Military Review

Soviet and German tank losses in 1942 year. Be careful with the statistics!

186
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. In previous articles of the cycle we analyzed technical features of the T-34 release in 1942, as well as states tank parts and formations, along with some nuances of the combat use of domestic armored vehicles. A quick summary would look like this:


As you know, a number of disadvantages T-34 arr. 1940, such as an unsuccessful transmission, insufficient resources, a narrow tower shoulder strap, "blindness" and a lack of an 5 crew member, were obvious to the top leadership of the Red Army before the war. However, in 1941 and in 1942, the stake was made not to eliminate all this, but to give maximum manufacturability and simplify the existing design of the tank. Our top military leadership considered it necessary to deploy mass production as quickly as possible and to provide the Red Army on a massive scale with tanks with anti-missile booking and an extremely powerful 76,2 mm cannon for its time, even if they have serious shortcomings. It was assumed that this would be better than a serious rework of the structure, and the associated drop in production volumes.



And what did we get?


What were the consequences of this decision? You can say that 1942 g became one of the most important stages for our "thirty-four". At the beginning of this year, it was still a fairly raw combat vehicle, moreover, it was not yet very well adapted for mass, mass production on equipment that existed at that time in the USSR. Its production was carried out at three factories, two of which started to produce T-34 before the war (Considering the Nizhny Tagil plant as a “continuation” of Kharkov). By the end of the year, the T-34 was already produced at 5 factories, and this taking into account the fact that STZ ceased production of tanks, due to the fact that the battles in Stalingrad were already fought on its territory. That is, if in 1941, in addition to STZ and Nizhny Tagil Plant No. 183, it was possible to expand the production of T-34 at the Gorky Plant, then in 1942, the Chelyabinsk, Omsk and Sverdlovsk plants were added to them.

In other words, the task of mass construction of T-34 in 1942 was solved. Of interest is the ratio of medium and heavy armored vehicles produced in 1941-42. in the USSR and Germany. In 1941, the production facilities of the Third Reich gave the Wehrmacht and the SS 2 850 T-III medium tanks T-IV, commander tanks based on them, as well as StuG III assault guns, which, with 22 t mass, had a reservation comparable to that of T-III but an incomparably more powerful 75-mm gun that can quite successfully fight with our T-34.



At the same time, the USSR in 1941 was able to produce 3 016 T-34, that is, it can be said that in terms of medium armored vehicles, the production capabilities of the Soviet Union and Germany turned out to be quite comparable. True, the situation was significantly improved by the release of heavy tanks KV, which in 1941 was created by 714 units, but still it must be stated that the USSR had no multiple advantage in producing medium and heavy armored vehicles in 1941: our country surpassed the German issue by about 30%.

But in 1942, the situation changed dramatically, because the USSR managed to produce armored vehicles 2,44 times more than the Third Reich - and the main role here was played by the increase in production of T-34.



The cost of production of one tank in comparison with 1941 was about 1,5 times (plant # 183, from 249 256 rubles to 165 810 rubles), although, of course, in new plants it was higher in 1942. . Many minor design flaws managed to be eradicated, and in general, by the end of 1942, the army received a much more advanced machine than the T-34 of 1941 was.

However, alas, the main design flaws were not eradicated - the T-34 remained difficult to manage and not very reliable a tank, the commander of which was extremely lacking review in battle. In other words, surpassing the bulk of German tanks in armor and armament, he was inferior to them in situational awareness and reliability, which allowed experienced German tankers, gunners and infantry to select effective tactics of confronting domestic medium tanks. Of course, the counter-booking and the powerful armament of the T-34 were excellent “arguments” that, if used properly, could lead success in battle to the side of the Soviet tank crews. But for this it was necessary to have combat experience, which the Wehrmacht still had more, and besides, the spent interaction with its own artillery and infantry, which, alas, the Red Army simply categorically lacked.

As we said earlier, at the end of 1941, the tank forces of the USSR were forced to "roll back" to the level of brigades - that is, purely tank units. And although at the beginning of 1942, the Red Army began the formation of larger units, tank corps, at first they were poorly balanced structures that clearly lacked field artillery and motorized rifle troops, as well as other important support units. Such units could not fight on their own with the same efficiency with which the German “Panzervaffe” did it, who had both artillery and motorized infantry in abundance, and who knew how to use all this in a comprehensive manner. At the same time, attempts of joint actions of the same tank brigades with rifle corps of the Red Army often led to the fact that infantry commanders illiterately used the tank formations assigned to them and did not provide an adequate level of interaction with their units.

The situation was corrected gradually, during the entire 1942, the states of the tank corps were constantly improved. States established in January 1943 in accordance with Decree No. GOKO-2791ss can already be considered optimal, but, apparently, at least part of the tank corps had a similar structure already in 4 quarter of 1942, and perhaps even earlier .

In other words, we can say that the “stars came together” precisely at the beginning of 1943, when:

1. The Red Army received a large number of T-34 tanks, free from many childhood diseases, although they still retained their main shortcomings that had been identified before the war;

2. The states of higher tank formations were close to optimal, and they fully met the requirements of a modern war of maneuver;

3. The troops gained combat experience, allowing them to successfully fight even against the best units of the Wehrmacht.

But all this happened only at the end of 1942. But at 1942 itself, we had to pay for the technical shortcomings of the tanks, for the lack of combat experience, for the imperfection of the states of tank formations a high price.

About the Soviet and German losses. At first only numbers


Let's look at the balance of losses of medium and heavy armored vehicles of the USSR and Germany in 1942. But the author warns immediately - the figures in the table should be treated very, I emphasize, very carefully! Below will be given all the necessary explanations.



So, we see that the USSR greatly overtook Germany in the production of armored vehicles, releasing 1942 2,44 times more than medium and heavy tanks and SPGs, although, strictly speaking, Su-76 with its 11,5 tons of mass on medium armored vehicles didn’t pull at all ". But on the other hand, she was armed with an 76,2-mm ZIS-3 gun, which quite confidently hit virtually any enemy tanks and self-propelled guns, with the exception of the Tiger, of course, therefore, “for the purity of the experiment” we took into account its production.

However, having overtaken the Third Reich in the production of tanks, we, alas, overtook it in terms of the losses that the Red Army, according to the above data, averaged 3,05 tanks per German. As a result, the following situation has arisen: at the beginning of 1941, the state of the Red Army tank forces can be described as catastrophic - we had 1 400 medium and heavy tanks against 3 304 tanks and SPGs from the Wehrmacht. But thanks to the efforts expended on organizing mass production of tanks, we were able, despite very large losses, to ensure the Red Army approximately 44,7% superiority in the number of heavy and medium tanks at the beginning of 1943.

But it is not exactly


Have you already been horrified by the ratio of losses of Soviet and German tanks in the amount of 3: 1? Well, such is the statistics - and now let's understand why the above data is incorrect.

The attentive reader probably already paid attention to the fact that the figures in the table “do not balance” among themselves: if we add to the presence of tanks at the beginning of the year the number of armored vehicles produced and subtract losses, the final figures will be completely different than those given as balances at the end of the year. Why?

To begin with, let us remember that tank losses can be divided into two categories - returnable and irrevocable. Both those and others, of course, make the tank non-operational, but tanks falling into the first category can be restored. They, in turn, are divided into 2 categories: those that can be repaired in the field, and those that can only be restored in the factory. The tanks, which are so badly damaged, are considered irretrievable losses, that even in factory conditions it is already irrational to restore them - it is easier and cheaper to build new ones.

So, the author took the figures of Soviet losses enlarged, according to the materials of the site tankfront.ru, where they are rounded up to hundreds. They are generally more or less true, deviations, if any, are relatively small. At the same time on the above site, they were summarized in the balance sheet, which we give below:

Soviet and German tank losses in 1942 year. Be careful with the statistics!


We see that the figures in the table correspond to the formula: “the actual number of tanks at the beginning of the year + the number of vehicles transferred to the troops for the year - the loss per year = the number of tanks at the end of the year”. Why? Yes, because the number of tanks received by the troops is greater than their release. As we said earlier, the T-34 was produced in 1942 a little more than 12,5 thousand units, and no other medium tanks were produced in the USSR at that time. At the same time, according to the above table, the number of medium tanks is 13,4 thousand, that is, almost 900 machines more. With heavy tanks, the picture is even more interesting - they were produced in 1942 g 1,9 thousand units, but put in the army - 2,6 thousand units! Where does this difference come from?

The options are, in fact, only two - this is either a lend-lease technology, or tanks, which for some reason were not taken into account in the general issue, and this could only be reconstructed tanks. Moreover, if you can still assume that a certain number of Lend-Lease cars that arrived in 1942 passed through the category of medium tanks, then we certainly didn’t supply heavy tanks - simply because of the lack of such tanks from our allies.

In other words, the table for the Soviet Union takes into account not only armored vehicles newly produced and delivered from abroad, but also reconstructed tanks. But to what extent they are included in the statistics - the question is, of course, interesting.

The fact is that some time ago, there was such a point of view that the USSR tank plants did not keep separate records of armored vehicles and reconstructed at the plants after damage to tanks and self-propelled guns. The fact is that all of them, of course, when ready, passed military acceptance, which took into account only the total number of transmitted vehicles. Unfortunately, the author of this article was unable to find out this way, but if this is the case, there are some T-12,5s released in 34 in 1942. There are some tanks that were not re-created, but restored.

In this case, the additional roughly 900 medium and almost 700 heavy tanks the difference between manufactured and transferred to the troops is the number of armored vehicles repaired in the field.

If the numbers 12,5 thousand. T-34 and 1,9 thousand. KV - it's still just a technique, excluding repaired at the factories, then the difference is - this is the tanks that were restored in the factory.

But, be that as it may, the following is obtained. In addition to the lost tanks, all the return losses of tanks (the 1 case described by us), or some of the return losses, ie, tanks that were restored in the factories. In other words, in the reported losses of the Soviet armored vehicles - 6,6 thousand. Medium and 1,2. Thousand heavy tanks "sit" as the irretrievable loss, and return. The latter could be in total losses in whole or in part (in volumes requiring factory repair), but they are absolutely certain there.

But the Germans took into account only and exclusively irretrievable losses. The fact is that the author made calculations of German tanks on the basis of the book of B. Muller-Hillebrand “Land Army of Germany 1933-1945”, which is considered the “golden fund” of literature on the Wehrmacht. But in this book, apparently in the part of the release of German armored vehicles, it is the new issue that is presented, without overhaul of damaged tanks and SPGs. Apparently, B. Muller-Hillebrand simply did not have data on the return losses of Wehrmacht and SS tanks, which is why he, in the appropriate section, cited only such data for only the 4 month, from October 1943 g to January 1944, inclusive. It must be said that the return losses of the Germans for these 4 months were very large - 10 259 tanks and SPGs were restored in field conditions, and 603 - in factory conditions. In this case, the author points out that tanks of types T-III and T-IV were being repaired. Well, since the tables for the production of armored vehicles do not contain those issued from the T-III factories during the specified period, this clearly indicates that the indicated table does not take into account the restored vehicles.

At the same time B. Muller-Gillebrand gives, at first glance, comprehensive data - both the monthly production of armored vehicles, and its remnants in the troops at the beginning of each month, and production ... The only problem is that these numbers categorically "do not fight" with each other. Take, for example, tanks "Panther". As you know, at the beginning of the war, these tanks were not produced, but, according to B. Muller-Hillebrand, until December 1944 g inclusively they were made 5 629 machines. The losses of the “Panther” through December 1944, inclusive, according to the “Land Army of Germany 1933-1945”, amounted to 2 822 tank. A simple arithmetic operation suggests that in this case the Germans on 01.01.1945 should have had 2 807 “Panther”. But - that's bad luck! For some reason, according to the data of the same B. Muller-Hillebrand on 1 in January 1945, the Germans had only the 1 964 tank. Sorry generously, but where is the 843 Panther? The same is observed with other types of German armored vehicles. For example, on the same 1 in January 1945, according to the production data and the losses of the T-VI Tiger tank, the 304 units were to remain in the ranks. this legend "Panzervaffe" - however, according to the data on the remains, there were only 245. Of course, the difference in 59 machines somehow “does not look” against the background of 843 “Panther”, but in percentage terms the figures are quite comparable - the Germans lost almost 30% “Panther”, and 19,4% “Tigers” relative to those what should be in order!

And this can only talk about two things - either the German statistics of tank losses lie to us without blushing, and in fact the losses of German armored vehicles were higher than those declared, or ... everything is correct, only irretrievable losses are taken into account in the loss tables. Then everything becomes clear - on the 01 of January 1945 the same Germans had the 1 964 “Panthers” in the ranks, and the 843 machines were disabled and inefficient, but could be returned to service after appropriate repair.

But maybe the Germans and the Red Army had the same thing - tanks and self-propelled guns, which were being repaired in the field, did not feature either losses or output, and only irretrievable losses and tanks that required factory repairs were taken into account in them. Mathematically, this is possible, but historically it is not, because in this case we will have to admit that the Germans had 1 “Panthers” accumulated on the 1945 in January 843 in January, while waiting for repairs. The figure is completely impossible, and not confirmed by any sources.

Thus, when we look at the statistics and see - in 1942, the Germans lost 2 562 medium and heavy tanks and SPGs, and the Russians lost 7 825 (approximately) similar combat vehicles, we should not forget in any way that see before us incomparable values. Just because the Germans took into account only irretrievable losses, and we have also returnable, or at least some of them. And, obviously, if we compared not “warm to soft”, then the loss ratio would be somewhat different, and not 3 to 1 not in favor of the Red Army.

But the strangeness of German statistics has not yet ended - they can only be said to begin. Let's look at the estimated remnants of the tanks of the Third Reich as of the end of 1942 g, or rather, on 1 January 1943 of the year.



That is, when we see, for example, that the Germans should have had 1 168 assault SAUs, but only 1 146 was listed, this can be explained by the fact that the remaining 22 SAUs were damaged and needed repair. Not enough, of course (we will return to this issue a little later), but when the actual balance is less than the calculated one, this can be explained and understood. But what to do when this residue is larger? T-IV tanks from the Germans, taking into account their production and losses, should have remained 1 005 machines, where did they come from the whole 1 077? Where does the "extra" 72 tank come from? The wizard in a blue helicopter flew in, with a racially-correct magic wand in his breeches pocket, or what?

This phenomenon can be explained only by the fact that in 1942, the number of return losses was less than the number of tanks repaired. Since neither one nor the other is included in the statistics of Germany, with their consideration of 72, the “magic” means of where the tanks came from can be explained. And this once again confirms the author's thesis that only irretrievably lost in German losses were taken into account, and in production only new tanks and self-propelled guns. If the author was wrong, then we have to admit that German statistics lies to us, yielding mathematically impossible data.

But here's the thing ... Let's remember what happened on the fronts at the end of 1942. Well, of course, the Battle of Stalingrad! In which, according to the German generals, the Wehrmacht suffered very heavy losses, including in technology. Could it be that, as of 01.01.1943, the Germans had only a few dozen tanks and SPGs in repair? On all fronts including Africa? Oh, something hard to believe.

Let's take a look at what. According to German data, in December 1942, the Germans lost the entire 154 medium tank and SPG. In January, 1943 losses increased to 387 units. And in February they reached a record, simply unrealistic value, which had no analogues during the whole of the Second World War - in February 1943, the Wehrmacht reported on the loss of 1 842 tanks and SPG!

That is, for a second, for the entire 1942, the Germans, according to their data, lost 2 562 medium and heavy tanks and SPG, or an average of 213-214 tanks per month. And then, in 1943, for February alone - more than 1,8 thousand units of medium and heavy armored vehicles, or almost 72% of last year’s annual losses? !!

Something ends here do not meet.



According to the author, the following has happened. The fact is that B. Muller-Hillebrand, in his own words, took his statistical data from surveys on the state of armaments published monthly by the German Army Armaments Directorate. So there is a persistent feeling that when the Red Army in the tail and into the mane crushed the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad, the German commanders in the field had no time for reporting to their superior authorities. It is quite possible that the army of Paulus who appeared in the boiler did not submit such reports at all, or presented them, but gave them erroneous data, which, given the actual state of the German forces, would be extremely surprising.

So, as you know, 2 in February, the northern grouping of the 6 th army surrendered, and its southern part, together with Paulus himself, surrendered two days earlier. And after that, the Germans had the opportunity to clarify the data on their tank losses, but since backdating the reports was somehow not comme il faut, they simply wrote off their 1943 in February.

In other words, it is quite possible, and even very likely, that the Wehrmacht, in fact, did not lose 1,8 thousands of tanks during February 1943 because some of the armored vehicles were lost to them earlier, simply these losses were not reported in a timely manner. But, in this case, we again come to the fact that in fact, even the irrecoverable losses in 1942 alone, the Germans had more than their statistics show.

But this is not all. The fact is that every successful military operation has several stages, and, of course, this fully applies to the Stalingrad operation. First, when our troops break through enemy defenses, we suffer casualties. Then, when our troops with a thin line embrace the “cauldron” into which large masses of the enemy's forces landed, and this enemy with all its forces from inside and outside tries to unblock this cauldron - we also suffer losses. But then, when the enemy’s forces run out, and he capitulates - at this moment he suffers simply colossal losses that far exceed all that we have lost before.

So, the statistics “by years” are just “lame” by the fact that the above proportions can be violated in it. We suffered heavy losses in order to stop and surround Paulus’s 6 army, of course, not only in casualties but also in tanks, and all this was taken into account in 1942 statistics. But all the benefits of our operation were “transferred” to 1943 year. In other words, besides all the above, it is necessary to understand that at the end of 1942 we made a certain “contribution” to losses in our future success, but we did not even have time to recover from the enemy “in a row”. Thus, statistical calculations for calendar 1942 will not be indicative.

It would be much more correct to estimate the losses of the tank forces of the USSR and Germany not for 12 months 1942, but for 14 months, including January and February 1943. Alas, the author does not have accurate data on the losses of the national armored vehicles monthly. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that for the period from January 1 1942 to 2 February 1943 inclusive, the Germans lost approximately 4,4 thousand medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Soviet troops - about 9 000 units. But Do not forget, again about the fact that in our 9 000 units. Some part of the return loss is also “sitting”, and the German 4,4 thousand are only irrecoverable losses.

And so it turns out that the real ratio of casualties of armored vehicles during this period is not related to 3 to 1, but rather, even less than 2 to one, but still, of course, not in our favor.

Alas, that was the price of the insufficient experience of our soldiers and commanders, the suboptimal states of the tank forces and the technical shortcomings of our tanks - including, of course, T-34. That is why the title of the cycle of articles appears "Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III ...". This does not mean, of course, that in the aggregate of the combat qualities of the T-34, it was once inferior to the German "treshka". But the fact is that during the 1941-1942 period, the German army, armed mainly with T-III (at the beginning of 1942, the share of "treshki" in the total number of medium armored vehicles was 56%, at the end of 1942 g - 44%) she knew how to inflict much more heavy losses on tanks than she carried herself

By the way, I anticipate the question of a careful reader: “Why does this author compare the total losses of German tanks with the losses of tanks in the USSR? After all, Germany fought not only on the Eastern Front, but, for example, in Africa ... ”.

Well, I answer with pleasure. The fact is that I have a persistent feeling that B. Müller-Hillebrand took the total losses of the German tanks not at all common, but only those that were incurred on the Eastern Front. Just to remind you that 26 in May 1941. Rommel began the battle that went into history as the "Battle of Gazalli". At the same time, before the beginning of June, he managed to attack, get involved in a battle with British tank forces, incur serious losses from the fire of 75-mm cannons of Grant tanks and get surrounded.

Obviously, Rommel's divisions suffered sensitive tank losses. Nevertheless, according to B. Muller-Hillebrand in May 1941, the Third Reich lost 2 (in words - TWO) tank, one of which - T-III, and the second - commander. Such a level of losses is quite acceptable if we are talking about non-combat losses unfolding on the Soviet-German border troops, but it is absolutely impossible for two tank divisions leading intensive battles during 6 days. Incidentally, from January to April 1941, according to B. Muller-Hillebrand, the Wehrmacht did not have any losses in tanks.

Oh, this German statistics!

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Why did T-34 lose to PzKpfw III, but beat Tigers and Panthers
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. Part of 2
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. Part of 3
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. Design refinement
Pre-war structure of the armored troops of the Red Army
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. Return to brigades
Why T-34 lost to PzKpfw III, but won against Tigers and Panthers. The revival of tank corps
186 comments
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  1. igordok
    igordok 10 May 2019 08: 42
    +31
    You read rare articles completely. This article, and most of the articles in this series, is not among them.
    Thank you very much.
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 11 May 2019 12: 07
      +3
      The author, still pleased with the news of tank construction. Then he, on a piece in 41g, has some kind of weapon that successfully fights with the T-34, for some reason KVs are released in 42g, only until August, then the allied tanks disappeared somewhere.
      So we get amazing conclusions with guesses, nothing to do with real.
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 12 May 2019 17: 20
        0
        42g. - the only year when the losses of medium tanks were much smaller than the number of medium tanks shipped to the front. This is despite a large retreat in the south (a lot of abandoned equipment), the imperfection of the structure of the BT and MVoisk, and the lack of experience among personnel. In the following years of the war, the losses were either close to the number of shipped medium tanks, or exceeded this number (1945).
        There are probably two reasons: the T-34 armor has not yet become bulletproof relative to the most massive anti-tank and tank guns of the enemy and some kind of not very small part of the tanks is sent to newly formed units that did not take part in the battles in 42g.
  2. vvp2412
    vvp2412 10 May 2019 08: 51
    +13
    Moreover, if we can still assume that a certain number of Lend-Lease vehicles arrived in the 1942 were in the category of medium tanks, then heavy tanks were not delivered to us for sure - simply because our allies did not have such tanks

    Churchill began to deliver on Lend-Lease in the summer of 1942 of the year
    1. Nikolaevich I
      Nikolaevich I 10 May 2019 10: 23
      +4
      That's right! The author is wrong, stating: "We were not supplied with heavy tanks for sure - just because our allies did not have such tanks ..."!
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        10 May 2019 14: 39
        +12
        Yes, I forgot about a hundred Churchill :))) But it doesn’t solve anything either - the difference in 700 machines by the hundreds is not covered :)
        1. Razvedka_Boem
          Razvedka_Boem 10 May 2019 16: 14
          +5
          There is a bike that when Churchill was shown this tank, named after him, he noticed - This tank has more flaws than I myself ..
          1. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 10 May 2019 17: 04
            +12
            Quote: Razvedka_Boem
            There is a bike that when Churchill was shown this tank, named after him, he noticed - This tank has more flaws than I myself ..

            The Churchill tank was not named after the then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (at least officially! wink ), and in honor of John Churchill - 1 of the Duke of Marlborough, an outstanding British commander of the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714 years ... ancestor of Winston Churchill. tongue
            1. Razvedka_Boem
              Razvedka_Boem 10 May 2019 18: 18
              +7
              Tank "Churchill" was not named after the then prime minister

              I didn’t know that)
              Thanks for clarifying!
            2. Mephody
              Mephody 17 June 2019 15: 18
              +1
              That's how gracefully licked. The British are. I wonder how many contemporaries knew which Churchill was in question?
              1. Nikolaevich I
                Nikolaevich I 17 June 2019 16: 29
                0
                Ash-tree stump that "licked"! I think that many Englishmen believed that the tank was named in honor of Winston Churchill ... who was "for" such an opinion, kept quiet ... And those who took it into their heads to be indignant at the "immodesty" of the Prime Minister could always point out that the Prime Minister Minister Winston Churchill has nothing to do with it! That we are talking about John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough ... wink
        2. Nikolaevich I
          Nikolaevich I 10 May 2019 16: 55
          +4
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          I forgot about a hundred Churchill :) :))) But she doesn’t solve anything either - the difference in 700 machines by a hundred is not covered


          Duc, zakovyka something not only in "only a hundred Churchills", but also in the "bold" statement about "the lack of heavy tanks from our allies!" hi
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            10 May 2019 19: 03
            +6
            Quote: Nikolaevich I
            Duc, zakovyka something not only in "only a hundred Churchills", but also in the "bold" statement about "the lack of heavy tanks from our allies!"

            Unfortunately, some things are not checked on the sources, relying on the memory. He mistakenly believed that Churchill had gone to the front since the beginning of 1943.
            1. Nikolaevich I
              Nikolaevich I 10 May 2019 23: 20
              +4
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Unfortunately, some things are not checked on the sources, relying on the memory.

              Happens! yes At the same time it just happened the same way! recourse
          2. Sanichsan
            Sanichsan 14 May 2019 16: 23
            0
            Quote: Nikolaevich I
            Duc, zakovyka something not only in "only a hundred Churchills", but also in the "bold" statement about "the lack of heavy tanks from our allies!"

            So he (Churchill) is this not a heavy tank. he is infantry! wink the one that the French were also infantry.
            then everything is true. the allies did not have heavy tanks. yes
            1. Nikolaevich I
              Nikolaevich I 15 May 2019 00: 50
              +1
              Quote: SanichSan
              So he (Churchill) is this not a heavy tank. he is infantry!

              Oh, this terminology, statistics! Infantry tanks, cruising, light, medium, heavy, main, reconnaissance, line ... the head goes with a compass! "Everyone" has his own! "Somewhere" heavy tanks "start" from 40 tons, and for "someone" - after 30 ... wink In the USSR (Red Army) "Churchillies" were referred to as heavy tanks and compared with the KV-1 ... If you "look" Internet "sources", then in very many the tank "Churchill" is called: 1. heavy tank; 2. infantry tank heavy in weight; 3. heavy infantry tank.
              1. Sanichsan
                Sanichsan 15 May 2019 11: 37
                0
                Quote: Nikolaevich I
                Oh, this terminology, statistics!

                "man, why are you so serious?" (from) laughing
                Yes, it is clear that in the USSR the tank was considered heavy. I mean, the author can be justified! wink
                and then try to prove here that the Panther is a heavy tank, and by the way, the fourth groove in the USSR was also considered heavy, at least at 41. yes
                1. Nikolaevich I
                  Nikolaevich I 15 May 2019 13: 25
                  +1
                  Quote: SanichSan
                  "man, why are you so serious?"

                  And what to do? request "We are not like that, but life is like that!" ... yes I was so often pixy on the site, crying that "spontaneously": a) "burnt in milk, you blow on water ..."; b) "a frightened crow is afraid of every bush ..." No, I, of course, guessed that this was a "joking form" ... but, just in case, "reinsured"! winked Like ... "it's better to overbid than not to ..." wink And the author? And the author!? I treat the Author with full understanding! hi soldier
      2. Letun
        Letun 13 May 2019 08: 32
        +1
        Yes, in general, this article is some kind of fortune-telling on the coffee grounds: "Perhaps the Germans thought so, but we did it, probably they did not take this into account, but we are the opposite ..." Compared to the previous articles in the series, it is frankly rather weak.
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 10 May 2019 19: 29
      +11
      Quote: vvp2412
      Churchill began to deliver on Lend-Lease in the summer of 1942 of the year

      Churchill didn’t supply us with Lend-Lease - this was done by the Americans, who supplied equipment and weapons of a certain nomenclature to the UK and other countries for free or for currency, which did not fall into the Lend-Lease. We bought military equipment from the British for gold and currency, or paid off with raw materials and other goods.
      But in general, the article is really very interesting and informative for those interested in the Great Patriotic War.
      1. Sanichsan
        Sanichsan 14 May 2019 16: 27
        0
        Quote: ccsr
        We bought military equipment from the British for gold and currency, or paid off with raw materials and other goods.

        Well, one way or another, in the Red Army, Churchill tanks were present ...
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 14 May 2019 19: 19
          +1
          Quote: SanichSan
          Well, one way or another, in the Red Army, Churchill tanks were present ...

          They didn’t come with us for free - we paid for them with gold, i.e. they had nothing to do with Lend-Lease.
          1. Sanichsan
            Sanichsan 15 May 2019 11: 45
            0
            Quote: ccsr
            They didn’t come with us for free - we paid for them with gold, i.e. they had nothing to do with Lend-Lease.

            an interesting detail, but the essence of the matter does not really change. Lend-Lease is also not free.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 15 May 2019 12: 15
              +1
              Quote: SanichSan
              Lend-Lease is also not free.

              Indeed, it was partly free, and partly it was necessary to either repay or pay on a loan, which is why we had problems with the Americans, and which were resolved at the beginning of this century. But the British did not have such a law, and therefore they sold us weapons only for gold, currency, or raw materials. It’s just that sometimes there is confusion, and Lend-Lease is ranked as something that has never been included in this program. That's why I just clarified this detail.
  3. bubalik
    bubalik 10 May 2019 08: 57
    +14
    Good afternoon!
    And how was the trophy technique taken into account for losses? Or is their number insignificant?
    ,, in the initial period of the war, the Germans captured in working condition from 900 to 1100 T-26 tanks, 300-500 BT tanks, more 40 T-28 tanks and more 45 T-34 and KV tanks.
    “After the battle in the spring of 1943 of the year for Kharkov and its re-capture of more than 50 T-34 / 76, fell into the hands of the Germans mainly in the release of 1942 / 1943 of the year.


    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      10 May 2019 14: 40
      +6
      Yes, I also wanted to mention about it, but in the end I missed it. crying
      1. Romka47
        Romka47 15 May 2019 16: 38
        0
        I saw the article "Why did the T-34 lose T3 ...." I did not read it, my soul did not perceive the name alone, I accidentally started reading this article and read it "in the same breath" but with a calculator in my hands, I liked it very much, THANKS hi now be sure to read all your materials !!!! a lot of fatty +++
  4. vvvjak
    vvvjak 10 May 2019 08: 58
    +3
    Oh, this German statistics!

    Well, with German statistics, everything is clear (what about the loss of tanks, that of aircraft). Maybe the author will give more adequate figures.
  5. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 10 May 2019 09: 09
    +9
    Only irretrievable losses can be taken into account.
    And not for months, for a year.
    A tank damaged on the battlefield could be re-commissioned
    only after half a year.
    Hitler, by the way, demanded that he not be informed in reports
    knocked out tanks and planes, and how many tankers and pilots died.
    So how to prepare a crew of a tank or pilot longer and harder than
    make a tank and plane.
    1. vvvjak
      vvvjak 10 May 2019 09: 15
      +11
      Quote: voyaka uh
      A tank damaged on the battlefield could be re-commissioned
      only after half a year.

      Depending on the damage received. T-34 could be restored to a combat-ready state during the night.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 10 May 2019 09: 38
        +1
        But the T-34 engine had to be sorted out every few days.
        Either in battle or in repair ... non-combat return losses.
        1. vvvjak
          vvvjak 10 May 2019 09: 56
          +9
          Quote: voyaka uh
          Either in battle or in repair ... non-combat return losses.

          So that’s the point. And how many tanks were used as donors of spare parts, which were written off as an irreparable loss? The Germans had a completely different matter, they considered only those tanks to be irretrievable losses that left for repair in Germany or fell into the hands of the Russians. And the fact that they repaired at front-line repair shops did not count, as it were. So the author cites the non-compliance with the stat. data.
  6. Alex013
    Alex013 10 May 2019 09: 24
    +13
    The article is very interesting, plus to the author. But if you take 42, a rather large percentage of armored vehicles were light tanks, for example, T-60 was released that year 4,5 thousand, T-70 - 4,9 thousand. And the losses were correspondingly high. And in the Fritz, the proportion of light armored vehicles decreased.
  7. KVU-NSVD
    KVU-NSVD 10 May 2019 09: 35
    +25
    I will allow myself to add my five cents to the topic of the ratio of losses of equipment in general and armored vehicles in particular in the initial period of the war. The fact is that during the retreat, the number of irretrievable losses is a multiple greater than during the offensive or actions with varying success. After all, the retreating army throws a lot of completely repairable damaged equipment, and often even quite serviceable. Those. When retreating, there is far from always time to take care of the evacuation of a damaged tank. In the offensive, almost all the slightly repairable equipment is restored, and even the cars finally destroyed from the first wave. offensives benefit the advancing second-tier units as part donors. Thus, the ratio of returnable and irretrievable losses of equipment depends heavily on the type of hostilities that the army is currently conducting.
  8. sevtrash
    sevtrash 10 May 2019 09: 55
    -6
    In general, it is interesting, as it were, but what is fundamentally new? There is an expression - "There is a lie, there is a blatant lie, there is statistics." Of course, it greatly exaggerates / exaggerates, but still characterizes the statistics as a wayward lady and demanding on the initial data, methods, etc. That is, mistakes, misinterpretation are quite possible. Both in the sources and, of course, in the author of the article.
    An article on the Lend-Lease Tanks website indicates that during the same 1942, medium-sized (classification by mass has not gone anywhere) Matilda, Lee, Sherman tanks about 1500, heavy (at that time) Churchill about 100 were delivered under Lend-Lease. , light about 2000. This is more than the author did not find / found in 1942. Should they be taken into account in losses? But what about, almost 4000 tanks.
    But in general - as if there is nothing new. The losses of the Red Army in tanks (and not only) were higher, no matter how you count. Pay for the worst quality quantity.
  9. boathouse
    boathouse 10 May 2019 10: 00
    +8
    A good article, there are probably a little bit of controversial points, but the author used the materials that he could find. As soon as something else is found, I think the article will be supplemented and corrected in some places. But, in any case, to the author RESPECT! A huge number of materials processed. I read it with pleasure.
  10. evgic
    evgic 10 May 2019 10: 14
    +5
    The author continues to delight with excellent balanced articles. Regarding German statistics, yes, it is very confusing, this also applies to personnel losses.
  11. 123456789
    123456789 10 May 2019 10: 24
    +3
    Quote: voyaka uh
    But the T-34 engine had to be sorted out every few days.

    Could you compare the engine life of the T-34 and T-VI engines ... Thank you in advance.
    1. 123456789
      123456789 10 May 2019 19: 46
      +2

      diesel from T-34 is still being produced
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 11 May 2019 02: 08
        +3
        Read about the T-34/76 gearbox. And you will understand why they went to battle
        according to the instructions only in 2nd gear with a wild roar (one T-34 roared like a T-4 company).
        And accordingly, why powerful T-34 diesels flew in a short time.
        The T-34 turned into a good combat vehicle from the second half of 1944.
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 22: 47
      +7
      Quote: 123456789
      Could you compare the engine life of the T-34 and T-VI engines ... Thank you in advance.

      You decided to throw on the fan?

      On paper, all cars could get to Lisbon. In fact, the British in trials, EMNIP, burned the Maybach for 600 km, and the Americans in Aberdeen in the 42nd trapped the T-34 in scrap metal for an engine for 340, like, kilometers.

      They write that pests (and Trotskyists) worked in Aberdeen who did not know how and did not want to clean the air filter. Most likely, it is, however, the level of training of Aberdeen’s testers hardly differed for the worse from the 42-year-old conscript.
      1. Albert1988
        Albert1988 11 May 2019 12: 53
        +4
        Quote: Cherry Nine
        They write that pests (and Trotskyists) worked in Aberdeen who did not know how and did not want to clean the air filter.

        First of all, there is an opinion (and very reasonable) that the infamous "Sormovo freak" was sent to Aberdeen, and the Americans were sure that this was a "reference" car, so the results came out corresponding ...
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 13: 33
          0
          Quote: Albert1988
          sent the infamous "Sormovo freak", and the Americans were sure

          But did they themselves do B-2 in Sormovo?
          1. Albert1988
            Albert1988 11 May 2019 22: 25
            0
            Quote: Cherry Nine
            But did they themselves do B-2 in Sormovo?

            Let's just say:
            Here is the T-34 manufactured by the plant number 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo"

            And here is the T-34 from Aberdeen:



            Agree - the similarity is somehow alarming ...
  12. Nikolaevich I
    Nikolaevich I 10 May 2019 10: 28
    +3
    "Be careful with statistics ..." Mdaaa ... "There are many things in the world, friend Horatio, that our sages never dreamed of ..."
  13. K-50
    K-50 10 May 2019 10: 51
    +1
    The return can be attributed to the enemy’s equipment, captured by those behind whom the battlefield remained and subsequently restored.
    Considering the fact that in the 42nd year the lion's share of the won battles remained with the Nazis, the fleet of their combat vehicles accordingly increased significantly precisely due to trophies, especially since they had much less problems recovering them, as well as due to large repair services, machinery, organization, and through the use of forced labor of prisoners of war, prohibited, incidentally, by the Convention of the Red Cross. Only the Nazis didn’t give a damn about all the international treaties signed by them, as, incidentally, now the pin dosniks are coming.
    1. PilotS37
      PilotS37 10 May 2019 14: 26
      +2
      The author gives a clear picture of the models: the captured equipment could not get into either T-III or T-IV statistics!
  14. Undecim
    Undecim 10 May 2019 11: 26
    +5
    I will allow myself some clarification.
    In 1941, the production facilities of the Third Reich gave the Wehrmacht and SS 2 medium tanks T-III T-IV, commander tanks at their base, as well as StuG III assault guns, which with a mass of 850 tons had a reservation comparable to T-III, but an incomparably more powerful 22-mm gun, capable of quite successfully fighting our T-75s.
    If we talk about 1941, the Sturmgeschütz III with a gun 7.5 cm StuK 37 L / 24 against the T-34 had no chance. Armor-piercing projectile PzGr. 39/43 at an angle of 30 degrees from 100 m penetrated armor of 40 mm.
    The 34 cm StuK 7.5 L / 40 guns capable of effectively fighting the T-43 and HF appeared in the spring of 1942, and the 7.5 cm StuK 40 L / 48 guns appeared in the autumn of 1942.
    1. Alex_vl
      Alex_vl 18 May 2019 13: 23
      0
      C
      7.5 cm StuK 37 L / 24 against the T-34 had no chance.
      not so simple. Wiki says that
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_37
      BB Shell Pzgr. 39/2 penetrated 55 mm from 500 m. And this, according to statistics, is the most frequent distance of PT shooting. In addition, 75 mm discs already had a bad ability to turn on 45 mm armor and penetrate normally. Impressed by Matild, by 1941, the Gr.38 Hl cumulatives were already in full use, whose armor-piercing performance was constantly improving, from 52 mm to 115 mm in the latter.
      Why do the Germans begin to switch to long-barreled artillery systems, you ask. The fact is that higher initial speeds increase the flatness of the trajectory and therefore the accuracy of shooting, as well as push the boundaries in range for accurate aimed shooting. The cumulatives were not very popular due to the fact that they were very capricious, and in addition they represented a danger to their crews in the combat station. In addition, with an increase in the initial speeds, the speed of rotation of the projectile increased, which the cumulative jet does not particularly like, therefore, the speed is cum. sn. limited to 650 m / s.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 18 May 2019 13: 53
        0
        I do not review information from Wiki. And Wiki as a source of information too.
        According to German sources, armor-piercing shells Pzgr. 39 x 100 m at a meeting angle of 90 degrees pierced 41 mm, so it is inappropriate about "turning".
        The second one. Cumulative shells Gran. 38 appeared in 1942, the conversation is about 1941. Their initial velocity from this gun was 450 m / s
        Pzgr shells. 39 are not blanks, they are filled with explosives.
  15. dvina71
    dvina71 10 May 2019 11: 43
    +2
    Tank loss statistics are very different. There are losses on the battlefield and they characterize the effectiveness of the enemy’s anti-tank forces. There are losses according to the technical condition, characterize the state of the equipment and the effectiveness of the rem service. Most of all I liked the statistics, which does not apply to the army. In the USSR, due to various reasons, the reception of captured equipment and weapons from the population and organizations was established. In total, more than 40 thousand tanks were delivered .. actually this is the minimum loss of the tank units of the Wehrmacht and only in the USSR ..
  16. Zum
    Zum 10 May 2019 13: 49
    +2
    There is a good book by M. Kolomiets "Tanks in the Kharkov catastrophe of 1942". There are many "notes" about the mistakes of our tank formations!
  17. demo
    demo 10 May 2019 14: 24
    -3
    Of course, the T-34 anti-ballistic armor and powerful weapons were excellent “arguments” that, if used correctly, could lead Soviet combat success in the battle. But for this, combat experience was needed, which the Wehrmacht still had more, and in addition, worked-out interaction with its own artillery and infantry, which, alas, the Red Army was simply categorically lacking.
    I specifically copied and pasted the milestones preceding the start of World War II.
    And there are dates of all significant events.
    INCLUDING Germany’s participation in hostilities.
    18 September 1931 years
    Japan attacks Manchuria.

    2 October 1935 - May 1936 of the year
    Fascist Italy invades Ethiopia, conquers and annexes it.

    October 25 - November 1 1936 of the year
    Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy conclude a cooperation agreement on October 25; On November 1, the creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis is announced.

    November 25 1936 years
    Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact against the USSR and the international communist movement.

    7 July 1937 year
    Japan invades China, World War II begins in the Pacific.

    11-13 March 1938 of the year
    Germany annexes Austria (the so-called Anschluss).

    29 September 1938 years
    Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France sign the Munich Agreement, which obliges the Czechoslovak Republic to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany (where the key Czechoslovak defenses were located).

    14-15 March 1939 of the year
    Under pressure from Germany, the Slovaks declare their independence and create the Slovak Republic. The Germans violate the Munich Agreement by occupying the remnants of Czech lands and create the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

    31 March 1939 year
    France and Great Britain guarantee the inviolability of the borders of the Polish state.

    7-15 April 1939 years
    Fascist Italy attacks Albania and annexes it.

    23 August 1939 year
    Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union sign a non-aggression pact and a secret annex to it, according to which Europe is divided into spheres of influence.

    1 September 1939 years
    Germany invades Poland, starting the Second World War in Europe.

    3 September 1939 years
    Fulfilling their obligations to Poland, Britain and France declare war on Germany.

    17 September 1939 years
    The Soviet Union invades Poland from the east.

    27-29 September 1939 years
    27 September surrenders Warsaw. The Polish government is sent into exile through Romania. Germany and the Soviet Union divide Poland among themselves.

    30 November 1939 year - 12 March 1940 year
    The Soviet Union attacks Finland, unleashing the so-called Winter War. The Finns are asking for a truce and are forced to cede to the Soviet Union the Karelian Isthmus and the northern shore of Lake Ladoga.

    9 April - 9 June 1940 years
    Germany invades Denmark and Norway. Denmark surrenders on the day of the attack; Norway resists until 9 of June.

    May 10 - June 22 1940 of the year
    Germany invades western Europe - France and the neutral countries of the Benelux. Luxembourg occupied May 10; The Netherlands surrenders on Xnumx of May; Belgium - May 14. 28 June France signed a ceasefire agreement, according to which German troops occupy the northern part of the country and the entire Atlantic coast. In the southern part of France, a collaborative regime is being established with its capital in Vichy.

    10 June 1940 year
    Italy enters the war. 21 June Italy invades southern France.

    28 June 1940 year
    The USSR forces Romania to cede the eastern region of Bessarabia and the northern half of Bukovina to Soviet Ukraine.

    14 of June - 6 of August 1940 of the year
    On 14-18 of June, the Soviet Union occupies the Baltic states, on 14-15 of July it organizes a communist coup in each of them, and then, on August 3-6, annexes them as Soviet republics.

    10 July - 31 October 1940 years
    The air war against England, known as the Battle of Britain, ends with the defeat of Nazi Germany.

    30 August 1940 year
    Second Vienna Arbitration: Germany and Italy decide to divide the controversial Transylvania between Romania and Hungary. The loss of northern Transylvania leads to the fact that the Romanian king Carol II abdicates in favor of his son Mihai, and the dictatorial regime of General Ion Antonescu comes to power.

    13 September 1940 years
    Italians attack British-controlled Egypt from Libya-controlled territory.

    27 September 1940 years
    Germany, Italy and Japan sign the Tripartite Pact.

    October 1940 years
    28 October Italy invades Greece from the territory of Albania.

    November 1940 years
    The German coalition is joined by Slovakia (November 23), Hungary (November 20) and Romania (November 22).

    February 1941 years
    Germany sends its African Corps to North Africa to support indecisive Italians.

    1 March 1941 year
    Bulgaria joins Axis.

    6 April - June 1941 years
    Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria invade and divide Yugoslavia. 17 April Yugoslavia capitulates. Germany and Bulgaria attack Greece, helping Italians. Greece ceases resistance in early June 1941.

    April 10 1941 years
    The leaders of the Ustasha terrorist movement proclaim the so-called Independent State of Croatia. Immediately recognized by Germany and Italy, the new state also includes Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia officially joins the Axis states on June 15, 1941.

    22 June - November 1941 of the year
    Nazi Germany and its allies (with the exception of Bulgaria) attack the Soviet Union. Finland, seeking to reclaim the territories lost during the Winter War, joins the Axis just before the invasion. The Germans quickly capture the Baltic states and by September, with the support of the joined Finns, they besieged Leningrad (St. Petersburg). On the central front, German troops occupied Smolensk in early August and were approaching Moscow by October. In the south, German and Romanian troops seize Kiev in September, and Rostov-on-Don in November.

    Do not be lazy and count WHERE, HOW MUCH and WHAT enemies did Germany fight.
    And where does she gain such experience, which the author tells us?
    I am in doubt.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      10 May 2019 14: 46
      +11
      Quote: demo
      And where does she gain such experience, which the author tells us?

      I did not understand the question. That is, large-scale military operations of tank forces in Poland and France are nothing? And it is comparable to the "occupation" of the Baltic states by the USSR, right? :)
      1. demo
        demo 10 May 2019 14: 56
        -5
        Read how and how much the French resisted the Germans.
        Calculate the loss in technology.
        Personal composition.
        And you can understand what "that" war was like.
        It was a little more complicated with Poland.
        But here they didn’t mess around for long.
        So the experience of the German tank gunners was not so much.
        This is what we are talking about.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          10 May 2019 15: 57
          +11
          Quote: demo
          Read how and how much the French resisted the Germans.

          I know this much better than yours, forgive me.
          Quote: demo
          Calculate the loss in technology.
          Personal composition.

          Military experience is taken not only from casualties, but from verification of concepts and combat training of troops. The Germans, based on the results of the battles, found out that their direction was correct, but at the same time they changed their staff very much - during the war with Poland, they still managed to combine infantry, tank and mountain divisions in one corps, in France they had 375 tanks and so on in their TD. d. They acquired an excellent successful experience in practical control of the masses of tank forces, refined their combat statutes, etc.
          And loss is not a measure of experience. Well, for example, the Germans suffered very heavy losses at Stalingrad, but they received almost no new experience in using tank forces.
          Quote: demo
          So the experience of the German tank gunners was not so much.

          Much the same, because they defeated millions of armies and forced them to surrender. The fact that they did it with a minimum of losses, neither merit nor the gained experience does not detract.
    2. Operator
      Operator 10 May 2019 14: 51
      +4
      Some strange chronology you have:
      September 3 1939 - fulfilling their obligations to Poland, Britain and France declare war on Germany;
      10 May 1940 of the Year - Germany invades ... France


      What was "the fulfillment of their obligations by Britain and France" - in the publication of documents on mobilization? laughing

      Correctly so:
      - October 10 1938 Poland together with Germany attacks the Soviet ally Czechoslovakia and dismembers it, Poland prevents the passage of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia;
      - 3 September 1939, Germany, with the support of Britain and France, invades Poland;
      - 17 September 1939 after the collapse of the Polish state and the exodus of the former Polish government from the USSR country enters its troops into the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine to protect ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians.
      1. demo
        demo 10 May 2019 14: 57
        +1
        This is such a wiki chronology.
        God forbid, I dare not make my corrections.
    3. PilotS37
      PilotS37 10 May 2019 14: 57
      +7
      Do not be lazy and count WHERE, HOW MUCH and WHAT enemies did Germany fight.
      And where does she gain such experience, which the author tells us?
      I am in doubt.

      At least Poland and France: those operations were transient, but very revealing.
      The timeline, of course, is compiled by you very convincing ... I applaud!
      In general, it would be more correct to say that the Germans managed to create a new war technology. It was not a revelation to opponents (before the War and de Gaulle, and our Triandofilov wrote about the same thing that Guderian was talking about), but the Germans REALLY realized this technology: they prepared the resources and put them into practice, and we the French (like and all others) were forced to adjust on the fly ... The French - in addition to the experience of conducting such a war - did not have enough territory (well, the will to win is likely), and we - having paid an insane price - managed ...
      By the way, the same T-34 and KV, as well as the Il-2 - evidence that the "party and government" did understand what awaited us, but Russia is not Germany!
      1. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 21: 21
        +4
        Quote: PilotS37
        The French - besides the experience of conducting such a war - did not have enough territory

        Anything can be said about the will to win, but the idea of ​​territory was tested in the 44th.

        This is the correct theory. Patton’s blitzkrieg went about the same kilometers as German. Choked before reaching the German border. Patton, however, writes that Aiki and Montgomery stopped him, having squeezed them from the supply, but Monti's skating rink with all its supplies, again to the Rhine, not to mention Berlin, did not reach from one approach. I had to get up for several months and save strength. This is with the undoubtedly best American rear in the world.
        So
        1. The 41-year-old Blitzkrieg was simply phenomenal in depth.
        2. It should have ended one way or another, a little closer or a little further than real. They wouldn’t have surrendered Moscow without a fight like Paris — the Wehrmacht had no forces to storm.
        1. Town Hall
          Town Hall 10 May 2019 23: 10
          -3
          Blitzkig 40 years already exhausted at Dunkirk
          1. Cherry Nine
            Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 23: 27
            +4
            Quote: Town Hall
            Blitzkig 40 years vydzatsya at Dunkirk

            Why do you think so? Under Dunkirk, the Allies simply were able to temporarily organize a defense and hold out a bit. Strategically, the blitzkrieg continued. From Ardennes to Paris we walked a little over a month.

            Blitzkrieg in the opposite direction - jerk 3A from Falez through Paris to the Metz - took 9 days.
            1. Town Hall
              Town Hall 11 May 2019 00: 46
              0
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              Under Dunkirk, the Allies simply were able to temporarily organize a defense

              They were able to do this because the Germans were exhausted by that time, the extended communications, losses, etc., etc., and there was not enough strength to destroy the Dunker bridgehead and further attack in France. We had to give up something
              1. Cherry Nine
                Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 00: 54
                +4
                Quote: Town Hall
                it was necessary to refuse something

                The British did not manage to crush at once and the blitzkrieg ran out of steam - not the same thing.
                1. Town Hall
                  Town Hall 11 May 2019 01: 09
                  +3
                  Quote: Cherry Nine
                  Failed immediately

                  Strictly speaking, they did not try seriously. Hitler of the 40th year did not yet imagine himself as a generalissimo and the military still obeyed. The loss of 15 divisions near Dunkirk was not so critical for England globally. But the protracted battles there gave France a respite and the opportunity to pull up their "Siberian" divisions, and the blitzkrieg risked dragging on for a long time
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          11 May 2019 00: 16
          +2
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          Blitzkrieg Patton

          These are two completely incompatible words :))))
          1. Cherry Nine
            Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 00: 50
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            These are two completely incompatible words.

            Someone seems to be confusing Patton and Monty. Patton always tried to jerk the carts, even when it would not be worth it.

            Although you, as I understand it, are sure that Sandomierz and Oppenheim are two completely different cities, and the Vistula and Rhine are completely different rivers. We seem to have discussed completely different Germans for some other reason.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              11 May 2019 12: 52
              +5
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              Someone seems to be confusing Patton and Monty. Patton always tried to jerk the carts, even when it would not be worth it.

              He tried to jerk, but he didn’t have a blitzkrieg. As, actually, and at all Anglo-American armies - in WWII they did not seize tank war
              1. Cherry Nine
                Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 13: 54
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                As, in fact, with all the Anglo-American troops - in WWII they did not master the tank war

                You are in vain a generalization. The partners did not have their own manstein, but they had their own rommel. The Allies could (and did) fly from Saint-Lo to Metz 500+ kilometers. But Aiki really failed to fit his capabilities into his strategy.

                On the other hand, Aiki's cowardly command corresponded well to the poor training of his army. As it turned out, the level of the army was growing rapidly and allowed more than the commander-in-chief demanded. Until 45, he did not perform a single boiler properly, but he himself did not allow a single boiler (Bastogne was a "fortress", not a boiler). Since he had nowhere to rush, we can say that he coped well. In contrast to the very daring and successful, Bautzen-Weissenberg, April 45th.
      2. Alex_vl
        Alex_vl 18 May 2019 15: 32
        0
        but what is there to procrastinate, the USSR took part in three major conflicts, where it was quite possible to gain combat experience.
        1. Spain 1937
        2. Mongolia 1939
        3. Finland 1939
        about the need for ballistic booking, the leadership of the Red Army realized only after Spain 1937, they began to act only in 1939.
        Although they should have realized after the purchase of the 1933 PT gun of Reinmetall, which was subsequently re-barreled under 45 mm (I don't know how the anti-recoil devices and the frame felt after that). The "advanced Soviet military thought" did not realize the danger of small-caliber artillery - who is to blame and what to do?
    4. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 21: 32
      +5
      Quote: demo
      WHERE, HOW MUCH AND WITH WHAT adversaries did Germany fight

      With half the European countries, including the 2nd, 3rd and 4th most powerful armies in Europe (France, Britain and Poland, respectively). Unexpectedly, right?
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 23: 55
          +5
          Quote: demo
          Just take and read.

          You see what’s the matter. I'm not too interested in the French, but still I read not only Wikipedia.
          Quote: demo
          It was, to put it mildly, not indicative.

          The author of the article answered you quite adequately.

          A plane will fly, a machine gun will be sharpened,
          Iron tanks clatter
          And the battleships will go, and the infantry will go,
          And dashing tachanka rush.

          We do not want war, but we will defend ourselves
          We are fortifying the defense for a reason,
          And in enemy land, we will crush the enemy
          Little blood, a mighty blow!

          In the whole world, nowhere is there such power
          To crush our country, -
          With us is Stalin's native, and with an iron hand
          Voroshilov leads us to victory!

          So, on enemy land, with little blood, with a mighty blow, everyone wanted to fight, but only Germans were able to fight. By the 41st, they had already done this three times (I don’t think Norway). Naturally, they swayed well. So the fourth blitzkrieg of the 41st was phenomenally successful. They knew how and they did it.

          But that was not enough.

          In the poorly educated, it is believed that the main achievement of WWII in terms of weapons was AB. This is not true. The main achievement was the Wehrmacht tank group and the Japanese AUS. These breakthroughs in military thought allowed the Germans and Japanese to wage a virtually colonial war with much more seemingly strong countries.
          ... We have got
          The Maxim gun, and they have not.

          While the good guys — the USSR and the Americans on land and also the Americans on the sea — had not mastered these things, they had nothing to catch.
          1. chenia
            chenia 11 May 2019 11: 20
            +1
            Quote: Cherry Nine
            The main achievement was the Wehrmacht tank group


            Certainly. But the Germans never developed this formation. Moreover, after France, they turned the tank divisions into breakthrough divisions (1 TP and 2 infantry), and the MK was an analogue of the shock army. And the MK thrown into the breakthrough was "heavy". With an unstable defense in 1941 and early 1942, it worked. But then it jammed. We also had a significantly more correct structure (2 TP and 1 MP (LP)), which was partially ripped off from the Germans (still, in the TP of the OShS, fix it, then the MK would have shrunk to 600 tanks.)
            Well art. offensive (thanks to Voronov and Kazakov) - the highest form of organization of artillery operations (although this was later), which was not owned by Germans. nor allies.
            1. Cherry Nine
              Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 13: 18
              +3
              Quote: chenia
              turned tank divisions into breakthrough divisions (1 TP and 2 infantry),

              Your claims are not entirely substantiated. Each of them is dear, but all the main WWII participants came to the division of about 200 vehicles (less is possible, more is no longer possible). For the Red Army, it was shopping mall, for the Germans and Allies - so on. TD for 300-400 cars is a mistake, this was checked by the Germans, the Red Army, and the Americans.
              Quote: chenia
              there was a more faithful structure (2 TP and 1 MP (SP))

              No. The Red Army came to a lightweight, etc., strongly compressed, under the guise of a body. A full-fledged TD was still too complicated, even in the 44th.
              Quote: chenia
              the highest form of organization of artillery operations (although this was later), which was not owned by Germans. nor allies.

              So let's clarify.

              In Russia, many people think that the fighting in the West took place according to the following scheme:
              1. A truck with blacks arrives, blacks dig a hefty trench with shovels, leave.
              2. An American arrives, sits in a trench. With him in the trench is a Coca-Cola box, binoculars, an English-German dictionary, a telephone and a cast-iron bathtub.
              3. An American drinks Coca-Cola, smokes cigars and looks through binoculars to see if the Germans are coming. When the Germans arrive, with the help of a dictionary and such a mother, he shows them the way to the nearest prisoner of war camp.
              4. Rarely, but it happens that there are crazy Germans. Instead of going to the camp, they start to shoot, as at a Caucasian wedding. (Perhaps veterans of the battles for Nalchik). Then the American takes the phone and calls London Spaatsu. After that, he quietly lies in the trench and covers himself with a bathtub along with the telephone and, most importantly, Coca-Cola.
              5. Spaats sends 400 liberators and they bury to hell the wrong Germans, and two or three of the nearest French cities.
              6. An American crawls out from under the bath and writes a report to give leave to the States and a Congress medal.

              Actually, everything was a bit wrong. There are a lot of questions to strategic aviation, not everything went well with armor, but the Allies artillery was phenomenal and unconditionally the best in the world. Arta and the suppliers who delivered the shells to this arta won the war in the West.
              By January 10, significant reserves of ammunition, fuel, and other material and technical means were concentrated on the Wiesley bridgeheads. The 1st Belorussian Front at the Magnushevsky bridgehead had 2 thousand shells and mines, which amounted to 479,8 cars, and at the Pulavsky bridgehead - 2132 thousand shells and mines, or 1 cars. By the beginning of the operation, there were 311,9 tons of liquid fuel in the front. In the 1157st Ukrainian Front there were 55 tons of ammunition, 989 tons of fuel and lubricants, 1 tons of food and 114 tons of various special cargoes. In total, by the beginning of the operation, there were 336-57 ammunition ammunition in the fronts, 215-47 gasoline and diesel fuel gas stations, and 805-43 aviation bezin gas stations

              3-4 ammunition at the beginning of the Vistula-Oder, remember.
              B / c norms in accordance with the Order of NPO N 0182 dated 09.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
              a) 37 mm and 45 mm guns - 200 pcs .;
              b) 76 mm field guns - 140 pcs.;
              c) 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns - 150 pcs.;
              d) 107-mm and 122-mm guns and howitzers - 80 pcs.;
              e) 152 mm howitzers and howitzers-guns - 60 pcs .;

              That is, less than 600 shells for ZiS-3, 320 for M-30, 240 for D-1 and ML-20.
              At that time, we were convinced that sixty shells for 105 mm guns and forty for heavy artillery - minimum daily allowance. All these calculations meant that if the supplymen were able to multiply the number of shells by the number of guns and by the number of days, the army would be able to save the necessary amount of ammunition, so that during hot battles the calculations of 105-mm guns had the opportunity to give three hundred and fifty - four hundred volleys per day.

              400 for you, shells a day. The American 105mm is much closer to the Soviet 122 than the ZiS-3, especially considering the expensive American explosives. So during the largest "artillery offensive" the Red Army did not keep up with the American "hot battles" that Patton provided with shells at his level of the army commander.

              The artillery offensive is a bit akin to the insanity of the Soviet mechanized corps. Only at the level of a strategic operation of the GK level, limited by time and place, could the Red Army ensure that level of artillery - concentration, control, and projectile consumption - which was the daily norm for the Allies. About the firepower of the American division, every american division, in the Red Army did not have to dream.
              1. chenia
                chenia 11 May 2019 14: 42
                +1
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                Your claims are not fully substantiated


                I have no complaints, but knowledge. To start. the name of the formation, with us, almost always did not correspond to the true rank. The Germans’s TD is overloaded with infantry, and thrown into the breakthrough will be slower at any rate (just don’t have to bring 41 when we were not able to organize any stubborn defense, I omit reasons) In the depths there is no dense echeloned defense (some strong points can (even need to be circumvented), and the counterattacks of the enemy’s reserves are counteracted due to numerical superiority (and this depends on the speed of the offensive.

                Quote: Cherry Nine
                came to a lightweight, etc., strongly crimped, under the guise of a body.


                Well, this is more or less true. TP TD (1940) is 4 battalions, 4-5 tanks each in platoons.
                And if there were three battalions in a regiment (the Germans basically had two), and three tanks in a platoon, would have 94 tanks in a regiment, 31 in a battalion each, infantry would have had a company of machine gunners (at that time), if necessary they would be allocated from SMEs a battalion, artillery is not necessary at all (the ADN in our military operations only appeared in the late 70s, already with self-propelled guns). Here’s a powerful formation, with a minimum number of l / s, with powerful weapons and high mobility, with a small load on the rear support units . I repeat - at the appropriate pace of the offensive, it will be difficult to meet a well-organized defense in the depths (which is difficult to get around), and it will always be possible to capture the most important areas (well, if before this event the enemy was misled and the attack was secreted).

                Quote: Cherry Nine
                but the Allied artillery was phenomenal and unconditionally the best in the world.


                First, the gunners of the Germans were certainly better than ours, and this is unequivocal.
                The second is artillery (mat.part — well, so-so, supply — yes) among the Allies, too.
                But our organization is an order of magnitude better than the first and second.

                Artillery preparation and subsequent periods with the Germans are extremely accurate with minimal expense, but alas with a delay of time.
                The Allies have measures to change the terrain, and in places of which everyone has left and are preparing to meet in depth.
                Art offensive is not just methods of firing, but a combination of artillery, infantry and tanks.
                1. Cherry Nine
                  Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 16: 40
                  +2
                  Quote: chenia
                  I have no complaints, but knowledge

                  It is always amusing to meet a person who understands the Wehrmacht better than Guderian.
                  Quote: chenia
                  .Here is a powerful formation, with a minimum number of l / s, with powerful weapons and high mobility, with a small load on the logistics support units.

                  You describe the armored cavalry. The main task of the blitzkrieg period was to wedge and lock the boilers. The task of the Wehrmacht - not the onset of the devil knows where, but the destruction of the enemy army in a border battle. Tanks without artillery and infantry are not capable of paving. The German infantry, in addition to the TG, is walking; I recall that horses are dragging artifacts.
                  Quote: chenia
                  our organization is much better than the first and second.

                  It is unlikely that you understand what you are talking about.
                  Quote: chenia
                  The Allies have measures to change the terrain, and in places of which everyone has left and are preparing to meet in depth.

                  You absolutely do not understand what you are talking about. The Allied fire control was outstanding and could not be compared with the Soviet and German.
                  Quote: chenia
                  a combination of artillery, infantry and tanks.

                  You are certainly right, but do not understand a rather important thing.

                  In the Red Army, the interaction of infantry, armor, aircraft and artillery was carried out at the level of front-line operations. Some, not all GVSD began to receive their own armor in the form of OSAD on the Su-76 in the 44th. Mostly armor appeared in the hull and above. Arta in the division was modest all the way, aviation - at the front level.

                  The Americans at the divisional level had infantry, armor, artillery of the RVGK (with Soviet money it was the artillery of the RVGK, the M114 range was the same as the ML-20 when firing howitzer grenades) and aviation (etc. had all this initially, they received armor by winter 44 when they were given permanent battalions of the RGC). And also

                  They had major generals, the best of whom could use this colossus. In the Red Army, Colonel General did such things.
                  And they had a rear that could support an infantry division with aircraft in the OSH.

                  True, the Americans were sad with Colonel General and above, but I will not argue here. Of the four army generals, one corresponded to the position held.
                  1. Andrey Shmelev
                    Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 19: 53
                    0
                    You absolutely do not understand what you are talking about. The Allied fire control was outstanding and could not be compared with the Soviet and German.


                    bold plus

                    The Americans at the divisional level had infantry, armor, artillery of the RVGK (with Soviet money it was the artillery of the RVGK, the M114 range was the same as the ML-20 when firing howitzer grenades) and aviation (etc. had all this initially, they received armor by winter 44 when they were given permanent battalions of the RGC).


                    and here is a bold plus

                    the American infantry division with all the makeweights together (such as a pair of tank battalions in the state stronger than the panzer-grenadier will easily succeed.
                  2. chenia
                    chenia 11 May 2019 20: 45
                    +1
                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    It is always amusing to meet a person who understands the Wehrmacht better than Guderian.


                    Of course, it is better only in the TD in general (formations to carry out the corresponding task, taking into account the belonging of both the combined arms and tank armies) I possess both the knowledge (obtained in the corresponding institutions) and the aftermath, taking into account the past war. well, a certain experience. What surprises you?

                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    You describe the armored cavalry. The main task of the blitzkrieg period was to wedge and lock the boilers. The task of the Wehrmacht - not the onset of the devil knows where,


                    Blitzkrieg is generally a gamble. hope for kollos on clay feet. Even taking into account that mess in the Red Army of that time, if we had had time to conduct MK exercises in the autumn of 1940, where they would have revealed the viciousness of the OShS, deficiencies in the reliability of equipment and brought the logistics support units into line with organizational conclusions.
                    And also leaving TBR in the UK and did not begin to form new MK. And they would do BP.
                    Then the Germans (with all the surprises) everywhere would have been Rostov with fire bags.

                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    It is unlikely that you understand what you are talking about.


                    You’d look next to the nickname in brackets.

                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    You absolutely do not understand what you are talking about. The Allied fire control was outstanding and could not be compared with the Soviet and German.


                    Fire control is only part of the organization of the art of the offensive. It was the organization that we corrected the deficiencies in the training of gunners (meaning gunners) and the lag in the technical means of preparing the data.


                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    They had major generals, the best of whom could use this colossus. In the Red Army, Colonel General did such things.


                    Here is something correct, but in a different context (for starters, a few stars below).
                    For starters (and you yourself are in the know), the rank of formation did not coincide with the name. Their divisions in our time were heavy (and any of their formation starting from a platoon). And at that time their commander was definitely theirs, this is at least our comcor.
                    But the ability to control fire and strike weapons was transferred to a higher level (even now). This made it possible to use both dowry and regular fire weapons of other formations for massaging the fire in the most necessary place. And this is not bad and gradually turned into a system of a single integrated fire destruction of the enemy. And the Germans blurry-the vassal of my vassal is not my vassal.
                    1. Cherry Nine
                      Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 21: 46
                      +1
                      Quote: chenia
                      And at that time their commander was definitely theirs, this is at least our comcor.

                      In terms of infantry, partly yes, in tanks and so on.
                      Quote: chenia
                      But the ability to control fire and strike weapons was transferred to a higher level

                      Quote: chenia
                      It was the organization that we corrected the deficiencies in the training of artillerymen (meaning firing) and the lag in the technical means providing data preparation.

                      You write the same as me, but pass it off as a life hack. From my bell tower, this is a lack of control. The Red Army could provide the level of artillery control that partners had by default, only in specialized formations of the RGC.

                      By the way, about the RGK. The main weapon of the Red Army's special power was an 8 "howitzer. For each such system, the partners produced 3 of the same (155 LongTom, 203, 240), without the British. They did not know how to massage, of course.
                      Quote: chenia
                      You would look in the bracket next to the nickname

                      I don’t see anything (Opera Android)
                      Quote: chenia
                      Then the Germans (with all the surprises) everywhere would have been Rostov with fire bags.

                      Quote: chenia
                      I possess both knowledge (obtained in the appropriate institutions) and aftertaste taking into account the past war. well, a certain experience. What surprises you?

                      You see. As for the altistory. As a rule, people who know how to fight better than the Wehrmacht greatly overestimate themselves.
                      1. chenia
                        chenia 11 May 2019 22: 25
                        0
                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        From my bell tower, this is a lack of control. The Red Army could provide the level of artillery control that partners had by default, only in specialized formations of the RGC.


                        It turns out you stubbornly do not understand what it is about. THE TALK IS NOT ABOUT FIRE MANAGEMENT, where technical means prevail (organization of intelligence, topo- meteo. Ballistic-technical preparation, etc.), but organization of the art of the offensive and the management of this process. Well, I’m not going to strain, here for understanding you need some preparation, you can’t explain in three words.



                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        3 pieces similar (155 LongTom, 203, 240), without the British. They did not know how to massage, but how.


                        Here, in more detail, what is meant by the word massing forces and means, and where does the caliber of systems. And, you just don’t know about the distribution of artillery by tasks and how to solve them

                        .
                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        Can't see anything


                        (kanonier)


                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        You see. As for the altistory. As a rule, people who know how to fight better than the Wehrmacht greatly overestimate themselves.


                        Why overestimate, Guderian with his knowledge above the battalion commander now would not be.
                        I discussed the structure of the tank association, and the effectiveness of its application.
                        And the effectiveness of a particular structure has already been confirmed, tested and has long existed. What the fuck is an alternative story. I refer to those who beat these guys. You want to say something?

                        Or, on the principle of a literary hero, I DO NOT AGREE. And period.
                        .
                      2. Cherry Nine
                        Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 23: 59
                        +1
                        Quote: chenia
                        You are stubbornly do not understand what it is about

                        Quote: chenia
                        you just don't know about distribution

                        You see, there are a hell of a lot of things that I don’t understand. However, now I see some strange statements, and then the transition from specifics to speculations on my account. This trajectory of your thoughts does not inspire optimism.
                        Quote: chenia
                        because I refer to those who beat these guys.

                        Those who beat these guys tried to get the same thing by the 45th year, with great difficulty. In fact, it was only in the army format (mk + mk) that the Red Army received something comparable to the Wehrmacht 41g in complexity, but on an enlarged, again colonel general scale.
                        Quote: chenia
                        DO NOT AGREE I. and point

                        As you say. If you are lucky, the world of altistory will open for you a lot of new and surprising things.
                      3. chenia
                        chenia 12 May 2019 10: 41
                        +1
                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        In fact, only in the army format (mk + mk) did the Red Army receive something comparable to the Wehrmacht 41g in complexity,


                        And why the heck are we difficulties. For example, we never had (later) such an association as the Tank Group, which included 3 Corps (MK, AK) of 3-4 divisions.
                        TA in the GSVG (before the Brezhnev initiatives) -1 MSD + 4 TD, then 1 TD less. And the commander is the duty rank of general colonel (the fact that almost always there were general lieutenants is different). And TD at that time. this is 3 TP + 1 MSD.
                        And the MSD 3-2 MSP + 1TP (about 230 tanks) - well, directly the Wehrmacht TD, but it performs slightly different tasks.

                        We always had a clear division of functions between associations (naturally, if they were at the front). And indeed, our structure is figuratively figurative - fine-grained, which in general is not bad. I read the combat orders of the Wehrmacht divisions - sensations of the control room, operational level. Everything was thrown to the KG commanders (essentially a reinforced regiment) and they were pulling the task of the day of the division. We have the first position for a regiment 2-3 km away, and all the dowry is taken to a fresh regiment (the next echelon), and the regiment further contributes to the fulfillment of the mission of the division day. The pressure on management and headquarters is not comparable. If you will declare a difference in the level of management (which actually happened then), but this principle has been preserved to this day, we try (naturally there are exceptions. Separate areas where there is more independence) not to overload the lower (even regiment) formations.

                        And never compare the successes of the Germans at the beginning of the war (when they were opposed by hastily assembled troops without a proper BP) and ours when we were fucking an experienced and strong enemy.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        11 May 2019 21: 20
        +2
        Quote: Cherry Nine
        The main achievement was the tank group of the Wehrmacht and the Japanese AUS.

        The rare case when I am ready to write your words on a poster and hang it on the wall in a frame. Psx!
  • BAI
    BAI 10 May 2019 14: 28
    +4
    Obviously, Rommel's divisions suffered sensitive tank losses. Nevertheless, according to B. Muller-Hillebrand in May 1941, the Third Reich lost 2 (in words - TWO) tank, one of which - T-III, and the second - commander. Such a level of losses is quite acceptable if we are talking about non-combat losses unfolding on the Soviet-German border troops, but it is absolutely impossible for two tank divisions leading intensive battles during 6 days. Incidentally, from January to April 1941, according to B. Muller-Hillebrand, the Wehrmacht did not have any losses in tanks.

    According to German data, the same picture was near Prokhorovka (which by the way explains why the Germans did not mark this battle in any way):
    Some argue that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks took part in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 tanks of the Wehrmacht were allegedly destroyed, is considered the "cemetery of German tank forces." However, in reality, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. At the same time, the Red Army lost 235 tanks, and German troops - only three!
    Copy - THREE !!! Under Prokhorovka!
    - The military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Frizer, who worked for many years in the military history department of the Bundeswehr, is considered the best expert on events on the Eastern Front.
    1. chenia
      chenia 10 May 2019 16: 55
      +8
      Quote: BAI
      Copy - THREE !!! Under Prokhorovka!
      - Military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Frize


      That's for sure. The Germans. if there is a bucket of bolts and nuts left from the tank, then the tank is NOT LOST.
      The truth must then be explained why, with scanty losses at such a concentration of forces and assets in the Kursk, they turned out to be 500 km west four months later.

      But here it is visible. Karl-Heinz and others, not so best specialists in this field, are not required to explain.
    2. dvina71
      dvina71 10 May 2019 17: 40
      +2
      Quote: BAI
      Copy - THREE !!! Under Prokhorovka!

      The battle in the Prokhorovka area took place from July 11 to 16 .. if we talk about July 12, then 1200 BT units were there in total, and not specifically on one field and certainly not three tanks there they lost .., with such a loss level in BT victory in the battle of Kursk can be called a miracle, but it is not.
    3. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 10 May 2019 18: 18
      +1
      Quote: BAI
      Copy - THREE !!! Under Prokhorovka!
      - The military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Frizer, who worked for many years in the military history department of the Bundeswehr, is considered the best expert on events on the Eastern Front.

      So nemchura thinks so. Dragged tanks in tow, and oops hi
  • PilotS37
    PilotS37 10 May 2019 14: 30
    +2
    Andrey, another great article!
    With regards to
    The T-IV tanks of the Germans, taking into account their production and losses, should have left 1 vehicles, where did they come from as many as 005? Where did the “extra” 1 tanks come from?
    , then note that the "command" vehicles have a comparable imbalance, but with a different sign: it is possible that some of the command vehicles were retrained into ordinary T-IVs. Although, in general, this does not remove the "problem of cons".
  • The comment was deleted.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      10 May 2019 14: 48
      +2
      Perhaps the option is interesting and I thought about it. But I highly doubt that Paulus had so many tanks :)
      1. PilotS37
        PilotS37 10 May 2019 15: 15
        +1
        At the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, Paulus had about 700 tanks. He lost something while walking towards the city and storming it, but something was added to him along the way ... So yes: 1800 is not only Stalingrad ... Perhaps, by the way, North Africa was added with a choke too.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          10 May 2019 15: 50
          +4
          Quote: PilotS37
          Perhaps, by the way, North Africa was supplemented with chokhom.

          But for her February 1942 Mr. - still a bit early :)))))
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 10 May 2019 23: 20
            +1
            The offensive undertaken by German tankmen on April 30, 1941, after lengthy aviation training, was unsuccessful. The 2nd battalion of the 5th tank regiment suffered particularly heavy losses. It is enough to say that only Pz.III killed 24 pieces. True, all tanks were evacuated from the battlefield and 14 vehicles soon returned to duty. I must say that Rommel quickly drew conclusions from such failures, and in the future the Germans did not launch frontal attacks, preferring tactics of flanking attacks and coverings.

            During the Cruzeider operation, for example, in November 1941, the British attacked with 748 tanks, including 213 Matild and Valentine, 220 Cruiser, 150 older cruising tanks and 165 American Stuarts production. The African corps could oppose them only 249 German and 146 Italian tanks. At the same time, the armament and armor protection of most British combat vehicles were similar, and sometimes surpassed the German ones. As a result of two-month battles, British troops missed 278 tanks. The losses of the Italo-German troops were comparable - 292 tanks.

            From the book "The Great Tank War".
            further consideration of the loss of tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" should pay close attention to the tank regiment Böcke!
            As of January 25, 1944, the regiment numbered 123 Panthers and 69 Tigers.
            And on February 4, there were already 34 Tigers and 47 Panthers left in the regiment!
            February 13 - 13 "Tigers" and 12 "Panthers".
          2. PilotS37
            PilotS37 11 May 2019 10: 08
            +1
            But are we, like, talking about 1943?
        2. Mordvin 3
          Mordvin 3 10 May 2019 18: 25
          +1
          Quote: PilotS37
          something to him and added on the go

          Klein with Manstein could not unlock.
  • NF68
    NF68 10 May 2019 15: 38
    +7
    At the same time, the USSR in 1941 was able to produce 3 016 T-34, that is, it can be said that in terms of medium armored vehicles, the production capabilities of the Soviet Union and Germany turned out to be quite comparable. True, the situation was significantly improved by the release of heavy tanks KV, which in 1941 was created by 714 units, but still it must be stated that the USSR had no multiple advantage in producing medium and heavy armored vehicles in 1941: our country surpassed the German issue by about 30%.


    And the USSR industry achieved these indicators in the most difficult conditions when numerous enterprises were evacuated to the east of the USSR, when production ties were broken and a lot of equipment was lost.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      10 May 2019 15: 50
      +9
      Quote: NF68
      And these indicators industry of the USSR has achieved in the most difficult conditions

      A thousand times yes!
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 21: 03
      0
      Quote: NF68
      USSR industry achieved these indicators in the most difficult conditions

      And what's the point of comparing the Soviet economy of total war and the German economy of the blitzkrieg, which last was until 2/2 of the 43rd year?
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 10 May 2019 16: 29
    +2
    Good afternoon!

    The article is good. But there are several questions traditional for covering the history of tanks.

    The first question.
    The production cost of one tank in comparison with 1941 fell by about 1,5 times (plant number 183, from 249 rubles. To 256 rubles.)

    Is there any evidence of what exactly was included in the tank production cost then?
    For example: are all components, are there any types of capital expenditures, what are general business expenses, etc.

    Thank you in advance!
    1. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 20: 57
      +3
      Quote: Andrey Shmelev
      Is there any evidence of what exactly was included in the tank production cost then?
      For example: are all components, are there any types of capital expenditures, what are general business expenses, etc.

      This is the state price of the tank, according to which the plant handed it over to the customer. The tank is supposed to be complete. Capex is not included, research / development work is not included.
      Perhaps the author will write in more detail, Soviet pricing is a fascinating topic (the author loves PPP, so it might be interesting for him to recount the T-34 in bigmax loaves, the result is funny). In any case, you should not approach this figure from the standpoint of capitalist science.
      1. Andrey Shmelev
        Andrey Shmelev 10 May 2019 22: 36
        +3
        Well, my science is not completely capitalist - until recently I had to read lectures about the State Defense Order within the framework of the Consultant + system, including about pricing within its framework a little, little, could not pass by.

        What is the price? the amount to be transferred to the factory for the transfer of the finished product.

        The first level of the problem: optics, for example, inside this amount or outside? The Germans, as I understand it, was outside. And then in the USSR, how?

        The second level of the problem: let's say the plant receives by cooperation from a neighbor a checkpoint worth 30 tr. - How is it taken into account in the price of the tank for this particular plant? How is tolling without price?
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 23: 02
          +2
          Quote: Andrey Shmelev
          lecture on the State Defense Order within the framework of the "Consultant +" system

          Sorry, but your naivety seems unnatural.

          In a planned economy, there is no pricing even as it is in the current state budget. All prices - intercompany prices, which it would be deemed reasonable to establish from the most unexpected considerations - such will be set. If HF was worth 1.5 million yesterday, and today it’s already worth 700 thousand, this does not mean at all that his production has revolutionized overnight.

          Quote: Andrey Shmelev
          the amount to be transferred to the factory for the transfer of the finished product.

          I myself did not find this nature, but older comrades, referring to non-cash rubles, used the word "candy wrappers".

          And here are the "funds". This is a completely different matter.
          1. Andrey Shmelev
            Andrey Shmelev 10 May 2019 23: 32
            +3
            All prices - intercompany prices, which it would be deemed reasonable to establish from the most unexpected considerations - such will be set.


            I worked in the defense industry. it's not like that at all. First you need to agree on the price with VP MO)

            If HF was worth 1.5 million yesterday, and today it’s already worth 700 thousand, this does not mean at all that his production has revolutionized overnight.


            yeah, this may mean that he has changed radically) what I tactfully hinted at above

            I myself did not find this nature, but older comrades, referring to non-cash rubles, used the word "candy wrappers".


            I also did not find candy wrappers. and my question to the author was very simple and at the same time complicated: what exactly is the sum of 165 tr - the amount of money that can be given to employees (and if so, which one) or the full amount of financing, of which 80% must be transmitted to suppliers of components (this broadcast can go directly from the bill)? Are, for example, water and electricity calculated in this amount?
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            11 May 2019 12: 51
            +6
            Quote: Cherry Nine
            In a planned economy there is no pricing, even in the form in which there is in the current GZ. All prices - intercompany, which it will be considered reasonable to establish from the most unexpected considerations - such will be established.

            I'm sorry, but it's fantastic. Inter-holding prices in the USSR were considered the good old cost method, there were no "unexpected considerations" there. By the way, modern SDO pricing is close to the USSR
            1. Andrey Shmelev
              Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 13: 32
              +1
              All prices are intercompany prices which it would be reasonable to establish


              earlier (a year of commercials in 2010), for example, the cost of the same block in essence for the S-300 in Algeria and the S-300 for the Moscow Region could be doubled, now there isn’t

              By the way, the current pricing of GOZ is close to the USSR


              exactly, but this does not change the problem with what the "price of a tank" is in 1940-1945, how it developed, whether the composition of the costs that it includes was constant and uniform
            2. Cherry Nine
              Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 14: 24
              +2
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Inter-holding prices in the USSR were considered the good old cost method, there were no "unexpected considerations" there. By the way, modern SDO pricing is close to the USSR

              Let’s say a Kurskul beekeeper from near Chelyabinsk wants to buy a T-34-85 tank for the front. How much honey should he sell?
              1. Andrey Shmelev
                Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 14: 46
                +3
                wants to buy


                or reimburse the head contractor the amount of assembly costs? repeat

                Kurkul-beekeeper from Chelyabinsk


                a bottle of vodka on cards 30 rubles
                bottle of vodka in the market 500 rubles
                a loaf of bread on the cards - for free
                loaf of bread on the market 100 rubles / kg
                millet in the market 100 rubles / kg
                cigarettes in the market 75 rubles per pack
                honey on the market (I did not find it, but I beat it, which is at least 1000 rubles / kg)

                not much honey will be required

                and more:
                let the worker’s salary be 400 rubles a month,
                the designer’s salary will be 1500 rubles a month,
                a worker can’t buy anything besides threads
                the designer will buy children "two loaves of white bread and sweets"
                (with luck, a jar of jam)

                Let's take this into account when talking about cost.
                1. Cherry Nine
                  Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 15: 47
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                  honey on the market (I did not find it, but I beat it, which is at least 1000 rubles / kg)

                  It came to five.
                  Tank = 32 kg of honey, 2 thousand packs of cigarettes. If someone smokes like a steam locomotive, the year of smoking is half a pound.

                  The way prices were formed on the bones in the USSR is a very long conversation.
                  Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                  or reimburse to the lead contractor

                  Well, they wouldn’t let him put a tank in the garage, not Texas, but 160 thousand, NNP, this is still the state price of the whole tank, not the assembly.
                  1. Andrey Shmelev
                    Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 16: 04
                    +1
                    then still the state price of the whole tank


                    do not consider it a pedant) but what is included in this price: is optics included, for example?
                    But was the pricing uniform and constant for different plants at different times?

                    2 thousand packs of cigarettes.


                    eh, right now I would change 2 thousand packs of cigarettes for "T-34 on the go")
                    and another 1 thousand packs of tea added
                    1. Tima62
                      Tima62 11 May 2019 22: 29
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                      but what’s included in this price: is optics included, for example?

                      Why not? The tank was complete. Or do you think that the opto-fur factory gave optics to the tank factory for free? Indeed, in Soviet times, when buying a Lada, they did not pay extra for a spare tire, or for a pump for a bicycle. And now, if you want a spare tire for a car - pay separately, if you want a pump with a bicycle - also pay separately.
                      1. Andrey Shmelev
                        Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 23: 03
                        0
                        Or do you think that the opto-fur factory gave optics to the tank factory for free?


                        As I think, the Germans, for example, did not include weapons in the tanks (for sure), optics and radio equipment (almost certainly), all three components were not included in the aircraft. Who corrects - I will say thanks.

                        Hence the problem: what if manual transmission tolling? What if the tower is from another factory? etc. etc. How were tolling details taken into account and how many were there and at which plant?
                      2. Tima62
                        Tima62 12 May 2019 00: 07
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                        and if manual transmission tolling?

                        And why should she be tolling? Manufacturers of towers (engines, cannons, radio stations, rubber products) also wanted to eat (get food cards). And their price was calculated in the same way as the price of hulls and assembly of tanks (fixed salary, price of electricity, water, metal, etc., and no margin. And the price of units made by subcontractors was added to the price of hulls and assembly. And the collector with Only in contrast to modern car and bicycle assemblers, the manufacturer could not look for other suppliers, or bargain with them on a market basis.
                      3. Andrey Shmelev
                        Andrey Shmelev 12 May 2019 00: 12
                        0
                        And why should she be tolling?


                        and here’s what: imagine that the Me-109F4 costs 62 Reichsmarks, and tolling details on it are another 000 thousand Reichsmarks (I don’t know for sure, honestly)

                        Imagine that the T-34 in the price decreased from 250 TR to 160 tr, as the volume of tolling parts increased from 38 tr up to 132 tr (I am conditional) wassat

                        All these prices are not included in the price of the product)
              2. strannik1985
                strannik1985 11 May 2019 16: 28
                +1
                Probably the prices on the market during the Second World War are also a separate conversation?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  11 May 2019 17: 03
                  0
                  Not likely, but definitely. Because they ate on ration cards, people got the main ration with them, and market prices were "welding" and the prices for it were absolutely exorbitant. In general, comparing the price of an industrial product and the price of honey on the market ... it's like determining the weight of a bag of potatoes in the azimuth of the North Star :)))
                  1. Cherry Nine
                    Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 17: 37
                    +3
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    comparing the price of an industrial product and the price of honey on the market ... it's like determining the weight of a bag of potatoes in the azimuth of the North Star :)))

                    How interesting.
                    Back to this topic, when we again recalculate the price of Su-35 by PPP.
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    11 May 2019 21: 21
                    0
                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    Back to this topic, when we again recalculate the price of Su-35 by PPP.

                    Let's go back, of course :)))
                  3. Andrey Shmelev
                    Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 21: 44
                    0
                    Let's go back, of course :)))


                    Tell me where to send French cognac, if it works well? repeat

                    But according to "statistics" at the moment, IMHO, two important topics are not disclosed:
                    - will not the problem with German statistics is completely far-fetched, if you just accept the losses as the month of write-off, that is, "the fact of loss + from 1 to 4 months", when it was decided whether to recognize it as irrecoverable, "the balances would converge", and questions about monthly reports will go away (a key question that requires continuation of the article)
                    - what is the price of T-34 and whether it is uniform and unchanged according to the methodology (secondary question)
                  4. Alex_vl
                    Alex_vl 18 May 2019 16: 58
                    +1
                    Since the prices are approximately known, the Americans estimated the T-34-85 more than $ 50000. That is roughly like Sherman $ 34-50.000. Can be estimated in the salaries of the average working heavy industry. - 340 rubles and the cost of the T-34 of the head plant in early 1942 to 250.000 rubles. Somewhere at the end of 1942 the cost of the T-34 miraculously began to fall to 150.000 rubles. As far as you can understand, Lend-Lease materials were in vain. Under Lend-Lease, they delivered 850.000 tons of armored car. Of course, what could a Soviet worker buy for 340 rubles and that German for 200 RM is two big differences.
                  5. Andrey Shmelev
                    Andrey Shmelev 18 May 2019 18: 31
                    0
                    Since the prices are approximately known, the Americans estimated the T-34-85 more than $ 50000. That is roughly like Sherman $ 34-50.000.

                    good
                    I did not know about it. share the source, please.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 10 May 2019 17: 09
    +1
    The numerical ratio of Soviet and German losses in tanks in 1942 is still worse than 3: 1 in favor of the Germans. There is a German OKH certificate dated January 18, 1945 in which German losses on the Eastern Front of all types of tanks and self-propelled guns (without armored vehicles) and from December 1, 1941 to December 31, 1942 3 vehicles. If in December 500 there will remain about 41 thousand irretrievable losses in the East in 3. These are losses of all types and only in the East. To them must be added the loss of satellite of Germany, but I have no information for them.
    Soviet losses in 1942 if you add 7200 light tanks (BT-7, T-60, etc.) about 15 thousand vehicles, or 5: 1.
    But this ratio means little. The first thing that needs to be said is that the Germans advanced and repaired their wrecked tanks, and the Red Army retreated and left vehicles quite suitable for repair. But UTB also means additional expenses for the evacuation and repair of German cars. In addition, more than 70% of lost German cars are average, and Soviet, respectively, 50%. In addition, the T-34 is about 3 times cheaper than German medium tanks, and light Soviet tanks where 6 or more times cheaper. Therefore, the ratio of the costs of manufacturing and repairing lost equipment is already approximately equal for the two sides.
    The Soviet losses of tankers were about 2 times more than the German ones, but if there weren’t any tanks, people fought in infantry and then the losses hit higher.
    1. 2Albert
      2Albert 10 May 2019 23: 29
      +1
      And can you give the sources of losses of the German tank crews? There were only general losses of German td.
    2. Alex_vl
      Alex_vl 18 May 2019 17: 13
      0
      about cheaper, it is unlikely, about the same and cost.
      for example, Pz III was so pleased with its simplicity that it was required to put it into production. And the cost of it. Techniques known Pz III- 96.000RM; Pz IV - 106.000RM; Pz V - 116.000 RM.
  • LeonidL
    LeonidL 10 May 2019 18: 35
    +4
    Correct stats. The German Panzerwaffe loss and victory statistics are as gloomy and two-faced as the Luftwaffe loss and victory statistics.
  • Anton Yu
    Anton Yu 10 May 2019 18: 49
    +8
    The trick here is that not only used captured Soviet tanks, but also Czech vehicles were not added here. In addition, the losses of allies (Hungarians, Romanians, Finns, etc.) are not indicated here. In addition to German tanks and self-propelled guns, the Hungarians had their own equipment.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      10 May 2019 19: 06
      +4
      Quote: Anton Yu
      The trick here is that not only the used captured Soviet tanks, but also the Czech machines are not added here.

      The Czechs did not have medium and heavy tanks, and statistics on them only. But with the Soviet - yes, here I blundered. By the way, you can also recall the French medium tanks - in some quantities on the eastern front, they could also be, and seemed to be
      Quote: Anton Yu
      In addition, the losses of the allies (Hungarians, Romanians, Finns, etc.) are not indicated here.

      There, too, with medium tanks is not very, and, most importantly, I do not have such statistics. But it was worth noting this moment
      1. Solo2503
        Solo2503 10 May 2019 19: 37
        +4
        Thanks for the interesting cycle, I read it with pleasure. And also a big sapasibochki for "Verbs over the Baltic"! Where we frolicked (what we liked was the feeling of the reality of your fantasy! Most of the heroes are known from history. And the move with the death of Rozhdestvensky in Tsushima and the recovery of Essen in the spring of 15 is an amazing move!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          11 May 2019 00: 20
          +3
          Quote: Solo2503
          And also a big sapasibochki for "Verbs over the Baltic"!

          Really? :) Always please, glad you like it :))) hi The last and finally corrected version was flooded in full on samizdat :)
          1. P
            P 11 May 2019 13: 17
            +1
            Andrei, thank you for raising such topics, forcing us to think about what really happened in those terrible years and contrasting the stupid mainstream with figures “filled up with corpses”. Thank you very much for the book “Verb over the Baltic”! I read it in one evening. And I re-read the scene with the training of the anti-mine caliber on Sevastopol three times, you got the video directly on paper
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              11 May 2019 14: 08
              +2
              Quote: Paradigm
              And I reread the scene with the training of mine caliber on Sevastopol three times, you just got a video picture on paper

              Ooh, you just give me a balm for the soul. hi drinks In order to write this scene, I spent a lot of time looking for how such training went, and finally I found it! It was the "Charter of the Artillery Service on RKKF Ships", which described such training for 120-mm cap guns, which were used to equip the "Sevastopoli", and on which they survived in Soviet times. Everything was there, including schemes for the position of the legs of calculations :)))))
              I wrote and thought - I wonder if there will be at least one person who appreciates all this? drinks
              1. Wildcat
                Wildcat 11 May 2019 19: 39
                +5
                hi
                The verb over the Baltic turned out well! The battle scenes in the mine - artillery position and the battle of 2 squadrons are my favorite!
                I even reread the verb when its author threatens from modern topics to start a series of articles about the Invincible Armada. I'm afraid to see an analysis of wood penetration ... winked
      2. Anton Yu
        Anton Yu 10 May 2019 20: 02
        +1
        The Czechs simply did not have time to take medium tanks into service before they were captured by Germany. Hungarians and Italians had medium tanks. The Hungarian medium tank 40M Turán was released in quantities from 424 to 459 pcs. Based on light Czech tanks, self-propelled guns Marder III and Hetzer were produced.
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 10 May 2019 20: 14
          0
          Quote: Anton Yu
          Hungarians and Italians were medium tanks. Hungarian Medium Tank 40M Turán

          Found, of course. Thunderstorm of the fields of the 42nd year.

          40 - caliber of his guns in millimeters. Medium tank.

          Generally this
          had 1 medium and heavy tanks against 3 304 tanks and self-propelled guns near the Wehrmacht.

          just butter over the heart. With all the people's love for Rezun and the Rezunovites, I thought that at least he had weaned him from such turns. But no.
          Separately, it’s good that a troika with a short gun is recorded with a medium tank. Did the T-28 hit the medium and heavy?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            11 May 2019 12: 57
            +2
            Quote: Cherry Nine
            With all the people's love for Rezun and Rezunovtsy, I thought that even from such turns he had weaned off. But no.
            Separately, it’s good that a troika with a short gun is recorded with a medium tank. Did the T-28 hit the medium and heavy?

            Three - in any case, an average tank, even with a long one, even with a short one. T-28 didn’t get into medium and heavy because I don’t know how many T-1942 we have left for the beginning of 28, but I suspect that there is a vanishingly small amount, because by the spring of 1942, only 20 machines remained.
            At the same time, the Germans did not take into account neither the French nor the Soviet captured medium tanks, so in fact for us things were much worse than those shown in the tables
            1. Cherry Nine
              Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 14: 14
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Three - in any case, the medium tank, even with a long, even a short one.

              Is it with a 30mm forehead? Is the T-50 also a medium tank?
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              since by the spring of 1942 there were only 20 cars left.

              I suspect that from the T-34, available in the first echelon of June 41, by the spring of 42 there was not one.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Germans are not counted nor French

              Something you this time tightly took the Soviet training manual. French medium tanks drove to the East. What kind of tanks, S35?
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                11 May 2019 16: 56
                +2
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                Is it with 30mm forehead?

                What's the difference? Mass 19,5 t - where to write it in the lungs? And about the weak booking - who prevented to make the fighting compartment smaller, throw out the fifth member of the crew, etc. and strengthen your booking? laughing I do not propose to retrain the T-34 in a light tank on the grounds that he did not have an 5 crew member.
                In general, one should still look at the mass, and what this mass was spent on is a matter of priorities, the business of the military and the designers.
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                I suspect that from the T-34, available in the first echelon of June 41, by the spring of 42 there was not one.

                What's the difference? There were others who entered the troops in 2-th half of 1941. The fact is that they were there, but I do not know T-28 ... Pieces 50?
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                Something you this time tightly took the Soviet training manual. French medium tanks drove to the East. What kind of tanks, S35?

                Yeah. In addition, they were used on the eastern front quite certainly, both as part of armored trains, and in anti-partisan events, and even EMNIP fell into tank divisions. Finally, one more thing - why should we take into account only those tanks that fought? After all, not all HF and T-34 were at the front, some were sent to training units. Nevertheless, the statistics are given for all KV and T-34, why should I ignore the tanks, in which German tankers learned to fight?
                1. Cherry Nine
                  Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 17: 58
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  all the same, it’s necessary to look at the mass, and even on what this mass was spent is a matter of priorities, the business of the military and designers

                  You see, you did not look at the mass. You took the Soviet template. On the right, only T-34 and KV, on the left are Prague, deuces, and early triples, for the summer of the 41, they were roughly equal.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Who cares? There were others

                  The difference is that the absence of the T-28 in the spring of the 42nd does not say anything about their presence in the summer of the 41st. In summer and autumn, more or less all tanks were lost, but new ones were made. Naturally, there were no new T-28s.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Why should I ignore the tanks on which German tankers learned to fight?

                  Because you ignore most of the Soviet tanks.
                  It seems easy to understand. Or the Wehrmacht in the East had 3 thousand tanks, then the Red Army had a lot of them. In some "old" MK, there should be 9 thousand of them. Either the Red Army had 1400 tanks (medium and heavy), and Germany had zero (medium and heavy), medium ones began to be produced in April 42nd, heavy ones - from August of the same year and very slowly.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    11 May 2019 19: 44
                    +1
                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    You see, you did not look at the mass. You took the Soviet template. On the right, only T-34 and KV, on the left are Prague, deuces, and early triples, for the summer of the 41, they were roughly equal.

                    Nonsense, I chose only threes, fours, Hubs and anti-tank artillery self-propelled guns - you can check by Muller-Hillebrand. Neither Czech T38, nor T1 and 2, and so on, are absent.
                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    The difference is that the absence of T-28 for the spring of the 42-th does not say anything about their presence for the summer of the 41-th.

                    Cherry nine, you are moving away from the topic. We are here, in fact, discussing the loss of tanks in 1942 g, and it is clear that the figures I give should not say anything about the summer of 1941.
                    Quote: Cherry Nine
                    Because you ignore most of the Soviet tanks.

                    Nonsense. I compare medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, and if you do not like the result obtained - these are not problems of result.
                    T-3 and T-4 are medium tanks, Marder and Stugi - medium armored vehicles, you could not argue against this. So what are you talking about? What in your personal hierarchy are twenty-ton German tanks and self-propelled guns? No problem, but this is your personal opinion, which has nothing to do with generally accepted classifications.
                    1. Cherry Nine
                      Cherry Nine 11 May 2019 22: 05
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      That rare case when I am ready to write your words on a poster

                      )))
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      if you don’t like the result, this is not a problem.

                      Hmm, you’re right, I’ve been gouging. He looked diagonally and climbed to convict.
                      It turns out that this time you have a different approach. You have been telling for so long and correctly that organizational structures are fighting, and then you suddenly spat on this matter and began to count glands according to gross output.

                      Suddenly.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        12 May 2019 13: 27
                        0
                        Quote: Cherry Nine
                        Suddenly.

                        And why? One thing does not interfere with the other. I look at the evolution of organizational structures in relation to the success of military operations and the level of losses. I think this is the right method, although in a number of questions I should have been more careful
  • free
    free 10 May 2019 19: 08
    +2
    Thanks to the author. Lovely article.
  • fighter angel
    fighter angel 10 May 2019 20: 24
    +2
    Thank you, Andrew!
    Dig deep and always strive to get to the bottom of the truth. Your articles are real research, differ for the better from most other articles here, where authors jump "to the top", not trying to get to the bottom.
    What I would like to say: I already here at VO gave an actual example of the fact that the Luftwaffe had cases of concealing true losses in aviation units. And there is an opinion that the Germans had "mutual responsibility" and "double-entry bookkeeping" for losses. They were not fools, and treasured their places, careers and crosses, so they covered each other at all levels, and reports were sent to Berlin, "what they need" ...
    Knowing the situation in the Luftwaffe, we can assume that in the Panzervaff there was a similar practice ...
    But I repeat that it’s just my assumptions regarding the tank units, and as for the Luftwaffe, I will repeat that there are facts of concealment of the true losses.
    1. Andrey Shmelev
      Andrey Shmelev 10 May 2019 22: 43
      0
      "mutual guarantee" and "double-entry bookkeeping"


      they rule only in relation to the competitive period, the balance will still be released for the year

      maybe it’s easier explained by the Panzerwaffe - the losses were considered the date of cancellation and you don’t need to reinvent the wheel and come up with all sorts of tricky versions, I will explain with a simple life example:
      at the factory on December 19.12.2018, 25343, a warehouse burned, for example, with paint in metal cans. They raked the fires, checked the reconciliations, inventory and reflected the loss in the fire element of 2018 cans of paint in the report ... correctly for 30.03.2019, but filed March XNUMX, XNUMX.
      the Germans did not have a reporting date for the previous period in the operational reports and they recorded losses by the current date (that is, the Wehrmacht would have burned 25343 banks, but in the report for March 2019)
  • Comrade
    Comrade 11 May 2019 02: 33
    +5
    the author took the figures of the Soviet losses in aggregate, according to the materials of the site tankfront.ru.
    The fact is that some time ago, there was such a point of view that the tank plants of the USSR did not keep separate records of new armored vehicles, and those restored at the plants after damage to tanks and self-propelled guns. The fact is that, of course, all of them, as they were ready, underwent military acceptance, which took into account only the total number of transferred machines.


    Dear Andrey, the point of view you mentioned is false, in fact, the archives have comprehensive data on this subject.
    The source from where the site borrowed the statistical table contains notes (judging by the questions in your article, there aren’t any notes on the site)
    According to the notes,
    in the column "Consisted on... "the equipment was taken into account, including those that were under repair, as well as those that used up the resource.
    In the column "Received"taken into account the equipment that came from the industry, under the lend-lease, after restoration and overhaul.
    And so it turns out that the real loss ratio of armored vehicles in the indicated period does not correspond to 3 to 1, but rather, even less than 2 to one

    An important point, dear colleague.
    In the columns "Losses"not only combat (irrevocable and irrevocable), but also non-combat loss of armored vehicles.
    So yes, you are absolutely right in raising this subject - so cannot be compared. So, within the framework of brain formatting, they compared, playing up to the Germans, our losses and those of the enemy in "perestroika".

    PS
    Once in my youth I was interested in statistics of tank and air losses in the Great Patriotic War, and somewhere I had information about how many Germans were evacuated from the battlefield, repaired and returned to the troops of tanks and assault guns. If I find it, I will certainly send it.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2019 10: 49
      +2
      Quote: Comrade
      So yes, you are absolutely right to raise this topic - so you can not compare.

      Thank you, dear Valentine, absolutely solidary!
  • Comrade
    Comrade 11 May 2019 02: 57
    +3
    Yes, I forgot to add that the Germans actively used captured tanks, which their statistics did not take into account. Probably from the principle :-)
    But there the bill went by the thousands.
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 12 May 2019 17: 25
      0
      Quote: Comrade
      Yes, I forgot to add that the Germans actively used captured tanks, which their statistics did not take into account. Probably from the principle :-)
      But there the bill went by the thousands.

      On medium tanks, in dozens of pieces.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 13 May 2019 04: 49
        0
        Quote: Jura 27
        On medium tanks, in dozens of pieces.

        It’s you who confused the Germans with the Finns, but for those, the number of captured tanks really counted in dozens.
        1. Jura 27
          Jura 27 13 May 2019 05: 10
          0
          No, it is necessary to consider only those captured tanks that participated in battles on the first line, and did not guard airfields and did not chase partisans.
          The former were in the tens, the latter was much more.
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 13 May 2019 13: 32
            0
            No one knows for sure how many and which Germans had captured tanks. Even y. serious researchers like Pledges have only estimates.
            Finns are simpler, everything is counted there according to the types of tanks and self-propelled guns with an accuracy of one.
  • KB-2
    KB-2 11 May 2019 09: 40
    -2
    What is the statistics for de ... silt and an article for deb ... fishing.
    Did the USSR have only T-34, KV and much more 25 SU-76 tanks?
    And where did BT-2 (620 released), BT-5 (released 1836), BT-7 (released 5328), T-18 (released 959), T-26 (released 11218), T-27 (released 3295) , T-28 (503 released), T-35 (61 released), T-37 (2552 released), T-38 (1340 released), T-40 (722 released), T-50 (75 released), T -60 (released 5920), T-70 (released 8231) and other pre-war tanks that were in service with the USSR before the war itself and in the initial period of the war (1941-1942)? Or did they not meet the enemy first, on the border? Or - they were not fighting? Or tankers didn’t die in them? Or did they not defend Moscow in 1941-1942? Or maybe it is worth counting all the losses suffered by tanks, among all types of tanks that were in service in the USSR and after that compare with the losses of the Germans? That's just the loss coefficient for tanks will turn out not 3 to 1, but much higher, and therefore they have extended the secrecy on the military archives on the Second World War until 2040.
    Oh, these German statistics !? Sad ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2019 10: 48
      +2
      Quote: KV-2
      What is the statistics for de ... silt and an article for deb ... fishing.
      Did the USSR have only T-34, KV and much more 25 SU-76 tanks?

      No, statistics for normal people. And not for you. Russian on white says that the figures are not for all tanks, but for medium and heavy armored vehicles :))))
  • paul3390
    paul3390 11 May 2019 09: 48
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    the Germans suffered very heavy losses at Stalingrad, but received almost no new experience in the use of tank troops.

    Well, why - the experience is colossal, not to hell with tank units to storm the city!
    1. Tamer
      Tamer 13 May 2019 18: 48
      0
      Quote: paul3390
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      the Germans suffered very heavy losses at Stalingrad, but received almost no new experience in the use of tank troops.

      Well, why - the experience is colossal, not to hell with tank units to storm the city!

      Wehrmacht tank commanders understood this. And the headquarters of the 6th Army, too. But the pressure from above to take Stalingrad as quickly as possible led to the fact that they tried to compensate for the acute shortage of assault guns, an effective means of supporting infantry lost during the fighting on the approaches to Stalingrad and the first assault. But the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht (14,16, 24 etc.) lost hardly more than 70-80 tanks in offensive street battles in Stalingrad.
  • ser56
    ser56 11 May 2019 13: 35
    -1
    It is a pity that the author eventually began to adjust reality to his desires, in fact, moved to the position of Agitprop ... request
    "and provide the Red Army in droves with anti-cannon armor and an extremely powerful 76,2 mm cannon for its time,"
    there was such a tank - the T-28 with the L-10, nothing prevented it from being replaced with the L-11, and then with the F-34, and with the screens its frontal armor was also more than the T-34 ... it’s clear that everything burned to make a new tank, so the T-28 was declared old, not all screened and even the ZP stopped doing it - why bother with junk ... bully
    "and the lack of a 5th crew member was obvious to the top leadership of the Red Army even before the war" that's why a very good T-34M was created, what prevented it from being put into production? correct formation of 30 MK ... Well, they would not have done 1000 T-34, but 500 T-34 + T-34M before the start of the war - there is a difference, but not any ...
    "but to give maximum manufacturability and simplify the existing design of the tank. Our top military leadership considered it necessary to launch mass production as soon as possible."
    to arm the 30MK ... hopeless nonsense and technical illiteracy ... instead of refining the design of the tank and accelerating the tests, preparing for mass production, the factories were loaded with the manufacture of wounded animals using handicraft technology ... This "tradition" was well described by Grabin, though using the example of the production of guns ... The result of the release of wounded tanks was increased losses of tanks and crews ... the usual Soviet bullshit - report, and there the grass does not grow ...
    "It would be much more correct to estimate the losses of the tank forces of the USSR and Germany not for 12 months of 1942, but for 14 months, including January and February 1943."
    Classic juggling - customize the selection to the desired answer ... bully and it’s even more correct to calculate for 20 months from the beginning of the war ... that’s the figure would have changed, only in the other direction ... hi
    "This does not mean, of course, that the T-34 was once inferior to the German three-ruble note in terms of the aggregate combat qualities." better only HE shell T-34 ...
    The strengths of the article include factual material in the tables! However, Lend-Lease posts were not taken into account, and they are already considerable at 42 ... request
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2019 14: 22
      0
      Quote: ser56
      It is a pity that the author eventually began to customize the reality to fit his desires.

      It is a pity that Sergey once again suffered in fantasy worlds
      Quote: ser56
      such a tank was - T-28 with L-10

      Yeah. Difficult, expensive and unsuitable for mass serial construction. And so - a normal tank, yes.
      Quote: ser56
      therefore, a very good T-34M was created, which prevented its launch into a series? correct formation of 30 MK ..

      Wrong, this question already understood before. In fact, there were many reasons, the main one was the lack of an engine (it was different) and a number of other transmission elements :))))
      Quote: ser56
      to arm 30MK ... foolish hopeless and technical illiteracy

      30MK has nothing to do with it at all. I cited data on the T-34 targets, there were no 30MKs. You again confuse warm with soft
      Quote: ser56
      It would be much more correct to estimate the losses of the tank forces of the USSR and Germany not for 12 months in 1942, but for 14 months, including January and February 1943. "
      Classic falsification - to customize the sample for the desired answer ..

      It does not even need to comment - the article gives all the answers. With the conclusion that actually a significant part of the armor, which the Germans said killed in February 1943 r was actually lost, they can argue earlier? You can not. It remains only to cry about fraud.
      Quote: ser56
      it means, starting with the screened modification H - exactly

      In your fantasy universe - definitely
      Quote: ser56
      However, Lend-Lease postaki are not taken into account.

      What, the text of the table niasilili? :))) I sympathize.
      1. ser56
        ser56 11 May 2019 15: 53
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Sergey once again suffered in fantasy worlds

        this is from your point of view ... hi
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Wrong, this issue has already been dealt with before

        I'm broadcasting Svirin’s opinion ... hi
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Complex, expensive and unsuitable for mass serial construction

        which was mass-produced - 500pcs? bully It was tested in battle and quite successfully ... But thrown ...
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        the main one is the lack of an engine (it was different) and a number of other transmission elements :))))

        it was possible to consistently replace units - the main difficulty in manufacturing any tank was not in the tower, but the main problems of the T-34 were there ... it could be solved in 41g, and not in 44 .. request
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        which the Germans considered killed in February 1943 was actually lost by them earlier can you argue? You can not.

        according to your logic, the loss of the Germans in January-February 42g should be attributed to 41g ... bully
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In your fantasy universe - definitely

        the classic answer is not in essence ... the armor of the T-3 is thicker in the front, the reliability and mobility are better, the review and distribution of duties in the crew are also ... 50 mm gun is quite suitable against the T-34 ... Forgot the enthusiasm of the testers of our training ground from T -3? bully
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        What, the text of the table niasilili? :))) I sympathize.

        when information is poorly perceived, the author is to blame, not the reader ... bully
        "recovered and lend-leased T-34 and KV" is new, strong and cool bully
        1. Andrey Shmelev
          Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 16: 06
          0
          according to your logic, the loss of the Germans in January-February 42g should be attributed to 41g ... bully


          Yes sir! laughing

          losses were considered the date of write-off


          as far as I understand
  • 123456789
    123456789 11 May 2019 18: 59
    +3
    IV. LOSSES IN THE YEARS OF WAR.

    After the war, GBTU conducted a study on the causes of the defeat of our tanks. Anti-tank artillery accounted for about 60%, 20% was lost in tank battles, howitzer artillery destroyed 5%, 5% were blown up on mines, and 10% fell on the share of aviation and anti-tank infantry.

    Losses of Soviet armored vehicles from June 22 to December 31, 1941 (according to http://tankfront.ru/ussr/losses.html): 20500.
    Losses of Soviet armored vehicles in 1942: 15000.
    Losses of Soviet armored vehicles in 1943: 22400.
    Losses of Soviet armored vehicles in 1944: 16900.
    Losses of Soviet armored vehicles in 1945 (from January 1 to May 9): 8700.
    Total loss of Soviet armored vehicles from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945: 83500.

    Losses of German armored vehicles from June 22 to December 31, 1941 (according to https://www.anaga.ru/poteri-nemeckih-tankov.htm): 2851.
    Losses of German armored vehicles in 1942: 3377.
    Losses of German armored vehicles in 1943: 8995.
    Losses of German armored vehicles in 1944: 12079.
    Losses of German armored vehicles in 1945 (from January 1 to May 9): 1433.
    Total loss of German armored vehicles from 22 June 1941 to 9 in May 1945: 28735.

    Sources:
    Production of tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR in 1941-1945. https://www.bonuscodewot.ru/main/1138-proizvodstvo-tankov-i-sau-v-sssr-v-1941-1945-godah.html
    Statistical collection No. 1 “Combat and strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War” (1994 Military Publishing House)
    Tank construction of Germany and the USSR https://vuzlit.ru/947522/tankostroenie_germanii_sssr_vremya_velikoy_otechestvennoy_voyny
    German tanks of WWII http://armedman.ru/tanki/1937-1945-bronetehnika/nemetskie-tanki-vtoroy-mirovoy-voynyi.html
    “The signature stamp removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, military operations and military conflicts. ” Ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. M .: Military Publishing, 1993. http://tankfront.ru/ussr/losses.html
    1. ROBIN-SON
      ROBIN-SON 11 May 2019 22: 31
      +1
      Losses of the USSR are 2.9 times greater than Germany. If we discard the initial period of the war, when the machines were simply thrown, then all the same the losses are big. I think the main reason is the poor preparation of the crews in the first place, and the second is equipment, walkie-talkies, and battlefield surveillance systems. The Germans of the cohesion of crews, not only tank but also submarines (unshaven Dennitsa boys) paid more attention.
    2. 123456789
      123456789 12 May 2019 00: 29
      0
      Total figures for the war (source: http://oldadmiral.livejournal.com/24595.html)
      Production of armored vehicles in the USA: tanks and self-propelled guns - 88410; BTR and BA - 123683.
      Production of armored vehicles in Britain: tanks and self-propelled guns - 33574; BTR and BA - 136991.
      Production of armored vehicles in the USSR: tanks and self-propelled guns - 105251; BA - 8505.
      Production of armored vehicles in Germany: tanks and self-propelled guns - 46857; BTR and BA - 26651.
      I would attribute all the produced armored vehicles to the losses of Germany and then we get the ratio 1,1: 1
    3. KB-2
      KB-2 12 May 2019 14: 25
      0
      I noticed that when the actual, statistical data on losses and production during the Second World War are given, the lip-slapping affectors are discouraged!
      For, real statistics do not give a flight of fancy to afftors-"hitmen", therefore we see some ugly and fantastic criteria for fictional comparisons and articles based on these fantasies.
      And all because the archives on the Great Patriotic War classified up to 2050! I wonder why? It is likely that there would be no dizziness from successes, so that such affectors would not burst with pride.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 May 2019 17: 40
      +1
      In short - nonsense. Specifically, this figure
      Quote: 123456789
      Total loss of German armored vehicles from 22 June 1941 to 9 in May 1945: 28735.

      You forgot to point out that according to this site, in January 1945 the Germans had more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns in service :))) that is, at the time when Joseph Sepp Dietrich said "we call ourselves the 6th Panzer Army, because that we had 6 tanks left "the Germans allegedly had 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns ...
      Quote: 123456789
      Sources of

      not the sources. The source of these numbers is Muller Gillebrandt.
      1. 123456789
        123456789 14 May 2019 07: 27
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In short - nonsense. Specifically, this figure

        Facts vs. Arguments.
  • bbss
    bbss 11 May 2019 21: 56
    0
    Some kind of accounting attempt to realize the greatness of the feat ... It will not work.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 11 May 2019 22: 27
    0
    In 1941, the production facilities of the Third Reich gave the Wehrmacht and SS 2 medium tanks T-III T-IV, commander tanks at their base, as well as StuG III assault guns, which with a mass of 850 tons had a reservation comparable to T-III, but an incomparably more powerful 22-mm gun, capable of quite successfully fighting our T-75s.

    What kind of nonsense? The Stug long gun appeared only at the end of 1942, in real life, these self-propelled guns appeared on the front only in 1943

    PzKpfw III Ausf. B. They were armed with a short-barrel (barrel length 24 gauge) 75 mm gun Sturmkanone 37 L / 24 (StuK 37 L / 24) with a low initial velocity of the projectile. .. Since the spring of 1942, they began to use the 75-mm StuK 40 L / 43 guns, and in the autumn of this year even longer-barrel versions of this gun.


    The fact is that some time ago, there was such a point of view that the tank plants of the USSR did not keep separate records of new armored vehicles, and those restored at the plants after damage to tanks and self-propelled guns. .. Unfortunately, the author of this article could not find out whether or not this, but if that is so, then in the 12,5 thousand T-34s released in 1942 there is a certain number of not newly created, but rebuilt tanks.

    Generally pearl. Tank factories did not repair damaged tanks. There were separate enterprises for this, and of course it is impossible to confuse the statistics of produced and restored.

    At the beginning, the tank cycle looked pretty interesting and adequate. But I see that:

    "The deeper into the forest, the thicker the partisans!" (from)

    Our author seems too carried away ..
    1. Andrey Shmelev
      Andrey Shmelev 11 May 2019 23: 53
      0
      Our author seems too carried away ..


      but without that it’s boring wassat
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      12 May 2019 13: 32
      +1
      Quote: Saxahorse
      What kind of nonsense? Stoug's long gun only appeared at the end of 1942 of the year.

      I did not know that March is at the end of the year, thanks
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Tank-building plants were not engaged in the restoration of damaged tanks. For this there were separate enterprises.

      I have no doubt that you can easily list the factories that repaired medium and heavy armored vehicles in the USSR laughing
      In short - this is simply enchanting nonsense.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 12 May 2019 19: 49
        +1
        NKTP, plant No. 180 (former Saratov steam locomotive-repair plant). People from the Izhora plant were evacuated to it).
        The decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2866 of February 10 of 1943, the factory is prescribed to overhaul the towers and hulls of T-34 tanks that received combat damage.
        From 1943 to 1945, the plant repaired 1334 hulls and 875 turrets, which, according to the plant's report, "was equivalent to the production of 950 new tanks."
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          12 May 2019 20: 14
          0
          Quote: hohol95
          The decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2866 of February 10 of 1943, the factory is prescribed to overhaul the towers and hulls of T-34 tanks that received combat damage.

          Sorry, but you did not understand :)))) Tank factories, of course, did not produce all the parts and assemblies themselves, a significant part was received from contractors. Likewise, other plants could repair some units, not those produced by tanks. But as a matter of fact there was the following - the towers and hulls repaired by the plant # XXUMX were transferred back to the tank-building plants, which used them for the production / overhaul of tanks. That is, the repaired tank was included in the statistics of the plant that collected it, and not in reports of the plant №180
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 12 May 2019 22: 26
            0
            Much Dear Andrey! Do not count me at all ...
            I got this information from Kolomiets' book "T-34. Complete encyclopedia of a tank".
            And he brought it just as an example! And there it is indicated -
            which, according to the plant's report, "was equivalent to the production of 950 new tanks."

            counterparties.

            Have you forgotten the word - MORTGAGE?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              13 May 2019 17: 17
              0
              Quote: hohol95
              Do not count me at all ...

              Yes, I do not think in any way, where did you get this? hi
              Quote: hohol95
              And he brought her just for example!

              Yes. And I explained that in this case the example is not appropriate. You write about allied companies, and my opponent - about individual factories that performed the entire repair cycle, and these are different things.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 13 May 2019 19: 12
                0
                So, besides the well-known factories (producing tanks and repairing the main parts: tower, hull), there were also factories that repaired the tank on their own without the use of hulls and towers from manufacturers or factory number 180?
                And it allowed them to do their equipment and the availability of qualified personnel!
  • Comrade
    Comrade 12 May 2019 02: 22
    +1
    Quote: KV-2
    Or maybe it is worth counting all the losses suffered by tanks, among all types of tanks that were in service in the USSR and after that compare with the losses of the Germans?

    You can also try.
    In 1942, the total losses of Soviet armored vehicles (heavy, medium and light tanks, self-propelled guns) amounted to 15 100 units. This figure includes both combat and non-combat losses.
    The latter, unfortunately, were sometimes quite significant.
    So, in the troops of the Western Front, the 2-I Guards Tank Brigade, making a march on 80 km, allowed such an organization that out of 35 (thirty-five) tanks, 30 (thirty) tanks were lost. 31-I tank brigade scattered along the roads and ditches of 19 (nineteen) tanks.
    Quote: KV-2
    That's just the loss coefficient for the tanks will turn out not 3 to 1, but much higher, which is why the secrecy on the military archives on the Second World War was extended to 2040.

    Conclusions can be made only after comparison irretrievable combat losses armored vehicles of the Red Army with those of the Germans and their allies.
  • Viknt
    Viknt 12 May 2019 11: 03
    +1
    Quote: Cherry Nine
    In a planned economy there is no pricing, even in the form in which there is in the current GZ. All prices - intercompany, which it will be considered reasonable to establish from the most unexpected considerations - such will be established.


    The question is extremely interesting and at least controversial! For example, compare the current price of a loaf of bread (25 r), the dollar exchange rate (65 r) with a Soviet loaf of bread - 24 kopecks, a dollar - 63 kopecks. The prices of the 40s came across, the proportions remained. It is interesting to compare ratios with pre-revolutionary prices. There is reason to believe that there they are the same. The marketplace rushing to power ... is ready to mix with the dirt all the legacy of the past, despite the fact that it itself is more stupid and more evil than its ancestors. But the matter is not in the subjects, but in the economy itself. In the USSR, with all the shortcomings, the economy was treated as an objective science and tried to calculate and balance it as professional mathematicians and economists. Arrays of information were outrageous for that time, and computing facilities were primitive. The Soviet specifics, when the whole industry was practically the same as a super holding or a trans-industry corporation with internal prices, there was a place to be, but this is only one of their possible options, a form of organization with the advantages and disadvantages inherent in such an organization more or less optimal here and now. For a giant country with a lack of infrastructure, centralization ensures the unity of the state, does not allow it to fall apart into autonomous markets - the state. Now the center is doing the same thing, at first all the money goes to the center, and there they already decide who and how much to give or not to give. Plus the effect of scale, coordination, subordination of the functioning of all elements. Order, order beats the crowd. The Turkish Janissaries individually exceeded three times the soldiers of the Russian army, but lost to the Russian army. In economics, the same laws apply. In addition to the purely economic, pricing in the USSR also had a social function, an artificial equivalent of market demand. The only problem is that high long-term social goals, ideas enter into an “implacable” contradiction with chewing gum, beads and mirrors here and now. One error in a decentralized system is one of many errors; an error in a single element becomes a global error of the entire system. But it does not at all follow from this that a decentralized system is guaranteed against the simultaneous identical error of all and immediately with the same consequences. Just the likelihood of such an error is less, but not fundamentally. Do not mix the form and replace it with the essence of the problem. The entire post-Soviet history and economic “achievements” of those in power are a clear demonstration of their squalor moral and professional. Specialists who understand the essence of the economic and social problems of the present day. In the government, obviously there are none. They replace the creature with formalism, in fact, the authorities, like the Chinese, are engaged in counterfeiting, not only in the production of Swiss chronometers and American electronics, but in management and economics. It turns out a lot worse. Neither centralization nor decentralization is better or worse than each other. There is not and cannot be some kind of eternal ideal. Any form of the system is not eternal, finite, any form of organization in the process is detached from the content, errors accumulate and this system also comes to a crisis. The economic crisis, for example, of capitalism is not at all evidence of the general crisis of capitalism as a system with the obligatory complete collapse, but only a compulsion to improve it. But the same applies to state capitalism in the USSR. Errors in setting social goals, excessive centralization, errors in the economy are not at all grounds for the destruction of the USSR and the replacement of the Soviet social system with criminal capitalism.
  • Viknt
    Viknt 12 May 2019 12: 53
    +2
    The article is not perfect, but it was worth writing at least for the commentators to be able to clarify or provide alternative information. In general, a comparison of gross losses of armored vehicles outside the context of losses in time, causes of losses, etc., in the author's terminology, is closer to comparing warm with soft. I read the memoirs of a tanker, he fought since 42, by the end of 44 of them from the initial staff there were several people left and the unit commander transferred them closer to him. He did not fight less, but he was no longer a plug in every hole and survived. He wrote about battles, and I figured out the ratio of losses. It turned out 1 to 3 until the end of 44, and only closer to the end of the war, the loss of steel was 1 to 1. Noteworthy is the opposite ratio of losses of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the offensive and defense. The losses of the Red Army in the offensive 3 to 1 seem to fit well into military theory. Now it is believed that in the offensive, the superiority in forces, the ratio should generally be up to 1 to 10. The comments cited the statistics of the ratio of losses of Red Army tanks from weapons of destruction, 60% on account of anti-tank artillery plus 5% howitzer. Only 20% of tanks were lost from duels with tanks. No such data was provided for German technology. In order not to mislead anyone, all this must be considered separately. A separate topic is non-combat "losses", the tank went out of order on the way and it was not a regiment that went into battle, but .... ??? There are a lot of nuances, starting with a lot of cheap tanks versus a smaller number of expensive and combat use.
  • Homer_J_Simpson
    Homer_J_Simpson 13 May 2019 07: 39
    0
    "So, the author took the figures of Soviet losses in aggregate, according to the materials of the site tankfront.ru, where they are rounded up to hundreds. On the whole, they are more or less correct" - why are they correct? Links to which documents? I've opened a help section on the site, and there is emptiness?
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 13 May 2019 10: 32
    0
    Quote: 2Albert
    And can you give the sources of losses of the German tank crews? There were only general losses of German td.

    I don’t have such sources, but an estimate can be made on the basis of the number of lost irretrievably, an estimate of the number of damaged tanks and the number of crews. Since the German army was advancing, the ratio of damage to lost tanks would be irrevocably much higher than for the Red Army. Crews of German tanks are also larger. The T-60, if I’m not mistaken, has only 2 crew members.
  • M. Michelson
    M. Michelson 13 May 2019 10: 41
    0
    But no matter how you juggle with numbers, it is clear that at first the spacecraft had to overwhelm the enemy with the "corpses" of equipment too.
  • Shteffan
    Shteffan 14 May 2019 09: 25
    0
    As a result, this situation developed: at the beginning of 1941, the condition of the armored forces of the Red Army can be described as catastrophic - we had 1 medium and heavy tanks against 400 tanks and self-propelled guns at the Wehrmacht. -What is nonsense, AUTHOR? HOW MUCH HEAVY WAS? -NIODE! THESE ARE MEDIUM AND LIGHT TANKS WITH WEAK SHORT-UP GUNS. THERE ARE MUCH NOT 3% TANKETS. WOULD YOU BE LITTLE WHERE THE CATASTROPHIC DRIED STEAM IS UNDERCATED? HAS MUCH MUCH? MORE THAN 304 ???? WHERE THE DISASTER, Trickster?
  • ZIS
    ZIS 14 May 2019 11: 54
    0
    In my youth, I read my memoirs I don't remember, either Rybalko, or someone else. So they were interested in the average survivability of the tank on the battlefield. I remember that our tank lived on average three battles, the German five. And ours tried to equal these numbers, but it was in 42nd before the "Tigers" and "Panthers".
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 15 May 2019 14: 36
    0
    Quote: M. Michelson
    But no matter how you juggle with numbers, it is clear that at first the spacecraft had to overwhelm the enemy with the "corpses" of equipment too.

    They juggle with numbers comparing one irretrievable loss of T-34 with one irretrievable loss and one heavy damage, evacuation and repair of T-3 as 1: 1. With this, the production of the T-34 is about three times cheaper than the T-3, and crew training is more than three times cheaper.
    1. Alex_vl
      Alex_vl 18 May 2019 21: 51
      0
      where it’s cheaper when it’s more expensive, the Americans estimated the T-34 at $ 50.000. one diesel is worth ...
  • kalibr
    kalibr 15 May 2019 18: 07
    0
    Very interesting article! "Alas, the author does not have accurate data on the losses of domestic armored vehicles on a monthly basis." You can use the data of the Sovinformburo. The general trend is reflected in them. On Wo there was my article on the monthly losses of the Wehrmacht in tanks and aircraft according to the data of the Sovinformburo! It would be interesting for you to familiarize yourself with it. Data are MONTHLY for all 1418 days! That was the job!
  • srha
    srha 16 May 2019 14: 19
    0
    Auto RU. Will you take into account the number of captured tanks?
  • pmkemcity
    pmkemcity 18 May 2019 08: 21
    0
    I read it. He smiled. So, for a seed to the author. "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal" No. 11 for 1985. Article "Technical reconnaissance in armored and mechanized troops during the Great Patriotic War" (Colonels Ivanov E.V. and Panov Yu.A.). A couple of passages:
    .... suffice it to say that if a failed tank (self-propelled gun), for some reason, was not found on the battlefield or along the route of troop deployment, then with good reason we can assume that from the category of reconstructed it went into the number irrevocably of the lost.
    ... On the 3rd Baltic Front in the operations of 1944 .... technical intelligence revealed 1216 tanks and self-propelled guns requiring repair. Of these, 947 were repaired by means of the front and returned to service, the rest were sent to the repair plants of the Center.
    ... During the Great Patriotic War, repair units and formations restored more than 400 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. Most of them were repaired in the immediate vicinity of the combat formations of the troops. Thus, the restoration of tanks and self-propelled guns was the main source of maintaining a high level of combat readiness of tank units and formations.
    ... Each repaired tank (self-propelled gun), except those that arrived at the repair site on their own, i.e. about 300 thousand units, was first reconnoitered by technical intelligence agencies, and then evacuated or repaired at the site of failure of the repair team sent to it. Bodies of technical intelligence from 1943 until the end of the war scouted 27 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns that could not be restored. They were removed from serviceable aggregates and units with a total weight of more than 80 thousand tons, an average of 3 tons from each tank and self-propelled guns irretrievable losses.
    Real scales simply overshadow all your guesses ...
  • Damask
    Damask 12 August 2019 22: 24
    0
    It’s interesting, of course, but I read somewhere, the Germans greatly exceeded the Soviet army in armored personnel carriers (wheeled, tracked, joint), which were armed with 30,50 and even 76mm cannons that hit our tanks, and even tankers destroyed them, it wasn’t considered , and yet it would also be fair to attribute to the German lost armored vehicles, otherwise ours seem to be in% something much comes out