The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 2)

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Preface. The following abbreviations were used in the communication: BAT - military attache, SC - armed forces, SC - Red Army, General Staff - General Staff, RU - Intelligence Directorate, AK - Army Corps, mk - motorized corps, SDF - Mountain Rifle Division, cd (CP) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), od - security division, pd - infantry division, sd - rifle division, etc. (tp, tbr) - tank division (regiment, brigade).



In order to simplify the text, the term “armored division (regiment) will be replaced by the TD (tp). For aircraft ratings, it is assumed that one division corresponds to 2 brigades or 4 regiments. The airborne corps of the spacecraft of the three brigade is taken to be 0,8 sd. There are many reports in the message that can be simply ignored if they are annoying.

In different sources of information, the strength of the Armed Forces is somewhat different among themselves. Therefore, some numbers may be different. On this issue, please be supportive of the author, since the number of divisions is not the main subject of the message.


Continuation of the "List ..."

Alta (Ilse Stöbe. Her work was led by Captain N. Zaitsev - Bine)

04.01.41 "Aryan" confirmed that he received this information from a military person he knew, and this was based not rumored, and on a special order of Hitler, which is strictly secret and which is known to very few individuals.

In support of this, he cites some more basic arguments:

1. His conversations with the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry, who said that Molotov’s visit to Berlin could be compared to Beck’s visit. Unanimity was not reached on any of the most important issues - neither in the question of Finland, nor in the question of Bulgaria.

2. The preparation of an offensive against the USSR began much earlier, but at one time it was suspended, because the Germans miscalculated with the resistance of England. In the spring, the Germans expect England to put on their knees and free their hands in the east.

3. Despite the fact that Germany sells military materials to the USSR, has buried Bukovina’s occupation to oblivion, “does not notice” the propaganda of the USSR in Bulgaria, Hitler’s hostile attitudes towards the USSR were not changed.

4. Hitler thinks: a) state of spacecraft right now so lowthat in the spring it will have undoubted success;

b) the growth and strengthening of the German army continues.

17.01.41 - Aryan said that the war with the USSR is not just rumor, but an order from Hitler, who is known to a limited circle of people engaged in preparing for war against the USSR.

25.03.41 - To maintain its food base and maintain its credibility, Hitler will oppose the USSR. Facts confirming this: 1 is concentrated in Poland20 divisions. Western airfields in Poland are engaged in bomber squadrons. There is an intensive construction of air defense facilities in East Germany.
Formed three army groups:

a) under the command of field marshals of Boc, Rundstedt and Ritter von Leeb;

b) The 1 Army Group "Koenigsberg" is moving towards Leningrad;
The 2 Army Group is moving towards Moscow;
3-I army group "Pozen" is moving in the direction of Kiev.

The attack will take place between 15 May and 15 June 1941 g.

The scouts had amazing analytical skills or intuition, but 25 in March nobody in Germany knew when the war with the USSR would start - even Hitler.

"X" ["CEC"] (employee of the German embassy in Moscow G.Kegel. Colonel K.Leontiev worked with him).

05.02.41 - On the border with the USSR, there are so many German troops that are more than necessary to protect the border ... After the war with France, Hitler gave the order to build eastern fortifications. In the eastern cities of Germany is the enhanced installation of air defense. The attack will begin after the end of the war with England ...

27.03.41 - Hitler said that with respect to the treaty of friendship with the USSR, not everything is in order and it is necessary to prepare public opinion regarding the change of policy of Germany to the USSR. The opinion prevails in the NSDAP circles, if Germany does not soon achieve a decisive victory over England, then she will come out against the USSR to seize Ukraine. Others believe that Germany should oppose the USSR already in June.

05.04.41 - An adviser from the German Ministry of Economy stated that in Berlin the responsible circles are convinced of the upcoming war against the USSR. Called timeline 15 May 1941 but in connection with the events in the Balkans, the term of the speech was postponed to 15 1941 June In the Berlin circles believe that Ka easy to break, because she concentrated the main forces on the central sector of the front. The Germans are going to drive several wedges in the south and north to these units, driving them into the hollow ... Initial attacks will be inflicted in the south and in the north.

17.04.41 - Judging by the ongoing training (concentration of troops in the east, especially in East Prussia), war with the USSR is not excluded in the very near future. On the borders with the USSR concentrated before 100 divisions.

29.04.41 - Schulenburg was not accepted by Ribbentrop. Only 23.04.41 was suddenly summoned by Hitler. The correspondent of German newspapers Timm was assigned to urgently report on the state of the Moscow-Minsk highway. Colonel Crippa said the Germans are counting to carry out the entire operation against the USSR right up to the occupation of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa, a maximum of 4 weeks. The Germans are quite openly preparing the public opinion of Germany for the war against the USSR.

07.05.41 - Adjutant Göring reported: the adventure with the concentration of German troops in the east "overlapped over the edge" and has serious consequences for Germany. OKV gave the order to complete the preparation of theater and concentration of troops in the East to 2 Jun. The number of troops after concentration: East Prussia - 2 million, the former Poland - 3 million, Romania, Hungary and the Balkans - 2 million. Thus, against the USSR should be concentrated up to 7 million troops.

7.05.41 - The war with the USSR has already been resolved. Facts: In Warsaw and other cities there are schools for hospitals. The German population of the General Government must be evacuated. Baltic, Russian and Ukrainians should be collected for military training. An order is given - to finish all preparations. to 2 June 1941
On the Baltic Sea coast, the Germans concentrated a large number of ships intended for the landing of troops. It is not excluded that Hitler will simultaneously attempt to land troops in the Baltics at the same time as he is performing at the land frontiers, in order to leave an army in the rear of the border defenses and to expand the front from the north.

23.05.41 - Soldiers in the Governor-General openly speak of an imminent war with the USSR. In Poland, concentrated to 2 million soldiers.

05.06.41 - It is believed that in the coming 3 weeks the situation should be finally resolved, i.e. if the war between Germany and the USSR does not start until June 20, then there will be no war at all.

10.06.41 - If Stalin does not come to Berlin, then the war is inevitable. Germany made demands on the USSR: a) additional supplies of 2,5 million tons of grain; b) free transit to Persia and military occupation of Soviet grain warehouses on 4-5 million tons. The deadline for accepting proposals is 23 June 1941. I am convinced that in a few weeks after the start of the war the Germans will occupy the most important parts of the USSR.

10.06.41 - Hilger stated that he knew that German military circles fear that the spacecraft may concentrate its main forces within the country. Then the Germans would be able to occupy most of the country's territory, but they would not be able to break the spacecraft in the first phase of the war.

14.06.41 - Information from Berlin suggests that military preparations continue and ministries are convinced that war will be launched in the first half of June with. year

19.06.41 - The embassy firmly believes that Germany is facing an attack on the USSR in the coming days. Call dates June 15, June 20 and June 24. Advisor Schieber stated that the attack will occur in the coming days, namely 23 Jun or 24 Jun... Tippelskirch believes that the cause of the war will be some kind of border conflict on the Soviet-Romanian border. Mobilization is announced in Romania and Finland.

19.06.41 - The embassy is convinced that from 20 June should be considered daily with the possibility the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR. The embassy was instructed to immediately send all the children and women. I received an instruction to leave the German naval attache with the staff from Moscow. Hilger stated that it is now absolutely clear that war is inevitable.

20.06.41 - Regular diplomas were instructed not to leave Berlin. Representatives of industrial firms in Moscow were instructed to immediately leave for Berlin. The attack is possible 23.06.41.

21.06.41 in the morning - the Embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. With 4 hours of the morning there is a meeting with Tippelskirch. Source convinced that the war will start in the next 48 hours.

21.06.41 in 19-00 - The Embassy in the morning was instructed to destroy all the secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. This decision is war.»

After the meeting of Colonel Leontyev with G. Kegel to 20-00, the head of the Directorate ordered the special communications officer urgently deliver a report to Stalin, Molotov and Tymoshenko. The envelopes indicated: “Only to the addressee. Staff members do not open. "

In addition to the documents presented in the "Calendar ..." and "List ..." documents, the media has information on other intelligence reports.

Special message 05.03.41 - The ministries of Berlin ... are convinced of the upcoming war against the USSR. The date of the attack is considered to be 1 in May of 1941. Recently, due to the events in Yugoslavia, the start of the war has been assigned to 15 June...

Special message 15.03.41 - The Gruppenführer SS stated in a conversation that there was no talk about a march on England. More 100 divisions focused on the eastern border... We go to Ukraine and the Baltic region. Hike to Russia will be a military walk. Governors for colonization have already been appointed to Odessa, Kiev and other cities. Now the main military opponent of Germany is the Soviet Union ... It was noted that attack on the USSR should be expected in three monthsi.e. in June.

Special Post 09.05.41 - The General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany abandoned plans to invade England. As the immediate task is to seize the Ukraine and Belarus. Implementation plans are scheduled for April - May 1941 Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria are also preparing for an attack on the USSR ...

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РќРЏР РРЊРРРРРРРР ° РЎРґРРР RoRјRμRЅRЅRѕ PI S,SЂRo RјRμSЃSЏS † ° F, The "P" SЂSѓRіV "RѕS,RІRμS,RoR" C ‡ S,Rѕ SЃR ° Rј RѕRЅ RЅRμ RІRїRѕR "RЅRμ SЂR ° F · RґRμR" SЏRμS, SЌS,Sѓ S,RѕS ‡ РєСѓ Р · рения, РЅРѕ РІСЃРµ РґСЂСѓРіРёРµ РІ этом СЃРѕРІРµСЂС ± РµР¶РґРµРЅС ‹. RS, Ryo RґSЂSѓRіRёRµ SЏRІR ”SЏSЋS, SЃSЏ R_RёRґRЅS ј RёRёё RґRµSЏS‚R РR Џ SЏRјRёR РRµSЂRјR ° RЅRёRё. In the "P" SЂSѓRіSѓV "RЅRμRoR · RІRμSЃS,RЅRѕ, RЅR ° C ‡ ‡ RμRј S,RѕS RЅRѕ RѕR ° ± RѕSЃRЅRѕRІR RЅS <Roes ... SѓR RμR¶RґRμRЅRoSЏ ± ± PI RїRѕR RμRґRμ Ryo RєR ° RєRoRјRo SЃRІRμRґRμRЅRoSЏRјRo SЂR ° SЃRїRѕR" P ° RіR ° SЋS, RЅRμRјS † C <RІRѕR№RЅRμ SЃ RЎRЎRЎR of the PS, RЅRѕ RІRЅSѓS,SЂRμRЅRЅRμRμ RїRѕR "RѕR¶RμRЅRoRμ PI RЎRЎRЎR Ryo SЃRѕSЃS,RѕSЏRЅRoRμ RљRђ SЏRІR" SЏRμS,SЃSЏ RІR ° R¶RЅS <Rј C "P ° RєS,RѕSЂRѕRј РІ уверенности РЅРµРјС † ев. Р РјРё Р ± СѓРґСѓС ‚РёСЃРїРѕР» СЊР · РѕРІР ° РЅС ‹Р ± ел РѕРіРІР ° СЂРґРµР№С † С ‹Рё СѓРєСЂР ° РёРЅС † С‹ .В »

РЎРїРµС † СЃР *Р *Р ± С ‰ ение Р РЈ В «Р — Р ° С… Р ° СЂСѓВ» In -10.06.1941 "RњS <RїRѕR" SѓS ‡ Röhr "Ryo SЃSЂRѕS ‡ RЅRѕRμ P · P ° ° RґR RЅRoRμ SЃRѕRѕS,RІRμS,SЃS,RІSѓSЋS ‰ Roes ... RoRЅSЃS,R ° RЅS † RoR№, RєR SЃR ° ° SЋS ‰ RμRμSЃSЏ RІS <SЏRІR "RμRЅRoSЏ Ryo SѓS,RѕS RЅRμRЅRoSЏ RґRoSЃR ‡" † RѕRєR ° C RoRo, RѕSЂRіR RЅRoR · ° F ° C † RoRo Ryo RІRѕRѕSЂSѓR¶RμRЅRoSЏ RіRμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRѕR№ SЂRјRoRo ° F.
Р'РѕРїСЂРѕСЃС ‹‹, РїРѕРґР »РµР¶Р ° С РёРµ СЂР ° Р · СЂР ° Р ± отке, СЃР» РµРґСѓСЋС ‰ РёРµ:

“2. RJ РёР№, тР° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№, тяжелы С… тР° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№...

5. ...РћСЃРѕР ± енно РІР ° жно РІС ‹СЏРІРёС: РїРѕ тР° РЅРєР ° Рј - РјР ° РєСЃРёРјР ° Р »СЊРЅСѓСЋ тол С ‰ РёРЅСѓ РЁ СЃРёР »Сѓ сопротивл ения Р ± СЂРѕРЅРё; СРРРРРС ‹С‚Р ° РЅРєРѕРІ СЃ РјР ° РєСЃРЁРјР ° Р» СЊРЅС ‹Рј весом Рё вооружением Рё РєРѕР »РЁС ‡ ество РІ Р“ ермР° РЅРёРё тР° РЅРєРѕРІ весом РѕС ‚45 тонн Рё РІС‹ С € Рµ...

8. P "P ° RЅRЅS <Rμ RїRѕ SЃS,SЂRѕRoS,RμR" SЊSЃS,RІSѓ RЈR RїSЂRѕS,RoRІ RЎRЎRЎR Pd ° F SЌSЂRѕRґSЂRѕRјRЅS <C ... SѓR · P "RѕRІ, RѕSЃRѕR ± RμRЅRЅRѕ RїRѕRґR RμRјRЅS · <C ... P ° RЅRіR ° SЂRѕRІ Rє RІRѕSЃS‚RєRSѓ RѕS С, SЂRµRєRћRёRћRµSaRґRЅRЅR ° C РRµRNoRoRoR †RёRёRёRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRrSaRRoRRoRRoRRRoRRRRRRRRRRRRrRaRR RџSЂRo SЌS,RѕRј RѕSЃRѕR ± RμRЅRЅRѕ RІR ° R¶RЅS <RґR ° RЅRЅS <Rμ RїRѕ SЃRѕSЃS,RѕSЏRЅRoSЋ RЈR PI RїRѕRіSЂR ° RЅRoS ‡ RЅRѕR№ RїRѕR "RѕSЃRμ RїRѕ SЂRμRєRμ R'RoSЃR" Rμ (P'P SЂS € ° F ° RІSЃRєRoR № РЈР, Р ”емР± Р» РёРЅСЃРєРёР№ РЈР); РїРѕ Р'РѕСЃС‚РѕС ‡ РЅРѕР№ РџСЂСѓСЃСЃРёРёРё Рё РїРѕ рекР° Рј РџСЂСѓС ‚, Серет (РњРѕР »РґР ° РІРёС) …¦

10. ПостР° СЂР ° тьсся РґРѕР ± С РѕСЂРјРµ: документР° Р »СЊРЅС‹ Рµ, РІС <СЃРєР ° Р · С <РІР ° РЅРёСЏ Рё С‚.Рґ.). В »

RњS <SЃRЅRѕRІR ° RІRoRґRoRј RѕRїR ° SЃRμRЅRoRμ RІS <SЃS € RμRіRѕ RєRѕRјR RЅRґRЅRѕRіRѕ SЃRѕSЃS,R ° ° ° RІR RљRђ RїRѕSЏRІR "RμRЅRoRμRј S,SЏR¶RμR" C <... S,R ° RЅRєRѕRІ PI RіRμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRoS ... R'RЎ. Rўrєєєєґґґґґґґґґґґґґґґґ · · · · · ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °ѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕѕ ,WITH<.

In "РђСЂРЅРѕР" СЊРґВ " (R'RμSЂR "RoRЅ) â €" 12.06.1941 In "vЂ|V" RђSЂRoRμS † B "PI RїRμSЂRμRґR ° RЅRЅRѕRј RЅR ° Rј SЃRμR№S ‡ ° F SЃ RјR ° S,RμSЂRoR ° F" Rμ RЅR ° F · C <RІR ° РµС ‚СЃСЂРѕРєРё вероятного РІС‹ ступления против РЅР ° СЃ 15 · 20 РёСЋРЅСЏ.V

16.06.41 Ri. Р ° РЅРіР »РёР№СЃРєРѕРµ руководѴтво RJP RЎRѕRіR »R ° SЅRЅRѕSЌR‚RјRґRґR ° RЅR ‹S ‹RјRIџR »RЊS €R РRµR ° C… RsRrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrn , Pd R'RμRЅRіSЂRoRo RЎR "RѕRІR ° RєRoRo â €" 76 RґRoRІRoR RoR№ · (· Röhr RЅRoS ... 2 S,Rґ Ryo 2 RјRґ) RїSЂRμRґRїRѕR "P ° RіR ° F" P ° SЃSЊ RїRμSЂRμR SЂRѕSЃRєR ° ± 29 RґRoRІRoR · Röhr No. РїРѕ Р'Р ° Р »С‚РёР№СЃРєРѕРјСѓ РјРѕС'С Ћ Ћ ґ ґ ґ X N N N N N ґ ґ ґ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Џ Џ Ѕ Ѕ Џ Џ Џ Ѕ Р'сего РЅР ° СЃС… еме Р ± С ‹Р» Рѕ РѕРїРєР ° Р · Р ° РЅРѕ 4 гермР° РЅСЃРєРёС… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№. Р 'действительностШ Р ± С‹ Р »Рѕ СЂР ° Р · вернуто 2 (РІ С‚.С ‡. 2 СРР Рё 2 РјРґ).

RљRРR »R РR СR RЃRѕRґRґR ‹RРR ·R ·R ·RРR »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R »R РR РR »RґRґRґRґRґRґRРR »R »R РR РRРRРRРRРRРRРRРRRРRRrRrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr ество тд Рё РјРґ СЃРёР »СЊРЅРѕ Р · Р ° нижено. RSR, R · RЅR ° RµRј RјC ° РєР »СЏС‚РѕРіРѕ РґСЂСѓРіР ° В». P • SЃR "Ryo RїSЂRoRїRѕRјRЅRoS,SЊ S,RμRєSЃS, Röhr RґRЅRμRІRЅRoRєR · ° F" RμR ± RμR "SЊSЃSЃR ° RґRμR of the PS · RoRЅS" RѕSЂRјR ° C † RoRo RїRѕ RІS,RѕSЂR¶RμRЅRoSЋ PI RђRЅRіR "RoSЋ, S,Rѕ RїRѕRЅSЏS, РЅРѕ, С ‡ то руководству СССРтруудно Р ± С <Р »Рѕ поверить РІ СЌС‚Rё СЃРІРµРRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR SRRPP

In "R'SЂR ° RЅRґV" - 17.06.1941 “... A general mobilization in Finland is confirmed. There is a large number of reservists, following the appointment. The mobilization began on June 10-11 ... On June 12 a state of siege was declared in Tammisaari, it was put on alert ... In parts of the holidays they stopped, on leave they were ordered to immediately come to the unit. ”

"Titus" (resident in Rome) - 19.06.1941 “... Yesterday, a telegram from the Italian ambassador in Berlin arrived at the Italian Foreign Ministry, in which he reported that the highest German military command had informed him about the beginning of hostilities in Germany against the USSR between 20 and 25 June this year

"Costa" - 20.06.1941 “The German emissary said today that a 21 or 22 is expected a military confrontation on June ... There are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 6 in Finland, 10 in Hungary, 7 in Slovakia. Total 60 motorized divisions ... In Romania, the mobilization is over and at any moment military operations are expected. There are 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria. ”

Ramsay (R.Zorge)

11.03.41 - in the opinion of the German BAT in Tokyo, "after the end of the present [Anglo-German] war, the bitter struggle of Germany against the Soviet Union should begin."

2.05.41 - Ott said that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part of the USSR into his own hands as a grain and raw material base for control by Germany throughout Europe. The ambassador and the attache agreed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia in the relations between Germany and the USSR, two critical dates are approaching. The first date is the end of sowing in the USSR. After the sowing is over, the war against the USSR can begin at any time, so Germany will only have to harvest.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR creates any difficulties in the question of Turkey’s acceptance of German demands, then war will be inevitable... »

6.05.41 - the German leadership is confident that "the war against the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of the war against England", but the decision to start a war against the USSR will be made Hitlereither in May or after the war with England". German generals rate spacecraft combat capability so low that it is believed that the spacecraft will be crushed within a few weeks. They believe that the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.

Military specialists of the General Staff at the beginning of June 1941 of the year would never agree with such an assessment of the combat capability of the spacecraft. Therefore, when preparing a report for the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Golikov ordered to remove the clause on the weakness of the spacecraft and the clause that, according to the German generals, the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.

21.05.41 - «war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May... This year the danger may pass».

30.05.41 - Berlin informed the ambassador Ott that German offensive against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott on 95% surethat war will begin. The indirect evidence for this at present is as follows: the technical department of the air force in my city was instructed to return shortly. Ott demanded that the BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. Transport of rubber through the USSR is reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German speech - existence of a powerful spacecraft does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, Ka must be driven away as soon as possible.

It is necessary to drive the spacecraft for how many kilometers from the border?

1.06.41 - Standby the beginning of the German-Soviet war around 15 June based solely on the information that Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left 6 May to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post BAT.

Ott said that he could not get information on this directly from Berlin, and has only the information of Scholl. In a conversation with Scholl, I found that the Germans in the matter of the statement against the SC attracts the fact of a large tactical errorwhich, according to Scholl, made the USSR. According to the German point of view, the fact that the defensive line of the USSR is located mainly against the German lines without large branches, is the greatest mistake. She is [Germany] will help break the spacecraft in the first big battle. Scholl declared that the strongest blow would be dealt to the left flank of the German army. "

There is a resolution: “BUT-3. Write "Ramsay" with the following request: "Please inform: 1) The essence of the big tactical error you are reporting and 2 is more understandable. Your own opinion about Scholl's truth about the left flank." Golikov .. 3.06.41 g "" But-3. In the list of dubious and disinfectant messages "Ramsay" Golikov. Perhaps this decision was made after consultation with high-ranking military experts.

17.06.41 - German courier told BAT that he is convinced that war against the USSR is delayed, probably, until the end of June. BAT does not know - there will be war or not...

After the start of the war, Ramsay clarified: “Lieutenant Colonel Scholl said then that the first and main attack would be inflicted by the Germans on the SC by their left flank. The Germans are fully confident that the main forces of the spacecraft will be concentrated in the opposite direction from the line, giving full opportunity for a strong blow. The Germans were very worried that the spacecraft, in the order of knowing the main attack, would retreat a certain distance in order to study the forces of the enemy and undertake something aside from the direction of the main attack. The main goal of the Germans is the destruction of a spacecraft covering it, as it was with the Polish army ... "

In addition to R.Zorge, in the Far East there were at least two Soviet intelligence officers: the German consul in Shanghai and the head of the gendarmerie service of the Kwantung Army. The text of their messages of the period under consideration is unknown. Did they also believe that the war would begin in June and what reasons were given — we do not know, but the intelligence leaders and Stalin carefully worked through these reports ...

Consideration of intelligence reports from intelligence officers will end with reports German agent "Peter" from the Soviet embassy in Berlin.

“12 June 1941 Filippov:“ ...Our ... task is to to find out, does Germany lead peace talks with England and is not a further attempt to reach a compromise with the United States expected ... ”

"13 June 1941. I asked why Filippov and Russian officials did not [experience] concerns about rumors concerning German-Russian relations ... Filippov: "Before the German-Russian conflict, about which the Times writes ... long away. Germany pursues a policy of intimidation". I ... asked how he explains to himself that on the eastern border [Germany] focused ... more than 100 divisions, and whether Russia is thinking of somehow counteracting ... the threat ... The only possible answer of the Russian side to the German intimidation could be a close alliance with the United States and Britain. To this Filippov replied that the union between Russia, America and England is nonsense ... If Germany really attacks, then German military successes, be it the seizure of the Baltic countries, Ukraine, etc., will mean nothing yet ... Pressure - until pressure and at the same time force, as long as it is used in a narrow space. Any expansion [of the front of the war] would mean a weakening for Germany, and Hitler won't do it».

“14 June 1941. I answered the question I was asked twice: are there efforts to achieve peace with England:“ None of the well-informed people here know anything about such events, and it’s foolish to say at the moment about peace talks between Germany and the enemy №1 its policy of establishing a new order. " In conclusion ... he spoke about a lively controversy and rumors about the confiscation of “Völkischer Beobachter ...”

“21 June 1941. I said that ... we are ... in a state of war of nerves and ... the German side will make an attempt to utterly exacerbate the nervous tension ... The nerves will be won by the one who has stronger nerves ... Filippov: “The situation is very serious ... We firmly believe that Hitler started a giant bluff. We do not believe that war can begin tomorrow. The process is likely to continue. It's clear that Germans intend to put pressure on us In hope achieve benefitsthat Hitler needs to continue the war. ”

It is often written that Stalin did not believe intelligence. From the presented materials it is clear that it was very difficult to understand the real situation. The fact that he did not understand - his fault as the sole leader.

Let's try to summarize what we have read in the messages, in which, of course, there are “seeds of truth”.

1) Incomprehensible position of the first persons of Germany. How does Hitler relate to the war with the USSR? There is no information about his position. Goering advocates an alliance with Britain against the USSR. Goering pushes Germany to war, recruits allies (for example, Antonescu). Ribbentrop against Gering's position. In Germany itself, there are two currents - for the war and against it (they fear that the Soviet Union will win). Industrialists of Sweden and Finland against the war. There was a dangerous current in the upper ranks of the Wehrmacht - the position of Brauchitsch is similar to the statements of Goering about the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance.

2) Intelligence brings Germany’s plans of attack one more fantastic than the other: giant ticks from Finland to the Balkans (or from Turkey to the Caucasus), three strikes and all aimed at Ukraine, German strikes against the USSR through Romania. Of course, in the reports one variant of the attack on the USSR was mentioned similar to the truth: one strike on Petersburg, the second on Moscow, the third on Kiev. Where do the blows come from, what forces? Is it a war or a provocation of the highest-ranking German military? It is not clear...

3) The question of the maneuverability of the German troops: in 25 days to reach the Urals or in three to four weeks to Moscow. To break through not in one direction, but to leave by troops on MERIDIAN, on which Moscow is located. [According to the highest ranks of the Soviet army, it was das ist fiction ... At that time, the GS General Staff did not know that SO could be fought!]

4) The misinformation actions of Germany are very successful. Quite often they are traced in the messages of our intelligence officers. The grouping of German troops for a long time remained almost unchanged, which calmed the military-political leadership of our country. By the beginning of the attack on the USSR, the German group on the western border of the USSR increased, but did not increase as expected to increase! The construction of defensive lines by German units, strengthening their air defense at various sites, evacuation measures. Various sources receive information that the Wehrmacht’s strong grouping is the need to repel the USSR in the event of its aggression (just as they say about the NATO grouping against the Russian Federation in Europe, we are supposedly the most aggressive country. How many years have passed and this policy has not changed ...) Later they began to say that to protect against flank attack from the USSR when the German Armed Forces moved to the Middle East. Even later - the harsh conditions of Germany, the USSR and the culmination - the participation of the USSR in the peace conference.

5) The timing of the attack on the USSR. We now know that the term was the initial 15 of May, then it was postponed to June 22. In the messages, March 1941 of the year, April, beginning of May, end of May, 15 of June, 22-24 of June, end of June, August is called. In addition to intelligence information received in June, everything else is only rumors or personal opinion of the German military.

First, the dates are tied to the moment when they “put England on their knees” and after that they will attack the USSR. Further messages come in - they will attack the USSR, and leave England after they are starved. New messages - will hit the USSR in the first place. Victories in Libya and again information about the invasion of England, and the Soviet Union will be left last. The decision was made and will attack the USSR in the coming days. But these days there is a massive disinformation of Gebelss. Between the reports of the attack appears version of the mighty enemy of Germany - the United States. The US has almost no land army. How to treat this version?

6) Causes of war or large-scale provocation. Present the USSR ultimatum on joining the axis. Ultimatum - this is the time to bring the troops on alert. Either Germany will push the Soviet troops away from the state border or occupies only Ukraine (maybe the Baltic States). They say that the spacecraft is powerful. Either the spacecraft’s combat capability is low and its defense system is weak, or the Germans fear that the spacecraft will be diverted from the border. Question: how should the spacecraft cover troops be positioned, if it is not clear how the Germans will fight? And will they fight? Now we know that a large number of these assumptions are pure nonsense. Did not plan to do so with the USSR Hitler.

All of these options required to consider, analyze and try to find possible activities to avoid war. Another scout reported that Germany will demonstrate its power, "play on the nerves." After report that Germany will try to provoke the Soviet military to create a pretext for the start of the war. At the same time, the Fuhrer is completely inactive - is he actually aware of the provocation or not?

Everything is very difficult. The author believes that strategic intelligence was able to determine the duration of the attack only around mid-June. But the emergence of additional conditions (6 listing) at the beginning of the war even more confused the situation and the understanding of real events and the scenario of Hitler's behavior. An incorrect estimate of the size of the German Armed Forces on the western border of the USSR and the absence of other truthful information led to an erroneous assessment of the situation and, as a result, was one of the reasons for the catastrophic defeat in the border battle.


What was the real size of the grouping of Germany and its allies to invade the territory of the USSR?

At present, we know that for the war with the USSR a significant grouping of the Armed Forces of Germany and its allies was singled out. Not all allies entered the 22 war on June 1941 of the year, but this is not so important for the topic in question. Grouping included: 190 divisions (of which up to 153 Germanic, Finnish 17,5, Romanian 17,5, Hungarian 2), 4714 tanks (of which German 4408) and 4739 airplanes (of which German - 3909, including communication planes and transport aircraft). It should be noted that the 24 German divisions were in the reserve OKV.

In these materials we will not consider the Finnish army and the German army "Norway" (4 divisions).

By 22.06.41, the German grouping on the Western border was about 125 divisions, of which 30, etc. and MD.

By 22 June Romania concentrated on the border with the USSR 3 and 4 army with a total of 17,5 divisions.

Germany and Romania attacked the USSR 22 on June 1941, and on July 1, a Carpathian group of Hungarian troops attacked the Soviet 12 th army.

What did German intelligence report about Hitler to KA?

On 15 in January of 1941, the reconnaissance estimated the number of spacecraft troops deployed in the western part of the USSR, in the 125 divisions (actually there were 161) and 30 TBR (it was 32).

According to intelligence estimates in the western part of the USSR, 11 divisions (182,5) and 186 tbrs (38) were present on 0 June.

The number of Soviet troops in the areas of intelligence information was: PribOVO - 31 division (25) and 7 tbr (0); COVO - 42 divisions (44) and 10 tbr (0); KOVO and OdVO - 72 divisions (80) and 15 tbr (0).

Much did not take into account the German theorists and Hitler. For example, about the events of the beginning of August 1941, Guderian wrote: “I pointed out to Hitler the fact that the Russians have a great superiority in the tanks ... Hitler then broke the phrase:“ If I had known that the Russians really had that number of tanks in your book, I probably would not have started this war. ” In my book “Attention, tanks!”, Released in 1937, I pointed out that at that time there were 10000 tanks in Russia ... The information I had at my disposal said that the Russians had 17000 tanks ”.

What opposed the German invasion forces from the USSR?

Order 145 divisions (of which 54 td and md), 13830 tanks and 8639 aircraft. We all know that the divisions were not mobilized, many of them scattered across the territory of military districts. A large number of divisions were in the formation stage and did not have weapons. We know that a huge number of aircraft and tanks were of the old types, had limited lifespan. Part of the technology was not efficient due to the lack of spare parts. Many T-27, T-37, T-38 and T-40 type tanks were counted among the tanks ...

One of the goals of Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war was to identify the military preparations of Germany, to concentrate troops on the borders of the USSR and to determine their numbers. What was reported about the German AF RU GSH?

According to the RP in 1938, in Germany there were 7300 tanks and 5160 aircraft. In fact, through the 8 months, the entire German 3474 tank and 4288 aircraft were located in the German Armed Forces. According to RU, the number of German troops on the border with the USSR was: 1.10.40 g. - 89 divisions (actually was 30 divisions), 1.11.40 g. - 88 Divisions (32). An overestimation of the German Armed Forces intelligence characteristic before the outbreak of war.

Special post RU №660279cc 11.03.1941 “… The total number of the German army by September 1940 was about 228 divisions, including 15-17 TD and 8-10 MD.

According to reports, over the past winter period, the German command has additionally formed 25 front, 5 etc., 5 md. In addition, due to the PD, it seems that it was formed to 5 md ... The total number of divisions of the German army on 1 March 1941 is about 263 divisions…, of them 22 TD and 20 MD...

... On 1 March 1941, Germany had 20700 aircraft, of which: combat - 10980 ... Combat aircraft were distributed: bombers - 4090, dive bombers - 1850, reconnaissance - 1220, fighters - 3820 ...

When attacking France in May, 1940 was part of the German army 2-3 tdwhich had one by one heavy tank regiment. For the last time received information about the formation of heavy tank divisions.

Currently there are three parachute and three airborne divisions ...

At the ČKD factories ... a light tank of the brand "38-T" is being built, having ... frontal armor - 50 mm... Armor thickness able to withstand a 45-mm projectile hit ...

According to information requiring additional verification, the Germans are beginning to build three new models of heavy tanks:

- type V - weight 36 t, armament 75-mm gun and 2 machine gun, armor up to 60 mm;

- type VI - weight 45 t, armament 75-mm and 20-mm cannon, 3 machine gun, armor up to 70 mm;

- Type VII - 90 T weight, 105-mm and 20-mm guns, machine gun 4 ...

Renault manufactures 72-ton French tanks under repair ... According to information received in March of this year. and requiring verification, the production of 60 and 80-ton tanks is put at the Skoda and Krupp factories ...

Conclusions:

1. Germany is gradually replacing type II light tanks ... with tanks with armor from 25 to 50 mm ...

3. Planned activities to create powerful new heavy tanks.

... The average production capacity of the main tank factories in Germany ranges from 70 — 80 tanks per month. The total 18 production capacity of the German factories known to us (including the Protectorate and the Governor-General) is determined by in 950 — 1000 tanks per month.

When deploying tank production on the basis of existing autotractor plants (up to 15-20 plants), as well as increasing the production of tanks in factories with streamlined production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18 — 20 thousand tanks per year.

When using French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10000 tanks per year...

... There is a quantitative increase in anti-tank artillery, an increase in its
caliber and attraction of 20, 37 and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to fight tanks.

... According to information that needs to be checked, some of the anti-tank battalions are deployed in anti-tank shelves two-divisional composition; The first division has 3 rotates for 12 37 or 47 mm caliber guns, and the second division has 12 to 21 75 or 88 mm guns (... which will be replaced by 75-mm anti-tank guns later) ... "

Actual Divi NumberGermany for that period was 191.

On the basis of this and similar messages, it was concluded that there was an increase in the reservation of German tanks, possible problems with their defeat by anti-tank artillery and the formation of large formations of heavy tanks.

23 April 1941, the Soviet government allowed the People's Commissariat of Defense to form 1 anti-tank brigades by July 10. According to the state each brigade was supposed to have forty-eight 76-mm divisional guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen XNMX-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 37-mm guns, sixteen XNMX-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four XNUMX-mm guns -mm anti-aircraft guns. The spacecraft began to prepare for the use of large-caliber anti-aircraft guns against German heavy tanks.



Special post RU №660370ss 4.04.41 g.

"... The total number of German troops on the border with the USSR ... with troops in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja reaches 83 – 84 divisionsapart from troops concentrated in the Czech Republic, Moravia and in the center of Romania ... "

The Germans at the beginning of April on the eastern border (including Romania) were placed only 47 divisions.


Special post RU №660448ss 26.04.41 g.

"...On 25.04 the total number of German troops on the western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) - 95 — 100 Divisions…, of them:

a) ... against Pribovo 21 – 22 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 1 etc ...

b) ... against SECOVO - 28 divisions, of which: ... 1 md and 4 etc ...

... Against KOVO - 29 – 32 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 4 etc ... In the region of Carpathian Ukraine 3 division ... Against OdVO - 8 – 9 divisions ...

... In the German army there are in the Air Force prepared 8 — 10 parachute divisions (their exact deployment is not clear).

Thus, the total number of the German army on 25.04.41 was 286 – 296 divisions, of them:…20 md; 22 td; SS divisions - 18 (of which to 10 md).

According to reports, from 1 on April, the German command began to form up to 40 divisionsthat requires additional verification. ”

As an example of assessing the distribution of German troops in the territory of the Reich, one message is given in a somewhat more complete form.


Special post RU №660506ss 15.05.41 g.
"... Accounting and comparison of the data received give the following distribution of the German armed forces along borders and fronts on 15 in May 1941 G.:

The total number of German troops against the USSR reaches the 114 – 119 divisions, including the 6 divisions that are located in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area. Of these, 82 – 87 PD, 6 mountain, 13 TD, 12 md, 1 cd ...

The German Armed Forces on our border are distributed:

a) in V. Prussia - 24 divisions, including ... 3 md, 2 td and 7 kn;

b) on the Warsaw direction against ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including ... 4 td, 1 md, 1 cd and 8 kn;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow district against KOVO - 36 divisions, including ... 5 md, 6 td and 5 kn;

d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 PD and 1 CP;

e) in Slovakia (area Zborov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 13 – 14 divisions, including 3 md, 1 mountain and 1, etc.

The total number of German troops in the Balkan Peninsula reaches 47 – 49 divisions, of which: in Romania - 6 divisions (without Moldova); in Yugoslavia - 9 divisions;

in Greece - 18 divisions (of which on the Turkish border 6 divisions); in Bulgaria - 16 divisions (of which on the Turkish border 6 divisions).

The created army in Bulgaria at the expense of reserves and units from Yugoslavia against Turkey is allegedly headed by General Reichenau. The rearmament of the Bulgarian army is noted at the expense of the material part transferred to it by Germany ...

On the African front is the 7 of the German divisions. There is evidence that part of the divisions located in Greece should be used against England in Africa.

In the occupied countries of Western Europe.

a) On the north-west coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 46 divisions.

b) Inside the occupied part of France - 9 divisions.

c) On the border with Spain - 9 divisions.

According to the latest data received, 5 divisions are being prepared to be deployed through Spain for operations against Gibraltar.

d) In Norway, both in the north of the country and in the south due to transfers through Sweden and Finland, there was an increase in the 1 division, as a result the number of divisions in Norway was brought to 14, of which 5 was in the North Norwegian grouping

5. German military units continue to arrive in Finland

6. In Italy - 9 divisions.

7. Reserve Command.

a) In the center of the country - around 12 divisions,

b) On the territory of Austria and the Protectorate - 11 divisions, and the total 23 divisions.

The Air Force has 8 — 10 parachute divisions, of which 1 – 2 divisions in Greece, 5 – 6 divisions on the northern coast of France and Belgium, 2 divisions within the country.

Conclusion:

The increase in German troops on the border with the USSR continues. The main areas of concentration are the southern part of the General Government, Slovakia and the northern part of Moldova. ”


Having calculated the above-mentioned number of German divisions, we get that Germany (excluding allies) on 15 May 1941 has 298 to 307 divisions! In fact, the 71 division was concentrated on the eastern border, and the total number of divisions of the German Armed Forces was about 212.


Memo of the SS GSA in the NKGB USSR № 660533 21 May 1941 city

"The German command reinforces the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR strip, making massive redeployment of troops from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans ... Along with the actual increase in troops in the frontier zone, the German command simultaneously maneuvers, transferring individual units in the border area from one locality to another, so that if we evaluate them, we will have the right impression. ... The German command in the border with the USSR strip is a series of exercises ... that are also associated with the movement of troops ... "

We see that the German command tried to distort the number of its troops. The NKGB reconnaissance is also involved in the assessment of the size of the German Armed Forces.


Special Post # 660586 5.06.41 g.

“The Romanian army is on alert. The call of reservists and reserve officers for the training camp, which began on April 21, has now assumed the character of a covert general mobilization ... against the USSR 11 PD, 2 cd, mbr, 2 mountain rifle brigades and 1 separate kbr. With all manpower and German weapons, the Romanian army can be brought to 40 infantry divisions, total number up to 1800 thousand people. "


Intelligence Summary No.5 (in the West) 15.06.1941 SC GSH

The total number of the German army on 1.06.41 was determined in 286 — 296 Divisions, including ... 20-25 md, 22 td, Xnumx gds, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, SS divisions - 18 ... The total number of German troops on our western border (including Moldavia and Dobrudzhu) on 1 June reaches 120-122, including: 14 etc. and 13 md.

German troops are distributed along the following lines:

a) in East Prussia 24 divisions, incl. ... 3 md, 5 tp (total 2 td) and 7 kn;

b) on the Warsaw direction (against Zapovo) 30 divisions, incl. ... 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td), 1 cd and 8 pp;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow district (against KOVO) 36 divisions, including ... 5 md, before 6 td and 5 kn;

d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6, DD, 1 CP;

e) in Slovakia ... - 5 divisions ...;

f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 17 divisions, including: 4 md, 1 mountain and 2 etc ...

Of the total number of German troops in the Balkans in Romania, there are twenty-eight divisions, of which: 16 march, 6 md, 1 gdsd, 4 td 1 aviation [probably refers to parachuting].

Thus, the main grouping of the German troops is in Romania and is directed against the USSR ... "


The transfer of German troops to the western border of the USSR was carried out according to plans, so that the Soviet military leadership did not know the true state of affairs.

The 1 echelon of concentration of the German troops occurred in the period from 20.02 to 15.03.41. It was taken over to the Soviet border by 7 np.

2 Echelon - 16.03-10.04.41 g. - 18 PD and 1 TD.

3 Echelon - 11.04-21.05.41 g. - 16 front and 1 light infantry division.

4 (A) Echelon - 22.05-5.06.41 g. - 11 PD and 9 one.

4 (B) - 6.06-18.06.41 g. - 2 PD, 3 light infantry division, 14 etc., 12 md and 2 mbr.


Td and md began to be advanced to the border 4 the day before the attack. Germanic connections from the places of dispersal directly to the original areas from which their invasion began, began to be advanced one day before the war. Since air reconnaissance was prohibited on the enemy’s territory, it was a difficult task to open up the movement of divisions to the initial areas.

In February-May, 1941 of the year, rear units and air force services were transferred to the East, and 22.05-18.06.41 were flown to the east. During the 21 of June, the flight of the first strike occupied the airfields west of the Vistula River, and in the evening flew to the field airfields near the border. The redeployment of German aviation to cross-border airfields failed.


Consider information of the RU on the number of German divisions on the western border of the USSR as of April 25, May 15, June 1 and June 17-20 1941 of the year. Information on the actual number of divisions is given in brackets.

Total divisions (taking into account the 6 divisions (in reserve) in the region of Danzig-Poznan-Thorn and excluding the CP): by 26.04.41 - to 95-100 divisions (on 04.04.41 - there were 47 divisions); on 15.05.41 g. - 114-119 (71); on 15.06.41 g. - 120-122 (84); on 17-20.06.41 - 129 (128).

Number of divisions Army Groups "North" (v. Pribovo): 22, 24 (17), 24 (21), 29 (29), incl. Td and MD 4, 5 (2), 5 (2), 5 (6).

Intelligence "revealed" more or less the number of German divisions. A tendency to a slight increase in their number was found.

In fact, on June 22 against the troops of PribOVO there were 20 PD (including 23 ak in reserve), 3 od, 6, etc. and md. In addition to these forces, 5 and 6 ak and 39 mic units of Army Group Center operated. There were a total of 24 PD, 12, etc. and MD, 4 security divisions against PribOVO. Moreover, at the junction of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, broke through 57 microns (2 TD and 1 MD). Thus, PribOVO’s intelligence did not reveal a sharp build-up of the forces of the German assault force.

The spacecraft divisions in PribOVO were around 24 (including the 5 airborne corps and some parts of the 27 army). 65 sk (11 and 16 sd) was located in the Tallinn area, 24 sk (181 and 183 sd - parts of the former Latvian army - unprepared troops somewhat negatively related to Soviet power) in the Riga region.

Number of divisions Army Group "Center" (vs ZOVOVO): 29, 30 (20), 30 (35) 30-49* (up to 51,5), incl. td and md 5, 5 (2) 6 (2) 6 (16,5)

The number of divisions for about two months was considered unchanged and the leadership of Zapov, probably, relaxed on a secondary front. ZAPOVO’s intelligence also failed to “open up” preparations for the sudden buildup of strike forces.

* - ZapOVO intelligence department "opened" the exit of the German units to the initial areas of June 21 1941 of the year, but the intelligence report came to command only in 15-20 22.06.1941.

The divisions of the spacecraft in Zapovo were up to 45,8 with parts of the RGK and 4-m airborne corps (of which 18, etc. and md);

Number of divisions Army Group South (against KOVO and OdVO): 44, 59 (22), 63 (28), 64 (up to 43,5), incl. Td and MD 7, 15 (0), 17 (0), 20 (8,5).

The KA had divisions in KOVO and OdVO 75,3 along with RGC connections (of which 30, etc. and md). The compounds transferred to the KOVO territory and transferred to the military district were not taken into account.

The KOVO Intelligence Division and the GSH RU significantly overestimated the number of enemy groups, including the main striking force of the ground forces - tank and motorized troops. It should be noted that the enemy’s misinformation was conducted in such a way that the military-political leadership of the USSR would expect the main attack in the southern direction.

The Soviet intelligence estimates of the strength of the Allied Armed Forces of Germany that they could put up for the war against the USSR: Finland - 18 divisions (in fact, 17,5 was put up), Romania - 33 divisions (17,5), Hungary - 20 divisions (2).


Intelligence report No.02 PribOVO 20-00 21.06.41 "... Among the military and civilians ... there is talk that the troops located in East Prussia were ordered to take the starting position for the offensive ...

Conclusions:

1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border. 2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions.... »
The report mentions about 16 divisions, incl. to 4 td and md.


Intelligence Report SOVOVO on 21 Jun 1941

The report mentions 52 divisions (including 3 kp and 9 tp of unspecified numbering), including to 14 TD and MD (including TP).

“... The main part of the troops is located in the 30 km lane from the border ... The pull-up of troops and rear forces to the border continues. Artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka region, heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. There are also concentrated heavy and medium tanks. ... Biała Podlaska arrived at 40 train echelons ...

Hack and predictor Aviator:

1) According to available data ... the main part of the German army in the zone against ZOVOVO took the initial position.

2) Tightening of parts and means of strengthening to the border is noted in all directions ... "

Marked on the document is sent to 22 on June 1941 of the year in 15 hours 20 minutes.

Intelligence Report No. 3 KOVO from 20 June 1941,

In a summary, the German grouping is estimated at 45-49 divisions.

"…Conclusion:

1. The movement of German troops to our borders is confirmed by various sources ... 5. The large movement of all the branches of troops and transport south of Tomashev is pursuing some kind of demonstrative purpose or is connected with the ongoing exercises. ”

But the same intelligence revealed at least something! Why did not Stalin and the military react?

Stalin was a tactician - not very. It was not his ... In technical matters, he quite often (perhaps always) was interested in the opinion of specialists. The author thinks that in matters of military strategy and tactics he had to consult with the military. True, the military in his memoirs put all the blame on the leader (we will discuss fragments of memoirs in the 3 part).

Estimated operational control of the General Staff (theorists of the time and military commanders of the senior commanders of the spacecraft) for an attack on the USSR, Germany and its allies had to deploy from 236 to 270 divisions (of which to 200 May-June 1941 should have been Germanic), more than 10 thousand tanks and 12-15 thousand aircraft.

And how many German divisions were on the western border of 22.06.41?

Detected 129 divisions (a small part, which were located far enough from the state border) - we know that now. What kind of surprise attack could there be, for example 15 Jun? Lacking more than seventy German divisions (35% of forces needed) and thousands of tanks.

In addition, the Germans had to use parachute divisions to capture important tactical and strategic objects, but the divisions did not redeploy to the western border of the USSR - they were far away. and it was misinformation. About the regiment "Brandenburg", which successfully solved problems in the Soviet rear, probably, the RU did not know.

"On the face" is not a correct assessment of the forces and means of Germany for the war with the USSR by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft, which led to the border defeat of the spacecraft. The political leadership, in this case, turned out to be a “hostage” of the quantitative data of military theorists ...

Information about the beginning of the attack brought more defectors.

18.06.41 g. From the memoirs of Colonel I. Fedyuninsky (at that time the commander of the 15 st sk 5 th army). In the evening, the commander of the border detachment called me: “Comrade Colonel, a German soldier came over to our side. He gave important information. ” I immediately went to the border guard detachment ... A German sergeant-major in a drunken state hit an officer and decided to flee abroad ... The sergeant-major told me: "... on 4 in the morning of 22 on June German troops would launch an offensive throughout the border ... When I returned to the corps headquarters, I called the commander 5-th army General M. Potapov and reported on the information received. "No need to believe provocations!" - the calm, confident basok of the general buzzed in the pipe ... "

On the same day, two Hungarian officers with information about the beginning of the war from 20 to 27 in June 1941 go to the territory of the USSR.

20.06.41 g. - Oberfeldwebel Wehrmacht, crossed the border at Brest. Full name unknown, probably killed in the battles of the first days of the war. On June 20, the captain of the Soldiers arrived at the commander of the 3 th outpost, V. Mikhailov, and with him a man in civilian clothes. Soldatov said: there is an order to urgently smuggle a civilian over the river, to Poland, in order to double-check "just received information from the defector from the Germans." This was done. Two hours later, the civilian returned and declared: the approaches to the Bug were hammered by German troops and means of ferry.

The captain of the 45 th infantry division, M.Hess, was captured and pointed out at the interrogation: the Germans were discussing a plan to transfer troops to the Brest fortress in order to capture the Soviet soldiers asleep. But the command considered that the chief sergeant-major had warned the Russians and the landing might be trapped. A resident of Terespol, V. Berezich, recalled: “20 of June 1941, the Germans got alarmed — they went into the houses, searched: they were looking for their soldier, who suddenly disappeared ...”

20.06.41. A soldier crossed the border with the 11 army.

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 2)


November 22.06.41, XNUMX - Corporal A. Liskov (detained at 21-00, due to the absence of an interpreter, was sent to the border detachment. Report to Moscow near 01-00), and private E. Kucher later moved to the USSR with information about the beginning of the attack.

In addition to these defectors on the Soviet side, the miller Iosif Bodzinsky, a German soldier (Pole, full name is not known) and a woman from the Terespol commandant's office (full name is not known) passed into 22-00 21.

From G. Zhukov's memoirs: "In the evening of June 21, the headquarters of the headquarters of KOVO, General M. Purkaev, called me and reported that a defector came to the border guards - German sergeant-major, arguing that German troops are entering their departure areas for an offensive that will begin on the morning of June 22.
I immediately reported to the Commissar and I. Stalin what Purkaev had conveyed ... "There are many" inaccuracies "in GK Zhukov - this is one of many.

As we can see, the sergeant-major from KOVO was only one and he passed on June 18. Probably, Potapov called the headquarters of KOVO, and from there they called back to the General Staff ... Information was not needed in the General Staff - the war was not expected. Nothing was done over the 3,5 day ... Below in the Appendix are the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense against 19 and 20 of June about aviation masking - there are not a single word in them that can be attributed to the preparation of the KA Air Force for the 22 attack of June 35 .

application

No. 0042 June 19, 1941
Nothing significant has been done so far to disguise airfields and major military facilities.
The airfield fields are not all planted, the take-off strips for the color of the terrain are not painted, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the attention of the observer tens of kilometers away.
The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft on airfields in the complete absence of their masking and poor organization of airfield service with the use of unmasking signs and signals finally unmask the airfield.
A modern aerodrome must completely merge with the surrounding environment, and nothing at the aerodrome should attract attention from the air.
Artillery and mechanized mechanized units display a similar carelessness for masking: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for defeating from the air.
Tanks, armored vehicles, commander and other special vehicles of mechanized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright glow, and are well observed not only from the air, but also from the ground.
Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations.
I order:
1. TO 1.7.41 d. sow all aerodromes with grass to the color of the surrounding area, paint the runways and imitate the entire aerodrome situation in accordance with the surrounding background.
2. Airfield buildings to the roofs inclusive paint over one style with the buildings surrounding the airfield. Gas storage bury in the ground and disguise very carefully.
3. Strictly prohibit the linear and crowded arrangement of aircraft; dispersed and disguised location of the aircraft to ensure their complete unobservability from the air.

4. Arrange to 5.7.41 in each aviation-based area of ​​the 500-km of the border strip 8 — 10 of false airfields; equip each of them with 40 — 50 aircraft mock-ups.
5. By 1.7.41 to paint tanks, armored vehicles, commander, special and transport vehicles. For camouflage coloring apply matte paints in relation to the area of ​​the areas of location and action. Strictly prohibit the use of paint, giving a reflection.
6. Districts entering the endangered zone should take the same measures to disguise warehouses, workshops, parks, and by 15.7.41 to ensure that they are completely unobservable from the air.
7. Conduct a masking of airfields, warehouses, combat and transport vehicles to check from the air with the supervision of responsible commanders of district headquarters and photography. All defects revealed by them immediately eliminate.
8. Execution to inform 1.7 and 15.7.41 through the Chief of General Staff.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov

Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the masking color of airplanes, runways, tents and airfield facilities"
19.06.1941 No.1711-724ss
Due to the fact that, according to their color, aircraft produced and manufactured by industry do not meet the modern requirements of camouflage, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decide:
1. To accept the proposals of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, t. Zhigarev, and the head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force, t. Petrov, on the masking summer coloring of the aircraft.
2. To oblige the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry (t. Shakhurin) to switch from July 1 1941 to the camouflage matte paint coating of all types of combat, training and passenger aircraft, according to paragraph 1 of this resolution.
3. Approve the NCAP order for masking aircraft coloring.
4. To oblige the chief of the State Air Force, t. Zhigareva:
a) to July 20 1941 years, all airplanes in service should be painted with masking paint, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Resolution, with the exception of the lower surface, which should remain the same color;
b) to July 20 1941 years to disguise runways;
VC July 1 1941 years to disguise tents;
d) to July 30 1941 years to disguise airfield structures.
5. Approve the order of NPO - About the masking color of the aircraft and the masking of runways, tents and airfield facilities in the air force units.
6. To oblige Narkomkhimprom (t. Denisov) to provide, from 25 June 1941, the delivery of paints for the Narkomaviaprom in terms, quantities and nomenclature.
7. Approve measures to ensure the manufacture of masking paints.
8. Instruct the Air Force (t.T. Zhigarev and Petrov) to submit proposals for the masking color of the aircraft by July 15 1941.
9. To oblige the NKVD (t. Beria) after the completion of the construction of the runways, taxiways and anchorage of aircraft to disguise them by painting in relation to the background of the surrounding area.
Bind nach. The air force comrade Zhigarev for July 10 1941 pass the technical conditions on the NKVD to disguise the runways, taxiways and anchorage of the aircraft.
To oblige the State Planning Committee (Comrade Saburova), the NKVD (Comrade Beria) and Narkomkhimprom (Comrade Denisov) to allocate the materials and funds necessary for the work indicated in this paragraph and submit their proposals for approval by the SNK of the USSR.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin

ORDER ABOUT MASKING OF AIRPLANES, TAKE-OFF BANDS, AERODROME CONSTRUCTIONS
No. 0043 June 20, 1941
Airplanes located in the Air Force units, runways, tents and airfield facilities throughout the painting do not meet the requirements of modern disguise *.
Such an attitude to camouflage, as one of the main types of combat readiness of the Air Force, can no longer be tolerated.
I order:
1. By 20 July 1941, the aviation forces, with the involvement of the aviation workshop workers, make a masked color for all existing airplanes in accordance with the enclosed color scheme, with the exception of the bottom surface, which should be left with the same color.
2. By 10 July 1941 to make a mask of all existing runways, concrete taxiways and anchorage of aircraft in relation to the background of the surrounding area.
3. By 1 July 1941 to disguise all airfield structures in relation to the background terrain.
4. By 1 July 1941 to disguise tents in the camps of aviation units.
5. At the airfield aerodromes planes disperse under natural and artificial shelters, on the outskirts of the airfield, preventing them from placing in straight lines.
6. I assign responsibility for the implementation of all camouflage measures, both in quality and in terms, to military councils and personally to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts.
7. Plan an event to report to 23 June 1941.

On the course of painting the planes to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts, report daily on the RF to the head of the Red Army Air Force from 21 hours to 23 hours.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Member of the Main Military Council
Marshal of the Soviet Union Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
S. Timoshenko G. Malenkov
Chief of General Staff
Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov


The article used data from the book of M. Meltyuhova "Lost Chance of Stalin"

End of 2 part
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  1. +24
    July 12 2017
    For those who are interested in this topic there is a bit unpleasant news:
    The third part will appear no earlier than Thursday-Friday (in a week).
    It so happened that since the beginning of 2011, the author began to play WoT. At the time when loading recorded information on the distribution of tanks by nation. Before 9.05.2011, the number of Soviet vehicles in random battles was 65-80% of the total number of tanks.
    Thank you, people, that they read my opus and are interested in the military history of our Country
    1. Ren
      +2
      July 13 2017
      Correct, please, it hurts my eyes a lot, but for the rest I like the article:
      "the defense of June 19 and 20 on the disguise of aviation - there is not a single word in them that can be attributed to the preparation of the SC Air Force for an attack 22-35 June 1941 years..."
    2. +3
      July 16 2017
      Quote: aKtoR
      Until May 9.05.2011, 65, the number of Soviet equipment in random battles was 80-XNUMX% of the total number of tanks.

      They simply simply started introducing new branches and so that they would be pumped by them or made into imbs, or the other two would quietly nerf. After went prodigy ...

      Quote: aKtoR
      Thank you, people, that they read my opus and are interested in the military history of our Country

      Thank. Although I came across by chance (and marked a lot for myself), but in general all the bars (for me) in the big picture.

      P.S. it will be interesting to read the third part, and when I say “it’s Stalin’s personally guilty” my teeth hurt and the question arises “Why then did you need the People’s Commissariat of Defense, intelligence, etc. etc. if it all comes down to Stalin personally? Should he personally gently smoke a pipe approach the soldiers in the barracks (to everyone!) with the words "Vanya get up, war ..."
      Maybe I’m not right from a professional point of view, but the People’s Commissariat / Ministry needs to bring the supreme document on the first day of the war "Attack by absolutely such and such, such forces, in such and such directions. Such and such measures have been taken. On the current situation is such and such. We are waiting for further orders. "
      All. Only nouns and verbs as said by G. Müller performed by L.S.Bronevoy in 17 Moments. Otherwise, why then are they needed? Eat a grocery card?
      1. +6
        July 17 2017
        You're right. There is a lot of material, in the third part everything does not fit (you can, of course, throw away reference material - but not ...). You and the 4 part will have to wait)))
        In order not to be disappointed, I can say - then only indirect evidence and the author's hypothesis
        1. 0
          28 September 2017
          the command of the front had a poor idea of ​​the situation and tried to get from the parts entrusted to him the fulfillment of tasks formulated before the war. The report of the Head of the Armored Directorate of the North-Western Front dated June 23, 1941 to the Commander of the North-Western Front about the tasks assigned to the commanders of the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps said:

          "To the Commander of the [North-West] Front, Colonel General Kuznetsov

          Kurkin was, finished work. He finished work with the commander of the 8th army.
          He made a decision and set the task to Kurkin:
          advance from the Rossiena area in a westerly direction to the Taurage - Šiauliai road. Then there is a sharp south-west turn on Taurage-Tilsit, having a border on the right (claim) of the Taurage-Šiauliai highway.
          Shestopalova set the task to advance in a southwestern direction, having a border on the left of the Taurage-Šiauliai highway.
          Kurkin ordered to start the offensive at 12 o’clock, from Shestopalov I will demand a speech an hour earlier for simultaneous advancement together with Kurkin. The time before the start of the offensive was reconnaissance by strong tank detachments.
          The army is in a helpless position - it has no connection with you or with mechanized corps.
          To better coordinate the actions of Kurkin and Shestopalov, a coded interaction table has been compiled.
          I ask you:
          1) In the morning, cover both buildings with fighter aircraft.
          2) Shestopalov accompanied by a strong bomber and fighter aircraft from 11 o’clock and Kurkin from 12 o’clock.
          3) To do everything to supply fuel and ammunition. What depended on me, already done.
          I’m going down to the 12th mechanized corps, where I’ll stay until the end of the day.
          Head of Armored Directorate
          Northwest Front
          Colonel Poluboyarov
        2. 0
          October 30 2018
          See our 1941 movie about our intelligence: https://youtu.be/_ccuF8Uofso
    3. +1
      26 September 2017
      Despite the seemingly CONSTANT MAGNIFICATION of the might of the German armed forces, the Soviet intelligence was closer to the truth than the list of troops according to the documents of the German General Staff. All Germany of that period, especially youth, was already organized into very effective support and labor groups, undergoing military training under the guidance of professional officers, especially during the period of long summer camp camps, campaigns, etc., subjected to continuous ideological processing, morally -physical training, getting used to military discipline, etc. In reality, even in conditions of war, the air defense forces, for example, were essentially given as full-time such formations FROM GIRLS-TEENAGERS, not to mention young men of 15-17 years old. These formations had their own military uniforms, their own "command corps", their barracks, etc. These formations reached a population of 50-60 thousand people in the internal air defense system of Germany, in the system of military hospitals, in the civil defense and rear services, etc. Although, according to the accounts of the Wehrmacht and the German General Staff, they were not listed - they were directly led by the NSDAP - they can quite justifiably and should be reckoned with the German armed forces. Apparently, our intelligence sources did just that, and since their German interlocutors were almost the same in this (in the ranking of paramilitary organizations as the armed forces). Details of their subordination, departmental accounting, etc. - secondary. Not for encryption.
    4. +1
      28 September 2017
      The 27th Army is also indicated on the deployment map of our troops. But the order to form its ADMINISTRATION in Riga was only given on May 25, 1941. That is, it was on June 22.06.41, 6. was only on paper - responsible for the anti-landing defense of the coast and the islands, mainly, and the district headquarters in Panevezys. It was supposed to replenish it primarily with a local call for a UNIVERSAL mobilization, to include in it the existing 2 territorial (21) Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian divisions, XNUMX mk Lelyushenko (MBO),
      since March, formed at the Idritsa station in the Pskov region, on 22.06. left without armored vehicles and artillery, etc. It was a VIRTUAL army - mythical in fact. But they persistently draw it on maps ... Understand the SHO archive of this army, you will probably discover miracles.
    5. +1
      October 6 2017
      Quote: aKtoR
      Thank you people

      These people should also be remembered and thanked. ⁷ * “Arcos” (All Russian Cooperative Society Limited) is a private joint-stock company that existed independently of the Russian Trade Delegation in London. His tasks included servicing both the London and other foreign representative offices of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade as a trading apparatus. The company was registered in the English Ministry of Commerce, its main function was to "act as a representative of cooperative organizations doing business in and outside Russia." In 1923, the SNK of the RSFSR authorized Arkos to conduct trading operations on the territory of the Soviet Republic. Arkos has become the largest export-import association in England. Its offices and branches existed in a number of other countries.
    6. +1
      November 9, 2018
      The following passage from the author is very important: "19.06.41/15/20 - The embassy is firmly convinced that Germany is facing an attack on the USSR in the coming days. The dates are called June 24, June 23 and June 24. Adviser Shiber said that the attack will take place in the coming days , namely on June XNUMX or June XNUMX ... Tippelskirch believes that the reason for the war will be some kind of border conflict on the Soviet-Romanian border Mobilization has been announced in Romania and Finland.

      19.06.41/20/XNUMX - The embassy is convinced that starting June XNUMX, the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR should be reckoned with daily. The embassy was instructed to immediately send all children and women. I received an order to leave Moscow a German naval attaché with staff. Hilger stated that it was now perfectly clear that war was inevitable.

      20.06.41 - Regular diplomas were instructed not to leave Berlin. Representatives of industrial firms in Moscow were instructed to immediately leave for Berlin. The attack is possible 23.06.41 g.

      21.06.41 in the morning - the Embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. With 4 hours of the morning there is a meeting with Tippelskirch. The source is convinced that the war will begin in the next 48 hours.

      21.06.41 at 19-00 - The embassy was instructed in the morning to destroy all secret papers. It was ordered all embassy staff to pack their things and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a solution. This decision is war. ”

      After Colonel Leontyev's meeting with G. Kegel until 20-00, the head of the RU ordered the special communications officer to urgently deliver a report to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko. The envelopes read: “For the addressee only. The staff of the apparatus should not be opened. ”“ This fragment clearly proves that at 20.00 the top leadership of the USSR and the NCO already knew for sure that on the night of June 21-22, 1941, a war with Nazi Germany would begin. From a much larger set of sources, but the main author This in the part of the NKO and above all the People's Commissar Marshal Tymoshenko demanded IMMEDIATE bringing the troops to combat readiness No. 1, the procedure of which was worked out back in April, when all the garrisons of the UR were in barracks in the fortifications from the beginning of the month, with full standard ammunition , supply, etc. But the NCO and the People's Commissar Marshal Timoshenko personally did not take ANY action until 23.00 (calling and informing the People's Commissar of the RKKF Kuznetsov), or rather, in fact, until 23.30. It was this delay that ensured the success of the Luftwaffe and the defeat of the USSR Air Force at border airfields with the loss of more than 3 aircraft almost at one time from 30 to 1000 at races. light 3.30.
      1. -1
        November 9, 2018
        Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
        A delay of 3 hours and 30 minutes in this most acute moment for the border districts is CHANGE.

        I don’t know how you calculated 3 hours 30 minutes, but in my opinion, judging by the memoirs of some military leaders, it was possible to send the directive to the troops an hour and a half earlier. If Tymoshenko and Zhukov convinced Stalin of the need to send the text of the directive agreed with him, Zhukov could ask for permission to leave the cabinet, and go to the General Staff to write the b / n directive. Thus, by the time Tymoshenko returned, the document was in the final version, and he would have signed it right away, which would have given a gain in time of at least one hour for sending the directive to the troops.
        1. +1
          November 9, 2018
          To withdraw the STAFF garrisons of the URs to the "Stalin line" (on the state border on September 17, 1939), with the issuance of ammunition, gas masks, helmets and NZ Timoshenko was entitled from 25.05.41. after Stalin's consent to Zhukov's proposal at a meeting of the country's leadership on the preservation of weapons in the old URs. Armament without security, i.e. garrisons are not left. There it was necessary to organize the front lines (to clean the shelling sectors, prepare barriers, mining, mount weapons and equipment, air defense, rear, communications equipment, etc. from warehouses, etc.), and the time for this was more than 3 weeks ... Moreover, since the beginning of June the enlistment has already been on the way, including to the pulbats. The districts could do this, but according to the orders of 1941, ONLY at the command of Timoshenko. He did not give a command, and this is a CHANGE of Tymoshenko and Kulik, "Ukrainian" marshals.
          1. -1
            November 9, 2018
            Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
            This could also be done by the districts, but in the order of 1941 ONLY at the command of Tymoshenko.

            Tymoshenko is not the head of the country, which is why he could solve such issues only with Stalin, because it’s impossible to hide such events from enemy intelligence. And this means that it would be impossible to predict Hitler’s actions if he received such information. And the Kremlin knew that.
            1. 0
              November 10, 2018
              Not an argument. Hitler himself OPENLY strengthened ALL new German borders in Eastern Poland. Transferred to the USSR in 1939, Lviv and Brest, occupied until September 17, when the "Stalin line" was already considered completed and ready for defense (which was not in real life, the WEAK project was rejected by the NCO in 1940, but in a combat situation into action It was 80% good, but it was COMPLETELY abandoned and even disarmed and disarmed (under People's Commissar Timoshenko) after the start of the construction of the "Molotov line", which was being built OPEN on the new border of the USSR in front of the Germans, and by 22.6.41. -30%). Hitler knew that in the SPECIAL Districts we had more than 40 divisions, he was 100. called the figure 22.6.41. The history of the "Stalin line" is also a history of CHARGE, and not only of Tymoshenko, but of the Military Councils of the KOVO and ZAPOVO as a whole, and the chief executives of the Central Committee of Ukraine and Belarus. They lost the many years of work of tens of thousands of Soviet people, the efforts of the whole country, which led them to defeat themselves.
            2. 0
              November 11, 2018
              To understand the situation near Minsk, I give info on 26 td on 22.6.41 .: "The division was formed from March 1941 in the Minsk region as part of the 20th mechanized corps. On June 22, 1941, it was stationed in the military town of Krasnoe Urochishche, 7 kilometers from Minsk , with the exception of the motorized rifle and howitzer regiments, which were stationed in Stankovo. [1]. By the beginning of the war, it had 31 T-26 tanks and 13 BT tanks. [2] " Those. 7 km from the capital of Belarus, a "tank" division formed for 4 months with a major general at its head received 44 old worn-out tanks (11 tanks per month on average) and could hardly even be considered a tank regiment in terms of "tank" strength. Approximately the same fiction was with the Minsk-Slutsk UR, which was under construction "ACTIVE" from 1932 to 1939, then the "construction" was "frozen, and only on June 4, 1941, the 63rd UR was formed and began work as part of SEVERAL pulbats, half of which on June 22.6.41, XNUMX, were transferred for some reason to the border, from the "Stalin line" to the "Molotov line", thereby exposing the SUPPORT defenses of Minsk. If this is not a CHANGE of the ZAPOVO AF, then what ?!
              1. -1
                November 11, 2018
                Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                If this is not CHANGE, it’s VS STOCK, then what ?!

                Just the above examples testify more to the fact that the country simply could not give everything the army needed, and the change in the borders of the USSR in 1939-1940 forced to abandon the Stalin line, and begin construction of new SD. Whose fault it is in particular, we are unlikely to find out now - this issue was not decided at the level of the spacecraft command. So at least stupid to see this as a betrayal - most likely there was a misunderstanding of the scenario of a future war, and a certain fear of the supreme, when presenting his proposals.
                1. +1
                  November 11, 2018
                  Milchakov, I already wrote to you that 25.05.41/2000/04.06. Zhukov personally suggested to the SUPREME COLLEGE LEADERSHIP of the country not to disarm the "Stalin line." Take a look at the materials OPEN since XNUMX about this. Voroshilov ran into him, which means that this NGSh was going to retreat to the old border and, like, raised the issue of changing the NGSh, but Stalin defended Zhukov then. As a result, it was decided to give garrisons to the "Stalin line", in particular to the Minsk-Slutsk district. But ZAPOVO gave an order about this only on XNUMX. Those. delayed by a week. This is treason.
                  1. -1
                    November 12, 2018
                    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                    Milchakov, I already wrote to you that 25.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. Zhukov personally suggested to the SUPREME COLLEGE LEADERSHIP of the country not to disarm the "Stalin line."

                    Well, what is so terrible in this OFFER if the Molotov line was to be built only by the end of 1941 according to the plan? Not only that, what use is it from the armament of an undelivered object - have you yourself served at least once in your life in a building under construction?
                    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                    Voroshilov ran into him, which means that this NGS was about to retreat to the old border and, like, raised the question of changing the NGS, but Stalin Zhukova then defended.

                    Well, what was Zhukov to blame for if he suggested that the initial period of the war might not work out for us?
                    Why were projects prepared in May with an estimate for building URs in a 200-kilometer zone from Moscow - you may not have heard about this?
                    1. +1
                      November 12, 2018
                      Zhukov was FOR the preservation of the combat effectiveness of the "Stalin's line" (already in February 1941 his directive was sent to check its condition), and Timoshenko was AGAINST, quietly recommending to remove weapons, equipment and guards from it. In April, Zhukov made sure that the regular garrisons of the completed URs on the "Stalin Line" spent almost a month in barracks in bunkers, ready and with a set of BC, but then this was canceled in early May. This, incidentally, proves that Stalin's ban on measures to strengthen the "Stalin's line" NEVER existed, it was Timoshenko who pushed for its disarmament and oblivion. Due to personal responsibility for the failure of its construction when he was the head of KOVO until 1939, including. Which is also in fact an ukrozagovor and treason.
    7. +1
      November 11, 2018
      To understand the situation near Minsk, I give info on 26 td on 22.6.41 .: "The division was formed from March 1941 in the Minsk region as part of the 20th mechanized corps. On June 22, 1941, it was stationed in the military town of Krasnoe Urochishche, 7 kilometers from Minsk , with the exception of the motorized rifle and howitzer regiments, which were stationed in Stankovo. [1]. By the beginning of the war, it had 31 T-26 tanks and 13 BT tanks. [2] " Those. 7 km from the capital of Belarus, a "tank" division formed for 4 months with a major general at its head received 44 old worn-out tanks (11 tanks per month on average) and could hardly even be considered a tank regiment in terms of "tank" strength. Approximately the same fiction was with the Minsk-Slutsk UR, which was under construction "ACTIVE" from 1932 to 1939, then the "construction" was "frozen, and only on June 4, 1941, the 63rd UR was formed and began work as part of SEVERAL pulbats, half of which on June 22.6.41, XNUMX, were transferred for some reason to the border, from the "Stalin line" to the "Molotov line", thereby exposing the SUPPORT defenses of Minsk. If this is not a CHANGE of the ZAPOVO AF, then what ?!
    8. 0
      December 6 2018
      In two (!) Artillery regiments (cannon and howitzer) of our 67th rifle division near Libava on 22.06.41. there were no shells! It is 50 km from the border. Palanga - on the very border, at a distance of line of sight and direct fire - was defended ONLY by border guards, and without artillery and heavy machine guns at all. The children's pioneer camp (2000 children, mostly children of our officers) was shot and burned there (wooden summer houses) by German artillery, only 400 children were saved, they left the encirclement on foot for 2 months! There were only 68 pilots for 53 combat fighters in the air regiment near Libava, of which 3 new "accelerated release" did not fly on a combat aircraft and did not shoot even once! The rest did not fly on new aircraft, somehow only the initial exercises on the I-153 were fired TWO TIMES at the range, and most of them were smeared. 22.6. took off only after two bombings, and from 21.6. had a SPECIAL PERSONAL order of the district air force headquarters from Riga not to shoot at the Germans, but only to "plant the violators." There was no interaction with the Navy at all.
    9. 0
      January 28 2019
      The question of family members of officers of the Red Army in Pribovo on the eve of 20.6.41. - not small, not private. The district headquarters FULLY worked out the evacuation plan for MULTIPLE ECHELONS, assigned stations and loading dates, and the chiefs responsible for the implementation of this plan reported to the NPO and General Staff. The situation on this issue in the Baltic was especially acute, since enemy DRGs were already operating in the rear and cities, and there were very good families who arrived for the summer. a lot (like the FIRST TIME to see the former foreign countries). This plan was banned for execution personally by Tymoshenko. As a result, from 22.06.41. on all roads from the seaside and from the border in general, from cities under bombardment, a stream of refugees calculated by SOMETHES poured so dense that the oncoming movements of troops to the border were forced to stop or change their routes, opening the main roads east for the Wehrmacht.
  2. +4
    July 12 2017
    Well, comparing the number of divisions is somehow not buzzing! The mobilized Wehrmacht division and the peacetime Red Army division are not the same thing! Here it is more appropriate to cite the number of troops on 22.06.1941/50/100 at the border of the parties. But this is also not buzzing. The concept of border areas count as?! This is how much 300km, 20 km, 10km?! There will be different data for each figure. Well, here's an example (the Western Special) directly at the border and 11776 km from it was at the Western Special Rifle Divisions - 92000 (45 people, why not 163, there were only on-duty battalions of these divisions put forward to reinforce border units with readiness 76 minutes); tanks and self-propelled guns - 881; guns 776 mm and above - 50; guns VET - 1620; anti-aircraft guns - XNUMX; mortars - XNUMX.,
    For divisions of the first echelon of the front, the standard for occupying the cover line was: 56th SD — 3–9 hours; 86th SD - 6-16 hours; 113th diabetes mellitus - 6-12 hours; 49th SD - 8-16 hours; 42nd SD - 3-9 hours; 75 SD - 4-10 hours.
    The enemy in the first echelon, directly striking on June 22, 1941: infantry divisions - 21, cavalry divisions - 1, tank divisions - 4 (430380 personnel); tanks and self-propelled guns - 688; guns 76 mm and above - 2491; anti-aircraft guns - 1937, anti-aircraft guns - 585; mortars - 3195.
    Now imagine what the front-line battalions of the Red Army cover were facing ?!
    1. +5
      July 12 2017
      The "advanced battalions of the Red Army cover" themselves decided (by voting) to be in a specific strength, in a specific place and at a specific time in front of the units of the Wehrmacht, or were they still ordered to do so? bully
      1. +3
        July 12 2017
        And what is it that the Stalinists are silent, do not defend their beloved leader, who overslept, to put it mildly, the German attack. They do not blame everything on the Trotskyists and anyone else. Somehow even boring.
        1. +3
          July 13 2017
          Actually, there is a version that explains such a catastrophic beginning of the war, and why Stalin spoke on the radio only on July 3, and Molotov spoke on June 22.
          Roughly on June 19 or June 20 there was an attempt on Stalin, with the aim of depriving the army and the country of a leader capable of organizing resistance, and at the same time making a mess in the troops in order to facilitate the Wehrmacht’s path to Moscow.
          This version also includes Pavlov’s frank betrayal and sabotage, which disorganized the defense of the Western Front and actually surrendered the front to the Germans, paving the way for two tank groups deep into our country.
          Of course, Khrushch’s assertion that Stalin allegedly “fell into prostration, locked himself in a country house and didn’t accept anyone” is an outright lie. There is even a journal of visits to Stalin, which shows who, when he came to him, and how long the meetings took place.
          But there is one “but” with this magazine. Firstly, the style of the records from June 20 to July 3 is different from the style of all other records (for example, the initials or identities / titles of visitors are not indicated, but only the last name). And secondly, there are no pages for June 19, 29 and 30. Generally.
          There is an assumption that the records were falsified in order to hide what really happened in the Kremlin in those days. An indirect confirmation can be the fact that almost everyone (except those interested in hiding information, for example, Khrushchev or Zhukov) has no mention in memoirs or in any recollections that they communicated with Stalin in the period from 20 until about June 26th. And those references that exist are replete with many inconsistencies, contradictions, and traces of explicit censorship, made, apparently in the Khrushchev era.
          I don’t know how reliable this is, but at least this version - about the plot with the assassination attempt - explains a lot. And the mess in the border districts, and the collapse of the front in the early days, and the silence of Stalin, and such a catastrophic situation on the fronts, with huge losses.
          1. +4
            July 13 2017
            Well, finally, the long-awaited, Pavlov, Zhukov, Khrushchev and someone else are to blame. Well, the great leader could not fall into prostration and generally allow such a grand miscalculation. It’s easier to put forward an assassination theory. True, there is no historical evidence, and Zhukov and Khrushchev were in favor with Stalin, but these are trifles.
            And I will say how it really was. The assassination has nothing to do with it. On 20 of June, 1941 of Stalin was stolen by aliens who collaborated with the Nazis and thus revealed the secret of making flying saucers. But the great leader was able to open the eyes of aliens to the true face of fascism, convince them of the advantage of the socialist path of development, accepted them in the CPSU (b), after which on July 2 it was returned to the place by aliens. wink
            1. +4
              July 13 2017
              Quote: Nikolai K
              Already 20 June 1941 Stalin was stolen by aliens

              That current is not necessary la-la ....
              Vissarionitch the day before in Courchevel with Aloysych because of Eva Brown argued. Torn, then reconciled. And when they found out what was happening, it was too late ...
            2. +3
              July 13 2017
              Quote: Nikolai K
              Well, finally the long-awaited, Pavlov, Zhukov, Khrushchev and someone else are to blame

              I won’t say anything about Zhukov, but Pavlov really ruined the defense. If he defended himself as KOVO, it is not a fact that the Germans would have reached Moscow.
              1. 0
                July 14 2017
                Not himself, someone from his headquarters.
    2. +1
      26 September 2017
      One battalion was allocated (on a rotational basis) for the construction of border SDs from each first-tier division in 1941, with full-time small arms and ammunition, according to guard standards, 15 rounds per rifle. With large sapper shovels and without machine guns. The machine gunners were supposedly trained separately in their own separate routine and course. Battalion mortar - also, if it was possible to consider a 50 mm mortar as a weapon in general, although it was the most massive. 45 mm battalion guns also cannot be considered anti-tank weapons, as They could penetrate Panzer-3’s armor at distances of more than 350 m into any projection, and they pierced the frontal projection only from a distance of 100 m. And the German tankers shot them to choose from a distance of a direct shot of their gun at 700 m. Our 76 mm regiment " guns ", including the T-34 cannon, could only damage German tanks from the outside with their fragmentation shells - without penetration, since there were no armor-piercing shots in the warehouses (the industry had not yet mastered them). And in general, it could have hit it on direct fire at a distance of less than 350 m, when the turret machine gun of a German tank mowed the calculation of “our anti-tank missile” from a distance of 800-1000 m. Such guns stood in our rifle regiments thanks to the deputy commissars for armaments of Tukhachevsky and Kulik, glorious arshalam of the proud USSR. And they rejected the 57 mm gun "for excessive armor penetration". It is with such an impudent wording.
      1. -1
        January 5 2018
        Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
        One battalion was allocated (on a rotational basis) for the construction of border SDs from each first-tier division in 1941, with full-time small arms and ammunition, according to guard standards, 15 rounds per rifle.

        Actually, in 1941 the battalion stood out from the rifle regiment (from the artillery regiment-division) and plus the sapper battalion of the division, that is, the total number of battalions could reach 5-6 from the division. Moreover, several dozens of sapper battalions arrived from the internal districts for the construction of border SDs, not counting the construction ones.
    3. 0
      October 30 2018
      See our 1941 movie about our intelligence: https://youtu.be/_ccuF8Uofso
    4. 0
      November 12, 2018
      Correct remark. For an illustration, take a look at the history of 141 SD 37 SK 6 A ZAPOVO, left flank. The division had experience in campaigns in Poland, Finland, Bessarabia. It was formed in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, Kharkov VO. At 22.6.41. had a number of approx. 4000 l / s, of which in rifle regiments approx. 2000, and in the paws ("light" artillery regiment) approx. 250, 205 in the medical battalion, even less in the anti-aircraft battalion. That is, the experienced division was not replenished and not re-equipped from the summer of 1940 until 22.6.41. The first battle she had was on 23.6 June, before that, on 22.6 June, there were no losses in the division. She fought CONTINUOUSLY for a month, in July she had approx. 1000 l / s and NO artillery, and finished it off completely in the encirclement near Uman, scattering and capturing the remnants when trying to break out of the encirclement, including the commander, Major General Tonkonogov. Those. in a month of battles, ANY division of the Red Army in the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht lost 3/4 l / s and almost all artillery and equipment, all warehouses and almost all supplies. And the "registration division" of the Red Army was three times inferior to the enemy's in number, five times inferior in weapons and equipment, and ten times in striking force and combat experience.
  3. +5
    July 12 2017
    Quote: Operator
    The "advanced battalions of the Red Army cover" themselves decided (by voting) to be in a specific strength, in a specific place and at a specific time in front of the units of the Wehrmacht, or were they still ordered to do so? bully

    Naturally at will! Voluntarily decided to die for glory.
  4. +2
    July 12 2017
    Welcome.
    1. What are the differences at the top of Germany after the Barbarossa plan and the concentration of troops prepared for an attack according to him?
    2. How was Goering going to “put up” with Great Britain from conquered Poland?
    3. How did the report on the defector at the time of acceptance at the district headquarters (June 20.06.) Turn out to be addressed to the chief of the front headquarters, - Rezun prompted?
    Health and do not be bored,
    Dmitriy
    1. +12
      July 12 2017
      I honestly did not understand what you meant about encryption. Filed from the headquarters of the 11 Army in the military district headquarters (after the interrogation of the detainee - it took a little less than a day). Two outgoing No. 133 and No. 136 were sent (where the second number went to in the encryption is not indicated - but you can guess). Sent to 23-46 20.06.41 (i.e., delivered from the 8 department to the communications node). Received by the VN communications node in 5 - 23. Received 8 duty officer for the county office in 5-30. by mistake, the person on duty typing the text on a typewriter hammered the date of 20.06 instead of 21.06 (believe so often when you sign and put the date of the person who signed it before you). Decryption was postponed, presumably to 8-30, decrypted in 9-00 21.06.41.
      About disagreements and how to put up with England - I'm sorry - see for yourself in the 1 part of the message of the Sergeant Major - ask him a question, pliz
      1. +3
        July 14 2017
        The chief of staff did not know where the addressee was located, and therefore the cipher telegrams were sent to the military district and to the front headquarters
      2. 0
        October 29 2018
        The overestimation of the number of German divisions by Soviet sources in Poland and East Prussia from February-March 1941 is understandable. These divisions were identified not by the found headquarters, but by the emblems of individual military units - the attributes-emblems on the uniform and equipment of divisions, traditional for the Wehrmacht. Those. the advance regiment of the division was spotted by reconnaissance as an already arrived division. Regiments and battalions of different divisions arrived in the border area "in bulk", by echelon, gradually getting denser by June 1941. This is not misinformation, but information ahead of events. In the end, it is not at all accidental that the actual presence of enemy troops only by June almost exactly coincided with the data of our intelligence, which the author will later note, although he called it "an accidental coincidence." It is worth recalling once again that the “blue” (Zhukov) smashed the “red” (Pavlov) at the famous game in January 1941, having only 60 divisions. At the same time, their actions were still hampered by intermediaries in every possible way. But then someone came up with a critical threshold for the readiness of No. 1 of our troops in 180 German divisions on our border. This stupidity (or meanness) was most likely approved by Tymoshenko, not Zhukov.
        1. 0
          October 29 2018
          Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
          These divisions were not identified by the discovered headquarters, but by the emblems of individual military units — the attribute emblems on the uniforms and equipment of the divisions traditional for the Wehrmacht.

          Clarification is necessary here, because undercover information is always cross-checked by radio intelligence data, if possible. And even if the appearance of the communications center of the division was detected, then believe it immediately becomes clear that it will be followed by the arrival of the headquarters, and as a result, the entire division.
          1. 0
            November 12, 2018
            The realities of the "RKKA radio intelligence" should be known - there were 2 stations for the entire KOVO, one was defeated by the Germans and seized the equipment already on 22.6 June. - Framed too close to the border. And the Germans had radio intelligence - in each division a company in the reconnaissance battalion. And you need to know that until 22.6. their headquarters of the first line were camouflaged and observed radio silence strictly, consolidating into the previously deployed headquarters and using their radio communications. Their radios on tanks had a stable communication range greater than our army transmitters. Study the materiel.
            1. 0
              November 12, 2018
              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

              The realities of the "RKKA radio intelligence" should be known - there were 2 stations for the entire KOVO, one was defeated by the Germans and seized the equipment already on 22.6 June. - Framed too close to the border.

              Do not fantasize if you do not really know the strength of the radio intelligence of districts. In KOVO there was an OSN radio division and a separate radio center operating on encrypted radiograms in the interests of the district intelligence department. On June 22, one radio station was defeated, and even then not completely, but partially. The remaining three and the receiving center continued radio reconnaissance.

              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
              And you need to know that until 22.6. their first-line headquarters disguised themselves and kept radio silence strictly,

              You also tell us that upon arrival at the new deployment site they did not do test sessions - so that experts would laugh at you.
              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
              Their radios on tanks had a range of stable communications more than our army transmitters. Learn the materiel.

              In what range - HF or VHF, educate us, "expert" .... By the way, what is the power of the army transmitter - do not tell me by chance?
  5. +2
    July 12 2017
    I’m interested in something else. How did German intelligence work with senior leaders of the Red Army? What tasks did they set for them? And the second. Was there a "Thunderstorm" operation?
    1. +11
      July 12 2017
      There was no conspiracy of generals - German intelligence did not work. otherwise they would have known more about our aircraft. They have a source appeared in the autumn at Headquarters ...
      Here another question is interesting: did Canaris report everything? (buddy arrogant)
      Thunderstorm - my personal opinion May-July - no. Expected replacement of the "red" packages including. with defensive tasks. You can not attack a more powerful opponent.
      1942 year - maybe
      1. +3
        July 12 2017
        Quote: aKtoR
        But was Canaris reporting everything? (impudent friend)

        All talk here is exclusively about German intelligence, and yet this war itself was extremely beneficial just for the British side. Both the organization of the attack and the complete failure of the Red Army in the initial phase could be organized precisely by them, the predecessors of today's MI-6, and they were always better with finances than the Germans. In addition, the Americans received the greatest bonuses from the war and a lot of money, too, and given that the Trotskyists worked more for the United States-Britain osb, it is easier to assume that they were actively involved in the initial failure of the Red Army. MI-6 is a private organization that works for the one who pays the most and who has the most money. I believe that all these factors are also worth considering.
        1. +1
          July 13 2017
          England built Germany, and the USSR built the United States. Built for the war that happened.
      2. 0
        November 12, 2018
        You are mistaken. The Abwehr knew the entire deployment of the Red Army on 18.6.41. and plans in "red envelopes". I think that everything that he dictated to Zhukov for recording in his, Zhukov's, secret notebook was written directly from Marshal Timoshenko's office with their tape recorder. And from Kulik's office, it seems, too, sound recordings came to the Abwehr. Not all the secrets of 1941 have yet been unearthed.
        1. 0
          November 12, 2018
          Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
          I think that directly from the office of Marshal Tymoshenko everything was written by their tape recorder that he dictated to Zhukov for writing in his secret Zhukov’s notebook.

          Where did the firewood come from? Can you bring a link, or do you think that they will just believe you?
          Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
          Not all the secrets of 1941 are still excavated.

          And where did you dig it from?
          Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
          and plans in "red envelopes".

          It is physically impossible to do this, if only because a very narrow circle of people was allowed to do this - see the cover plan.
          1. 0
            November 12, 2018
            Throughout May, the projects of KONTRUDAROV filed by the ARMYs and the DISTRICTS (according to the principled guidelines of the NCO and GSh chief executives) within the framework of the "counterstrike" Coverage Plan were repeatedly supplemented and reconciled in the GSh-DISTRICT-ARMY cipher correspondence, but were never finally approved. ONLY the order of their storage "in red envelopes" and the order of their opening on a special signal and admission to familiarization were approved. The district and the armies, in principle, knew their own PROPOSALS, but the final ORDERS were received only from the "red envelopes" on 22.6.41. In PribOVO, the plan was developed specifically by the beginning. of the operational department of the district, General Trukhin, who in the very first week deserted to the Germans with all the operational plans of the NWF headquarters. That's all your secrecy, hacked from the top by the Abwehr.
            1. 0
              November 13, 2018
              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

              Throughout May, the projects of KONTRUDAROV filed by the ARMYs and the DISTRICTS (according to the principled guidelines of the NKO and General Staff chiefs) within the framework of the "counterstrike" Coverage Plan were repeatedly supplemented and reconciled in the GSH-DISTRICT-ARMY encrypted correspondence, but were never finally approved.

              Do not invent - the cover plan does not provide for any "counterattack". And no "reconciliation" with the cover plans could take place in May - they were ready by June 1, 1941.
              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
              ONLY the order of their storage "in red envelopes" was approved

              The cover plan is not stored in the "red package" - there was just an order on where to move and what to do after opening the package.
              Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
              who in the first week ran to the Germans with all the operational plans of the headquarters of the NWF.

              After the first week, the cover plan in that situation has already lost all meaning, it’s a pity that you don’t understand this either, even though you decide to judge that time.
              1. 0
                November 13, 2018
                You are talking about misinformation. Read Directive No. 2 of 22.6.41., Which was just based on the "counterblow" Coverage Plan, which was worked out in the districts and armies, according to the orders of the NKO and the General Staff, up to the positions of BATTERIES and ROT. In PribOVO, specifically, on June 19-20, tank divisions were redeployed from Libava for counterattacks on Tilsit and Suwalki, the readiness for which was checked by Poluboyarov and which the Germans parried at the very beginning, on the original, already 23.6.
                1. 0
                  November 13, 2018
                  Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                  You are talking about misinformation. Read Directive # 2 of 22.6.41. Which was just based on the "counterblow" Covering Plan,

                  And here is this directive, if you do not know the text of the May directive of NGOs:
                  TO THE COMMANDING MILITARY OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
                  Map 1: 1
                  In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops by May 20, 1941, personally you, the chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the district’s headquarters, should develop:
                  a) a detailed plan for the defense of the state border from Kapczyamestis to the suit. Lake Svityaz;
                  b) a detailed air defense plan.
                  I. Defense tasks:

                  And where is it written about the counterattack plan?
                  Do you even know how to understand military documents?
                  1. 0
                    November 13, 2018
                    I wrote about this to you, uv. comrade In April, it was ordered the districts and armies to give OFFERS on the Cover Plan, May 1, under the Principle of Counterparty. And in May there was WATER correspondence with EACH DISTRICT on DETAILING AND CORRECTING the plan and deployment in certain areas in specific bands of armies, corps and divisions, up to the positions of batteries and companies. The headquarters of the armies were fooling about this WRONG work, but they were waiting for the approval of their studies, AND THESE WERE NOT RECEIVED, but received the notorious sealed envelopes - in fact cats in bags - which they had the right to open only on orders from at least NS level. You pop me one of these WORKING encryption, not a directive.
                    1. 0
                      November 13, 2018
                      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                      And in May there was WATER correspondence with EACH DISTRICT on DETAILING AND CORRECTING the plan and deployment in certain areas in specific bands of armies, corps and divisions, up to the positions of batteries and companies.

                      Do not fool me if you yourself do not know how all this is done. First of all, the May’s directives of the People’s Commissar for a cover plan were not born from scratch, but based on old cover plans with the addition of changes that have occurred in recent months in the deployment of parts of the district.
                      Secondly, the General Staff would never go into the details of cover plans, if only because they know better the situation on the ground.
                      And thirdly, there are no fools in the General Staff to take responsibility for the development of cover plans, if only because they do not have to answer for their failure to fulfill.
                      I see that you are still that "theoretician", and apparently you have never seen anything higher than battalion planning.
                      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                      but received the notorious sealed envelopes

                      Complete nonsense - the commander and chief of staff are always privy to what is in the sealed envelope of the officer on duty. They are taught this in the higher headquarters in the "dark room".
                      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
                      You pop me one of these WORKING encryption, not a directive.

                      This is a text from the NGO directive - you don’t even know it, but you decide to judge who gave what instructions:
                      Top secret
                      Of particular importance
                      Ex. No. 2
                      People's Commissar
                      USSR defense
                      May 14, 19 41

                      No. 503859 / SS / s

                      TO THE COMMANDING MILITARY OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
                      Map 1: 1
                      In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district’s troops by May 20, 1941, personally to you, the chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the district’s headquarters, to develop:

                      a) a detailed plan for the defense of the state border from Kapczyamestis to the lawsuit. Lake Svityaz;

                      b) a detailed air defense plan.
  6. +1
    July 12 2017
    Quote: pp to Oparyshev
    I’m interested in something else. How did German intelligence work with senior leaders of the Red Army? What tasks did they set for them? And the second. Was there a "Thunderstorm" operation?

    But no way. Abwehr had no exits to the leadership of the Red Army. With whom he worked, they cleaned them up in 1937-1938.
    Not Operation "Thunderstorm", but the code "Thunderstorm" - putting all troops on alert. Canceled in May 1941. in the preparation of new deployment plans for the Red Army.
    1. 0
      July 12 2017
      Yours. But if the abwehr did not work with the high command, then the command worked on its own, giving bonuses to the Germans.
      you probably don’t know, but the whole concentration of the Red Army troops was in accordance with some plan. And obviously not defensive.
      1. +4
        July 12 2017
        I will offer you another version in the 4 part.
        1. 0
          July 12 2017
          I don’t observe the need for the 4th version. That is quite enough.
      2. +2
        July 12 2017
        This concentration of troops of the Red Army, was in accordance with some plan. And clearly not defensive.

        You can not destroy the enemy with defensive actions. naturally these actions were ultimately offensive.
        1. 0
          July 13 2017
          That's what it is all about. Ultimately offensive! So you confirm that an offensive operation was planned. This is enough. And as it was called, it is not so important.
          1. +1
            July 13 2017
            Ultimately offensive! So you confirm that an offensive operation was planned. This is enough.

            In fact, any resident of the Soviet Union knew that it was necessary to beat the enemy with little blood and on its territory. Any military man developing a plan to retreat several thousand kilometers inland would be put in a madhouse. Or do you have a different opinion?
      3. +4
        July 13 2017
        Quote: p-k Oparyshev
        you probably don’t know, but the whole concentration of the Red Army troops was in accordance with some plan. And obviously not defensive.

        Burn, feel free .....
        wassat
    2. 0
      November 12, 2018
      You are mistaken. The Abwehr knew the entire deployment of the Red Army on 18.6.41. and plans in "red envelopes". I think that everything that he dictated to Zhukov for recording in his, Zhukov's, secret notebook was written directly from Marshal Timoshenko's office with their tape recorder. And from Kulik's office, it seems, too, sound recordings came to the Abwehr. Not all the secrets of 1941 have yet been unearthed.
  7. +4
    July 12 2017
    Quote: dmitriz
    Welcome.
    3. How did the report on the defector at the time of acceptance at the district headquarters (June 20.06.) Turn out to be addressed to the chief of the front headquarters, - Rezun prompted?
    Health and do not be bored,
    Dmitriy

    And just like the encryption department of the 11th army in 1941. used forms of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation!
    1. +5
      July 12 2017
      Right. Only there is one interesting thing ... To whom did 11 headquarters send the second encryption (outgoing numbers then two. By the way, the same thing in the encryption from Zapov in the army)?
      Any thoughts?
      Each outgoing - one recipient, in the case of non-pass encryption - a new number ..
      1. 0
        26 September 2017
        The headquarters of the 11th Army understood that the defector should be urgently sent to Moscow. In Alytus there was an airfield of the ARMY ESCADRIL. Why in Riga (to ukroDibrov) do a hook? I think that this is a cipher about this - from the army RO to Moscow RU. By the way, on the topic of "moles". Not one case was noted - the 2nd tier divisions, moved to the first (into the forests) according to the plans of the General Staff from 16.06.41., Found that 22.06. Germans bombed their planned positions intensively. Those who succeeded, those who suffered, and those who did not succeed, or who made a small mistake in the place, did not suffer and watched the Germans knead the forest with bombs. With such a bombing of 15 SK, the SF launched one junker with anti-aircraft fire, and a flight mission with a map was found on the captured pilot, which stated that this was the latest German intelligence data on 18.06. - for target designation of aviation. The map and the prisoner were sent to Kiev. An important detail is 18.06/22.06.41. it was an empty forest place, parts of the corps approached this forest only on XNUMX., and then they did not manage to get to the exact place of the new planned location. But the headquarters of the corps thought about the "moles" somewhere in Moscow or Kiev.
        1. -1
          January 5 2018
          Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
          The headquarters of the 11th Army understood that the defector should be urgently sent to Moscow.

          Why send him to Moscow if it is much easier to interrogate him on the spot and compare all his data with the situation with the army intelligence chief? And then to report to Moscow - that would be faster and more reliable.
    2. 0
      July 12 2017
      Slimmer than Rezun theory, no one has yet proposed anything.
      1. 0
        July 12 2017
        Quote: p-k Oparyshev
        Slimmer than Rezun theory, no one has yet proposed anything.


        What are you talking about? I hope not about the stupidity that Hitler was ahead of Stalin by several weeks?
        1. 0
          July 13 2017
          The female gender speaks with emotions.
      2. +5
        July 13 2017
        Quote: p-k Oparyshev
        Slimmer than Rezun theory, no one has yet proposed anything.

        Resunoids have a replenishment ...
        lol
        1. +2
          July 13 2017
          Yes, it’s very funny if we are talking about 4 million prisoners and how many people have died. Do you look softly said by a gibberish.
          1. +3
            July 13 2017
            Quote: p-k Oparyshev
            Do you look softly said gibberish.

            I am not offended by the inferior ....
            laughing
        2. +1
          July 13 2017
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          Resunoids have a replenishment ...

          Hardly. This is most likely a bot from the site team. Just in the summer, a drawdown in attendance, it is necessary to entertain people. Bots just drive 5-6 "arguments" on the list. You can just as well argue with the wall.
        3. 0
          July 17 2017
          it is he himself! And then people began to forget the book does not buy!
  8. +4
    July 12 2017
    Quote: pp to Oparyshev
    I’m interested in something else. How did German intelligence work with senior leaders of the Red Army? What tasks did they set for them? And the second. Was there a "Thunderstorm" operation?

    But no way. Abwehr had no access to the leadership of NGOs and the General Staff. All agents were regularly destroyed, and those who fell under the influence were cleaned up in 1937-1938.
    Not an operation, but the “Thunderstorm” code - bringing troops into full combat readiness. Canceled in May 1941.
    1. 0
      July 13 2017
      Where does such an accurate and comprehensive infa come from? The categorical conclusions are striking.
  9. +3
    July 12 2017
    Quote: pp to Oparyshev
    Slimmer than Rezun theory, no one has yet proposed anything.

    What ?! In unfounded lies ?!
    1. MrK
      +4
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Predator
      What ?! In unfounded lies ?!


      Lie, don’t lie, I don’t know. But there are other articles. I’m quoting a small passage.

      ... 16 June 1941 g. Order for the USSR Armed Forces not to succumb to provocations. At the same time, putting them into combat readiness and covert withdrawal under the guise of exercises at the 52 concentration center of divisions of the second echelon of the covering army from places of permanent deployment (Order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense from 16.6.41).

      18 June 1941 Stalin summoned the head of the Red Army Air Force P.F. Zhigarev and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, which was subordinated to the border troops, and ordered the aviation forces of the Western Special Military District to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance in order to clarify the real situation on the Soviet-German border.

      18 June 1941 Directive of the General Staff of the Red Army on putting troops on high alert. The deadline is June 21 1941.

      The command of General Pavlov is not brought to the troops of the Western Military District. After the defeat of the Western Front, General Pavlov and other commanders will be arrested. Pavlov himself will deny the fact of receiving the directive, but interviewed witnesses will confirm that the directive was successfully received.

      19 June 1941 The order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense 0367 from 27.12.40 on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft, the withdrawal of the command of the western border districts, converting them into front-line command, field command posts, camouflage of military units, parks, warehouses, bases ...
      22 June 1941 or how it all began
      http://samlib.ru/s/sherdan_p/22iuna1941.shtml
      1. +12
        July 12 2017
        not to be a talker - give a scan or a copy of the directive you specified:
        "18 June 1941. Directive of the General Staff of the Red Army on bringing the troops on high alert. Deadline to 21 June 1941."

        There was no this directive. PribOVO began to prepare within the framework of new cover plans - it was believed there would be a minor blow.
        Even KOVO “lifted” TOTAL one corps of the MK and one tank division — they were only waiting for a provocation — for that would be enough raised forces. You see, none of the military men thought that it was possible to go 200-300 km in less than TWO weeks!
        1. +4
          July 12 2017
          Tactical and strategic surprise are two different things.
          The Wehrmacht grouping was concentrated near the borders of the USSR and there was no secret in this. Hitler himself wrote to Stalin that the troops were concentrated, but against the enemy in the west. Our intelligence confirmed this, since the troops were deployed in the first echelon to the west, and there were really rear units near our borders. A few days before the attack, the troops began to turn in the other direction, to the east. The race began, where no one wanted to give the enemy a chance to be accused of aggression, so the mobilization in the USSR was carried out secretly undercover and not according to the full scheme. Did not make it...
        2. 0
          28 September 2017
          2,8 cm s.Pz.B.41 were mass-produced from 1940 to September 1943 at the Mauser factory in Oberndorf am Neckar. The main reason for the cessation of production was the shortage of tungsten for the manufacture of cores of armor-piercing shells. The cost of one gun was 4520 Reichsmarks. For its mass of 229 kg, the artillery system s.Pz.B.41 was quite expensive; for comparison, the cost of a 37 mm Pak 36 anti-tank gun weighing 440 kg was 5730 Reichsmarks, and for a 50 mm Pak 38 weighing 830 kg it was 10 600 Reichsmarks [2] [3].
          Ammunition for the gun was also produced from 1940 to 1943, with more than 3 times more armor-piercing shells than fragmentation ones.
          Production of s.Pz.B.41 and shells for them [2]
          Products \ Year 1940 1941 1942 1943 Total
          2,8 cm s.Pz.B.41, pcs. 94 349 1030 1324 2797
          fragmentation shells, thousand pieces — 9,2 373,3 130,1 512,6
          armor-piercing shells, thousand pieces 156,2 889,5 270,0 278,1 1602,8
          In 1942, a tank version of the gun was created - 2,8 / 2 cm KwK.42, released in a limited installation series of 24 guns. In 1941, work began on the creation of a larger-caliber conical bore cannon, which resulted in the adoption of the 4,2 cm Pak 41 gun. Other developments, such as the 37/27-mm schwere Panzerbüchse 42 and 42/27-mm Panzerbüchse 42 / 27, remained at the stage of testing prototypes [2] [3].
          Service and military use [edit | edit wiki text]

          2,8 cm s.Pz.B.41 in combat position
          s.Pz.B.41 arrived in a variety of units - infantry, light infantry, motorized, mining and jaeger divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops, as well as parachute and airfield divisions of the Luftwaffe [1] [5]. Some of the guns entered the tank destroyer divisions - for example, in June 1941 the 654th tank destroyer division, operating as part of the Army Center group, was armed with 32 Pak 35/36 guns and 4 s.Pz.B.41 guns [ 6].
          On June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 183 such guns that had been used since the beginning of World War II. Apparently, they [7] had in mind KK Rokossovsky in his memoirs “Soldier's duty” [8]:
          If the Germans saw our new technology such as the KV, then we also found something in them, namely, new models of anti-tank rifles, the bullets of which were flashing our old types of tanks. We conducted a test, made sure that the T-34 side armor also penetrates with special bullets from these guns. The captured novelty was urgently sent to Moscow.
        3. 0
          November 12, 2018
          You correctly looked at the data on armor-piercing anti-tank missiles in Pribovo - an average of 10-15 pieces per barrel. And the Germans - this is my quote from the document - the cost of the 37 mm Pak 36 anti-tank gun weighing 440 kg was 5730 Reichsmarks, and for the 50 mm Pak 38 weighing 830 kg - 10 600 Reichsmarks [2] [3].
          Ammunition for the gun was also produced from 1940 to 1943, with more than 3 times more armor-piercing shells than fragmentation ones.
      2. +2
        July 12 2017
        And how should the leadership of the USSR react to information about the concentration of 190-200 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies at the borders ?! Only a bit late however. But after the flight of the scout, the doubts disappeared completely. The only question is why the order was not executed.
        But Rezun’s theory (fabrications) is not a topic at all. If the villain Stalin decided to liberate Europe, then why disband the Red Army shock groups formed at the end of September 1939?! More infantry, tank and air divisions would have been added in May 1940. everything and everything on the Western border would be torn to pieces. The Wehrmacht then in May 1940 freed France from democracy. An ideal time!
        1. 0
          28 September 2017
          Carriage [edit | edit wiki text]

          Top view on the breech of the gun
          The gun has a carriage with sliding beds formed by the upper and lower machines. The pivoting part of the gun is located on the trunnions of the upper machine, and a shield cover and a damper are also attached to it. Together, these structural elements make up the rotating part of the gun, which is connected to the lower machine using a ball epaulet. The artillery system does not have vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms; guidance is carried out manually by turning the rotating and swinging parts of the gun [11].
          The damper is designed to damp barrel oscillations during firing and aiming, consists of a molded case with valve devices, two covers, a rod with two pistons and a rod head with a latch. The shield cover, designed to protect the calculation from bullets, small fragments and shock waves from close gaps, form two parallel armor plates 4 mm thick each with a gap of 35 mm between them. This design, implemented on the principle of diversity booking, provides better resistance to bullets and small fragments of shells compared with one armor plate of the same geometric shape and weight. In addition to the main shield, in the area of ​​the breech box, a small additional shield is attached to the cradle, also of two parallel armor plates [11] [16].
          To the lower machine, part of which are two beds with openers, a sprung wheel drive is attached. The connection of the wheel drive with the machine is carried out using a pin with a stopper. The wheels are iron disk, with rubber tires filled with sponge rubber. The presence of a suspension allows towing a gun at a speed of up to 40 km / h [11] [12].
          A feature of the gun is the ability to fire both from the wheels and directly from the lower machine. In the latter case, the wheel drive is removed (which takes 30-40 seconds), and the calculation is in the lying position. If necessary, the gun without any tools can be easily disassembled into 5 parts: a shield cover (20 kg), a barrel with a muzzle brake (37 kg), a cradle with anti-recoil devices, a breech, a bolt and a counterweight (45 kg), a wheel drive with a spring (62 kg ), the upper and lower machines with beds (57 kg) [11].
        2. 0
          28 September 2017
          Work on a light anti-tank gun with a conical bore was launched by Mauser in late 1939. Initially, the gun, which had the indexes "Gerät 231" and "MK.8202", was developed as a universal (infantry and anti-tank) automatic gun equipped with an 18-round magazine. However, during the development, it was decided to abandon this concept and create a single-shot version of the weapon with a conical barrel, and only for anti-tank needs. According to a number of German sources, Rheinmetall [3] was involved in this work. In June - July 1940, the first batch of 30 guns was tested at the Kummersdorf training ground, after which the artillery system was put into service and put into serial production [1] [2]. There is a version that when creating the guns, German engineers used structural elements of the 29/20-mm Larsen gun, designed for the French army and tested since 1937 [4].
  10. +2
    July 12 2017
    The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment, so that Germany will only have to reap
    !!!!!!!!!!!! and then and now !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    agricultural production to the latitude of Poshekhonya. The United States and NATO will not attack the Russian Federation with agricultural production to the latitude of Poshekhonya.
    it is an opportunity to feed the country in the Kirov and Sverdlovsk Regions.
    German arm-in estimated (and now "partners") - to die of hunger or feed
    MAIN IN THE COUNTRY-
    - SEMI-FLOOR VANKA MECHANIZER.
    And NOT IVS + JUKOV + KIRPONOS (NOW GDP + SHOIGU)
    VANKA - OR "ON X-R-E-N-THIS-POWER" OR "X-R-E-N THEM, WE DO NOT RETURN OURSELVES"
  11. +2
    July 12 2017
    Dear aKtoR, you have extracts from the Archive, but there is no geopolitical vision. I, as a sofa strategist, do not understand the catastrophe of 1941. There are many opinions. The "conclusions" of Mark Solonin are less suitable. And if you play WoT, then the length of the main T-2 tank was less than mine Volkswagen Passat. The so-called tank armies of the Reich in June 1941 did not represent anything special ...
    1. +2
      July 13 2017
      Quote: rruvim
      The so-called tank armies of the Reich in June 1941 did not represent anything special ...

      Come on! The boys went out for a picnic! How many were there? From 5 to 7 million personnel, armed, motorized, trained. Well, of course they were nothing. And even more so because they attacked first. If you start shooting at you with a Mauser rifle (I will refrain from talking about MG) what color will your bGGyuki become?
    2. +1
      28 September 2017
      The deepest error. Compare the performance characteristics of small arms, artillery, tank weapons, EFFECTIVE FIRE RANGE, the ultimate range of the lethal force of bullets, the penetration of shells, etc. A German rifle of caliber 7,92 (the main caliber of the Germans) was superior to our Mosinka caliber of 7,62 (our main caliber) by about 100 m. If we add armored personnel carriers with machine guns (also more powerful and aimed) to the battlefield, add the EXPERIENCED battalion artillery and hang over the top reconnaissance reconnaissance reconnaissance aircraft, plus the Yu-87 attack aircraft and bombers that each German battalion commander broadcast on the radio during the battle, there were no chances for our SDs to stand the battle in front of the German battalion — a matter of FIRE defeat and knockdown pos It was only a matter of time — an hour or two, or three or four. And ours, as they ruled, stayed on day, and at night the unfinished and hungry REMAINS, with the remnants of b / c, left, or left the encirclement. About tank duel battles - read the "Battle of Alytus" on Wikipedia. Our tanks were forced to let German tanks 100-200 m away, hit point-blank with RIP (there were no armor-piercing ones), stun, and then TARANIT. German fragmentation armor ours did not break through!
    3. +1
      28 September 2017
      Work on a light anti-tank gun with a conical bore was launched by Mauser in late 1939. Initially, the gun, which had the indexes "Gerät 231" and "MK.8202", was developed as a universal (infantry and anti-tank) automatic gun equipped with an 18-round magazine. However, during the development, it was decided to abandon this concept and create a single-shot version of the weapon with a conical barrel, and only for anti-tank needs. According to a number of German sources, Rheinmetall [3] was involved in this work. In June - July 1940, the first batch of 30 guns was tested at the Kummersdorf training ground, after which the artillery system was put into service and put into serial production [1] [2]. There is a version that when creating the guns, German engineers used structural elements of the 29/20-mm Larsen gun, designed for the French army and tested since 1937 [4].
  12. +2
    July 13 2017
    the picture is clear ... and to say that the Kremlin did not know about the imminent start of the war, it is time to stop it. They knew very well! And in their opinion, they did the maximum possible for preparation. Also quite believable.
    The General Staff also knew this situation that the combat-ready German army would certainly and quickly crush the not mobilized and combat-ready Red Army ...
    Betrayal and direct sabotage.
    At that time, a citizen was given a deadline for being late for work and not fulfilling plans. And in the army, you could not directly obey orders? And no consequences?
    1. +1
      July 13 2017
      You have a childish approach to the topic. You write the Kremlin didn’t know .. But the Kremlin, this is not a single whole. The Kremlin consists of the people of Stalin, Beria, American Litvin, Someone Molotov. Budenny Voroshilov. Disguised Trotskyists. Conspirators against Stalin, agents of the Abwehr and still those about whom nothing is known. And everyone was doing their undercover mouse fuss.
  13. +2
    July 13 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    You see, none of the military thought that you can go 200-300 km in less than TWO weeks!

    a lie from start to finish! Zhukov during the exercises worked out the capture of Minsk in 5 days. And the same data was laid down in the German Blitzkrieg.
    1. +4
      July 13 2017
      Take your time, you will soon realize that you were wrong, wait 3 hours.
      You will be amazed when you read who wrote
      about the reasons for the defeat. After all, everything is so visible ...
      Only unfortunately 3 ch. Will be released now only after 8 days + moderation (the whole evening had to unsubscribe that it was not a camel and in the articles and better.
      Good luck
  14. +6
    July 13 2017
    The number of divisions of Germany and its allies, taken into account by the General Staff of the Red Army, as of the first half of the 1941 year, clearly indicated the preparation of a military operation against the USSR.

    Nevertheless, the military-political leadership of the USSR struck a bolt on reality (concentration of enemy troops) and believed the words of the German leadership about such "original" preparations for an attack on Britain.

    For six months of the 1941 of the year, Stalin and the General Staff of the Red Army did not hit a finger in terms of building a defensive line against the Wehrmacht strike force (with the exception of a few days immediately before the June 22). Not a single trench, dugout or anti-tank ditch was dug. None of the divisions were withdrawn from their locations to the line of defense. Not a single air regiment was transferred to a field airfield. Not a single field command post of the corps, army, or front was deployed. Not a single fuel or ammunition base was dispersed directly in the areas of troop deployment on the front line.

    Yes, and the feverish and contradictory attempts of the military-political leadership of the USSR on June 20 and 21 to change the situation under the slogan not to succumb to provocations ended in the fact that the entire Red Army in the west was caught in the morning on June 22 literally without pants - in only underpants.

    It could not be otherwise - as soon as it came to Stalin and the General Staff a few days before the German attack that they messed up and looked at the war, they immediately made a muzzle on the brick and began to spread the misinformation that this was not their mistake, but the unexpected actions of the Germans. And this despite the fact that Stalin and the General Staff were informed about the buildup of enemy forces as much as six months - there was a wagon and a full truck to “wait” time.

    If you look at the map with the location of the troops of the Baltic and Western military districts as of June 22, the stupidity of the actions of the high military command in terms of the deployment of the Red Army forces in the west is directly evident - over 90% of Soviet divisions are located directly on the state border. Moreover, they are not located in deployed defensive orders, but in barracks, while the enemy is located in deployed offensive orders in accordance with all the rules of operational and tactical military art.

    And Stalin, the People’s Commissar of Social Security and the USSR Service Station, Tymoshenko’s People’s Commissar of Defense, and Zhukov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, are solely to blame.
    1. +9
      July 13 2017
      Andrew, you did not understand the main thing - it did not reach the military. Even after the instructions of Stalin, they are not particularly in a hurry. After receiving the message from Golovorov, Stalin again called the army leaders and practically forced them to write a directive, but even after that they did not hurry - Zhukov did not believe that there would be a war.
      1. +6
        July 13 2017
        I, too, was and is the leader, in my work I did not and do not allow the repetition of the mistakes of my subordinates by a simple method - removing the guilty from my post (otherwise they will remove me).

        If subordinates repeat their mistakes (especially repeatedly, as follows from the shameful orders of NPOs and the General Staff about the facts of the flagrant indiscipline of the Red Army command staff from top to bottom), then it is not the subordinates who are to blame, but their leaders.
        1. +4
          July 13 2017
          Quote: Operator
          a simple method - removing the offenders

          So already filmed and shuffled. The mess was only getting worse.
          Quote: Operator
          if the subordinates repeat their mistakes (all the more than once, as follows from the shameful orders of the NPO and the General Staff on the facts of the flagrant indiscipline of the Red Army commanding staff from top to bottom), then it is not the subordinates who are to blame, but their leaders.

          Well, again, Stalin turned out to be extreme :).
        2. +1
          July 17 2017
          You as a leader must be prepared for crises! Do you have a business plan about the actions of the enterprise in the face of a 10% reduction in the flow of financial flows twenty%; 20% and 30%! I tried to teach this to students at the dean level. It was clearly said that we develop only in optimistically calculated scenarios! DO NOT PROHIBIT calculation of the enterprise’s work scenarios in crisis conditions as it does not correspond to the purpose of the work!
          1. +2
            July 17 2017
            You have confirmed my thesis - the dean (Stalin) went wrong laughing
    2. +5
      July 13 2017
      hell with him with such a guide! But I am surprised by the mass helplessness of junior and middle commanders. It seems that everyone from the lieutenant to the major just transferred to their platoon - the battalion, they don’t know the area, they see their soldiers for the first time. (Is that why the films often show only officers who have arrived at the service? Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the complete turmoil and chaos in the troops)
      You can understand when during the war they stamped a new summer ... but these officers were normally trained and many already had experience in the army. Or what is taught in educational institutions or comprehended in the army is not necessary at all in wartime?
      As one wrote here nearby - square snowdrifts show the combat coordination of units?
      Very often it seems that only a small number could think and make decisions on their own.
  15. KLV
    +3
    July 13 2017
    And where is the link to the first part? It so happened that I rarely visit the site now. The author somehow reacted casually to this.
    1. The comment was deleted.
  16. +3
    July 13 2017
    Quote: glory1974
    Did not make it...

    when in 39 the Germans entered Poland, their main thrust was horses. After a year and a half, the main forces were almost all motorized.
    My relatives told me that the Red Army was retreating for several days — all on foot and rarely saw cars or tractors in columns. Then there was a lull. After several days on the roads there was a deafening roar of equipment: the German infantry was moving in cars and other equipment. Nobody walked on foot.
    Another interesting fact was the training of the Red Army: anti-aircraft gunners put their guns and machine guns specially in the courtyards of the houses for “disguise”. Locals begged not to do this ... to no avail. As a result, not a single German aircraft was shot down. And all the houses where anti-aircraft guns stood nearby were destroyed by bombs.
  17. 0
    July 13 2017
    Another question arises, who and when compiled a similar list at that time. And what was discarded. Whether written conclusions, memoranda were made on this basis, or what they had there. And then with a hind mind all are strong. Well, how on one note that the war is being prepared in the summer, there were 2-3 notes that it was postponed until next year? And all this was in a heap of other notes, where everything was mixed up, from specific documents to rumors.
  18. +4
    July 14 2017
    Not a single source in my 58 years of life and 25 years of service in the VS has ever seen an explanation of the reasons for such a long time, which does not fall under any standards for the passage of 1 directive from 21 June 1941 from Moscow and beyond. It is not even known which category she was sent to? And this is also the reason for the defeat of 1941 of the year ...
    1. +4
      July 14 2017
      Nice to see a specialist))) In the fourth part this issue will be considered. I will offer my version of the event. There are several problems ...
    2. 0
      28 September 2017
      Work on a light anti-tank gun with a conical bore was launched by Mauser in late 1939. Initially, the gun, which had the indexes "Gerät 231" and "MK.8202", was developed as a universal (infantry and anti-tank) automatic gun equipped with an 18-round magazine. However, during the development, it was decided to abandon this concept and create a single-shot version of the weapon with a conical barrel, and only for anti-tank needs. According to a number of German sources, Rheinmetall [3] was involved in this work. In June - July 1940, the first batch of 30 guns was tested at the Kummersdorf training ground, after which the artillery system was put into service and put into serial production [1] [2]. There is a version that when creating the guns, German engineers used structural elements of the 29/20-mm Larsen gun, designed for the French army and tested since 1937 [4].
  19. +1
    July 14 2017
    Avos and criminal negligence + fear of initiative fettered owls. top-level military commanders in order to at least disperse the aircraft ... Indeed, in a regime similar to "naval BG No. 2", army men could wait weeks for an attack. And do not suffer terrifying losses in the first weeks of the war. The human factor - Stalin, a special tragic page in 1941
    1. +2
      July 15 2017
      His power did not extend to the fleet, or simply the hands of the Pavlovsky headquarters did not reach there?
  20. +1
    July 15 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    Nice to see a specialist))) In the fourth part this issue will be considered. I will offer my version of the event. There are several problems ...

    In the SA there were several categories of urgency - "Monolith", "Airplane" and so on. All the time, the question is tormented - directive No. XXUMX on which one was transmitted? There is a feeling that by "Ordinary." Immediately a number of questions:

    1. The category is assigned by the one who signs - that is, Tymoshenko and Zhukov. They pointed it out? Or not?
    2. If indicated, then what transmitted?

    Simply put, is it about slobbery (?!) Tymoshenko and Zhukov? Or about the carelessness of the signaling performers ?. I remember that in the 80-e90-s in the military control bodies almost every day they worked through the passage of such cipher telegrams. For failures from the posts flew immediately. If possible, I would like to know the answers to these questions, colleague))) wink
    1. +5
      July 15 2017
      A little bit wrong: in Soviet times, there were five degrees of urgency: urgent, extraordinary, aircraft, missile danger and air (known to users from the book "In August 44-th").
      In the 41 year, there was no such thing as a degree of urgency, which in the future entered as a mandatory line on the top right of the form. Previously, such information was transmitted as official at the beginning of the encryption text.
      How is service information known to us like: "ABC I ASK TO CONFIRM THE GROUP" - have you met?)))
      A MONOLITH is the passing of a command for passing launch codes in parts of the Strategic Missile Forces with a term of 14 minutes (from the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces to the regiments) - in this you are right. About - a colleague is only one of my qualities))))
      Good luck to you!
      1. +2
        July 15 2017
        Understood thanks. Only in the Air Force, all of these categories were - "Monolith", "Air", "Rocket", "Airplane" and "Ordinary". It turns out that in 41 the urgency category simply did not exist? Sadly ... Then we can assume that the directive №1 just did not pay attention and she got into the general queue.
  21. +2
    20 September 2017
    As for the CONSTANT overestimation of the number of Wehrmacht divisions by Soviet intelligence (there were 3-5 of them at least) - this is sad, but tolerable. They could take into account as troops of any kind the NUMEROUS paramilitary "youth volunteer" formations of the Germans, also wearing uniforms, marching in formation and stationed in summer camps engaged in all kinds of MOBILIZATION work.
  22. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    For those who are interested in this topic there is a bit unpleasant news:

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  23. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: avia12005
    And this is also the reason for the defeats of 1941 ...

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  24. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: Predator
    how should the leadership of the USSR react to information about the concentration of 190-200 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies at the borders ?!

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  25. 0
    October 5 2017
    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
    1. +2
      October 5 2017
      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
      In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

      You have nothing stuck there?
  26. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    Thank you, people, that they read my opus and are interested in the military history of our Country

    Author! Everything turns out if you dig a little deeper. The Red Army was condemned to shameful and grave defeat by those conspirators who stole the 1930-mm PTO, which had already been purchased by the GRAU of the Red Army from Germany in 37, and DECIDED the adoption of a series of our "most famous" and most massive caliber 45 mm - a lousy little gun made by the most serial and wretched as an anti-tank. With a muzzle velocity of the projectile 335 m / s, and not 750, as in the more mobile and rapid-fire German! With poor armor penetration. I bring the testimony of experts on art: The new gun was adopted for service under the designation 1928 cm Pak 3,7 in 28, later the Pak 29 modification appeared, which went into mass production. It was this weapon that became the prototype of the famous Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun. Their main difference, which immediately catches the eye, were wooden wheels without suspension on the guns of the 1920s. Soviet specialists from GAU RKKA quickly showed interest in the new German anti-tank gun. They decided to purchase several guns, drawings and detailed documentation for them in order to establish the production of guns in the Soviet Union. The corresponding agreement was signed in 1930. With minor design changes, the German gun was adopted by the Red Army under the designation "37-mm anti-tank gun of the 1930 model" (1-K, GAU index 52-P-162). The ammunition of the German and Soviet guns was completely interchangeable.
  27. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: Mordvin 3
    You have nothing stuck there?

    I didn’t check arithmetic - I just quoted OUT OF OFFICIOSIS. And I will not check - for the days of loss, divide their amounts yourself. It is enough for me MINIMUM of 25000 cars, incompetently lost through fault ... Or, according to the plan-plan of whom? You still need to think about this topic, you are our arithmetic, preoccupied with my wedges. About VET the most necessary and circulation in 1941: Everything turns out if you dig a little deeper into the story. The Red Army was condemned to shameful and grave defeat by those conspirators who stole the 1930-mm PTO, which had already been purchased by the GRAU of the Red Army from Germany in 37, and DECIDED the adoption of a series of our "most famous" and most massive caliber 45 mm - a lousy little gun made by the most serial and wretched as an anti-tank. With a muzzle velocity of the projectile 335 m / s, and not 750, as in the more mobile and rapid-fire German! With poor armor penetration. I bring the testimony of experts on art: The new gun was adopted for service under the designation 1928 cm Pak 3,7 in 28, later the Pak 29 modification appeared, which went into mass production. It was this weapon that became the prototype of the famous Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun. Their main difference, which immediately catches the eye, were wooden wheels without suspension on the guns of the 1920s. Soviet specialists from GAU RKKA quickly showed interest in the new German anti-tank gun. They decided to purchase several guns, drawings and detailed documentation for them in order to establish the production of guns in the Soviet Union. The corresponding agreement was signed in 1930. With minor design changes, the German gun was adopted by the Red Army under the designation "37-mm anti-tank gun of the 1930 model" (1-K, GAU index 52-P-162). The ammunition of the German and Soviet guns was completely interchangeable.
  28. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    Ukov did not believe that there would be a war.

    The beginning of many Soviet artillery systems was laid by the development of KOSARTOP, the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments led by the outstanding scientist and artillery V. Trofimov. Created on December 17, 1918, this commission conducted research on a wide front. Over the first 6 years, the staff of the commission, not numerous in composition, but highly qualified, created more than 140 original scientific works, completed 9 scientific and 82 design works. New guns, ammunition, instruments and other artillery weapons were designed and tested here. And when in December 1927 the Artcom GAU adopted a new work program, it was based on the proposals of COSARTOP.

    Group "D" - a constructive testing group on mortars in the gas-dynamic laboratory of the Artillery Research Institute - was headed by the famous artillery engineer N. Dorovlev. Initially, the search for group "D" went in two directions: on the one hand, mortars were developed - samples of conventional rifled artillery, and on the other - mortars - smooth-bore guns with fired shells. By 1931, it became clear that the smooth-bore mortar, firing non-rotating fixed shells - mines, should be an instrument of direct support for infantry. Performing the same combat missions as the rifled mortar, the mortar was much easier, and its accuracy was higher. The relatively small recoil force during the shot allowed to abandon bulky recoil devices, and the insignificant pressure of the powder gases almost completely eliminated the height of the barrel bore. Group "D" also established the basic structural scheme of mortars - the so-called scheme of an imaginary triangle (barrel - two-legged - base plate). This scheme later became a classic for muzzle-loading mortars.

    During 1932-1934, the D group created prototypes of the 60 mm PM mortar mortar, the 82 mm BM battalion mortar, the 107 mm and 120 mm PM regimental mortars. In 1934, a 107-mm mortar was adopted, two years later, 82-mm mortar began to enter the troops.

    Sometimes they ask why our battalion mortar adopted a 82 mm caliber, not 81,4 mm, as the foreign mortars that were being developed at that time. The designer of the 82-mm mortar of the 1936 model, N. Dorovlev, substantiated the difference in calibers as follows: mines of battalion mortars of foreign armies could be used when firing from our mortars, but our mines could not be fired from foreign mortars. Since the armies of foreign armies consisted of many battalion mortars of 81,4 mm caliber, such a solution promised undoubted benefits, which, by the way, was confirmed in the battles.

    1936 - a turning point for the Soviet mortar engineering. Design teams began to turn into large creative teams. Since that time, a large role in the development of mortar weapons began to play the team, which for many years was headed by the Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes, Doctor of Technical Sciences B. Shavyrin.



    The glorified 120 mm mortar of the 1943 model of the design of the Hero of Socialist Labor B. Shavyrin: 1 - barrel; 2 - breech, 3 - two-legged carriage; 4 - base plate; 5 - hoisting mechanism, 6 - swivel mechanism, 7 - fuse against double loading

    In 1937, the team created a new model of 82-mm mortar improved design. A year later, the Red Army received the 50-mm company, 107-mm mountain-pack and 120-mm regimental mortars designed by B. Shavyrin.
  29. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: Predator
    The enemy in the first echelon, directly striking on June 22, 1941: infantry divisions - 21, cavalry divisions - 1, tank divisions - 4 (430380 personnel); tanks and self-propelled guns - 688; guns 76 mm and above - 2491; anti-aircraft guns - 1937, anti-aircraft guns - 585; mortars - 3195

    We are like “digital comparators”, and you know what a weapon is - and its quality, ammunition. For example, what are our “VET tools”? The battalion "Forty" even an armor-piercing caliber (and there were no sub-caliber) could break even the German T-2, not to mention the T-3 and T-4, only from a distance of 300 m. A T-2 of its 20 mm with a cannon and a 7,92 mm machine gun (with optics) shot it from 700 m. Our 76 mm fragmentation shells didn’t pierce its armor - but there were no armor-piercing shells at all! the industry has not mastered ... That is, regimental and division guns could catch only infantry and armored personnel carriers, but not tanks. Our mortars - look TTX 50-mm, the most numerous "company". Even if someone trained from him could hit the target, then no closer than 200 m, and no further than 800 m - and this is the distance of the lethal fire of German machine guns (200 m) and machine guns (800 m), not to mention ANY German guns, which the Germans even had in the infantry division in BULK, some VET 72 barrels with optics in the division, and easel PTR with optics in each company. There is nothing to say about their larger caliber - he simply shot our people, even without the help of tanks and aircraft, smashed where their well-trained intelligence found them.
  30. +1
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    In the 41 year, there was no such thing as a degree of urgency, which in the future entered as a mandatory line on the top right of the form. Previously, such information was transmitted as official at the beginning of the encryption text.

    State of the mechanized corps of the southwestern front
    REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE AUTO-ARMORED DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH-WEST FRONT TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN AUTO-ARMORED DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY ON THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF THE MATERIAL OF THE MECHANIZED FRAME OF JULY 15, 1941
    Ow. top secret
    Head of the Main Armored Directorate

    Red Army Lieutenant General of Tank Forces

    comrade Fedorenko

    REPORT ON THE STATE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE MATERIAL
    OF MECHANIZED BODIES OF THE SOUTH-WEST FRONT
    AS OF 15.7.41
    The 9,19th and 22nd mechanized corps are part of the 5th army and are continuously in battles east of Novograd Volynsky.
    On the basis of Directive No. ORG / 955 of 10.7.41, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, mechanized corps begin to withdraw from the front crews and commanding personnel, which do not have combat materiel, to the 10th reserve tank regiment in the Kobyzhch district.
    The presence of material in these buildings:
    9th mechanized corps - BT - 7; T-26 - 25, armored vehicles - 30.
    19th Mechanized Corps - KV - 4; T-34 - 7; T-26 - 22; armored vehicles - 2.
    22nd Mechanized Corps - BT-2; T-26 - 28; armored vehicles - 17.
    On 15.7.41, the remaining material part of the buildings passed under their own power more than 1000 km and, as a rule, did not have a single day for inspection and repair, which led to its premature failure.
    The 4th and 16th mechanized corps, which are part of the 6th Army, operate in the Berdichev area.
    The 16th Mechanized Corps on 9.7.41 was transferred to the Mazyr region, but due to the changed situation, it was detained and put into battle near Berdichev. Data on the condition of the material part of the 16th mechanized corps are being specified.
    The 4th mechanized corps, on the basis of the directive No. org / 955, began to withdraw its units to the area of ​​Priluki.
    The presence of the material part of the 4th mechanized corps: KV-6, T-34 - 39, BT-23, armored vehicles - 36.
    The material part of the 4th mechanized corps on 15.7.41 passed under its own power over 1200 km.
    The 24th Mechanized Corps, which is part of the 12th Army, acts essentially as a rifle corps, defending a site north of Letichev.
    The presence of the remaining material in the case is being specified.
    The 8th and 15th mechanized corps are withdrawn from the battlefield. The 8th mechanized corps - Nizhyn, the 15th mechanized corps - Piryatin.
    A large number of long marches in difficult terrain, under the influence of aircraft, anti-tank guns and enemy artillery, without technical inspections and the possibility of recovery for reasons of permanent withdrawal, led to a large percentage of tank losses.
    The lack of appropriate evacuation means in the corps and armies led to the fact that an exceptionally large number of tanks and armored vehicles wrecked and disabled for technical reasons were left on the battlefield and along the roads.
    Until now, the armored armored units of the armies have remained the same, which leads to the fact that these departments do not cover the control of mechanized corps and do not direct the activities of armored units in rifle corps.
    The Armored Front Command still does not have a plan for replenishing mechanized corps with material parts, and thus it is impossible to say when the allotted and withdrawn 4th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps can be put into operation.
    Based on the foregoing, I ask:
    Create evacuation facilities in corps and armies according to my proposal made in my report to you dated July 3 of this year under No. E-1/0025.
    The armored armies departments should be strengthened so that they could cover the activities of mechanized and rifle corps with their leadership.
    It is possible in the shortest possible time to launch a plan to replenish the material part of mechanized corps.
    Head of the Armored Directorate of the South-Western Front

    Major General of the Tank Forces Morgunov
  31. 0
    October 6 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    After went prodigy ...

    The cost of certain types of Soviet tanks by years
    ATTENTION! When using the materials in this table, a link to it is required!
    Wartime tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
    T-34 (Plant No. 183*) 596 373 429 256 249 256 165 810 141 822 140 996 136 380
    T-34 (Plant No. 183**) - 510 - 000 166 300 136
    T-34 (Plant No. 112) - - - 209 700 179 300
    T-34 (Plant No. 174) - - - 3 127 000 2
    T-34 (UZTM) - - - 273800 190800 179400 -
    KV-1s (ChKZ) - - - 300 200 246 000 - -
    IS-2 (ChKZ) - - - - 347 900 264
    IS-3 (CHKZ) - - - - - - 267200
    Notes:
    * - figures from the plant report
    ** - figures from the report of the People’s Commissariat
    Self-propelled artillery mounts
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1942 1943 1944 1945
    2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y
    SU-122 203 900 175 - - - -
    SU-85 - - 201 000 175 - -
    SU-100 - - - - 176 500 176
    Pre-war tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
    BT-2 (KhPZ) 93 313 - - - - - - -
    BT-5 (KhPZ) - - 66 830 - - - - - -
    BT-7 (KhPZ) - - - 91 309 96 453 95 326 104 168 101 094 -
    BT-7M (KhPZ) - - - - - - - 168 196 177 609
    The tables are compiled according to the NKTP reports in 1940-1945. (RGAE)
  32. 0
    October 6 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    It so happened that since the beginning of 2011, the author began to play WoT. At the time when loading recorded information on the distribution of tanks by nation. Before 9.05.2011, the number of Soviet vehicles in random battles was 65-80% of the total number of tanks.

    Generalized data of the 11th Army intelligence department about trophies and losses in battles against partisans

    1. 16 partisan bases were defeated.

    2. Trophies:

    75 grenade launchers
    3 easel machine guns,
    1 light machine gun
    5 machines
    736 rifles,
    7 warehouses with food,
    1 ammunition depot,
    56 ammunition boxes for grenade launchers,
    18 machine gun belts,
    2500 rounds and 23 boxes of rounds,
    124 hand grenades,
    5 German and several Romanian helmets,
    2 bags min
    3 trucks,
    4 horses
    1 broken radio station
    540 hand grenades,
    warm clothes,
    1 sanitary box
    5 German overcoats,
    German cards and canned food, vegetables, sheep, pigs.
    In addition, more weapons, ammunition and other military equipment.
    3. Destroyed:

    6 trucks
    2 cars,
    4 carts
    4 warehouses with products,
    1 radio station
    3 containers with oil,
    2 tanks with gasoline,
    16 machine guns,
    A large number of weapons, ammunition, hand grenades and other equipment.
    4. Partisans and several suspected civilians were captured - 490 people.

    5. Partisans killed: - 470 people.

    6. German losses:

    killed - 45 people.
    the wounded - 72 people.
    missing - 1 person
    A written report will be provided on 1. 12. [19] 41 g.

    Submitted by: [signature]
    November 30.11. [19] 41g.
    Accepted: [signature]
    WF-03/10432, l. 295
  33. +1
    October 18 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    For those who are interested in this topic

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  34. -2
    January 5 2018
    Quote: pp to Oparyshev
    Slimmer than Rezun theory, no one has yet proposed anything.

    Yes, he lied like a gray gelding - those who understand military affairs understand this.

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