In 1940 and in the first half of 1941, at the command and staff games, the “Southern” and “Northern” scenarios of a possible war with Germany, primarily affecting KOVO and PribOVO, were considered. In accordance with the disinformation measures carried out by the Germans, the General Staff of the Spacecraft adopted the “Southern” option as the main one.
In the 1 and 2 parts, quite a lot of intelligence reports were presented on this issue. For example, in special messages The “foremen” (11.6.41) stated: “... In the leading circles of the German Ministry aviation and the aviation headquarters say that the question of the attack on the Soviet Union is finally resolved. Goering's main headquarters is moved from Berlin, presumably to Romania. 18 June Goering should go to the new headquarters. " One of the highest officials of Germany can go to Romania: is it that the most important military events are expected? AT special messages KVTs (19.6.41) said: “... Counsel Schieber stated that the attack would occur in the coming days, namely June 23 or June 24 ... Tippelskirch believes that reason for war will any border conflict on the Soviet-Romanian border... "Romania again ... Therefore, when developing the last Peace Directive No. 1 (for 6 ... 7 hours before the war), we could not ignore this trend. In draft material, the ciphering directive after words "The German attack can start with provocative actions." crossed out words: "Especially from Romania."
It would be logical to assume that equipment with equipment and troops should be carried out according to the priority of the districts considered during these games, as well as taking into account the detected groups of the opposing enemy forces: KOVO, PribOVO, ZOVO, LVO and OdVO. Consider how it really was.
What was the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic States? PribOVO consisted of 8, 11 and 27 army (the beginning of the formation of 27 army 25.5.41), 3 and 12-th micron (four TD and two MD), seven SK (nineteen cd), 5-rd airborne corps, 9 and 10-I anti-tank artillery brigades, eleven ap (corps and RGK), three air defense brigades (10, 12 and 14-I) and 3-I separate rifle brigade. Unlike KOVO and ZOVOVO, PribOVO practically did not have district reserves. The reserve of the district was 180-I SD and 5-th airborne corps.
In the Estonian SSR, the 65 st skater was concentrated as part of 11, 16 and 90 st. One of the tasks of the corps was the implementation of the antiamphibious defense of the coast. In wartime, the 16-I SD was supposed to be part of the LVO. These actions were reinforced by intelligence (we now know that it was misinformation). AT special messages Yeshchenko (26.3.41) said: "... Germany is expected to speak in Ukraine through 2-3 of the month, at the same time the Baltic countries will perform, where the Germans expect a rebellion against the USSR ... "In special messages "KHVTs" (7.5.41): "... On the Baltic Sea coast, the Germans concentrated a large number of ships intended for the landing of troops. It is possible that Hitler, at the same time as he was performing at the land borders, will try to land troops in the Baltic States in order to leave an army in the rear to protect the borders and to expand the front from the north ... ”
In connection with the increase of the German grouping against the PribOVO troops in May 1941, the 90-I division was transferred to Lithuania. Unlike KOVO and ZOVOVO, where in transferring the corps of the district reserves, whole armies began to relocate to replace them, in the Baltics new connections did not increase. Only the subordination of the 16 division was changed - in the case of hostilities, it remained at the disposal of PribOVO. June 14 was supposed to begin redeployment to Lithuania. 11-I sd. The first parts of this division began to unload 21.6.41 d. The redeployment of 16-sd was planned, but before 22.6.41 it did not start due to the lack of railway cars.
The total troop count on 22.6.41 was 369702 people, of which 347987 people. combat strength (excluding air force units, logistics and support). 99 construction sites, demining and car battalions took part in the work on equipping defensive lines at the border, taking into account that the number of district troops exceeded 400 thousand people. Most of the personnel of the sections and battalions (practically without weapons), in accordance with the plans of the command, were to be used to complete the units and formations of the HE. According to the memoirs of Major-General I.I.Burlakin (commander of 523 cn 188 cd): “It was indicated that the construction site was quickly subordinate to me ... During the reconnaissance period, I contacted the site head and found that they had more than two thousand personnel, 50 rifles, some of which were training, two training programs and no more weapons. Due to the fact that the personnel turned out to be unarmed, I especially didn’t link up interaction issues with them ... ”
After the start of the war, before 10.7.41, the assigned personnel was sent to the NWF to deploy units and formations to the war-time states from the Moscow Military District in an amount of about 160 thousand. To replenish the natural loss of personnel of the front, 24 of the marching battalion, 5 artillery battalions and 12 batteries with a total number of about 26 thousand were received. from other VO.
The PribOVO troops included 22 st (180 (in the district reserve) and 182 pr), 24 st (181 and 183 sd), 29 st (179 and 184 sd), formed, respectively, on the basis of former armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In total, in these divisions there were about 30 thousand people.
«People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Commander of the Western Front 22.6.41 9-35 ... In Orany there is 184-I SD, which not yet equipped with our composition completely and is absolutely unreliable, 179-I SD - in Siventsyany also not manned and unreliable, I also appreciate 181-th Gulbene, 183-I on the march to camp Riga ... F.Kuznetsov Dibrova» When talking about "Our lineup"it implies the arrival of personnel from the MVO. It should be noted that 21.8.41 remains to 181 in 40 sd, and in 183 cd - 60 Latvians. Most of the personnel fled, someone died, someone went to the service of the Germans. In principle, it was natural, in one year the population cannot be dragged to one’s side. Therefore, before staffing 179 ... 183 sd personnel living outside the Baltic states, it was impractical and dangerous to redeploy these divisions closer to the border. Thus, at the disposal of the command of PribOVO there were reliable 13 sd (of which one was waiting for the wagons at Tallinn, and the second was being transferred by rail).
It was planned to use 40 German divisions against the PribOVO troops, which accounted for 32% of the total number of German armed forces formations against the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO troops. The indicated number of divisions included 13 TD and MD (39,4% of the German moto-armored forces deployed against the spacecraft). Thus, in the first days of the war, the most powerful group of German troops was set up against the forces of PribOVO-NWF in relation to the number of spacecraft formations in the military forces. Below is a table with the distribution tanksarmed with a weapon in the border military district
From the presented materials it is clear that by the number of tanks PribOVO ranks fourth, and by the number of modern tanks - 3. At the 1-th place KOVO, on the 2-m - ZOVOVO. It turns out that when equipping with tanks, VO was not guided by the possible variants of the main attacks of the enemy. Consider the information on the security of some artillery systems of the troops of the Western HE.
From the table it can be seen that according to the provision of six types of guns, the PribOVO troops occupy the last place. At the same time, in some systems, PribOVO is significantly ahead of other VOs: in 76-mm divisional, in 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 152-mm howitzer guns. It should be noted that the security of ZOVOVO troops with separate types of guns is even higher than that of KOVO. Again, we see that when artillery were equipped with artillery, they did not take into account the directions of the main strikes that the GSH assumed. The table below shows the availability of armor-piercing shells for 45 and 76-mm caliber guns on 1.5.41 g. This problem is well known. PribovoV again on 4 and 3-th place.
The tables show data on the provision of artillery systems with ammunition on average in districts and in% of the required quantity.
On average, in PribOVO, the situation looms quite well. The exceptions are the shots to the 85-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as to the 120-mm mortars: there is only about one BK to the 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and to the regimental mortars. For these artillery systems, there was little ammunition in all districts.
PribOVO was somewhat lucky with shots to 37-mm guns - there were actually up to 600 on the cannon. Consequently, in other VO shots to these guns were less. The district had anti-aircraft guns: 116 - 37 and 40-mm caliber, 232 - 76-mm 1931 and 1938 g., 156 - 85-mm. From the second or third day of the war, 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which fired while covering the troops or objects, were transferred to “hungry ration” or left completely without projectiles. It is known that individual anti-aircraft artillery units from the beginning of the war did not have shots at these guns. For example, the security of 33 and 38 td (SEC) was 0%. The KOVO, PribOVO mobzapaze lacked 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns - all the available shells were handed over to the troops. There were no projectiles for 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in 12 MK. The books indicate that 85-mm projectiles were missing in the units of the 12-th air defense brigade PribOVO. Already on the night of 22 on 23 June 1941, the gunners “sound the alarm”: "Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Comrade Kulik 23.6.41 6-00 As a result of the first day of hostilities, there is an acute shortage of the following types of ammunition: 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns - the material part of these calibers is inactive; 76-mm regimental; 122-mm - 10 / 30, 38 g .; 152-mm - 09 / 30, 38 g .; 152-mm - 37 g .; hand grenades - 33 g .; F-1; large-caliber ... [The head of the artillery of the North-West Branch] P. Belov» Thus, through 1 ... 2 of the day of war, ground forces could only carry out 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and 7,62-mm machine guns.
It should be noted that according to the available data on the lost ammunition, the PribOVO-SZF occupies one of the last places. According to reports of the Western Front from 22.6 to 1.8.41, it was undermined in the warehouses of 2700 cars, destroyed by enemy aircraft 655 and captured by the enemy 79 cars. The southwestern front from 22.6 to 10.7.41 lost 2238 ammunition wagons. Before 1.08.41, the Northern Front lost about 386 cars, and SZF lost 110 cars. Therefore, the “shell hunger” in the NWF troops, against which one of the most powerful German forces acted, is difficult to associate with the “traitor generals” abandoned artillery warehouses. The phrase "traitor generals" has become fashionable among individual writers and their admirers. Very handy version. When the machine broke down in 30-ies or the plan was not fulfilled for various reasons - there were always “enemies” who carried it out purposefully ... The author does not agree with this theory ... It should be noted that in fuel and food depots (captured or destroyed) As of 15.7.41, PribOVO is again not in the first places.
In military memoirs there are descriptions of the battles of the initial period of the war, when the German attacking group (near the battalion reinforced with armored vehicles and artillery) stops suddenly after the start of the movement. The defending troops took this as a sign of the enemy's uncertainty in their abilities and opened heavy fire from everything that fired. This fire was useless for the enemy, but at the same time the enemy was firing positions of the defenders. Having received combat experience, the units of the spacecraft no longer succumbed to such a trick.
One of the main methods of covering objects with medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was the installation of fire curtains in the path of enemy aircraft. In this case, anti-aircraft guns fire at the maximum rate (for 85-mm guns - up to 20 r / min). At this rate of fire, one BC would be enough for 7 minutes, and there were no more shells on the territory of the Baltic states to these guns. Perhaps the air defense units with 85-mm guns, rather quickly shot their stock of shots. In the previous parts, it was said that the spacecraft’s leadership overestimated the capabilities of medium-caliber anti-aircraft weapons and underestimated the potential impact of enemy aviation on ground forces. In the Directives of the General Staff, which served as the basis for the development of new projects of the “Cover Plans ...”, ground troops on 15 days military action was diverted three BC. In the materials presented in the previous parts, the author tried to show that for the first 10-12 days, the high command of the spacecraft only expected individual clashes with enemy units. Therefore, no one thought about saving ammunition ...
Consider the memories of two regimental commanders 128-th SD. Col. AI Grebnev (former commander of 374 cn): "... All the personnel of the regiment were handed over to 1 BK ..., with whom no one, under any circumstances, parted ... The sudden attack of the Germans ... began in 4-00 22 June 1941 of the year ... After the planes there were massive concentrations of tanks and self-propelled the guns, which with their fire from the course and noise of the engines tried to bring terror and panic on our fighters ... The first wave of tanks, ironing our battle formations, quickly removed to our rear, followed by another wave, followed by the third. So it went on until 6-00 ... The mechanized infantry of the enemy went after the tanks, which was met with rifle and machine-gun fire of the survivors of our firing points ... After a while [up to 7-00] from the battalions it was reported that the ammunition was running out ... " Practically an hour later, one battalion of battalions was shot down by a motorized infantry battalion, and before that, perhaps another 1,5 hours - by armored vehicles ...
Colonel Bochkov PA (former commander of 533 cn): “... 22.6.41 in 4-00 ... the regiment was alarmed ... I had one BK ammunition on my hands and one in the battalion carts ... 25 June ammunition left for 5-10 shells for cannon, 30-40 ammunition for a rifle ... Within these days, the regiment, leading continuous battles ... " Having about two BC regiment five days is fighting. The intensity of the hostilities of the regiments in question could be different. The unexpected German attack and the passage of large groups of moto-armored formations through 374's sprawling defenses could, of course, cause shock, partial panic, and part of the ammunition could be left in position ... The author simply tried to show how quickly different units could shoot off one BC which was intended on average for five days of war. It cannot be ruled out that anti-aircraft gunners, artillerymen, etc. could have done the same.
There are slightly different data on the number of aircraft in the Prikhovo Air Force. This is not so important in the framework of the topic. By the beginning of the combat operations in the Prikhovo Air Force, there were 529 fighters, 405 bombers SB and Ap 2, 60 attack planes I-153 and I-15 bis. Most fighters were 364 and 153. There were about 76 (working in two ip) AND-16. 15 and 31-iap received MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters. Some of these aircraft had manufacturing and design defects that delayed the process of retraining the flight and technical staff. The 15 iap had 31 MiG-3, 15 I-153 and 8 I-16. The 31 iap had 31 MiG-1, 32 MiG-3 (according to other 54 MiG data), as well as I-153 and I-16 aircraft.
According to intelligence, the 1st Air Fleet had about 500 combat aircraft. The following could act against the PribOV Air Force: 1st Air Fleet (270 fighters, of which 164 Bf-109F (serviceable 131); 210 bombers (192 serviceable)) and 8 air corps from the 2nd Air Force fleet (5 fighter air groups).
Let's see: what shortcomings in the basing of the Air Force are reflected in a document issued a year after the start of the war. “On the combat activity of the NWF air force from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42”: “... Air Force PribOVO had up to 70 airfields, of which there were permanent - 21, operational - 49. At 23 airfields, concrete runways were built, but by the beginning of the hostilities, no airfield had completed the work. Part of the operational airfields just before the war was put into operation ... and was a bare field with a number of temporary field-type structures. Absence of vegetation on a number of airfields did not allow proper masking of aircraft.
During the 4-5 days before the war, some divisions began to build earthen caponiers for aircraft, but unit commanders did not pay due attention to this event., and no shelters were fully built by the beginning of the war ... Half of the airfields of the district were spotted long before the war, and the photographs were taken 15-20 before the war. Many airfields were in the zone of tactical surprise, the rest were close to this ...
The airfield network PribOVO was poorly developed; for the year of their stay in the Baltic States, they basically completed the construction of the front-line airfield zone in the strip to the depth of 100 km from the state border to the Libava, Siauliai, Panevezhes, Vilnius lines. The second and third zones were not developed, which is why maneuver in depth was extremely difficult ...
There was no necessary number of communication channels from command posts to units, there were no bypass directions and wires on the main operational directions to the existing aerodromes ...
The exit from the blow became more complicated due to the large number of airplanes at the airfields and the lack of operational airfields in the depths. There were no natural stripes or sites due to the fragmentation of land, limited in size and intersected by intersections and ditches ... "
Since 1941 deployed the so-called “Aviators Case” in June (started with a high accident rate), none of the air forces of the border districts would have ordered the relocation of units from main and operational airfields to field sites. This could increase the accident rate and was not envisaged by the plans of warfare. In addition, this event did not allow for the lack of the necessary number of communications and technical support.
When discussing the Order of Commander Pribovo from 18.6.41, it is often said about the appointed superfluous control over the preparation of positions by the commanders of corps-division-regiments. We see that in the units of the Air Force, having begun the construction of earthen caponiers without proper control by the command of the formations and the district air force, no one was particularly in a hurry to finish something.
«On the combat activities of the Air Force ...... Aviation regiments of four squadrons were bulky. The regiment was based on two or three airfields, lost operational control of the units, the organization of the headquarters did not ensure the combat control of the regiment from two or three points ... The attack on the Soviet Union occurred during the reorganization of the units. The units were not yet conglomerated ... The NWF Air Force caught up with the IAP and BAP for the new material part, as a result of which 30-40% of the combat-ready crews were engaged in distilling the SB airplanes to flight aviation schools of the Air Force KA and were retrained outside the district. Therefore, two sets of airplanes (I-153 and MiG-3, I-16 and MiG-3) turned out at the airfields on advanced airfields, later all non-authorized airplanes were destroyed by enemy aviation raids and evacuation teams because of the impossibility of transportation to the rear with a transient situation. The new materiel (MiG-3 airplanes) were not fully mastered by the flight crews, and some of them stood at the airfields defective (not brought to the factories) ...
With the beginning of the war, it turned out that all was not well with covert radio control; the escape of parts from the blow was also not worked out; the interaction between the fighters and bomber and between the fighters and anti-aircraft artillery was not clearly organized, which was reflected in the future work of the headquarters ... The reconnaissance aircraft were not prepared at all ... The lack of a clear plan for using the air force in case of war led to the loss of a significant number of aircraft and flight personnel ... "
The PribOVO reconnaissance air regiment was in the formation stage (the end of the formation was to occur in July) and had only 6 SS aircraft, and corps air squadrons equipped with Р-5 aircraft, under the domination of enemy aviation, did not have sufficient survivability during aerial reconnaissance. The absence of a plan to use the Air Force was mentioned in other parts of this topic. Before the war, the combined arms command of the districts and armies, as well as the General Staff of the SC, had little idea how it would use the existing combat aircraft against the enemy troops. The lack of a clear plan for the use of the Air Force is typical for all HE. For example, 57 Garden Combat Use Plan [district air force vision]:
"...54 bap: 1) Destruction of enemy aviation on airfields. Xnumx of the regimental. Provides 3 iap
2) Destruction of enemy warehouses. Xnumx of the regimental
3) To disrupt and detain the concentration of enemy troops by blows on the railway bridges and railway nodes. Xnumx of the regimental.
4) Strike enemy enemy concentrations. Xnumx of the regimental.
42 iap: 1) 54 Bomber Cover 3 Bomber Regiment
2) Covering the area of Vilnius and Oran. 5 polkovyletov
3) Destruction of enemy aviation on airfields. Xnumx of the regimental
4) Covering the district concentration area. Xnumx of the regimental
5) Striking enemy force clusters. 2 of the regiment ... "
Planning was carried out in accordance with the allowable volume of combat sorties, designated GSH - for 15 days of war - 15 fighter flight regiments and 10 bomber flight regiments. Nobody really thought: “Is the specified number of sorties enough to solve real combat missions?” The plans for the action of the aviation by the command of the divisions should have been worked out in more detail, but incomplete intelligence data about the enemy probably did not allow competently plan the work of aviation.
With 14.6.41, it is planned to nominate four cd and four ap closer to the border.
23-th and 48-th SD (part of 48-th is already working in defensive positions) begin the nomination of 17.6.41. A few months after the start of the war, when analyzing the actions of the PribOVO leadership, it was noted: “... Concentration of the NWF troops was late for 5-7 days ... By the end of 21.6, only part of the cover (six sections) and a micron were brought to combat readiness ..."In the 7 part, it was shown that from 15 May to 15 June, the number of German troops against PribOVO did not change. Therefore, there was no reason to start redeploying troops closer to the border. The relocation of the 12 and 16 stations was started after the approval of this decision in the GSH, but the insufficient capacity of the railways in the Baltic States did not allow it to be done on time.
18.6.41 d. 125 sd and 51 corps an began the nomination and by the morning of June 20 began to occupy the defense sector. By the morning of June 20, units of 11 ck were already defensive or marching to their positions. By the morning of June 22, the main forces of 48 and 126-th SD went out to their areas of concentration, parts of 23-th SD were at that moment slightly east. The 8-i anti-tank artillery brigade was given operational control of the 9 Army. Battle Report No. 1 9 anti-tank brigade “636 and 670 an 9 anti-tank brigade is in battle formation. Communication with parts is established. The materiel is transported to areas in the 3-4 reception due to lack of traction means. 19-35 20.06 NS Major Zhemartsev» The 9-00 21.6.41 up brigades almost fully occupied combat positions.
RCB 5-th howitzer an: "18.6.41 10-00 5 gap as part of all units ... raised on alert and was located in the Orana area No.2 from 18 to 20 June 1941 g ... 20.6.41 4-00 received a combat order of XTNUMX-5 about concentrating a X-NNX in the forest 8 km east of Swabishki [about 50 km from the Soviet-German border] ... The regiment concentrated in the forest ... where it was until June 22 1941. In this area was organized anti-circular defense and the equipment was made of aerial bombardment bombs ... " In 50 km from the border, the regiment prepares a circular anti-tank defense. Does this mean that the VO leadership implies a breakthrough of the enemy's motorcycle and armored groups to such depth in the first days after the start of the conflict (war)?
19.6.41 the main staff of the PribOVO headquarters is transferred to the front command post in the Panevezys area. Actually, the transformation of PribOVO into the SPF took place, and the shortened headquarters of the Baltic HE, which essentially played the role of a rear command and control center, separated from its composition. Employees of the NWF headquarters instead of the legendary name "PribOVO" often began to use the abbreviation of the true name "NWF." Therefore, an order was prepared, signed by the head of the operational department of the headquarters, General Trukhin.
Since the troops of the 1 echelon of frontier VE cover are (in fact) on alert No. 2 and a significant part of the district headquarters began to move to front-line command posts, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet suffered a similar fate: «Commander LVO, Commander PribOVO, Chief of Border Troops 20.6.41 g. Parts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet since 19.6.41 have been put on alert as per plan No. XXUMX, a command station has been deployed, patrol service has been strengthened at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irben Strait. Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral TRIBUTS»
Earlier we reviewed the Order of the Military Council PribOVO No. 00229 from 18.06.41 g. When discussing the provisions of this order, there is some misunderstanding:“The strangest orders from 15 and 18 June. Almost every point is absurd. For example: ... VNOS posts should be equipped with communications ... (god of God, and previously these communications posts did not have?) Stupid duplication - so that later they wouldn’t say in the cellars of Checkbook clever men - you didn’t tell us what you need to provide the communications with the link ... "two firing positions for each gun ..." Some readers may agree with such statements. What is the catch? In the order number 00229 in the part of VNOS says:“To the commander of the air defense zone, by the end of 19 June 1941, bring into full combat readiness the entire air defense of the district, for which:
a) organize round-the-clock duty on all posts VNOS and provide them continuous communication;
b) make all the anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, assigning round-the-clock duty on batteries by arranging uninterrupted communication them with posts, having carefully prepared in the engineering relation and having provided with fire supplies;
... d) organize uninterrupted communication VNOS posts with fighter aviation aerodromes ... " The problem is that the communication of VNOS posts with air defense units and formations, and air force units that will perform tasks in the interests of air defense, the units of the MoE, should be carried out via wire lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications. The communications centers were former citizens of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. What is continuous or uninterrupted communication? If necessary, installation of additional communication lines or provision of radio communications, implementation of permanent duty of communications personnel of spacecraft on non-military communications centers in order to avoid sabotage and provide communications in order of priority of subscribers, etc. This issue is also mentioned in the note. «On the combat activities of the Air Force... "" ... The VNOS system in the presence of large debris from the communications authorities did not guarantee timely notification of the air force front units of the district ... "
On the preparation of positions for guns. The author thinks that the VO leadership knew the situation well in the troops, as well as the junior and middle command personnel of their troops. It was said above that the commanders of the Air Force units did not particularly hurry their subordinates to dig the aircraft caponiers [on sites where it was impossible to disguise them]. Let's see what the report says about the use of artillery in the initial period of the war. «Report on the combat activities of the 8 Army artillery in battles with 22.6. by 20.8.41 » "... From the first days of the fighting, the disguise was good, digging was bad. In recent battles, self-dripping activities have improved, artillery, usually, began to go deep into the ground, resilience and vitality has increased ... Colonel Ivin, Chief of Artillery of the 8 Army, Colonel Ivanov, Artillery NSh of the 8 Army It turns out that the battery commanders and divisions didn’t hurry to dig positions and ditches in the first days of the war. It took a lot of lives and resources to “drive” the commandment into the head: “Took defense - dig in.” The same problem was in the infantry units for a much longer time. Probably, in the preparation of defensive positions near the border, there was also a “pofigism” and the command was aware of this. The Order from 18.6.41 essentially raised the level of control over the implementation of the provisions of this order by lower-ranking officers.
In the PribOVO-SZF, air defense preparation activities are continuing. “Only to the commander of the 1403 military unit №0054 20.6.41 23-30 Confirming the introduction of readiness №2 with the implementation of all activities for 18-00 - 19.6.41г. I ORDER:
1. All anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns and searchlights put on
positions in accordance with the point’s air defense plans you have developed and my personal instructions.
2. To introduce round-the-clock duty at all command posts and in
subdivisions of officers.
Control over the duty to carry personally you ...
7. From 20.6.41, together with the Ministry of Defense, to organize the blackout of a point, fire protection, medical assistance to the victims and to schedule premises for use as bomb shelters. Commander of the Northwest Air Defense Zone, Colonel Karlin, NSh of the Northwest Air Defense Zone, Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov»
Item 7 means that units connected to the territorial NKVD bodies are connected to the work. Earlier it was said that on the night of 19 on 20 June, the former commander of PribOVO A.D.Loktionov was arrested. The arrest was made in Riga ... HE was to learn about this. Therefore, from June 20, the leadership of PribOVO-NWF began only to follow orders from Moscow, ceasing all manifestations of its initiative.
In the 5 part, we already talked about the beginning of the evacuation of the families of the KA military personnel in PribOVO and about the direct prohibition of this evacuation in ordering the People's Commissar of Defense 20.6.41 of the city. On June 20, the Deputy People’s Commissar of the Interior for Border and Internal Troops, I.I. Maslennikov, signed the message: “The head of the border troops of the NKVD BSSR, Lieutenant-General T. Bogdanov informed that, by order of the Commander of the Baltic Border District, the families of the commanding personnel of the CA units of the Taurogren direction are preparing for evacuation. T. Bogdanov asks for instructions on the evacuation of families of the commanders of the Sakiai border detachment, on the preparation for which the order was given to them ... I ask for your instructions. Lieutenant-General Maslennikov " It should be noted that the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR, T. Bogdanov, was the head of the border troops stationed in PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO. On June 20 from other parts of the border (in his area of responsibility) there were no reports of preparations for the evacuation of families of the commanding personnel of the spacecraft ...
In the evening, 21.6.41 Tymoshenko summoned his deputy, KA Meretskov: “... S.K.Timoshenko said then:
- Perhaps tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to give in to provocations..
- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.
- Exposure first. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war. But be on alert. In the case of an attack, you know what to do ... ”
In KA Meretskov's memoirs about this episode there is not a single word about the Directive No. XXUMX being prepared. It turns out that in the evening, the People's Commissar 1 had not yet thought about developing this document ...
In a similar conversation took place Happy 21.6.41 in the Baltic States, who remembered V.P. Agafonov (head of communications of the 11 Army): “... Are you not too openly focused on the border? - asked district commander F. I. Kuznetsov. - As if on the other side did not get wind of it. Then do not avoid trouble.
- We did everything so that our movements did not arouse suspicion. The compounds simply left the camp in the order of the exercises, ”answered I.T. Shlemin.
- management approved?
- There is a decision of the Military Council of the army.
- I was informed that the ammunition was issued to the troops.
- Perhaps, hurried. Be careful with them. One random shot from ours
sides the germans can use both reason for any provocations.
- We understand. People are strictly warned.
... Kuznetsov nervously wore, then took off his gloves: “Confused atmosphere. Terribly confused ... " What a tricky situation, if there was a Directive of the General Staff from 18.6.41 about bringing the troops of the 1-th echelon of the covering armies into combat readiness ?! Or it was not?
In the evening of June 21, combat alert is announced for the troops of the Libavsky garrison. Units 67 sd after the announcement of the exit to the exercises headed for combat positions.
Since special messages and “Cover Plans ...” mentioned possible landings of enemy assault forces, 21. 6.41 in 16-05 prepared order: “... All airfields on the islands of Ezel and Dago, which are not occupied by aviation, should immediately be brought to a standstill, filled up with large stones, trees, stumps, etc. heavy objects, but do not disturb the ground cover. Execution to deliver 25 June 1941 Deputy Commander PribOVO Lieutenant-General Sofronov» Twelve hours before the war set the date of execution 25.6.41 g.