The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 11. Far from the border
Preface. The following abbreviations will be used in the text of the new cycle: AK - army corps, AZ - aerostat (s) barriers, ap (hell) - artillery regiment (division), bad (bap) - bomber air division (regiment), naval base - naval base, air force - military district, airborne aerospace defense - air surveillance, warning and communications, the Armed Forces - the armed forces, the General Staff - Iad (IAP) - fighter air division (regiment), the KA - the Red Army (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army), the Baltic Fleet - the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, CP (NP) - command (observation) point, ZhBD - military operations magazine, zenap - anti-aircraft artillery regiment, rear - anti-aircraft artillery battalion, ZF - Western Front, MVO - Moscow Military District, mk - mechanized (motorized) corps, md - motorized division, NCO - People’s Commissariat of Defense, NS — chief of staff, ozad — separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion, front (pp, pb) — infantry division (regiment, battalion), brigade — reconnaissance air regiment, RM — reconnaissance materials, RO — reconnaissance department, RU — Intelligence Directorate General Staff, garden - mixed Navy Air Division, NWF - North-Western Front, SD (joint venture) - Rifle Division (regiment), SNK - Council of People's Commissars, SF - Northern Fleet, td (tp, tbr) - tank division (regiment, brigade), cap - assault air regiment, SHO - encryption department (department), ST - encryption (cipher telegram), PMC - member of the Military Council, Black Sea Fleet - Black Sea Fleet, SWF - South-Western Front, SF - Southern Front.
To reduce the volume of the material presented, the author used the following simplifications:
1) when citing the text of documents and memoirs, the above abbreviations are introduced, which distorts the quoted text somewhat. For example, the aviation division (if it is a fighter) was replaced by the designation "iad", and the intelligence report - by "RM";
2) in the description of parts and compounds used unusual designations:
- for artillery and anti-aircraft artillery battalions;
- in the German Armed Forces: cn (Sat) - sapper regiment (battalion), etc. - armored division, md - infantry division (motorized);
Previously published a cycle consisting of 10-ti parts, links to which are given at the end of the article. Some readers asked the author to continue this cycle or to clarify individual episodes. You will be presented with 12 new parts for this topic. Parts turned out to be voluminous and, perhaps, difficult to read. Therefore you should decide for yourself: do you need to read this cycle? Those who decide to familiarize themselves with the new material will become familiar with some documents that are not particularly illuminated or have been distorted in books. The author is grateful to 38 readers who responded to his request, as well as those who have helped in finding and providing information. Thank you, people! We kindly request those who like the material: put asterisks only in the last part.
A part of the presented material in the new cycle was partially considered by the author earlier. Since new users may join the cycle, the author considers it necessary to briefly repeat some fragments of the previously described material. To confirm his point of view, the author will present a large amount of material. Previously presented material will be supplemented with memories of veterans and extracts from the Republic of Moldova. Since a lot of materials are not available in free electronic access, the author will accompany certain events that are not confirmed either in documents or in memoirs with the words “probably».
Due to lack of time for your consideration, the first part is “Far from borders, Which was supposed to be the fifth. In addition to the first three parts, almost all the material has been prepared. Therefore, the author apologizes for the delay of the first parts, which will not be released on June 22, but somewhere in the first decade of July. In these parts, we will consider again the information provided by intelligence, since the actions of Soviet military leaders before 22.6.41 are directly related to their existing RM. Further reports will be presented on the Navy, Air Defense and the border VO (in view of the large amount of material for KOVO and ZOVOVO - two parts will be given to them).
The closeness of a large number of documents relating to the events preceding 22.6.41, forcing some writers to draw conclusions based on their experience (including the military), complementing these events with their own considerations. They are trying to link different documents together. Is it possible to extend your experience for pre-war time? Is it possible to link different documents to each other? They do not really think about it ... Maybe it is because this is their business and means of self-affirmation? ..
We slip the version of the betrayal of Soviet generals. A little-known fact is that this version is planned for a mass “throw-in” closer to the threatened period in order to “sow” distrust of its generals. The same version is prepared in the intelligence section. The goal is to sow distrust of Russian intelligence, to cause the fear of ordinary people about the possible non-detection of a potential enemy’s preparation for a massive nuclear strike. For fear of annihilation, cause subsequent disobedience and riots to disorganize all state systems. Many books available to readers say that "intelligence reported exactly." However, an analysis of the existing RM shows a completely opposite situation. It should be said that intelligence in that period brought information that she was able to get ...
You will be presented a lot of excerpts from the memories of veterans, but, unfortunately, you can not believe everything without additional checks. For various reasons, the information may be distorted. The author agrees with the opinion of the user Sergei: “The answers of the divisional divisions ... well, what will they admit to their mistakes?!” We will see that some events in the memoirs are distorted. The reasons for this are uninteresting to the author. You should trust only those memories that are duplicated by different people or documents. Although this also does not guarantee absolute certainty ...
The author advises to pay attention to the repeatability of individual events in different VO, connections and, conversely, the lack of identity of individual events in HE. This indicates that individual events are not carried out according to some single Directive from Moscow, but were a personal initiative of commanders of various ranks. The materials that will be presented to you confirm this ...
A large number of heads and leaders in the USSR knew that war with Hitler Germany was inevitable. Why not everything? Consider the opinion of one of these commanders, part of which was stationed at the border.
A.I. Grebnev (PribOVO, commander 374 cn 128 cd): “No one even thought about the war with Germany. We were generally very peaceful towards Germany. We considered her a good neighbor, loyally abiding by the non-aggression treaty ... " This opinion is not the only ...
Since the end of 1940, different periods of the beginning of the war have been called and predicted by intelligence services, but it was not there. The spacecraft repeatedly prepared to strike the nazis, but everything did not strike. In the materials of the article, the author will try to justify his two versions:
1) the beginning of a full-scale war was 22 June, which was not expected by the top managers of the spacecraft (Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and some other persons), ie for these people, the full-scale 22 war of June began unexpectedly;
2) the real fighting of the Germans in the first days of the war differed from the vision of the highest Soviet military leaders on the actions of the enemy in the initial period of the war;
3) there were a certain number of events that were associated with the preparation of troops for war, which were personal initiative individual military leaders or groups of people.
People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR SM.Timoshenko did not show anything special on the eve of 22.6.41 and on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. The situation with him is very similar to the situation with General F.I. Kuznetsov.
On the eve of the war, PribOVO, headed by the commander of the troops F. I. Kuznetsov and NS, P. S. Klenov, tried to prepare for the attack of the German troops. Let's just say he was preparing for military action better than the rest of the BO. While commanding the troops in the Crimea, the same person (F.I. Kuznetsov) does not try to prepare his troops for a similar enemy strike. He does not take any initiative ... Also, Timoshenko behaves during the Kharkov operation, which led to the defeat of a large group of Soviet troops ...
B.V. Whitman (captured near Kharkov): “Several cars drove up. From them came the dapper SS officers with cockade in the form of a skull on their caps. One of them, looking at the huge mass of prisoners and the mountain of trophies, said to the others: “It is a pity that Marshal Tymoshenko is not present at the same time. As a sign of gratitude for such a significant contribution to our victory, the Führer reserved him a knight’s cross! .. ”
S.M. Budenny (First Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR): "At the defensive turn (the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers), work was being done to strengthen the defense, and the troops settled along the entire defense line ... I returned from Smolensk, where I spent the whole night meeting with regional workers, at 7 in the morning and found breakfast apartment tt.Timoshenko, Mehlis and Shaposhnikov, the first two from Moscow, the last from Minsk, arrived by car. After breakfast, I reported to them about the situation at the front and that the enemy would advance from Lepel to Orsha. Therefore, our troops, relying on solid defense, must break up the Guderian group ... Tov.Timoshenko told me that he was appointed front commander, and I was his deputy and the front was renamed from Osobyu to Zapadny. And also added that he will go on the offensive against the Guderian group ...
[20-50 21.6.41 g.] Stalin told us that the Germans, without declaring war, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. June 22 ... What we should and can do today and before dawn tomorrow 22.6.41. Tymoshenko and Zhukov said that if the Germans attacked, we would break them at the border, and then on their territory. I. Stalin thought and said: “This is not serious” ...
In 4-01 22.06.41 I got a call from Commissar Comrade. Tymoshenko and said that the Germans are bombing Sevastopol, and whether it is necessary to report on this to Comrade Stalin? I told him that I needed to report immediately, but he said: “Call you!” I immediately called and reported not only about Sevastopol, but also about Riga, which the Germans were also bombing. Tov. Stalin asked: “Where is the commissar?” I replied: “Next to me here ...” Comrade. Stalin ordered to hand him the phone ... "
The version of the Chief of the General Staff about the call to Stalin is completely different, and the version of the People's Commissar of the Navy is the third. All versions differ between. Therefore, none of them can not be trusted - there is no evidence. However, one should take into account the fact that at the final stage of the defeat of the Soviet troops under the city of Kharkiv S.M. Tymoshenko also “fell out” of the connection with the supreme command of the spacecraft ... Probably by the beginning of the war he was not in his place, like many other military commanders ... But he himself was not capable of anticipating something on the night of 22.6.41, according to the author ...
Chief of General Staff. The inept first use of the moto-tank troops in Mongolia ... The praise in the memoirs to Pavlov's report at the meeting of the higher command in December 1940 of the year testifies to his misunderstanding of the role of mobile groups. Scenarios of war games with the advancement of German troops to a depth of 150-250 km in 12-15 days, which were to be agreed (approved) by GKZhukov. The recognition given to them in his memoirs: “Many senior officials of NGOs and the General Staff have too much canonized the experience of the First World War. Most of the commanding staff of the operational-strategic level, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had occurred in the nature and methods of conducting the Second World War. However, in fact, they were preparing to wage the war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that a big war would begin, as before, with border battles, and only then would the main forces of the enemy enter into action. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the land and air forces of Nazi Germany ...
The sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not envisaged. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M.Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov, nor the management staff of the General Staff did not countthat the enemy will concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day by compact groups in all strategic areas. This is not taken into account and were not to that ready our commanders and troops of the border VO ... "
21.6.41 from PribOVO is heading for STS: “To the Chief of the General Staff. The Military Council controls the troops from the CP - Paneževis, and does not have a direct line with Moscow. SHOs work in peacetime when there is a shortage of 50% in wartime. Document processing is delayed - reports are late ... I ask:
1) Provide a direct Moscow-Panevezys wire around the clock.
2) to bring the number of encoders of district staffs and armies to wartime states.
3) release the four 13-4 devices in order to have the 3 devices in the shtakra and two in the straps. Maples
In 4-00, 22.6.41 is sent to ShT by communications: “The Chief of the General Staff Weak points of communication in the district that may cause a crisis are:
1. Weakness of front-line and army communications units in terms of size and power relative to their tasks.
2. Non-equipped communication centers of the army and the front.
3. Insufficient development of wires from the Panevezys and Dvinsky communication centers.
4. Lack of communications to ensure rear communication.
5. Weak security of communications property of the district, army communications units and the Air Force.
Please: 1. Allow partial mobilization of front-line and army communications units by mobilizing communications regiments, line battalions, operational companies and communication squadrons.
2. Release the equipment of communication centers: Panevezys, iron wires - 70 tons, underground cables - 10 km ...
5. To provide corps, army, district communications and air force units, select the minimum: BODO apparatuses - 10 units, CT-35 - 36 units, telegraph cable - 2393 km ... Maples
As for the distribution of duties, the head of the General Staff supervised, among others, the Department of Communications of the Spacecraft and was obliged to know the timelines for the deployment of subunits and communication units and the communication scheme. Communication was the "Achilles' heel" of all headquarters ... Perhaps it was one of the flaws and misunderstandings of the actions of the troops in the modern war ... The connection remained in peacetime states, a large number of means of communication remained in warehouses ... Or, nevertheless, G. K.Zhukov did not expect the beginning of a full-scale 22 war of June?
A.M. Vasilevsky (deputy head of the operations department of the General Staff): "... Proceeding from the development of the plan ... from the correct position that modern wars are not declared, but they simply begin by the enemy already prepared for hostilities ... The correct conclusions ... for themselves the leadership of our aircraft and the General Staff did not ... The plan provided for the old so-called initial period of war lasting 15-20 days from the outbreak of hostilities to the entry of the main troops of the country, during which the troops of the echelons of cover ... deployed along the borders, their combat actions should be to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of our troops. At the same time, the opposing side, i.e. Fascist Germany, with its fully mobilized and already belligerent army, was placed in relation to the terms necessary for its concentration and deployment against us, under the same conditions as our Armed Forces ... ”
The commander of KOVO, Colonel-General MPKirponos, expressed a similar opinion a few days before the war: “It will take some time from the moment of the announcement of mobilization to the beginning of active operations of large forces at the border. In the First World War, this time was measured in weeks, in modern conditions it will certainly drastically decrease. But still a few days, we will obviously have ... "
Far from the borders. Consider the memories of veterans about how they met the news of the beginning of the war.
K.A. Meretskov (Deputy NKO for combat training): “I was summoned to my office ... by the people's commissar of defense ... The words of the people's commissar unusually sharply and anxiously entered my mind. S.K.Timoshenko said then: “Attention! tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations. ” “What are my powers in the event of an armed attack?” I asked.
- Exposure first. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you know what to do ...
The NPO by the end of June 21 made it clear that the fascist Germany would attack the USSR the next day. It was necessary to quickly inform the troops and withdraw them from the attack, relocate Aviation to alternate aerodromes, to occupy the first tier troop lines that are advantageous for repulsing the aggressor, to begin the withdrawal of the second echelon and reserves to the appropriate areas, and also to withdraw the district and military headquarters to the designated areas, having adjusted the command and control. A number of urgent measures should be taken to increase the combat readiness of the troops.
Unfortunately, in the 5-6 hours remaining before the start of the war, NGOs and the General Staff failed to solve this problem. Only at 00-30 on June 22 a directive was sent from Moscow to the okrugs to put troops on alert. While the directive was being written in Moscow and sent to the troops, a lot of time passed and the war began. Only the People's Commissar of the Navy, its headquarters and command of the OdVO did more quickly, giving a short order fleets and the troops by telephone and telegraph ... A belated warning to the military and troops placed the border districts in unfavorable, difficult conditions, and ultimately was one of the reasons for our failures in the initial period of World War II ... "
S.M. Shtemenko (lieutenant colonel, operational management of the General Staff. From 11.1948 to 6.1952 - Head of the General Staff):“Fascist Germany managed to use the element of surprise ... The situation was further complicated by the fact that the orders for full combat readiness were not given in time for the sun. The troops (except for the fleet and the OdVO formations) therefore did not have time to take the defensive positions provided for by the plan, change airfields, raise planes into the air, and carry out other measures necessary in that situation.
We must not forget errors in determining the order of action and the strength of the initial strikes of the enemy. The supreme Soviet command assumed that the enemy would not enter all forces at once on the entire Soviet-German front and this would allow to restrain the aggressor using the forces of the so-called cover. But the war did not turn out well.: The Nazi invaders rushed forward with shock groupings of troops all along the western border of our state. We could not repulse this blow by forces located in the border zone, moreover not quite ready for immediate action. Miscalculations and omissions in the preparation of troops to repel the first strike of the German fascist aggressors, undoubtedly, complicated our position when entering into combat with ... the machine of Nazi Germany ... "
N.G. Kuznetsov (Commissar of the Navy): “In those tense days, the deputy head of the General Staff, N. F. Vatutin, came to me. He said that reads carefully our operational reports and reports to their superiors. Vatutin promised to notify us immediately if the situation becomes critical. We decided, however, no longer to wait for instructions, we began to act ourselves. KBF 19 June was transferred to operational readiness number 2. To some extent this protected him from any surprises. At the Federation Council it was calmer than in the Baltic, but we also transferred it to the same readiness. June 18 from the exercise area in Sevastopol returned the Black Sea Fleet and received an order to remain in readiness number X NUMX ...
Saturday, June 21 was almost the same as the previous one, full of alarm signals from fleets. Before the weekend, we usually stopped working earlier, but that evening our hearts were restless, and I called home: “Do not wait for me, I’ll linger ...” The lull reigned in the institutions of the capital. On normal days after 18, dinner time began: the leaders went home for about three hours to sit at work until late at night. But on Saturday, many were leaving the city. Business suffering subsided. That evening was somehow especially quiet. The phone did not ring at all, as if it had been turned off. Even such "restless" people's commissars, as V.A. Malyshev and I.I. Nosenko ... did not remind of themselves of a question that has already become customary in recent times: "How are you? .."
My thoughts were interrupted by the Deputy Chief of the Main Naval Staff, VA Alafuzov. As always, he came with an evening report. The situation didn’t seem to have changed: it was still very restless in the Baltic, on the Black Sea - calmer; nothing special happened in the North ... Once alone, I called the Commissar of Defense. "Commissar left", - they told me. The chief of the General Staff was also not in place ...
Why is there no information on top? The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of our opsquot know that fleets are on high alert. The General Staff does not take such measures along its lines.and we are not told a word. M.A. Vorontsov, who had just arrived from Berlin, came to 20-00. That evening, Mikhail Alexandrovich told me about fifty minutes about what was happening in Germany. He repeated: the attack must wait an hour to an hour. "So what does all this mean? ”I asked him point-blank. “This is war!” He answered without hesitation ... ”
M.M.Popov (Commander LVO): "In the tenths of June, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was received, which appointed ... a commission chaired by the commander of the LVO, entrusting it with the tasks of selecting sites for building airfields to base fighter and bomber aviation along the shores of the Barents Sea ... Before the commission’s work [had to] to carry out a plan previously planned ... a field trip in parts of the 14 army ...
[Already in Murmansk] by the end of our meeting, AGGolovko reported that the destroyer allocated for the commission on the choice of airfields, where I was supposed to go, was ready to go to sea, and offered to specify the time of this exit ...
The soul did not lie, as they say, to this parting from the land for almost a month ... After some reflection, it was found reasonable to report to him [Commissar of Defense] on the phone our mood. And the Commissar on the wire. A short report on the situation on the land frontier, at sea and in the air, and a frank statement that under these conditions it is not advisable to go to sea.
“It's good that I called,” said the people's commissar's voice. - Putting to sea for the time being. Immediately return to Leningrad. ” Those present during the conversation with the People's Commissar - the komflot and the commander - saw in the cancellation of going to sea some confirmation of our fears. “It smells like a thunderstorm in the air,” sighed AGGolovko and immediately by phone gave the command to cancel the release of the destroyer into the sea ... ”
And if the commander of the LVO did not call and went to sea for a long time? It turns out did not expect the People's Commissar of Defense 18-19 June war involving LVO troops? And if he waited, how could he send a comma on a third-level trip? ..
A.A. Novikov (Commander of the Air Force LVO): “On Saturday evening, when I finished all the work, the head of the GU training, formation and combat training of the Air Force KA General A.V. Nikitin entered the office.
“It's good that you came back,” said Alexey Vasilyevich. “I finished the inspection tour of the district's aviation units and tomorrow I will fly to Arkhangelsk. My report is ready, it will be transferred to you. In general, things are going well for you, but I would like to verbally inform you about something, Alexander Alexandrovich. There are questions that are best addressed in a personal conversation.
I wanted to say to Nikitin that I was no longer the commander of the District Air Force, but I changed my mind: it was always useful to talk with such a thoughtful, well-informed person like Alexey Vasilyevich face to face ... Our conversation dragged on. At the end of the conversation, I asked Nikitin, as a more informed person, that can be heard on other parts of our western border and how there, at the highest levels, assess the situation in the border VO. In response, Alexey Vasilyevich made an indefinite gesture with his hands.
“And by the way, let's try to find out,” he said. - Order me a conversation with Moscow. A few minutes later, Nikitin talked with General PF Zhigarev, Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force KA. The conversation was short. Nikitin reported that he had finished his work in Leningrad, and asked if he should go to Arkhangelsk or return to Moscow. According to the expression on the face of Alexei Vasilyevich I understood that Zhigarev was surprised by such a question. “Well, here,” after hearing the authorities' answer, Nikitin said, “I was ordered to immediately fly to Arkhangelsk ... I was at the end of the first hour of the night [22.6.41 r.] ... We left the district headquarters ... and went our separate ways ... "
N.D. Yakovlev: “June 21 around 14 watches arrived in Moscow. Literally an hour later, the People's Commissar of Defense presented himself ... S.K.Timoshenko. In the office of the People's Commissar was just Chief of General Staff Army General GK Zhukov. We warmly greeted. But S.K.Timoshenko did not give us time to talk. Succinctly suggested from Monday, that is with 23 Jun, start taking cases from the former head of GAU ... G.I. Kulik. And then come to him again for further instructions.
During our short conversation from Riga just called the commander of the troops PribOVO General F. I. Kuznetsov. The People's Commissar rather strictly asked him if it was true that they, Kuznetsov, had been ordered to introduce a blackout in Riga. And in the affirmative answer ordered to cancel it.
I did not hear the continuation of this telephone conversation, since I left the office of the people's commissar and from his receptionist called G.I. Kulik. He agreed to start the delivery of cases on Monday, but for now he offered to come to GAU by 20 for hours and unofficially attend a meeting related to the testing of fuses for anti-aircraft shells.
It was already deep night, and the meeting continued. Now military and civil engineers were speaking ... G.I. Kulik did not intervene, he was sitting silently, with an indifferent expression on his face. I, too, soon lost a thread of discussion in a stream of hot words ... So Xormin 22 misunderstood until the beginning of the fourth morning. And soon followed by a call on the "Kremlin". Kulik took the phone, threw several incomprehensible phrases into it. With a slightly pale face, he put it on the levers and with a gesture he called me into the next room. Here he hastily said that the Germans attacked our frontier troops and settlements, he was urgently summoned to the Central Committee, so now I myself will have to assume the post of head of the GAU ...
I was left alone in the office of the head of the GAU ... There was no one from the personnel in the administration, other than the duty officers. Meanwhile, it was dawning outside the windows, and, if we take into account what Kulik said, there was a war. And the phones are silent. He called the Commissar himself, then the head of the General Staff. I tried to contact NFVatutin, G.K.Malandin. In a word, with everyone he knew from work at KOVO. All in the Central Committee. What to do? .. He called the perplexed attendant, announced to him that I was the new head of the State Agrarian University, and demanded from him a list of the management personnel of the department. He was even more embarrassed when I ordered to call his deputies to the 10 watch. On an uncertain reminder that today is Sunday, bluntly confirmed his order. The attendant went out. Exactly in 10-00, Generals V.I. Khokhlov, K.R. Myshkov, A.P. Baikov, P.P.Chechulin, Commissioner I.Novikov visited me. He announced his inauguration, met them, and told them that this morning, the fascist German troops had attacked our homeland without declaring war. This post literally dumbfounded my deputies.... But personal emotions - later. He demanded that General A.P. Baikov, who was in charge of organizational matters, show me a plan for the GAU. But it turned out that this plan is kept in the General Staff of General PA Ermolin. Having ordered the deputies to summon the entire personnel to the service, he went to the General Staff to see General Yermolin ... "
A.V. Khrulev (Chief intendant of the Red Army): “When the war began, I was at home, and On this day, no one called me anywhere. Before 21 June, I did not receive any instructions, and I did not receive anything either on 22 June. About the Nazi attack learned on the radio. And then for two days I was not invited anywhere and did not go anywhere myself ... "
N.N.Voronov (Head of State Department of Air Defense): "19 June ... I took the post of the Chief of the Main Directorate of Air Defense ... The war was advancing every hour - this was signaled by reports from the border, VNOS reports, reports of flights of German aircraft. And the NGOs didn’t pay much attention to the threatening symptoms ... It was clear that the General Staff did not expect that the war could begin in 1941 ... Not without knowledge of the General Staff, mechanical means were removed from artillery units at that time and used in the construction of the UR along the new western borders ...
A few days before the start of the war, I accidentally met in Moscow with the commander of BOVO troops, D. G. Pavlov: “How are you?”.
“District troops stomp on various tactical battalion and regimental exercises,” answered Pavlov. - Everything is normal with us. I took advantage of the calm atmosphere, came to Moscow for various trifles. In such a complacent mood was the commander of one of the most important frontier military ...
A wide network of VNOS posts reported in detail about all the flights of German reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of our border districts. These data were put on special cards and immediately reported to the General Staff. Very often we were answered: “We already know. Do not worry"…
On the morning of 21.6.41, on the way to the service, I was wondering how to plan a Saturday evening and a Sunday, so that I could work on a memorandum and at the same time perhaps have a better rest ... The day passed as usualin current affairs stream. The authorities could not get there, they promised to accept me with a report only on Monday or Tuesday... By the end of the day, they received orders to ensure that all responsible workers were in their office offices until further notice.
Late in the evening at the VNOS service, reports began to arrive from the western borders that the Germans had an increased noise of motors in various directions ... We passed information to the General Staff. However, no new orders have been received. All night we did not sleep. News from the borders came more and more alarming. About four o'clock we received the first report of the bombing by enemy aircraft of Sevastopol. Soon through the VNOS information was received on the air raids on Vindava and Libau. I phoned the People's Commissar of Defense, S.K.Timoshenko, and asked me to be admitted immediately on a particularly important matter. A few minutes later I was with him with data on the bombing of a number of our cities. The chief of the Main Political Department L.3.Mehlis was also in the office of the People's Commissar.
I reported all the information I had about the actions of the enemy’s aircraft. Without making any comments on my report, the People's Commissar gave me a large notebook and suggested that the report be presented in writing. When I was writing, Mehlis stood behind me and watched me accurately state what I said. After I finished, Mehlis offered to subscribe. I signed my name and I was allowed to continue with my current duties.
I left the office with a stone at heart. It struck me that in such a serious situation the people's commissar did not set any task for the air defense forces, did not give any instructions. It seemed to me then: he could not believe that the war really began...
A duty officer at the GABTU, located in the neighborhood, ran in ... Alarmed and pale, she said that in a secret box of the armored control there was a large package with many wax seals and the inscription: "Open up by mobilization." The duty officer asked what to do? No mobilization has been announced, but the war is already underway ... I advised to open the package and act in accordance with the instructions of the document. Urgently call the generals and officers. In our administration, most of the commanders were already in their places ... "
In the middle of June, 1941, the commander of ZPOVA, General Pavlov, was in a “complacent mood” and neither the people's commissar nor the head of the General Staff noticed this. They didn’t "cheat" him, they didn’t explain to him about the proximity of the war, or they reported on such criminal behavior of the Commander of the Supreme Soviet to Stalin ... Perhaps they themselves were in the same condition? It turns out that we didn’t expect anything serious on the night of 22 June either in GABTU, but also in the General Staff, in the Main Directorate of the Air Force, in the GAU, etc.
N.I. Galich (Head of the NKO Communications Department): “Why, in the very first days of the war, wired communications, prepared with sufficient care, far from fully accomplished their task, especially in the link, army headquarters were subordinate units? .. The main reason was that many army headquarters and even the headquarters of the Polar Division , we did not manage to occupy the command center with the equipped connection, and the subordinate connections did not reach the initial deployment areas, where the wire connection was also prepared for them ...
With the outbreak of World War II, the weakness of the industrial base for the production of communications equipment had a negative impact on the maintenance of command and control. The mistake of the prewar years had serious consequences for almost the entire war ... The fact is that the bulk of the communications property received before the war was armed, it was naturally allocated to the border HEs and put into warehouses so that during the mobilization period It was equipped in sufficient quantities with quality material part of the connection. Domestic military districts had a very low percentage of communications security. But in view of the fact that the planned mobilization, concentration and deployment in border districts was actually disrupted by the invasion of the enemy army, the property of the mobilization reserve, and partly the inviolable military reserve were mostly lost in military warehouses and units. At best, this property was used unplanned ... "
D.F.Ustinov (People's Commissar of Arms, with 1976 USSR Minister of Defense): “At dawn 22, the nurse in my apartment rang the telephone. After picking up the phone, I heard the voice of N.А.Voznesensky: “Voznesensky says, war, Dmitry Fedorovich. German troops crossed our border. War. Please come to me ... "
A.I. Shakhurin (People's Commissar of Aviation Industry): “At two o'clock in the morning on Sunday 22 June 1941, I left work ... Arriving at the dacha, I slowly washed, had dinner and went to bed about four o'clock in the morning, hoping to sleep for six hours. But soon I was picked up by the government telephone.
“Comrade Shahurin,” I heard a voice. Molotov- the war began. Fascist troops treacherously attacked our western borders ... Come urgently to the People's Commissariat. I called the duty officer on the People's Commissariat. I conveyed to him the words of Molotov and asked to immediately call all the deputies and heads of the glavkov ... "
P.N.Goremykin (Commissar of Ammunition): “I met the war in 4-20 in the building ... where GAU was located. There, under the chairmanship of the head of the State Agrarian University, the Deputy Commissar of Defense ... Kulik was met by a commission on increasing the mobilization capacity for ammunition. The commission, besides me, included Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy Tevosyan People's Commissar of Nonferrous Metallurgy Lomako, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee Borisov and a number of workers GSH and GAU. At this meeting, various issues on increasing the production of ammunition and their deployment in HE were discussed. Questions were raised very sharply by General of the Army GK Zhukov. He spoke of the need for substantial revision of the mobilization plan for ammunition, bearing in mind the increase in digital tasks ... The call came from Stalin's assistant, Poskrebyshev. He said that the Germans bombed our cities. Having received some more news, Kulik rose from his seat and said: “I will leave you, the meeting will be led by Lieutenant-General N. D. Yakovlev, who is appointed head of the GAU. Meet and solve all questions now with him ... "
I.V. Kovalev (Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Control of Railway Transport): “The beginning of the war caught me in the People's Commissariat of State Control, in my office. 22 June 1941, as well as the next three days, the staff of the People's Commissariat of State Control, were in some kind of uncertainty. Everyone felt that war like an avalanche invades our home, that something needs to be done, and that no one knew. The people's commissar and the chief of Glavpur (he was appointed to this post on June 21) Mehlis was not up to us. We with Popov, Deputy Commissar, were disoriented ... "
I.T. Peresypkin (Commissar of Communication): “On the eve of the Great Patriotic War 19 June 1941, I was summoned by JV Stalin ... When I entered the office, Stalin walked for a few more minutes, then approached me, greeted me and said:“ You have trouble with the selection and placement of personnel in Baltic republics. Go and understand. " After these words, he turned and went to his desk, from which I concluded that the conversation was over. A few more minutes I stood in bewilderment, and then asked: "Allow me to go?"
“Go,” he replied, without lifting his head from the papers he was already considering ...
After returning from the Kremlin to the People's Commissariat of Communications and after consulting with our deputies, we outlined people who were supposed to go with me. They were all ordered to quickly prepare for departure. However, our trip was delayed. The next day, on Friday, 20 June, a meeting of the CPC was held, at which I was also present. This meeting was chaired by JV Stalin, who by that time was already the Chairman of the CPC. During the meeting it became necessary to create a commission to prepare a draft decision on a certain agenda item. For inclusion in the commission were given the names, including mine, which was suggested by Stalin. The deadline for the submission of the decision to the government by the commission was June 21. This gave me the right to assume that my trip to the Baltic States is automatically postponed for two days. In the afternoon of the next day, a draft decision was prepared and signed. After that, having worked in the People's Commissariat for two hours, I left the city. It was already Saturday evening, and the thought occurred to me that on Sunday in the Baltic we have nothing to do, since everyone is resting on that day. In short, I postponed my trip until the next day. When I arrived at my dacha, A.N. Poskrebyshev called me and said: “Call Comrade Stalin by that phone number”. Immediately dial the specified phone number.
“You haven't left yet?” - Stalin asked me.
I tried to explain to him that, on his instructions, he worked at the commission, but he interrupted me and again asked the question: “When do you leave?” I had no choice but to answer: “Tonight.” He put the phone down, and I began to think about how to leave Moscow today ... I let the Commissariat of Railways and asked to hook our car to the Moscow-Vilnius train. Then he called to his job and ordered that all those who should go with me to the Baltic States were at the train by the time of its departure. He himself began to gather at the station, because the train went to 23 hours ...
All gathered on time, settled in a separate car and set off ... We woke up in Orsha. Some signalman came to our car, asked Omelchenko and handed him a telegram of incomprehensible content. With a shrug, Omelchenko handed it to me, and I read: “Ties are a change in the situation, would you consider it necessary to return to Moscow?” The text was incomprehensible, but the most incomprehensible thing was that the telegram was under my signature - Peresypkin.
We were guessing what that might mean. I asked the signalman who delivered the telegram, he turned out to be the head of the local liaison office: “What happened?” Surprised even more than me, he replied: “Don't you know? The war began ...
What should I do? Do you want to continue or interrupt your trip? The situation has changed dramatically, the war began, I was firmly convinced that at this crucial moment it was most important for me to be in Moscow, but only the night before was the necessity of my business trip. Maybe for this there were some important considerations?
From the office of the station chief, by rail link, I called Moscow and asked my deputy Popov to talk with KE Voroshilov, who at that time was working on the questions of the People's Commissariat of Communications, what should I do next. A few minutes later, an instruction from Moscow followed: "Return immediately ..."
Y.E. Chadaev (Head of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR): “In Moscow from Saturday 21 June 1941. the weather was good. It was a hot summer day. The pre-holiday bustle was felt on the streets, usually such as happens on the eve of Sundays ... I had to come to Stalin's office several times on June 21 — to bring individual solutions for signature or to take them for registration.
The members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) were in the Kremlin throughout the day, discussing and resolving the most important state and military issues. For example, a decision was made to create a new law firm and unite second-line armies, moving from the depths of the country to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, under single command. The formation of the front control was entrusted to the Moscow Military District, which immediately sent a task force to Vinnytsia. The Politburo of the Central Committee heard the report of the USSR NKO on the state of the air defense and issued a decision on strengthening the country's air defense forces. The individual commissars summoned to the meeting received instructions to take additional measures in the defense industries.
When employees of the Department of Affairs came to me with certain documents, they invariably asked how things were at the border. I answered in the standard way: “The air smells of gunpowder. Need a quotation, above all a quotation. It is important not to succumb to the feeling of panic, not to succumb to the accidents of minor incidents ... ”At about 7 hours of the evening A.N.Poskrebyshev called and asked to come to him to take one document for registration ... Poskrebyshev sat at the open window and all the time applied to the glass with“ narzan ” ". It was a hot and stuffy evening outside the window ... I took paper from Poskrebyshev. This was the next decision to award military ranks.
“Well, what's new, Alexander Nikolaevich?” I asked. Poskrebyshev pointedly looked at me and hesitated with an answer. Usually he openly shared with me the newsthat he knew about.
- Anything important?
“I suppose so,” Poskrebyshev said almost in a whisper. “The Boss,” he nodded at the door to Stalin’s office, “just talked in an excited state with Tymoshenko ... Apparently, he is about to be expected ... Well, you yourself guess what ... The German attack ...” “Us?”, It broke out.
- And who else?
“Just think what will begin now,” I said contritely, feeling a great annoyance. “But perhaps this is still a vain alarm?” Indeed, for several months it was rumored that Hitler would attack us, but all this did not come true ...
“There are alarming signals every now and then,” Poskrebyshev added. - Stalin also summoned the Moscow leaders Shcherbakov and Pronin [in accordance with the magazine, they were not visited]. He ordered them this Saturday to detain the secretaries of the district party committees, who are forbidden to leave the city. “German attack is possible,” he warned ...
Early in the morning of June 22 caught a glimpse of Stalin in the corridor. He arrived at work after a short sleep. He looked tired, tired, sad. His pockmarked face was drawn. It looked depressed mood. Passing by me, he answered my greeting with a flick of the wrist ...
After some time, many Kremlin employees learned the terrible news: the war began! First of all, I went to N.A. Voznesensky, because, as the first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he conducted current affairs for the Council of People's Commissars. When I entered the office, Voznesensky at that moment was on the phone with someone from the military leadership ... "
M.G. Pervukhin (Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry of the USSR): “I met G.Z. Zhukov shortly before the war, when he, being army general, was appointed head of the General Staff KA. Having studied the state of affairs in our Armed Forces, Zhukov, in particular, found that half of the vehicles listed there were laid up, because there are no automobile tires. And then, together with the People's Commissar for Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union, S.K.Timoshenko, he raised the question of allocating the necessary number of tires to the troops. Since the industry could not give such a number of tire covers, I was instructed, together with the head of the General Staff, to prepare a draft decision on dismissing them from state reserves. Unfortunately, this was done only a month before the outbreak of the war, and therefore not everything that was unsettled, the leadership of the NPO of the USSR managed to use for our army ... "
I.Tyulenev (commander of the Moscow Military District Vos): “It was already getting dark [it was getting dark, the onset of darkness in Moscow from 21-17 to 22-19) when I left the headquarters of the Moscow Military District ... In the evening I was at the People’s Commissar of Defense ... General Staff Army General GK Zhukov. From them I learned about the new alarming symptoms of an impending war. Guards were also suspicious about the German embassy: employees of all ranks hurriedly drove away in cars outside the city. Later I went back to Zhukov.
“According to reports from district headquarters,” he said, “it’s as if everything is calm.” Nevertheless, I warned the commanders of a possible attack by fascist Germany. These assumptions are supported by our intelligence. [It is strange that the hard Zhukov pours out the soul. In the afternoon, a message was received from ZOVOVO on the removal of wire barriers and columns of German troops to the Suwalki bulge, but the people's commissar and the head of the General Staff were reassuring Pavlov ...]
I wondered what the balance of power is now - ours and Germans.
“The Germans, as far as I know, do not have a general superiority,” Zhukov said shortly ...
I got out of the car in a quiet Rzhevsky Lane, where I lived with my family - my wife and two children. At 3 o'clock in the morning 22 June a phone call woke me up. Urgently summoned to the Kremlin ... On the way I drove into the General Staff. GK Zhukov on HF talked with the staffs of the border VO. After telephone conversations, he informed me that German aircraft bombed Kovno, Rovno, Sevastopol, Odessa.
In the Kremlin, the commandant met me and immediately escorted Konstantin Voroshilov to Marshal of the Soviet Union. Clement Yefremovich asked: “Where is the command post prepared for the High Command?”
“Nobody set such a task for me,” I replied. The headquarters of the Moscow Military District and the anti-aircraft defense of the city If necessary, you can transfer these facilities to the High Command.
Then Voroshilov announced that I was appointed commander of the law firm. It was proposed to depart to the destination today ... "
A.F. Khrenov (Head of the Engineering Forces of the Moscow Military District): “I will not go too far in my story on June 22. On Monday, the headquarters planned a trip to work out the organization and interaction as part of the field front control ... Home returned long after midnight. I collected everything I needed in the field and quickly went to bed. Early in the morning I was going to go to the country, to Zhukovka, - there, in the country house with relatives, the family lived. He barely fell asleep, his phone rang.
“Comrade general,” came the excited voice of the operational duty staff of the district, “the commander calls you.” It is ordered not to linger. The car is leaving now ... In the reception of the commander, I found the NSH Major General GD Shishenin, the head of the political department of the divisional commissar FN Voronin, the rear chief of the major general A. I. Shebunin and several other comrades. The generals stood in small groups, talking quietly. In a furious humming of voices, I caught some words: “It seems to have begun ...”, “Yes, all along the border ...”. Means war…
Soon the commander appeared and invited us to the conference hall of the Armed Forces ... Upon entering the hall and accepting the report of the NS, he did not sit as usual, but remained standing: “Comrades, at four o'clock with minutes I was summoned to the Kremlin. K.Ye. Voroshilov and S.K.Timoshenko informed me that fascist Germany had attacked our Motherland perfidiously ... Ivan Vladimirovich said that he was appointed commander of the Southern Front, ChVS — Army Commissar of X. ZHPX, A.N. - Major General GD Shishenin. The heads of the arms and services of the front are appointed by the appropriate heads of the district. Field control departs to the front in two echelons. Destination - Vinnitsa. The composition of the first echelon should be ready for shipment today, the composition of the second - tomorrow. Then he announced who was leaving for the first echelon, determined the time of gathering at the Kiev railway station to 1 watches and ordered me to take up the duties of the head of the first special train. ”
VF Vorobiev: “21 June 1941 of the year I was completely unexpectedly appointed by me as the chief of operations of the law department headquarters, which was formed from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District ... Quite unexpectedly, the front commander and the NSH on the third day in Vinitsa learned that there was a Vinnitsa equipped front KP, where the front command and the main divisions of the front headquarters immediately moved ... "
V.I. Kazakov: “[The war] caught me in Moscow. I then served as chief of artillery 7 MK. Parts and formations of the corps were quartered in the Moscow region. It consisted of about 1000 tanks, up to 500 guns and mortars. From 13 to 20 June 1941, the headquarters of the corps, according to the previously developed plan, conducted reconnaissance in the Kaluga and Tula regions ... In the evening of June 20 we received orders to return to Moscow, and in the morning of June 21 a new order followed, which alerted us. The corps commander was ordered to urgently withdraw parts from the camps, and artillery to stop combat training firing at the Alabino training ground and return to the points of their permanent deployment. In addition, the corps commander received orders to allocate a motorcycle company, providing it with ammunition, to staff the headquarters of one of the fronts. Orders were given hastily, nervousness was felt in everything ...
The evening was Saturday. Most of the officers, giving the necessary orders to the junior commanders, went home or left the city, intending to spend the day in the open air. The fact that the war began, they learned only at noon on June 22 from a government report on the radio ... "
PI Batov: “I got to Crimea unexpectedly, just before the start of the war. 13-17 June 1941, in Transcaucasia, where I was the deputy commander of the VO, passed the exercises. Just returned from them - I find out that I have been ordered to urgently arrive in Moscow. NSh of the district, General F.I.Tolbukhin prepared all the necessary references and materials on the needs of the law for the Military District for the report to the Commissar and a brief memorandum ...
20.6.41, after listening to the report, Marshal S.K.Timoshenko informed me that I was appointed commander of the ground forces of the Crimea and at the same time the commander of 9 sk. At the same time, the marshal did not say a word about what relations with the Black Sea Fleet should be, what to do in the first place, if it is necessary to urgently bring the Crimea in readiness as a theater of military operations. He only casually mentioned the OdVO mobilization plan, which included the territory of Crimea organizationally, and let me go, warmly saying goodbye and wishing success in the new duty station ... ”
Mikhail I. Kazakov (NS of the Central Asian Military District): “On June 12, a SB military aircraft took me from the exercise area to Tashkent, and the next day I flew to Moscow with a regular flight. Below us, almost all the time, the railway stretched. Numerous trains followed it, and very soon it became clear to me that these were military echelons. Their heads were turned in one direction - to the north-west.
I knew well that no troop movement was carried out or planned from our district. It means that these are troops from Eastern Siberia or Transbaikalia. And then I myself began to form alarming assumptions. If the transfer of troops to the west takes place, it means that serious events are brewing there ...
In the General Staff, I met MF Lukin, who then commanded the army in ZabVO. It turns out that it was his army that moved by rail. It seemed inconvenient to ask about the final point of her route.
A day or two later I saw several other army commanders here dressed in the field. It is clear that they were not driving maneuvers; I would know about maneuvers. But there was little time left for riddles and otgadki. It was necessary to deal with the affairs for which I arrived in the General Staff.
Lieutenant-General NFVatutin suggested that I clarify some issues of the operational plan of the district, taking into account the recent changes in the composition and organizational structure of the troops. The work on the documents took me four or five days. And throughout them, I could not help noticing all the growing excitement in the General Staff. I was told that the mobilization of the armed forces of Finland was under way, and the troops of fascist Germany were already concentrated on our borders. To my direct question: “When will the war begin with fascist Germany?” - A.M. Vasilevsky answered: “It’s good if it does not start within the next fifteen to twenty days”.
On the morning of June 20, I got an appointment with the Chief of the General Staff. GK Zhukov invited me along with Vatutin. He rather carefully looked through our development, made me remember some sections of it and asked directly: can we, without having the headquarters of this document, deploy troops in accordance with it and accomplish the task? I answered in the affirmative, for I remembered the documents well and could easily transfer their contents to the commander. After that, Zhukov allowed to fly to Tashkent.
In the evening of June 20, we with Vatutin once again looked through all the documents, sealed the folders, handed over to the vault and said goodbye for a long time ... I flew from Moscow to Tashkent on the night of June 22 ... "
In 1937, M.I. Kazakov graduated from the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, together with A.M. Vasilevsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan, M.V.Zakharov, N.F.Vatutin, A.I.Antonov, A.I.Kurasov, L.M.Sandalov and others. In the memoirs there is not a word about preparations for the rise in combat alarm of the troops of the western districts on the night from 21 to 22 June. Schoolmates would hint, but it turns out they did not know it ...
RC 18 army: "June 22 1941 g ... In the morning 22.6.41, the commander of the Kharkov VO in pursuance of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the Union of the USSR № ___ ordered the allocation of a full Army Directorate.
The Army Field Office 4-echelons 29 June 1941 was fully concentrated in the district Kamenetz-Podolsk. 26 June 1941. The Starma Operational Group (1-th Echelon) arrived in Kamenets-Podolsk in 2-30 ... "
S.I. Rudenko (commander of the air division): “From the end of May all five regiments of the division were in camps. June 14 began maneuvers in the border area. The division headquarters, the fighter and bomber units participated in them. Supervised the maneuvers of the NS of the Far Eastern Front, General I.V.Smorodinov. On the night of June 15, the division commissioner N. Baba and I went to see General Smorodinov to report on the results of the day and get the task for tomorrow. It was approaching midnight. In the tent where we waited for the reception, it was cool, but despite this, I wanted to sleep. Without undressing, we lay down on the bunks standing there and fell asleep. We were woken up in the second hour and invited to the report to the head of the maneuvers.
“I greet you, Sergey Ignatievich and Nikolai Pavlovich!”, General Smorodinov met us quite unusually ... Pointing to the chairs with a gesture, the general continued: “It’s a pity to part with you, but nothing can be done ... Your order has been received, three regiments of your division - 29 Fighter . 37-th high-speed bomber and 22-th long-bomber - send to Belarus. The 3 and 13 of the IAP remain here on their airfields. Now return the headquarters of the division and the air unit to a permanent home base and get ready for loading ... "
PASudoplatov (Deputy Head of the USSR NKGB): “The leaders of the NKGB services and directions from the Merkulov in 3-00 on the night of June 22 learned about the start of hostilities. At the urgent meeting - in connection with the implementation of the responsible assignments - Fitin and Fedotov were absent. That day they were out of town. The most resolutely behaved Mikheev, who immediately reported that in special departments of the armies and fleets there were comprehensive instructions on the restructuring of operational work in wartime conditions. The message Merkulov, of course, was not unexpected. Instructions on combat readiness, on the exacerbation of the situation were transferred by the NKVD and NKGB 18, 19 and 20 on June 1941, both to territorial units and through military counterintelligence, as well as to headquarters and command of border and internal troops deployed in Ukraine in Belarus and the Baltic States.
There, the combat readiness was actually announced on June 21 in 21-30, i.e. until he received the well-known directive of the Commissar of Defense authorized by Stalin. On the intelligence line, we also sent a warning about the exacerbation of the situation in Berlin, where Ambassador Dekanozov, in the morning of June 21, ordered the staff not to leave the territory of our missions abroad and all staff to report on their location without special permission ...
20.6.41, when it became quite obvious that we were separated from the beginning of the war in a matter of days, I was given the task to create a special group, which, being involved in reconnaissance and sabotage operations, would have the opportunity to independently carry out sabotage actions in the immediate rear of the enemy.
Eitingon engaged in coordinating future actions with the General Staff and with the command of the spacecraft in the border districts. He did not succeed in contacting the commander of the special forces of the Belarusian District, D.Pavlov. But a good working relationship was established with the organizer of the special forces and partisan detachments during the Finnish war, Colonel KA X. Mamsurov ...
21 Jun. Beria agreed with Eitingon’s proposals, which I actively supported, that we should have a special combat reserve in 1200 people from border guards and internal troops. Eitingon had the idea to create four sabotage battalions. Three were supposed to deploy in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. And leave the fourth in reserve in the suburbs ... "
KF Telegin (Brigadier Commissar of the Central Staff of the NKVD): “At dawn hours of this day, raised and assembled in alarm, employees of the political propaganda department of the USSR border troops filled the office of the head of the brigade commissar P. N. Mironenko ...
The provocative fuss of the fascists on our western border was regarded in our State Directorate of the NKVD border troops quite unequivocally, but with all this I wanted to believe that an armed clash with the forces of imperialism is a distant future, and all that happens on the border is only a sophisticated form of military-political blackmail aimed at misinforming the ruling circles of England in order, say, to hide from them the intention to force the English Channel.
That morning we did not yet know that this kind of self-righteous reflections were already refuted by the harsh reality. Fascist Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact, began a gangster invasion of our country. The fire of war is already blazing on our western borders ...
Brigadier Commissioner PN Mironenko looked at his watch again, glanced around the crowd, cleared his throat as if trying to get rid of annoying hoarses, and quietly said: “Today, at four o'clock, German troops across the western border suddenly attacked the border detachments and units KA ... "We silently, and, I will not hide, shocked by Mironenko’s message, watched him open the package - a guide to action in case the war started ..."
NN Dushansky: “For many of us, rest in the Crimea seemed like a sweet dream ... But this idyll ended on the eighteenth of June, when an order came in - to gather all Lithuanian security officers“ with things to go out ”. We were taken by cars to the railway station in Simferopol, we loaded into the cars and in the evening our train arrived in Minsk 21.6.41. The two of us, with my friend Bloch, walked around the city ... At one o'clock we got on the train Minsk-Riga ... "
Information