Once again on intelligence (continued). Let me remind you that the top leadership of the spacecraft does not expect an invasion of large enemy groups from the first day of the conflict with Germany. And the intelligence data that we saw above does not contradict this misconception. You can not believe the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, but when Georgy Konstantinovich writes about mistakes (including his own), then what is the reason for him to write a lie? To decide: as far as one can believe the statements of the Soviet military quoted below, or not to believe, accept you, dear readers, individually ...
G.K.Zhukov (22.6.41 - Head of General Staff): “... Many senior officials of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff have too much canonized the experience of the First World War. Most of the commanding staff of the operational-strategic level, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had occurred in the nature and methods of conducting the Second World War. However, in fact, they were preparing to wage war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that a big war will begin, as before, from the border battles, and then the main forces of the enemy will only enter. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the land and air forces of Nazi Germany....
The sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not envisaged. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov, nor the management staff of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and abandon them. on the first day of compact groups in all strategic areas. This was not taken into account and our commanders and troops of the border HEs were not ready for this ... ”
A.M. Vasilevsky (22.6.41 - Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the General Staff): "... Proceeding from the development of the plan ... from the correct position that modern wars not declared, but they just start already prepared for hostilities by the enemy... The correct conclusions ... for themselves, the leadership of our armed forces and the General Staff did not make and did not make any amendments to the operational plan in this regard. On the contrary the old-fashioned plan called for the so-called initial period of the war, lasting 15-20 days from the start of hostilities to the entry of the main forces of the countryduring which the troops of the covering echelons from the border VO, deployed along the frontiers, by their combat operations were supposed to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of our troops. At the same time, the opposing side, i.e. Fascist Germany, with its fully mobilized and already belligerent army, was placed in relation to the terms necessary for its concentration and deployment against us, under the same conditions as our armed forces ... ”.
Commander KOVO Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos He expressed a similar opinion a few days before the war: “... From the moment of the announcement of mobilization to the beginning of active operations of large forces at the border, some time will pass. In World War I, this time was measured in weeks, in modern conditions it will certainly decline dramatically. But still in a few days we will obviously have... »
The chief of the 94 frontier post of the border detachment, MG Padzhev ("Through the whole war"): “... The commandant ordered to open the secret package, pull out the clothes from the border ... Immediately after the conversation, I opened the envelope sealed with seals and found in it a document which stated what should have been done in case the war began. The outpost, in particular, was instructed to hold the state border for three days, then, with the approach of parts of the spacecraft, move into the depths of our territory ... ”
Of course, it is clear to all readers that for three days the frontier post alone cannot keep the frontier against the German troops. This is possible only in the case of border clashes with a smaller or equal in number enemy. Consider an extract from the “Covering plan ...” of the 6-th army of Zapovo regarding operational use of the border troops:
“... a) the enemy on the border began to openly conduct hostile actions against the USSR. During this period, border troops organize enhanced border security and do not allow individual armed groups and troops to cross into our territory from the adjacent side. In addition, they organize an enhanced observation of the adjacent side with the task to establish:
- approach to the border of the enemy troops;
- where and what defensive works are performed by the enemy near the border;
- who do the defenses erected by the enemy near the border;
b) detachments and groups of enemy troops break through the state border and invade the territory of the USSR. During this period, in order to support the border troops, on alert, pre-allocated units from the 3 cd, 41 and 97 cd units arrive at the border. Moving detachments to a reinforced rifle company, rifle battalion and cavalry regiment must arrive at the border from 45 minutes to an hour and repel the enemy’s attack in conjunction with the 91 and 92 frontier detachments, being in their operational subordination. With the arrival of the senior general commander in the area of operations, the battle leadership should pass into his hands. Under the cover of border units and mobile units, the main forces of the 6 Army are emerging at the border.
Having repelled the invasion of armed detachments and groups of enemy troops, the border units with the release of covering troops in their defense areas continue to guard the border... "
Some kind of unhurried scenario of expected military actions, do not you think? And the top leadership of the spacecraft believed that this was the way events would take place during hostilities with German troops. A very similar point of view was reflected by G.K. Zhukov in his report on the frontal offensive operation at the meeting of the Supreme Command of the Red Army in December of 1940: "... Based on the average pace of development of the 10-15 km operation, the total duration of the operation to a depth of 200 km will be 12-20 days ..." Similar scenarios of hostilities with Germany were considered at the games in 1941 (there is an article on this topic on the Military Review website: https://topwar.ru/21830-igry-41-go-goda.html).
The following is the order of the 11 Army's artillery NS that the position (the deployment of enemy units) has not changed according to intelligence data on 14-00 21.6.41.
«Battle Order No. 01 Nachartm headquarters 11, Kaunas 21.6.1941 14-00
1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same
2. Conduct reconnaissance by all means of artillery instrumental reconnaissance and ground observation with the task of identifying the grouping of artillery, OP and NP areas
a) NAK-16 [chief of artillery 16-th sk] conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right - Neman river, on the left - Vidgirs, Pelyany, Poyavy, Pobondze lake. Special attention Lazenen, Shillenen, Shirvindt, Aidkunen, Vishtynets
b) NAD-126 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: fl. Karklin, Pilekalne, Lepolata, Kamionka; left: Krasna, Pogrudy, Polyunts flora, Voytok. Particular attention to the direction of Suwalki
c) NAD-128 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: Podzishki, Zelenka, Buraki, Lake Seyva; left: Druskiniki, Koptsevo, Budnitsa, Sernetka. Particular attention: Sejny, Giba
3. Intelligence details are displayed in detail in intelligence reports and reported to NN to 3, 10 and 15 watches on a daily basis. ” NS Artillery 11 Army Major (Svetsov), Pom.NSH intelligence station Lieutenant (Belostotsky)
Consider the recent peaceful reconnaissance of the RO PribOVO and ZOVOVO (in terms of the deployment of German troops against PribOVO and in the zone of the Suvalki lug). Below the figures will show the location of the German troops in accordance with these documents.
«Intelligence report of PribOVO headquarters No.02 to 20-00 22.6.41.
Cc: Chief of General Staff, Chief of RU, NS 8, 11 and 27 Armies, NS ZOVOVO
...The first. Siauliai direction
a) The data of our intelligence confirmed and established the following deployment:
In Klaipeda: headquarters 291-rd, 504-th, 505-th and 506-th pp, 291-th ap, 291-th TB, 291-th SAT, 291-th communications battalion, 7-th coastal regiment in the composition of hell and two pb, heavy an, battalion 20 th TD; detachment of attack aircraft in the three mouths.
At Prikkula: a spare battalion of the 348-n pp 217-rd.
In Silute: 161-md at full strength, TB 20-th TD.
To Tilsit: headquarters of the 7th AK, headquarters of the 1st front, 216, 43, 45th pp, 213rd reserve battalion, 21st light up, 22nd heavy up, 101st TB. Headquarters 8th MD, 202, 204, 227th MP, 505th Motorized Heavy Ap. Headquarters 290th Front, 501st, 502nd and 503nd, 290th Ap. Headquarters of the 20th TD (the numbering of units organizationally included in the division has not been precisely established). Headquarters 1st CBD, 1st and 2nd CP, 1st hell. Aviation A group of up to 63 aircraft.
In Neukirch: headquarters 217-dd, 348-th nn (the numbering of the remaining units, organizationally included in the division, is not installed).
In Koenigsberg: the headquarters of the 1 Army, the headquarters of the 8 AK, the headquarters of the 4 and 43 st, the headquarters of the 3 AK (data require verification). 21, 207, 201 and 210, PP, 25, MP, 4 and 19, AP, TP, 1 headquarters; on aerodromes königsberg to 300 aircraft of unidentified types.
In Pillau: 215-th regiment of naval anti-aircraft artillery, heavy an, air unit to 100 seaplanes and to 50 U-87.
In Tapilau: headquarters of the 205-th PD (earlier, in the report number 15, we noted the parts that are part of the 205-th PD, in the Memel region).
In Nattishkken and Koadiuten: tb 20 th TD and hell 511 th heavy an;
b) according to the 105th border detachment in Klaipeda, the headquarters of the 61st regiment is marked, in the forest ... - to the infantry battalion and cavalry squadron, in the forest ... - to the battalion tanks with artillery in the forest ... - up to two tank battalions (data need verification).
Note. The data of our intelligence headquarters 61 th PD in Klaipeda was not observed.
The second. Kaunas-Vilnius direction
a) Continuation of the German units directly to the state border. In the area of the Sudavske flooded up to the infantry battalion with 6 cannons advanced from Vizhayna;
b) in the area of Bryzgol, Lyas-Podsersky - parts of the 5-th front.
Note. Previously, according to our data, 5-I PD was observed in the Silute area, we did not notice the departure from the Silute area;
c) the data of our intelligence confirmed and installed on the direction of Kaunas, Vilnius, the next location.
In Insterburg: 12 headquarters AK, 16 headquarters, 22 headquarters (according to unverified data, we noted 15 headquarters AK, obviously, it was headquarters 22 th). 22, 27, 29 th pp, 69 th, 10 th spares, 43 th, 61 th, 206 th anti-tank guns, 4 th kn, 206 st TB, 25 th battalion . 337-I aviation group - up to 16 aircraft.
In Gumbinen: the headquarters of the 120-th PD (we in the report number 15 previously noted the headquarters of an unidentified numbering). 222, 203, 204-th PP, 317-th hell of air defense, 494-th spare PB.
In Stallupenen: The headquarters of the 405-th pp (1-th, 2-th and 3-th battalion of the 405-th pp are located near the border in the Eidtkunen region).
1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border.
2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions.
3. It is required to establish: the accuracy of the deployment in Königsberg of the headquarters of the 3-st AK, the headquarters of the 1-th army (the headquarters of the 18-th army was observed for a long time; there were no data about its descent); whether the parts that are not indicated in this report continue to be noted by us earlier (our intelligence report No. XXUMX [intelligence from 18.06.41, cited in the previous part]. NS PribOVO Lieutenant-General Klenov, Deputy Chief of the RO of PribOVO headquarters Colonel Kashnikov
Intelligence Report SOVOVO "... The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 was determined:
1. East Prussian direction. On the right, Suwalki, Heilsberg; on the left - Schuchin, Naidenburg: Allenstein 9 Army Headquarters, four AK headquarters - Elk, Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine headquarters are Seyny, Spray, Suwalki, Oletsko, Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava, Lidzbark; up to two PD, two MD (data PribOVO), ten up (up to two heavy an: presumably two divisions "SS", anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four CP) ...
1) According to available data, which are checked, the main part of the German army in the ZOVOVO zone has taken up its original position.
2) In all directions, parts and means of reinforcement are tightened to the boundary.
3) All reconnaissance means check the location of troops at the border and the depth.
NSH ZOVOVO Major General Klimovskiy, Chief of the Regional Staff of the ZAPOV Colonel Blokhin»
It turns out that RO Zapovo, in contrast to RO PribOVO, managed to detect the exit of German troops from the depths of its territory to the border to the initial lines. RO ZOVOVO was also able to detect a sharp increase in the number of German connections from 30 (appearing in reconnaissance during 1,5 months) to 49 to 20-00 21.6.41 ... But for various reasons, it did not have time to bring ZOVOVA’s management ... "Sent 22 June 1941 g. In 15 hours 20 minutes". This information did not have time to get to the beginning of the war before the leadership of the ZOVOVO and PribOVO. But it is unlikely that the information from the previous Zapovo report on the deployment of German troops against PribOVO was very different from that considered.
From the figures it is clear that 8 hours before the start of the war:
- the concentration of German troops near the border with PribOVO was not noted again. At a distance of about 10 km from the border, there are only four TB. Another part of the motorcycle and armored units is located in 15-20 km;
- again there are no pronounced shock groups near the border. The grouping concentrated near the city of Gambinnnen can also be redeployed to the Suwalki bulge, which corresponds to the concept of attacking Germany against the USSR in the opinion of the General Staff;
- the headquarters of the MK and tank groups were not found again;
- near the border with PribOVO there are no headquarters of German troops at all. An exception is the possible location of the 61 headquarters in 10 km from the border. The nearest AK headquarters is located in 20 km. If there are no headquarters near the attacking troops, then how can these troops be led? The number of aircraft has not changed significantly (on 17.6.41 - more than 500, on 21.6.41 - 583). A significant part of the regiments and formations disappeared somewhere from the zone of attention of our intelligence, but intelligence was instructed to sort out this issue: “... Do the parts that are not indicated in this report continue to remain, which we have previously noted (our intelligence No. 15 from 18.6.41.”. The lack of reliable sources of information abroad and the lack of communication with the few available ... Even reconnaissance aircraft to raise, having read this summary, the leadership of the district is late ...
If you look again at the disposition of the German troops shown in the figures, you can only conclude that provocations German troops in the area of Klaipeda and Suvalka protests against PribOVO. In other places, the German units near the Baltic border are too few. According to the disposition of the German troops shown in the figures nothing can be said about the possible start of a full-scale war in 8 hours.
It turns out that K. Derevianko, in his answers to General Pokrovsky, reflected incorrect information: there is no information in the latest intelligence reports of the PribOVO on the directions of the expected strikes of the German troops. There are no distinct shock groups at the border. The concentration of German troops on the border with the Baltic states was not detected. Perhaps most of the German formations and units are located in the same place where they were deployed in the autumn of 1940 - in the spring of 1941 ... No German divisions were found around 20 in the adjacent territory. A day before the war, district intelligence lost some of the previously detected compounds ... Strange, but why did the deputy head of the RO need to reflect incorrect information in his answers?
As you remember, in the previous part it was mentioned that the deputy head of the RO Pribova K. Derevianko wrote: “... The probable directions of the expected strikes of the Germans RO considered the directions: Eidkunen-Kaunas and Turogen-Šiauliai ...” was held much later after the start of the war.
From the presented materials it is clear that on 21.6.41, the troops of the PribOVO front concentrated to cover the directions of Tilsit-Šiauliai, Gumbinnen-Kaunas, and Suvalki-Vilna. The first two directions coincide with the opinion of specialists of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, the leadership of PribOVO and RO. Why did the deputy head of the RO pay special attention to indicating these directions in his answers? They also appeared in the projects of the “Plans of cover ...” and in all subsequent documents on the management of the Okrug troops. It turns out that the leadership of the district knew about these directions for a long time. The leadership of PribOVO did not know only: when the troops of the enemy would advance to the state border to their initial positions for attack. And, it was precisely this fact that the RO of the front-district could not detect ... In addition, the shock German groups could concentrate before attacking in other directions. After all, the above directions are purely theoretical calculations of the GSH specialists based on the results of the military games of the Soviet military, who did not know how exactly the German military leaders would act - they only supposed.
Consider excerpts from the three documents of the German troops (documents are provided from the “Personal Website of the Historian Mark Solonin”).
RCB 3 Tank Group: «21.06.41 0-00 39-th and 57-th MK took their sites and changed the security at the border ...
20-20 The 57-th AK reports that two SS brigades stopped at the Lyck-Treuburg section and blocked the advance of the 19-th etc ...
The advancement of the Tank Group took place according to plan. The need to continue the march during the daytime, which arose due to the small number of roads and short nights, did not prevent secrecy ... The divisions took shelter of artillery, heavy guns and anti-aircraft guns, perfectly disguised and ready for the offensive ...
22.06.41 02-00 Divisions took the starting position.
03-05 After a quietly past night and taking up initial positions in 2-00, all four corps of the Panzer Group launched an offensive. Tank corps on the front line on foot are accompanied by arrows and infantry ... "
RCB 57 MK (3 Tank Group). "...14.6.41 Tracked vehicles 12-th TD arrived at the point of temporary deployment. The first parts of the 19 th TD are unloaded and follow the march to the designated point of temporary deployment.
16.6.41 18 wheeled vehicles arrived at the temporary deployment point.
17.6.41 ... All parts of 19 td arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
18.6.41 Half of the 18 md leaves the temporary dislocation point and marches to halt at Ekersberg (Okartovo). Rearguard located there 19.6 to 4-00. The 210 th bridge building battalion entered Suwalki with all units. Half 18 md in 16-00 finished the halt and goes to the prescribed starting position. 12 td moves out ... in accordance with the schedule and is on vacation along the route from Suwalki to Lytsk.
20.6.41 12 td occupies the prescribed starting position ... The 29-th TP division, along with the other units, with 16-00 resumes movement along the established route. 19 td moves along the route from the former point of temporary dislocation with a halt on both sides of the route of movement of tanks ...
21.6.41 Around 7 in the morning begins the redeployment of the corps control from Mikolajki to a new command post in the Sejny area [9,5 km from the Soviet-German border]... In 20-00 from 19, etc., they said by telephone that her planned march southwest from Orzhes [Orzhes - Arys - 133 km from the border with the Baltic States] due to the wedging of two SS connections on the road intended for the movement of tanks, it becomes questionable ... With 21-00, 19 etc. continued to move in the area of Lytsk-Suwalki ... "
Order 20 th AK (from the 9 Army): “... Divisions are being deployed in their districts ... so that they can launch an offensive at dawn on day B [22 June]. At the same time, we should strive to ensure that the most powerful units in their capabilities were moved to their initial positions only on the night from “B-1” to day “B” ... Pulling up to the border should be done ... as far as possible late and unnoticed. Defense of initial positions should be limited to the most necessary; Unreasonably high protection measures will allow the enemy’s intelligence to reveal our intentions prematurely ... ”
RCB 3 td (from the 24-th MK 2-th tank group, army group "Center"): "...13.06.41 Units report on arriving in a new area of concentration ... Parts in forest camps are persistently complaining about the torment of mosquitoes ...
14.06.41 East of the restraining line is prescribed a thorough disguise....
20.6.41 Released from the Radzyn area [64 km from the border] in accordance with the order of the division commander, the units are leaving ... to the area of initial positions ...
21.6.41 In 23-30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the latest starting positions. ”
“Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (the Barbarossa plan) ... OKH intends to redeploy by this time all the working headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups to the East to prepare and implement the necessary measures. In order to keep secrets the said headquarters should be located in the areas of the headquarters of the armies of Army Group “B” or armies already in the East ... Army Command and Army Commanders accept the lanes intended for them, in accordance with the directive on concentration, observing first masking measures... »
“Command of the 6 Army (from the Army Group“ South ”) 2 in May 1941 Directions for the nomination of“ Barbarossa ”... 13. Secrecy: ... Necessary Attractions [military personnel] for intelligence should be masked by exercises and territorial events. The corps command is responsible for ensuring that reconnaissance at the frontier is carried out only under camouflage (unobserved from abroad). To do this, you should immediately create barriers on all roads and paths leading to the border in cover areas that can be crossed only by officers (for example, sappers) who have a special corps command pass. Any involvement of the civilian population is prohibited. Orders for the nomination of troops can not be issued completely, and work out only excerpts (in stages) ... "
From the documents submitted it is clear that the German command prepared for the final stage in advance and carefully: the concentration of its troops at the Soviet-German border. It sought to ensure the secrecy of conducting reconnaissance of the concentrating troops and relocating the headquarters of the formations to the border. There was some "Prohibitive line"followed by the strictest disguise. The movement of troops was carried out in the evening and at night, on the part of the halts stopped in the woods during the day. First of all, less combat-ready units were put forward (construction, bridge-over parts, supply columns, engineer battalions, etc.). Combat units were deployed in the last 1,5-1 day before the start of the war. From June 18-19, orders are given to shoot down any Soviet aircraft that have flown over the border. Conducting aerial reconnaissance along the border before 21 June was ineffective ... Therefore, the scouts did not notice how the Germans redeployed, as unknown headquarters appeared near the well-known headquarters. The 57 connections of the MK were 18.6.41 along the Lutsk-Suwalki road. In the military intelligence unit for 21.6.41, these units should have been reflected, but, unfortunately, intelligence did not detect them. Moreover, reconnaissance during this period lost many German units and formations that began to redeploy to the border. Even concentrating near the border, the German troops reached the border directly (to the initial areas for attack) only by the beginning of 22.6.41.
In the early days of the war, turmoil, lack of communication, not understanding of the situation, panic affected the work of intelligence. The intelligence of the North-Western Front could not provide the necessary information to the command of divisions-corps-armies-front. Therefore, the order has already been prepared on June 24. Similar orders were issued in subordinate NWF unions.
“Order of the headquarters of the North-Western Front from 24 June 1941 to the Chiefs of Staff of 8, 11, 27 armies. Heads of the 5 and 12 MC
Despite the fact that the NWF troops have been fighting on the whole front for two days, until now almost in none of the command links there is no information about the strength and grouping of the enemy. The incoming information and reports are contradictory, confused and therefore of little value. This is explained by the fact that the commanding personnel forgot about the need to conduct thorough reconnaissance by all means during the whole battle and outside it. So far, at the front, captured units have been captured, and besides, the numbering of the units to which they belong is unknown to the headquarters of the army ... Deputy NSH SZF, Head of the RO Colonel Safronov»
«Battle Order №3 by 26.6.41 On eliminating deficiencies in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance by formations and units
1. The first four days of the military operations of the corps units showed that reconnaissance, surveillance and security in the units were completely absent. The commanding personnel are not interested in reconnaissance, do not organize - forget ...
2. In the absence of our reconnaissance, the enemy regroup with impunity, is active in fast-moving groups on the flanks and in the seams, and even penetrates to the rear of our units. The enemy, each time throwing forward mobile reconnaissance units consisting of motorcyclists, motorized infantry, tanks and cavalry, with impunity, finds out the joints and flanks of our parts and then throws out large, fast moving parts and thereby achieves some success.
3. Control prisoners in parts were delayed by more than 2-3 hours, and the first prisoners were delayed up to 5-6 hours. Prisoners interview anyone they want, without a system, but not the scouts, who should be in the first place. When sending prisoners, questionnaires and any reports of their preliminary testimony as a result of their questioning on the spot are not submitted ... The commander of 10 sk sk Major-General Nikolaev, NS Major-General Berezinsky»
The specified problems remained in the specified question even in the beginning of July. The reconnaissance of armies, corps and divisions is conducted by intelligence agencies of the front. Among others, the deputy head of the SZF RO, K. Derevianko, is responsible for this (from July 4, head of the SZF RO).
Report of Major General Tikhonov from 9.7.41 g. «About the reasons for unsuccessful combat operations of the North-Western Front in the Riga-Pskov and Ostrovsko-Pskov directions":" ... Exploration is not enough, primitive, careless. The headquarters do not put parts of the tasks for reconnaissance in battle. The obtained intelligence data remain unused, do not draw conclusions, often do not inform the higher headquarters and, as a rule, do not inform the lower headquarters and neighbors at all.
As a result, the troops are working blindly - not a single case has been noted where the commander would make a decision, having more or less accurate information about the enemy ... "
In the summer of 1942, there was also a lack of intelligence work before the start of the war: «Annual report. On the combat activity of the air forces of the North-Western Front for the period from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42. ... Composition and number of enemy air forces in front of the NWF [to 22 June 1941 of the year] due to the lack of intelligence before the war, it was impossible to pinpoint [it was] impossible ... ”
Someone had to answer for the defeat of the NWF frontier group in the unexpected attack of the German troops. Or intelligence (which "blinked" the concentration of enemy troops on the initial lines at the border) or the district command for their criminal negligence ... Did the leaders of the RO understand that they, in fact, were "switchmen"? They had to understand - they are smart and thinking people. 1 July 1941 year NSH NWF PS Klenov removed from office.
NKVD data: “Klenov Petr Semenovich, born 1892, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (BPS) 1931, headquarters captain of the tsarist army. Before his arrest - NS PribOVO, Lieutenant General. 9.6.1941 was arrested. He is found guilty of the testimony of Dybenko, Kochergin and Egorov, as a member of a Trotskyist right-wing organization, is accused of sabotage by the testimony of witnesses Rubtsov, Derevianko, Kashirsky and Korenovsky. He confessed to the manifestation of inactivity in the leadership of the district troops. " 13.02.42 d. By decree CCA sentenced to capital punishment. Shot 23 february1942 of the year. Rehabilitated 9 June 1956
Since the four witnesses who convict Pavel S. Klenov were not placed in alphabetical order and three of them had the title of “colonel”, they are probably placed according to the importance of the testimony given by them against NSH NWF. Who are these witnesses?
Colonel Rubtsov. For February, 1941 is in the state of RO PribOVO. From the first days of July 1941 of the year - deputy head of the operations department of the NWF. One of the main witnesses. What information is available about this person? “From August 1938 to August 1940 - Head of RO Kalininsky IN. In the period 1939 – 1940. participated in the war against Finland in the post of chief of the RO 7-th army. In August, 1940, in connection with the reorganization of Kalinin VO in PribOVO, was appointed deputy head of the district RO [this is incorrect information - since the summer of 1940, Colonels Kashnikov and Derevyanko are deputy chiefs of the RO.] He led a group of officers of the HE headquarters according to the description of the advanced theater, as well as the military-geographical description of Lithuania and Latvia. In the same period, he was appointed chairman of the mixed Soviet-German commission on demarcation (8 subgroup) ”. It is evident that this was not a fairly unambiguous person. Former head of the Regional Department of Military Unity, who became just a colonel in the District of RO. He was forced by the order of the National Military School of Higher Education to engage in secondary matters. Over the next thirteen years, remained in the same rank that he had a year before the outbreak of war ...
Colonel Derevyanko. The second most important witness. He was obliged to repeat the testimony he gave to the investigator at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941 of the year in the answers to General A.Pokrovsky. April 1953 of the year. Stalin is gone, but the organs still exist. There were no people at that time who would not be afraid of them. The author tried to show that in his answers to Pokrovsky K. Derevianko distorted the true picture of the German troops discovered by PribOVO on the eve of the war. In the autumn of 1938, two of his relatives were repressed; he was blamed for marrying the daughter of a priest. Derevianko managed to survive the repression of that period, referring directly to the Commissar of Defense. These contrived accusations and the incorrect reflection of the location of the German troops before the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941 could lead to only one final for him ... Later, he fought worthily, Lieutenant General.
Colonel Kashirsky. Head of the staffing department of the NWF. The only witness who is not a scout. Kashirsky is known from the loss report (from 22.06.41 to 01.08.41, NWF lost 57207 people, that is, almost one and a half times less than in the first days of the 18 war). Surely, in the manning department in the first days of the war there was a real "madhouse": tens of thousands of draftees from the areas adjacent to the Baltic states arrived, there was not enough of everything that one can imagine; Also, for all this, someone was obliged to answer. Kashirsky found guilty NSh District, or just helped the intelligence ...
Korenovsky. The surname is a typo. This is Major Korenevsky - Head of the 3 (Information) Branch of the RO PribOVO. This person was responsible for analyzing the information received from the agents for the preparation of analytical reviews and summaries. Reports were presented to you, there is no analysis in them. After the appointment Derevyanko head of the RO was appointed to the post of deputy head of the RO SZF. Later he fought with dignity. Already 22.7.41 has been submitted to the award. Colonel-General of the GRU.
Employees of the front of the RO front "piled" his immediate superior - the front of the NS, blaming him for his flaw. I am glad that among the witnesses, not a single deputy (or assistant) of the NS and other employees of PribOVO-NWF, leadership and army headquarters were noted.
Perhaps, the witnesses believed that they were right, but, unfortunately, this is not particularly “whitewashing” them ... Consider the memorandum of the intelligence officer RO ZOVOVO written in 6 months after the start of the war.
«Memorandum the head of the Lomzhinsky operative center of the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters to the representative of the special department of the NKVD of the Western Front about the work of this point before and during the 4 war in January 1942.
Since March, 1941, the agent’s office began reporting on the concentration of German troops in East Prussia and the former Poland along the Soviet border. According to a secret employee of Felix, in March 1941, in Poland and East Prussia, more 100 infantry and 8-10 etc were concentrated.
The Felix material was reported by the ZOVOVO headquarters RO. After the conversation, the Felix data were called misinformation, and the item was pointed out that the Germans have 25-40 divisions on this front ... RO often reproached the point for intelligence dispatches, in which, according to department, exaggerated the number of German troops ...
In April, 1941 of the year, according to residents of Arnold, Vistula and Pochtovoy, concentrated along the Soviet border up to 1,5 million troops, which was immediately reported to RO, but a resolution was put on our report by the deputy head of the RO Lieutenant Colonel Ilnitsky content: "This stupidity can be expected only from the Lomzhinsky item." According to the RO, the Germans at this time had 25-40 divisions. This standard figure has been in the intelligence department for more than a year ... Captain Kravtsov»
In fact, on the whole of the Soviet-German border, including the territory of Finland, in April there were only 47 German divisions. As of March 1941, there could be even fewer divisions. The captain Kravtsov, who wrote the memorandum, was confident that the German divisions were up to 100-108. Confident in the rightness, he writes a report to the special department of the front on "Careless attitude" RO ZAPOVO's guides to their intelligence information ...
In conclusion, I would like to note that a large number of Directives from Moscow are addressed to the District Military Councils. The District Military Council includes: the commander of the troops, the CID and the NS. Directives from the HE headquarters to subordinate troops were also signed by all members of the District Military Council. Responsibility is collegial. Of course, this does not exclude the sole order of the commander of the armed forces. What happened to the rest of the Military Council of PribOVO-NWF?
3.7.41 NWF Commander F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from office for inept command and control. The Commander of PribOVO-SZF should have a greater responsibility than the District High School. From July 10, F.I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 21 army, and 26.7.41 - commander of the Central Front.
ChVS Corps Commissar P. Dibrova 1.7.41 July removed from their posts and appointed Commissioner 30-th SD. With 18.12.41, again the FWS of the 59, and later of the 2 of the Shock Army. By rank he could claim for re-certification for the rank of “Lieutenant-General”, but he did not pass by position. In December, 1943 received the rank of Major General of the quartermaster service.
D.N.Gusev - since July 1940, Deputy NS Pribovo. Since July 1941, the NSN of the 48 Army of the Western Front. Since September, 1941 - Deputy, and from October, NSH of the Leningrad Front.
GPSofronov - from January 1941, the 1-th Deputy Commander PribOVO. From June 19-20 - Commander of the Baltic Military District (after the separation of the front command post from PribOVO). 1.7.41 removed from office. With 26.7.41 appointed commander of the Seaside Army of the Southern Front.
All the above-mentioned former leaders of PribOVO-NWF have been preserved life and rank, having been demoted. Former NSh SZF Lieutenant-General Peter Semenovich Klenov recognized everything and did not “drag him along” his like-minded people and subordinates ... The kingdom of heaven, a kind man ...
PS The events reviewed on the eve of the war and in its first days are a sad lesson for the country's leadership and intelligence. The theme of the surprise attack is relevant in our time, when quite often on the websites it is said about the “Fast global strike” by the NATO forces and, first of all, by the United States. The pogrom of a similar defeat of one of the armies - the SC in the summer of 1941, will not happen again. There will be no surprise attack ... Intelligence will fulfill its role ...