The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. POROVO continued (part of 6)
The PribOVO leadership believes that it correctly assesses the situation on the other side of the border. According to the intelligence of the RO of the Okrug and the GS GSA, the German troops (including infantry units) are stationed not near the border. Motor-mechanized troops are also not compactly grouped near the border, but scattered throughout East Prussia. [some of them are just arriving, but intelligence has not fixed their concentration far from the border]. Airplanes are stationed far enough away from the border airfields. The German forces are not enough to attack the district troops, according to the PribOVO command. Only provocative actions of the German troops are possible.
Up to one day is required for occupying a defense of the 1st echelon. To counter the provocative actions, the command of PribOVO, under the guise of defensive work and exercises, puts forward units of individual units of the 1st echelon of cover armies to defensive positions. The withdrawal of microns to the spare areas begins. It is believed that forces mk (supported by artillery and aviation) will be enough to retaliate against the enemy units invading to provoke. Under the guise of moving to new field camps, the transfer of some units from the rear of the district begins. Probably, it is believed that at least a day before the outbreak of hostilities, reconnaissance will be able to track the movement of German troops and shock groups of motorized forces to the border.
ORDER of Commander 12 MK №0038 from 18 June 1941
“1. With the receipt of this order to bring in combat readiness all parts.
2. To bring the parts on alert in accordance with the plans for raising the alert, but the alert itself should not be announced ...
3. Replenish each unit with personnel. Immediately withdraw personnel from business trips and remove those who are in all kinds of jobs ...
4. In 23-00 18.6.41, parts of the occupy the occupied winter apartments and focus ... "
The commander of 12 mk Major General Shestopalov
NS Corps Colonel Kalinichenko "
Bringing parts into alertness without declaring a combat alarm disguises itself from vigilant “well-wishers” who are ready to report this to Moscow.
1953 year. Colonel-General PP Poluboyarov (former chief of ABTU PribOVO): “16 June in 23 hours the command of the 12-th MK received a directive to bring the compound on alert… On June 18, the corps commander picked up the units and alert units and ordered them to be taken to the planned areas. During 19 and 20 of June this was done ... 16 of June was ordered by the order of the district headquarters and 3-th, which was concentrated in the specified area at the same time. ”
Details of the movement of the units were reported daily to the NSh of the district, armies and corps. Below is one of these reports from the headquarters of the 48-th SD, making a march to the Nemakshchay area at night and morning. Probably also daily reports were received from the headquarters of the cf 1-th echelon.
1952 year. Former commander of the 8 Army, Lieutenant-General PP Sobennikov (c. 04.07.41, the commander of the NWF): "About 10-11 hours of 18 June, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to their defense sectors by the morning of 19 June ... By the end of the day, all orders for the withdrawal of troops to the border were made by me orally. During the day [19 Jun] 10, 90 and 125 sd were deployed ... in the prepared trenches and DZOTs ... On the night of June 12, parts of the 19-th micron were transferred to the Šiauliai area, and the army headquarters also arrived at the command post. No written orders to deploy troops before 20.06.41 and after 20.6 were received from the district headquarters ...
Artillery [33 and 125 sd] was actually fully deployed. The camps were part of the artillery 5 and 188 sd, corps anus 16 ck and army howitzer ap…
There was a rather peaceful mood in the district headquarters. An inspection of the Okrug arrived at the Kozlov Ruda 21.6.41 camp ... By order of the commander, F.I. Kuznetsov 22.6.41 inspector shooting for 5 and 188 units and artillery units was assigned to morning ...
Management before the war was carried out by wire communications. With the beginning of the war, the 23 of June already had the entire wired network destroyed and we switched to radio communication ... ”
1952 year. Former commander of the 11 Army, Lieutenant General Morozov: "…Based oral orders of the district commander, 11 units of the army reached the prepared line along the border. This was done under the guise of continuing field fortifications or improving them. On the border there was one regiment from each division. The regiments were reinforced by artillery, as a rule with the regiment there was one artillery division. The command posts of the divisions and regiments were deployed. At the command posts there were constantly on-duty officers ... Communication with the troops, border troops and the construction commanders of the UR was organized and operated well by the beginning of the war. As the commander, I received about the border crossing by the German fascist troops from all border outposts, from all the regimental and battalion commanders ... Only with 128 sd the connection was lost around June 11-00 22, as the division headquarters turned out to be crushed. There was no loss of communication with the corps and division commanders in the first days of the war ... ”
Major General I.I. Fadeev (former commander of 10 sd 8 army): “... 19.06.41 of the year was received from the commander of 10 sk Major General I.F. Nikolaev on bringing the division on alert. All units were immediately withdrawn to the area of defense, occupied the bunkers and artillery firing positions. With the dawn, the commanders of the regiments, battalions and companies in the terrain clarified combat missions according to a previously developed plan and brought them to the commanders of platoons and branches. In order to conceal the activities carried out at the border, normal defense works were carried out, and part of the personnel was disguised inside defensive structures, while on full alert ... "
1952 year. Colonel-General MS Shumilov (former commander of 11 ck): “... The verbal instruction through the 8 Army Communications Officer Army Corps received 17.06.41 on the occupation of 125 SD Defense, on the advancement of corps units and corps headquarters. 125 cd occupied the defense of 18.6.41, the other two divisions of the corps were on the move ... Other divisions were also ordered to nominate verbally through the communications officers of the 8 army. The corps headquarters was also informed about this through liaison officers ...
The artillery units of the corps were together with their divisions. Corps an were advanced to the state border 18.6.41. There were no artillery units in training artillery camps. The provision of ammunition and shells by the time the war began was before the 1 ammunition load, and the security of the 125 sd was higher, since its reserves were all with it ... "
Late in the evening of June 19, 1941, to the Military Councils of the 8 and 11 armies, and a new directive is being sent to the three sk.
In accordance with the new Directive, parts of border divisions should be on alert, the installation of minefields begins, indicated on the replenishment of ammunition on the defense line, the advancing units should take into account flights of German aircraft (ie, move at night). At the command posts of the army, ck and sd should be on duty commanders. This document is not signed by the DECS, but it is probably not in the VO headquarters.
At the same time, a permit is being sent to parts of the district to receive helmets and property from the NT.
Colonel-General MS Shumilov: “My cartridges and shells were issued by me ...”
Do not find anything strange in the text? “... ChVS PribOVO ... ordered the ammunition and shells to be immediately taken away ... I asked the Army 8 Headquarters for a written order to select the cartridges and remove the mines. I did not receive a response to the request either from the 8 army headquarters or from the district headquarters ... ”
The corps commander gives his order for the issuance of ammunition and the installation of minefields. The commander requests for written confirmation of the cancellation from the district headquarters or the army to the order of the superior chief (FVS VO) ... An absurd situation ... But it is possible in one case, if the corps commander was ordered to issue ammunition and start mining from the superior headquarters.
The PribOVO headquarters of 19 of June of the 8 Army's Military Council could familiarize themselves with this Directive in the morning of June of 20. On the same day, the Military Council of the Army was to transmit oral orders to the corps. June 20-th commander Shumilov gave the appropriate instruction: to issue ammunition and start mining. It is not clear just why he writes differently? We have already met with inaccuracies in memories ...
3 Special Post Office of NKO No. 4 / 37155 from 8 July 1941 “... In addition to the 36833 No. 7.07.41 of the city, we inform you that by the investigation of the NWF department of 3, the fact of giving order of Priestly Pribov Dibrova’s order regarding mine clearance of minefields and the delivery of ammunition issued to personnel in 11 ck and 125 sd before the start of military operations is confirmed ... "
Two days after the transfer of the Directive of PribOVO headquarters from 19 June, the FWS of Dibrova district does not know about it (about the arbitrariness of the leaders left without its supervision). And what was the FWS doing?
The sudden outbreak of the war took not only the troops of the western border districts unawares, but also the families of military personnel stationed in the border areas. In the first hours of the war, not only the military facilities of our troops, but also the houses of the commanders and their families were shelled and bombarded. Of course, the issue of evacuation of families of the commanders in the border units was included in the list of activities carried out during mobilization. Due to the unexpected German attack on the USSR, it was not possible to hold these events in certain areas. In the formations and units that were in the formative stage, mobilization plans were not developed. From June 18-19, individual commanders raised the question of the need to evacuate the families of the commanders from the border areas before the higher command. Some of them sent their families to the rear. The flow of people leaving has increased and by June 20 the information has come to Moscow. 20 on the second day was followed by an instruction to stop the departure of families of servicemen. Some families were even removed from the trains ...
Special message 3-th Office of NGOs from 8.07.41 №4 / 37155 “... The command of the 11 sk and 125 cd PribOVO, on their own initiative, began preparations for the evacuation of families. The arrived 21 of June 1941 of the year in the corps of the FWS of Dibrova ordered: “to stop the panic ... to stop the preparation for the evacuation of the families of the officers”. On the same day, the ChVS of the 8 Army S. Shabalov telegram confirmed Dibrov’s order to stop preparations for the evacuation. As a result, at the time of the onset of the enemy, the families of the commanders had to be taken out during the battle, while a significant part of the families died ...
Later, Dibrova himself explained his orders by saying that the evacuation of the families of the commanders was prohibited by the People's Commissar of Defense by order of June 20.
There were no instructions from Moscow to evacuate the families, and the commander of the district with the NSH withdrew from the activities related to the ban on departure. In such a situation, the CHVS could become a “signaling device” about the panic situation in the district (as he probably thought). The ban on the departure of the people's commissar of families once again confirms that the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect a war in the coming days.
After specifying from Moscow to the recyclable Directive No. XXUMX, PribOVO headquarters introduced a separate item: “5. The families of the commanding personnel of 10, 125, 33 and 128 units are transported to the rear only when the border is crossed by large enemy forces ... ” The leadership of the district was afraid to already ignore the orders of Tymoshenko and Zhukov - for this were their reasons.
Let's look at an excerpt from the combat magazine of the 8 Army.
It turns out that the leadership of the NPO is a sin for the death of the wives and children of servicemen of the border garrisons - the most expensive that the servicemen who defended the Motherland had. This once again shows that Moscow did not expect a full-scale war ...
On the night from 19 to 20, June, the former PribOVO commander was arrested (until July 1940 - Deputy Defense Commissar for the Air Force) A.D. Loktionov. This was the “last bell” for Petr Semenovich Klenov and the “first bell” for F.I. Kuznetsova. P.S. Maples could now expect arrest - not many people were not broken by the NKVD ...
According to the testimony of the investigators who tortured A.D. Loktionova: “... No one could split it. The Kursk Nightingale was inflexible. Despite the sophistication of torture, he did not admit guilt. The executioners passed the general from hand to hand, but did not succeed ... The General shouted in pain, rolled on the floor, but did not agree to sign the protocol. They beat him until they were tired ... ” A man of strong character, no one from the leadership of PribOVO “dragged” behind him. Shot Rehabilitated in 1955 year. Kingdom of Heaven, Good Man ...
The preparation of the advance units for military operations with the German troops continued (again under the guise of exercises, hiding the true cause from their own) and the movement of individual units closer to the state border was carried out.
«Commander 128 sd, Commander 374 cn, Commander of the Howitzer Regiment
By the morning of 21.6, take the following defense position:
1. One division of the howitzer ap put on a position in the area of height 147,9 (south-west. Kalvariya). The task is to support the 128 battalions in the event of an enemy attack.
2. Bring the battalion 374 cn to the area of the Zelenka grove.
The end of classes is only on my instructions.
Army Commander 11, Lieutenant-General Morozov
FSW Brigadier Commissioner Zuev
NSh army Major General Shlemin "
In connection with the concentration of large German forces on the state border, the movement of district troops began to increase the grouping of the 1 th echelon of the covering armies.
FOLDER #01 22-00 21.6.41
1) PribOVO units and formations at the points of permanent deployment are engaged in combat and political training, putting forward separate units and units for observation at the state border. At the same time, individual connections are being relocated to new areas.
2) Parts of the 8 Army to the 17-00 21.6.41 occupy the position:
a) 10 sk (headquarters headquarters - 5 km north-west of Varniai):
10-I SD (division headquarters - Kulej) occupies the area of Palanga, Shveksna, Kulej;
90-str (division headquarters - forest 5 km northeast of Silale) occupies Kvedarna, Pagramantis, Kaltinenai areas. Three battalions advanced to the line Meshkin and Zhigaytz for observation;
b) 11-th sk (corps headquarters - forest 2 km south-west of Skoudvil): 125-sd (division headquarters - 5 km south-west of Batakiai), pushing separate units to the line Aukstupupe, Pures for observation occupies the area (claim ) Pamarmantis, Taurage, Le Havre, Scaudvile;
c) The 48-I division, continuing the march to the Nemakshchay area, until 22-00 21.6.41 - on vacation in the forest 10 km south of Šiauliai, with the onset of darkness the march continues;
d) 11-th SD, from the Narva region by rail, from the morning of 21.6.41, began to concentrate in the Radvilnshkis, Beysagol, Seduva region;
e) management of 65 sk, having the task of arriving by rail to Keblei district (10 km north of Siauliai), and 16-I SD - to the area south of Prena (on the east bank of the Neman river) due to the lack of cars for loading proceeded;
c) 12-th mk (corps headquarters - Nayse town city - 12 km northeast Siauliai) by the end of 21.6.41 occupies the position:
23-td (division headquarters 1 km north of Nerimdaychay) - in the area of Seda, Trishkiai, Tirkshlyay;
28-th TD (division headquarters - 3 km west of Meshkuychay) - in the Grudziai district, (claim) Siauliai, Meshkuychay;
202-md by noon 21.6.41 concentrated in the Kelme region;
g) The 9 th artillery brigade of anti-tank defense (brigade headquarters - 1 km southeast of Uzhzentis) - in the area of Varniai, Krazhey, Kelme, Uzhzhentis;
h) The high power 402 howitzer ap continues to be concentrated by rail to the area of the Uzhpelkaya station;
i) army headquarters - in the forest 15 km southwest of Šiauliai.
3) Parts of the 11 Army for 17.00 21.6.41 occupy the position:
16 st (corps headquarters - forest 7 km south-west of the station Kozlova Ruda):
5-I SD (division headquarters - Lukše) - in the Yurovsky camp; its three battalions at the Gile line (10 km south of Yurburg), Dobishki, Penshki;
33-I SD (division headquarters - 5 km south-west of Pilvishki) - in the area Vilkaviskis, Mariampol; has three battalions at the turn (claim) Nahamiestis, Boblavka;
188-I (division headquarters - 14 grove km south of Vilkaviskis) - in the Yurov camp; has three battalions at the turn of Virbalis, Vishtynets;
128-I (division headquarters - forest 5 km west of Sarae) occupies Lozdzee, Sarae, Simno area;
b) On the night of 23, the 22.6.41-th SDR protrudes from the Pagliizhiai region (20 km south-west of Ukmerge) to the Andrushkantsi area for further movement to the forest area south and south-east of Kaunas;
c) On the night of 126, the 22.6.41-th SD station protrudes from яnehmoriai and follows to the forest area of Prena;
d) management of the 29 st, 184 st and 429 howitzer ap RGC - in the Oran camp; 179-I am in the ьwienczyń camp;
2-th TD - in the camp 5 km southeast of Jonava;
84-md - in the Kaišiadorys region;
5-I td in the area of Alytus on the east bank of the river Neman
10-I anti-tank artillery brigade - in the area of Kozlovarudskiy forests;
g) Army Headquarters - Fort No. 6 Kaunas.
4) The 27-I army (22-i st, 67-i sd and 3-i separate rifle brigade) occupies points of permanent dislocation.
24 st: control, hull parts and 181-I SD - in the camps in the area Gulbene;
183-str - on the march to the Riga camp. Before the onset of darkness 21.6.41, in the area of Zoseny, Sobari (50 km west of Gulbene). Army headquarters - Riga.
NSH Lt. Gen. P. Maples
Deputy Head of the Operations Division of the District Headquarters Colonel S. Kinosyan
Under the pretext of transferring to the Riga camp, the 183-I division was being deployed, which was to concentrate in the 8-army zone from 8 to 13-th mobilization day. Mobilization has not yet been announced, and the division is already marching. For the 8 th army begins to concentrate 402 th howitzer ap high power.
On the night of June 22, the 23 and 126 sd units begin to be deployed, which should concentrate in the 11 Army zone from 2 to 4 mobilization day.
Closer to the border, the transfer of 11 sd began (earlier at the beginning of the war, it had to be placed at the disposal of the Leningrad IN). Due to the lack of wagons, the transportation of parts of the 65 sk and 16-th SD (not previously planned to protect the Baltic Sea) was not started.
The district with the consent of the General Staff carries out the transfer of troops, but not intensive. Five divisions (179, 181, 182, 183 and 184) remain in the camps along with the controls and units of 22, 24 and 29 sk.
Waiting for future military action, the district headquarters attended to reducing the consumption of cipher and coding tables in peacetime. The headquarters are well aware that during hostilities, the consumption of these documents will increase many times, and their number is limited.
Since the leaders of the spacecraft before 22 June 1941, did not encounter the massive use of enemy aircraft against the Soviet troops, they had a wrong idea about the air defense of ground forces during a massive use of aircraft. For example, in the report of G.K. Zhukov at a meeting of the High Command in December 1940 of the year said: “... To cover the anti-aircraft artillery of the strike and mobile groups of the army with fire, you need to cover the area along the front in 30 km and in depth 30 km - 900 sq. Km. One ass can cover 160 sq. Km with fire, and 900 ass will need to cover 6 sq. Km ... ”We see rather high estimates of the capabilities of the troop defense. It is unlikely that by June 22 the opinion of the troops ’air defense of the Chief of the General Staff could have changed fundamentally.
By the beginning of hostilities in the territory of PribOVO, there were up to 70 airfields: 21 - permanent and 49 operational. 23-x of them carried out construction work. In the Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 from 19.06.41 and No. 0043 from 20.06.41 there is not even a mention of the dispersal (deployment) of aviation on field airfields and sites. Naturally, in the plans of the Air Force of the districts such options for basing aviation are not envisaged. Especially with an increase in repression against the leaders of the KA Air Force.
In accordance with the Directive of the PribOVO headquarters of 18 June, an order was issued to the commander of the Air Force of the District A.P. Ionova about relocation, dispersal and camouflage of aircraft. Based on this order, squadrons of some air regiments were redeployed to operational airfields.
From the operational report No. 02 of the PribOVO Air Force Headquarters, it is clear that in each regiment one squadron is in combat readiness No. XXUMX (as well as the PribOVO air defense units in readiness No. XXUMX).
Below are the permanent airfields, on which the PribOVO air force regiments were based in May 1941. In parentheses are the airfields based on the same regiments to 22.06.41 (permanent and operational, to which some regiments flew over).
4 garden. 35 bap - Tartu (Tartu, Võhma); 50 BAP - Ungri; 63 BAP - Tallinn (Tallinn, Kuusiku); 38 iap - Tartu (Tartu, Tallinn).
6 garden. 31 bap - Weinode (Weinode, Plato); 40 Bap - Vindava (Vindava, Plato); 148 iap - Libava; 21 iap - Riga. The regiment was intended for use in air defense; 239 iap - Ezer. He was in the formation stage and had no planes.
7 garden. 9 Bap - Panevezys; 46 Bap - Shavli (Shavli, Grujcayi); 10 iap - Shavli (Shavli, Nemakshay); 238 iap - Panevezys; 241 cap - Mitawa.
8 garden. 15 iap - Kovno (Alytus, Potsunai, Venchai); 31 iap - Kovno (Kovno, Karmelava); 61 cap - Kaydans (Kaydans, Makstava); 240 iap - Rossiens. Was in the formative stage had 13 aircraft; 236 iap - Alytus.
57 garden. 54 bap - Vilna (Vilna, Kivishki, Kryzhany); 42 iap - Vilna (Vilna, Oran, Pernoy); 49 iap - Dvinsk (Dvinsk, Liksna); 237 iap - Orana. Was in the formative stage.
312 rap - Riga. Was in the formative stage. 23.06.41 will transfer its aircraft (6 SAT and 6 P-5) to 46 bap and depart for re-formation
In the near future, as the military operations with German troops imagined, the command of PribOVO and the commander of the Air Force prepared for them ...
Echoes of events from the neighbors (in the PribOVO aviation unit) reached the Commander of the Air Force I. Kobts ZOVOVO.
Only Moscow pushed the rejection of combat readiness, and Colonel Tarasenko was forced to give oral instructions to cancel the events ...
To be continued
Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.