Military Review

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 9)

49



In 1940 and in the first half of 1941, at the command and staff games, the “Southern” and “Northern” scenarios of a possible war with Germany, primarily affecting KOVO and PribOVO, were considered. In accordance with the disinformation measures carried out by the Germans, the General Staff of the Spacecraft adopted the “Southern” option as the main one.

In the 1 and 2 parts, quite a lot of intelligence reports were presented on this issue. For example, in special messages The “foremen” (11.6.41) stated: “... In the leading circles of the German Ministry aviation and the aviation headquarters say that the question of the attack on the Soviet Union is finally resolved. Goering's main headquarters is moved from Berlin, presumably to Romania. 18 June Goering should go to the new headquarters. " One of the highest officials of Germany can go to Romania: is it that the most important military events are expected? AT special messages KVTs (19.6.41) said: “... Counsel Schieber stated that the attack would occur in the coming days, namely June 23 or June 24 ... Tippelskirch believes that reason for war will any border conflict on the Soviet-Romanian border... "Romania again ... Therefore, when developing the last Peace Directive No. 1 (for 6 ... 7 hours before the war), we could not ignore this trend. In draft material, the ciphering directive after words "The German attack can start with provocative actions." crossed out words: "Especially from Romania."

It would be logical to assume that equipment with equipment and troops should be carried out according to the priority of the districts considered during these games, as well as taking into account the detected groups of the opposing enemy forces: KOVO, PribOVO, ZOVO, LVO and OdVO. Consider how it really was.

What was the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic States? PribOVO consisted of 8, 11 and 27 army (the beginning of the formation of 27 army 25.5.41), 3 and 12-th micron (four TD and two MD), seven SK (nineteen cd), 5-rd airborne corps, 9 and 10-I anti-tank artillery brigades, eleven ap (corps and RGK), three air defense brigades (10, 12 and 14-I) and 3-I separate rifle brigade. Unlike KOVO and ZOVOVO, PribOVO practically did not have district reserves. The reserve of the district was 180-I SD and 5-th airborne corps.

In the Estonian SSR, the 65 st skater was concentrated as part of 11, 16 and 90 st. One of the tasks of the corps was the implementation of the antiamphibious defense of the coast. In wartime, the 16-I SD was supposed to be part of the LVO. These actions were reinforced by intelligence (we now know that it was misinformation). AT special messages Yeshchenko (26.3.41) said: "... Germany is expected to speak in Ukraine through 2-3 of the month, at the same time the Baltic countries will perform, where the Germans expect a rebellion against the USSR ... "In special messages "KHVTs" (7.5.41): "... On the Baltic Sea coast, the Germans concentrated a large number of ships intended for the landing of troops. It is possible that Hitler, at the same time as he was performing at the land borders, will try to land troops in the Baltic States in order to leave an army in the rear to protect the borders and to expand the front from the north ... ”

In connection with the increase of the German grouping against the PribOVO troops in May 1941, the 90-I division was transferred to Lithuania. Unlike KOVO and ZOVOVO, where in transferring the corps of the district reserves, whole armies began to relocate to replace them, in the Baltics new connections did not increase. Only the subordination of the 16 division was changed - in the case of hostilities, it remained at the disposal of PribOVO. June 14 was supposed to begin redeployment to Lithuania. 11-I sd. The first parts of this division began to unload 21.6.41 d. The redeployment of 16-sd was planned, but before 22.6.41 it did not start due to the lack of railway cars.

The total troop count on 22.6.41 was 369702 people, of which 347987 people. combat strength (excluding air force units, logistics and support). 99 construction sites, demining and car battalions took part in the work on equipping defensive lines at the border, taking into account that the number of district troops exceeded 400 thousand people. Most of the personnel of the sections and battalions (practically without weapons), in accordance with the plans of the command, were to be used to complete the units and formations of the HE. According to the memoirs of Major-General I.I.Burlakin (commander of 523 cn 188 cd): “It was indicated that the construction site was quickly subordinate to me ... During the reconnaissance period, I contacted the site head and found that they had more than two thousand personnel, 50 rifles, some of which were training, two training programs and no more weapons. Due to the fact that the personnel turned out to be unarmed, I especially didn’t link up interaction issues with them ... ”

After the start of the war, before 10.7.41, the assigned personnel was sent to the NWF to deploy units and formations to the war-time states from the Moscow Military District in an amount of about 160 thousand. To replenish the natural loss of personnel of the front, 24 of the marching battalion, 5 artillery battalions and 12 batteries with a total number of about 26 thousand were received. from other VO.

The PribOVO troops included 22 st (180 (in the district reserve) and 182 pr), 24 st (181 and 183 sd), 29 st (179 and 184 sd), formed, respectively, on the basis of former armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In total, in these divisions there were about 30 thousand people.

«People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Commander of the Western Front 22.6.41 9-35 ... In Orany there is 184-I SD, which not yet equipped with our composition completely and is absolutely unreliable, 179-I SD - in Siventsyany also not manned and unreliable, I also appreciate 181-th Gulbene, 183-I on the march to camp Riga ... F.Kuznetsov Dibrova» When talking about "Our lineup"it implies the arrival of personnel from the MVO. It should be noted that 21.8.41 remains to 181 in 40 sd, and in 183 cd - 60 Latvians. Most of the personnel fled, someone died, someone went to the service of the Germans. In principle, it was natural, in one year the population cannot be dragged to one’s side. Therefore, before staffing 179 ... 183 sd personnel living outside the Baltic states, it was impractical and dangerous to redeploy these divisions closer to the border. Thus, at the disposal of the command of PribOVO there were reliable 13 sd (of which one was waiting for the wagons at Tallinn, and the second was being transferred by rail).

It was planned to use 40 German divisions against the PribOVO troops, which accounted for 32% of the total number of German armed forces formations against the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO troops. The indicated number of divisions included 13 TD and MD (39,4% of the German moto-armored forces deployed against the spacecraft). Thus, in the first days of the war, the most powerful group of German troops was set up against the forces of PribOVO-NWF in relation to the number of spacecraft formations in the military forces. Below is a table with the distribution tanksarmed with a weapon in the border military district

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 9)


From the presented materials it is clear that by the number of tanks PribOVO ranks fourth, and by the number of modern tanks - 3. At the 1-th place KOVO, on the 2-m - ZOVOVO. It turns out that when equipping with tanks, VO was not guided by the possible variants of the main attacks of the enemy. Consider the information on the security of some artillery systems of the troops of the Western HE.



From the table it can be seen that according to the provision of six types of guns, the PribOVO troops occupy the last place. At the same time, in some systems, PribOVO is significantly ahead of other VOs: in 76-mm divisional, in 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 152-mm howitzer guns. It should be noted that the security of ZOVOVO troops with separate types of guns is even higher than that of KOVO. Again, we see that when artillery were equipped with artillery, they did not take into account the directions of the main strikes that the GSH assumed. The table below shows the availability of armor-piercing shells for 45 and 76-mm caliber guns on 1.5.41 g. This problem is well known. PribovoV again on 4 and 3-th place.



The tables show data on the provision of artillery systems with ammunition on average in districts and in% of the required quantity.





On average, in PribOVO, the situation looms quite well. The exceptions are the shots to the 85-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as to the 120-mm mortars: there is only about one BK to the 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and to the regimental mortars. For these artillery systems, there was little ammunition in all districts.

PribOVO was somewhat lucky with shots to 37-mm guns - there were actually up to 600 on the cannon. Consequently, in other VO shots to these guns were less. The district had anti-aircraft guns: 116 - 37 and 40-mm caliber, 232 - 76-mm 1931 and 1938 g., 156 - 85-mm. From the second or third day of the war, 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which fired while covering the troops or objects, were transferred to “hungry ration” or left completely without projectiles. It is known that individual anti-aircraft artillery units from the beginning of the war did not have shots at these guns. For example, the security of 33 and 38 td (SEC) was 0%. The KOVO, PribOVO mobzapaze lacked 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns - all the available shells were handed over to the troops. There were no projectiles for 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in 12 MK. The books indicate that 85-mm projectiles were missing in the units of the 12-th air defense brigade PribOVO. Already on the night of 22 on 23 June 1941, the gunners “sound the alarm”: "Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Comrade Kulik 23.6.41 6-00 As a result of the first day of hostilities, there is an acute shortage of the following types of ammunition: 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns - the material part of these calibers is inactive; 76-mm regimental; 122-mm - 10 / 30, 38 g .; 152-mm - 09 / 30, 38 g .; 152-mm - 37 g .; hand grenades - 33 g .; F-1; large-caliber ... [The head of the artillery of the North-West Branch] P. Belov» Thus, through 1 ... 2 of the day of war, ground forces could only carry out 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and 7,62-mm machine guns.

It should be noted that according to the available data on the lost ammunition, the PribOVO-SZF occupies one of the last places. According to reports of the Western Front from 22.6 to 1.8.41, it was undermined in the warehouses of 2700 cars, destroyed by enemy aircraft 655 and captured by the enemy 79 cars. The southwestern front from 22.6 to 10.7.41 lost 2238 ammunition wagons. Before 1.08.41, the Northern Front lost about 386 cars, and SZF lost 110 cars. Therefore, the “shell hunger” in the NWF troops, against which one of the most powerful German forces acted, is difficult to associate with the “traitor generals” abandoned artillery warehouses. The phrase "traitor generals" has become fashionable among individual writers and their admirers. Very handy version. When the machine broke down in 30-ies or the plan was not fulfilled for various reasons - there were always “enemies” who carried it out purposefully ... The author does not agree with this theory ... It should be noted that in fuel and food depots (captured or destroyed) As of 15.7.41, PribOVO is again not in the first places.



In military memoirs there are descriptions of the battles of the initial period of the war, when the German attacking group (near the battalion reinforced with armored vehicles and artillery) stops suddenly after the start of the movement. The defending troops took this as a sign of the enemy's uncertainty in their abilities and opened heavy fire from everything that fired. This fire was useless for the enemy, but at the same time the enemy was firing positions of the defenders. Having received combat experience, the units of the spacecraft no longer succumbed to such a trick.

One of the main methods of covering objects with medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was the installation of fire curtains in the path of enemy aircraft. In this case, anti-aircraft guns fire at the maximum rate (for 85-mm guns - up to 20 r / min). At this rate of fire, one BC would be enough for 7 minutes, and there were no more shells on the territory of the Baltic states to these guns. Perhaps the air defense units with 85-mm guns, rather quickly shot their stock of shots. In the previous parts, it was said that the spacecraft’s leadership overestimated the capabilities of medium-caliber anti-aircraft weapons and underestimated the potential impact of enemy aviation on ground forces. In the Directives of the General Staff, which served as the basis for the development of new projects of the “Cover Plans ...”, ground troops on 15 days military action was diverted three BC. In the materials presented in the previous parts, the author tried to show that for the first 10-12 days, the high command of the spacecraft only expected individual clashes with enemy units. Therefore, no one thought about saving ammunition ...

Consider the memories of two regimental commanders 128-th SD. Col. AI Grebnev (former commander of 374 cn): "... All the personnel of the regiment were handed over to 1 BK ..., with whom no one, under any circumstances, parted ... The sudden attack of the Germans ... began in 4-00 22 June 1941 of the year ... After the planes there were massive concentrations of tanks and self-propelled the guns, which with their fire from the course and noise of the engines tried to bring terror and panic on our fighters ... The first wave of tanks, ironing our battle formations, quickly removed to our rear, followed by another wave, followed by the third. So it went on until 6-00 ... The mechanized infantry of the enemy went after the tanks, which was met with rifle and machine-gun fire of the survivors of our firing points ... After a while [up to 7-00] from the battalions it was reported that the ammunition was running out ... " Practically an hour later, one battalion of battalions was shot down by a motorized infantry battalion, and before that, perhaps another 1,5 hours - by armored vehicles ...

Colonel Bochkov PA (former commander of 533 cn): “... 22.6.41 in 4-00 ... the regiment was alarmed ... I had one BK ammunition on my hands and one in the battalion carts ... 25 June ammunition left for 5-10 shells for cannon, 30-40 ammunition for a rifle ... Within these days, the regiment, leading continuous battles ... " Having about two BC regiment five days is fighting. The intensity of the hostilities of the regiments in question could be different. The unexpected German attack and the passage of large groups of moto-armored formations through 374's sprawling defenses could, of course, cause shock, partial panic, and part of the ammunition could be left in position ... The author simply tried to show how quickly different units could shoot off one BC which was intended on average for five days of war. It cannot be ruled out that anti-aircraft gunners, artillerymen, etc. could have done the same.

There are slightly different data on the number of aircraft in the Prikhovo Air Force. This is not so important in the framework of the topic. By the beginning of the combat operations in the Prikhovo Air Force, there were 529 fighters, 405 bombers SB and Ap 2, 60 attack planes I-153 and I-15 bis. Most fighters were 364 and 153. There were about 76 (working in two ip) AND-16. 15 and 31-iap received MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters. Some of these aircraft had manufacturing and design defects that delayed the process of retraining the flight and technical staff. The 15 iap had 31 MiG-3, 15 I-153 and 8 I-16. The 31 iap had 31 MiG-1, 32 MiG-3 (according to other 54 MiG data), as well as I-153 and I-16 aircraft.

According to intelligence, the 1st Air Fleet had about 500 combat aircraft. The following could act against the PribOV Air Force: 1st Air Fleet (270 fighters, of which 164 Bf-109F (serviceable 131); 210 bombers (192 serviceable)) and 8 air corps from the 2nd Air Force fleet (5 fighter air groups).

Let's see: what shortcomings in the basing of the Air Force are reflected in a document issued a year after the start of the war. “On the combat activity of the NWF air force from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42”: “... Air Force PribOVO had up to 70 airfields, of which there were permanent - 21, operational - 49. At 23 airfields, concrete runways were built, but by the beginning of the hostilities, no airfield had completed the work. Part of the operational airfields just before the war was put into operation ... and was a bare field with a number of temporary field-type structures. Absence of vegetation on a number of airfields did not allow proper masking of aircraft.

During the 4-5 days before the war, some divisions began to build earthen caponiers for aircraft, but unit commanders did not pay due attention to this event., and no shelters were fully built by the beginning of the war ... Half of the airfields of the district were spotted long before the war, and the photographs were taken 15-20 before the war. Many airfields were in the zone of tactical surprise, the rest were close to this ...

The airfield network PribOVO was poorly developed; for the year of their stay in the Baltic States, they basically completed the construction of the front-line airfield zone in the strip to the depth of 100 km from the state border to the Libava, Siauliai, Panevezhes, Vilnius lines. The second and third zones were not developed, which is why maneuver in depth was extremely difficult ...

There was no necessary number of communication channels from command posts to units, there were no bypass directions and wires on the main operational directions to the existing aerodromes ...

The exit from the blow became more complicated due to the large number of airplanes at the airfields and the lack of operational airfields in the depths. There were no natural stripes or sites due to the fragmentation of land, limited in size and intersected by intersections and ditches ... "


Since 1941 deployed the so-called “Aviators Case” in June (started with a high accident rate), none of the air forces of the border districts would have ordered the relocation of units from main and operational airfields to field sites. This could increase the accident rate and was not envisaged by the plans of warfare. In addition, this event did not allow for the lack of the necessary number of communications and technical support.

When discussing the Order of Commander Pribovo from 18.6.41, it is often said about the appointed superfluous control over the preparation of positions by the commanders of corps-division-regiments. We see that in the units of the Air Force, having begun the construction of earthen caponiers without proper control by the command of the formations and the district air force, no one was particularly in a hurry to finish something.

«On the combat activities of the Air Force ...... Aviation regiments of four squadrons were bulky. The regiment was based on two or three airfields, lost operational control of the units, the organization of the headquarters did not ensure the combat control of the regiment from two or three points ... The attack on the Soviet Union occurred during the reorganization of the units. The units were not yet conglomerated ... The NWF Air Force caught up with the IAP and BAP for the new material part, as a result of which 30-40% of the combat-ready crews were engaged in distilling the SB airplanes to flight aviation schools of the Air Force KA and were retrained outside the district. Therefore, two sets of airplanes (I-153 and MiG-3, I-16 and MiG-3) turned out at the airfields on advanced airfields, later all non-authorized airplanes were destroyed by enemy aviation raids and evacuation teams because of the impossibility of transportation to the rear with a transient situation. The new materiel (MiG-3 airplanes) were not fully mastered by the flight crews, and some of them stood at the airfields defective (not brought to the factories) ...

With the beginning of the war, it turned out that all was not well with covert radio control; the escape of parts from the blow was also not worked out; the interaction between the fighters and bomber and between the fighters and anti-aircraft artillery was not clearly organized, which was reflected in the future work of the headquarters ... The reconnaissance aircraft were not prepared at all ... The lack of a clear plan for using the air force in case of war led to the loss of a significant number of aircraft and flight personnel ... "


The PribOVO reconnaissance air regiment was in the formation stage (the end of the formation was to occur in July) and had only 6 SS aircraft, and corps air squadrons equipped with Р-5 aircraft, under the domination of enemy aviation, did not have sufficient survivability during aerial reconnaissance. The absence of a plan to use the Air Force was mentioned in other parts of this topic. Before the war, the combined arms command of the districts and armies, as well as the General Staff of the SC, had little idea how it would use the existing combat aircraft against the enemy troops. The lack of a clear plan for the use of the Air Force is typical for all HE. For example, 57 Garden Combat Use Plan [district air force vision]:

"...54 bap: 1) Destruction of enemy aviation on airfields. Xnumx of the regimental. Provides 3 iap

2) Destruction of enemy warehouses. Xnumx of the regimental

3) To disrupt and detain the concentration of enemy troops by blows on the railway bridges and railway nodes. Xnumx of the regimental.

4) Strike enemy enemy concentrations. Xnumx of the regimental.

42 iap: 1) 54 Bomber Cover 3 Bomber Regiment

2) Covering the area of ​​Vilnius and Oran. 5 polkovyletov

3) Destruction of enemy aviation on airfields. Xnumx of the regimental

4) Covering the district concentration area. Xnumx of the regimental

5) Striking enemy force clusters. 2 of the regiment ... "


Planning was carried out in accordance with the allowable volume of combat sorties, designated GSH - for 15 days of war - 15 fighter flight regiments and 10 bomber flight regiments. Nobody really thought: “Is the specified number of sorties enough to solve real combat missions?” The plans for the action of the aviation by the command of the divisions should have been worked out in more detail, but incomplete intelligence data about the enemy probably did not allow competently plan the work of aviation.

With 14.6.41, it is planned to nominate four cd and four ap closer to the border.


23-th and 48-th SD (part of 48-th is already working in defensive positions) begin the nomination of 17.6.41. A few months after the start of the war, when analyzing the actions of the PribOVO leadership, it was noted: “... Concentration of the NWF troops was late for 5-7 days ... By the end of 21.6, only part of the cover (six sections) and a micron were brought to combat readiness ..."In the 7 part, it was shown that from 15 May to 15 June, the number of German troops against PribOVO did not change. Therefore, there was no reason to start redeploying troops closer to the border. The relocation of the 12 and 16 stations was started after the approval of this decision in the GSH, but the insufficient capacity of the railways in the Baltic States did not allow it to be done on time.

18.6.41 d. 125 sd and 51 corps an began the nomination and by the morning of June 20 began to occupy the defense sector. By the morning of June 20, units of 11 ck were already defensive or marching to their positions. By the morning of June 22, the main forces of 48 and 126-th SD went out to their areas of concentration, parts of 23-th SD were at that moment slightly east. The 8-i anti-tank artillery brigade was given operational control of the 9 Army. Battle Report No. 1 9 anti-tank brigade “636 and 670 an 9 anti-tank brigade is in battle formation. Communication with parts is established. The materiel is transported to areas in the 3-4 reception due to lack of traction means. 19-35 20.06 NS Major Zhemartsev» The 9-00 21.6.41 up brigades almost fully occupied combat positions.

RCB 5-th howitzer an: "18.6.41 10-00 5 gap as part of all units ... raised on alert and was located in the Orana area No.2 from 18 to 20 June 1941 g ... 20.6.41 4-00 received a combat order of XTNUMX-5 about concentrating a X-NNX in the forest 8 km east of Swabishki [about 50 km from the Soviet-German border] ... The regiment concentrated in the forest ... where it was until June 22 1941. In this area was organized anti-circular defense and the equipment was made of aerial bombardment bombs ... " In 50 km from the border, the regiment prepares a circular anti-tank defense. Does this mean that the VO leadership implies a breakthrough of the enemy's motorcycle and armored groups to such depth in the first days after the start of the conflict (war)?

19.6.41 the main staff of the PribOVO headquarters is transferred to the front command post in the Panevezys area. Actually, the transformation of PribOVO into the SPF took place, and the shortened headquarters of the Baltic HE, which essentially played the role of a rear command and control center, separated from its composition. Employees of the NWF headquarters instead of the legendary name "PribOVO" often began to use the abbreviation of the true name "NWF." Therefore, an order was prepared, signed by the head of the operational department of the headquarters, General Trukhin.



Since the troops of the 1 echelon of frontier VE cover are (in fact) on alert No. 2 and a significant part of the district headquarters began to move to front-line command posts, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet suffered a similar fate: «Commander LVO, Commander PribOVO, Chief of Border Troops 20.6.41 g. Parts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet since 19.6.41 have been put on alert as per plan No. XXUMX, a command station has been deployed, patrol service has been strengthened at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irben Strait. Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral TRIBUTS»

Earlier we reviewed the Order of the Military Council PribOVO No. 00229 from 18.06.41 g. When discussing the provisions of this order, there is some misunderstanding:“The strangest orders from 15 and 18 June. Almost every point is absurd. For example: ... VNOS posts should be equipped with communications ... (god of God, and previously these communications posts did not have?) Stupid duplication - so that later they wouldn’t say in the cellars of Checkbook clever men - you didn’t tell us what you need to provide the communications with the link ... "two firing positions for each gun ..." Some readers may agree with such statements. What is the catch? In the order number 00229 in the part of VNOS says:“To the commander of the air defense zone, by the end of 19 June 1941, bring into full combat readiness the entire air defense of the district, for which:

a) organize round-the-clock duty on all posts VNOS and provide them continuous communication;

b) make all the anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, assigning round-the-clock duty on batteries by arranging uninterrupted communication them with posts, having carefully prepared in the engineering relation and having provided with fire supplies;

... d) organize uninterrupted communication VNOS posts with fighter aviation aerodromes ... "
The problem is that the communication of VNOS posts with air defense units and formations, and air force units that will perform tasks in the interests of air defense, the units of the MoE, should be carried out via wire lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications. The communications centers were former citizens of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. What is continuous or uninterrupted communication? If necessary, installation of additional communication lines or provision of radio communications, implementation of permanent duty of communications personnel of spacecraft on non-military communications centers in order to avoid sabotage and provide communications in order of priority of subscribers, etc. This issue is also mentioned in the note. «On the combat activities of the Air Force... "" ... The VNOS system in the presence of large debris from the communications authorities did not guarantee timely notification of the air force front units of the district ... "

On the preparation of positions for guns. The author thinks that the VO leadership knew the situation well in the troops, as well as the junior and middle command personnel of their troops. It was said above that the commanders of the Air Force units did not particularly hurry their subordinates to dig the aircraft caponiers [on sites where it was impossible to disguise them]. Let's see what the report says about the use of artillery in the initial period of the war. «Report on the combat activities of the 8 Army artillery in battles with 22.6. by 20.8.41 » "... From the first days of the fighting, the disguise was good, digging was bad. In recent battles, self-dripping activities have improved, artillery, usually, began to go deep into the ground, resilience and vitality has increased ... Colonel Ivin, Chief of Artillery of the 8 Army, Colonel Ivanov, Artillery NSh of the 8 Army It turns out that the battery commanders and divisions didn’t hurry to dig positions and ditches in the first days of the war. It took a lot of lives and resources to “drive” the commandment into the head: “Took defense - dig in.” The same problem was in the infantry units for a much longer time. Probably, in the preparation of defensive positions near the border, there was also a “pofigism” and the command was aware of this. The Order from 18.6.41 essentially raised the level of control over the implementation of the provisions of this order by lower-ranking officers.

In the PribOVO-SZF, air defense preparation activities are continuing. “Only to the commander of the 1403 military unit №0054 20.6.41 23-30 Confirming the introduction of readiness №2 with the implementation of all activities for 18-00 - 19.6.41г. I ORDER:

1. All anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns and searchlights put on
positions in accordance with the point’s air defense plans you have developed and my personal instructions.

2. To introduce round-the-clock duty at all command posts and in
subdivisions of officers.

Control over the duty to carry personally you ...

7. From 20.6.41, together with the Ministry of Defense, to organize the blackout of a point, fire protection, medical assistance to the victims and to schedule premises for use as bomb shelters. Commander of the Northwest Air Defense Zone, Colonel Karlin, NSh of the Northwest Air Defense Zone, Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov»


Item 7 means that units connected to the territorial NKVD bodies are connected to the work. Earlier it was said that on the night of 19 on 20 June, the former commander of PribOVO A.D.Loktionov was arrested. The arrest was made in Riga ... HE was to learn about this. Therefore, from June 20, the leadership of PribOVO-NWF began only to follow orders from Moscow, ceasing all manifestations of its initiative.

In the 5 part, we already talked about the beginning of the evacuation of the families of the KA military personnel in PribOVO and about the direct prohibition of this evacuation in ordering the People's Commissar of Defense 20.6.41 of the city. On June 20, the Deputy People’s Commissar of the Interior for Border and Internal Troops, I.I. Maslennikov, signed the message: “The head of the border troops of the NKVD BSSR, Lieutenant-General T. Bogdanov informed that, by order of the Commander of the Baltic Border District, the families of the commanding personnel of the CA units of the Taurogren direction are preparing for evacuation. T. Bogdanov asks for instructions on the evacuation of families of the commanders of the Sakiai border detachment, on the preparation for which the order was given to them ... I ask for your instructions. Lieutenant-General Maslennikov " It should be noted that the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR, T. Bogdanov, was the head of the border troops stationed in PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO. On June 20 from other parts of the border (in his area of ​​responsibility) there were no reports of preparations for the evacuation of families of the commanding personnel of the spacecraft ...

In the evening, 21.6.41 Tymoshenko summoned his deputy, KA Meretskov: “... S.K.Timoshenko said then:

- Perhaps tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to give in to provocations..

- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.

- Exposure first. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war. But be on alert. In the case of an attack, you know what to do ... ”

In KA Meretskov's memoirs about this episode there is not a single word about the Directive No. XXUMX being prepared. It turns out that in the evening, the People's Commissar 1 had not yet thought about developing this document ...

In a similar conversation took place Happy 21.6.41 in the Baltic States, who remembered V.P. Agafonov (head of communications of the 11 Army): “... Are you not too openly focused on the border? - asked district commander F. I. Kuznetsov. - As if on the other side did not get wind of it. Then do not avoid trouble.

- We did everything so that our movements did not arouse suspicion. The compounds simply left the camp in the order of the exercises, ”answered I.T. Shlemin.

- management approved?

- There is a decision of the Military Council of the army.

- I was informed that the ammunition was issued to the troops.

- Issued.

- Perhaps, hurried. Be careful with them. One random shot from ours
sides the germans can use both reason for any provocations.

- We understand. People are strictly warned.

... Kuznetsov nervously wore, then took off his gloves: “Confused atmosphere. Terribly confused ... "
What a tricky situation, if there was a Directive of the General Staff from 18.6.41 about bringing the troops of the 1-th echelon of the covering armies into combat readiness ?! Or it was not?

In the evening of June 21, combat alert is announced for the troops of the Libavsky garrison. Units 67 sd after the announcement of the exit to the exercises headed for combat positions.

Since special messages and “Cover Plans ...” mentioned possible landings of enemy assault forces, 21. 6.41 in 16-05 prepared order: “... All airfields on the islands of Ezel and Dago, which are not occupied by aviation, should immediately be brought to a standstill, filled up with large stones, trees, stumps, etc. heavy objects, but do not disturb the ground cover. Execution to deliver 25 June 1941 Deputy Commander PribOVO Lieutenant-General Sofronov» Twelve hours before the war set the date of execution 25.6.41 g.
Author:
49 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. avia12005
    avia12005 21 November 2017 06: 41
    16
    Perhaps, in the initial period of the war, all the negative factors developed together for the Red Army. And not one other country could not recover from such a blow. But the USSR could. And won. And this is a fact.
    1. siberalt
      siberalt 21 November 2017 11: 34
      +1
      So much has already been written about the Second World War by specific participants in the war, by eyewitnesses, marshals and military historians, but who doesn’t want to rethink and rewrite everything in their own way .. The question is, why? request
      1. VS
        VS 21 November 2017 13: 14
        +3
        because everyone lied too much)))
        1. Settlement Oparyshev
          Settlement Oparyshev 21 November 2017 16: 27
          +3
          The Trotskyists lied, and they established their own fosterlings against the Country. Now you are observing how their dirty tricks are becoming more poisonous. Where they look ... I can’t say.
          1. VS
            VS 22 November 2017 08: 38
            +1
            and who will watch it?))) The boy heaped snotty bullshit in Berlin - and everything is simple - they organize these trips - penitential - about the Wehrmacht's innocent soldiers - the same bastard that always crap on the country)))
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 22 November 2017 10: 36
        14
        Quote: siberalt
        So much has already been written about the Second World War by specific participants in the war, by eyewitnesses, marshals and military historians, but who doesn’t want to rethink and rewrite everything in their own way .. The question is, why? request


        Many myths are known.

        Who analyzed the actions of the NHS before the war?
        1. VS
          VS 22 November 2017 12: 34
          +1
          want to read ??)))
        2. novel66
          novel66 23 November 2017 12: 21
          +7
          who will take it apart! but the BEETLES!
          1. VS
            VS 25 November 2017 10: 11
            -1
            disassemble - not a problem)) Want to read?))
            1. novel66
              novel66 25 November 2017 19: 47
              +6
              Nuuu, offer, suddenly I learn something new
              1. VS
                VS 26 November 2017 11: 29
                -2
                give your box - I'll throw it off)) this is a new book just about the stories about June 22 - analysis of the main stories)) plus - according to pre-war plans)) Although - in "The Secret of the Tragedy of June 22" - this is also shown but there is more analysis responses commanders Pokrovsokmu))
    2. iouris
      iouris 22 November 2017 11: 23
      +4
      The "surprise" of a great war is a myth. Too much has been done (by whom?) So that the initial period of the war proceeds just so catastrophically for the armed forces and the population of the USSR.
      And also the US factor. If the achieved goal of the USA in WWII and WWII was to weaken the competitors to the maximum, then after WWII the goal of the USA is to eliminate competitors.
      Quote: avia12005
      But the USSR could.

      Could, because the USSR had great strategic depth, huge human and material resources (Stalin, VKP (b)) provided foreign policy, ideological and personnel support for the victory, created technology. And which of these victory factors is available for the Russian Federation today?
      1. VS
        VS 22 November 2017 12: 35
        +2
        "" The USSR had great strategic depth, huge human and material resources, (Stalin, CPSU (b)) provided foreign policy, ideological and personnel support for the victory, created technologies. And which of these victory factors is available for the Russian Federation today? ""

        -ZERO((((
      2. Severomor
        Severomor 23 November 2017 12: 34
        +2
        Here it is! The idea of ​​a liberal world is about
        Quote: iouris
        huge human resources
        established in the USSR !!!! I don’t even want to argue, if they are huge in the USSR, then in Europe ..... ??????
  2. antivirus
    antivirus 21 November 2017 09: 10
    12
    murk
    slowly washed off this dregs only with their blood.
    any draftee may act within his or her worldview.
    What could peasants understand in these mobilization directives-orders?
    in PM and officers? how did they give orders?
    Confidence in the correct execution by ordinary members of whom was?
    how much you need to train, to automatism, action- "" ... From the first days of the fighting, camouflage was good, ditching was bad. In the last battles, self-dipping activities improved, artillery, as a rule, began to go deep into the ground, stamina and vitality increased ... "
    How much do you need to train before fights?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 21 November 2017 11: 51
      22
      Quote: antivirus
      in PM and officers? how did they give orders?

      To the best of my knowledge. The ambush is that the 1941 officers are former cadets of the early 30s, 70-90% of whom had only elementary education.
      It seems that we still do not realize how low the level of general education of the Red Army commanders was in the 30s - not only after the repressions, but even earlier. For example, in 1929, 81,6 percent (and in infantry schools — 90,8 percent) of the army enrolled in military schools had only primary education or had none at all! In January 1932, 79,1 percent of cadets in military schools had primary education, in January 1936, 68,5 percent (but 85 percent in armored ones).
      © Smirnov. Great maneuvers.
      Quote: antivirus
      Confidence in the correct execution by ordinary members of whom was?

      There was no certainty even of the correct execution by some commanders of the orders of other commanders. It’s not in vain that Zhukov went to KOVO from the district headquarters to the mechanized corps — he knew from Khalkhin-Gol that he needed personal supervision to execute his own orders. For without it, grassroots commanders can easily score to execute an order or begin to execute it creatively - as did the same Muzychenko, who did not give his 4th MK for frontal counterattack and put his paw on the 8th MK passing nearby.
      Quote: antivirus
      how much to train, to automatism, action

      It would be someone to train. Education of ordinary personnel is the task of the junior command staff. And with him in the infantry was full of seams. At first there was an explosive increase in the number of rifle divisions (after the transition from the "triad" to the personnel-cropped system) - the number of posts increased, and there was no one to fill them. Then the most literate youngsters were transferred from infantry to the BTV and the Air Force. And all this was superimposed on a low overall literacy rate. If even in BTV KOVO, out of 16,5 thousand youths, 6 thousand had education of 1-3 grades, then what happened in the infantry ...
      The level of training of the infantry in the infantry is well illustrated by the anecdotal incident of the first months of the war, which fell into the order in the North-West direction: Sergeant XYZ was ordered to conduct reconnaissance, he crawled to the enemy dugout and, not knowing what to do next, turned around and crawled back.
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 21 November 2017 16: 38
        +7
        "By the age of 20, I graduated from the 7th grade, joined the Komsomol ..." - my grandfather 1909gr - it was CSO-CSO
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 23 November 2017 20: 10
          +4
          for 6 people with +
          at the age of 16, his grandfather, already with his older sister (17 years old), was covering the roof of his father’s house with shingles with a new crate - aspen, sawed-pricked-cut planks. sister served grandfather at the top did everything.
          and how many classes then, in 25 g, did --- --- ???
  3. Operator
    Operator 21 November 2017 09: 17
    +6
    "Intricate situation" - now the so-called crap of the Supreme Commander and General Staff of the Red Army.
  4. RuSFr
    RuSFr 21 November 2017 10: 50
    26
    Thank you Author. Famous events
    Everything seems to be so commonplace, somewhere once a war is expected
    But no one is getting ready
    1. Jarserge
      Jarserge 21 November 2017 11: 01
      +3
      Try on today .............
      1. VS
        VS 21 November 2017 13: 15
        +2
        the pogrom will be worse .. And there is neither Stalin nor Beria to save the country (((And - treason in the army and in society tramples steeper than under Nicholas was (((
  5. VS
    VS 21 November 2017 12: 39
    +1
    “In 1940 and in the first half of 1941, the“ Southern ”and“ Northern ”scenarios of a possible war with Germany were considered at the command and staff games, primarily affecting the KOVO and PribOVO troops. In accordance with the disinformation measures carried out by the Germans, the General Staff of the KA adopted the “Southern” version as the main one. ”

    - but what is this))) there were only one KSHI - in JAVAR on the 41st. )))
    They wanted to spend them in November for another 40, but were postponed to January 41st)))
    No one chose the southern option - it’s a lie and even more so it has nothing to do with the fact that the Germans drove the desu there)))
    The lady’s brain is arranged so that - she can’t walk through the woods and at the same time gnaw nuts)))) That is, ladies CANNOT be engaged in ANALYTICS by definition - so nature ordered)))
    And our author, who gives anonymity to this, also shows this - there is a fact or a dock missing - and ONE IS trying to compose some hypotheses ONE)) stupid with it)))
    And it seems that her main idea is that intelligence did not report anything there)))) And she draws such conclusions only on the basis of a couple of reports published in the Robin collection, which many have already fished for falsification)))

    “In parts 1 and 2, quite a lot of intelligence reports on this issue were presented. "

    - alas - the girl ITS understanders - what was there who thought reading these reports - gives out for reality))) like - and so they thought in the Kremlin)))

    “During the development of the latest Peace Directive No. 1 (6 ... 7 hours before the war)”

    - illiteracy - NO THIS directive "NUMBERS"))))

    “Could not ignore this direction. In the draft encryption material of the Directive, after the words “The German attack may begin with provocative actions.” crossed out the words: “Especially from Romania.” ”
    - so crossed out - so did not consider it important))))

    “It would be logical to assume that the equipment with equipment and troops should be carried out according to the priority of the districts considered during these games, and”

    - if the girl knew that the General Staff would never play CWI according to the approved plans in case of war - it would be easier for herself)))

    “Taking into account the detected groupings of opposing enemy forces: KOVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, LVO and OdVO. "

    - so the intelligence quite accurately gave data on these groups and EVERYTHING wrote afterwards - we knew who was in front of us and what forces - according to the part numbers - answering Pokrovsky and answered - ALL the data on the enemy on the morning of the 22nd - was CONFIRMED completely))))
    1. VS
      VS 21 November 2017 12: 40
      0
      “In contrast to the KOVO and ZAPOVO, where whole armies began to be replaced by the replacement of the corps of the district reserves, there weren’t new connections in the Baltic states”

      - moreover - there also the collection of attributed there was disrupted - from the MBO did not send 36 thousand ascribed in May-June. But the blame for this is on Pribovo COMMAND!

      “When it is said about“ our staff ”, it means the arrival of personnel from the MBO. "

      - these 36 thousand ascribed from the MBO were supposed to arrive in these divisions - national corps - back in May - early June (((
      But Kuznetsov and Klenov did not send applications for these attributed documents to the NPO on time (((
      “It was supposed to use 40 German divisions against the PribOVO troops,”

      - WHERE are these numbers coming from ??)))) Against 23 divisions of PribOVO - the Germans set up 29 divisions of their own. Why do you invent all kinds of garbage?))) About the mythical 40 divisions ???

      “In the early days of the war, the most powerful group of German troops was set up against the forces of PribOVO-NWF in relation to the number of spacecraft units in the military district. "

      - taking into account the tank group, what hit Pribovo? - yes. And this is exactly what Shaposhnikov wrote even north of woodland will be the main enemy forces. But - the main blow - nevertheless was on ZAPOVO - on BREST))) ...

      “It turns out that when equipped with tanks, the VO were not guided by the possible options for the main enemy attacks.”

      -- not this way. Madame doesn’t understand a damn thing - what guided the General Staff when strengthening KOVO.
      Walking in the woods and at the same time gnawing nuts - this is not every man can)))
      But - to understand why Zhukov strengthened KOVO - you just need to read Baghramyan, Zakharov and Gretsov simply and stupidly, as well as "1941 — Lessons and Conclusions." There EVERYTHING is about the pre-war plans of the GSh-Zhukov and about why he so wooed it. And in our General Staff it was exactly what they hoped — God forbid, the Germans will find out that we are putting our main forces in the KOVO and our main ones will be thrown there !!
      MADAM - yes you read at least that thread on the topic where they climbed to get clever not on detski))))

      “We again see that when equipping military artillery with artillery, the directions of the main strikes that the General Staff assumed were not taken into account. "

      - German intelligence reported in May - the Russians in their General Staff know for sure where the main forces and attacks of the Wehrmacht will be.
      MADAM - yes you read at least that thread on the topic)))) One robin for "analysis" - LITTLE)))))
      The General Staff knew exactly where the main forces of the Germans would be, but it had its own plans - either to embed it first from the KOVO, or - in response - immediately after the German attack. IT WRITTEN ALL authors - Zakharov Baghramyan Gretsov and “lessons and conclusions” in the IVI, of which you did not read it seems at all)))
      1. VS
        VS 21 November 2017 12: 41
        0
        “According to reports from the Western Front, from 22.6 to 1.8.41, 2700 cars were blown up at warehouses, 655 were destroyed by enemy aircraft and 79 cars were captured by the enemy. The South-Western Front from 22.6 to 10.7.41 lost 2238 carriages of ammunition. Until 1.08.41, the Northern Front lost about 386 wagons, and the NWF lost 110 wagons. "

        - a question for the author - what does this mean - how many ammunition wagons have been lost?)))) Type - about 5 thousand wagons with ammunition were lost?))))

        "The" shell hunger "in the NWF troops, against which one of the most powerful groupings of German troops acted, is difficult to associate with the" traitor generals "abandoned warehouses of artillery weapons. The phrase "traitor generals" has become fashionable among individual writers and their admirers. Very convenient version. When the machine broke down in the 30s or the plan was not fulfilled for various reasons, there were always “enemies” who carried out this purposefully ... The author does not agree with such a theory ... ”

        - Yes, you never know what the author does not know or does not agree with what)))

        In ALL districts - there were warehouses - with b / p)) And in PribOVO - they were stupidly not - ground storage and TAM TUPO had nothing to lose in the form of warehouses))) Dvztzii had their own supply b / p = - more often - in small shtabelah or even on machines it was stored. Therefore, the losses were not so great ...))

        I’m afraid the author stubbornly doesn’t answer t - because she doesn’t know what kind of 5 thousand “wagons” were lost but I will tell you - ALL this was not in railway wagons, but in warehouses where they consider property - in “wagons”))) Reporting in warehouses it always goes in wagons and even today - in wagons of 20 tons - from the 30s))))

        And b / p and stored ---- in the warehouses of the district, in the warehouses of the "central subordination" GAU (GRAU), and - on the rocks of the divisions themselves.
        So - warehouses in PribOVO and were - God forbid - only on the divisions themselves. And these b / p and shot the divisions in a couple of days, but supplies from the warehouses of the district did not start - because they practically did not exist in the district)))
        But - the poor staffing of the division’s warehouses is the fault of the district’s command !!! CLEAR?? author)))

        “In warehouses of fuel and food (seized or destroyed) as of 15.7.41, PribOVO is not in the first places again.”
        - similar to warehouses with b / p))) they were stupidly few created in Pribovo))) After all, this district became Soviet just a year before the war))) But the author seems unable to understand this)))
        1. VS
          VS 21 November 2017 12: 41
          0
          “For 15 days of military operations, ground forces were allocated the expense of three ammunition. In the materials presented in the previous parts, the author tried to show that for the first 10-12 days the high command of the spacecraft expected only a clash of individual formations with the enemy. "

          - a lie. This is sabotage.
          Laying in the plans for the event of war. COMMON with crap or planners or - treason. Do you think those planners ???)))

          “Consider the memoirs of two regiment commanders of the 128th regiment. Colonel A. Grebnev (would"

          - it seems that Madame bought the two-volume Chekunov - and right now she will begin to customize the data from there for her fantasies)))

          “Ammunition I had one ammunition in hand and one in battalion convoys ... On June 25, ammunition was left with 5-10 shells per gun, 30-40 rounds of ammunition per rifle ... During these five days, the regiment, conducting continuous battles ..." Having about two ammunition the regiment fights for five days "

          - there is such a thing - “wearable” and “transportable stock” of ammunition))
          Wearable - this is what the soldier drags in his duffel bag - 90 rounds of ammunition)) And before the war, these rounds are stored in small arms in the companies, in the barracks. Transportable - what is stored in the division’s warehouse = they are transported in carts and taken to the trenches)) And when the cartridges end here and are needed - second-hand warehouses are district - or GAU from which they will be delivered to the shelves))) So - the warehouses these in PribOVO were not stupidly created, and in the same Brest, cartridges from the barracks - a portable reserve for a soldier - were seized a week before June 22 (((
          Madame does not know this - her problems))) there is nothing to climb where not a trace)))

          "One BC, which on average was intended for five days of the war"

          - nonsense. IF the b / p ends - the RAV service is in the shelves and must deliver the required number of b / p to the shelves for the fighters - BY THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENT - according to requests-calls from the regiments. . And what they write in the PP - spit and forget. REAL combat work with the outbreak of war — ALWAYS breaks ANY “plans” and NO ONE thinks later - we will stretch cartridges and b / p until type 15 days expire !!))) MADLAM - study military affairs in this way)))

          And if ammunition and shells ran out somewhere and they weren’t brought up for it, then they’ll be put on trial and they’ll write to the PP there - the prosecutor will spit)))
          1. VS
            VS 21 November 2017 12: 42
            0
            “Since the so-called“ Aviator Case ”is unfolding in June 1941 (it began with a high accident rate), none of the command of the Air Force of the border districts would give an order to relocate units from the main and operational airfields to field sites. This could increase the accident rate and was not provided for by the combat plans. In addition, this event did not allow for the lack of the required number of communications and technical support. ”

            __ well, what kind of nonsense))) In the event of war, all the air forces MUST work precisely with the field sites - which the district command and the district air force command MUST prepare in advance and if it did not prepare them, and this was indicated in the reports as MAIN reason = = "The exit from the attack was complicated due to the large number of aircraft at airfields and the lack of operational airfields in the depths."!
            And in the reports and in other districts, THE MOST ALSO was indicated - field reserve sites were not prepared for combat work !!
            “In the Air Force units, having begun the construction of earthen caponiers without proper control by the command of the formations and the district air forces, no one was in a hurry to finish something.”

            - so it’s to sit down - TAMPER !!! The innocent victims of Stalinism (((
            But - the main task of preserving the aircraft - they weren’t digging koi caponiers especially during the war but - the readiness of SPARE field sites for combat work. And the dispersal of aircraft at airfields. What EXACTLY was not done in the Air Force of ALL districts BEFORE June 22 !!!
            “Planning was carried out in accordance with the permissible amounts of sorties indicated by the General Staff - for 15 days of the war — 15 half-departures of fighters and 10 half-departures of bombers. No one really thought: “Is the indicated number of sorties enough to solve real combat missions?” "The plans for aviation action by the division command should have been worked out in more detail, but incomplete reconnaissance data about the enemy probably did not allow for the proper planning of aviation work."

            - and then comes the suffering e - ah, the innocent victims of Stalinism (((

            “From 14.6.41, it is planned to nominate four SD and four AP closer to the border.”

            - in connection with the expectation of an attack, or - FOR WHAT? A - the author ??)))
            After all, you said before - the attack did not wait))))
            “From May 15 to June 15, the number of German troops against PribOVO did not change. Therefore, there was no reason to begin the redeployment of troops closer to the border. "

            - yeah .. And with what xp .. vegetable began to withdraw to the border of the Air Force and border divisions - SIX pieces and MK ???)))
            I’ll tell you that it will NEVER make such a comic circle - INDEPENDENTLY)) And if the author reads Chekunov's collection, then he will see TAM - orders for these troop movements are from NGOs and General Staff))))
            1. VS
              VS 21 November 2017 12: 42
              0
              “On 18.6.41, 125 SD and 51 corps ap began to advance and by the morning of June 20 began to occupy the defense section. By the morning of June 20, part 11 sk were already holding defensive positions or marching to their positions. By the morning of June 22, the main forces of the 48th and 126th SDs reached their concentration areas, part of the 23rd SD at that time was a little east ”

              - Really, on the initiative of Kuznetsolva and Klenov, a kind person, these tyrants did not fear anger, did this ??)))

              “The 8th anti-tank artillery brigade was assigned to the operational subordination of the 9th army. Battle report No. 1 of the headquarters of the 9th anti-tank brigade “636 and 670 ap 9 of the anti-tank brigade occupy the battle formation. Communication with parts is established. The materiel is transported to areas in 3-4 receptions due to lack of traction. 19-35 20.06 NS Major Zhemartsev "By 9-00 on 21.6.41 the brigade almost completely occupied combat positions."

              - I will tell you for those who can’t walk through the woods and gnaw nuts at the same time - TAKE COMBAT POSITIONS - it is possible only by order of MOSCOW in the border region)))

              “At 50 km from the border, the regiment is preparing a circular anti-tank defense. Does this mean that the leadership of the VO implies a breakthrough of the enemy's motorized armored groups to such a depth in the first days after the outbreak of conflict (war)? ”

              - so stupidly according to the charter should be done))))
              And yet yes - on the same days there were orders = to prepare crossing facilities - in the depths of their rivers)))
              “Since the troops of the 1st echelon of covering frontier military forces are (essentially) in a state of combat readiness No. 2 and a significant part of the headquarters of the districts began moving to the frontal command posts, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet suffered a similar fate”

              - type - the district transferred the fleet to BG 2 ??)) Or maybe - they have their own commander - and in MOSCOW - Admiral Kuznetsov ??))
              1. VS
                VS 21 November 2017 12: 43
                -1
                ““ To the Commander of the LVO, the Commander of PribOVO, the Head of the Border Troops on 20.6.41. Units of the Baltic Fleet since 19.6.41 have been put on combat alert according to plan No. 2, a CP has been deployed, and patrol service has been strengthened at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irbensky Strait. Commander of the KBF Vice Admiral TRIBUTS »»

                - On June 19, the Baltic Fleet was NOTHING MORE THAN - informed Pribovo headquarters - NOTIFICED that they had entered readiness “No. 2” ...))

                On June 20 there was a command of the General Staff - to coordinate the districts with their fleets - within two days ... (The Baltic Fleet had already informed the PribOV headquarters that it had introduced an increased military base. This is also shown by Major General I.P. Makara, head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, candidate of historical sciences, member of the editorial board of the Military History Journal, in the article "From the experience of planning the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and direct preparation for reflection" - VIZH No. 6, 2006, p. 3-9): - “Simultaneously with measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the Navy. On June 19, by the decision of the People's Commissar of the Navy, the fleets and flotillas were put on operational readiness No. 2. The next day, the commanders of the Leningrad, Baltic special and Odessa military districts received instructions from the General Staff to work out the issues of interaction with the fleet in two days in accordance with the cover plan. "...))

                “Order No. 00229 in the part of the airspace test says:“ By the end of June 19, 1941, give the head of the air defense zone all the air defense of the district in full combat readiness, ”

                - and then oh ?? SHOULD THE ATTACK Germany waited for the same ???))) Yes, and in full BG Air Defense led))))

                “From June 20, the leadership of PribOVO-NWFZ began only to comply with orders received from Moscow, stopping any manifestation of its initiative.”

                - it was before that - ONLY MOSCOW’s orders were executed !!
                1. VS
                  VS 21 November 2017 12: 44
                  -1
                  “In the memoirs of K.A. Meretskov about this episode there is not a single word about the prepared Directive No. 1. It turns out that the People’s Commissar on the evening of 21.6.41/XNUMX/XNUMX did not think to start developing this document ... "

                  - in this episode - a description of ONLY WHAT HAPPENED in those minutes))) No more and no less))))

                  But - Zhukov and Tymoshenko at 21 o'clock brought Stalin ANOTHER directive - "Proceed to the implementation of the 1941 PP")) Which Zhukov dragged to Stalin and June 11 more))))
                  T .. e - how could Tymoshenko say something to Meretskov about T.N. "Deer. 1 "if he was preparing another directive about which he incidentally Meretskov and warned -" be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do ”
                  In the event of an attack, they open the packages and execute the command - “Proceed with the 1941 command”)) For the ladies, I will explain - even the command to the packet - to enter the command - during the attack - the officers themselves will open it)) And here it’s obvious warning - be prepared to open it yourself))))

                  “I was informed that the ammunition was given to the troops.

                  - Issued.

                  - Perhaps, hurried up. Be careful with them. The Germans can use one random shot from our side as an excuse for any provocation.

                  - We understand. People are strictly warned.

                  ... Kuznetsov nervously put on, then took off his gloves: “A confusing situation. Terribly confusing ... ”What is the confusing situation if there was a General Directive dated 18.6.41 on bringing the troops of the 1st echelon of cover armies on alert ?! Or was she not there? ”

                  - cartridges on hand - it’s like they hurried to give out)))
                  BECAUSE this is done ONLY when entering FULL bg. and this happened ONLY according to the directive b / n which Madame calls a deer. 1)))
                  And from "June 18" - it was required to BRING ALL the troops, the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy - to the INCREASED battlefield)))
                  Alas - Madame does not get into the topic of where she got into cleverness and does not want to listen to others - who better understands what happened then)))
                  ONCE))))
                  Since June 18, there has been NO order for the entry of military units for the troops. )))
                  THERE were - orders for the WITHDRAWAL of troops in the frontier - of border divisions - from June 17-18, with bringing to the regiments and the approximate date of the attack - on the night of June 20))) And before that - there were orders to withdraw second echelons and reserves from MK! ! And THESE orders - about the CONCLUSION by the PP - AUTOMATED oblige commanders to bring their troops increased B.G.)))
                  CLEAR??)))
                  “In the evening of June 21, a combat alert is announced for the troops of the Libava garrison. "Subdivisions 67 SD after the announcement of the exit to the exercises went to combat positions."

                  - oh how))) Really without waiting for the so-called. deer 1 battle alert announced ??)))

                  Let me tell you - this was NOT ONLY in one Pribovo)))

                  And it's simple - Zhukov informed the okrug around 18 o’clock - like Tymoshenko Meretskova - an attack is possible))))
                  1. antivirus
                    antivirus 21 November 2017 16: 57
                    +6
                    see my pro level of education
                    Apparently the General Staff Academy was finishing.
                    today 2 towers are the norm.
                    from only in 41 7 cells there were already a lot and were confused by orders and then in the testimony of the NKVD
  6. parusnik
    parusnik 21 November 2017 13: 30
    31
    Thank you, we are waiting for the continuation ...
  7. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 23 November 2017 01: 01
    +3
    The problem is that the connection of the air navigation support posts with the units ... should have been carried out through the wire lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications. At the communication centers, former citizens of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia worked. What is continuous or uninterrupted communication? This, if necessary, the laying of additional communication lines or providing radio communications, the implementation of the constant duty of the spacecraft communications at non-military communication centers in order to eliminate sabotage and provide communication in the order of priority of subscribers, etc.

    Where did all this information about "What is continuous or uninterrupted communication?" Come from? The author's speculation or is there a source? Why is this directive not explicitly talking about the exclusion of sabotage and duty on "non-military" nodes?
    That is, the level of commanders was such that, aside from the front commander, no one in the armies of the whole front, as expected, would guess that for the guns it was necessary to choose positions, and this had to be clarified literally in orders, but did everyone know about sabotage and duty? Or were they supposed to read this between the lines?
    4-5 days before the war, some divisions began to build earthen caponiers for aircraft, but the unit commanders did not pay enough attention to this event, and shelters were not completely built by the beginning of the war ... When discussing the Order of the Commander of PribOVO from 18.6.41 it is often said on the assigned excessive control over the preparation of positions by the commanders of the corps-divisions-regiments. We see that in the Air Force units, having started the construction of earthen caponiers without proper control from the command of the formations and the Air Force of the district, no one was in a hurry to finish something.

    Caponiers are structures with a roof, as I understand it. So that the plane could leave it under its own power, and so that there was no water and dirt, its floor should be paved with something at the level of the airfield, and the roof would not leak. So the caponier should have something like walls. We all saw the caponiers on TV at the Syrian airfield bombed by the Americans. Airplanes are tall and sweeping things. To shelter them, large structures are needed. That is, someone was going to or ordered to build caponiers for entire aviation regiments in 5 days? .. Materials, ceilings, etc. for them, it was first necessary to include in the State Planning Commission, prepare the industry, organize the supply, etc. If someone in command ordered them to be built in 5 days, then this is an indicator of the level of command, not troops. Excessive control is also an indicator of the level of command, and not of lower-level troops. As I already wrote, the front commander had to deploy armies, not guns. And he, apparently, did not know how to do his job, but climbed into someone else's.
    1. novel66
      novel66 23 November 2017 12: 38
      +7
      An aviation caponier is an earthen wall poured around an airplane. no front. with a roof is already a hangar
      1. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 23 November 2017 13: 19
        +3
        I agree, got excited. But about the hangars I do not quite agree - depending on how the structure looks. Wikipedia:
        Also, a caponier (which is wrong [a source is not indicated 1090 days]) is called an open parking area of ​​a plane bunched up at the airport, ... The same name can be used for arched shelters (including reinforced type) for front-line aircraft. For "large" aviation (long-range, strategic, military transport, etc.), arched shelters are not built because of their enormous dimension and corresponding cost.

        Anyway, even if I had in mind a simple embankment, that is, open caponiers (which is not indicated in the text) - dig each of hundreds of aircraft in the absence of construction equipment in five days? Where to get the soil, which - so that it does not spread, and so that it is dry inside - in theory, gravel or a sand-gravel mixture is needed to cover the shaft and pour under the wheels of the aircraft. For temporary construction, you can fill the shaft and just out of the ground and not touch the lawn under the wheels, but you need dump trucks to deliver this soil from outside the airfield and excavators to climb to a height - and all this equipment, even if it is, will turn the field into a swamp. But she most likely is not there and in five days she has nowhere to take on in the combat air unit. And all the same, it will not provide good shelter.
        1. VS
          VS 23 November 2017 13: 55
          -2
          during the war, they didn’t bother with these “caponiers” at all)))) That is, to arrange for this as a problem of the air force pogrom - there were no caponiers in the pre-war days - stupidity)))
          1. novel66
            novel66 24 November 2017 09: 25
            +4
            Well, did you need to disperse the planes?
            1. VS
              VS 24 November 2017 10: 39
              -1
              Well Duc))) Orders for this were -19 and June 20 - at the level of the people's commissar)))

              The same Kopets, and then to Pavlov at 1.30 and rubbed - the aircraft are dispersed and are given in BG. - according to the guidelines of NGOs ...

              then the truth had to put ALL Air Force com against the wall))) except for the OdVO ...
        2. novel66
          novel66 23 November 2017 13: 55
          +5
          “whoever wants to do is look for a way ...” even a simple embankment will protect the planes from a bomb burst, and so ...
          1. VS
            VS 24 November 2017 09: 03
            -2
            from the 1st volume of "Answers to Pokrovsky":
            =====
            RESPONSIBLE GENERAL-MAJOR AVIATION ANDREEV A.P. May 20, 1952:
            1. The possibility of an attack by fascist Germany on the night of 22.6.41 was not exactly known, but the Air Force units of the 8th army, like all the air forces of the district, were warned by the command of the district air forces about June 16-17 about the possibility of an attack. It was ordered to withdraw the units to field airfields, and where this cannot be done, disperse the planes on the main ones and dig them in order to shelter them from being hit by fragments of air bombs. In the fighter units, enter duty squadrons one per regiment, and the rest of the flight and technical personnel be in the location of the unit. ""))))

            Since June 18, the Air Force has been brought to an increased base station. )))

            "MEMORIES
            former commander of 523 joint venture 188 sd Major General BURLAKIN Ivan Ivanovich.
            .....
            The regiment entered the camp as a part of the entire division on May 5, 1941. Due to the fact that the camp was being built entirely new, its construction was delayed, the regiment began planning exercises only on June 1, although the staffing was still ongoing.
            It should be noted that immediately with access to the camp, one battalion with a regimental battery was sent to the border in the area of ​​Verzhbolov (Virbalis) for engineering work along the East Prussian border.
            Around May 25-30, I received instructions from the division commander that war with the Germans was inevitable and that appropriate explanatory work was needed among the personnel on this issue.
            On this issue, I gave instructions to the battalion commanders, the political apparatus, and work was begun and actively carried out with the personnel that the Germans were preparing a war, that in the near future a war was inevitable and we should be ready for a war with the Germans.
            Around June 16-17, at 17.00 p.m., the commander of units 188 with Colonel IVANOV was called in and the directive was read out; I don’t remember whose PribOVO or 11th army seems to be PribOVO. I won’t be able to list all the directive exactly, but I remember well some of the points in which the following was indicated:
            296
            The Germans concentrated a large number of infantry and motorized divisions on the state border. Crossing the border is expected on the night from 19 to 20.6.
            The directive required all property and ammunition to be loaded into vehicles. To issue personnel gas masks on hands. (then the BSS-MO-2 gas mask was secret), remove the units from the camp on the night of 20.6-41 and disperse them.
            Battery artillery dispersed through the forest.
            Aircraft fully keep refueled, pilots on duty at the aircraft. I don’t remember other points. ”

            As you see, in the 11th Army, after June 16, a directive (district) was brought to bring the district troops on high alert. She was brought to an increased B.G. and aviation.
            As you can see, they were waiting for the attack altogether - on the night of June 20))) Well, to dig ALL planes in a few days - with some technicians Timoshenko cut back in the spring - leaving the “team” of techies from one plane to THREE is problematic even if you break ass for days)))
    2. aKtoR
      27 November 2017 19: 13
      +8
      Information about the "continuous" and "uninterrupted" communication in the part of the air defense troops is available in a rather ancient document. Since there is no reference to this document in the books, I do not want to disclose it. I can clarify that when PSKlenov taught tactics at the academy, the document already existed. Of course, you will not believe me - your right. Therefore, I will clarify this issue on the information available on the Internet.

      In the existing references to VNOS, the word "continuous" occurs once with respect to communication (in the description of the Moscow air defense zone) and for the most part about continuous tracking of enemy aircraft by locators. The word "uninterrupted" is found more often in relation to VNOS communications. But deciphering what is meant by this no.

      During the period under review, there was no urgency of the messages “Air”, so known to us from the book “In August 1944”. The term "Air" was used for access by VNOS subscribers (as well as observers of the airspace of other parts) for extraordinary communication. You asked the question: why is this not in the PribOVO Order from 18.6.41? It is there, but somewhat veiled. This is still the truism for the command of the district.

      The PribOVO Military Council Directive No. 00224 FROM 15.6.41 states: "...8. Upon receiving a telegram from the district headquarters “SEND CONNECTIONS TO THE LINE OF MAPPERS”, the corps commanders, divisions and heads of \ 13 \ army headquarters send commands from the communications units for employment and work at the communications centers according to the list in the 2 annex ...."In the list are civilian communications centers and the number of military personnel being sent. For example, Kuresare - 3-I infantry brigade - 1 middle commander, 2 duty officer overseer; ... Saldus - 571-th communication battalion - 1 junior commander, 2 taskmaster, etc.

      In the order from 18.6.41 there is a clause: "d) schedule and manufacture teams of communications personnel, who must be ready by morning 20.6.41 on the orders of the commanders of the formation to take control of the communication centers that I have approved." This is about those military personnel who should be sent to supervise the NCC specialists.
      1. aKtoR
        27 November 2017 19: 25
        +8
        For example, here is the mention of similar employees.
        (Mark Solonina’s personal site): "... Five telegrams of identical content sent to border districts: "Immediately appoint military representatives to the NCC communications nodes two people each with continuous duty at the nodes in points ... Representatives' tasks: ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the communication center, ensuring timely passage of the Air reports through the entire communication center system ... " Telegrams were sent from 3-15 to 3-50 22 June
        1. aKtoR
          27 November 2017 19: 33
          +8
          Another example is the 1945 Directive of the year.
          Organization of service VNOS
          ... 4. To transmit reports on the activities of the enemy’s aviation under the Air password, to military and army VNOS posts, to grant the right of extraordinary use of all means of communication of military units and connections (telephone, telegraph and radio), as well as military and front-line means. To the commanders of communications of the rifle corps, divisions and regiments to ensure the fastest passage of reports on the password "Air" ...
          8. On-call telephonists at communication centers, in order to ensure the fastest transmission of Air reports, to answer out of turn the call to opponents of the VNOS network and immediately connect them to the called subscriber, interrupting all conversations and transmissions that are carried out by the required wires.

          The sabotage report was
          1. Falcon5555
            Falcon5555 27 November 2017 21: 32
            +3
            Earnestly. hi Then the meaning of this specific paragraph (about the uninterrupted communication of VNOS) of the discussed directive is somewhat clarified. But others are still very strange. And about the "directive number 1" what do you have to say? She's some weirder one.
            1. aKtoR
              28 November 2017 05: 02
              +5
              Unfortunately for each item at the moment I can not walk. After reading a few thousand sources - for me everything is more or less clear. I cannot search for links and give explanations due to lack of time. Maybe in the future...
              The 1 directive (I was already accused of illiteracy - the directive does not have a number. It was written in the 4 part. Just by writing the number 1 - it’s clear to everyone). To understand its text, it is necessary to analyze the information about the presence of the mythical sacred cow of many writers - the directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on bringing troops into combat readiness from 18.6.41. According to preliminary estimates - this is fiction, based on events pribovo, knocked out testimony from the generals Zapov and indirect indirect facts. It is necessary to study this question more thoroughly. Perhaps my opinion will change after receiving more information.
              If possible, I will look at this question. After the New Year holidays. Maybe good people with links will help - there are such people and not a few. Try to analyze the data yourself. Recently, the author was helped to find the document Intelligence of the county with the mailing list. Interestingly, the report is sent to the Bialystok border guards as well. This once again proves that there was a continuous exchange of data from all intelligence agencies, including At the grassroots level among themselves. Look at the intelligence known from this angle of view and the position of Tymoshenko and Zhukov. thank
              If I have time to accomplish the canons today, tomorrow it will be problematic to contact me. You may be responding to my request in the 10 part
            2. VS
              VS 28 November 2017 09: 39
              -2
              Yes there is nothing strange in this directive. Erase not how it is interpreted by memoirists and illiterate boobies all these years, but - see HOW the commanders in TU understood it directly that night))) To do this, open the answers of the commanders about that night to Pokrovsky’s third question about this night and about this directive)) - "" Question No. 3. WHEN THE ORDER HAS BEEN RECEIVED ON PERFORMANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXPECTED ATTACK OF Fascist GERMANY FROM THE MORNING OF JUNE 3; WHAT AND WHEN THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORMING THIS ORDER WAS GIVEN AND WHAT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE MILITIES? ""

              The simplest answer is WHAT THE GSH demanded by that directive "b / n" at TU night gave nsh KOV Purkaev - where this directive simply could not be decrypted and read ..

              "" In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the District Commander received an order from the General Staff, which required to bring the troops into full combat readiness, in case of the Germans crossing the state border by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until further notice. ""

              The main idea of ​​this directive is "to bring troops into full combat readiness." ALL.
              Also look at what Admiral Kuznetsov ordered after reading this directive in Tymoshenko’s office - he gave the command - go to readiness No. 1 - in full BG)) Also, see the directive on Pribovo which was composed on the basis of the deer. b / n - everything, too, is very clear and precise there - to bring troops into full battlefield.
              That is - the main meaning of the directives b / n - the so-called. deer 1 - bring ALL troops, air force, air defense and navy in FULL combat readiness. ))) everything is simple and there is nothing strange in it)))
              Once again - see not HOW and WHO THEN invented about it but - who and how understood it in TU night and in those days)))
  8. VS
    VS 28 November 2017 10: 01
    -2
    Quote: aKtoR
    To understand its text, it is necessary to analyze information about the presence of the mythical sacred cow of many writers - the directive of the General Staff of the Space Administration on bringing troops into combat ready state from 18.6.41. According to preliminary estimates, this is fiction based on the events of the coast, extorted testimonies from the generals of ZAPOVO and indirect facts.


    finally study ALL districts and ALL events of the pre-war days)))
    The fact that in the ZAPOVO "and after the director general of the General Staff on June 18, Pavlov did not bring troops to the b ... g" showed Grigoriev at the investigation - his problems)))

    But - they already told you - THERE WAS NO ORDER for the TROOPS - about bringing to the military base. from from Moscow. There was ..)) calm down already)))
    From June 16-18, the Air Force, Air Defense and Fleet moved to the INCREASED battlefield. - in readiness No. 2 - and this is the increased b.g.))
    But the troops received OTHER orders. Starting from June 8-11 and 17)) These are orders for WITHDRAWAL according to Cover Plans)) First, the second echelons and reserves began to be withdrawn, and then - from June 17 and BORDER divisions))
    And now this conclusion also OBLIGATED the okrug - to give orders to bring it to BG))

    The Air Force, Air Defense and the Navy had already come up with the degree of b..g — increased)) But in the army — it didn’t exist and therefore there was no formal order to bring the General Staff to b..g)) because the districts would understand like full bg)))
    Therefore, they did it in another way - they gave orders for the withdrawal of PP, and this was already understood in the districts as an order - for bringing in b, d. (but not complete yet))))

    And now look what orders were given in the districts receiving those directives of the General Staff on the conclusion on PP - from June 8-11 - in ALL districts)))

    Something like that in the same KOVO was ordered:

    "" 4. With parts of the hull at the campsite, remove fully transportable stockpiles of ammunition and fuels and lubricants. Take mobile card kits with you and the package of Special Importance No. 0025 stored with you.
    5. To protect the winter apartments in each unit, leave strictly the minimum number of servicemen, mostly unsuitable for a campaign due to health reasons.
    ""))

    Remember forever)) - IF the GSH TEAM is on withdrawal to the district by software - the part is brought up to the READY increased minimum - AUTOMATICALLY and for this DO NOT NEED ADDITIONAL indications of this from the GSh))))
    AND MORE THAN if the part goes to the border zone))))
    He wrote the same thing in the drafts of his memoirs and Zhukov -

    "The commanders of the border military districts were ordered to withdraw the troops of the districts - designated as part of the covering forces, closer to the state border and the lines that they had to occupy in an emergency, by special order. At the same time, the advanced units were ordered to be advanced to the area of ​​border units. "Other equally important events were held. All of this obliged the commanders of the districts and armies to increase their combat readiness and general combat alertness."
    Now see HOW it was described by the commander Abramidze -)) - how to increase b .. g in those days)))

    "4th QUESTION
    When did you receive the order to bring the units entrusted to you on alert?
    What instructions and when were given to the units of the compound in pursuance of this order and what was done by them?
    ОТВЕТ
    From 15.6.1941, I began to receive orders to bring combat units into combat readiness from direct chiefs and in encrypted telegrams from the headquarters of the KVO and the General Staff.
    Pursuant to the received orders to put combat units in combat readiness, I personally with my headquarters and senior officers of the division set specific tasks on the ground and the deadlines for the execution, which were as follows: 1) the exit and location of some divisions and units of the division in the indicated areas near the border in readiness to engage in battle immediately in the right directions, depending on the situation;
    2) carrying out the strictest camouflage by all units and parts of the connection from air and ground surveillance;
    3) abandonment: by certain units and parts of the former location - location in order to lead the enemy astray;
    4) masking ammunition depots to the color of the surrounding area;
    5) the dispersal of vehicles and other types of transport in sheltered places from enemy aircraft;
    6) strengthening of extraterrestrial and aerial surveillance and defense;
    7) providing divisions of the division with all types of weapons and allowances;
    8) full agreement and coordination between the commanders of units, subunits of my unit and the commanders of 92 and 93 border detachments with a view to a single action, Border. units covering state. the borders in the division strip were transferred to my disposal on 19.6.1941. ”


    In the Far Eastern Military District, also from June 18 - as the division commanders later answered - they were brought to the military base. troops from June 18)))
    1. VS
      VS 28 November 2017 11: 44
      -1
      Since June 13, in the KOVO, they began to withdraw by the PP, in the Ura, two divisions of the 5th Army of Potapov)))
      And there they issued SUCH orders))))


      "SECRETLY
      ind. N: 2
      ORDER ON THE BACKGROUND N: 001 STAPOLK-16 CAMP KOGILNO 13.6.41 YEARS
      42000 card
      Pursuant to headquarters directive 87 SD N: 1/002000 on the procedure for bringing the regiment to minimum combat readiness - I ORDER:
      1. In the period from 13-15.6.41, bring the rear of the companies, battalions, as well as the regimental unit into final combat readiness, for which:
      I.
      ARTILLERY SUPPLY
      1. To have for the units located in the camps of 0,5 ammunition for all types of weapons, with the exception of artillery rounds - artillery shots have 2 ammunition equipped.
      2. Fireproof contain in the following form:
      Art. machine gun - 1500 pcs., of which 600 pcs. armored bullet, 150 pcs. Trampule stuffed in ribbons.
      Ruch. machine gun - 450 pcs., of which 120 pcs. armored bullets stuffed in stores.
      Rifle - 90 pcs. equipped with a clip.
      mortar 50 mm. - 0,5 BK to store finish. outfitted. in special. drawers.
      quad installations - 5000, of which 1000 pcs. B-32 stuffed all in ribbons.
      Hand grenades - 0,5 BK to store in specials. drawers.
      ... ""))))

      the term "increased bg" has not yet been invented for the army - that's what they called it - "minimum bg")))
      1. VS
        VS 28 November 2017 11: 53
        -1
        To the headquarters of the 87th SD its reports on the measures taken to strengthen bg represented all the regiments of this division ...

        "NPO - USSR
        283 sp.
        16.6.1941 years
        N: 00471
        V-Volynsk
        Vh. N: 1355
        Sov. Secret
        ind. N: 1
        [Stamp:] Entrance. 5479 Case N: ___
        November 16.6.1941, XNUMX
        TO THE HEAD OF STAFF 87 SD
        To your N: 1/002090 dated 12.6.1941
        Present: Combat order N: 002, rear order N: 001, air defense order N: 02, anti-aircraft guns location scheme, concentration and organization of ground guards, command list, personnel instruction, alarm instruction. on 9 sheets.
        HEAD OF STAFF 283 JV CAPTAIN
        / Kurgan / _________
        printed in 2 copies.
        N: 1 to destination
        N: 2 in business
        Spanish Rezanov. "

        The regiment presented to the division "Order on air defense N: 02," - and this means that they brought their air defense to the BIGGERED bg)))

        Perhaps someone was embarrassed by the words in the order - “In pursuance of the headquarters directive 87 sd N: 1/002000 on the procedure for bringing the regiment to minimum combat readiness”? Someone think that we are talking here and bringing to a certain "minimum" degree of BG? Alas, the tongues of the military are their weakness ... sometimes ... In this case, we are talking about reducing time when put on combat alert ... through the following measures. And in the text there is an obvious typo. The phrase “In pursuance of the headquarters directive 87 sd N: 1/002000 on the procedure for bringing the regiment to minimum combat readiness - I ORDER” should, of course, say “to the regiment’s maximum combat readiness ...” ...

        Also on this site there is an order of the headquarters of the 87th SD (also for 12.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX) to increase the level of BG, or rather units that were allocated for various construction works ...

        "OWL. SECRET.
        Ex. N: ____
        Combat order N: I. Headquarters 87. Vl. Volynsky. 12.6.41 g.
        Map 42000.
        Without interrupting defensive operations, the battalions should be in full combat readiness to carry out combat missions in their areas of work on the instructions of the Stadiv; For what:
        1. Having the entire personnel of the battalion concentrated, carry out work on sections of such a width that would make it possible to assemble the battalion within 5-10 minutes.
        2. Stop all circulations of personnel, ordinary and junior command personnel, outside the camp location and places of work.
        3. Thoroughly check the alarm plan, ensuring the speed of occupation by fire means of their positions, and the issuance of ammunition.
        4. At each battalion site, have at least TWO observation posts equipped with binoculars and periscopes and carefully masked.
        5. The results of the observation shall be entered in the observation logs, for which a representative of the division headquarters will arrive daily by 19.00.
        6. To send all hasty reports through the frontier posts and duplicate by horseback to the division headquarters.
        7. Carefully organize and verify, especially at night, the military security of the camp and the river bank. Bug.
        HEAD OF STAFF 87 sd
        COLONEL ___ / FORM /
        Printed 3 copies.
        Calculation of sending at copy. N: 1. "

        These documents are posted on the website "Memory of the People")) So Madame - study ALL the okrugs))
        Not only one PribOVO was doing something and even more so - it was not at the personal initiative of "good people" such as Maple)))))

        EVERYWHERE where they started to withdraw frontier divisions to the defense zone by the BCP - in THEIR divisions THERE issued such orders)) Moreover, if the district received orders from the General Staff to withdraw troops to the area according to the BCP, "of June 18", then there WAS NOT instructions to bring troops in the battlefield))))