The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. POROVO continued (part of 6)

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The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. POROVO continued (part of 6)


The PribOVO leadership believes that it correctly assesses the situation on the other side of the border. According to the intelligence of the RO of the Okrug and the GS GSA, the German troops (including infantry units) are stationed not near the border. Motor-mechanized troops are also not compactly grouped near the border, but scattered throughout East Prussia. [some of them are just arriving, but intelligence has not fixed their concentration far from the border]. Airplanes are stationed far enough away from the border airfields. The German forces are not enough to attack the district troops, according to the PribOVO command. Only provocative actions of the German troops are possible.



Up to one day is required for occupying a defense of the 1st echelon. To counter the provocative actions, the command of PribOVO, under the guise of defensive work and exercises, puts forward units of individual units of the 1st echelon of cover armies to defensive positions. The withdrawal of microns to the spare areas begins. It is believed that forces mk (supported by artillery and aviation) will be enough to retaliate against the enemy units invading to provoke. Under the guise of moving to new field camps, the transfer of some units from the rear of the district begins. Probably, it is believed that at least a day before the outbreak of hostilities, reconnaissance will be able to track the movement of German troops and shock groups of motorized forces to the border.

ORDER of Commander 12 MK №0038 from 18 June 1941

“1. With the receipt of this order to bring in combat readiness all parts.

2. To bring the parts on alert in accordance with the plans for raising the alert, but the alert itself should not be announced ...

3. Replenish each unit with personnel. Immediately withdraw personnel from business trips and remove those who are in all kinds of jobs ...

4. In 23-00 18.6.41, parts of the occupy the occupied winter apartments and focus ... "

The commander of 12 mk Major General Shestopalov
NS Corps Colonel Kalinichenko "


Bringing parts into alertness without declaring a combat alarm disguises itself from vigilant “well-wishers” who are ready to report this to Moscow.

1953 year. Colonel-General PP Poluboyarov (former chief of ABTU PribOVO): “16 June in 23 hours the command of the 12-th MK received a directive to bring the compound on alert… On June 18, the corps commander picked up the units and alert units and ordered them to be taken to the planned areas. During 19 and 20 of June this was done ... 16 of June was ordered by the order of the district headquarters and 3-th, which was concentrated in the specified area at the same time. ”

Details of the movement of the units were reported daily to the NSh of the district, armies and corps. Below is one of these reports from the headquarters of the 48-th SD, making a march to the Nemakshchay area at night and morning. Probably also daily reports were received from the headquarters of the cf 1-th echelon.



1952 year. Former commander of the 8 Army, Lieutenant-General PP Sobennikov (c. 04.07.41, the commander of the NWF): "About 10-11 hours of 18 June, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to their defense sectors by the morning of 19 June ... By the end of the day, all orders for the withdrawal of troops to the border were made by me orally. During the day [19 Jun] 10, 90 and 125 sd were deployed ... in the prepared trenches and DZOTs ... On the night of June 12, parts of the 19-th micron were transferred to the Šiauliai area, and the army headquarters also arrived at the command post. No written orders to deploy troops before 20.06.41 and after 20.6 were received from the district headquarters ...

Artillery
[33 and 125 sd] was actually fully deployed. The camps were part of the artillery 5 and 188 sd, corps anus 16 ck and army howitzer ap…

There was a rather peaceful mood in the district headquarters. An inspection of the Okrug arrived at the Kozlov Ruda 21.6.41 camp ... By order of the commander, F.I. Kuznetsov 22.6.41 inspector shooting for 5 and 188 units and artillery units was assigned to morning ...

Management before the war was carried out by wire communications. With the beginning of the war, the 23 of June already had the entire wired network destroyed and we switched to radio communication ... ”


1952 year. Former commander of the 11 Army, Lieutenant General Morozov: "…Based oral orders of the district commander, 11 units of the army reached the prepared line along the border. This was done under the guise of continuing field fortifications or improving them. On the border there was one regiment from each division. The regiments were reinforced by artillery, as a rule with the regiment there was one artillery division. The command posts of the divisions and regiments were deployed. At the command posts there were constantly on-duty officers ... Communication with the troops, border troops and the construction commanders of the UR was organized and operated well by the beginning of the war. As the commander, I received about the border crossing by the German fascist troops from all border outposts, from all the regimental and battalion commanders ... Only with 128 sd the connection was lost around June 11-00 22, as the division headquarters turned out to be crushed. There was no loss of communication with the corps and division commanders in the first days of the war ... ”

Major General I.I. Fadeev (former commander of 10 sd 8 army): “... 19.06.41 of the year was received from the commander of 10 sk Major General I.F. Nikolaev on bringing the division on alert. All units were immediately withdrawn to the area of ​​defense, occupied the bunkers and artillery firing positions. With the dawn, the commanders of the regiments, battalions and companies in the terrain clarified combat missions according to a previously developed plan and brought them to the commanders of platoons and branches. In order to conceal the activities carried out at the border, normal defense works were carried out, and part of the personnel was disguised inside defensive structures, while on full alert ... "

1952 year. Colonel-General MS Shumilov (former commander of 11 ck): “... The verbal instruction through the 8 Army Communications Officer Army Corps received 17.06.41 on the occupation of 125 SD Defense, on the advancement of corps units and corps headquarters. 125 cd occupied the defense of 18.6.41, the other two divisions of the corps were on the move ... Other divisions were also ordered to nominate verbally through the communications officers of the 8 army. The corps headquarters was also informed about this through liaison officers ...

The artillery units of the corps were together with their divisions. Corps an were advanced to the state border 18.6.41. There were no artillery units in training artillery camps. The provision of ammunition and shells by the time the war began was before the 1 ammunition load, and the security of the 125 sd was higher, since its reserves were all with it ... "


Late in the evening of June 19, 1941, to the Military Councils of the 8 and 11 armies, and a new directive is being sent to the three sk.





In accordance with the new Directive, parts of border divisions should be on alert, the installation of minefields begins, indicated on the replenishment of ammunition on the defense line, the advancing units should take into account flights of German aircraft (ie, move at night). At the command posts of the army, ck and sd should be on duty commanders. This document is not signed by the DECS, but it is probably not in the VO headquarters.

At the same time, a permit is being sent to parts of the district to receive helmets and property from the NT.



Colonel-General MS Shumilov: “My cartridges and shells were issued by me ...”



Do not find anything strange in the text? “... ChVS PribOVO ... ordered the ammunition and shells to be immediately taken away ... I asked the Army 8 Headquarters for a written order to select the cartridges and remove the mines. I did not receive a response to the request either from the 8 army headquarters or from the district headquarters ... ”

The corps commander gives his order for the issuance of ammunition and the installation of minefields. The commander requests for written confirmation of the cancellation from the district headquarters or the army to the order of the superior chief (FVS VO) ... An absurd situation ... But it is possible in one case, if the corps commander was ordered to issue ammunition and start mining from the superior headquarters.

The PribOVO headquarters of 19 of June of the 8 Army's Military Council could familiarize themselves with this Directive in the morning of June of 20. On the same day, the Military Council of the Army was to transmit oral orders to the corps. June 20-th commander Shumilov gave the appropriate instruction: to issue ammunition and start mining. It is not clear just why he writes differently? We have already met with inaccuracies in memories ...

3 Special Post Office of NKO No. 4 / 37155 from 8 July 1941 “... In addition to the 36833 No. 7.07.41 of the city, we inform you that by the investigation of the NWF department of 3, the fact of giving order of Priestly Pribov Dibrova’s order regarding mine clearance of minefields and the delivery of ammunition issued to personnel in 11 ck and 125 sd before the start of military operations is confirmed ... "

Two days after the transfer of the Directive of PribOVO headquarters from 19 June, the FWS of Dibrova district does not know about it (about the arbitrariness of the leaders left without its supervision). And what was the FWS doing?

The sudden outbreak of the war took not only the troops of the western border districts unawares, but also the families of military personnel stationed in the border areas. In the first hours of the war, not only the military facilities of our troops, but also the houses of the commanders and their families were shelled and bombarded. Of course, the issue of evacuation of families of the commanders in the border units was included in the list of activities carried out during mobilization. Due to the unexpected German attack on the USSR, it was not possible to hold these events in certain areas. In the formations and units that were in the formative stage, mobilization plans were not developed. From June 18-19, individual commanders raised the question of the need to evacuate the families of the commanders from the border areas before the higher command. Some of them sent their families to the rear. The flow of people leaving has increased and by June 20 the information has come to Moscow. 20 on the second day was followed by an instruction to stop the departure of families of servicemen. Some families were even removed from the trains ...

Special message 3-th Office of NGOs from 8.07.41 №4 / 37155 “... The command of the 11 sk and 125 cd PribOVO, on their own initiative, began preparations for the evacuation of families. The arrived 21 of June 1941 of the year in the corps of the FWS of Dibrova ordered: “to stop the panic ... to stop the preparation for the evacuation of the families of the officers”. On the same day, the ChVS of the 8 Army S. Shabalov telegram confirmed Dibrov’s order to stop preparations for the evacuation. As a result, at the time of the onset of the enemy, the families of the commanders had to be taken out during the battle, while a significant part of the families died ...

Later, Dibrova himself explained his orders by saying that the evacuation of the families of the commanders was prohibited by the People's Commissar of Defense by order of June 20.

There were no instructions from Moscow to evacuate the families, and the commander of the district with the NSH withdrew from the activities related to the ban on departure. In such a situation, the CHVS could become a “signaling device” about the panic situation in the district (as he probably thought). The ban on the departure of the people's commissar of families once again confirms that the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect a war in the coming days.

After specifying from Moscow to the recyclable Directive No. XXUMX, PribOVO headquarters introduced a separate item: “5. The families of the commanding personnel of 10, 125, 33 and 128 units are transported to the rear only when the border is crossed by large enemy forces ... ” The leadership of the district was afraid to already ignore the orders of Tymoshenko and Zhukov - for this were their reasons.

Let's look at an excerpt from the combat magazine of the 8 Army.



It turns out that the leadership of the NPO is a sin for the death of the wives and children of servicemen of the border garrisons - the most expensive that the servicemen who defended the Motherland had. This once again shows that Moscow did not expect a full-scale war ...

On the night from 19 to 20, June, the former PribOVO commander was arrested (until July 1940 - Deputy Defense Commissar for the Air Force) A.D. Loktionov. This was the “last bell” for Petr Semenovich Klenov and the “first bell” for F.I. Kuznetsova. P.S. Maples could now expect arrest - not many people were not broken by the NKVD ...

According to the testimony of the investigators who tortured A.D. Loktionova: “... No one could split it. The Kursk Nightingale was inflexible. Despite the sophistication of torture, he did not admit guilt. The executioners passed the general from hand to hand, but did not succeed ... The General shouted in pain, rolled on the floor, but did not agree to sign the protocol. They beat him until they were tired ... ” A man of strong character, no one from the leadership of PribOVO “dragged” behind him. Shot Rehabilitated in 1955 year. Kingdom of Heaven, Good Man ...



The preparation of the advance units for military operations with the German troops continued (again under the guise of exercises, hiding the true cause from their own) and the movement of individual units closer to the state border was carried out.

«Commander 128 sd, Commander 374 cn, Commander of the Howitzer Regiment

By the morning of 21.6, take the following defense position:

1. One division of the howitzer ap put on a position in the area of ​​height 147,9 (south-west. Kalvariya). The task is to support the 128 battalions in the event of an enemy attack.

2. Bring the battalion 374 cn to the area of ​​the Zelenka grove.

The end of classes is only on my instructions.

Army Commander 11, Lieutenant-General Morozov
FSW Brigadier Commissioner Zuev
NSh army Major General Shlemin "


In connection with the concentration of large German forces on the state border, the movement of district troops began to increase the grouping of the 1 th echelon of the covering armies.

FOLDER #01 22-00 21.6.41

1) PribOVO units and formations at the points of permanent deployment are engaged in combat and political training, putting forward separate units and units for observation at the state border. At the same time, individual connections are being relocated to new areas.

2) Parts of the 8 Army to the 17-00 21.6.41 occupy the position:

a) 10 sk (headquarters headquarters - 5 km north-west of Varniai):
10-I SD (division headquarters - Kulej) occupies the area of ​​Palanga, Shveksna, Kulej;
90-str (division headquarters - forest 5 km northeast of Silale) occupies Kvedarna, Pagramantis, Kaltinenai areas. Three battalions advanced to the line Meshkin and Zhigaytz for observation;

b) 11-th sk (corps headquarters - forest 2 km south-west of Skoudvil): 125-sd (division headquarters - 5 km south-west of Batakiai), pushing separate units to the line Aukstupupe, Pures for observation occupies the area (claim ) Pamarmantis, Taurage, Le Havre, Scaudvile;

c) The 48-I division, continuing the march to the Nemakshchay area, until 22-00 21.6.41 - on vacation in the forest 10 km south of Šiauliai, with the onset of darkness the march continues;

d) 11-th SD, from the Narva region by rail, from the morning of 21.6.41, began to concentrate in the Radvilnshkis, Beysagol, Seduva region;

e) management of 65 sk, having the task of arriving by rail to Keblei district (10 km north of Siauliai), and 16-I SD - to the area south of Prena (on the east bank of the Neman river) due to the lack of cars for loading proceeded;

c) 12-th mk (corps headquarters - Nayse town city - 12 km northeast Siauliai) by the end of 21.6.41 occupies the position:
23-td (division headquarters 1 km north of Nerimdaychay) - in the area of ​​Seda, Trishkiai, Tirkshlyay;
28-th TD (division headquarters - 3 km west of Meshkuychay) - in the Grudziai district, (claim) Siauliai, Meshkuychay;
202-md by noon 21.6.41 concentrated in the Kelme region;

g) The 9 th artillery brigade of anti-tank defense (brigade headquarters - 1 km southeast of Uzhzentis) - in the area of ​​Varniai, Krazhey, Kelme, Uzhzhentis;

h) The high power 402 howitzer ap continues to be concentrated by rail to the area of ​​the Uzhpelkaya station;

i) army headquarters - in the forest 15 km southwest of Šiauliai.

3) Parts of the 11 Army for 17.00 21.6.41 occupy the position:
16 st (corps headquarters - forest 7 km south-west of the station Kozlova Ruda):
5-I SD (division headquarters - Lukše) - in the Yurovsky camp; its three battalions at the Gile line (10 km south of Yurburg), Dobishki, Penshki;
33-I SD (division headquarters - 5 km south-west of Pilvishki) - in the area Vilkaviskis, Mariampol; has three battalions at the turn (claim) Nahamiestis, Boblavka;
188-I (division headquarters - 14 grove km south of Vilkaviskis) - in the Yurov camp; has three battalions at the turn of Virbalis, Vishtynets;
128-I (division headquarters - forest 5 km west of Sarae) occupies Lozdzee, Sarae, Simno area;

b) On the night of 23, the 22.6.41-th SDR protrudes from the Pagliizhiai region (20 km south-west of Ukmerge) to the Andrushkantsi area for further movement to the forest area south and south-east of Kaunas;

c) On the night of 126, the 22.6.41-th SD station protrudes from яnehmoriai and follows to the forest area of ​​Prena;

d) management of the 29 st, 184 st and 429 howitzer ap RGC - in the Oran camp; 179-I am in the ьwienczyń camp;
2-th TD - in the camp 5 km southeast of Jonava;
84-md - in the Kaišiadorys region;
5-I td in the area of ​​Alytus on the east bank of the river Neman
10-I anti-tank artillery brigade - in the area of ​​Kozlovarudskiy forests;

g) Army Headquarters - Fort No. 6 Kaunas.

4) The 27-I army (22-i st, 67-i sd and 3-i separate rifle brigade) occupies points of permanent dislocation.
24 st: control, hull parts and 181-I SD - in the camps in the area Gulbene;
183-str - on the march to the Riga camp. Before the onset of darkness 21.6.41, in the area of ​​Zoseny, Sobari (50 km west of Gulbene). Army headquarters - Riga.

NSH Lt. Gen. P. Maples
Deputy Head of the Operations Division of the District Headquarters Colonel S. Kinosyan


Under the pretext of transferring to the Riga camp, the 183-I division was being deployed, which was to concentrate in the 8-army zone from 8 to 13-th mobilization day. Mobilization has not yet been announced, and the division is already marching. For the 8 th army begins to concentrate 402 th howitzer ap high power.

On the night of June 22, the 23 and 126 sd units begin to be deployed, which should concentrate in the 11 Army zone from 2 to 4 mobilization day.

Closer to the border, the transfer of 11 sd began (earlier at the beginning of the war, it had to be placed at the disposal of the Leningrad IN). Due to the lack of wagons, the transportation of parts of the 65 sk and 16-th SD (not previously planned to protect the Baltic Sea) was not started.

The district with the consent of the General Staff carries out the transfer of troops, but not intensive. Five divisions (179, 181, 182, 183 and 184) remain in the camps along with the controls and units of 22, 24 and 29 sk.

Waiting for future military action, the district headquarters attended to reducing the consumption of cipher and coding tables in peacetime. The headquarters are well aware that during hostilities, the consumption of these documents will increase many times, and their number is limited.



Since the leaders of the spacecraft before 22 June 1941, did not encounter the massive use of enemy aircraft against the Soviet troops, they had a wrong idea about the air defense of ground forces during a massive use of aircraft. For example, in the report of G.K. Zhukov at a meeting of the High Command in December 1940 of the year said: “... To cover the anti-aircraft artillery of the strike and mobile groups of the army with fire, you need to cover the area along the front in 30 km and in depth 30 km - 900 sq. Km. One ass can cover 160 sq. Km with fire, and 900 ass will need to cover 6 sq. Km ... ”We see rather high estimates of the capabilities of the troop defense. It is unlikely that by June 22 the opinion of the troops ’air defense of the Chief of the General Staff could have changed fundamentally.

By the beginning of hostilities in the territory of PribOVO, there were up to 70 airfields: 21 - permanent and 49 operational. 23-x of them carried out construction work. In the Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 from 19.06.41 and No. 0043 from 20.06.41 there is not even a mention of the dispersal (deployment) of aviation on field airfields and sites. Naturally, in the plans of the Air Force of the districts such options for basing aviation are not envisaged. Especially with an increase in repression against the leaders of the KA Air Force.

In accordance with the Directive of the PribOVO headquarters of 18 June, an order was issued to the commander of the Air Force of the District A.P. Ionova about relocation, dispersal and camouflage of aircraft. Based on this order, squadrons of some air regiments were redeployed to operational airfields.







From the operational report No. 02 of the PribOVO Air Force Headquarters, it is clear that in each regiment one squadron is in combat readiness No. XXUMX (as well as the PribOVO air defense units in readiness No. XXUMX).

Below are the permanent airfields, on which the PribOVO air force regiments were based in May 1941. In parentheses are the airfields based on the same regiments to 22.06.41 (permanent and operational, to which some regiments flew over).

4 garden. 35 bap - Tartu (Tartu, Võhma); 50 BAP - Ungri; 63 BAP - Tallinn (Tallinn, Kuusiku); 38 iap - Tartu (Tartu, Tallinn).

6 garden. 31 bap - Weinode (Weinode, Plato); 40 Bap - Vindava (Vindava, Plato); 148 iap - Libava; 21 iap - Riga. The regiment was intended for use in air defense; 239 iap - Ezer. He was in the formation stage and had no planes.

7 garden. 9 Bap - Panevezys; 46 Bap - Shavli (Shavli, Grujcayi); 10 iap - Shavli (Shavli, Nemakshay); 238 iap - Panevezys; 241 cap - Mitawa.

8 garden. 15 iap - Kovno (Alytus, Potsunai, Venchai); 31 iap - Kovno (Kovno, Karmelava); 61 cap - Kaydans (Kaydans, Makstava); 240 iap - Rossiens. Was in the formative stage had 13 aircraft; 236 iap - Alytus.

57 garden. 54 bap - Vilna (Vilna, Kivishki, Kryzhany); 42 iap - Vilna (Vilna, Oran, Pernoy); 49 iap - Dvinsk (Dvinsk, Liksna); 237 iap - Orana. Was in the formative stage.

312 rap - Riga. Was in the formative stage. 23.06.41 will transfer its aircraft (6 SAT and 6 P-5) to 46 bap and depart for re-formation

In the near future, as the military operations with German troops imagined, the command of PribOVO and the commander of the Air Force prepared for them ...

Echoes of events from the neighbors (in the PribOVO aviation unit) reached the Commander of the Air Force I. Kobts ZOVOVO.



Only Moscow pushed the rejection of combat readiness, and Colonel Tarasenko was forced to give oral instructions to cancel the events ...

To be continued
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  1. +23
    19 September 2017
    there is something to think about ...
    1. 0
      November 25, 2018
      In the documents of the headquarters of the 8th air division, the report of the commander of the 86th air base (it was she who served the airfield in Alytus), Lieutenant Colonel Morozov was found (TsAMO, f. 200045, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 19-21). "... In the period from about 14 to 16 hours on 22.6.41 from the command post they observed the movement of a column of tanks in the direction of Alytus. without hindrance across the bridge, entered the town of the motorized regiment, into the rear of the left flank of the airbase and the airfield. There was no communication with the units. At 3:30 (as the text obviously means 15-30, that is, "half past four in the evening" - MS) June 22, having received a report from the soldiers of construction battalion No. 181, who were fleeing from machine-gun fire, as well as from the sergeant of the Belousov base, that enemy tanks appeared in the town of the motorized rifle regiment [5th Panzer Division], immediately proceeded to evacuation of vehicles, ammunition and classified documents. The GAZ-AA car, on which the wounded were sent to the Medical Battalion No. 5, went missing. The GAZ-AA car was set on fire by the tank fire at the moment of leaving the encirclement at the Alytus-Kaunas road intersection enemy. On this machine, 59.280 cartridges of various systems exploded and burned. In Kaunas, the base was concentrated at 19-00 22.6.41 ...

      The personnel are available as of 28.6.41.

      - average command staff 15, missing 19

      - junior command personnel 13, missing 13

      - rank and file 38, 210 missing

      Killed - 1, wounded - 3 "From other sources it is known that the tanks of the 5th TD on the eve of 22.6.41. Were delivered to 2 outposts at 2 bridges in Alytus on the eastern, high bank of the Neman. The bridges were mined, but the wires to The charges were cut by local spies-Nazis. On these bridges from the border troops of the 126th division and border guards were supposed to withdraw from the border, but they were surrounded by the Germans already at 9.00 22.6., About which they managed to report. 3 air raids were made on Alytus in the morning, the city was on fire By 13.30 German tank columns 7th TD and 20th TD approached Alytus and launched reconnaissance in the western part of the city and across the bridges.Our tank ambushes missed the reconnaissance of the Germans on motorcycles (destroyed in the depth of the defense 4-5 km from the bridges from ambushes of the 2nd lines), and on the tank companies that had crossed, they opened devastating fire, burned 12 tanks, including 4 "heavy" T-4s. The Germans then buried about 100 l / s in those places. Until 23.00 22.6. (until dark) 5 TD held positions on the eastern bank of the Nemunas, preventing the crossing of bridges, etc. hiding an organized withdrawal of its troops, and retreated on orders to Kaunas, leaving and "finishing off" its damaged equipment on the battlefield and along the way, in view of the need to accelerate the movement and lack of fuel for towing. It is also known that 7 TD Germans lost a third of their tanks in the first month of fighting in the USSR.
  2. +29
    19 September 2017
    Author do not worry
    There are people who read with interesting.
    My grandfather died in the offensive of the Baltic on June 23.
    War is bad, repression is bad.
    1. +13
      19 September 2017
      Quote: RuSFr
      War is bad, repression is bad.

      And you know that on this site a huge number of ignoramuses who believe that there was no repression! And if there were, then in the right amount and everything needed. Give them a machine gun, so they would shoot around the clock without trial. Himself was shocked by such a discovery. I naively believed that time had inspired the mind. But no ... there wasn’t enough reason for everyone ...
      1. +11
        20 September 2017
        Yes, I noticed.
        I find it strange .....
        I foreigner know this, why did the Russians forget?
        When contemporaries write their story
        youth and future generations suffer.
        1. +8
          20 September 2017
          Quote: RuSFr
          When contemporaries write history their youth and future generations suffer.

          Do not confuse history with stories. Stories are written by everyone who is not lazy. History is investigated according to documents. This consequence is necessary so that future generations can become wiser. In the meantime, history teaches us that it does not teach anything.
      2. +9
        20 September 2017
        This is true. And how many more degenerates who, wringing their hands, moan about the tormented hundred men?
        Truth is always in the middle. This is our story with you.

        And wishes to the author: Could you insert links to the previous parts? Or is this not possible in the format of VO publications?
  3. +18
    19 September 2017
    It’s a pity that it is published with long breaks, bookmarked, re-read with the rest for a complete picture. Thank you ..
  4. +11
    19 September 2017
    I drew attention to such a detail: the comcor, acts with the verbal order of the commander, and he must at least have the tacit consent of the district commander. But everything is kept secret from the FWM, as well as from the Germans (also an enemy?)
  5. +15
    19 September 2017
    The consequences of the military doctrine of "little blood on foreign territory."

    Plus the lack of professionalism of military intelligence at the district level - they could not establish the presence of enemy strike groups in 25 km from the border line.
    1. +9
      19 September 2017
      Quote: Operator
      could not establish the presence of enemy strike groups 25 km from the border line.


      But as? Reconnaissance groups on the rear do not roam, planes do not fly over the border line.
      Only undercover. Incomplete, sometimes conflicting information, with the need for confirmation and double-checking.
      1. +10
        19 September 2017
        High-altitude Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft Ju-86 until 22 on June 1941 carried out flights and aerial photography in the airspace of the USSR up to Moscow.

        But this is not the point - the depth of reconnaissance in 25 km is quite feasible for a network of agents at the district level. Apparently, RU NPO of the USSR completely failed this work in January-June of the 1941 year.
        1. +8
          21 September 2017
          The Germans prepared their reconnaissance divisions and corps separately and separately. Each reconnaissance battalion had a company of radio intelligence and direction finding. They also worked to intercept messages on wire lines in our rear, with local agents in the prewar days. Therefore, within a couple of hours from 1.00 to 4.00, they managed to break off our entire communication system. And how did our intelligence battalions serve? Were you preparing only sentries at warehouses and headquarters to shoot silently? What did they learn in real life, and who taught? Theorists?
    2. +7
      20 September 2017
      Quote: Operator
      The consequences of the military doctrine of "little blood on foreign territory."

      WWII - a continuation of the First World War. The goal of World War II (WWII) is to make the US an economic superpower, i.e. make all countries economically and politically dependent on the United States. To do this, it was necessary to undermine the position of the British Empire, France, defeat Germany, Japan and the USSR. The war proceeded exactly as it was planned. Before the WWII the USA produced 40% of the total, after the WWII the USA produced 60% of the total.
  6. 0
    19 September 2017
    Please tell me how to decode the PMA?
    1. +1
      19 September 2017
      Quote: AKKUL
      How to decode the PMA?


      Member of the Military Council - political worker in the army, under the commander of the district (for example, Khrushchov under Tymoshenko) ..
    2. 0
      19 September 2017
      Member of the Military Council
    3. 0
      19 September 2017
      Member of the Military Council
    4. +7
      21 September 2017
      Member of the Military Council, snitch from Mehlis. Steeper than the special bastards were suppliers of denunciations and "characteristics" on the party line to prosecutors and tribunals. The party line was bent, carried out! Conspiracies and biases sniffed and composed, if there was nothing in real life even. The party process was managed. Organized spying on conversations and perusal letters. All award submissions were signed. Yes, and all the most important orders, too. There were up to 4 thousand of them in the troops only senior political staff, from the regimental commissar and above.
      1. +2
        23 September 2017
        Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
        suppliers

        You’re a nice man of what you have read. What are you talking about with stamps from Solzhenitsynism-Yakovlevschina and Sanidzevism?
        What do you know about Mehlis, except that he is Jewish by nationality? Nothing? And why then such a loud cry?
        Military Council of the Military District, then FRONT-members of the Military Council-http: //myfront.in.ua/krasnaya-armiya/voenn
        ye-okruga.html
        You don’t understand what is it?
        Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
        Organized spying on conversations and perusal letters. All award submissions were signed.

        So are you here to pile this bunch of lies?
        1. +1
          August 7 2018
          There are many truths; later, at the second stage of the war, the experience and results of the work were cut off by the half-powers of the commissars and came to unity of command. And here is LZ Mehlis’s track record - executions and other repressions wherever I. Stalin did not send, and everywhere he failed the assignment blaming everyone around. Stalin’s words: “If you need to fail the case, send the Mehlis” ... And the main work as a political worker: “The Mehlis, during his tenure as representative of the Headquarters, was engaged in writing rather critical reports on senior officers” ....
  7. +9
    21 September 2017
    Respect to the author, however, we all have this topic, we dig it ourselves, and not always successfully - a lot has already been buried and combed. And a lot more of a secret. For example - the topic of chemical weapons, and even bacteriological weapons. The Poles, for example, killed our Red Army prisoners in the 20s in camps with artificial epidemics and other deadly diseases, this fact, although little studied. The Poles and Germans produced chemical weapons, and intended to use them against the USSR. Our intelligence on this topic has worked particularly well - but this is still a secret. Why? The facts of our cooperation with the Germans in chemical weapons since 1920 have already been published. What was done on this TOPIC topic in the RO of the front-line districts in 1941? At us chemical shells were stored there - what happened to these warehouses and chemical stockpiles? We had chemical shells for 76-mm guns there - look at the documents on the delivery of ammunition there, they were declassified and published. According to the fate of the warehouses - too. My father (2nd rank quartermaster, head of a department in the headquarters of the 11th Army of the NWF) personally, by order of the convoys, took out the property and ammunition, received it for military service, it’s written in the “description of the feat” on the award sheet. On an Internet now very good. You can dig a lot in the archives. Respect and respect for the author once again FOR THE NEEDING LARGE FOLDER OF ARCHIVES.
    1. VS
      -5
      22 September 2017
      "" To the author once again respect and respect FOR THE NEEDING LARGE FOLDER OF ARCHIVES "

      just do this - in OPEN ACCESS FOR A LONG TIME)))) everyone can find them - these docks - that TsAMO itself has been laying out for several years now))))

      and alas, there are unwise who will grab the first dock that came across - and immediately without thinking they rush to compose versions - without thinking that there are still documents and facts))) and that BEFORE pleasing the audience with their sensations anonymous - it would be necessary to read something else topic)))
      1. +2
        25 September 2017
        People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Top Secret 26.6.41 20.35
        I report the position of the troops of the North-Western Front. 1. The enemy continues to encircle Libau.
        2. The 8th Army - the 12th mechanized corps and the 5th Panzer Division behind enemy lines without fuel. The commander of the 3rd mechanized corps reported openly on 25.6.41/27/XNUMX: "Help, surrounded." Rifle formations at the front Plateliai, Krazhai, Kelme, Shiaulenay, Seduva. On the night of June XNUMX will begin the departure of the river. Lielupe and further to the north coast of Zap. Dvina to Jekabpils. Army formations suffered losses and need to be replenished immediately, which began to be mobilized, but cannot be worn, since uniforms of two rifle divisions remained at the former deployment points.
        The compounds have lost part of the weapon, which is being specified.
        The 11th Army - the headquarters and the Military Council of the Army, according to some reports, was captured or died. The Germans captured the cipher document. The 5th, 33th, 188th, 128th infantry divisions do not know in what condition and where they are. Many laggards and runaways, detained in the direction of Dvinsk. A lot of weapons are thrown. The 11th Army is not an organized combat formation.
        In Vilnius, the deployment of a new army group is imperative. Due to the replenishment of apparently dead divisions, I ask you to allow the formation of new four rifle divisions.
        I ask you to strengthen the front with ten artillery regiments account of the dead. The 11th Infantry Division is fresh, but its howitzer artillery regiment is defeated by aviation.
        The air forces of the front suffered heavy losses of a small number of airfields. At this time, they are not able to effectively support, cover ground troops and attack the enemy.
        Crews saved 75%. Losses of the material part of 80%.
        I ask you to strengthen the front with three mixed aviation divisions. To replenish parts of the air forces of the front with material parts, first of all, with flight personnel.
        I ask for the release of 200 thousand sets of uniforms and equipment for providing mobilized and for the new four rifle divisions of weapons. The 22nd, 24th rifle corps are mobilized in winter apartments. The 29th Rifle Corps moved east of Vilnius. I’ll clarify the situation. Dvinsk direction. Dvinsk was occupied by enemy tanks. He demanded to restore the situation. In view of the enemy bombing of communications centers and the destruction of their hostile elements, communications are poor.
        I ask you on 26.6.41 to transfer at my disposal three bomber and two fighter divisions to strengthen the air forces.
        I ask you to include six new rifle divisions in the front instead of the former territorial divisions redeployed for retraining.
        F. Kuznetsov Dibrova P. Klenov
        - Report of the commander of the North-Western Front on June 26, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the situation at the front by 20 hours 35 minutes on June 26, 1941, F. 221, op. 2467ss, d.39, l. 346-348.
  8. +7
    22 September 2017
    There is one more advice to the author - you must read the memoirs of those who passed 1941. For example, Lelyushenko. Imagine - he was entrusted with forming a mechanized corps, they were appointed a commander a couple of months before the war, the place of permanent deployment is Idritsa, a station in Latvia on the way to St. Petersburg. Officers (various) arrive, headquarters are being formed, soldiers are slowly being transported by echelons, and three divisions already have L / S lists. But there are no tanks, and according to the state, he should have 1000 of them. There is no artillery - no, not a single barrel. 20.06.41/22.06/22. summoned to Moscow in the General Staff (Vatutin), arrive in the morning of 24.06. Rushing, 27 in the morning at the General Staff finds out about the beginning of the war, comes to Vatutin, where a group of generals from the troops, and Vatutin immediately sends him back to Idritsa - "And you will receive written directives on the spot." Rushing to Idritsa, arriving on June 105th. - There are already two trains from the west at the station, one with families and refugees, and the other with the wounded. German planes are already bombing them, there are no our anti-aircraft guns, nor are there any fighters. There is no connection with either the 45th army or the district headquarters (already the headquarters of the NWF). Suddenly, the general Akimov, unfamiliar to him, happens in Idritsa and gives him 26.06 cannons 28.06 mm from the warehouses (!!!) and orders him to advance to Dvinsk (Daugavpils) with the task of defending him at the turn of the Daugava River (aka Zapadnaya Dvina). Immediately from Moscow they send (under their own power!) A couple of dozen tanks FROM THE ACADEMY of mechanization and motorization. Units move forward with marching convoys on 2/105, go under bombardment, then only at night, on the approach to Dvinsk they destroy German intelligence on motorcycles, the prisoners are sent by car to Moscow. They learn from the Germans that Dvinsk is already taken by the Germans. They are going to beat him on 45/XNUMX. Next, read Lelyushenko. These were the states and actions of the XNUMXnd echelon of the NWF. Does your hair stand on end? Teach at least one gun calculation to shoot from it and get into these marching conditions ... XNUMX crackers of XNUMX mm into three divisions of the MEKHKORPUS.
    1. +3
      23 September 2017
      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
      Teach at least one gun calculation to shoot from it and get into these marching conditions ... 105 crackers of 45 mm into three divisions of the MEKHKORPUS.

      Are you again pouring all sorts of tales here? Well, here is the regular number- http://forum.guns.ru/forum/42/141432.html
      What are you not happy with?
      And these are real memories, http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/lelyushenko_d
      d / 01.html
      And not your lying interpretation of them.
      1. +4
        25 September 2017
        I double-checked on your invectives. In March and March, they ordered Lelyushenko, a divisional commander of the 1st Moscow Proletarian Division in Moscow, to form quickly the 21st mechanized corps in Idritsa (Pskov region, the Latvian border, a two-track railway station with water pumping. They promised two TDs and one unit. Their formed in three places - 185 sd in Belgorod, the Oryol military district then, from the brigade, 42 td in Gorky, from the light tank brigade, and 46 td in Khamovniki, in Moscow. The TANKS came ONLY to Idritsa on June 24.06.41, 26. - from Gorky in the train to all kinds of platforms BT, T-30, “flamethrower” 5 pcs. and 5 machine guns floating (by the way, these came in handy when crossing the Zap. Dvina near Dvinsk, where they died along with the paratroopers 20 airborne forces during the assault on Dvinsk. From Moscow then 30-60 came YOURSELF, that is, they greatly shortened motor resources and already had breakdowns, etc. With crews from the Armored type of the Academy (I studied there as a cadet in the 21s, after the cadet). There are 98 corps (in Wikipedia) scraped the LIST of 100 tanks. "And more than 25.06 guns" (Wikipedia). But tanks with literate e at least there were barges, and with some bk (I doubt very much about flamethrowers). And they moved to Dvinsk in real life on 26.06., Not knowing that on 150. German tanks of the SS division "Dead Head" have already entered there. They learned this when they were hit by 20 SS intelligence motorcycles, which they beat and partly captured, including XNUMX officers. The prisoners were interrogated
      2. +4
        25 September 2017
        The prisoners were interrogated and sent under escort to Moscow. The first captured SS officers. The 21 corps went on, all 3 divisions, only at night, because on the first day of the march the Germans bombed and stormed them hard. For days, the hiding place was hidden in the woods. They approached Dvinsk with their paratrooper neighbors, 5 airborne troops, who also went to Dvinsk on the right. 28.06.41/29.06/29.06. together they stormed the city, someone even burst in and fought on its outskirts, from all sides, it seems that they pulled the bridge, but in the end the Germans fought back, and when they came up completely "Dead Head", it became completely sour. 21/30.06. they were ordered to take the city of Dvinsk anyway and further develop the offensive ... They became even more acidic, but the Germans helped them out. They themselves went on the offensive on 42/270. and so fucked up that from 7 microns to 45. (see Wikipedia) there are: in 46 TD 400 people and 7 cannons 16 mm, in 45 TD 185 people, 2300 BT and 66 105 mm each, and in 1000 SD - 3000 people. and 21 "mallet" of the same quality and caliber (and there were 34). That is, in the mechanized corps from the state of the tank fleet (25.06.41 + tail units) there are less than a company of BATTLE tanks and 34 (regiment by staff?) L / s. Check yourself before accusing me of lying! Yes - I forgot - Wikipedia writes that initially there were two T-76 tanks in 1941 MK as of June 70, XNUMX, but this could only be an account in the General Staff from Moscow to Idritsa T-XNUMX-XNUMX mod. XNUMX was hardly able to reach on its own. Could happily let out a motor resource (approx. XNUMX engine hours in real life) on the road. This is also not a lie, ask yourself knowledgeable tankers. Although the Academy of BTV could achieve such miracles ...
      3. +4
        25 September 2017
        To further enhance the documentation of the situation at the NWF on 26.06.41/11/360. I am reprinting here - also from Wikipedia, the following document, in which the three signatures of the chief officers of the North-West Fleet went scum lies and vile slander against the headquarters of the 26.6.41th army, in which my father served and resigned from the entourage, who saved the headquarters (they saved the banner, all the secret ones, etc. . documents taken out of the wounded, ammunition and even partially property from the warehouses) received the medal "For Military Merit". In the award sheet, the description of the feat is as follows: mobilized 20.35 wagons, took out warehouses. Read below carefully: People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR Top Secret XNUMX XNUMX
        I report the position of the troops of the North-Western Front. 1. The enemy continues to encircle Libau.
        2. The 8th Army - the 12th mechanized corps and the 5th Panzer Division behind enemy lines without fuel. The commander of the 3rd mechanized corps reported openly on 25.6.41/27/XNUMX: "Help, surrounded." Rifle formations at the front Plateliai, Krazhai, Kelme, Shiaulenay, Seduva. On the night of June XNUMX will begin the departure of the river. Lielupe and further to the north coast of Zap. Dvina to Jekabpils. Army formations suffered losses and need to be replenished immediately, which began to be mobilized, but cannot be worn, since uniforms of two rifle divisions remained at the former deployment points.
        The compounds have lost part of the weapon, which is being specified.
        The 11th Army - the headquarters and the Military Council of the Army, according to some reports, was captured or died. The Germans captured the cipher document. The 5th, 33th, 188th, 128th infantry divisions do not know in what condition and where they are. Many laggards and runaways, detained in the direction of Dvinsk. A lot of weapons are thrown. The 11th Army is not an organized combat formation.
        In Vilnius, the deployment of a new army group is imperative. Due to the replenishment of apparently dead divisions, I ask you to allow the formation of new four rifle divisions.
        I ask you to strengthen the front with ten artillery regiments account of the dead. The 11th Infantry Division is fresh, but its howitzer artillery regiment is defeated by aviation.
        The air forces of the front suffered heavy losses of a small number of airfields. At this time, they are not able to effectively support, cover ground troops and attack the enemy.
        Crews saved 75%. Losses of the material part of 80%.
        I ask you to strengthen the front with three mixed aviation divisions. To replenish parts of the air forces of the front with material parts, first of all, with flight personnel.
        I ask for the release of 200 thousand sets of uniforms and equipment for providing mobilized and for the new four rifle divisions of weapons. The 22nd, 24th rifle corps are mobilized in winter apartments. The 29th Rifle Corps moved east of Vilnius. I’ll clarify the situation. Dvinsk direction. Dvinsk was occupied by enemy tanks. He demanded to restore the situation. In view of the enemy bombing of communications centers and the destruction of their hostile elements, communications are poor.
        I ask you on 26.6.41 to transfer at my disposal three bomber and two fighter divisions to strengthen the air forces.
        I ask you to include six new rifle divisions in the front instead of the former territorial divisions redeployed for retraining.
        F. Kuznetsov Dibrova P. Klenov
        - Report of the commander of the North-Western Front on June 26, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the situation at the front by 20 hours 35 minutes on June 26, 1941, F. 221, op. 2467ss, d.39, l. 346-348.
  9. VS
    -4
    22 September 2017
    AUTHOR once again juggling and distorting the facts involved))))

    “Bringing units into combat readiness without announcing combat alert is masked by vigilant“ good intentions, ”ready to report this to Moscow"

    Why are you all making up some garbage?)))
    Open Chekunov’s two-volume book according to the complete answers of the commanders “I write exclusively from memory” and Poluboyarov’s answer is there and on page 108 an explanation is given of these orders for mechanized corps in PribOVO - on June 16 they were ordered to bring the headquarters of these military units to ... on June 18 - gave the order to bring in B.G. and deduce by PP))) And this was done according to the ORDER of MOSCOW - NPO and GSh))) AND EXACTLY ALSO in the neighboring ZAPOVO and in KOVO and in OdVO - EXACTLY ALSO their MKs were brought to BG. and deduced by PP - read the fucking answers of the divisors at last)))

    “Information on the movement of formations was daily reported to the NSh of the okrug, armies and corps. "

    And the districts at 22 .00 EVERY DAY sent their report to the General Staff - starting from the DAY of the beginning of the withdrawal - HOW the withdrawal of troops is going)))
    For the same ZAPOVO and Solonin made such reports (though not understanding how I always meant what they meant) and the same Koziknin))))) - EVERY DAY SUCH REPORTS were sent to the General Staff of the okrug - reports))) On June 11 Pavlov sent a report No. June 1 and 21 - - No. 11)))

    The withdrawal teams were verbal BUT - THEN these orders MANDATORY "were duplicated" and in writing - at the district headquarters)))
    The 48th SD began to be deduced from the 15-16th day and Sobenikov was also “addressed” with copies. 2 orders - Order No. 00217 of 15.06.41/48/XNUMX on the withdrawal of the XNUMXth SD)))

    DON'T NEED TO THINK Nonsense that these orders were given contrary to the General Staff))
    DO NOT))))
    1. VS
      -4
      22 September 2017
      “In accordance with the new Directive, part of the border divisions should be on alert, the installation of minefields begins, it is indicated on the replenishment of ammunition on the defense line, the retreating units should take into account the flights of German aircraft (that is, move at night). At the command posts of the army, sk and sd should be on duty command "

      And here it is - THAT IS THE MOST “ORDER of June 18”))))

      And in points where there are no deadlines for execution - the term - means - IMMEDIATELY do this))))


      “Do not find anything strange in the text?” "... PMB PribOVO ... ordered to immediately take away cartridges and shells ... I asked the Headquarters of the 8th Army for a written order,"

      Nothing strange - mu .. eccentric he was this Dibrova))) Kotiory Potmo rebuilt I- for Nya - he didn’t order cartridges at the depots but only to the elders in the capers only)))

      There, a certain political deputy Borisov was shitting on him - who was coming to PribOV from Moscow in general - who was even put in the 42nd for these things)) Mehlis tried to take him in the ass))) BUT Zhukov later dismissed him and helped him out - an old friend of KOVO .. Then Borisov became the commandant of Leipzig and supplied Zhukov with trophy junk)))

      To compose stupid versions without taking into account ALL the existing information on events - BIG stupidity of some authors))))

      “The corps commander gives his order for the issue of ammunition and the installation of minefields. On the order of a superior chief (PMC VO) to cancel his order, the correspondent asks for written confirmation of the cancellation from the headquarters of the district or army ... An absurd situation ... "

      Yes, no shit, it’s not absurd)) .. normal military tyagomotina))) everyday madhouse military)))

      They gave HIM ORDER to these things either from the headquarters from above or - they gave the nod to his independent decisions on this issue - read how it was at the headquarters of Firsov - in the army of Morozov))).

      And when the stupid political commander tries to cancel them, the commander seeks support from the higher authorities))) And this is exactly Kuznetsov and Klenov who tried - especially Klenov - READ Morozov’s answer CAREFULLY and ALL !! - and not just what you want for your stupid versions - - to disrupt and bring in BG and other nasty things done)))

      ...............................
      1. VS
        -5
        22 September 2017
        “Suddenly, the outbreak of the war took by surprise not only the troops of the western border districts, but also the families of servicemen deployed in the border regions. "

        And here - many thanks to Zhukov who forbade the removal of families, although some put it on his order ... So many families died under shelling - at the same Eremenko))) The Germans also later specifically searched for such families and destroyed them ((((

        "The ban on the people's commissar leaving families once again confirms that the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect a war in the coming days."

        Yes, this does not mean anything (((Only about the stupidity and meanness of the one who forbade it to be done ...

        BUT - This means the withdrawal of troops on the BCP, the reduction in these same days in B.G. increased air force, air defense fleets and MK with the PTBR - does not this mean that they were waiting for the attack ???


        “It turns out that the leadership of the NPO has a sin for the deaths of the wives and children of the military personnel of the border garrisons - the most precious thing that the military personnel who defended their homeland had. This once again shows that Moscow did not expect a full-scale war ”

        Dumber "conclusion" must still be able to make ((((

        TWO m .. an odd one for their own reasons decided to play it safe and the author composes his stupid conclusions on this (((And do not care about the ORDERS of those days and what was done in ALL districts in THE SAME DAYS !! ??? Maladets ... BRAVO author (((
        ...............................
        1. VS
          -4
          22 September 2017
          “It was the“ last call ”for Pyotr Semenovich Klenov and the“ first call ”- for F.I. Kuznetsova. P.S. Klenov could now expect an arrest - not many people were broken by the NKVD ... "

          Well away we go))))

          “According to the testimony of the investigators who tortured A.D. Loktionova: “... Nobody could split him. The Kursk nightingale turned out to be unbending. Despite the sophistication of torture, he pleaded not guilty. The executioners passed the general from hand to hand, but did not succeed ... The general screamed in pain, rolled on the floor, but did not agree to sign the protocol. They beat him until they were tired ... "

          So that's how the regular posts were called in the bloody gebne - executioners !!!)))

          Or maybe this fighter with the bloody Stalinist regime didn’t admit that they didn’t touch him with his finger ??)))
          More than that, giving me the author mdam Kantor reminding me of the beginning)))) there isn’t enough current of “stale” spots on the protocols of interrogation of “tortured nightingales”)))

          "The kingdom of heaven, the Good Man ..."

          Are you sure that he is in the kingdom of heaven and not in the underground?)))

          “The preparation of the advanced units for military operations with the German troops continued (again under the guise of exercises, hiding the true reason from their own)”

          Well, thank God)) I ALL WAITED for the author’s rezonism to be trampled upon - and he did wait - it turns out that these forces were moving FROM THEIRS !!!)))))
          Therefore, it turns out that he receives an order to take “fully transportable stockpiles of fire stocks and fuels and lubricants” some commdivies - such as the bastard of a divisional commander 48 sd who got to the Germans and became a punisher by handing over his commissars - they dragged training rubbish instead of cartridges (( war (((

          ............................
          1. VS
            -2
            22 September 2017
            "" To the commander of 128 SD, to the commander of 374 joint ventures, to the commander of the howitzer regiment

            By the morning of 21.6, take the following position for defense: "


            Well, what are you saying straightforward - no one was waiting for the attack !!!!!! )))))

            “Mobilization has not yet been announced, and the division is already marching”

            )) Patamo ATO attack did not wait !!!))))
            and if they did it, then contrary to Moscow and the bloody tyrant !!!)))

            “In the Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 0042 of 19.06.41/0043/20.06.41 and No. XNUMX of XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX there is not even a mention of the dispersal (deployment) of aircraft at field airfields and sites. Naturally, such plans for aviation based are not provided for in the plans of the district air forces. Especially with the increase in repression against the leaders of the KA Air Force. ”

            Do not bother nonsense to smack that ???))

            In these directories, there SHOULD NOT BE ANYTHING about the dispersal of aviation into field reserve sites. THEREFORE, AND TAKE A HUNT OF Crap that an attack of the type was not expected since such directives went in those days - only a complete ignoramus or a falsifier and might)))

            AT THEM, the Air Force withdraws with the BEGINNING of hostilities - at the last minute in a pinch !!! This is - that the enemy about these sites ahead of time did not recognize))))

            “In accordance with the Directive of the headquarters of PribOV dated June 18, an order was prepared for the commander of the Air Force of the Okrug, A.P. Ionova on the relocation, dispersal and camouflage of aircraft.
            ....
            From the operational report No. 02 of the Pribovo Air Force headquarters it can be seen that in each regiment one squadron is in combat readiness No. 2 (as well as the air defense units of PribOV in readiness No. 2). "

            BECAUSE ON THIS AND INSTRUCTIONS came from MOSCOW !!! !!)))) ABOUT Bringing in a higher BG Air Force and dispersal - because the attack did not wait in Moscow)))))


            “Echoes of the events from the neighbors (in the part of PribOVO aviation) have reached the Commander of the Air Force ZAPOVO I.I. Kobets.”

            Or maybe it was all easier - HIM AS AND ALL OTHER DISTRICTS GIVEN MOSCOW AT THIS ORDER without expecting an attack ???))))

            “Moscow pushed back the abandonment of combat readiness, and Colonel Tarasenko was forced to give an oral order to cancel the events ...”

            And de this order on this ??))
            author - maybe enough to lie that already ???)))

            KOLI DO YOU NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT you see before yourself - maybe it’s not worth it to please the public with stupid things?

            But - I have long been waiting for the anti-Soviet climbers to at least somehow "comment" on the documents of the pre-war days published recently by TsAMO - I was waiting for some nonsense to start smashing the uttermost .. And I waited - in spite of the tyrant, the glorious generals tried to do what ..

            That's just - all this has already happened))))
            1. VS
              0
              22 September 2017
              DEAR author - so how many Tymoshenko and Zhukov offered the tyrant a plan for a preemptive strike on Germany?))))

              And - so when you open the face - you’ll show your name - who did we find such a great historian?))) Engaged in misrepresentation and distortion of facts and documents - in other words, falsifications))))
    2. +1
      October 3 2017
      June 1941 Riga
      Jul 4, 2011 at 19:14
      Latvjustrelnieki

      The inhabitants of Riga learned about the German attack on the USSR earlier than most Soviet people. Many on these disturbing nights listened to foreign radio. And already at 6 o’clock in the morning German and English news programs broadcast the news of the beginning of the war ...
      Author: Nikolay Kabanov
      http://www.ves.lv/article/178491

      The chaos of the early days

      The command of the Baltic Special Military District was located on the field CP near Panevezys on June 22 - maneuvers were announced. "On the farm" remained the deputy commander, Lieutenant General Georgy Pavlovich SOFRONOV. In fact, at his disposal was only a group of staff officers, a guard company, commandant units, anti-aircraft gunners and cadets of the infantry school.

      The 98th coastal artillery division on Mangalsal, the pilots at the Spilve airfield, and the commanders of warships on the Daugava roadstead had their command. By the way, it was them (specifically, the Kirov cruiser) who happened to repel the attack of German bombers on the afternoon of June 22. These were the first military operations near the territory of Riga ...


      On June 23, the war came to the capital of Latvia in the person of two dozen Junkers. Having come from Babite’s side for about 15 hours, they dumped a deadly cargo at the Spilva airfield, whose neat building was built just three years before. Fuel tanks caught fire. Watering from the streets of Riga machine guns, Luftwaffe vultures (by the way, this name can often be seen on Latvian cars; I wonder who their owners are? - Ed.) Several times passed over the city. From that moment on, raids became permanent - only on June 25, 10 air attacks were recorded. The textile factory in Ilguciems, the Ziemelblazma quarter, houses in Sarkandaugava and on the corner of ul. Valdemara and Bruninieku.

      On June 26, they began to form detachments of the Labor Guard - in total, they created 3 battalions and 1 company, distributing about 1 English Ross – Enfield rifles from the warehouses of the Aizsargs. The 000th NKVD convoy regiment and an armored train were to join the defense.

      But the next day chaos reigned in Riga: the evacuation took on a spontaneous character. Despite everything, prisoners were transported east (3 special trains). Sent 1 tons of various cargoes - from flax to bicycles, 500 million rubles were taken from the State Bank of Latvia. SSR. They left Riga by ship - to Pärnu, along the highway - towards Estonia. And shooting was everywhere: both at real opponents, "attic brothers", and because of confusion among themselves. Sometimes tanks and armored vehicles hit from houses with guns.

      And on June 29, at about 10 o'clock, a battle broke out in Pardaugava between the advance detachments of the German colonel Otto LASHA and the defenders of Liepaja, the Red Army soldiers of the 67th regiment of the 114th Infantry Division. A five-hour battle took place in the area of ​​Altonavas and Kapu streets. Anninmuiža, Kliversala, Kalnciema Street became places of fierce battles. Trying to help his own, the artillery division in Mangalsal deployed guns towards the city and opened fire with shells of 130 and 152 mm. Alas, there was no need to talk about any accuracy of hits ...

      At the same time, about 12 hours across the Daugava, a German avant-garde of 150 people with wheeled-tracked armored personnel carriers Kfz251 tried to break through the Zemgale bridge. The bridge was blown up behind the attackers, and almost all Germans were destroyed.

      But this was the last success of the defenders. On the evening of June 29, Riga was literally shocked by the explosions of ammunition depots in Mezaparks and gasoline in Milgravis. June 30 on the right bank of the Daugava was already complete anarchy. But, surprisingly, city phones worked: it was possible to get through even through the front line! And, most importantly, on critical days, Riga residents still received bread and milk.

      A group of German colonel ULLERSHPERGER at 6 am on July 1 forced Dvina in the Kengarags area. At 10 o’clock, an employee of the film studio, JEKSTE, asked him for permission to transmit a historical signal from the Riga Radio ...
  10. +5
    22 September 2017
    Quote: the most important
    Quote: RuSFr
    War is bad, repression is bad.

    And you know that on this site a huge number of ignoramuses who believe that there was no repression! And if there were, then in the right amount and everything needed. Give them a machine gun, so they would shoot around the clock without trial. Himself was shocked by such a discovery. I naively believed that time had inspired the mind. But no ... there wasn’t enough reason for everyone ...

    For tens of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army thrown in marching orders under the rink of 2 tank groups, I would still have taken a machine gun without trial or investigation ......
    1. The comment was deleted.
  11. +5
    22 September 2017
    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
    Member of the Military Council, snitch from Mehlis. Steeper than the special bastards were suppliers of denunciations and "characteristics" on the party line to prosecutors and tribunals. The party line was bent, carried out! Conspiracies and biases sniffed and composed, if there was nothing in real life even. The party process was managed. Organized spying on conversations and perusal letters. All award submissions were signed. Yes, and all the most important orders, too. There were up to 4 thousand of them in the troops only senior political staff, from the regimental commissar and above.

    ! And what to leave the army without control? !!! Special departments in the hands of Zhukov and the People’s Commissar .... they wanted something and turned it around, and the result is the defeat of the districts with "monstrous" losses, which is not enough ?!
    1. +10
      23 September 2017
      Dibrova, specifically, at least three of his district comrades-in-arms, generals, PERSONALLY AND INITIATIVE, sent false accusations of shameful torture and shameful executions, and remained all in orders, including the Red Banner for 1941. Mehlis reached the execution of military generals before the formation, from personal participation. The corps commissar Dibrova, PMB PribOVO, roamed around the headquarters of the armies and divisions of the first line, and even at the warehouses, branding those issuing and receiving ammunition as provocateurs! The tasks of denunciation were set by Mehlis personally, the "chain dog of Stalin," as he was called and everyone knew. He became the army general, the head of the Head of the PURA in 1941. He personally arrested Pavlov, and not just him. After the war, he died as Minister of State Control. The role of such as these dogs in our failure of 1941 has not yet been clarified. Respect and respect for the author in one attempt to do this. Even her minor mistakes in military matters, especially tank-technical ones, are unimportant. And then please excite the excitement of the elite, for what purpose does the comrade of TWICE write the word STANDARD = persistently seek replenishment of ammunition and persistently seek coordination of parts on the march and position? Reread, DEAR. This directly indicates that someone forbade the warehouses to issue ammunition WITHOUT AN ORDER ABOVE THREE SIGNATURES. That someone HINDER MALTING PARTS ON THE MARCH. Who could? Could it be that political instructors by order of Dibrova?
      1. VS
        -2
        24 September 2017
        "" for what purpose does the comrade ’TWICE write the word SECURE = persistently seek replenishment of ammunition and persistently seek coordination of parts on the march and position? Reread, DEAR. This directly indicates that someone forbade the warehouses to issue ammunition WITHOUT AN ORDER ABOVE THREE SIGNATURES. That someone HINDER MALTING PARTS ON THE MARCH. Who could? Could it be that political instructors by order of Dibrova? ""

        - nonsense)))) In the army they practically ALWAYS write - DO CAREFULLY study military affairs in this way))))

        Do not look for secrets where it does not exist. If Dibrova and crap then it is NOT ONLY WILL Stalin)))
        And even more so touch the Mehlis. Maybe he lashed out with zeal to slaughter cowardly generals, but there were such ones too - that they handed over their divisions for slaughter .. And there were a lot of them.

        In LenVO - it seems to the Brick-Workers. In PribOVO - divisional 48 sd ..., - in general - see how many of them in ROA then it turned out in the end (((
  12. +4
    22 September 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    DEAR author - so how many Tymoshenko and Zhukov offered the tyrant a plan for a preemptive strike on Germany?))))

    And - so when you open the face - you’ll show your name - who did we find such a great historian?))) Engaged in misrepresentation and distortion of facts and documents - in other words, falsifications))))

    They suggested ... in May 1941, to which they received an answer - YOU are Finnish little?! Want a rout?! I will arrange it for YOU ... I.V. STALIN
    1. VS
      -3
      23 September 2017
      Well, it’s us and we think that it was in MAY)) the author, I’m sure that this was still in April — the date is so on the 16th))))
      1. +8
        23 September 2017
        For some reason, these searchlights (without a date, secret handwritten in 1 copy, with traces of a reading of the temporary detention center) of historians are especially worried - especially traitors-perverters like Rezun-Suvorov. This is now the ideological field of information warfare, not the history of military affairs. Tymoshenko rather exposed this project to Zhukov, because the General Staff did all the calculations.
        1. VS
          -1
          24 September 2017
          "" These projections (without date, secret manuscripts in 1 copy, with traces of the IVS reading) for some reason historians are especially worried - especially traitors-perverters like Rezun-Suvorov. This is now the ideological field of information warfare, not the history of military affairs. Tymoshenko rather exposed this project to Zhukov, because General Staff did all the calculations. ""

          Alas - not one Tymoshenko suffered from this. Rather, it was the GSh who suffered from this - dashing evil offensives without thinking how it would end in the end.
          It was also Meretskov who dreamed - to smash preventively at the Germans, or better, just do the first to start a war. And he gave it out from the stands quite at the meetings of the military. And this he proposed - having become the chief of the General Staff (Tymoshenko removed Shaposhnikov and Meretskov and became the chief of the Staff since September 40) - to prepare our retaliatory strategic strike from Ukraine - against the NON-PRIMARY enemy forces ... And the preparation of such a strike itself - which is ANSWERING but immediate that the preparation of the PREVENTIVE attack by us was the first - ONE and the same measures in essence.

          So - Rezun, of course, is a piece of der..ma but in the "main thing he is right" - they didn’t prepare serious defense in the General Staff, alas .. They were preparing the offensive.
          Rezun this preparation of the offensive from KOVO - RESPONSE - according to the minority forces of the enemy, who, with their main forces, rushing north of woodland, gives the prompting of their masters in London for preparing the ATTACK first, but in essence - our strategists in the General Staff - the Meretskov-Zhukovs did not really prepare a serious defense. And if you read the answers of the commanders of the summer of 41 to Pokrovsky’s questions, then you will see all this)))

          The apotheosis of the stupidity of our strategists - this is the plan of May 15 - the plan of a preventive strike. Because at any cost our strategists dreamed of embarking nevertheless first !!
          And under it, Zhukov even managed to throw off directives to the districts on new BCPs in early May - taking this preventive strike into account - you WAS NOT WAITING for Stalin to approve this plan!
          The numbers on May 16, Zhukov somehow informed the tyrant of this plan, received a sentence on the head for stupidity and political mediocrity, and the new BCPs were not signed as a result at the NGOs and the General Staff, and below the district, these BCPs in the districts already did not work out practically. ..
          And the whole withdrawal of troops in May and June was all the more so - it was going under the plan of May 15 anyway !!!

          But in any case - it’s the complete merit of GSh-Zhukov — these crazy plans for the event of war, which, together with the failure to fulfill Zhukov’s orders in the districts in early June and by the 21st, led to the tragedy of June 22 ...
          1. VS
            -1
            24 September 2017
            "" These projections (without date, secret manuscripts in 1 copy, with traces of the IVS reading) for some reason historians are especially worried - especially traitors-perverters like Rezun-Suvorov. This is now the ideological field of information warfare, not the history of military affairs. "

            Most of these "plans" are historical rubbish of course - but - and they are needed - for a better understanding of the intentions of our strategists themselves in the General Staff.))))
            1. +4
              25 September 2017
              In terms of cover (PP) from 02.06.41. for Pribovo there is, in my opinion, a clear nonsense from the General Staff. They set the task of covering the entire coast for the 27th army, including Liepaja, whose command was ordered to begin to form in Riga only on 25.05.41. It will not fall from the moon in a week! Further, both mechanized corps (3 and 12) of both border armies (8 and 11), as well as the army reserves of the armies, were not allowed to use without the consent of the district headquarters, even when attacked. Allegedly for possible massaging. Further, Alytus, appointed three times as the most likely point of Germans' strike, was appointed as the unloading point of the first virtual freshly mobilized reserves (the General Staff calculated that the first would ripen 4-5 days after the announcement of the mobilization). Did they think that Alytus (right next to the border), where there were 5 td in direct line of sight from the border, would last a week? My father is 22.06.41. at 3.30, he brought there a package with a communications plan from the 11th Army headquarters in case of a database, and did not manage to get to the hotel when he came under shelling at 4.00. 45 minutes of artillery bombardment gouged this Alytus into the trash, and the headquarters was 5 TD (they removed tanks in the vicinity on June 21.06, by order of the commander, to whom the district headquarters transferred this 5 TD to submission, separating it from 3 mk - they cheated it like that). And yet it turned out that Alytus was defending a separate collection of 5th, which was left there and other parts such as a pontoon battalion, ozad, staff company, signalmen, etc. Armored vehicles did not even get under artillery training (only defective), to which the Germans clearly calculated. She came when they seized the bridge and started forcing, and only because of this they were able to keep Alytus until nightfall, under shelling and bombing, and attacks all day. From 22.06 TD per day, little is left, but there were 5 T-50, 34 T-20, 28 T-26 and 26 BT170-M, and where 7 BA50 and BA10. And according to BCP, it was supposed to hold 20 km of the border, helping shooters and border guards. Arrows and border guards, and our art also fought, but the Germans had a 30-fold advantage only on the ground, not to mention the air. And what did they think of this at the General Staff, writing up calculations and plans?
              1. VS
                -2
                25 September 2017
                "" In terms of cover (PP) dated 02.06.41. for Pribovo there is, in my opinion, a clear nonsense from the General Staff. ""

                - in order to understand how it happened, you have to figure it out, where did it come from)))

                At the end of April, Zhukov, and once again, was blasted on that - but whether to embed on the first !!! After all, Japan has signed the Neutrality Treaty and if she is the first to hit Hitler, she will not attack us. GS-Zhukov compose a "plan of May 15" - for this preemptive strike, and without waiting for what Stalin will say to him - and there is NO mention of Japan as a likely adversary - they throw off directives for new BCPs to this district under THIS plan - they drop 4 -6 and May 14 (in different districts on different days - it does not matter)))
                The deadline for the readiness of these BCPs is the end of May and the beginning of June - on these days their districts should already be sent to the General Staff and NCO for approval !!

                In the districts they compose BCPs, but they are not always brought to armies everywhere, Everything is done "secretly" - so the divisional officers have no idea about the tasks of their divisions in these BCPs !!!
                And the whole point is that Stalin tapped the stupid head of the non-publics - PPs became ILLEGAL !!, - and they definitely gave a command to the Okrugs - do not advertise new PPs and it’s better not to talk about them ...

                By June 20, the BCPs themselves were sent to the General Staff, because you won’t be able to recognize the command of the districts that these BCPs are illegal and there they hung - NOT SIGNED by anyone respectively!

                BUT - the withdrawal of troops from the end of May, and even more so in June, went specifically under THIS "PLAN of May 15" !!!
                Under the plan of the PREVENTIVE strike, under our attack first !!!

                And the general deployment of our troops was — it was imprisoned for this, and therefore there was no sense of our forces on the border — they were held under the idea of ​​an offensive !!!

                In general - study for yourself the full answers of the commanders of the summer of 41 to “Pokrovsky’s questions” - “I write exclusively from memory” = S. Chekunov’s two-volume, and you can - “The Secret of the June 22 tragedy” - these are the answers in the two-volume with a detailed analysis of these answers and the additional factories of those days))))
            2. 0
              October 3 2017
              June 1941 Riga
              Jul 4, 2011 at 19:14
              Latvjustrelnieki

              The inhabitants of Riga learned about the German attack on the USSR earlier than most Soviet people. Many on these disturbing nights listened to foreign radio. And already at 6 o’clock in the morning German and English news programs broadcast the news of the beginning of the war ...
              Author: Nikolay Kabanov
              http://www.ves.lv/article/178491

              The chaos of the early days

              The command of the Baltic Special Military District was located on the field CP near Panevezys on June 22 - maneuvers were announced. "On the farm" remained the deputy commander, Lieutenant General Georgy Pavlovich SOFRONOV. In fact, at his disposal was only a group of staff officers, a guard company, commandant units, anti-aircraft gunners and cadets of the infantry school.

              The 98th coastal artillery division on Mangalsal, the pilots at the Spilve airfield, and the commanders of warships on the Daugava roadstead had their command. By the way, it was them (specifically, the Kirov cruiser) who happened to repel the attack of German bombers on the afternoon of June 22. These were the first military operations near the territory of Riga ...


              On June 23, the war came to the capital of Latvia in the person of two dozen Junkers. Having come from Babite’s side for about 15 hours, they dumped a deadly cargo at the Spilva airfield, whose neat building was built just three years before. Fuel tanks caught fire. Watering from the streets of Riga machine guns, Luftwaffe vultures (by the way, this name can often be seen on Latvian cars; I wonder who their owners are? - Ed.) Several times passed over the city. From that moment on, raids became permanent - only on June 25, 10 air attacks were recorded. The textile factory in Ilguciems, the Ziemelblazma quarter, houses in Sarkandaugava and on the corner of ul. Valdemara and Bruninieku.

              On June 26, they began to form detachments of the Labor Guard - in total, they created 3 battalions and 1 company, distributing about 1 English Ross – Enfield rifles from the warehouses of the Aizsargs. The 000th NKVD convoy regiment and an armored train were to join the defense.

              But the next day chaos reigned in Riga: the evacuation took on a spontaneous character. Despite everything, prisoners were transported east (3 special trains). Sent 1 tons of various cargoes - from flax to bicycles, 500 million rubles were taken from the State Bank of Latvia. SSR. They left Riga by ship - to Pärnu, along the highway - towards Estonia. And shooting was everywhere: both at real opponents, "attic brothers", and because of confusion among themselves. Sometimes tanks and armored vehicles hit from houses with guns.

              And on June 29, at about 10 o'clock, a battle broke out in Pardaugava between the advance detachments of the German colonel Otto LASHA and the defenders of Liepaja, the Red Army soldiers of the 67th regiment of the 114th Infantry Division. A five-hour battle took place in the area of ​​Altonavas and Kapu streets. Anninmuiža, Kliversala, Kalnciema Street became places of fierce battles. Trying to help his own, the artillery division in Mangalsal deployed guns towards the city and opened fire with shells of 130 and 152 mm. Alas, there was no need to talk about any accuracy of hits ...

              At the same time, about 12 hours across the Daugava, a German avant-garde of 150 people with wheeled-tracked armored personnel carriers Kfz251 tried to break through the Zemgale bridge. The bridge was blown up behind the attackers, and almost all Germans were destroyed.

              But this was the last success of the defenders. On the evening of June 29, Riga was literally shocked by the explosions of ammunition depots in Mezaparks and gasoline in Milgravis. June 30 on the right bank of the Daugava was already complete anarchy. But, surprisingly, city phones worked: it was possible to get through even through the front line! And, most importantly, on critical days, Riga residents still received bread and milk.

              A group of German colonel ULLERSHPERGER at 6 am on July 1 forced Dvina in the Kengarags area. At 10 o’clock, an employee of the film studio, JEKSTE, asked him for permission to transmit a historical signal from the Riga Radio ...
  13. +3
    24 September 2017
    Quote: Salute
    there is something to think about ...

    And above that (below, it is published on Wikipedia) - how the three generals responsible for the NWF could sign such a COMMON lie, the vile slander of the 11th army, which fought from the first hour near Alytus, until the end of the day on 22.06.41. held positions on the border in the direction of the main strike, incurring huge losses under continuous shelling and bombing, organized by moving away from the night of 23.06. with convoys of the wounded, members of the families of command personnel, refugees, and even with a convoy of ammunition and property from warehouses, already being surrounded and without communication ?! Read for yourself this heinous lie and the vile slander of the "report" of the three chief officers of the North-Western Front: People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Top Secret 26.6.41 20.35
    I report the position of the troops of the North-Western Front. 1. The enemy continues to encircle Libau.
    2. The 8th Army - the 12th mechanized corps and the 5th Panzer Division behind enemy lines without fuel. The commander of the 3rd mechanized corps reported openly on 25.6.41/27/XNUMX: "Help, surrounded." Rifle formations at the front Plateliai, Krazhai, Kelme, Shiaulenay, Seduva. On the night of June XNUMX will begin the departure of the river. Lielupe and further to the north coast of Zap. Dvina to Jekabpils. Army formations suffered losses and need to be replenished immediately, which began to be mobilized, but cannot be worn, since uniforms of two rifle divisions remained at the former deployment points.
    The compounds have lost part of the weapon, which is being specified.
    The 11th Army - the headquarters and the Military Council of the Army, according to some reports, was captured or died. The Germans captured the cipher document. The 5th, 33th, 188th, 128th infantry divisions do not know in what condition and where they are. Many laggards and runaways, detained in the direction of Dvinsk. A lot of weapons are thrown. The 11th Army is not an organized combat formation.
    In Vilnius, the deployment of a new army group is imperative. Due to the replenishment of apparently dead divisions, I ask you to allow the formation of new four rifle divisions.
    I ask you to strengthen the front with ten artillery regiments account of the dead. The 11th Infantry Division is fresh, but its howitzer artillery regiment is defeated by aviation.
    The air forces of the front suffered heavy losses of a small number of airfields. At this time, they are not able to effectively support, cover ground troops and attack the enemy.
    Crews saved 75%. Losses of the material part of 80%.
    I ask you to strengthen the front with three mixed aviation divisions. To replenish parts of the air forces of the front with material parts, first of all, with flight personnel.
    I ask for the release of 200 thousand sets of uniforms and equipment for providing mobilized and for the new four rifle divisions of weapons. The 22nd, 24th rifle corps are mobilized in winter apartments. The 29th Rifle Corps moved east of Vilnius. I’ll clarify the situation. Dvinsk direction. Dvinsk was occupied by enemy tanks. He demanded to restore the situation. In view of the enemy bombing of communications centers and the destruction of their hostile elements, communications are poor.
    I ask you on 26.6.41 to transfer at my disposal three bomber and two fighter divisions to strengthen the air forces.
    I ask you to include six new rifle divisions in the front instead of the former territorial divisions redeployed for retraining.
    F. Kuznetsov Dibrova P. Klenov
    - Report of the commander of the North-Western Front on June 26, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the situation at the front by 20 hours 35 minutes on June 26, 1941, F. 221, op. 2467ss, d.39, l. 346-348.
  14. +1
    October 3 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    But in any case - it’s the complete merit of GSh-Zhukov — these crazy plans for the event of war, which, together with the failure to fulfill Zhukov’s orders in the districts in early June and by the 21st, led to the tragedy of June 22 ...

    Zhukov wrote his projects himself by hand, and Tymoshenko ruled. Formally, he did not have the right to DO NOT READ the proposals of the NGS - critically graphically.
    1. VS
      -2
      October 4 2017
      wrote - Vasilevsky))) Therefore, it was these two who later lied most of all to the tyrant - he did not give it, he did not give this)))
  15. +1
    October 5 2017
    Quote: Salute
    there is something to think about ...

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. The comment was deleted.
  18. +2
    October 10 2017
    Quote: Salute
    Probably, it is believed that at least a day before the outbreak of hostilities, reconnaissance will be able to track the movement of German troops and shock groups of motorized forces to the border.

    In the ciphers of RO Pribovo in the General Staff of the General Staff, whole lists of Wehrmacht division numbers were reported near the borders, but they did not contain 6 units, which eventually quickly crossed the Neman, went along the seashore, besieged and took Liepaja, in which there was the MOST IMPORTANT Baltic Fleet base, the fortress times of the Republic of Ingushetia, powerful coastal and railway artillery, arsenals and warehouses, and a garrison — the strength of a division (at least 10000 men) of our troops. The German population is 6 pd on 22.06.41/14000/72. - OK. 37. IT WAS NOT STRENGTHENED BY TANKS, she broke through the border with the Neman crossing and took Liepaja ONLY with full-fledged military units and weapons - a couple of dozen armored personnel carriers, a motorcycle battalion, 20 anti-tank battalions of 150 mm caliber and about the same amount of FIELD company, battalion, regiment and division artillery calibres from 130 to 180 mm. Ours in Liepaja even had long-range guns of caliber from 22.06.41 to XNUMX mm with full ammunition in full combat readiness. The garrison of Liepaja is believed to have accomplished a heroic feat and held out for about a week, having lost THOUSAND people killed, wounded and captured - and ingloriously surrendered to the enemy the most important fleet base, including the Navy air base, where XNUMX. was our Aviation Regiment. Who and how explained the defeat in this particular case? What documents are there on the defense and surrender of Liepaja? What is the role of the NWF in this, and what is the NK RKKVMF, General Staff of the Red Army and the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet?
  19. +2
    October 10 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    DON'T NEED TO THINK Nonsense that these orders were given contrary to the General Staff))

    Rear Admiral, Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Two-Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF), military historian Vladimir Pavlovich Masyagin spoke about the tragic and heroic events in the history of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet during the Great Patriotic War in an exclusive interview with Zvezda: “The most powerful blow to the Baltic the fleet came not from the sea and not from the air, but from the land. At 4 hours 22 minutes on June 22, 1941, the Nazis launched an offensive in the area of ​​Polangen (now the city of Palanga). By 22 o’clock they had broken through to Libau. Despite the heroic defense of the naval base, Libau had to leave. As a result, the fleet lost several more ships, and the Lenin destroyer, which was under repair, and immediately 6 submarines were blown up with their own hands: S-1, M-71, M-80, M-83, Ronis and Speedola. The 67th Infantry Division, which defended the city, died completely. Few managed to escape from the environment. ”
  20. 0
    October 18 2017
    Quote: Salute
    there is something to think about ...

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  21. The comment was deleted.
  22. +2
    November 4, 2017
    Where is the promised sequel? wink
    1. VS
      -5
      November 5, 2017
      Yes, maybe it’s better and not worth it to do)))
      1. +7
        November 5, 2017
        Everyone has the right to read what he likes. I like.
        Do not like it - do not read
  23. 0
    December 10 2021
    Sorry, a question for the author.
    Where can you find a screenshot of the document of the operative bulletin No. 01 22-00 21.06.41. And whose summary is it?
    Front or district?
    And, if possible, please provide the details of the archival storage.
    Really needed!

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"