The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 8)

Once again on intelligence (continued). Let me remind you that the top leadership of the spacecraft does not expect an invasion of large enemy groups from the first day of the conflict with Germany. And the intelligence data that we saw above does not contradict this misconception. You can not believe the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, but when Georgy Konstantinovich writes about mistakes (including his own), then what is the reason for him to write a lie? To decide: as far as one can believe the statements of the Soviet military quoted below, or not to believe, accept you, dear readers, individually ...

G.K.Zhukov (22.6.41 - Head of General Staff): “... Many senior officials of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff have too much canonized the experience of the First World War. Most of the commanding staff of the operational-strategic level, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had occurred in the nature and methods of conducting the Second World War. However, in fact, they were preparing to wage war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that a big war will begin, as before, from the border battles, and then the main forces of the enemy will only enter. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the land and air forces of Nazi Germany....

The sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not envisaged. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov, nor the management staff of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and abandon them. on the first day of compact groups in all strategic areas. This was not taken into account and our commanders and troops of the border HEs were not ready for this ... ”

A.M. Vasilevsky (22.6.41 - Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the General Staff): "... Proceeding from the development of the plan ... from the correct position that modern wars not declared, but they just start already prepared for hostilities by the enemy... The correct conclusions ... for themselves, the leadership of our armed forces and the General Staff did not make and did not make any amendments to the operational plan in this regard. On the contrary the old-fashioned plan called for the so-called initial period of the war, lasting 15-20 days from the start of hostilities to the entry of the main forces of the countryduring which the troops of the covering echelons from the border VO, deployed along the frontiers, by their combat operations were supposed to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of our troops. At the same time, the opposing side, i.e. Fascist Germany, with its fully mobilized and already belligerent army, was placed in relation to the terms necessary for its concentration and deployment against us, under the same conditions as our armed forces ... ”.

Commander KOVO Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos He expressed a similar opinion a few days before the war: “... From the moment of the announcement of mobilization to the beginning of active operations of large forces at the border, some time will pass. In World War I, this time was measured in weeks, in modern conditions it will certainly decline dramatically. But still in a few days we will obviously have... »

The chief of the 94 frontier post of the border detachment, MG Padzhev ("Through the whole war"): “... The commandant ordered to open the secret package, pull out the clothes from the border ... Immediately after the conversation, I opened the envelope sealed with seals and found in it a document which stated what should have been done in case the war began. The outpost, in particular, was instructed to hold the state border for three days, then, with the approach of parts of the spacecraft, move into the depths of our territory ... ”

Of course, it is clear to all readers that for three days the frontier post alone cannot keep the frontier against the German troops. This is possible only in the case of border clashes with a smaller or equal in number enemy. Consider an extract from the “Covering plan ...” of the 6-th army of Zapovo regarding operational use of the border troops:

“... a) the enemy on the border began to openly conduct hostile actions against the USSR. During this period, border troops organize enhanced border security and do not allow individual armed groups and troops to cross into our territory from the adjacent side. In addition, they organize an enhanced observation of the adjacent side with the task to establish:

- approach to the border of the enemy troops;

- where and what defensive works are performed by the enemy near the border;

- who do the defenses erected by the enemy near the border;

b) detachments and groups of enemy troops break through the state border and invade the territory of the USSR. During this period, in order to support the border troops, on alert, pre-allocated units from the 3 cd, 41 and 97 cd units arrive at the border. Moving detachments to a reinforced rifle company, rifle battalion and cavalry regiment must arrive at the border from 45 minutes to an hour and repel the enemy’s attack in conjunction with the 91 and 92 frontier detachments, being in their operational subordination. With the arrival of the senior general commander in the area of ​​operations, the battle leadership should pass into his hands. Under the cover of border units and mobile units, the main forces of the 6 Army are emerging at the border.

Having repelled the invasion of armed detachments and groups of enemy troops, the border units with the release of covering troops in their defense areas continue to guard the border... "

Some kind of unhurried scenario of expected military actions, do not you think? And the top leadership of the spacecraft believed that this was the way events would take place during hostilities with German troops. A very similar point of view was reflected by G.K. Zhukov in his report on the frontal offensive operation at the meeting of the Supreme Command of the Red Army in December of 1940: "... Based on the average pace of development of the 10-15 km operation, the total duration of the operation to a depth of 200 km will be 12-20 days ..." Similar scenarios of hostilities with Germany were considered at the games in 1941 (there is an article on this topic on the Military Review website: https://topwar.ru/21830-igry-41-go-goda.html).

The following is the order of the 11 Army's artillery NS that the position (the deployment of enemy units) has not changed according to intelligence data on 14-00 21.6.41.

«Battle Order No. 01 Nachartm headquarters 11, Kaunas 21.6.1941 14-00

1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same

2. Conduct reconnaissance by all means of artillery instrumental reconnaissance and ground observation with the task of identifying the grouping of artillery, OP and NP areas

a) NAK-16 [chief of artillery 16-th sk] conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right - Neman river, on the left - Vidgirs, Pelyany, Poyavy, Pobondze lake. Special attention Lazenen, Shillenen, Shirvindt, Aidkunen, Vishtynets

b) NAD-126 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: fl. Karklin, Pilekalne, Lepolata, Kamionka; left: Krasna, Pogrudy, Polyunts flora, Voytok. Particular attention to the direction of Suwalki

c) NAD-128 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: Podzishki, Zelenka, Buraki, Lake Seyva; left: Druskiniki, Koptsevo, Budnitsa, Sernetka. Particular attention: Sejny, Giba

3. Intelligence details are displayed in detail in intelligence reports and reported to NN to 3, 10 and 15 watches on a daily basis. ” NS Artillery 11 Army Major (Svetsov), Pom.NSH intelligence station Lieutenant (Belostotsky)

Consider the recent peaceful reconnaissance of the RO PribOVO and ZOVOVO (in terms of the deployment of German troops against PribOVO and in the zone of the Suvalki lug). Below the figures will show the location of the German troops in accordance with these documents.

«Intelligence report of PribOVO headquarters No.02 to 20-00 22.6.41.

Cc: Chief of General Staff, Chief of RU, NS 8, 11 and 27 Armies, NS ZOVOVO

...The first. Siauliai direction

a) The data of our intelligence confirmed and established the following deployment:

In Klaipeda: headquarters 291-rd, 504-th, 505-th and 506-th pp, 291-th ap, 291-th TB, 291-th SAT, 291-th communications battalion, 7-th coastal regiment in the composition of hell and two pb, heavy an, battalion 20 th TD; detachment of attack aircraft in the three mouths.

At Prikkula: a spare battalion of the 348-n pp 217-rd.

In Silute: 161-md at full strength, TB 20-th TD.

To Tilsit: headquarters of the 7th AK, headquarters of the 1st front, 216, 43, 45th pp, 213rd reserve battalion, 21st light up, 22nd heavy up, 101st TB. Headquarters 8th MD, 202, 204, 227th MP, 505th Motorized Heavy Ap. Headquarters 290th Front, 501st, 502nd and 503nd, 290th Ap. Headquarters of the 20th TD (the numbering of units organizationally included in the division has not been precisely established). Headquarters 1st CBD, 1st and 2nd CP, 1st hell. Aviation A group of up to 63 aircraft.

In Neukirch: headquarters 217-dd, 348-th nn (the numbering of the remaining units, organizationally included in the division, is not installed).

In Koenigsberg: the headquarters of the 1 Army, the headquarters of the 8 AK, the headquarters of the 4 and 43 st, the headquarters of the 3 AK (data require verification). 21, 207, 201 and 210, PP, 25, MP, 4 and 19, AP, TP, 1 headquarters; on aerodromes königsberg to 300 aircraft of unidentified types.

In Pillau: 215-th regiment of naval anti-aircraft artillery, heavy an, air unit to 100 seaplanes and to 50 U-87.

In Tapilau: headquarters of the 205-th PD (earlier, in the report number 15, we noted the parts that are part of the 205-th PD, in the Memel region).

In Nattishkken and Koadiuten: tb 20 th TD and hell 511 th heavy an;

b) according to the 105th border detachment in Klaipeda, the headquarters of the 61st regiment is marked, in the forest ... - to the infantry battalion and cavalry squadron, in the forest ... - to the battalion tanks with artillery in the forest ... - up to two tank battalions (data need verification).

Note. The data of our intelligence headquarters 61 th PD in Klaipeda was not observed.

The second. Kaunas-Vilnius direction

a) Continuation of the German units directly to the state border. In the area of ​​the Sudavske flooded up to the infantry battalion with 6 cannons advanced from Vizhayna;

b) in the area of ​​Bryzgol, Lyas-Podsersky - parts of the 5-th front.

Note. Previously, according to our data, 5-I PD was observed in the Silute area, we did not notice the departure from the Silute area;

c) the data of our intelligence confirmed and installed on the direction of Kaunas, Vilnius, the next location.

In Insterburg: 12 headquarters AK, 16 headquarters, 22 headquarters (according to unverified data, we noted 15 headquarters AK, obviously, it was headquarters 22 th). 22, 27, 29 th pp, 69 th, 10 th spares, 43 th, 61 th, 206 th anti-tank guns, 4 th kn, 206 st TB, 25 th battalion . 337-I aviation group - up to 16 aircraft.

In Gumbinen: the headquarters of the 120-th PD (we in the report number 15 previously noted the headquarters of an unidentified numbering). 222, 203, 204-th PP, 317-th hell of air defense, 494-th spare PB.

In Stallupenen: The headquarters of the 405-th pp (1-th, 2-th and 3-th battalion of the 405-th pp are located near the border in the Eidtkunen region).

Conclusions

1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border.

2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions.

3. It is required to establish: the accuracy of the deployment in Königsberg of the headquarters of the 3-st AK, the headquarters of the 1-th army (the headquarters of the 18-th army was observed for a long time; there were no data about its descent); whether the parts that are not indicated in this report continue to be noted by us earlier (our intelligence report No. XXUMX [intelligence from 18.06.41, cited in the previous part]. NS PribOVO Lieutenant-General Klenov, Deputy Chief of the RO of PribOVO headquarters Colonel Kashnikov

Intelligence Report SOVOVO "... The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 was determined:

1. East Prussian direction. On the right, Suwalki, Heilsberg; on the left - Schuchin, Naidenburg: Allenstein 9 Army Headquarters, four AK headquarters - Elk, Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine headquarters are Seyny, Spray, Suwalki, Oletsko, Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava, Lidzbark; up to two PD, two MD (data PribOVO), ten up (up to two heavy an: presumably two divisions "SS", anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four CP) ...

CONCLUSION:

1) According to available data, which are checked, the main part of the German army in the ZOVOVO zone has taken up its original position.

2) In all directions, parts and means of reinforcement are tightened to the boundary.

3) All reconnaissance means check the location of troops at the border and the depth.

NSH ZOVOVO Major General Klimovskiy, Chief of the Regional Staff of the ZAPOV Colonel Blokhin»

It turns out that RO Zapovo, in contrast to RO PribOVO, managed to detect the exit of German troops from the depths of its territory to the border to the initial lines. RO ZOVOVO was also able to detect a sharp increase in the number of German connections from 30 (appearing in reconnaissance during 1,5 months) to 49 to 20-00 21.6.41 ... But for various reasons, it did not have time to bring ZOVOVA’s management ... "Sent 22 June 1941 g. In 15 hours 20 minutes". This information did not have time to get to the beginning of the war before the leadership of the ZOVOVO and PribOVO. But it is unlikely that the information from the previous Zapovo report on the deployment of German troops against PribOVO was very different from that considered.





From the figures it is clear that 8 hours before the start of the war:

- the concentration of German troops near the border with PribOVO was not noted again. At a distance of about 10 km from the border, there are only four TB. Another part of the motorcycle and armored units is located in 15-20 km;

- again there are no pronounced shock groups near the border. The grouping concentrated near the city of Gambinnnen can also be redeployed to the Suwalki bulge, which corresponds to the concept of attacking Germany against the USSR in the opinion of the General Staff;

- the headquarters of the MK and tank groups were not found again;

- near the border with PribOVO there are no headquarters of German troops at all. An exception is the possible location of the 61 headquarters in 10 km from the border. The nearest AK headquarters is located in 20 km. If there are no headquarters near the attacking troops, then how can these troops be led? The number of aircraft has not changed significantly (on 17.6.41 - more than 500, on 21.6.41 - 583). A significant part of the regiments and formations disappeared somewhere from the zone of attention of our intelligence, but intelligence was instructed to sort out this issue: “... Do the parts that are not indicated in this report continue to remain, which we have previously noted (our intelligence No. 15 from 18.6.41.”. The lack of reliable sources of information abroad and the lack of communication with the few available ... Even reconnaissance aircraft to raise, having read this summary, the leadership of the district is late ...

If you look again at the disposition of the German troops shown in the figures, you can only conclude that provocations German troops in the area of ​​Klaipeda and Suvalka protests against PribOVO. In other places, the German units near the Baltic border are too few. According to the disposition of the German troops shown in the figures nothing can be said about the possible start of a full-scale war in 8 hours.

It turns out that K. Derevianko, in his answers to General Pokrovsky, reflected incorrect information: there is no information in the latest intelligence reports of the PribOVO on the directions of the expected strikes of the German troops. There are no distinct shock groups at the border. The concentration of German troops on the border with the Baltic states was not detected. Perhaps most of the German formations and units are located in the same place where they were deployed in the autumn of 1940 - in the spring of 1941 ... No German divisions were found around 20 in the adjacent territory. A day before the war, district intelligence lost some of the previously detected compounds ... Strange, but why did the deputy head of the RO need to reflect incorrect information in his answers?

As you remember, in the previous part it was mentioned that the deputy head of the RO Pribova K. Derevianko wrote: “... The probable directions of the expected strikes of the Germans RO considered the directions: Eidkunen-Kaunas and Turogen-Šiauliai ...” was held much later after the start of the war.

From the presented materials it is clear that on 21.6.41, the troops of the PribOVO front concentrated to cover the directions of Tilsit-Šiauliai, Gumbinnen-Kaunas, and Suvalki-Vilna. The first two directions coincide with the opinion of specialists of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, the leadership of PribOVO and RO. Why did the deputy head of the RO pay special attention to indicating these directions in his answers? They also appeared in the projects of the “Plans of cover ...” and in all subsequent documents on the management of the Okrug troops. It turns out that the leadership of the district knew about these directions for a long time. The leadership of PribOVO did not know only: when the troops of the enemy would advance to the state border to their initial positions for attack. And, it was precisely this fact that the RO of the front-district could not detect ... In addition, the shock German groups could concentrate before attacking in other directions. After all, the above directions are purely theoretical calculations of the GSH specialists based on the results of the military games of the Soviet military, who did not know how exactly the German military leaders would act - they only supposed...

Consider excerpts from the three documents of the German troops (documents are provided from the “Personal Website of the Historian Mark Solonin”).

RCB 3 Tank Group: «21.06.41 0-00 39-th and 57-th MK took their sites and changed the security at the border ...

20-20 The 57-th AK reports that two SS brigades stopped at the Lyck-Treuburg section and blocked the advance of the 19-th etc ...

The advancement of the Tank Group took place according to plan. The need to continue the march during the daytime, which arose due to the small number of roads and short nights, did not prevent secrecy ... The divisions took shelter of artillery, heavy guns and anti-aircraft guns, perfectly disguised and ready for the offensive ...

22.06.41 02-00 Divisions took the starting position.

03-05 After a quietly past night and taking up initial positions in 2-00, all four corps of the Panzer Group launched an offensive. Tank corps on the front line on foot are accompanied by arrows and infantry ... "

RCB 57 MK (3 Tank Group). "...14.6.41 Tracked vehicles 12-th TD arrived at the point of temporary deployment. The first parts of the 19 th TD are unloaded and follow the march to the designated point of temporary deployment.

16.6.41 18 wheeled vehicles arrived at the temporary deployment point.

17.6.41 ... All parts of 19 td arrived at the point of temporary deployment.

18.6.41 Half of the 18 md leaves the temporary dislocation point and marches to halt at Ekersberg (Okartovo). Rearguard located there 19.6 to 4-00. The 210 th bridge building battalion entered Suwalki with all units. Half 18 md in 16-00 finished the halt and goes to the prescribed starting position. 12 td moves out ... in accordance with the schedule and is on vacation along the route from Suwalki to Lytsk.

20.6.41 12 td occupies the prescribed starting position ... The 29-th TP division, along with the other units, with 16-00 resumes movement along the established route. 19 td moves along the route from the former point of temporary dislocation with a halt on both sides of the route of movement of tanks ...

21.6.41 Around 7 in the morning begins the redeployment of the corps control from Mikolajki to a new command post in the Sejny area [9,5 km from the Soviet-German border]... In 20-00 from 19, etc., they said by telephone that her planned march southwest from Orzhes [Orzhes - Arys - 133 km from the border with the Baltic States] due to the wedging of two SS connections on the road intended for the movement of tanks, it becomes questionable ... With 21-00, 19 etc. continued to move in the area of ​​Lytsk-Suwalki ... "

Order 20 th AK (from the 9 Army): “... Divisions are being deployed in their districts ... so that they can launch an offensive at dawn on day B [22 June]. At the same time, we should strive to ensure that the most powerful units in their capabilities were moved to their initial positions only on the night from “B-1” to day “B” ... Pulling up to the border should be done ... as far as possible late and unnoticed. Defense of initial positions should be limited to the most necessary; Unreasonably high protection measures will allow the enemy’s intelligence to reveal our intentions prematurely ... ”

ZhBD 3 td (from the 24-th MK 2-th tank group, army group "Center"): "...13.06.41 Units report on arriving in a new area of ​​concentration ... Parts in forest camps are persistently complaining about the torment of mosquitoes ...

14.06.41 East of the restraining line is prescribed a thorough disguise....

20.6.41 Released from the Radzyn area [64 km from the border] in accordance with the order of the division commander, the units are leaving ... to the area of ​​initial positions ...

21.6.41 In 23-30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the latest starting positions. ”

“Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (the Barbarossa plan) ... OKH intends to redeploy by this time all the working headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups to the East to prepare and implement the necessary measures. In order to keep secrets the said headquarters should be located in the areas of the headquarters of the armies of Army Group “B” or armies already in the East ... Army Command and Army Commanders accept the lanes intended for them, in accordance with the directive on concentration, observing first masking measures... »

“Command of the 6 Army (from the Army Group“ South ”) 2 in May 1941 Directions for the nomination of“ Barbarossa ”... 13. Secrecy: ... Necessary Attractions [military personnel] for intelligence should be masked by exercises and territorial events. The corps command is responsible for ensuring that reconnaissance at the frontier is carried out only under camouflage (unobserved from abroad). To do this, you should immediately create barriers on all roads and paths leading to the border in cover areas that can be crossed only by officers (for example, sappers) who have a special corps command pass. Any involvement of the civilian population is prohibited. Orders for the nomination of troops can not be issued completely, and work out only excerpts (in stages) ... "

From the documents submitted it is clear that the German command prepared for the final stage in advance and carefully: the concentration of its troops at the Soviet-German border. It sought to ensure the secrecy of conducting reconnaissance of the concentrating troops and relocating the headquarters of the formations to the border. There was some "Prohibitive line"followed by the strictest disguise. The movement of troops was carried out in the evening and at night, on the part of the halts stopped in the woods during the day. First of all, less combat-ready units were put forward (construction, bridge-over parts, supply columns, engineer battalions, etc.). Combat units were deployed in the last 1,5-1 day before the start of the war. From June 18-19, orders are given to shoot down any Soviet aircraft that have flown over the border. Conducting aerial reconnaissance along the border before 21 June was ineffective ... Therefore, the scouts did not notice how the Germans redeployed, as unknown headquarters appeared near the well-known headquarters. The 57 connections of the MK were 18.6.41 along the Lutsk-Suwalki road. In the military intelligence unit for 21.6.41, these units should have been reflected, but, unfortunately, intelligence did not detect them. Moreover, reconnaissance during this period lost many German units and formations that began to redeploy to the border. Even concentrating near the border, the German troops reached the border directly (to the initial areas for attack) only by the beginning of 22.6.41.

In the early days of the war, turmoil, lack of communication, not understanding of the situation, panic affected the work of intelligence. The intelligence of the North-Western Front could not provide the necessary information to the command of divisions-corps-armies-front. Therefore, the order has already been prepared on June 24. Similar orders were issued in subordinate NWF unions.

“Order of the headquarters of the North-Western Front from 24 June 1941 to the Chiefs of Staff of 8, 11, 27 armies. Heads of the 5 and 12 MC

Despite the fact that the NWF troops have been fighting on the whole front for two days, until now almost in none of the command links there is no information about the strength and grouping of the enemy. The incoming information and reports are contradictory, confused and therefore of little value. This is explained by the fact that the commanding personnel forgot about the need to conduct thorough reconnaissance by all means during the whole battle and outside it. So far, at the front, captured units have been captured, and besides, the numbering of the units to which they belong is unknown to the headquarters of the army ... Deputy NSH SZF, Head of the RO Colonel Safronov»

«Battle Order №3 by 26.6.41 On eliminating deficiencies in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance by formations and units

1. The first four days of the military operations of the corps units showed that reconnaissance, surveillance and security in the units were completely absent. The commanding personnel are not interested in reconnaissance, do not organize - forget ...

2. In the absence of our reconnaissance, the enemy regroup with impunity, is active in fast-moving groups on the flanks and in the seams, and even penetrates to the rear of our units. The enemy, each time throwing forward mobile reconnaissance units consisting of motorcyclists, motorized infantry, tanks and cavalry, with impunity, finds out the joints and flanks of our parts and then throws out large, fast moving parts and thereby achieves some success.

3. Control prisoners in parts were delayed by more than 2-3 hours, and the first prisoners were delayed up to 5-6 hours. Prisoners interview anyone they want, without a system, but not the scouts, who should be in the first place. When sending prisoners, questionnaires and any reports of their preliminary testimony as a result of their questioning on the spot are not submitted ... The commander of 10 sk sk Major-General Nikolaev, NS Major-General Berezinsky»

The specified problems remained in the specified question even in the beginning of July. The reconnaissance of armies, corps and divisions is conducted by intelligence agencies of the front. Among others, the deputy head of the SZF RO, K. Derevianko, is responsible for this (from July 4, head of the SZF RO).

Report of Major General Tikhonov from 9.7.41 g. «About the reasons for unsuccessful combat operations of the North-Western Front in the Riga-Pskov and Ostrovsko-Pskov directions":" ... Exploration is not enough, primitive, careless. The headquarters do not put parts of the tasks for reconnaissance in battle. The obtained intelligence data remain unused, do not draw conclusions, often do not inform the higher headquarters and, as a rule, do not inform the lower headquarters and neighbors at all.

As a result, the troops are working blindly - not a single case has been noted where the commander would make a decision, having more or less accurate information about the enemy ... "

In the summer of 1942, there was also a lack of intelligence work before the start of the war: «Annual report. On the combat activity of the air forces of the North-Western Front for the period from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42. ... Composition and number of enemy air forces in front of the NWF [to 22 June 1941 of the year] due to the lack of intelligence before the war, it was impossible to pinpoint [it was] impossible ... ”

Someone had to answer for the defeat of the NWF frontier group in the unexpected attack of the German troops. Or intelligence (which "blinked" the concentration of enemy troops on the initial lines at the border) or the district command for their criminal negligence ... Did the leaders of the RO understand that they, in fact, were "switchmen"? They had to understand - they are smart and thinking people. 1 July 1941 year NSH NWF PS Klenov removed from office.

NKVD data: “Klenov Petr Semenovich, born 1892, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (BPS) 1931, headquarters captain of the tsarist army. Before his arrest - NS PribOVO, Lieutenant General. 9.6.1941 was arrested. He is found guilty of the testimony of Dybenko, Kochergin and Egorov, as a member of a Trotskyist right-wing organization, is accused of sabotage by the testimony of witnesses Rubtsov, Derevianko, Kashirsky and Korenovsky. He confessed to the manifestation of inactivity in the leadership of the district troops. " 13.02.42 d. By decree CCA sentenced to capital punishment. Shot 23 february1942 of the year. Rehabilitated 9 June 1956

Since the four witnesses who convict Pavel S. Klenov were not placed in alphabetical order and three of them had the title of “colonel”, they are probably placed according to the importance of the testimony given by them against NSH NWF. Who are these witnesses?

Colonel Rubtsov. For February, 1941 is in the state of RO PribOVO. From the first days of July 1941 of the year - deputy head of the operations department of the NWF. One of the main witnesses. What information is available about this person? “From August 1938 to August 1940 - Head of RO Kalininsky IN. In the period 1939 – 1940. participated in the war against Finland in the post of chief of the RO 7-th army. In August, 1940, in connection with the reorganization of Kalinin VO in PribOVO, was appointed deputy head of the district RO [this is incorrect information - since the summer of 1940, Colonels Kashnikov and Derevyanko are deputy chiefs of the RO.] He led a group of officers of the HE headquarters according to the description of the advanced theater, as well as the military-geographical description of Lithuania and Latvia. In the same period, he was appointed chairman of the mixed Soviet-German commission on demarcation (8 subgroup) ”. It is evident that this was not a fairly unambiguous person. Former head of the Regional Department of Military Unity, who became just a colonel in the District of RO. He was forced by the order of the National Military School of Higher Education to engage in secondary matters. Over the next thirteen years, remained in the same rank that he had a year before the outbreak of war ...

Colonel Derevyanko. The second most important witness. He was obliged to repeat the testimony he gave to the investigator at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941 of the year in the answers to General A.Pokrovsky. April 1953 of the year. Stalin is gone, but the organs still exist. There were no people at that time who would not be afraid of them. The author tried to show that in his answers to Pokrovsky K. Derevianko distorted the true picture of the German troops discovered by PribOVO on the eve of the war. In the autumn of 1938, two of his relatives were repressed; he was blamed for marrying the daughter of a priest. Derevianko managed to survive the repression of that period, referring directly to the Commissar of Defense. These contrived accusations and the incorrect reflection of the location of the German troops before the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941 could lead to only one final for him ... Later, he fought worthily, Lieutenant General.

Colonel Kashirsky. Head of the staffing department of the NWF. The only witness who is not a scout. Kashirsky is known from the loss report (from 22.06.41 to 01.08.41, NWF lost 57207 people, that is, almost one and a half times less than in the first days of the 18 war). Surely, in the manning department in the first days of the war there was a real "madhouse": tens of thousands of draftees from the areas adjacent to the Baltic states arrived, there was not enough of everything that one can imagine; Also, for all this, someone was obliged to answer. Kashirsky found guilty NSh District, or just helped the intelligence ...

Korenovsky. The surname is a typo. This is Major Korenevsky - Head of the 3 (Information) Branch of the RO PribOVO. This person was responsible for analyzing the information received from the agents for the preparation of analytical reviews and summaries. Reports were presented to you, there is no analysis in them. After the appointment Derevyanko head of the RO was appointed to the post of deputy head of the RO SZF. Later he fought with dignity. Already 22.7.41 has been submitted to the award. Colonel-General of the GRU.

Employees of the front of the RO front "piled" his immediate superior - the front of the NS, blaming him for his flaw. I am glad that among the witnesses, not a single deputy (or assistant) of the NS and other employees of PribOVO-NWF, leadership and army headquarters were noted.

Perhaps, the witnesses believed that they were right, but, unfortunately, this is not particularly “whitewashing” them ... Consider the memorandum of the intelligence officer RO ZOVOVO written in 6 months after the start of the war.

«Memorandum the head of the Lomzhinsky operative center of the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters to the representative of the special department of the NKVD of the Western Front about the work of this point before and during the 4 war in January 1942.

Since March, 1941, the agent’s office began reporting on the concentration of German troops in East Prussia and the former Poland along the Soviet border. According to a secret employee of Felix, in March 1941, in Poland and East Prussia, more 100 infantry and 8-10 etc were concentrated.

The Felix material was reported by the ZOVOVO headquarters RO. After the conversation, the Felix data were called misinformation, and the item was pointed out that the Germans have 25-40 divisions on this front ... RO often reproached the point for intelligence dispatches, in which, according to department, exaggerated the number of German troops ...

In April, 1941 of the year, according to residents of Arnold, Vistula and Pochtovoy, concentrated along the Soviet border up to 1,5 million troops, which was immediately reported to RO, but a resolution was put on our report by the deputy head of the RO Lieutenant Colonel Ilnitsky content: "This stupidity can be expected only from the Lomzhinsky item." According to the RO, the Germans at this time had 25-40 divisions. This standard figure has been in the intelligence department for more than a year ... Captain Kravtsov»

In fact, on the whole of the Soviet-German border, including the territory of Finland, in April there were only 47 German divisions. As of March 1941, there could be even fewer divisions. The captain Kravtsov, who wrote the memorandum, was confident that the German divisions were up to 100-108. Confident in the rightness, he writes a report to the special department of the front on "Careless attitude" RO ZAPOVO's guides to their intelligence information ...

In conclusion, I would like to note that a large number of Directives from Moscow are addressed to the District Military Councils. The District Military Council includes: the commander of the troops, the CID and the NS. Directives from the HE headquarters to subordinate troops were also signed by all members of the District Military Council. Responsibility is collegial. Of course, this does not exclude the sole order of the commander of the armed forces. What happened to the rest of the Military Council of PribOVO-NWF?

3.7.41 NWF Commander F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from office for inept command and control. The Commander of PribOVO-SZF should have a greater responsibility than the District High School. From July 10, F.I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 21 army, and 26.7.41 - commander of the Central Front.

ChVS Corps Commissar P. Dibrova 1.7.41 July removed from their posts and appointed Commissioner 30-th SD. With 18.12.41, again the FWS of the 59, and later of the 2 of the Shock Army. By rank he could claim for re-certification for the rank of “Lieutenant-General”, but he did not pass by position. In December, 1943 received the rank of Major General of the quartermaster service.

D.N.Gusev - since July 1940, Deputy NS Pribovo. Since July 1941, the NSN of the 48 Army of the Western Front. Since September, 1941 - Deputy, and from October, NSH of the Leningrad Front.

GPSofronov - from January 1941, the 1-th Deputy Commander PribOVO. From June 19-20 - Commander of the Baltic Military District (after the separation of the front command post from PribOVO). 1.7.41 removed from office. With 26.7.41 appointed commander of the Seaside Army of the Southern Front.

All the above-mentioned former leaders of PribOVO-NWF have been preserved life and rank, having been demoted. Former NSh SZF Lieutenant-General Peter Semenovich Klenov recognized everything and did not “drag him along” his like-minded people and subordinates ... The kingdom of heaven, a kind man ...

PS The events reviewed on the eve of the war and in its first days are a sad lesson for the country's leadership and intelligence. The theme of the surprise attack is relevant in our time, when quite often on the websites it is said about the “Fast global strike” by the NATO forces and, first of all, by the United States. The pogrom of a similar defeat of one of the armies - the SC in the summer of 1941, will not happen again. There will be no surprise attack ... Intelligence will fulfill its role ...

Comments

[ecologist]

Now our leaders would have such a "low" intellect as that of Stalin, who was able to build the most modern industry and recreate the army out of ruin in a short time. Not forgetting the crimes of the regime, the fact remains that the USSR won the war, relying on the new army and economy, clearly could not have created it. Stalin was anyone, but not a person with low intelligence.
Nobody destroyed the line of defense on the old border - it is a myth of couch historians, it’s another thing that they used it through one place, just like the new line of defense.
People are not arming themselves with rifles, and rightly so - I would not want to see a new round of crime an order of magnitude higher than the current one.
But problems with the command of the army arose for one reason - in the early to mid-30s, they “cleared out” all military specialists — staff officers of the tsarist army with vast combat experience. Ideology intervened in the army, professionalism was replaced by partisanship. From here all the troubles went - the low level of the command staff of the army, military intelligence, communications, supplies, organization of command and control of troops. And as soon as this experience was gained with blood, not earlier - they began to beat Germany. What are only ten Stalinist strikes in the 44th, “Barbarosa" resting.

[Evgenijus]

ecologer:

... at the beginning - the middle of 30-s, they “cleaned” all military specialists - cadre officers of the tsarist army with a huge combat experience.

You have one statement contradicts another. Who do you think the military experts cleaned out? Isn't that the one with HIGH intelligence? When it was good that something turned out in the country and at the front, the name STALIN was the same, but as a crime or failure, it is someone unknown. The villains lived in the country, did not report to the DRIVER of the army in the staff ...
I thought that this heresy would go to IN only until the celebration of 100 - the anniversary of Maidan 1917 in Russia, and it continues now.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: Michael HORNET

Plus, he was afraid to allow the people possession of rifled weapons and generally lean on the people as such ...

Yo mine! Yes, after the defeat of large military formations of the Red Army, the "fields and forests" were "dotted" with weapons! And what? "People" immediately rushed to collect these weapons? Yes fic you guessed it!
Not relied on the people? And why did they leave “illegal immigrants”, caches? Yes, in a hurry, but not organized enough; but measures were taken that were possible ... for what? Yes, for the organization of armed resistance to the enemy in the occupied territory, Relying on the People!
As for the "destroyed partisan underground with warehouses ..." then "the grandmother for two said" ... and about the sufficiency of the "partisan underground"; and about the "complete destruction of it" ... Well, don’t read you " on an empty stomach "" liberal "newspapers!

[chenia]

Quote: Michael HORNET

Alas, the very low intellectual level of Stalin and his inner circle did not allow to draw lessons even from the 1939-1940 campaign.

But Chamberlain and Daladier’s high intelligence .... Continue to continue (I can, if your intellectual level does not allow it), or do you get it yourself?

Stalin at least won several years and did not allow Germany to attack in alliance with Poland.

.The Germans in 1941 were really not ready. And only our reorganization of the Red Army (which buried B / P,) helped them very cool.

All these conversations that if they had complied with the directive on bringing the Red Army to the BG would have been fulfilled, the war would have gone differently, stupidity.

If a month before the start of the war. such an event would then be- would retreat along the Dnieper, and conditionally would begin in 1942 (with failures, but without losses of 1941).

And so, for such a beginning of the war, Meretsky was rightly pressed, it would have been necessary for Zhukov. Then he would have fought prudently.

[polpot]

As he mistrusted the people from the number of militia divisions, partisans and underground fighters, the defensive lines are a separate topic of the Siegfried and Maginot line, and apparently the expression dibelism in relation to gineralisimus used the incorrectly atomic shield of Russia to a large extent.

[aKtoR]

Thank you for the kind comment to you and the forum users who left them below and for their support.

[stas]

Author, for what purpose are you writing your flyworm articles.
Radishes like you have long lost, your facts are not all true. But we have a fact, we defeated fascism and Europe, which attacked us.
It’s a pity that you’re not standing nearby.
And your swaggering truth is directed only at the diarrhea of ​​OUR VICTORY. But this is all that you are capable of; the US State Department is apparently more devoted to Russia than to Russia.

[parusnik]

Thanks to the author for the wonderful material ...

[aKtoR]

Thanks, there will be a sequel soon 2 parts))

[SCHWERIN]

I can not understand. Complete inaction .... What are they all drunk?

[antivirus]

The theme of the unexpected attack is relevant in our time, when quite often the websites talk about the “Fast global strike” by the NATO forces and, first of all, by the United States. A pogrom similar to the defeat of one of the armies - the spacecraft in the summer of 1941 - will not happen again. There will no longer be an unexpected attack ... Intelligence will fulfill its role ...

by "drunk" :::
Who knew about preparing for the landing in England?
how did intelligence work in normality?
all this is an answer to "a distracting maneuver from England near the borders of the USSR"

NOW DOES SIMPLY - "I HAVE THE RIGHT TO A PREVENTIVE NUCLEAR KICK" and period.
not intelligence work--
- A DECISION AND COURAGE OF THE SUPREME POLIT OF HAND-VA. (The teddy bear has gone far from totalitarianism, the USSR also "dismissed").
WE DIDN'T HAVE THEN FORCES AND MEANS FOR PREVENTIVE IMPACT.
WEAKNESS WAS IN THE NUMBER OF ICE (AUTO) AND BRIDGES + COBBLES (GRAVEL) HIGHWAY (not asphalt), + number of people fast on the rise and competent- independently thinking-
- "It’s easier not to twitch at all. !!! we’ll be more whole."
studied with their blood but then

[SCHWERIN]

The agents were. And along the lines of the Comintern and the GRU. At the border, a powerful Wehrmacht group was pulled together. And you want to say that you have not seen this? Pecked at the tale of England?
True, until the age of 41, a similar situation was in the year 39. Soviet-Finnish War. Stupidly went to the Finns and ran into powerful fortified areas, the modern bunkers of which the KA did not even know.
About the preemptive strike. I do not agree with you. Like there were no forces and means. And when are they enough? Everything was. There was no competent and decisive leadership. There were no competent warlords. For me in Russia there was only one commander who fought not by numbers, but by skill. A.V. Suvorov. There were no others.
There was a lot of equipment, caterpillar tractors were used to tow artifacts. The Germans used horses. We had medium tanks, until the age of 42 they were no better. There were heavy HF. There were light tanks. True, the Germans burned the tanks with aircraft, and the tractors were abandoned by the retreating units and about 1000 units were used by the Germans. The figure from memory. So the opportunity to suddenly hit the first was. And a chance to bring the Germans to flight. Even in case of failure, hostilities would not go on our territory. And it would be time to mobilize and expand industry, since factories were built in the Urals. Yes, history has no subjunctive mood.
Do you think it was better to send troops to Ukraine in 2014 or to wait for them to trample on us now. In 2014 there were reputational risks (sanctions, etc.) and now there are big losses. The West feeds Ukrainians, the West has become one. What scenario will the states play. No one knows. But the probability of using Ukrainians as a battering ram is high. And now we will wait for them to fall apart ......

[antivirus]

. And it would be time to mobilize and expand industry, since factories were built in the Urals
THERE WAS NO PLANTS BEFORE EVACUATION THERE FROM THE CENTER OF THE USSR.
OWNERS OF THE WORLD -USA DETERMINED DETERMINED ---- --- WHO WILL ATTACK THAT AND THE AGGRESSOR
Truman's words "if he wins ... then we will help the other side ..."
before agreeing on positions with the USA and Vl Br, it WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO START A WAR. they hung Hitler like that. cm you need the number of stew and ICE + number of bridges (see mine above) + shipbuilding + million tons of iron and steel, aluminum and + 1000 other little things
"fooling around" in front of the border, in my opinion, is simple-- "eat, tear yourself and become an aggressor"
forced victim.
they thought - "maybe according to the plates the losses were counted in the exercises and it will be something like Zhukov and Tymoshenko say" otherwise it’s NOT CLEAR (or is it possible?)

They didn’t enter the outskirts in 14g - bad, but it was impossible to enter. RF-AGGRESSOR loot over everything and from export - the EU will close tightly.
while there is no China and others (Iran + India) to bend-smile-bustle.
there is a number of dough — it must be given every day for activities from meth combines to point-to-day homes. LESS IS IMPOSSIBLE. this is besides personal billion in offshore

[SCHWERIN]

I read that they built boxes of factories in the Urals for American money (Stalin's tricky move) I can’t provide a link.
There was information that Britain asked the USSR to begin military operations against the Germans. Europe was occupied, i.e. the aggressor has already been found. Therefore, fighting is the deliverance of Europe from the brown plague. They entered Syria. True, at the request of Assad. But the West wanted to overthrow him, for them he is not the president.
Ukraine. GDP requested the Federation Council permission to use the troops of the Russian Federation abroad. Immediately after the coup in Kiev. So there was a solution, someone offered him? And then the recognition of chocolate. Stop.
In short, we are waiting for aggression ........

[antivirus]

Yes. wait, sir.
50 years later, they started already "the USSR is not a victim but agresorrrrrr" it is necessary to disperse it and divide it among civilized "
and then VBR suggested ... as she suggested, "I'm sorry you didn’t understand me. YOU AGRESSORRRR-R" DIVIDE THE USSR BETWEEN CIVILIZED BY 1944 IN 7 PARTS "curtain. and now the curtain lies somewhere (a big rag), yes no one can cover us yet.
hi them "cover"

[Mordvin 3]

Quote: antivirus

THERE WAS NO PLANTS BEFORE EVACUATION THERE FROM THE CENTER OF THE USSR.

And you read what you did in the Urals in three pre-war five-year plans.

[Nehist]

This powerful group of the Wehrmacht consisted of infantry divisions. But the main strike force (tank and motorized) divisions of the Wehrmacht transferred over the course of two weeks, so that the Red Army could not fully turn around well, no matter how it could, it took 3-4 months.

[BAI]

I can not understand. Complete inaction .... What are they all drunk?

There was a cruel attitude - "Do not succumb to provocations, do not give cause for war." That is why the trains with raw materials drove to Germany until the last second. And to any question from the bottom "Will there be a war or not" there was an answer - "Explain what is not, until there is no stone left from Germany from stone." And do what you want. But if something is wrong - no one forgot for 37 years.
And they were preparing for war, Stalin at the graduation of military academies in May 5, 1941 directly said about the upcoming war:

Peace policy provided peace to our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being, for a time we drew a line on the defense - until they rearm our army, did not provide the army with modern means of struggle.
And now, when we reconstructed our army, filled it with equipment for modern combat, when we became strong - now we have to go from defense to offensive.

[SCHWERIN]

There was a cruel attitude - "Do not succumb to provocations, do not give cause for war." That is why the trains with raw materials drove to Germany until the last second.

I agree. But when after the war Zhukov was asked about this, he replied: "See the charter of the Red Army!" Like everything is said there, what and how to do it. And we drive the "echelons" now ... Especially goal number 1 on the border of the Rostov region.

[VS]

the Trotskyists ’captain’s staff were drunk - that they dreamed of repeating the experience of the WWI — to overthrow power in the Soviet Socialist Republic on German bayonets ??)))

[vladimirvn]

Find out ours, maybe it will cost. And the most important thing in people is killed personality, self-esteem. The right to have an opinion and not being afraid to defend it.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Michael HORNET

Monstrous mistakes were made by the Soviet leadership much earlier
Alas, the very low intellectual level of Stalin and his inner circle did not allow to draw lessons even from the 1939-1940 campaign.

For starters, you would have to worry about your own level of intelligence before poking your fingers on the clave .....

[97110]

Quote: stalkerwalker

To begin with, you would be concerned about your own level of intelligence, before you poke your fingers on the clave ...

Mr. is in a hurry to testify to “progressive humanity” that he is his own, so as not to cut off his own paths for entry into this “humanity." So with intelligence, most likely everything is in order there. I would not be surprised if, in order to find a pass to "progressive humanity", he would describe his nasty things about Stalin without errors in English in the American version.

[Black5Raven]

Quote: 97110

The gentleman is in a hurry to testify to "progressive humanity" that he is his own, so as not to cut off his own paths for entry into this "humanity"

The actions taken by Stalin led to the deaths of twenty million Soviet citizens during the war, can we call it reasonable action? If you think so, your right.

[97110]

Quote: Black5Raven

Actions taken by Stalin

And here we are naive, we all sin on civilized Europe. Well, there was an eyewitness. And then my grandfathers came from the front, did not know anything, did not see anything. If they did, it was about a mountain of German corpses and good English machine guns in Matyldy.

[demo]

Quote: Michael HORNET

Unfortunately, Stalin was afraid of arming the people, he saw enemies everywhere, made gross mistakes (including the actual destruction of both large defensive lines (they didn’t have time to create the old one)

Ask yourself - why is one fortification line destroyed and another not created?
Maybe the answer that you find will give you an understanding of the fact that IV Stalin was not so stupid.
And then you can answer for yourself why the partisan detachments were decommissioned.
And you will get answers to other questions.
Seek, yeah, look.
God help you.

[Glory1974]

It would be interesting to read about the work of intelligence and headquarters during the beginning of the 1 and 2 th Chechen wars. The events were recently, the vast majority of participants are in good health, you can type a lot of information. But I’m afraid there will still be the same unsolved problems: lack of information about the enemy, poor-quality analysis, generals make decisions “who is in the woods, who is by fire”, etc. and as a result, everything is decided by the courage of soldiers and officers, by the skills of individual senior officers and generals.

[Nehist]

Gg, everything was right there at headquarters and in intelligence. And the mess is connected with political decisions. When they could not decide whether to entrust the armies of Toli VV as a result, different and sometimes directly opposite actions of the army and VV

[Glory1974]

everything was right there at headquarters and in intelligence.

Therefore, many units entered Chechnya in the 94 year, but did not distribute ammunition to personnel.
131 brigade marching into the center of Grozny and did not leave.
3 times Bamut stormed.
in June 1999 of the year, Stepashin came to Karamakhi, said that everything was normal there, and in August the assault began, and they stormed for a month. And when they took it, they saw that there were underground fortifications made of concrete. Many things can be listed. In general, I do not agree with you.

[DimerVladimer]

G.K. Zhukov (22.6.41 - Chief of the General Staff): “... Many senior officials of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and General Staff too canonized the experience of the First World War. Most of the command staff of the operational-strategic link, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had occurred in the nature and methods of waging the Second World War.

In general, the NHS is not the last person in the state hierarchy.
And if he does not understand how modern wars are fought, then the question arises of what he is doing at the NSS.
By that time, information was known about the Germans conducting the French campaign - everything lay on the surface since Poland.

Zhukov did not correspond to the position of the NHS either by education or by nature.

[DimerVladimer]

The opposite side, i.e. Fascist Germany, with its fully mobilized and already warring army, was put in relation to the terms necessary for its concentration and deployment against us, in the same conditions as our armed forces ... ”

This only speaks of the quality of the General Staff of the General Staff, and that the beginning of the composition did not expect a war with Germany, being guided by formal plans for mobilization (despite all the visible preparations of the Germans).

[SCHWERIN]

We often analyze the past with today's standards. Repressions 37-39 today are certainly bloated, but they were! Meretskov, Rokossovsky, after all, were specifically sitting, and not a war, not the fact that they would have survived. And how many are there. Zhukov apparently tried not to anger Stalin and clearly execute his orders. Therefore, he did not sit. By the way, he supported Nikita after the death of the leader, about whom (Stalin) after the congress he spoke impartially, playing along with Khrushchev. Those. the man was addicted.
Of course, the dictates of Stalin suppressed the will of leaders. Many just wanted to sit out. And it doesn’t matter whether he was literate or illiterate. No one wanted to die.

[xomaNN]

Respect is also given to those commanders of the GRU who provided reliable information about the deployment of the enemy and it is a pity that the top did not give it its due. Thanks to the author for the links of the documents. They are trusted more than the memoirs edited during the political departments of the CPSU.

[97110]

Quote: xomaNN

during the political departments of the CPSU.

And what apart from the CPSU were there still political departments? Share your knowledge, you are our witness. Nobody corrected his memoirs. All by yourself. Even twice. Do not agree? Then the exact name of the POLITISHER who edited Zhukov’s memoir, for example.

[VS]

Zhukov’s memoirs were written in VNU GSh))) At the same time, what was dumping on Stalin’s memoirs from Zhukov also came in and what showed what contradicts the “party line” —the real facts about the same withdrawal of troops BEFORE June 22 were not included)) )

[avia12005]

The farther 22.06.41, the more willing to discuss this date. But...
The attack on the Crimea in 1854 - suddenly.
Port Arthur - in 1904 suddenly.
Yes, and Pearl Harbor in 1941 - suddenly. And 1 September 1939 - not suddenly? And the strike of the Wehrmacht in 1940 year in France is also not sudden? Conclusion: the aggressor always has effective methods to disguise his intentions well. And in this sense, Crimea in the 2014 year, one of the exemplary operations to prevent the seizure of the territory of Russia. We rehabilitated before the story.

[VS]

do not confuse the surprise of an attack as an attack without foreplay - without notes, without warnings and an attack like surprise, unexpectedness)))

[VS]

“When Georgy Konstantinovich writes about mistakes (including his own), then what is the reason for him to write a lie? "

- to hide his guilt for defeat at the beginning of the war. . by transferring the shooter to intelligence, which didn’t report something to him, to Stalin, who mixed up something with him ..
“However, in reality they were preparing to wage the war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that the great war would begin, as before, with border battles, and then the main enemy forces would only enter into business. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the land and air forces of Nazi Germany ... "

- lying. And - he writes about the mythical workers of the General Staff, but in general this is what he is - the General Staff ... This is he ... he invented with pre-war plans and he did them stupid things that led to the fact that at the border the cover division was not holding 10 km of authorized defense and - up to 30-50 km minimum.
Madame, the author, before getting into the topic, would have to figure out what the Meretskov Zhukovs planned in our General Staff to do in the event of an German attack, and what they then hid with their lies — how they waited for the Germans to get in between ...
“Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K. A. Meretskov, nor the command staff of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day with compact groups in all strategic directions . ”

- lying ... Especially since Shaposhnikova smears her ... shame ..

"A.M. Vasilevsky (22.6.41 - Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the General Staff):" ... Ref "

- Zhukov's “matchmaker” - he was different and couldn’t lie later .. Stalin was to blame for them in the end ...
For starters, Madame Aftaru should not read Zhukov’s lie and Vasilevsky’s rehearsal = pre-war plans, but the work of Marshal Zakharov or Gretsov or Baghramyan - what was there who planned in the General Staff in case of war with Germany.

“From the figures it is clear that 8 hours before the start of the war:

“Once again, there was no concentration of German troops near the border with PribOVO.”

- yeah - and therefore, on June 18, in PribOVO, it was reported to the regiments that the attack was expected on the night of June 20, border mining began and border divisions were withdrawn to the defense zone along the border ... Secret from the Kremlin)))

[VS]

“If there are no headquarters next to the advancing troops, then how to lead these troops?”

- type - headquarters - ahead of the troops, on a dashing horse, or something ???)))

“It turns out that K. Derevyanko in his answers to General Pokrovsky reflected incorrect information: there is no information in the latest intelligence reports of RO Pribovo about the directions of the expected attacks by German troops. There are no pronounced strike groups at the border ”

- no - this is Madame, the author ignoring OTHER facts - composes on ONLY ONE material - on PUBLISHED RO reports - a picture of the world))))

“The leadership of PribOVO did not know only: when the enemy troops would advance to the state border at the starting positions for the attack. And, it was this fact that the RO of the front-district could not detect ... "
- and therefore, since June 17, has led to B.G. their border divisions in these areas)) bringing to the regiments that an attack is expected, and the Air Force commanders brought their SBD divisions on June 19 - the date and time of the attack - 3.00 on June 22)))
Madame - can you begin to finally study the question on ALL available facts and events?)))

“The above directions are purely theoretical calculations of the specialists of the General Staff based on the results of the military games of the Soviet military, who did not know exactly how the German military commanders would act - they only assumed ...”

- actually - this is science)) military geography for example))) Or Madame the author thinks like - from the ceiling, such "assumptions" were taken ???)))

". The combat units were deployed in the last 1,5-1 days before the start of the war "

- and with us - from June 17, border divisions and MEKKORPUS began to withdraw along the border into the defense zone - with the expectation of an attack on June 20 more))))
“Even focusing on the border, the German troops went directly to the border (in the original areas for attack) only at the beginning of 22.6.41.”

- it would be better if the author told Madame how the beginning of the Headquarters of the Maples acted on the night of the attack. How he scored on the order of the General Staff - to raise the district on alarm))))

“The conduct of reconnaissance activities by reconnaissance of armies, corps and divisions is primarily controlled by the Front Front. Among others, the deputy head of the North-West Federal District K. Derevyanko is also responsible for this ”

- and so it’s cho)) EXPLORATION OF TYPE DO NOT REPORT IN TIME - who there with what forces will trample on the USSR !!!))))
And I thought - where did Madame drive it all)))) BRAVO !!!))))
I grabbed a couple of docks and got into intelligence again)) And who there and who else dreamed and muddied - do not care))) What orders went to the okrugs all June - do not give a damn))) As Trukhin with ciphers of the headquarters of PribOVO-NWF, the Germans wandered over - 27th already - yes, do not care - the guilty intelligence)))
"I confessed to being inactive in the leadership of the district’s troops." 13.02.42/23/1942, the decision of the CCA sentenced to capital punishment. Shot on February 9, 1956. Rehabilitated June XNUMX, XNUMX "

- so we finally wait for the story of how this wonderful staff captain and adorer of Trotskag - the "creator" of the Red Army - put on the order of Moscow on the night of June 22 and did not raise the district on alarm AT ALL ???)))
“Surely, in the staffing department in the early days of the war there was a real“ lunatic asylum ”: tens of thousands of draftees arrived from areas adjacent to the Baltic, there wasn’t enough everything that could be imagined, there was a hostile atmosphere in the national divisions to understaff units. Also, someone was obliged to answer for all this. Kashirsky found guilty of the NSh district, or simply helped scouts ... "
- Madame - Klenov is not accused of what he did or did not AFTER June 22, but - BEFORE ...))) - “he is convicted of wrecking evidence of witnesses Rubtsov, Derevianko, Kashirsky and Korenovsky. I confessed to being inactive in the leadership of the district’s troops ”)))

[VS]

“The workers of the Front of the Front“ dumped ”their immediate superior, the NSh of the Front, blaming him for their shortcomings. "

- what other flaws ??? What the Klenovs put on intelligence reports or the like. as well as RO employees participated in this - in the same ZAPOVO - - FACT)))

MADAM "historian" - Klenov DID NOT RAISE THE DISTRICT AT NIGHT AT ALL ALARM !! THE ONLY DISTRICT that SLEEP after receiving the deer. BN - about full combat readiness !! ONLY!!
This fact alone is enough to shoot Klenov like a dog - without trial or investigation in general ..

“In April 1941, according to the residents of Arnold, Vistula and Postal, up to 1,5 million troops were concentrated along the Soviet border, which was immediately reported to the RO, but a resolution was put on our report by the deputy chief of the RO Lieutenant Colonel Ilnitsky of the following content: "Such stupidity can be expected only from the Lomzhinsky point." According to the RO, the Germans at that time had 25-40 divisions. This standard figure has been featured in the intelligence reports of the department for more than a year ... Captain Kravtsov "

In fact, in April there were only 47 German divisions on the entire Soviet-German border, including the territory of Finland. As of March 1941, there could be even less divisions. Captain Kravtsov, who writes the Memorandum, is sure that there were up to 100-108 German divisions. "

- Yes, because he writes about the territory of ALL RUSSIA AND POLAND and not only about the border itself)))
It seems Madame "historian" and she does not understand what facts she cites and whom she blames))))
But this FACT confirms - CHANGE was happening in ZAPOVO - AT ALL fucking headquarters of Pavlov - where they were engaged in juggling data about the Germans - they lied that not the main forces of the Germans are concentrated against ZAPOVO !!! In order to please the General Staff of Zhukov, by the way, where they lied to Stalin that the main German forces they allegedly expected only against KOVO, and when the Germans crashed, they began to trend - we did not wait for such a blow north of Polesie and the intelligence was to blame))))))

"The commander of PribOVO-NWF must bear greater responsibility than the NSh of the district."

- so he attacked at NIGHT - when Klenov did not raise the district on alarm - he was in the troops and therefore got out))) evaded responsibility)))

“Former NSh NWF Lieutenant-General Pyotr Semenovich Klenov acknowledged everything and did not“ drag away “his like-minded people and subordinates ... The kingdom of heaven, good man ...”

- get hurt !!! The kingdom of a man who spoiled as best he could and through his fault killed hundreds of thousands as a result of no reason soldiers and army commanders ((((

[VS]

By the way - Madame the author did lie)))) She kind of quotes Kravtsov's report - "" In April 1941, according to the residents of Arnold, Vistula and Postal, up to 1,5 million troops were concentrated along the Soviet border "" "
And in the original,
""
On May 28, 1941, the Arnold resident arrived without a call. I drove out to meet him and asked him at the outpost why he had arrived ahead of schedule (his deadline was June 20). He replied that there was an important message, and reported the following:
1. The Germans are preparing an offensive and in mid-June, a war will begin against the USSR. He managed to learn about the offensive from the Sikorsky intelligence center and some British intelligence officers, as well as from personal observation.
2. The Germans concentrated from 1,5 to 2 million troops on the eastern front.
3. In Prague, the training of White Guards saboteurs in the amount of 10 thousand people has been completed, which before the start and at the time of the war will be thrown out by small landing groups to blow up bridges, roads, [commit] terrorist acts and indicate targets for aviation, etc.
4. The plan of the German attack: a decisive blow to Belarus and Minsk should be occupied on the 8th day, and Moscow on the 21st day.

The resident indicated several airfields on which the planes arrived, and tanks and artillery were drawn to the border.
When asked if this was panic, Arnold replied that he was responsible for this data with his head. ""

MADAM - more accurately with documents - you can check them out after all))))

[VS]

Kravtsov directly shows - treason was in RO Zapovo ....

"" After such a categorical statement, on the morning of May 28, I reported the contents of the Arnold report with the RO code and asked for permission to send Arnold to the RO.
I received a response on May 29, in which I was ordered to deliver Arnold to Minsk by the evening of May 29, which I did. Blokhin talked with Arnold. Ilnitsky and Samoilovich, in conclusion, noted: "Lomzha always presents sensations, it would be better to give part numbers." Arnold was explicitly told that the material was implausible, and the invention of British intelligence. Arnold replied: “You can shoot me, but I answer for the credibility of the information with my head. I have fulfilled my duty to the Soviet state, and you may or may not believe me - your business. The war will begin in mid-June. "
On June 4, I escorted him across the border, and the Arnold did not appear again.

Could one believe Arnold? Based on the following data, he could be trusted.
1. 2 months before the Germans occupied Romania, he predicted that the Germans would send their troops to Romania and that Romania would be occupied. He also said in a month and a half that the Germans were sending 12 infantry and 6 armored divisions to Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia and Greece would be occupied in the near future.
2. “Arnold” gave complete data on the presence of White Guard organizations, committees and military organizations.
3. In support of his information on the deployment of military units, he brought documents - orders and photographs.
4. According to him, the NKVD authorities arrested several German spies and saboteurs.
Recently, he worked on a plan to open the White Guard Center in Vilna. The center was led by German intelligence and set out to raise an uprising in the Baltic states. The uprising was to be supported by the Prussian garrisons.
5. The data of Arnold were cross-checked by several sources and confirmed. The RO of Western OBO knew this very well.

After sending Arnold abroad on June 8 or 9, I was in Minsk in the RO. Lieutenant Colonel Ilnitsky asked: "Well, Arnold managed to leave, his war in Lomza did not catch him." I replied that he was sent abroad, and you know better about the war, but the situation on the border is restless. Ilnitsky smiled and said: "And you fell into the bait of British intelligence." I didn’t answer anything, and he went on to say that Arnold’s information was incorrect, that there was no evidence of preparations for the offensive. On the same day, I met Senior Lieutenant Chubakov from the Information Department, who told me: “For the first time, I see an agent like Arnold, a very capable and serious intelligence officer, but our authorities are afraid of bold information, and therefore any new message lingers for a long time in the department, and in the worst case, it’s not sent anywhere at all. "Arnold" data was edited 5 days, and then the emasculated report was sent to Moscow. " ""

[VS]

"" In early June, in areas of the 87th and 88th border ridges, sabotage groups of people with explosives began to be transferred. Each detained group was immediately reported to the RO with conclusions: since the enemy launched active reconnaissance, apparently, an offensive is being prepared. Arriving agents from abroad signaled an impending offensive. All this was timely reported to the RO. I don’t know what measures the department took, but I didn’t receive any special tasks, there weren’t any special orders even for active intelligence.
.....

3. RO work style before the war
1. In 1941, very little foreign currency was released for undercover work. It came to the point that we were forced to buy zloty from the rural population - a trifle ¦ - in order to give 20 to 30 zloty to the agent sent. In 1940, more than 100 thousand zlotys were exchanged through an agent in a Warsaw bank through an agent, but these funds were withdrawn to the RO, and we found ourselves without funds. Capable agents left us because we could not provide them.
In February 1941, a Schultz resident was sent with a radio station, and for 2 months he was given only 250 marks, during which time he was in debt and returned back to the USSR. The Glushko resident owed several hundred marks and, without paying the debt, returned to the USSR.
2. In the department, all attention was focused on ensuring that each point sent intelligence reports daily.
In April 1941, the deputy chief of the RO, Lieutenant Colonel Ivchenko, advised me not to send large summaries, but to break the agent data into several parts and send them to the RO every day in small parts. I objected to him, saying that this was fraud and I would not go for it. He answered me that the head of the Brest point, Major Romanov, did so and his point was in the first place. In my opinion, careerism, toadness, and not business work, flourished in the RO.
Captain Kravtsov

The memorandum was accepted on January 5, 1942 by the operative officer of the 6th branch of the PA NKVD of the Western Front, State Security Lieutenant Zhuravlev

V.Abramov "Smersh" M, 2005
Cit. by: "USSR State Security Organs in the Great Patriotic War." T. 3. Book. 1. The collapse of the Blitzkrieg (January 1 - June 30, 1942). - M., 2003. S. 19-23.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: V.S.

By the way - Madame the author lied

By the way, Madame, as you call the author, has done a gigantic job - not everyone can handle such a mountain of documents, studies and memoirs.
Even recognized masters and investigators Shirokorad, Isaev, Svirin and others could not avoid both errors and discrepancies.
And personally from me - a huge respect and a deep bow to the author for this work, which can be safely used for research of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

[aKtoR]

Thank you, Ilyich! Your support is very important to me.
In the comments to the 10 part, there will be a request to those who sincerely support the author. If you can - respond
Good luck!
And in reconnaissance worth dots - part of the text is omitted
Thank you

[VS]

what do you call the "mountain of documents" ??)))
This is called-grabbed what is on the surface and has long been published and shown TO HERE DIFFERENT authors and began to make nonsense - to compose - who is there that "THINKED" in the General Staff))) And we must not invent - who was there and thought and - watch WHAT DONE in the pre-war days - what orders went and how they were executed)))

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: V.S.

This is called-grabbed what is on the surface and has long been published and shown TO HERE DIFFERENT authors and began to make rubbish - write - who is what

On your part, I see only criticism ... Or did you publish a monograph about one of the moments of the Great Patriotic War?

Quote: V.S.

publishednnо

Gee ....
"Glass, pewter, wooden!"

[aKtoR]

Yes, in the books of this person the same nonsense and womanish hysteria ...
All advised to read the two-volume Chekunov - the problem is that there is a completely different written. I do not know if there will be time to create a theme for this book ...
the time that everyone lacks ...
And most importantly, this person does not even understand: why the only commander of the rifle division (of all those concentrated in western districts) reports to the operations department of the General Staff in the presence of the commander and ignoring the comcor and district headquarters.

[VS]

"", in the books of this person the same nonsense and Babskii hysteria ... ""

- i.e. when they poke YOUR mistakes and stupidities in your nose - how do you compose who the “THINKED” in the General Staff was there - you don’t like it - only the enthusiastic praises from those who do not know anything on the topic will flatter your vanity?))))
Or - can you show - which of the facts I have cited - which you stubbornly ignore - - at least here - nonsense?)))

"" Everyone advises reading a two-volume Chekunov - the problem is that it says completely different there. I don’t know if there will be time to create a theme for this book .. ""

- something that contradicts your fantasies - about who cho thought there - definitely, ..)))
And - you don’t even have to “disassemble” the answers of the generals))) Although - if you decide not to anonymously publish a book on these answers - - we are waiting)))

"" This person does not even understand: why the only commander of the rifle division (from all those concentrated in the western districts) reports to the operational department of the General Staff in the presence of the commander and ignoring the commander and the headquarters of the district. ""

- What do you dislike about the answer of the commander Abramidze?))) What did he show on the orders of the General Staff for his division? So this is NORMAL in the army))) I’ll tell you - in those days I also brought out 17 border divisions !!)))) And that's all, by order of the General Staff))))

But - why did you get that the commander ignores the commander and commander ??))))

[Kostadinov]

At the same time, the opposing side, i.e. fascist Germany with its fully mobilized and already fighting army

1. The USSR (like Russia in the PRC) could in no way be ahead of Germany in the deployment. Not only because the German army was already at war and fully otmobilized, but also because Germany has the best transport network and more short average transport distances.
2. All that could give a partial mobilization was done. Full mobilization meant a war in which the blame will be for the USSR and Germany still ahead of bi and in this case the USSR.
3. But if, somehow, the USSR managed to outstrip the deployment in some fantasy way, and the attack on Yyun 1941 UTB was the first to lead the bi to even worse results, as UTB in May 1942 of the year.

[chenia]

Quote: Kostadinov

1. The USSR (like Russia in WWI) could not get ahead of Germany in deployment.

I could not get ahead.
The bottom line is that the General Staff in principle correctly assessed the readiness, or rather not the readiness of the Germans to start a war in 1941.
And if so, to hell with BP, all the forces for reorganization, the creation of new structures (30 MK what are). And then, in the fall of 1941, to carry out large gatherings (and the hell would the Germans climbed out to fight the USSR for the winter), drive the MK out during exercises, and adjust the OSh.
And by the spring of 1942 to have a more or less prepared army, with completely mobilized border military forces, and constant numerous gatherings in the internal.

Further, assuming that the Germans were not ready for war, but could go on a provocation (to achieve some kind of concessions), he created a shock fist from MK (in the first operational one). That is, as at Khalkhin-gol, they’ll climb with a powerful fist, and then we will reconcile (for a while naturally).
Zhukov always repeated methods that previously led to success. The fact that he was not able to calculate the changed conditions, well, such is Zhukov (his level) ..

This seems to be possible to justify Zhukov, but the reorganization of the Red Army was carried out in a stupid manner, which destroyed all internal ties between formations and associations, and turned parts into weapons storage bases with constant work on the maintenance of equipment and weapons.
And for this Zhukov must be fully responsible.

[VS]

the very formulation of the question is that - Germany has forerun the Soviet Socialist Republic in deployment - stupidity))))

[avia12005]

Quote: Kostadinov

At the same time, the opposing side, i.e. fascist Germany with its fully mobilized and already fighting army

1. The USSR (like Russia in the PRC) could in no way be ahead of Germany in the deployment. Not only because the German army was already at war and fully otmobilized, but also because Germany has the best transport network and more short average transport distances.
2. All that could give a partial mobilization was done. Full mobilization meant a war in which the blame will be for the USSR and Germany still ahead of bi and in this case the USSR.
3. But if, somehow, the USSR managed to outstrip the deployment in some fantasy way, and the attack on Yyun 1941 UTB was the first to lead the bi to even worse results, as UTB in May 1942 of the year.

From which it follows that if there will be a war between NATO and the Russian Federation, the first kirdyk will have no jokes. Logistics...

[Operator]

The quality of work of the military district military district did not affect the quality of work of the RU of the General Staff of the Red Army in any way, since in its work at the strategic level it mainly used the data of foreign agents. This is even more true for the political leadership of the country, which also used data from foreign agents as part of foreign political intelligence - at that time, 1 GU NKGB of the USSR.

In the first half of 1941, data from foreign agents on these two lines (at least) unequivocally testified to the systematic buildup of German troops on the Soviet border, a month before the attack, summary data from all sources unequivocally indicated the completion of the preparation of the attack on the USSR. Plus, the transfer to a military regime at the same time as Germany's railway transport.

In other words, with the correct conclusion from the information received, it was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces, marshals and generals of NPOs who went to the fullest, and not the colonels and lieutenant colonels of the border military districts.

PS And yes - an urgent wish to the author: to stop confusing the deployment of German invasion forces in the border zone (which was created a few days before the start of the war) with the deployment of the same forces in the border governor generals of Germany (which was opened by Soviet intelligence at all levels for several months before the start of the war).

[VS]

“with the correct conclusion from the information received, it was precisely the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces, marshals and generals of NPOs, and not the colonels and lieutenant colonels of the border military districts that went to the fullest." "

- and in what - then the supreme one went wrong (and who is it on June 21?) and NPOs and the General Staff ???))) Where did you get the idea - that someone went wrong ?? And most importantly - WHAT did this manifest ??
🇧🇷

"" a wish to the author: to stop confusing the deployment of German invasion forces in the border zone (which was created a few days before the start of the war) with the deployment of the same forces in the border governor generals of Germany (which was opened by Soviet intelligence at all levels several months before the start war). "

- take pity on the author - she’s a lady))))

[Operator]

Quote: V.S.

in what - the supreme one went wrong (and who is it on June 21?) and NPOs and the General Staff ???))) Why did you get the idea that someone went wrong ?? And most importantly - WHAT did this manifest?

In the first half of 1941, VG and GSh went around:
- in a general assessment of the intentions of the enemy (an attack on the USSR was expected in 1942);
- in the deployment of the Red Army's available forces directly in the border zone without creating a solid defense line at a distance of 200-300 km from the new border (if there are engineer-trained positions on the old border);
- in the strategic plan of the enemy (long preparation for an offensive within 1-2 weeks after the declaration of war with provoking attacks by small forces, in reality - a massive short-range strike in many directions at the same time);
- in the speed of transfer to martial law of the military units of the Red Army on the border and the transfer of reinforcing forces (compared with the speed of deployment in battle formation and the rate of advance of the enemy).

[Town Hall]

Quote: Operator

- in the strategic plan of the enemy (long preparation for an offensive within 1-2 weeks after the declaration of war with provoking attacks by small forces, in reality - a massive short-range strike in many directions at the same time);

Quote: Operator

- in the strategic plan of the enemy (long preparation for an offensive within 1-2 weeks after the declaration of war with provoking attacks by small forces, in reality - a massive short-range strike in many directions at the same time);

What operational plans do these expectations reflect in? What IQ should (not) be in order to expect such a scenario in 1941 after Poland, France, etc.?

[Operator]

The completion of the mobilization of industry of the USSR and the transition to the production of only new weapons were planned for May 1942.
The pace of formation of the mechanized corps was such that, at best, it would be completed in December 1941.
The advance of the Red Army reserves from the rear military districts to create at least equal forces in the western direction began in June 1941. And if we take into account that a counterattack was planned for the war with "little blood on foreign territory," then the creation of the necessary triple superiority of forces over the Wehrmacht was obviously possible only in the spring of 1942.

As for IQ, I can not help.

[Town Hall]

This is no sideways to the question I asked.


I’ll try to repeat. From where is the statement about the expectation that ".. there will first be an official declaration of war ... and then a couple of weeks the boobs will be remembered, they will take a menacing look .. and only then they will hit .."? ....

Who expected such a scenario from the officials? ... if already two years of the war began with a lightning strike with all forces, either without declaring a war or declaring it a couple of hours before the strike.

[Operator]

If they expected, then why did they tighten it with tightening reserves (July 1941), forming mechanized corps (December 1941) and mobilizing industry (May 1942)?

Or hoping to knead boobs before the May Day holidays?

[Town Hall]

Quote: Operator

If they expected, then why did they tighten it with tightening reserves (July 1941), forming mechanized corps (December 1941) and mobilizing industry (May 1942)?

Or hoping to knead boobs before the May Day holidays?

But would you like the whole army to be on the border strip on June 22.06? What would the Germans have come to Moscow by the main step by autumn?

What kind of industry was Comrade Stalin’s industry not mobilized by the summer of 1941? Which factories didn’t rivet weapons in three shifts by that time and didn’t plant workers for being late / absenteeism and for wrecking failure to fulfill the plan?


The mechanized corps began to be created after analyzing the French campaign of the Germans. Where the German analogs of the mechanized corps proved their effectiveness.

[Operator]

How about understanding the Russian text?

I write “reserves”, “100% industrial mobilization”, “completion of the formation of mechanized corps” - you read “the whole army”, “in three shifts”, “they began to create mechanized corps”.

Maybe change the flag in the avatar?

[ccsr]

Quote: Town Hall

What kind of industry was Comrade Stalin’s industry not mobilized by the summer of 1941? Which factories didn’t rivet weapons in three shifts by that time and didn’t plant workers for being late / absenteeism and for wrecking failure to fulfill the plan?

You started it up - the USSR industry was operating in peacetime by June 22, no one had canceled holidays and weekends, the production of peaceful products did not stop, and the annual plans did not change in industry. So do not create unnecessary myths about the war - there are a lot of them created without you.

[VS]

The completion of the mobilization of industry of the USSR and the transition to the production of only new weapons were planned for May 1942.
The pace of formation of the mechanized corps was such that, at best, it would be completed in December 1941. ""

- i.e. - you made a "conclusion" from THIS that the attack before the 42nd year did not wait ??)))
You’re just like the author - you compose, think up - who is there who “thought” in NGOs and the General Staff - instead of exploring reality)))
And now read Zakharov or the Plenum where they filmed Zhukov - what the General Staff was waiting for the war - and invented those MKs and create other nonsense)))

"" The advance of the Red Army reserves from the rear military districts to create at least equal forces in the western direction began in June 1941. ""

--- actually - in May still)))

"" if you also take into account that a counterattack was planned for the war with "little blood on foreign territory," then the creation of the necessary triple superiority of forces over the Wehrmacht was obviously possible only in the spring of 1942. ""

- And where did you get this - that SO was going to hit Zhukov - with a triple margin - and the MOST IMPORTANT - and where ??)))

[Operator]

Yes, yes, yes: the planned mobilization of industry is carried out a year after the start of the war and nothing else

What is the difference - May / June: Germany was supposed to attack the USSR in May 1941 (Yugoslavia moved the deadline by a month), and the Supreme Council and the General Staff were all guessing on the camomile “attack / not attack”.

And what, for a counterattack no longer triple superiority over the enemy? And what does “where” mean - like “we don’t know where the blows will be delivered and, well, figs with her, with preparation for war”?

[VS]

"" What is the difference - May / June: Germany was supposed to attack the USSR in May 1941 (Yugoslavia moved the deadline by a month), and the Supreme Court and the General Staff all wondered “will attack / not attack” on a daisy. "

- who wondered ??)) In May, the troops began to withdraw from the internal districts)) And on June 6-8-9, the Armed Forces of the districts gave requests to NGOs and the General Staff - is it time to start the withdrawal of troops by the BCP ??)) They are 8-11 On June 12, they signed the directives - so far only the second echelons and reserve reserves should be withdrawn, MK began to withdraw since June 16, and from June 18 they also began to withdraw border divisions. Total border - 17 out of 39 border. But for the fact that someone did not deduce the rest, for this they put it to the box wall)))
As you can see - measures were taken quite adequate)))

"" What, for a counterattack no longer triple superiority over the enemy? "
- you are poorer in the network of garbage any read ()))

Explore the January KSHs — there WAS NO triple or any superiority in forces — the Germans attacked, and in response we launched our offensive — according to the NON-BASIC enemy forces — from KOVO))) and we were in Budapest a week later)))

"" what does "where" mean - like "we don’t know where the blows will be delivered and, well, figs with it, with preparation for war"? ""

- quite everyone who wanted to - knew - where will be what kind of blows)))

[Operator]

Then why ask the question "where"?

KSHI from January 1941 - fiction in its purest form.

[VS]

"" What operational plans do these expectations reflect in? What IQ should (not) be in order to expect such a scenario in 1941 after Poland, France and so on? ""

-))))))))))

[VS]

"" In the first half of 1941, VG and GSh went to bed:
- in a general assessment of the intentions of the enemy (an attack on the USSR was expected in 1942); "

- who said these things - in what docks these things are reflected - the attack will not be earlier than the 42nd ??)))
The author issued Madame - they didn’t wait for the attack because, you see, the reconnaissance did not find another 200 divisions - but only 120-130)) BUT when I asked her to be shown in DOCUMENTS - WHO didn’t wait for the attack when and as indicated, because that there are no 200 more divisions on the border - it has fallen)))

So, what did you get from — whether from Zhukov’s memoirs — that they didn’t wait for the attack before the 42nd — in the spring of the 41st ??)))

"" - in the deployment of the Red Army's available forces directly in the border zone without creating a solid defense line at a distance of 200-300 km from the new border (if there are engineer-trained positions on the old border); ""

- become the Minister of Defense - do it))))

And according to plans in case of war, EXACTLY SUCH same PPs were written even after the Second World War))) - on the border - border divisions are put up and while they meet the enemy and heroically die - the rest of the army and country and carry out mobilization))) and in peacetime - border districts kept in abbreviated composition))) And - the transition to the states of wartime, through the same bus - would be carried out - as well as in the spring of the 41st)))

"" in the strategic plan of the enemy (lengthy preparations for an offensive within 1-2 weeks after the declaration of war with provoking attacks by small forces, in reality - a massive short-range strike in many directions at the same time); ""

- Do you still believe that EVERYTHING in the General Staff and NGOs thought SO, and even more so in the Kremlin - that SO the war will begin ??))) Believe that Zhukov was so dumb actually ??))

"" in the speed of transfer to martial law of the military units of the Red Army on the border and the transfer of reinforcing forces (compared with the speed of deployment in combat formation and the rate of advance of the enemy). ""

- here, too, no one messed around - everything was done in accordance with the plans, but they remained the same AFTER WWII)))

[Operator]

Yes-yes-yes: VG / GSh plans - the most planned plans in the world, said according to plan - means according to plan, and there though the grass doesn’t grow and nevermind the reports of three types of intelligence about an "unscheduled" attack by the enemy

[RuSFr]

Thanks to the author for an interesting article.

[SCHWERIN]

The article makes you think and analyze. And further. In Soviet times, all analytics (I mean public) came down to the publication of "castrated" memoirs of military commanders. And still we do not know why it happened? And after all, this is not the fault of several people, but it turns out the whole mechanism was not configured. It is rightly said that the PEOPLE won the war, the personnel units stood to their deaths, conquering the minutes, hours, days by their death in the conditions of the complete destruction of the army control system. Thanks to the author ...

[VS]

Quote: SCHWERIN

we still don’t know why it happened?

who does not know ??)))

[SCHWERIN]

And who can point to specific culprits from among at least the military and list them in order? And what is their fault. You? Just don't mention the IVS. He alone could not demand from lieutenants to abide by the Charter of the Red Army. Just don’t talk about Zhukov, he’s our Marshal of Victory.

[VS]

Quote: stalkerwalker

On your part, I see only criticism ... Or did you publish a monograph about one of the moments of the Great Patriotic War?

already nak - 7 books))))

[VS]

Quote: Operator

If they expected, then why did they tighten it with tightening reserves (July 1941), forming mechanized corps (December 1941) and mobilizing industry (May 1942)?

and where did you get it - what did they delay ??)))

[Operator]

You will study the percentage of transfer of reserves of the Red Army to the western direction as of June 22, 1941, the number of staffed mechanized corps on the same date and the level of mobilization of Soviet industry to the heap.

[VS]

Quote: SCHWERIN

And who can point to specific culprits from among at least the military and list them in order? And what is their fault. You? Just don't mention the IVS. He alone could not demand from lieutenants to abide by the Charter of the Red Army. Just don’t talk about Zhukov, he’s our Marshal of Victory.

it’s from Zhukov’s who will have to be enumerated)))) from his plans for the event of war — ka, he represented these things and how he wanted to fight))) alas ... More precisely - with the Meretskovsky’s still suit - to attack first))) Next - see the shooting things - like maple boxes Kablov Pavlov and others. Kirpanos shit in the districts with the execution of the orders of the General Staff in the pre-war days)))
That is, some - they composed idiotic - adventurous minimum plans for the event of war, and others - prepared for their defeat by not fulfilling the orders that there were shliy in the okrug in the pre-war days.

[VS]

Quote: Operator

VG / GSh plans - the most planned plans in the world, said according to plan - that means according to plan, and even though there is no grass to grow and nevermind to reports of three types of intelligence about an "unscheduled" attack by the enemy

VG is who ??)) What kind of position and who is this as a character ??))

In case of war they write plans - which usually after a couple of days at most - fall down)) But - you can’t not write)))
Except maybe Zhukov didn’t put on intelligence reports))) Surely it wasn’t Stalin))) And to see it - and we need to study - not who is there "THINKING" in the General Staff reviewing ONLY a couple of intelligence reports that are published - out of hundreds of friends - but it is necessary to study - what directives went in the district in those days and how they were implemented)))

[VS]

Quote: Operator

Learn the percentage of transfer of reserves of the Red Army to the western direction as of June 22, 1941, the number of manned mechanized corps on the same date and the level of mobilization of Soviet industry to the heap.

try to learn the simple - FIRST ACCEPT BATTLE - BORDER divisions))) And most importantly - WHEN THEY will be withdrawn at the BCP and how quickly they will take their trenches at the border. And those 17 divisions that out of 39 were withdrawn by the BCP from June 18 - to the areas of BCP - to the defense lines - they completely occupied the trenches))) When they were given the order for deer at 2 o’clock. b.n. - go to full b..g- i.e. give ammunition to the soldiers and "take the firing points at the border" and at 3 o'clock they gave the order to open their packages))) And while they are fighting and dying - ALL other troops will get time - to mobilize the divisions of the second echelon and reserves and MK including))) and industry as well))) But 17th - this is only 17th. - and they couldn’t keep the enemy at the border - thanks for that to the plans of the General Staff ... After all, Meretskov and Zhukov were cut to 30 -50 km at the border))) because these "strategists" were preparing to attack first and then embed in response without bothering about the defense especially))

[VS]

Quote: Operator

KSHI from January 1941 - fiction in its purest form.

almost))) This fiction and tried to implement our strategists in the end)))
Shaposhnikov’s plan - to deploy troops with an idea - our main forces are opposed to the main enemy forces Meretskov and others. Untery have taken over and started to push the idea - our main ones are opposed to the NON-ESSENTIAL enemy forces - and if not the first to fight, Meretskov was the main supporter of the attack first always - then in response - you have to hit fast - right after the enemy attack)))
Stalin didn’t approve of this — he upheld Shaposhnikov’s plan — our MAJORs against the main forces of the Germans — but at the same time allowed our warriors to check their proposals on those KSHs)))
Let me tell you - approved plans do not play on KSHI))))
These KSHs also showed - their stupidity and fantasticness - when the Germans came up with stupid actions that helped us beautifully defeat the Germans ALWAYS)))
On January 13, Stalin will hold a meeting - a discussion of these CSIs where the military indicates their mistakes and stupidities, but these instructions are not accepted and Zhukov, having become the head of the General Staff, is stubbornly trying to implement these ideas quietly - we will advance from KOVO - according to the UNFINCERNED enemy forces)))
In May, CSIs are held again and there the game is fair - but this is a separate issue)))

[ccsr]

Some unhurried scenario of the expected military operations, do not you think? And the top leadership of the spacecraft believed that this is how events will occur during hostilities with German troops.

So, based on your words, the leadership of the Red Army did not take into account the experience of the Wehrmacht’s military operations against Poland — you seem to be from advanced “military experts”.

On the contrary, the old-fashioned plan provided for the so-called initial period of the war lasting 15-20 days from the start of hostilities until the main troops of the country entered the business, during which the troops of the echelons from border military units deployed along the borders should cover mobilization with their military operations. the concentration and deployment of the main forces of our troops.

The point is not "the old fashioned way", but that based on these terms, the district’s mobile reserves are formed based on the fact that stocks of all types of weapons, ammunition, food, etc. It should be enough for this period, and how they will make up for losses later, it is not within the competence of the district, because the General Staff is engaged in this.

It turns out that the RO Zapovo, unlike the RO PribOVO, managed to detect the exit of German troops from the depths of its territory to the border at the starting lines. RO ZAPOVO was also able to detect a sharp increase in the number of German units from 30 (appearing in intelligence reports for 1,5 months) to 49 by 20-00 on 21.6.41 ... But I did not manage to bring ZAPOVO to the leadership for various reasons ... On the document mark: "Sent June 22, 1941 at 15 hours 20 minutes." This information did not reach the beginning of the war before the leadership of ZAPOVO and PribOVO.

Absolute nonsense - this report is reported by the NSh to the district commander immediately, and she was sent to the General Staff of the GSh, which is why the time of sending to Moscow, and not the time of her report to the district commander, is indicated.

[aKtoR]

“So, based on your words, the leadership of the Red Army did not take into account the experience of the Wehrmacht’s combat operations against Poland — you seem to be from advanced military experts.”

You seem ready to give out labels, do not think much? 3 part.
In December 1940, a meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft was held in Moscow, where G. Zhukov with the report: "The nature of the modern offensive operation": "What is particularly instructive of the actions in the West?
1. This is a bold and decisive use of [German] TD and MK in close cooperation with the Air Force throughout the depth of the enemy’s operational defense.
2. Decisive strikes by the MK in the oncoming battle and their desire to bravely and independently break through to the rear of the operational grouping of the enemy.
3. The massive use of parachute units and air divisions to capture the most important objects in the near and deep rear of the enemy, with the frequent use of these troops in the form of the enemy.
4. During the breakthrough of the UR, the Germans paid special attention to the close cooperation of infantry, artillery, tanks, sappers and aviation.
5. High rates of offensive operations. Poland ... the average daily advance of the Germans ... 30km. Holland, Belgium and Northern France - 20 km per day. Defeat of France - 16 km per day. At the same time, the effect of the MMC reached 100 — 120 km [the Guderian group went to a depth of 100 km — this stage lasted for the day 3-4 of the day from D. Pavlov's report].
6. The offensive operation, as a rule, was preceded by the advance development of a powerful network of espionage agents and sabotage groups. This agents, as a rule, sat down closer to airfields, URs, the most important warehouses, railway bridges and other important objects.
7. This is the ability of the Germans to organize the continuity of operations. The continuity of operations in all cases was ensured by: preliminary thorough preparation of the operation and the presence of a plan for the subsequent operation, powerful automobile transport and a well-developed network of railways providing extensive regroupings, troops and rear equipment, and the presence of layered reserves.
Modern conditions are characterized by the presence of powerful technical means of struggle, allowing the upcoming:
1. In close cooperation of aviation, tank units, artillery and rifle troops, destroy not only the field defense, but also break through the modern fortified strip.
2. Having broken through the tactical defense, having entered a powerful mobile group, defeat operational reserves decisively and develop operational success into strategic success.
3. With a powerful and sudden blow, crush the enemy's air force to the full depth of the operational-strategic strike and win air supremacy ... ”
G. Zhukov noted the main points that the spacecraft will face with the start of the 1941 summer war. Having no practical experience in front-line operations with the use of large MMPs, he, as we see, is well acquainted with the topic. Understands the place of parachute assault forces and enemy agents. It is strange that after the war he wrote in his memoirs: “A major gap in Soviet military science was that we did not draw practical conclusions from the experience of the battles of the initial period of the Second World War in the West ... First of all, about the operational-strategic surprise with which Hitler's troops invaded the countries of Europe. Striking powerful blows with armored troops, they quickly cut through the defenses to reach the enemy’s rear. The actions of the armored forces the Germans supported the Air Force ... " The same GSH operates with the rate of advance of the German troops to 12 km / day. Probably, your claims should be attributed to the former employees of the General Staff ...

[aKtoR]

"Complete nonsense - this report is reported to the NSH to the commander of the district immediately, but it was sent to the RS of the GS, that is why the time of departure to Moscow is indicated, and not the time of its report to the commander of the district."

It is clear to any close person that the time of sending to Moscow is indicated and not only
The summary was still sent to ZOVOVO.
First of all, this intelligence was not reported to the commander before 00-00. She only began to print after 20-00. Before 22-00, it was not even read by the deputy director of the RO.
It is not known even when the school district has read the text of this particular report.

If you have proof of reverse - present them and everyone will understand your genius or, on the contrary, not knowing ....

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The quality of work of the military district military district did not affect the quality of work of the RU of the General Staff of the Red Army in any way, since in its work at the strategic level it mainly used the data of foreign agents.

This was a strong juggle, if only because the OVNAZ district radio divisions could more accurately reveal not only the enemy’s border grouping, but they probably also revealed the passage of the Dortmund signal, which was reported to the General Staff, which is why they urgently convened a meeting on June 21 from Stalin . This is a very specific question, and you will never study it in the open archives of the Moscow Region, because the GRU will not allow anyone to access its archives.

[VS]

Quote: aKtoR

G. Zhukov noted the main points that the spacecraft will face with the outbreak of war in the summer of 1941. Having no practical experience in front-line operations with the use of large-scale IFMs, he, as we see, is well versed in the topic. He understands the place of parachute landing and enemy agents. It is strange that after the war he writes in his memoirs: “A major gap in Soviet military science was that we did not draw practical conclusions from the experience of the battles of the initial period of World War II in the West ...

Yes, there is nothing strange here)) He hid his chatter with this chatter and blame for the pogrom of the summer of 41))) After all, if he knew how Germany would attack and he honestly wrote about it in his memoirs, they could have asked him if he had to answer - why then did the plgshgrom happen ?? !! But - Zhukov himself rehabilitated the Pavlovs, and therefore it was necessary either to slander Stalin who allegedly did not allow him to bring troops to the battlefield. and fool themselves to expose themselves in such a way and lie that they did not expect such an attack - or we would have to go to court ourselves (((

[VS]

Quote: aKtoR

It is clear to any close person that the time of sending to Moscow is indicated and not only
The summary was still sent to ZOVOVO.
First of all, this intelligence was not reported to the commander before 00-00. She only began to print after 20-00. Before 22-00, it was not even read by the deputy director of the RO.

And where is the mark - when it was printed - at what time ??)))

There is only the SENDING time already in the General Staff and the rest is your “guesses” again)))

Do you want to say that her RO in Minsk was sent to the General Staff - at 2 a.m. - without allowing Pavlova and his nsh to be read?)))

[aKtoR]

In principle, the author promised to enter into a discussion with you, but today I will answer ...
I don't want to say that the bulletin was sent to 2-00. I want to say that the text this The reports were not interesting to our district. Try to guess why.
If you can, I will continue the explanation ...

[VS]

as I understand it - it’s prettier for you when the ignoramuses praise you ??)))
Why did you get that the NSh didn’t read it and was not interested in him, huh?) Again, you give out YOUR fantasies - who do you think “think” instead of analysis - do you come up with affairs and actions - who do you think? On the basis of some reports you think up who there thought instead of looking - and what they did, in response to them ???))
Read Purkaev’s answer - by June 11th they were talking with Zhukov - supposedly intelligence gives data about the attack - we ask the PP to enter - withdraw the divisions to the URA))) And - June 12, Zhukov gave them the go-ahead for this)))

And - it’s all the same to me - and you shouldn’t take me weakly - "if you can continue the explanation")))
So far - you compose garbage here - YOUR fantasies are given out as the "thinking" of the General Staff or someone else)))

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

Some unhurried scenario of the expected military operations, do not you think? And the top leadership of the spacecraft believed that this is how events will occur during hostilities with German troops.

I hope you do not disown your words?
You yourself have refuted this conclusion, referring to the report of Zhukov in 1940: "The nature of the modern offensive operation."
So I didn’t put a label on you, but you didn’t bother to understand that the General Staff knew perfectly well that there would be no “unhurried script”.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

First of all, this intelligence was not reported to the commander before 00-00. She only began to print after 20-00. Before 22-00, it was not even read by the deputy director of the RO.

Actually, the daily intelligence is prepared by the operational duty officer and submits it to the district intelligence chief for signature at a STRICTLY set time. It is not necessary to represent her to the deputy chief of intelligence, unless he has remained for the chief — this is an alphabet that you do not know, but undertake to discuss such a difficult issue.

It is not known even when the school district has read the text of this particular report.

In peacetime, the head of the district’s headquarters receives a reconnaissance report at a strictly defined time, because this document is generated on the basis of data submitted to the intelligence department by subordinate agencies and intelligence units by a certain date. During the war, these terms can be changed, but for this an order of the NS of the okrug (front) is needed at least, because the intelligence chief of the okrug (front) does not have the right to give orders to army chiefs of staff. Do you even understand this?

If you have evidence to the contrary - present them and everyone will understand your genius or vice versa not knowledge ....

So far, you have demonstrated ignorance regarding the organization of intelligence in the district, and this immediately catches the eye of those who, unlike you, are in the subject. So do not rush to your conclusions - learn a little so that you begin to be taken seriously by military experts.

[aKtoR]

Have fun, my dear! So you understand intelligence matters!
I hope you know that ZHAPOVO NS is directly the head of the RO district head. You should also be aware that the intelligence reports from the unions went several times a day and their head of the RO already reported to the Klimovskys. In addition, the deputy chief, who was responsible for the intelligence work, was literally choking on the flow of reports, which were also reported as the information was important (either in groups or most important, according to a specialist). Information is also reflected on the map. Border guards were also noted ... The NS district knew all the intelligence information, tried to report back to the commander of the troops and once the beginning of the General Staff. The problem was that focal concentrations of enemy troops near the initial positions were detected. Therefore, when, after 20-00, they got ready to prepare a summary (you are mistaken, daily intelligence reports began to be prepared only with 22.6.41), then neither the head of the PO, nor the Zapov National School was at its headquarters. Around 23-00, the Klimovskys tried again to report on the concentration of troops to Zhukov, but failed. Printed intelligence Klimovskiy saw and signed in the afternoon 22.6.41. Pavlov did not see the text of this report, this information after 23-00 turned out to be unclaimed ...
And the report went right after the NS had time to sign it.

[aKtoR]

Unfortunately, I need to leave the site for a certain time and your answer could not be seen. It could be nice to "put you in a puddle" ...
You, of course, should have said about the daily intelligence reports ...
In response, a couple of questions (they could have been much more with links to published documents) would have been from me: "If the reports are daily, then why did the RPN PribOVO RP intelligence from the year 18.6.41 have the entire number 18? And what kind of reports did the pre-war RO prepare?"
PS In the first message, the time "22-00" and "00-00" are "checkboxes" - to understand your level of awareness in this matter. Time from the source is somewhat different)))

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

The same GSH operates with the rate of advance of the German troops to 12 km / day. Probably, your claims should be attributed to the former employees of the General Staff ...

Of course, the officers of the General Staff believed that the divisions in Brest would not sleep, and that part of the cover, at least by the beginning of the German attack, would be located not far from the positions assigned to them under the cover plan. That's why they hoped that on the first day the Germans would not be able to advance at a faster pace. By the way, some border outposts fought without cover units until 10-12 hours on June 22 — that is what combat positions occupied on time and the ability to fight even with small arms are meant.

[aKtoR]

This means only one thing, that these positions were secondary. If they stood in the direction of the main or at least an auxiliary strike, they would have been demolished in less than half an hour.

[VS]

WHO TELL YOU that the Brest direction in the General Staff was considered secondary ???) AGAIN you invented something - on the basis of some data or God forbid a lie of memoirs - and give out these things as truths - who is there that "THINK" in the General Staff)))) Read the answer ns SK who covered this direction - HOW HE ASSESSED the situation - not you))))))

[ccsr]

Quote: SCHWERIN

Rokossovsky after all exactly sitting,

Do you know why Rokossovsky was under investigation? Take an interest, and then you might find out what he was accused of. By the way, he was not convicted - the investigation was closed, he did not even serve a term.

[aKtoR]

It is even known who among the great specialists of the bodies interrogated him. They even met quite peacefully in 1941. Strong physical measures were not applied to him, lucky, great for an unknown reason did not begin to break him

[VS]

why should someone break Rokosovsky’s ??)) you don’t know why he was arrested and why - and again they carried some garbage)) But yes - he just didn’t knock out his teeth)) like the Queen, they didn’t break his jaw and like this then became the cause of his death on the operating table)))

[VS]

Quote: aKtoR

I need to leave the site for a certain time and your answer could not be seen. It could be nice to "put you in a puddle" ...

I hope you already understand how you yourself flopped into a puddle? It turns out not only in PribOVO that they brought their border divisions into the defense zone))) In PribOVO, they removed 6 out of a minimum of 16 border divisions — across the entire border))) and I brought orders to this effect on the KOVO here)))

[VS]

Quote: aKtoR

Why did RO Pribovo intelligence report dated 18.6.41 have a total of 18?

June 1 - number 1 was)) and June 18 - number 18))) ???

ZAPOVO at 22.00 on the 11th sent a report on the withdrawal of troops - at number 1 ..)) and on the 21st - at number 11)))

[RuSFr]

You were caught as a little kid.
Everyone knows that intelligence number 18.6.41 has 15
How does the writer not know this for many years engaged in history?
You do not know that you can’t have two profiles?

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

You were caught as a little kid.
Everyone knows that intelligence number 18.6.41 has 15
How does the writer not know this for many years engaged in history?
You do not know that you can’t have two profiles?

You’re a little child in military history, and don’t know that the intelligence number is not tied to a date:

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

Have fun, my dear! So you understand intelligence matters!

I think that is better than you.

I hope you know that NS ZAPOVO is directly the chief of the district RO head. You should also know that reconnaissance reports from associations went several times a day and their beginning was already reported by Klimovsky.

What does this have to do with the fact that the DAILY reconnaissance is compiled for a specific hour? Only the operational duty officer decides which of the information received will go into the reconnaissance text, and that "will fly to the basket." You do not know this either, but you are already undertaking to teach me.

In addition, the deputy chief, who was responsible for the intelligence work, was literally choked with the flow of reports, which were also reported as information was important (either by groups or the most important, according to the specialist). Information is also reflected on the map.

You have no idea what the district intelligence kit is, how it functions, what tasks were assigned to the OCHNAZ radio division and to a separate radio unit of the special service, what information came from neighboring districts and the General Staff, who processed the air reconnaissance reports, but suddenly decided that intelligence work was a little perhaps not the most important, although from the point of view of obtaining operational information, the agent network is not always able to quickly organize the receipt of the NECESSARY information. So first, learn about this issue so that your opinion is taken seriously.

The NSh of the district knew all the intelligence information, tried to report to the commander of the troops and once started the General Staff. The problem was that focal concentrations of enemy troops were found near the starting positions. Therefore, when after 20-00 they sat down to prepare a report (you are mistaken the daily reconnaissance reports began to be prepared only from 22.6.41), then by the end of the headquarters there were neither the beginning of the RO nor the NS ZAPOVO. Around 23-00 Klimovskikh tried once again to report on the concentration of troops to Zhukov, but unsuccessfully.

By and large, it is the district’s chief of staff who needs intelligence most of all, because on its basis the operations department will receive instructions from him for developing operational plans. Your vision of the “problem” tells me that you have no idea how the district headquarters function, that’s why you are making ridiculous conclusions about secondary facts, giving them out almost as defining.
By the way, daily intelligence is a mandatory element in the organization of duty in the RO district in peacetime - you are not in the subject here.

Klimovskikh saw the printed intelligence report and signed it on the afternoon of 22.6.41.

Yes, the chief of staff of the district does not sign the daily intelligence report - its chief of intelligence of the district signs. Only in those cases when he receives instructions from the chief of the General Staff to submit an extraordinary report, then he will personally sign a telegram or encryption.

Pavlov did not see the text of this summary, this information after 23-00 turned out to be unclaimed ...
And the report went right after the NS had time to sign it.

So what about the fact that Pavlov did not see her - it is enough for him to call the chief of staff or give a telegram, and he will immediately be informed about everything that intelligence has at the moment. Pavlov can call the intelligence chief for a report - that’s all, so there’s no need to fantasize, everything is much simpler and worked out during the exercises. Moreover, the daily reconnaissance report must be submitted to the General Staff of the General Staff, and in some cases even before the NSh of the district sees it - this is determined by the chief of the General Staff.

[RuSFr]

You forgot that it’s forbidden to have two profiles on the site

[RuSFr]

Even I, a German, know that there is no operational duty officer in the intelligence department of the Russian district. It’s just on duty. The operational duty officer may be at the district headquarters. This person cannot see intelligence.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

This means only one thing, that these positions were secondary. If they stood in the direction of the main or at least an auxiliary strike, they would have been demolished in less than half an hour.

So, according to the cover plan, the border guards needed to hold out for 45 minutes before the arrival of the allocated detachments from the cover divisions - there was such a standard in the ZAPOVO. The trouble is that not in all sections of the state border the border guards arrived at the time indicated by the normative. But this then played a decisive role in the defeat of our units during the first days of the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

It is even known who among the great specialists of the bodies interrogated him. They even met quite peacefully in 1941. Strong physical measures were not applied to him, lucky, great for an unknown reason did not begin to break him

As expected, you don’t even know what was blamed on Rokossovsky, but you’re already undertaking to give estimates of that time. Well, take an interest, and then you will understand why it happened.

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

You were caught as a little kid.
Everyone knows that intelligence number 18.6.41 has 15
How does the writer not know this for many years engaged in history?

You look like a small child in this situation, because intelligence reports are taken into account by time and date, and a number is assigned to it depending on the adopted registration system in the intelligence department. That's why the intelligence number has no direct relation to the date of its compilation.

You do not know that you can’t have two profiles?

Why have you placed this pearl here? Leave your speculative conclusions to yourself.

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

Even I, a German, know that there is no operational duty officer in the intelligence department of the Russian district. It’s just on duty. The operational duty officer may be at the district headquarters. This person cannot see intelligence.

You don’t know, because the operational duty officer in the intelligence department can be appointed by order of the district’s intelligence chief — it all depends on the forces and means of the district’s intelligence, as well as on the deployment of the district itself and the opposing enemy grouping.

[RuSFr]

I apologize for my ignorance
So you know better.
For a long time it was 77 years ago. Could give an address where to look
You read or see it somewhere. Something I think you are using modern data and telling lies. If there is no address, then you are a liar

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

You read or see it somewhere. Something I think you are using modern data and telling lies. If there is no address, then you are a liar

Yes, I’m not a liar, but you’re just a layman in military affairs - open the staff structure of a separate OCHNA radio division on the eve of the war and find out what is hidden under the term OO and to whom they presented operational information about their work. This also applies to other reconnaissance units and bodies - for example, individual district radio nodes. As for your claims that I “use modern data”, you are a complete amateur here, because the modern intelligence department has two duty officers - operational and regular, it all depends on the forces and means of intelligence.

[RuSFr]

I was sure that there would be no links. Your reasoning alone, as in the second. Profile. For a long time I had to study the intelligence structure of the Red Army districts as well. Before the war, there was no operational duty officer in the intelligence department of the district. Such a position was at the district headquarters. You are a swindler and a liar. There is no more communication with you .. I also had control, but I do not insult people and write the truth

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

For a long time it was 77 years ago. Could give an address where to look

I don’t know why you have a Russian address, but you are clearly not a citizen of Russia, and therefore it is unlikely that you will understand what is described here, but try to understand what “operational information” means and how it is disposed of in critical cases, not even in the intelligence department:

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

If there is no address, then you are a liar

If you are illiterate, then it’s not my fault, but I recommend not to show your ignorance on Russian forums, it’s better to show it to your compatriots, they will probably be more loyal to you. Well, here they’ll just make fun of us - the people of the ignorant do not like us, and they will demonstrate it to you.

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

I was sure that there would be no links. Your reasoning alone, as in the second. Profile. For a long time I had to study the intelligence structure of the Red Army districts as well. Before the war, there was no operational duty officer in the intelligence department of the district. Such a position was at the district headquarters. You are a swindler and a liar. There is no more communication with you .. I also had control, but I do not insult people and write the truth

You poorly studied the structure of military intelligence, which is why you don’t know that in intelligence at all levels, starting from the RU of the Red Army and ending with separate regional radio divisions, there were operational duty officers, because this was required for the operational control of reconnaissance forces and assets. Not only that, there were even regular duty officers, but you don’t know this either:
"Matsukevich Alexander Konstantinovich

Matsukevich Alexander Konstantinovich (ps.: Matsuna). 1911, Art. Isakagorka Northern Railway -?

Russian. Of employees. Colonel In the Red Army since 1933. Member of the Communist Party since 1931. He graduated from the eight-year school.

He completed a training course in the training team of the headquarters of the Belarusian Military District (1934-1935). Then the assistant chief of the 6th (encryption) branch of the headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps (1935-1936).

In military intelligence since 1936. At the disposal of the RU of the Red Army (February 1937 — October 1938). Cryptographer (Talmudist) of the apparatus of the chief military adviser in Spain. By a closed decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR dated July 17.07.1937, XNUMX, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. The operational duty of the 1st branch of the secret encryption department of the RU of the Red Army (October - December 1938), employee for assignments under the chief of the RO headquarters of the Trans-Baikal Military District (December 1938 - October 1939). "
So this is you an illiterate crook, spreading lies on Russian sites, and even loving to slander at other forum participants.

[RuSFr]

I will not argue, but on indirect facts you are right
As for blasphemy - it’s a shame at your age not to be able to behave in society and to deceive. You are not another forum member
And the same one. Two-faced Janus

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

As for blasphemy - it’s a shame at your age not to be able to behave in society and to deceive.

I’m not deceiving anyone, but you’re a scammer and this is obvious to any Russian person, because you and I have a different understanding about decency.

[ccsr]

Posted by: aKtoR writes:

Employees of the front of the RO front "piled" his immediate superior - the front of the NS, blaming him for his flaw. I am glad that among the witnesses, not a single deputy (or assistant) of the NS and other employees of PribOVO-NWF, leadership and army headquarters were noted.

This nonsense could only be written by a person who understands neither the ear nor the snout in the relationship within the district, because operators can "knock down" the NSh district faster than intelligence officers when the "debriefing begins." As for the alleged “flaws” in the intelligence, the author is apparently so illiterate in this matter that he never saw real reports of the Pribovo headquarters on the eve of the war, which even indicate individual battalions:
https://d.radikal.ru/d19/1802/fa/53e99f3c3c2a.jpg

https://a.radikal.ru/a30/1802/95/269c93e70857.jpg

https://b.radikal.ru/b09/1802/71/842b74599ef7.jpg

https://c.radikal.ru/c17/1802/26/c7213f67f4b4.jpg

[Mikhail Zubkov]

I quote very good. an important finding of the author: "Below is the order of the NSh of the 11th Army artillery that at 14-00 on 21.6.41, according to the reconnaissance data, the position (deployment of enemy units) has not changed.

“Combat order No. 01 headquarters nachartm 11, Kaunas 21.6.1941/14/00 XNUMX-XNUMX

1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same.

2. Conduct reconnaissance by all means of artillery instrumental reconnaissance and ground observation with the task of identifying the grouping of artillery, OP and NP areas

a) NAK-16 [chief of artillery of the 16th sk] to conduct reconnaissance in the strip: on the right is the Neman River, on the left is Vidgira, Pelyany, Poyava, Lake Pobondze. Particular attention Lazenen, Shillenen, Shirvindt, Aydkunen, Vishtynets

b) NAD-126 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: fl. Karklin, Pilekalne, Lepolata, Kamionka; left: Krasna, Pogrudy, Polyunts flora, Voytok. Particular attention to the direction of Suwalki

c) NAD-128 conduct reconnaissance in the band: on the right: Podzishki, Zelenka, Buraki, Lake Seyva; left: Druskiniki, Koptsevo, Budnitsa, Sernetka. Particular attention: Sejny, Giba

3. Information about intelligence should be displayed in detail in intelligence reports and submitted to Nachararma by 3, 10 and 15 hours daily. " Artillery NS of 11 Army Major (Svettsov), Pom.NSh for reconnaissance lieutenant (Belostotsky) ". The author's find is important because in the afternoon of 21.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. PribOVO actually fought as a Northwest Federal District. was clear - they had already fought. And all sorts of PMCs of the front like Dibrov, on the instructions of any Mekhlis and Timoshenkov from Moscow, ACTIVELY prevented them from doing this, connecting the General Staff of the NKO to this.