The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 2)
Preface. The following abbreviations were used in the communication: BAT - military attache, SC - armed forces, SC - Red Army, General Staff - General Staff, RU - Intelligence Directorate, AK - Army Corps, mk - motorized corps, SDF - Mountain Rifle Division, cd (CP) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), od - security division, pd - infantry division, sd - rifle division, etc. (tp, tbr) - tank division (regiment, brigade).
In order to simplify the text, the term “armored division (regiment) will be replaced by the TD (tp). For aircraft ratings, it is assumed that one division corresponds to 2 brigades or 4 regiments. The airborne corps of the spacecraft of the three brigade is taken to be 0,8 sd. There are many reports in the message that can be simply ignored if they are annoying.
In different sources of information, the strength of the Armed Forces is somewhat different among themselves. Therefore, some numbers may be different. On this issue, please be supportive of the author, since the number of divisions is not the main subject of the message.
Continuation of the "List ..."
Alta (Ilse Stöbe. Her work was led by Captain N. Zaitsev - Bine)
04.01.41 "Aryan" confirmed that he received this information from a military person he knew, and this was based not rumored, and on a special order of Hitler, which is strictly secret and which is known to very few individuals.
In support of this, he cites some more basic arguments:
1. His conversations with the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry, who said that Molotov’s visit to Berlin could be compared to Beck’s visit. Unanimity was not reached on any of the most important issues - neither in the question of Finland, nor in the question of Bulgaria.
2. The preparation of an offensive against the USSR began much earlier, but at one time it was suspended, because the Germans miscalculated with the resistance of England. In the spring, the Germans expect England to put on their knees and free their hands in the east.
3. Despite the fact that Germany sells military materials to the USSR, has buried Bukovina’s occupation to oblivion, “does not notice” the propaganda of the USSR in Bulgaria, Hitler’s hostile attitudes towards the USSR were not changed.
4. Hitler thinks: a) state of spacecraft right now so lowthat in the spring it will have undoubted success;
b) the growth and strengthening of the German army continues.
17.01.41 - Aryan said that the war with the USSR is not just rumor, but an order from Hitler, who is known to a limited circle of people engaged in preparing for war against the USSR.
25.03.41 - To maintain its food base and maintain its credibility, Hitler will oppose the USSR. Facts confirming this: 1 is concentrated in Poland20 divisions. Western airfields in Poland are engaged in bomber squadrons. There is an intensive construction of air defense facilities in East Germany.
Formed three army groups:
a) under the command of field marshals of Boc, Rundstedt and Ritter von Leeb;
b) The 1 Army Group "Koenigsberg" is moving towards Leningrad;
The 2 Army Group is moving towards Moscow;
3-I army group "Pozen" is moving in the direction of Kiev.
The attack will take place between 15 May and 15 June 1941 g.
The scouts had amazing analytical skills or intuition, but 25 in March nobody in Germany knew when the war with the USSR would start - even Hitler.
"X" ["CEC"] (employee of the German embassy in Moscow G.Kegel. Colonel K.Leontiev worked with him).
05.02.41 - On the border with the USSR, there are so many German troops that are more than necessary to protect the border ... After the war with France, Hitler gave the order to build eastern fortifications. In the eastern cities of Germany is the enhanced installation of air defense. The attack will begin after the end of the war with England ...
27.03.41 - Hitler said that with respect to the treaty of friendship with the USSR, not everything is in order and it is necessary to prepare public opinion regarding the change of policy of Germany to the USSR. The opinion prevails in the NSDAP circles, if Germany does not soon achieve a decisive victory over England, then she will come out against the USSR to seize Ukraine. Others believe that Germany should oppose the USSR already in June.
05.04.41 - An adviser from the German Ministry of Economy stated that in Berlin the responsible circles are convinced of the upcoming war against the USSR. Called timeline 15 May 1941 but in connection with the events in the Balkans, the term of the speech was postponed to 15 1941 June In the Berlin circles believe that Ka easy to break, because she concentrated the main forces on the central sector of the front. The Germans are going to drive several wedges in the south and north to these units, driving them into the hollow ... Initial attacks will be inflicted in the south and in the north.
17.04.41 - Judging by the ongoing training (concentration of troops in the east, especially in East Prussia), war with the USSR is not excluded in the very near future. On the borders with the USSR concentrated before 100 divisions.
29.04.41 - Schulenburg was not accepted by Ribbentrop. Only 23.04.41 was suddenly summoned by Hitler. The correspondent of German newspapers Timm was assigned to urgently report on the state of the Moscow-Minsk highway. Colonel Crippa said the Germans are counting to carry out the entire operation against the USSR right up to the occupation of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa, a maximum of 4 weeks. The Germans are quite openly preparing the public opinion of Germany for the war against the USSR.
07.05.41 - Adjutant Göring reported: the adventure with the concentration of German troops in the east "overlapped over the edge" and has serious consequences for Germany. OKV gave the order to complete the preparation of theater and concentration of troops in the East to 2 Jun. The number of troops after concentration: East Prussia - 2 million, the former Poland - 3 million, Romania, Hungary and the Balkans - 2 million. Thus, against the USSR should be concentrated up to 7 million troops.
7.05.41 - The war with the USSR has already been resolved. Facts: In Warsaw and other cities there are schools for hospitals. The German population of the General Government must be evacuated. Baltic, Russian and Ukrainians should be collected for military training. An order is given - to finish all preparations. to 2 June 1941
On the Baltic Sea coast, the Germans concentrated a large number of ships intended for the landing of troops. It is not excluded that Hitler will simultaneously attempt to land troops in the Baltics at the same time as he is performing at the land frontiers, in order to leave an army in the rear of the border defenses and to expand the front from the north.
23.05.41 - Soldiers in the Governor-General openly speak of an imminent war with the USSR. In Poland, concentrated to 2 million soldiers.
05.06.41 - It is believed that in the coming 3 weeks the situation should be finally resolved, i.e. if the war between Germany and the USSR does not start until June 20, then there will be no war at all.
10.06.41 - If Stalin does not come to Berlin, then the war is inevitable. Germany made demands on the USSR: a) additional supplies of 2,5 million tons of grain; b) free transit to Persia and military occupation of Soviet grain warehouses on 4-5 million tons. The deadline for accepting proposals is 23 June 1941. I am convinced that in a few weeks after the start of the war the Germans will occupy the most important parts of the USSR.
10.06.41 - Hilger stated that he knew that German military circles fear that the spacecraft may concentrate its main forces within the country. Then the Germans would be able to occupy most of the country's territory, but they would not be able to break the spacecraft in the first phase of the war.
14.06.41 - Information from Berlin suggests that military preparations continue and ministries are convinced that war will be launched in the first half of June with. year
19.06.41 - The embassy firmly believes that Germany is facing an attack on the USSR in the coming days. Call dates June 15, June 20 and June 24. Advisor Schieber stated that the attack will occur in the coming days, namely 23 Jun or 24 Jun... Tippelskirch believes that the cause of the war will be some kind of border conflict on the Soviet-Romanian border. Mobilization is announced in Romania and Finland.
19.06.41 - The embassy is convinced that from 20 June should be considered daily with the possibility the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR. The embassy was instructed to immediately send all the children and women. I received an instruction to leave the German naval attache with the staff from Moscow. Hilger stated that it is now absolutely clear that war is inevitable.
20.06.41 - Regular diplomas were instructed not to leave Berlin. Representatives of industrial firms in Moscow were instructed to immediately leave for Berlin. The attack is possible 23.06.41.
21.06.41 in the morning - the Embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. With 4 hours of the morning there is a meeting with Tippelskirch. Source convinced that the war will start in the next 48 hours.
21.06.41 in 19-00 - The Embassy in the morning was instructed to destroy all the secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. This decision is war.»
After the meeting of Colonel Leontyev with G. Kegel to 20-00, the head of the Directorate ordered the special communications officer urgently deliver a report to Stalin, Molotov and Tymoshenko. The envelopes indicated: “Only to the addressee. Staff members do not open. "
In addition to the documents presented in the "Calendar ..." and "List ..." documents, the media has information on other intelligence reports.
Special message 05.03.41 - The ministries of Berlin ... are convinced of the upcoming war against the USSR. The date of the attack is considered to be 1 in May of 1941. Recently, due to the events in Yugoslavia, the start of the war has been assigned to 15 June...
Special message 15.03.41 - The Gruppenführer SS stated in a conversation that there was no talk about a march on England. More 100 divisions focused on the eastern border... We go to Ukraine and the Baltic region. Hike to Russia will be a military walk. Governors for colonization have already been appointed to Odessa, Kiev and other cities. Now the main military opponent of Germany is the Soviet Union ... It was noted that attack on the USSR should be expected in three monthsi.e. in June.
Special Post 09.05.41 - The General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany abandoned plans to invade England. As the immediate task is to seize the Ukraine and Belarus. Implementation plans are scheduled for April - May 1941 Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria are also preparing for an attack on the USSR ...
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РќРЏР РРЊРРРРРРРР ° РЎРґРРР RoRјRμRЅRЅRѕ PI S,SЂRo RјRμSЃSЏS † ° F, The "P" SЂSѓRіV "RѕS,RІRμS,RoR" C ‡ S,Rѕ SЃR ° Rј RѕRЅ RЅRμ RІRїRѕR "RЅRμ SЂR ° F · RґRμR" SЏRμS, SЌS,Sѓ S,RѕS ‡ РєСѓ Р · рения, РЅРѕ РІСЃРµ РґСЂСѓРіРёРµ РІ этом СЃРѕРІРµСЂС ± РµР¶РґРµРЅС ‹. RS, Ryo RґSЂSѓRіRёRµ SЏRІR ”SЏSЋS, SЃSЏ R_RёRґRЅS ј RёRёё RґRµSЏS‚R РR Џ SЏRјRёR РRµSЂRјR ° RЅRёRё. In the "P" SЂSѓRіSѓV "RЅRμRoR · RІRμSЃS,RЅRѕ, RЅR ° C ‡ ‡ RμRј S,RѕS RЅRѕ RѕR ° ± RѕSЃRЅRѕRІR RЅS <Roes ... SѓR RμR¶RґRμRЅRoSЏ ± ± PI RїRѕR RμRґRμ Ryo RєR ° RєRoRјRo SЃRІRμRґRμRЅRoSЏRјRo SЂR ° SЃRїRѕR" P ° RіR ° SЋS, RЅRμRјS † C <RІRѕR№RЅRμ SЃ RЎRЎRЎR of the PS, RЅRѕ RІRЅSѓS,SЂRμRЅRЅRμRμ RїRѕR "RѕR¶RμRЅRoRμ PI RЎRЎRЎR Ryo SЃRѕSЃS,RѕSЏRЅRoRμ RљRђ SЏRІR" SЏRμS,SЃSЏ RІR ° R¶RЅS <Rј C "P ° RєS,RѕSЂRѕRј РІ уверенности РЅРµРјС † ев. Р РјРё Р ± СѓРґСѓС ‚РёСЃРїРѕР» СЊР · РѕРІР ° РЅС ‹Р ± ел РѕРіРІР ° СЂРґРµР№С † С ‹Рё СѓРєСЂР ° РёРЅС † С‹ .В »
РЎРїРµС † СЃР *Р *Р ± С ‰ ение Р РЈ В «Р — Р ° С… Р ° СЂСѓВ» In -10.06.1941 "RњS <RїRѕR" SѓS ‡ Röhr "Ryo SЃSЂRѕS ‡ RЅRѕRμ P · P ° ° RґR RЅRoRμ SЃRѕRѕS,RІRμS,SЃS,RІSѓSЋS ‰ Roes ... RoRЅSЃS,R ° RЅS † RoR№, RєR SЃR ° ° SЋS ‰ RμRμSЃSЏ RІS <SЏRІR "RμRЅRoSЏ Ryo SѓS,RѕS RЅRμRЅRoSЏ RґRoSЃR ‡" † RѕRєR ° C RoRo, RѕSЂRіR RЅRoR · ° F ° C † RoRo Ryo RІRѕRѕSЂSѓR¶RμRЅRoSЏ RіRμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRѕR№ SЂRјRoRo ° F.
Р'РѕРїСЂРѕСЃС ‹‹, РїРѕРґР »РµР¶Р ° С РёРµ СЂР ° Р · СЂР ° Р ± отке, СЃР» РµРґСѓСЋС ‰ РёРµ:
“2. RJ РёР№, тР° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№, тяжелы С… тР° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№...
5. ...РћСЃРѕР ± енно РІР ° жно РІС ‹СЏРІРёС: РїРѕ тР° РЅРєР ° Рј - РјР ° РєСЃРёРјР ° Р »СЊРЅСѓСЋ тол С ‰ РёРЅСѓ РЁ СЃРёР »Сѓ сопротивл ения Р ± СЂРѕРЅРё; СРРРРРС ‹С‚Р ° РЅРєРѕРІ СЃ РјР ° РєСЃРЁРјР ° Р» СЊРЅС ‹Рј весом Рё вооружением Рё РєРѕР »РЁС ‡ ество РІ Р“ ермР° РЅРёРё тР° РЅРєРѕРІ весом РѕС ‚45 тонн Рё РІС‹ С € Рµ...
8. P "P ° RЅRЅS <Rμ RїRѕ SЃS,SЂRѕRoS,RμR" SЊSЃS,RІSѓ RЈR RїSЂRѕS,RoRІ RЎRЎRЎR Pd ° F SЌSЂRѕRґSЂRѕRјRЅS <C ... SѓR · P "RѕRІ, RѕSЃRѕR ± RμRЅRЅRѕ RїRѕRґR RμRјRЅS · <C ... P ° RЅRіR ° SЂRѕRІ Rє RІRѕSЃS‚RєRSѓ RѕS С, SЂRµRєRћRёRћRµSaRґRЅRЅR ° C РRµRNoRoRoR †RёRёRёRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRrSaRRoRRoRRoRRRoRRRRRRRRRRRRrRaRR RџSЂRo SЌS,RѕRј RѕSЃRѕR ± RμRЅRЅRѕ RІR ° R¶RЅS <RґR ° RЅRЅS <Rμ RїRѕ SЃRѕSЃS,RѕSЏRЅRoSЋ RЈR PI RїRѕRіSЂR ° RЅRoS ‡ RЅRѕR№ RїRѕR "RѕSЃRμ RїRѕ SЂRμRєRμ R'RoSЃR" Rμ (P'P SЂS € ° F ° RІSЃRєRoR № РЈР, Р ”емР± Р» РёРЅСЃРєРёР№ РЈР); РїРѕ Р'РѕСЃС‚РѕС ‡ РЅРѕР№ РџСЂСѓСЃСЃРёРёРё Рё РїРѕ рекР° Рј РџСЂСѓС ‚, Серет (РњРѕР »РґР ° РІРёС) …¦
10. ПостР° СЂР ° тьсся РґРѕР ± С РѕСЂРјРµ: документР° Р »СЊРЅС‹ Рµ, РІС <СЃРєР ° Р · С <РІР ° РЅРёСЏ Рё С‚.Рґ.). В »
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In "РђСЂРЅРѕР" СЊРґВ " (R'RμSЂR "RoRЅ) â €" 12.06.1941 In "vЂ|V" RђSЂRoRμS † B "PI RїRμSЂRμRґR ° RЅRЅRѕRј RЅR ° Rј SЃRμR№S ‡ ° F SЃ RјR ° S,RμSЂRoR ° F" Rμ RЅR ° F · C <RІR ° РµС ‚СЃСЂРѕРєРё вероятного РІС‹ ступления против РЅР ° СЃ 15 · 20 РёСЋРЅСЏ.V
16.06.41 Ri. Р ° РЅРіР »РёР№СЃРєРѕРµ руководѴтво RJP RЎRѕRіR »R ° SЅRЅRѕSЌR‚RјRґRґR ° RЅR ‹S ‹RјRIџR »RЊS €R РRµR ° C… RsRrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrn , Pd R'RμRЅRіSЂRoRo RЎR "RѕRІR ° RєRoRo â €" 76 RґRoRІRoR RoR№ · (· Röhr RЅRoS ... 2 S,Rґ Ryo 2 RјRґ) RїSЂRμRґRїRѕR "P ° RіR ° F" P ° SЃSЊ RїRμSЂRμR SЂRѕSЃRєR ° ± 29 RґRoRІRoR · Röhr No. РїРѕ Р'Р ° Р »С‚РёР№СЃРєРѕРјСѓ РјРѕС'С Ћ Ћ ґ ґ ґ X N N N N N ґ ґ ґ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Р'сего РЅР ° СЃС… еме Р ± С ‹Р» Рѕ РѕРїРєР ° Р · Р ° РЅРѕ 4 гермР° РЅСЃРєРёС… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№. Р 'действительностШ Р ± С‹ Р »Рѕ СЂР ° Р · вернуто 2 (РІ С‚.С ‡. 2 СРР Рё 2 РјРґ).
RљRРR »R РR СR RЃRѕRґRґR ‹RРR ·R ·R ·RРR »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R РR РR »RґRґRґRґRґRґRРR »R »R РR РRРRРRРRРRРRРRРRRРRRrRrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr ество тд Рё РјРґ СЃРёР »СЊРЅРѕ Р · Р ° нижено. RSR, R · RЅR ° RµRј RјC ° РєР »СЏС‚РѕРіРѕ РґСЂСѓРіР ° В». P • SЃR "Ryo RїSЂRoRїRѕRјRЅRoS,SЊ S,RμRєSЃS, Röhr RґRЅRμRІRЅRoRєR · ° F" RμR ± RμR "SЊSЃSЃR ° RґRμR of the PS · RoRЅS" RѕSЂRјR ° C † RoRo RїRѕ RІS,RѕSЂR¶RμRЅRoSЋ PI RђRЅRіR "RoSЋ, S,Rѕ RїRѕRЅSЏS, РЅРѕ, С ‡ то руководству СССРтруудно Р ± С <Р »Рѕ поверить РІ СЌС‚Rё СЃРІРµРRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR SRRPP
In "R'SЂR ° RЅRґV" - 17.06.1941 “... A general mobilization in Finland is confirmed. There is a large number of reservists, following the appointment. The mobilization began on June 10-11 ... On June 12 a state of siege was declared in Tammisaari, it was put on alert ... In parts of the holidays they stopped, on leave they were ordered to immediately come to the unit. ”
"Titus" (resident in Rome) - 19.06.1941 “... Yesterday, a telegram from the Italian ambassador in Berlin arrived at the Italian Foreign Ministry, in which he reported that the highest German military command had informed him about the beginning of hostilities in Germany against the USSR between 20 and 25 June this year
"Costa" - 20.06.1941 “The German emissary said today that a 21 or 22 is expected a military confrontation on June ... There are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 6 in Finland, 10 in Hungary, 7 in Slovakia. Total 60 motorized divisions ... In Romania, the mobilization is over and at any moment military operations are expected. There are 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria. ”
Ramsay (R.Zorge)
11.03.41 - in the opinion of the German BAT in Tokyo, "after the end of the present [Anglo-German] war, the bitter struggle of Germany against the Soviet Union should begin."
2.05.41 - Ott said that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part of the USSR into his own hands as a grain and raw material base for control by Germany throughout Europe. The ambassador and the attache agreed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia in the relations between Germany and the USSR, two critical dates are approaching. The first date is the end of sowing in the USSR. After the sowing is over, the war against the USSR can begin at any time, so Germany will only have to harvest.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR creates any difficulties in the question of Turkey’s acceptance of German demands, then war will be inevitable... »
6.05.41 - the German leadership is confident that "the war against the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of the war against England", but the decision to start a war against the USSR will be made Hitlereither in May or after the war with England". German generals rate spacecraft combat capability so low that it is believed that the spacecraft will be crushed within a few weeks. They believe that the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.
Military specialists of the General Staff at the beginning of June 1941 of the year would never agree with such an assessment of the combat capability of the spacecraft. Therefore, when preparing a report for the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Golikov ordered to remove the clause on the weakness of the spacecraft and the clause that, according to the German generals, the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.
21.05.41 - «war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May... This year the danger may pass».
30.05.41 - Berlin informed the ambassador Ott that German offensive against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott on 95% surethat war will begin. The indirect evidence for this at present is as follows: the technical department of the air force in my city was instructed to return shortly. Ott demanded that the BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. Transport of rubber through the USSR is reduced to a minimum.
Reasons for the German speech - existence of a powerful spacecraft does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, Ka must be driven away as soon as possible.
It is necessary to drive the spacecraft for how many kilometers from the border?
1.06.41 - Standby the beginning of the German-Soviet war around 15 June based solely on the information that Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left 6 May to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post BAT.
Ott said that he could not get information on this directly from Berlin, and has only the information of Scholl. In a conversation with Scholl, I found that the Germans in the matter of the statement against the SC attracts the fact of a large tactical errorwhich, according to Scholl, made the USSR. According to the German point of view, the fact that the defensive line of the USSR is located mainly against the German lines without large branches, is the greatest mistake. She is [Germany] will help break the spacecraft in the first big battle. Scholl declared that the strongest blow would be dealt to the left flank of the German army. "
There is a resolution: “BUT-3. Write "Ramsay" with the following request: "Please inform: 1) The essence of the big tactical error you are reporting and 2 is more understandable. Your own opinion about Scholl's truth about the left flank." Golikov .. 3.06.41 g "" But-3. In the list of dubious and disinfectant messages "Ramsay" Golikov. Perhaps this decision was made after consultation with high-ranking military experts.
17.06.41 - German courier told BAT that he is convinced that war against the USSR is delayed, probably, until the end of June. BAT does not know - there will be war or not...
After the start of the war, Ramsay clarified: “Lieutenant Colonel Scholl said then that the first and main attack would be inflicted by the Germans on the SC by their left flank. The Germans are fully confident that the main forces of the spacecraft will be concentrated in the opposite direction from the line, giving full opportunity for a strong blow. The Germans were very worried that the spacecraft, in the order of knowing the main attack, would retreat a certain distance in order to study the forces of the enemy and undertake something aside from the direction of the main attack. The main goal of the Germans is the destruction of a spacecraft covering it, as it was with the Polish army ... "
In addition to R.Zorge, in the Far East there were at least two Soviet intelligence officers: the German consul in Shanghai and the head of the gendarmerie service of the Kwantung Army. The text of their messages of the period under consideration is unknown. Did they also believe that the war would begin in June and what reasons were given — we do not know, but the intelligence leaders and Stalin carefully worked through these reports ...
Consideration of intelligence reports from intelligence officers will end with reports German agent "Peter" from the Soviet embassy in Berlin.
“12 June 1941 Filippov:“ ...Our ... task is to to find out, does Germany lead peace talks with England and is not a further attempt to reach a compromise with the United States expected ... ”
"13 June 1941. I asked why Filippov and Russian officials did not [experience] concerns about rumors concerning German-Russian relations ... Filippov: "Before the German-Russian conflict, about which the Times writes ... long away. Germany pursues a policy of intimidation". I ... asked how he explains to himself that on the eastern border [Germany] focused ... more than 100 divisions, and whether Russia is thinking of somehow counteracting ... the threat ... The only possible answer of the Russian side to the German intimidation could be a close alliance with the United States and Britain. To this Filippov replied that the union between Russia, America and England is nonsense ... If Germany really attacks, then German military successes, be it the seizure of the Baltic countries, Ukraine, etc., will mean nothing yet ... Pressure - until pressure and at the same time force, as long as it is used in a narrow space. Any expansion [of the front of the war] would mean a weakening for Germany, and Hitler won't do it».
“14 June 1941. I answered the question I was asked twice: are there efforts to achieve peace with England:“ None of the well-informed people here know anything about such events, and it’s foolish to say at the moment about peace talks between Germany and the enemy №1 its policy of establishing a new order. " In conclusion ... he spoke about a lively controversy and rumors about the confiscation of “Völkischer Beobachter ...”
“21 June 1941. I said that ... we are ... in a state of war of nerves and ... the German side will make an attempt to utterly exacerbate the nervous tension ... The nerves will be won by the one who has stronger nerves ... Filippov: “The situation is very serious ... We firmly believe that Hitler started a giant bluff. We do not believe that war can begin tomorrow. The process is likely to continue. It's clear that Germans intend to put pressure on us In hope achieve benefitsthat Hitler needs to continue the war. ”
It is often written that Stalin did not believe intelligence. From the presented materials it is clear that it was very difficult to understand the real situation. The fact that he did not understand - his fault as the sole leader.
Let's try to summarize what we have read in the messages, in which, of course, there are “seeds of truth”.
1) Incomprehensible position of the first persons of Germany. How does Hitler relate to the war with the USSR? There is no information about his position. Goering advocates an alliance with Britain against the USSR. Goering pushes Germany to war, recruits allies (for example, Antonescu). Ribbentrop against Gering's position. In Germany itself, there are two currents - for the war and against it (they fear that the Soviet Union will win). Industrialists of Sweden and Finland against the war. There was a dangerous current in the upper ranks of the Wehrmacht - the position of Brauchitsch is similar to the statements of Goering about the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance.
2) Intelligence brings Germany’s plans of attack one more fantastic than the other: giant ticks from Finland to the Balkans (or from Turkey to the Caucasus), three strikes and all aimed at Ukraine, German strikes against the USSR through Romania. Of course, in the reports one variant of the attack on the USSR was mentioned similar to the truth: one strike on Petersburg, the second on Moscow, the third on Kiev. Where do the blows come from, what forces? Is it a war or a provocation of the highest-ranking German military? It is not clear...
3) The question of the maneuverability of the German troops: in 25 days to reach the Urals or in three to four weeks to Moscow. To break through not in one direction, but to leave by troops on MERIDIAN, on which Moscow is located. [According to the highest ranks of the Soviet army, it was das ist fiction ... At that time, the GS General Staff did not know that SO could be fought!]
4) The misinformation actions of Germany are very successful. Quite often they are traced in the messages of our intelligence officers. The grouping of German troops for a long time remained almost unchanged, which calmed the military-political leadership of our country. By the beginning of the attack on the USSR, the German group on the western border of the USSR increased, but did not increase as expected to increase! The construction of defensive lines by German units, strengthening their air defense at various sites, evacuation measures. Various sources receive information that the Wehrmacht’s strong grouping is the need to repel the USSR in the event of its aggression (just as they say about the NATO grouping against the Russian Federation in Europe, we are supposedly the most aggressive country. How many years have passed and this policy has not changed ...) Later they began to say that to protect against flank attack from the USSR when the German Armed Forces moved to the Middle East. Even later - the harsh conditions of Germany, the USSR and the culmination - the participation of the USSR in the peace conference.
5) The timing of the attack on the USSR. We now know that the term was the initial 15 of May, then it was postponed to June 22. In the messages, March 1941 of the year, April, beginning of May, end of May, 15 of June, 22-24 of June, end of June, August is called. In addition to intelligence information received in June, everything else is only rumors or personal opinion of the German military.
First, the dates are tied to the moment when they “put England on their knees” and after that they will attack the USSR. Further messages come in - they will attack the USSR, and leave England after they are starved. New messages - will hit the USSR in the first place. Victories in Libya and again information about the invasion of England, and the Soviet Union will be left last. The decision was made and will attack the USSR in the coming days. But these days there is a massive disinformation of Gebelss. Between the reports of the attack appears version of the mighty enemy of Germany - the United States. The US has almost no land army. How to treat this version?
6) Causes of war or large-scale provocation. Present the USSR ultimatum on joining the axis. Ultimatum - this is the time to bring the troops on alert. Either Germany will push the Soviet troops away from the state border or occupies only Ukraine (maybe the Baltic States). They say that the spacecraft is powerful. Either the spacecraft’s combat capability is low and its defense system is weak, or the Germans fear that the spacecraft will be diverted from the border. Question: how should the spacecraft cover troops be positioned, if it is not clear how the Germans will fight? And will they fight? Now we know that a large number of these assumptions are pure nonsense. Did not plan to do so with the USSR Hitler.
All of these options required to consider, analyze and try to find possible activities to avoid war. Another scout reported that Germany will demonstrate its power, "play on the nerves." After report that Germany will try to provoke the Soviet military to create a pretext for the start of the war. At the same time, the Fuhrer is completely inactive - is he actually aware of the provocation or not?
Everything is very difficult. The author believes that strategic intelligence was able to determine the duration of the attack only around mid-June. But the emergence of additional conditions (6 listing) at the beginning of the war even more confused the situation and the understanding of real events and the scenario of Hitler's behavior. An incorrect estimate of the size of the German Armed Forces on the western border of the USSR and the absence of other truthful information led to an erroneous assessment of the situation and, as a result, was one of the reasons for the catastrophic defeat in the border battle.
What was the real size of the grouping of Germany and its allies to invade the territory of the USSR?
At present, we know that for the war with the USSR a significant grouping of the Armed Forces of Germany and its allies was singled out. Not all allies entered the 22 war on June 1941 of the year, but this is not so important for the topic in question. Grouping included: 190 divisions (of which up to 153 Germanic, Finnish 17,5, Romanian 17,5, Hungarian 2), 4714 tanks (of which German 4408) and 4739 airplanes (of which German - 3909, including communication planes and transport aircraft). It should be noted that the 24 German divisions were in the reserve OKV.
In these materials we will not consider the Finnish army and the German army "Norway" (4 divisions).
By 22.06.41, the German grouping on the Western border was about 125 divisions, of which 30, etc. and MD.
By 22 June Romania concentrated on the border with the USSR 3 and 4 army with a total of 17,5 divisions.
Germany and Romania attacked the USSR 22 on June 1941, and on July 1, a Carpathian group of Hungarian troops attacked the Soviet 12 th army.
What did German intelligence report about Hitler to KA?
On 15 in January of 1941, the reconnaissance estimated the number of spacecraft troops deployed in the western part of the USSR, in the 125 divisions (actually there were 161) and 30 TBR (it was 32).
According to intelligence estimates in the western part of the USSR, 11 divisions (182,5) and 186 tbrs (38) were present on 0 June.
The number of Soviet troops in the areas of intelligence information was: PribOVO - 31 division (25) and 7 tbr (0); COVO - 42 divisions (44) and 10 tbr (0); KOVO and OdVO - 72 divisions (80) and 15 tbr (0).
Much did not take into account the German theorists and Hitler. For example, about the events of the beginning of August 1941, Guderian wrote: “I pointed out to Hitler the fact that the Russians have a great superiority in the tanks ... Hitler then broke the phrase:“ If I had known that the Russians really had that number of tanks in your book, I probably would not have started this war. ” In my book “Attention, tanks!”, Released in 1937, I pointed out that at that time there were 10000 tanks in Russia ... The information I had at my disposal said that the Russians had 17000 tanks ”.
What opposed the German invasion forces from the USSR?
Order 145 divisions (of which 54 td and md), 13830 tanks and 8639 aircraft. We all know that the divisions were not mobilized, many of them scattered across the territory of military districts. A large number of divisions were in the formation stage and did not have weapons. We know that a huge number of aircraft and tanks were of the old types, had limited lifespan. Part of the technology was not efficient due to the lack of spare parts. Many T-27, T-37, T-38 and T-40 type tanks were counted among the tanks ...
One of the goals of Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war was to identify the military preparations of Germany, to concentrate troops on the borders of the USSR and to determine their numbers. What was reported about the German AF RU GSH?
According to the RP in 1938, in Germany there were 7300 tanks and 5160 aircraft. In fact, through the 8 months, the entire German 3474 tank and 4288 aircraft were located in the German Armed Forces. According to RU, the number of German troops on the border with the USSR was: 1.10.40 g. - 89 divisions (actually was 30 divisions), 1.11.40 g. - 88 Divisions (32). An overestimation of the German Armed Forces intelligence characteristic before the outbreak of war.
Special post RU №660279cc 11.03.1941 “… The total number of the German army by September 1940 was about 228 divisions, including 15-17 TD and 8-10 MD.
According to reports, over the past winter period, the German command has additionally formed 25 front, 5 etc., 5 md. In addition, due to the PD, it seems that it was formed to 5 md ... The total number of divisions of the German army on 1 March 1941 is about 263 divisions…, of them 22 TD and 20 MD...
... On 1 March 1941, Germany had 20700 aircraft, of which: combat - 10980 ... Combat aircraft were distributed: bombers - 4090, dive bombers - 1850, reconnaissance - 1220, fighters - 3820 ...
When attacking France in May, 1940 was part of the German army 2-3 tdwhich had one by one heavy tank regiment. For the last time received information about the formation of heavy tank divisions.
Currently there are three parachute and three airborne divisions ...
At the ČKD factories ... a light tank of the brand "38-T" is being built, having ... frontal armor - 50 mm... Armor thickness able to withstand a 45-mm projectile hit ...
According to information requiring additional verification, the Germans are beginning to build three new models of heavy tanks:
- type V - weight 36 t, armament 75-mm gun and 2 machine gun, armor up to 60 mm;
- type VI - weight 45 t, armament 75-mm and 20-mm cannon, 3 machine gun, armor up to 70 mm;
- Type VII - 90 T weight, 105-mm and 20-mm guns, machine gun 4 ...
Renault manufactures 72-ton French tanks under repair ... According to information received in March of this year. and requiring verification, the production of 60 and 80-ton tanks is put at the Skoda and Krupp factories ...
Conclusions:
1. Germany is gradually replacing type II light tanks ... with tanks with armor from 25 to 50 mm ...
3. Planned activities to create powerful new heavy tanks.
... The average production capacity of the main tank factories in Germany ranges from 70 — 80 tanks per month. The total 18 production capacity of the German factories known to us (including the Protectorate and the Governor-General) is determined by in 950 — 1000 tanks per month.
When deploying tank production on the basis of existing autotractor plants (up to 15-20 plants), as well as increasing the production of tanks in factories with streamlined production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18 — 20 thousand tanks per year.
When using French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10000 tanks per year...
... There is a quantitative increase in anti-tank artillery, an increase in its
caliber and attraction of 20, 37 and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to fight tanks.
... According to information that needs to be checked, some of the anti-tank battalions are deployed in anti-tank shelves two-divisional composition; The first division has 3 rotates for 12 37 or 47 mm caliber guns, and the second division has 12 to 21 75 or 88 mm guns (... which will be replaced by 75-mm anti-tank guns later) ... "
Actual Divi NumberGermany for that period was 191.
On the basis of this and similar messages, it was concluded that there was an increase in the reservation of German tanks, possible problems with their defeat by anti-tank artillery and the formation of large formations of heavy tanks.
23 April 1941, the Soviet government allowed the People's Commissariat of Defense to form 1 anti-tank brigades by July 10. According to the state each brigade was supposed to have forty-eight 76-mm divisional guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen XNMX-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 37-mm guns, sixteen XNMX-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four XNUMX-mm guns -mm anti-aircraft guns. The spacecraft began to prepare for the use of large-caliber anti-aircraft guns against German heavy tanks.
Special post RU №660370ss 4.04.41 g.
"... The total number of German troops on the border with the USSR ... with troops in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja reaches 83 – 84 divisionsapart from troops concentrated in the Czech Republic, Moravia and in the center of Romania ... "
The Germans at the beginning of April on the eastern border (including Romania) were placed only 47 divisions.
Special post RU №660448ss 26.04.41 g.
"...On 25.04 the total number of German troops on the western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) - 95 — 100 Divisions…, of them:
a) ... against Pribovo 21 – 22 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 1 etc ...
b) ... against SECOVO - 28 divisions, of which: ... 1 md and 4 etc ...
... Against KOVO - 29 – 32 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 4 etc ... In the region of Carpathian Ukraine 3 division ... Against OdVO - 8 – 9 divisions ...
... In the German army there are in the Air Force prepared 8 — 10 parachute divisions (their exact deployment is not clear).
Thus, the total number of the German army on 25.04.41 was 286 – 296 divisions, of them:…20 md; 22 td; SS divisions - 18 (of which to 10 md).
According to reports, from 1 on April, the German command began to form up to 40 divisionsthat requires additional verification. ”
As an example of assessing the distribution of German troops in the territory of the Reich, one message is given in a somewhat more complete form.
Special post RU №660506ss 15.05.41 g.
"... Accounting and comparison of the data received give the following distribution of the German armed forces along borders and fronts on 15 in May 1941 G.:
The total number of German troops against the USSR reaches the 114 – 119 divisions, including the 6 divisions that are located in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area. Of these, 82 – 87 PD, 6 mountain, 13 TD, 12 md, 1 cd ...
The German Armed Forces on our border are distributed:
a) in V. Prussia - 24 divisions, including ... 3 md, 2 td and 7 kn;
b) on the Warsaw direction against ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including ... 4 td, 1 md, 1 cd and 8 kn;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow district against KOVO - 36 divisions, including ... 5 md, 6 td and 5 kn;
d) in the area of Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 PD and 1 CP;
e) in Slovakia (area Zborov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;
f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 13 – 14 divisions, including 3 md, 1 mountain and 1, etc.
The total number of German troops in the Balkan Peninsula reaches 47 – 49 divisions, of which: in Romania - 6 divisions (without Moldova); in Yugoslavia - 9 divisions;
in Greece - 18 divisions (of which on the Turkish border 6 divisions); in Bulgaria - 16 divisions (of which on the Turkish border 6 divisions).
The created army in Bulgaria at the expense of reserves and units from Yugoslavia against Turkey is allegedly headed by General Reichenau. The rearmament of the Bulgarian army is noted at the expense of the material part transferred to it by Germany ...
On the African front is the 7 of the German divisions. There is evidence that part of the divisions located in Greece should be used against England in Africa.
In the occupied countries of Western Europe.
a) On the north-west coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 46 divisions.
b) Inside the occupied part of France - 9 divisions.
c) On the border with Spain - 9 divisions.
According to the latest data received, 5 divisions are being prepared to be deployed through Spain for operations against Gibraltar.
d) In Norway, both in the north of the country and in the south due to transfers through Sweden and Finland, there was an increase in the 1 division, as a result the number of divisions in Norway was brought to 14, of which 5 was in the North Norwegian grouping
5. German military units continue to arrive in Finland
6. In Italy - 9 divisions.
7. Reserve Command.
a) In the center of the country - around 12 divisions,
b) On the territory of Austria and the Protectorate - 11 divisions, and the total 23 divisions.
The Air Force has 8 — 10 parachute divisions, of which 1 – 2 divisions in Greece, 5 – 6 divisions on the northern coast of France and Belgium, 2 divisions within the country.
Conclusion:
The increase in German troops on the border with the USSR continues. The main areas of concentration are the southern part of the General Government, Slovakia and the northern part of Moldova. ”
Having calculated the above-mentioned number of German divisions, we get that Germany (excluding allies) on 15 May 1941 has 298 to 307 divisions! In fact, the 71 division was concentrated on the eastern border, and the total number of divisions of the German Armed Forces was about 212.
Memo of the SS GSA in the NKGB USSR № 660533 21 May 1941 city
"The German command reinforces the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR strip, making massive redeployment of troops from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans ... Along with the actual increase in troops in the frontier zone, the German command simultaneously maneuvers, transferring individual units in the border area from one locality to another, so that if we evaluate them, we will have the right impression. ... The German command in the border with the USSR strip is a series of exercises ... that are also associated with the movement of troops ... "
We see that the German command tried to distort the number of its troops. The NKGB reconnaissance is also involved in the assessment of the size of the German Armed Forces.
Special Post # 660586 5.06.41 g.
“The Romanian army is on alert. The call of reservists and reserve officers for the training camp, which began on April 21, has now assumed the character of a covert general mobilization ... against the USSR 11 PD, 2 cd, mbr, 2 mountain rifle brigades and 1 separate kbr. With all manpower and German weapons, the Romanian army can be brought to 40 infantry divisions, total number up to 1800 thousand people. "
Intelligence Summary No.5 (in the West) 15.06.1941 SC GSH
The total number of the German army on 1.06.41 was determined in 286 — 296 Divisions, including ... 20-25 md, 22 td, Xnumx gds, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, SS divisions - 18 ... The total number of German troops on our western border (including Moldavia and Dobrudzhu) on 1 June reaches 120-122, including: 14 etc. and 13 md.
German troops are distributed along the following lines:
a) in East Prussia 24 divisions, incl. ... 3 md, 5 tp (total 2 td) and 7 kn;
b) on the Warsaw direction (against Zapovo) 30 divisions, incl. ... 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td), 1 cd and 8 pp;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow district (against KOVO) 36 divisions, including ... 5 md, before 6 td and 5 kn;
d) in the area of Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6, DD, 1 CP;
e) in Slovakia ... - 5 divisions ...;
f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 17 divisions, including: 4 md, 1 mountain and 2 etc ...
Of the total number of German troops in the Balkans in Romania, there are twenty-eight divisions, of which: 16 march, 6 md, 1 gdsd, 4 td 1 aviation [probably refers to parachuting].
Thus, the main grouping of the German troops is in Romania and is directed against the USSR ... "
The transfer of German troops to the western border of the USSR was carried out according to plans, so that the Soviet military leadership did not know the true state of affairs.
The 1 echelon of concentration of the German troops occurred in the period from 20.02 to 15.03.41. It was taken over to the Soviet border by 7 np.
2 Echelon - 16.03-10.04.41 g. - 18 PD and 1 TD.
3 Echelon - 11.04-21.05.41 g. - 16 front and 1 light infantry division.
4 (A) Echelon - 22.05-5.06.41 g. - 11 PD and 9 one.
4 (B) - 6.06-18.06.41 g. - 2 PD, 3 light infantry division, 14 etc., 12 md and 2 mbr.
Td and md began to be advanced to the border 4 the day before the attack. Germanic connections from the places of dispersal directly to the original areas from which their invasion began, began to be advanced one day before the war. Since air reconnaissance was prohibited on the enemy’s territory, it was a difficult task to open up the movement of divisions to the initial areas.
In February-May, 1941 of the year, rear units and air force services were transferred to the East, and 22.05-18.06.41 were flown to the east. During the 21 of June, the flight of the first strike occupied the airfields west of the Vistula River, and in the evening flew to the field airfields near the border. The redeployment of German aviation to cross-border airfields failed.
Consider information of the RU on the number of German divisions on the western border of the USSR as of April 25, May 15, June 1 and June 17-20 1941 of the year. Information on the actual number of divisions is given in brackets.
Total divisions (taking into account the 6 divisions (in reserve) in the region of Danzig-Poznan-Thorn and excluding the CP): by 26.04.41 - to 95-100 divisions (on 04.04.41 - there were 47 divisions); on 15.05.41 g. - 114-119 (71); on 15.06.41 g. - 120-122 (84); on 17-20.06.41 - 129 (128).
Number of divisions Army Groups "North" (v. Pribovo): 22, 24 (17), 24 (21), 29 (29), incl. Td and MD 4, 5 (2), 5 (2), 5 (6).
Intelligence "revealed" more or less the number of German divisions. A tendency to a slight increase in their number was found.
In fact, on June 22 against the troops of PribOVO there were 20 PD (including 23 ak in reserve), 3 od, 6, etc. and md. In addition to these forces, 5 and 6 ak and 39 mic units of Army Group Center operated. There were a total of 24 PD, 12, etc. and MD, 4 security divisions against PribOVO. Moreover, at the junction of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, broke through 57 microns (2 TD and 1 MD). Thus, PribOVO’s intelligence did not reveal a sharp build-up of the forces of the German assault force.
The spacecraft divisions in PribOVO were around 24 (including the 5 airborne corps and some parts of the 27 army). 65 sk (11 and 16 sd) was located in the Tallinn area, 24 sk (181 and 183 sd - parts of the former Latvian army - unprepared troops somewhat negatively related to Soviet power) in the Riga region.
Number of divisions Army Group "Center" (vs ZOVOVO): 29, 30 (20), 30 (35) 30-49* (up to 51,5), incl. td and md 5, 5 (2) 6 (2) 6 (16,5)
The number of divisions for about two months was considered unchanged and the leadership of Zapov, probably, relaxed on a secondary front. ZAPOVO’s intelligence also failed to “open up” preparations for the sudden buildup of strike forces.
* - ZapOVO intelligence department "opened" the exit of the German units to the initial areas of June 21 1941 of the year, but the intelligence report came to command only in 15-20 22.06.1941.
The divisions of the spacecraft in Zapovo were up to 45,8 with parts of the RGK and 4-m airborne corps (of which 18, etc. and md);
Number of divisions Army Group South (against KOVO and OdVO): 44, 59 (22), 63 (28), 64 (up to 43,5), incl. Td and MD 7, 15 (0), 17 (0), 20 (8,5).
The KA had divisions in KOVO and OdVO 75,3 along with RGC connections (of which 30, etc. and md). The compounds transferred to the KOVO territory and transferred to the military district were not taken into account.
The KOVO Intelligence Division and the GSH RU significantly overestimated the number of enemy groups, including the main striking force of the ground forces - tank and motorized troops. It should be noted that the enemy’s misinformation was conducted in such a way that the military-political leadership of the USSR would expect the main attack in the southern direction.
The Soviet intelligence estimates of the strength of the Allied Armed Forces of Germany that they could put up for the war against the USSR: Finland - 18 divisions (in fact, 17,5 was put up), Romania - 33 divisions (17,5), Hungary - 20 divisions (2).
Intelligence report No.02 PribOVO 20-00 21.06.41 "... Among the military and civilians ... there is talk that the troops located in East Prussia were ordered to take the starting position for the offensive ...
Conclusions:
1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border. 2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions.... »
The report mentions about 16 divisions, incl. to 4 td and md.
Intelligence Report SOVOVO on 21 Jun 1941
The report mentions 52 divisions (including 3 kp and 9 tp of unspecified numbering), including to 14 TD and MD (including TP).
“... The main part of the troops is located in the 30 km lane from the border ... The pull-up of troops and rear forces to the border continues. Artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka region, heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. There are also concentrated heavy and medium tanks. ... Biała Podlaska arrived at 40 train echelons ...
Hack and predictor Aviator:
1) According to available data ... the main part of the German army in the zone against ZOVOVO took the initial position.
2) Tightening of parts and means of strengthening to the border is noted in all directions ... "
Marked on the document is sent to 22 on June 1941 of the year in 15 hours 20 minutes.
Intelligence Report No. 3 KOVO from 20 June 1941,
In a summary, the German grouping is estimated at 45-49 divisions.
"…Conclusion:
1. The movement of German troops to our borders is confirmed by various sources ... 5. The large movement of all the branches of troops and transport south of Tomashev is pursuing some kind of demonstrative purpose or is connected with the ongoing exercises. ”
But the same intelligence revealed at least something! Why did not Stalin and the military react?
Stalin was a tactician - not very. It was not his ... In technical matters, he quite often (perhaps always) was interested in the opinion of specialists. The author thinks that in matters of military strategy and tactics he had to consult with the military. True, the military in his memoirs put all the blame on the leader (we will discuss fragments of memoirs in the 3 part).
Estimated operational control of the General Staff (theorists of the time and military commanders of the senior commanders of the spacecraft) for an attack on the USSR, Germany and its allies had to deploy from 236 to 270 divisions (of which to 200 May-June 1941 should have been Germanic), more than 10 thousand tanks and 12-15 thousand aircraft.
And how many German divisions were on the western border of 22.06.41?
Detected 129 divisions (a small part, which were located far enough from the state border) - we know that now. What kind of surprise attack could there be, for example 15 Jun? Lacking more than seventy German divisions (35% of forces needed) and thousands of tanks.
In addition, the Germans had to use parachute divisions to capture important tactical and strategic objects, but the divisions did not redeploy to the western border of the USSR - they were far away. and it was misinformation. About the regiment "Brandenburg", which successfully solved problems in the Soviet rear, probably, the RU did not know.
"On the face" is not a correct assessment of the forces and means of Germany for the war with the USSR by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft, which led to the border defeat of the spacecraft. The political leadership, in this case, turned out to be a “hostage” of the quantitative data of military theorists ...
Information about the beginning of the attack brought more defectors.
18.06.41 g. From the memoirs of Colonel I. Fedyuninsky (at that time the commander of the 15 st sk 5 th army). In the evening, the commander of the border detachment called me: “Comrade Colonel, a German soldier came over to our side. He gave important information. ” I immediately went to the border guard detachment ... A German sergeant-major in a drunken state hit an officer and decided to flee abroad ... The sergeant-major told me: "... on 4 in the morning of 22 on June German troops would launch an offensive throughout the border ... When I returned to the corps headquarters, I called the commander 5-th army General M. Potapov and reported on the information received. "No need to believe provocations!" - the calm, confident basok of the general buzzed in the pipe ... "
On the same day, two Hungarian officers with information about the beginning of the war from 20 to 27 in June 1941 go to the territory of the USSR.
20.06.41 g. - Oberfeldwebel Wehrmacht, crossed the border at Brest. Full name unknown, probably killed in the battles of the first days of the war. On June 20, the captain of the Soldiers arrived at the commander of the 3 th outpost, V. Mikhailov, and with him a man in civilian clothes. Soldatov said: there is an order to urgently smuggle a civilian over the river, to Poland, in order to double-check "just received information from the defector from the Germans." This was done. Two hours later, the civilian returned and declared: the approaches to the Bug were hammered by German troops and means of ferry.
The captain of the 45 th infantry division, M.Hess, was captured and pointed out at the interrogation: the Germans were discussing a plan to transfer troops to the Brest fortress in order to capture the Soviet soldiers asleep. But the command considered that the chief sergeant-major had warned the Russians and the landing might be trapped. A resident of Terespol, V. Berezich, recalled: “20 of June 1941, the Germans got alarmed — they went into the houses, searched: they were looking for their soldier, who suddenly disappeared ...”
20.06.41. A soldier crossed the border with the 11 army.
November 22.06.41, XNUMX - Corporal A. Liskov (detained at 21-00, due to the absence of an interpreter, was sent to the border detachment. Report to Moscow near 01-00), and private E. Kucher later moved to the USSR with information about the beginning of the attack.
In addition to these defectors on the Soviet side, the miller Iosif Bodzinsky, a German soldier (Pole, full name is not known) and a woman from the Terespol commandant's office (full name is not known) passed into 22-00 21.
From G. Zhukov's memoirs: "In the evening of June 21, the headquarters of the headquarters of KOVO, General M. Purkaev, called me and reported that a defector came to the border guards - German sergeant-major, arguing that German troops are entering their departure areas for an offensive that will begin on the morning of June 22.
I immediately reported to the Commissar and I. Stalin what Purkaev had conveyed ... "There are many" inaccuracies "in GK Zhukov - this is one of many.
As we can see, the sergeant-major from KOVO was only one and he passed on June 18. Probably, Potapov called the headquarters of KOVO, and from there they called back to the General Staff ... Information was not needed in the General Staff - the war was not expected. Nothing was done over the 3,5 day ... Below in the Appendix are the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense against 19 and 20 of June about aviation masking - there are not a single word in them that can be attributed to the preparation of the KA Air Force for the 22 attack of June 35 .
application
No. 0042 June 19, 1941
Nothing significant has been done so far to disguise airfields and major military facilities.
The airfield fields are not all planted, the take-off strips for the color of the terrain are not painted, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the attention of the observer tens of kilometers away.
The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft on airfields in the complete absence of their masking and poor organization of airfield service with the use of unmasking signs and signals finally unmask the airfield.
A modern aerodrome must completely merge with the surrounding environment, and nothing at the aerodrome should attract attention from the air.
Artillery and mechanized mechanized units display a similar carelessness for masking: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for defeating from the air.
Tanks, armored vehicles, commander and other special vehicles of mechanized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright glow, and are well observed not only from the air, but also from the ground.
Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations.
I order:
1. TO 1.7.41 d. sow all aerodromes with grass to the color of the surrounding area, paint the runways and imitate the entire aerodrome situation in accordance with the surrounding background.
2. Airfield buildings to the roofs inclusive paint over one style with the buildings surrounding the airfield. Gas storage bury in the ground and disguise very carefully.
3. Strictly prohibit the linear and crowded arrangement of aircraft; dispersed and disguised location of the aircraft to ensure their complete unobservability from the air.
4. Arrange to 5.7.41 in each aviation-based area of the 500-km of the border strip 8 — 10 of false airfields; equip each of them with 40 — 50 aircraft mock-ups.
5. By 1.7.41 to paint tanks, armored vehicles, commander, special and transport vehicles. For camouflage coloring apply matte paints in relation to the area of the areas of location and action. Strictly prohibit the use of paint, giving a reflection.
6. Districts entering the endangered zone should take the same measures to disguise warehouses, workshops, parks, and by 15.7.41 to ensure that they are completely unobservable from the air.
7. Conduct a masking of airfields, warehouses, combat and transport vehicles to check from the air with the supervision of responsible commanders of district headquarters and photography. All defects revealed by them immediately eliminate.
8. Execution to inform 1.7 and 15.7.41 through the Chief of General Staff.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the masking color of airplanes, runways, tents and airfield facilities"
19.06.1941 No.1711-724ss
Due to the fact that, according to their color, aircraft produced and manufactured by industry do not meet the modern requirements of camouflage, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decide:
1. To accept the proposals of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, t. Zhigarev, and the head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force, t. Petrov, on the masking summer coloring of the aircraft.
2. To oblige the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry (t. Shakhurin) to switch from July 1 1941 to the camouflage matte paint coating of all types of combat, training and passenger aircraft, according to paragraph 1 of this resolution.
3. Approve the NCAP order for masking aircraft coloring.
4. To oblige the chief of the State Air Force, t. Zhigareva:
a) to July 20 1941 years, all airplanes in service should be painted with masking paint, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Resolution, with the exception of the lower surface, which should remain the same color;
b) to July 20 1941 years to disguise runways;
VC July 1 1941 years to disguise tents;
d) to July 30 1941 years to disguise airfield structures.
5. Approve the order of NPO - About the masking color of the aircraft and the masking of runways, tents and airfield facilities in the air force units.
6. To oblige Narkomkhimprom (t. Denisov) to provide, from 25 June 1941, the delivery of paints for the Narkomaviaprom in terms, quantities and nomenclature.
7. Approve measures to ensure the manufacture of masking paints.
8. Instruct the Air Force (t.T. Zhigarev and Petrov) to submit proposals for the masking color of the aircraft by July 15 1941.
9. To oblige the NKVD (t. Beria) after the completion of the construction of the runways, taxiways and anchorage of aircraft to disguise them by painting in relation to the background of the surrounding area.
Bind nach. The air force comrade Zhigarev for July 10 1941 pass the technical conditions on the NKVD to disguise the runways, taxiways and anchorage of the aircraft.
To oblige the State Planning Committee (Comrade Saburova), the NKVD (Comrade Beria) and Narkomkhimprom (Comrade Denisov) to allocate the materials and funds necessary for the work indicated in this paragraph and submit their proposals for approval by the SNK of the USSR.
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin
ORDER ABOUT MASKING OF AIRPLANES, TAKE-OFF BANDS, AERODROME CONSTRUCTIONS
No. 0043 June 20, 1941
Airplanes located in the Air Force units, runways, tents and airfield facilities throughout the painting do not meet the requirements of modern disguise *.
Such an attitude to camouflage, as one of the main types of combat readiness of the Air Force, can no longer be tolerated.
I order:
1. By 20 July 1941, the aviation forces, with the involvement of the aviation workshop workers, make a masked color for all existing airplanes in accordance with the enclosed color scheme, with the exception of the bottom surface, which should be left with the same color.
2. By 10 July 1941 to make a mask of all existing runways, concrete taxiways and anchorage of aircraft in relation to the background of the surrounding area.
3. By 1 July 1941 to disguise all airfield structures in relation to the background terrain.
4. By 1 July 1941 to disguise tents in the camps of aviation units.
5. At the airfield aerodromes planes disperse under natural and artificial shelters, on the outskirts of the airfield, preventing them from placing in straight lines.
6. I assign responsibility for the implementation of all camouflage measures, both in quality and in terms, to military councils and personally to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts.
7. Plan an event to report to 23 June 1941.
On the course of painting the planes to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts, report daily on the RF to the head of the Red Army Air Force from 21 hours to 23 hours.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Member of the Main Military Council
Marshal of the Soviet Union Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
S. Timoshenko G. Malenkov
Chief of General Staff
Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov
The article used data from the book of M. Meltyuhova "Lost Chance of Stalin"
End of 2 part
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