Ye. Katukov one of the symbols of victory over Hitler's fascism.
And finally, the last. As many history buffs pay attention, and professional historians, too, the order to form 120 separate brigades for 91 tanks in each required almost 11 000 tanks. This was more than enough to form the 29 tank divisions of the pre-war structure (375 tanks in the division), and if this was not done, it means there were some weighty and fundamental objections to such divisions.
The author of this article fully agrees that such objections were, some of the reasons for the formation of brigades are given by him above. But we must not forget the most important thing - the presence of a sufficient number of tanks to form three dozen tank divisions does not at all give us the opportunity to form them. Tanks - this is just one of the necessary conditions for their formation, but - not the only one.
For a tank division, you also need a lot of vehicles for the transport of infantry and field artillery and anti-tank guns, as well as this artillery itself and many supporting units. At the same time, the tank brigade, despite the formal presence of a motorized rifle battalion in it, by and large is still a purely tank unit, with a minimum amount of forces attached to it. It was planned that the tank brigade would not act independently, but in close cooperation with rifle or cavalry divisions, which had both infantry and field artillery, but where would the USSR take the same artillery to form 29 new tank divisions? Only the infantry, because of the free reserves of the Red Army, of course, was not. Thus, an attempt to create tank divisions in 1941 was possible only at the expense of weakening infantry divisions, and there was no place to weaken them. On the contrary, they needed reinforcement, which tank brigades could give them, but tank divisions were unlikely.
Thus, we are dealing with another important aspect - in 1941, the USSR, apparently, simply did not have the opportunity to equip tank divisions for the state they required, and the problem was not in the tanks, but in cars and so on.
By virtue of the above, a return to tank brigades, as to the main compound of tank forces for the USSR in 1941, was without alternative, and had many benefits. However, of course, tank brigades could not replace larger tank formations. For all its merits, the return to the individual brigades had one, but the most fundamental disadvantage. Tank troops, made up of tank brigades, could never achieve the killing efficiency of the German Panzerväfe. For the reason that, as an independent force, tank brigades could not compete with tank divisions due to the lack of field artillery in them and a sufficient number of motorized infantry. And to establish effective interaction between rifle or cavalry corps and tank brigades could not always. Whatever one may say, his rifle corps always remained “dearer” than the tank brigade attached to him for the commander, and the ability of the infantry commanders to use it correctly was not enough. But there was always the temptation to “plug the holes” with the bodies of tankers - they are “in the gland,” and the lump is less responsible for their losses than for their own ...
It turned out that in cases where between infantry and cavalry units and a tank brigade it was possible to ensure normal interaction, sometimes a completely phenomenal result was achieved. For example, joint actions of the previously mentioned 4 Tank Brigade ME. Katukov, the 316 th Infantry Division (Panfilov) and the cavalry group Dovator 16-20 on November in Volokolamsk direction delayed the onset of 46-th motorized and 5-th army German corps, which in aggregate consisted of 3 tank and 2 infantry units and XNUMX armored infantry units and XNUMX armies.
But in most cases, alas, it did not. Just to quote part of the order of the NKO USSR №057 from 22 January 1942, "On the combat use of tank units and formations", revealing the essence of the problems:
As we can see from the above, tank brigades categorically lacked their own infantry and artillery, trained in interaction with tanks. In other words, despite all the validity of the return to tank brigades, they were not, and could not be, an equally perfect tool for maneuvering war, which were the German tank divisions. Alas, but we have to state that for our temporary inability to form full-fledged units for a tank war, the Red Army had to pay high losses in tanks and tank crews.
At the same time, as we said earlier, in 1941-42. the production was engaged in fine-tuning the T-34 to a normal technical and technological state, setting aside some fundamental upgrades for later. The leadership of the Red Army perfectly understood the shortcomings of the T-34, including the difficulty of controlling the tank, the lack of a commander's turret, and the insufficient crew size. But then the shaft was extremely important, because there was categorically not enough tanks, and in no case it was impossible to reduce the release of T-34s with their still counter-booking and a very serious 76,2-mm gun. From the above structures of tank brigades, it is clearly seen what a huge share was occupied by light tanks like the T-60, and it was they who, in the absence of T-34, had to solve all the tasks of the tank war.
Of course, with all its flaws, the T-34 and 1942 still had the advantage in defense and firepower over the main mass of Wehrmacht tanks. And these qualities of T-34 helped the Red Army to survive in that terrible period for us. But, of course, in its then technical condition and in the conditions of a forcedly non-optimal structure of the tank forces, our units and formations that fought on the T-34 could not match the effectiveness of the German Panzervaffe. They could not yet.
To be continued ...
Alas, the majority of the most manned and combat-ready mechanized corps, which we had at the beginning of World War II, were lost during the border battle and the battles that followed. There were a lot of reasons for this, and we listed them in detail earlier:
1. The strategic initiative belonged to our enemy, while the USSR had no plans to repel such an invasion. The fact is that the war plan of the USSR envisaged the disruption of the deployment of the German army by forces deployed in border districts, but intelligence "overslept" and we had to repel the invasion of a fully mobilized and deployed enemy.
2. The superiority of the Germans in the number of personnel, the unfortunate disposition of our troops.
3. Worst training of the staffs and personnel of the Red Army, less combat experience in comparison with the Wehrmacht, a weak link, which made it extremely difficult to control the troops.
4. And finally, the organizational and technical reasons are the suboptimal composition of the mechanized corps, an insufficient number of vehicles and tractors in them, design flaws and “childhood diseases” of the newest T-34 and KV tanks, including in the small resource of these combat vehicles.
All this together determined the defeat of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war and the defeat of its mechanized corps. What next? It was quite obvious that such compounds did not justify themselves, and the attempt to form new mechanized corps does not make sense. But what should have come to replace them? The Red Army already had experience in creating tank and mechanized divisions of various composition, but nevertheless the choice was made in favor of tank brigades. The decree of the State Defense Committee No. GKO-570ss of 23 of August 1941 stated:
“When forming new tank units, install two main types of organization of tank forces:
a) a separate tank battalion in the rifle division;
b) tank crew.
Tank divisions and mechanized corps will no longer be formed. "
a) a separate tank battalion in the rifle division;
b) tank crew.
Tank divisions and mechanized corps will no longer be formed. "
At the same time, a little earlier, 12 of August of the same year, the State Defense Committee issued the order No. 0063 “On the formation of separate tank brigades”, according to which 1 should have already formed 1942 of such connections in the period before 120 in January. Let us consider in more detail what went in the stead of the mechanized corps and the tank divisions.
The tank brigade had a new, not previously used staff: in fact, it was formed on the basis of two regiments, tank and motorized rifle, besides having anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, four companies — reconnaissance, motor, control and repair, brigade management and medical platoon. In other words, according to the original idea of the creators, the new tank brigade was a kind of “tank division in miniature”, which, however, lacked field artillery. As for the total number of the brigade of the “sample of August 1941”, there is a small mystery here, which the author, unfortunately, has not figured out.
The fact is that the number of personnel of a separate tank brigade was to be 3 268 people. At the same time, in the well-known to the author transcripts of the number of brigades by division, the number of the motorized regiment of the whole 709 people is indicated. This is too small for a regiment, and besides, by summing up its number with other units, we get the number of the brigade equal to 1 997 people. It remains for the author to assume that the idea of completing brigades with a full-fledged motorized regiment very quickly followed the path of all good intentions simply because of a shortage of vehicles, as a result of which they had to restrict themselves to a motorized battalion.
As for the tank regiment of the brigade, he, alas, was also a kind of "mechanized corps in miniature", because he had a tank of three different types in the 91 state. The regiment initially consisted of a battalion of light, medium and heavy tanks, and two battalions of light tanks, and included 7 KV, 20 T-34 and 64 T-40 or T-60, and the number of personnel reached 548 people. However, less than a month later, the 13 September 1941 g., The regiment was significantly reduced - now it included only 67 tanks, including battalions: 7 KV, 22 T-34 and 32 T-40 or T-60.
Alas, but even that turned out to be too much for our industry, and 9 in December, 1941 was waiting for another detachment of tank crews. The tank regiment disappeared - the 2 battalion took its place, each of which had 5 KV, 7 T-34 and 10 T-60 in its structure, and only 46 tanks were in the brigade from then on (there was an 2 tank of management in addition). The staff number of the brigade was reduced to 1 471 people.
But this was not the limit. The separate tank crew according to 15 approved February 1942, had the same 46 tanks, and the number of T-34 in the battalions increased from 7 to 10, and T-60, on the contrary, decreased from 10 to 8, but the number of motorized The battalion was reduced from 719 to 402 people. Thus, the staff number of the brigade again decreased, and amounted to 1 107 people. This number was the minimum for the tank forces of the Red Army, and in the future the number of tank brigades and larger units only increased. True, there existed in the Red Army tank brigades and a smaller number, but we are talking about specialized brigades intended for operations as part of cavalry corps. As a rule, they were assigned the same 46 tanks, but the heavy KVs were not included in it, as were the supporting units, including the motorized battalion and so on, since their functions were performed by the cavalry corps.
How justified was the decision to abandon armored and motorized divisions in favor of individual brigades? Reasoning from the point of view of the theory of tank war, this, of course, was a great setback in comparison with the pre-war formations. But in practice, apparently, it was the only correct decision in that situation.
As mentioned earlier, individual tank companies, battalions and regiments attached to rifle and cavalry divisions did not justify the hopes placed on them during the Soviet-Finnish war. Therefore, it was decided to abandon them, and to reduce equipment and personnel into separate tank brigades, whose task would be to support rifle and cavalry corps. At the same time, mechanized corps were formed to conduct a maneuverable war.
This was not the worst distribution of duties, but after 1941 g was decided in the winter to bring the number of mechanized corps to 30, there was categorically not enough tanks for their formation. Separate tank brigades were quite predictably transferred to new mechanized corps. But after such "brigade cannibalization", rifle and cavalry formations were left completely without tank support!
It was wrong, because both infantry and cavalry, of course, needed the support of armored vehicles, but where did it come from? As a result, in the very first days of the war, a significant part of the mechanized corps' forces were "pulled out" to support rifle divisions and died with them. That is, combat experience irrefutably showed that tank forces, in addition to large, "heavy" formations intended for maneuvering war, entering into a breakthrough, actions on the operational rear of the enemy armies and fronts, also needed infantry units.
Moreover - after the death of the main mechanized forces in the border battle and further, the task of supporting the task again came to the fore, and in the rush of the infantry divisions being formed - at least to give them greater combat stability. This, of course, did not mean at all that the Red Army was refusing to carry out deep operations on the enemy’s environment. As a matter of fact, already in the course of the battle near Moscow, the Soviet counteroffensive almost led to the encirclement of Army Group Center or its individual parts. For example, there was a moment when the last communication of the German 4 tank and 9 armies was the only Smolensk-Vyazma railroad. The Red Army lacked only a little bit ...
However, what was done was enough to bring the Wehrmacht to a crisis literally at all levels. Many military leaders demanded the immediate withdrawal of troops, since only this could save the personnel of Army Group Center. Kurt ph Tippelskirch, a German general whose memoirs are considered the “golden fund” historical literature about the Second World War, since they are distinguished by an amazing desire for impartiality, he spoke of this idea:
“From an operational point of view, this thought was undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, Hitler spoke out against her with all the energy of his indomitable character. He could not accept her out of fear of dropping his prestige; he was also afraid — and not without reason — that such a large withdrawal would cause a decline in the morale of the army. Finally, there was no guarantee that it would be possible to stop the outgoing troops in a timely manner.».
Translated into Russian, this means that neither the generals nor the Führer himself were confident of their own troops, and they seriously feared that the “organized withdrawal to previously prepared positions” would turn into a massive and uncontrolled flight. The situation was stabilized only by the resignation of the commander-in-chief of the land forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, whose place was taken by Hitler, and the army believed him unconditionally. And, of course, the famous “stop-order” “Not one step back!”, Which the German army received about six months earlier than the Red Army, since a similar order (No. XXUMX) was signed by I.V. Stalin only on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad.
Nevertheless, despite carrying out such a large-scale operation, as a result of which the Wehrmacht suffered the most sensitive defeat for the first time in its history, the main leitmotif of the Red Army was defensive battles, in which tank brigades were extremely popular as a means of supporting infantry divisions. In addition, as we said earlier, the brigade organization of tank troops was well known and mastered by the Red Army. But, in addition to all of the above, there were other arguments in favor of tank brigades.
The fact is that the tank division is, without a doubt, an extremely formidable force, the “top of the food pyramid” of the ground forces. But - only if it is competently controlled by correctly applying tanks, motorized or self-propelled artillery, anti-tank guns and motorized infantry in the right place at the right time. And the organization of such management is very difficult - it is the competence of the division commander and his staff, and the level of communication, and the level of interaction between the individual units. In other words, a tank division is an extremely formidable tool of war, but it is extremely difficult to manage. So, in 1941, we, apparently, still lacked the skill to use tank divisions, even if we had them - there was not enough training, the level of commanders, communications, everything.
In this respect, the career of one of the best Soviet commanders of the tank forces, Mikhail Yefimovich Katukov, is very indicative.
The war found him the commander of the 20-second tank division, which took part in the famous battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. Without a doubt, M.E. Katukov did not shame the honor rendered to him, but, on the other hand, it is impossible to say that the division under his leadership had achieved some amazing successes. Then, after Mikhail Efimovich withdrew the remnants of his unit from the encirclement, he received under his command the 4 Tank Brigade, which, as you know, brilliantly showed itself in the battle of Moscow and became the first brigade to deserve the Guards title.
In other words, at the beginning of the war, the division for M.E. Katukov, perhaps, was still too big, but the team - just right, it was there that he was able to prove himself perfectly and hone his skills. Then, in 1942 g, he was appointed commander of the tank corps and valiantly (although not always successfully) fought. Well, later, having received such an excellent experience, he superbly commanded the 1 tank army, distinguished in the battles of the Kursk and Sandomir bridgehead, and became under the guidance of M.Ye. Katukov one of the symbols of victory over Hitler's fascism.
And finally, the last. As many history buffs pay attention, and professional historians, too, the order to form 120 separate brigades for 91 tanks in each required almost 11 000 tanks. This was more than enough to form the 29 tank divisions of the pre-war structure (375 tanks in the division), and if this was not done, it means there were some weighty and fundamental objections to such divisions.
The author of this article fully agrees that such objections were, some of the reasons for the formation of brigades are given by him above. But we must not forget the most important thing - the presence of a sufficient number of tanks to form three dozen tank divisions does not at all give us the opportunity to form them. Tanks - this is just one of the necessary conditions for their formation, but - not the only one.
For a tank division, you also need a lot of vehicles for the transport of infantry and field artillery and anti-tank guns, as well as this artillery itself and many supporting units. At the same time, the tank brigade, despite the formal presence of a motorized rifle battalion in it, by and large is still a purely tank unit, with a minimum amount of forces attached to it. It was planned that the tank brigade would not act independently, but in close cooperation with rifle or cavalry divisions, which had both infantry and field artillery, but where would the USSR take the same artillery to form 29 new tank divisions? Only the infantry, because of the free reserves of the Red Army, of course, was not. Thus, an attempt to create tank divisions in 1941 was possible only at the expense of weakening infantry divisions, and there was no place to weaken them. On the contrary, they needed reinforcement, which tank brigades could give them, but tank divisions were unlikely.
Thus, we are dealing with another important aspect - in 1941, the USSR, apparently, simply did not have the opportunity to equip tank divisions for the state they required, and the problem was not in the tanks, but in cars and so on.
By virtue of the above, a return to tank brigades, as to the main compound of tank forces for the USSR in 1941, was without alternative, and had many benefits. However, of course, tank brigades could not replace larger tank formations. For all its merits, the return to the individual brigades had one, but the most fundamental disadvantage. Tank troops, made up of tank brigades, could never achieve the killing efficiency of the German Panzerväfe. For the reason that, as an independent force, tank brigades could not compete with tank divisions due to the lack of field artillery in them and a sufficient number of motorized infantry. And to establish effective interaction between rifle or cavalry corps and tank brigades could not always. Whatever one may say, his rifle corps always remained “dearer” than the tank brigade attached to him for the commander, and the ability of the infantry commanders to use it correctly was not enough. But there was always the temptation to “plug the holes” with the bodies of tankers - they are “in the gland,” and the lump is less responsible for their losses than for their own ...
It turned out that in cases where between infantry and cavalry units and a tank brigade it was possible to ensure normal interaction, sometimes a completely phenomenal result was achieved. For example, joint actions of the previously mentioned 4 Tank Brigade ME. Katukov, the 316 th Infantry Division (Panfilov) and the cavalry group Dovator 16-20 on November in Volokolamsk direction delayed the onset of 46-th motorized and 5-th army German corps, which in aggregate consisted of 3 tank and 2 infantry units and XNUMX armored infantry units and XNUMX armies.
But in most cases, alas, it did not. Just to quote part of the order of the NKO USSR №057 from 22 January 1942, "On the combat use of tank units and formations", revealing the essence of the problems:
“The experience of the war showed that there are still a number of major shortcomings in the combat use of tank forces, as a result of which our units suffer heavy losses in tanks and personnel. Excessive, unjustifiable losses with a low combat effect in tank forces occur because:
1) The interaction of infantry with tank formations and units is still poorly organized in combat, infantry commanders set tasks not specifically and hastily, infantry lags behind in the attack and does not reinforce the lines captured by tanks, does not cover tanks standing in ambush, and even does not warn the commanders of tank units of a change in the situation and abandons tanks to the mercy of fate.
2) The attack of tanks is not supported by our artillery fire, tanks are not used for escorting tanks, as a result of which combat vehicles die from enemy anti-tank artillery fire.
3) Combined-arms commanders are extremely hasty in the use of tank formations - they are thrown straight into the battle, piecemeal, without wasting time, even for the production of enemy elementary reconnaissance and terrain.
4) Tank units are used by small subunits, and sometimes even one tank at a time, which leads to dispersal of forces, loss of communication between the assigned tanks and their brigade and the impossibility of providing them in combat, and the infantry commanders use these small groups tanks in frontal attacks, depriving them of maneuver, which increase the loss of combat vehicles and personnel.
5) Combined-arms commanders do not take good care of the technical condition of subordinate tank units — they make frequent transfers over long distances under their own power, withdraw from questions of evacuation of the emergency materiel from the battlefield, set combat missions without complying with the amount of time that tanks stay in combat without preventive repair , which in turn increases the already large losses in the tanks. "
1) The interaction of infantry with tank formations and units is still poorly organized in combat, infantry commanders set tasks not specifically and hastily, infantry lags behind in the attack and does not reinforce the lines captured by tanks, does not cover tanks standing in ambush, and even does not warn the commanders of tank units of a change in the situation and abandons tanks to the mercy of fate.
2) The attack of tanks is not supported by our artillery fire, tanks are not used for escorting tanks, as a result of which combat vehicles die from enemy anti-tank artillery fire.
3) Combined-arms commanders are extremely hasty in the use of tank formations - they are thrown straight into the battle, piecemeal, without wasting time, even for the production of enemy elementary reconnaissance and terrain.
4) Tank units are used by small subunits, and sometimes even one tank at a time, which leads to dispersal of forces, loss of communication between the assigned tanks and their brigade and the impossibility of providing them in combat, and the infantry commanders use these small groups tanks in frontal attacks, depriving them of maneuver, which increase the loss of combat vehicles and personnel.
5) Combined-arms commanders do not take good care of the technical condition of subordinate tank units — they make frequent transfers over long distances under their own power, withdraw from questions of evacuation of the emergency materiel from the battlefield, set combat missions without complying with the amount of time that tanks stay in combat without preventive repair , which in turn increases the already large losses in the tanks. "
As we can see from the above, tank brigades categorically lacked their own infantry and artillery, trained in interaction with tanks. In other words, despite all the validity of the return to tank brigades, they were not, and could not be, an equally perfect tool for maneuvering war, which were the German tank divisions. Alas, but we have to state that for our temporary inability to form full-fledged units for a tank war, the Red Army had to pay high losses in tanks and tank crews.
At the same time, as we said earlier, in 1941-42. the production was engaged in fine-tuning the T-34 to a normal technical and technological state, setting aside some fundamental upgrades for later. The leadership of the Red Army perfectly understood the shortcomings of the T-34, including the difficulty of controlling the tank, the lack of a commander's turret, and the insufficient crew size. But then the shaft was extremely important, because there was categorically not enough tanks, and in no case it was impossible to reduce the release of T-34s with their still counter-booking and a very serious 76,2-mm gun. From the above structures of tank brigades, it is clearly seen what a huge share was occupied by light tanks like the T-60, and it was they who, in the absence of T-34, had to solve all the tasks of the tank war.
Of course, with all its flaws, the T-34 and 1942 still had the advantage in defense and firepower over the main mass of Wehrmacht tanks. And these qualities of T-34 helped the Red Army to survive in that terrible period for us. But, of course, in its then technical condition and in the conditions of a forcedly non-optimal structure of the tank forces, our units and formations that fought on the T-34 could not match the effectiveness of the German Panzervaffe. They could not yet.
To be continued ...
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