The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 4)
Preface.
Further consideration of materials related to the German attack on the USSR will be difficult due to the lack of information about the pre-war period. To focus only on the memoirs of the participants of those actions that are not supported by documents (at least indirectly) is not advisable.
For example, the memoirs of the respected admiral N. Kuznetsov, published after the publication of G. Zhukov’s memoirs, lost some fragments of text that did not correspond to the official version of the beginning of the war. It cannot be ruled out that other participants in the initial period of the war under pressure from “above,” or in order to eliminate their mistakes, or “fitting into the general version of events” could correct the chain of events. Therefore, the author will describe his version of events, which is also not supported by documentary materials. I apologize in advance to those readers who have a different point of view. Perhaps it is better to stop and not read the author's nonsense ...
The following abbreviations are used in the text: VO - military district, Armed forces - General Staff, KA - Red Army, md - motorized division, mk - mechanized corps, NS - chief of staff, PM - typewriter, RU - intelligence agency , sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), UR - fortified area, etc. - tank division, PMC - member of the military council, SHO - encryption department (department), CMM - encryption machine, ST - cipher telegram (encryption).
The 3 portion of the message stated that from April 27 to 9, 1941 of the year changed conceptual concept building "Cover Plans ..." spacecraft.
16.04.41 - The People's Commissar and the Head of the General Staff presented to I. Stalin a “Note ...”, in which they set forth their vision of the “Plans ...” built on the preemptive attack of the German Armed Forces until the end of their concentration against the USSR.
Since July, 1940, the scenarios of the war games envisaged an attack by Hitler's Germany on the USSR. After repelling aggression, Soviet troops transferred military operations to the territory of the Third Reich. Information about games regularly reaches the leader. In March, 1941, the senior management of NGOs and the General Staff, decided that it was not worthwhile to “waste time on trifles” and “aim a blow” at a preemptive strike against the non-concentrated German armed forces.
26.04 - Directives for the development of “Plans ...”, based on the provisions of the specified “Notes ...”, have been sent to cross-border HEs. The author believes that the leaders of the SC without informing Stalin would not have decided to send such Directives to the troops.
10, 12 and 14 of May - S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov are present at the meetings with I. Stalin. 14-th numbers in VO leave the new Directive on the urgent development of "Plans ...". New plans should include only defensive actions of spacecraft with a possible retreat to the old boundaries.
With the departure of the new Directives, the previous “Plans ...” were canceled. The result was a paradoxical situation: old cover documents (red bags) were removed from the KA troops and no new ones were introduced.
THEIR. Baghramyan - the former head of the operations department of KOVO: “... The troops directly involved in covering the state border ... had detailed plans and documentation up to the regiment inclusive.”
P.I. Abramidze - commander of 72 sd (8 ck, 26-I army): "...The division command did not know the contents of the defense plans. After opening the red packets, everyone was convinced that all the defensive work on securing the state border, all command and staff exercises with access to the field in June proceeded from the plans... »
P.I. Lyapin - former NSH of the 10 Army ZOVOV: “...We repeatedly reworked the defense plan of the state border of 1941 from January to the very beginning of the war, but we didn’t finish it. The last change to the operational directive of the district was received by me on May 14 in Minsk. It ordered 20 in May to complete the development of the plan and submit it for approval to ZOVOVO headquarters. I reported to 20 on May: “The plan is ready, approval by the district commander is required in order to start developing the executive documents”. But the call did not wait until the beginning of the war ...»
P.P. Sobennikov - Commander of the 8-th Army PribOVO: “...The plan was not brought to the troops. However, the troops stationed at the border were engaged in the preparation of field fortifications at the border and were focused almost on their tasks in the defense sectors.»
I.P. Shlemin, the former chief of staff of the 11 Army, PribOVO: “... I did not see such a document, where the tasks of the 11 Army would be set out. In the spring of 1941, the district headquarters was an operational game, where each of the participants performed duties according to their position. It seems that this lesson explored the main issues of the state border defense plan. After that, with the commanders of divisions and their headquarters (5, 33. 28 sd), defensive lines were studied on the ground. Basic requirements and their training were communicated to the troops. A reconnaissance of the terrain was carried out with the headquarters of divisions and regiments in order to select defense lines and their equipment. ”
It turns out that only one variant of actions of the border troops of the spacecraft was developed - a full-scale war with Germany. Most likely, there was a short signal for action on this scenario. Additional instructions in the Directive led to the fact that there was no signal for such actions by the troops. This is a clear defect of the General Staff ...
The figure shows a draft of the first page of the document of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff I. Stalin on the deployment of the spacecraft (the document also discusses the option of a preemptive strike on Lublin). Changing the concept of "Plans ..." led to the fact that the document was probably not sent to the leader and remained in the form of a draft copy in the archive.
What could cause an unexpected change in the concept of spacecraft?
Maybe Stalin agreed with the opinion of the military about a preemptive strike on Germany, and then he realized that this was a wrong decision? On the actions of Stalin is somehow not similar.
Perhaps Stalin received a document justifying the erroneous concept of the leadership of the spacecraft and "opening his eyes"? If after so many years we do not know about such a document, then this version is unconvincing.
Received new intelligence information? If you look at the intelligence messages for the period from 27.04 to 10.05.41 (part of 1 and 2), then there is nothing special about them that could alarm Stalin. The number of German divisions on the border with the USSR on April 25 was estimated by XR KU was 95-100, and on May 5 - 103-107. Intelligence probably could not have caused the change in concept.
Received some political information about the possible collusion of third countries with Germany? And a pre-emptive strike by a spacecraft on Germany could lead to the creation of a united front against the USSR or to the transfer of all the power of German troops to the East?
Note NKGB №1451 / m 05.05.41 We are sending the contents of the telegrams of the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps on April 23 from 1941. "... Below I give a summary of my impressions of the state of Soviet-German relations in the context of recent events: ... 2. MilitaryThat beginning to be a force outside the partyare convinced that war is inevitable, but they long to delay it at least until winter...
8. The strongest counterweight is the fear that we can make a separate peace subject to the evacuation by Germans of the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler free hand in the East... »
Late in the evening on May 10 Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could learn about this on 11-12 May. Soviet intelligence reports published on Hess's flight date back to 14 in May (May 14 developed guidelines are already sent to the HEI). There is not enough information to review this version. We do not know what our intelligence reported on the “flirting” of Germany and England. until 10 May 1941 of the year. One can say that the Hess case is “dull and muddy”. The materials on the Hess case are classified, and we are unlikely to see them with the existence of England. A few months before the release of Hess, they were hanged (the British guarded the prison at that time). Very similar to B. Berezovsky’s murder after he asked V.V. Putin's take it back. And the brazen ones "lit up" ...
Readers can choose any version that they like best, or push their own, but what was really the root cause - we will not know.
For the presented variants of events, it turns out that it was I. Stalin who initiated the change of concept. He convinced (or better to say - forced) the Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff to change his vision for the concept of "Plans ..." and for the initial period of hostilities. If a person is forced to do what he does not want (does not believe), then he happens to work "carelessly". The leadership of the spacecraft knew that once there would be a war with Germany, but it could not believe that Germany would attack the USSR in the near future by such “insignificant” forces (part of 2 and 3). In addition, the military was confident that after the start of the battle on the border, the collision of the main forces of the warring countries would happen only in 3 days. Consequently, they will have time to bring their main forces on alert.
24 May 1941 was held a large meeting with Stalin with the command of the spacecraft and military academy, where the issues developed by (KOVO and ZOVOVO) and the plans being developed (PribOVO and OdVO) were to be discussed. The meeting from the VO was attended by the commanders of the districts and the Air Force, the FVS VO, and the NS were not present. Although it was the NS (with the heads of operations departments) that developed new plans. The version that they needed to lead the districts during the absence of commanders is not consistent due to the presence of deputy commanders in the higher education institutions.
And what is happening in the troops of the Western IN in the last peaceful days? The leader “pushed” the military to prepare the troops of the Western Military Institution for defense ...
The KOVO concentrates the SK from the North Caucasian Military District, which does not obey the command of the VO. The arrival of the 16th Army, which will be part of the KOVO, is expected. Other armies are coming. From June 11-12, the KOVO SK reserves (later, ZAPOVO) begin to move with a deadline of reaching the border until 01.07.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. It seems that there is a buildup of forces that the NGO is trying to equalize with the German Armed Forces at our border. But nothing changes regarding the divisions already located at the border. There is even an order from the chief of the General Staff that these compounds are allowed to be moved only on his special order. Aviation located at major airfields. The AC leadership is actively fighting the VO command: not allowing it to give a command to occupy the pre-field and the bunkers (viewed from the German side - in the telegram of the General Staff there was such a wording).
The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff are obliged, of course, to know that according to the cover plans, the time for occupying the defense with the first echelon divisions was:
- PribOVO - 13-16 hours (average operational density per division - 33 km);
- Consumers - 3-16 hours (average operational density per division - 47 km). Exit to the concentration areas of the 2 tier troops - 4-24 h (6 kk - up to 48 h);
- KOVO - 3-19 hours (average operational density per division - 50 km). Exit to the concentration areas of the 2-tier troops - 7-24 h;
- OdVO - 4-70 hours (average operational density per division - 90 km). Exit to the concentration areas of other troops - in 30-100 hours.
18 June, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff is sent on bringing the troops of the border VO into combat readiness by June 21. True, no one saw this Directive, but many know that it is.
What could be an indicator of military training for war? First of all, these are the compounds that are most important and may be affected by an unexpected attack: the Air Force and the Air Force. About the movement of aviation less published information compared with the data on the MK. What happened to the MK before June 22?
SOBOVO. 6 micron (1131 tanks). Received an order for combat alert in 2-20 22 of June.
11 microns (414). No data. 29 TD was displayed in the area of concentration under the attacks of the enemy aircraft.
13 microns (282). Received an order of combat alarm after 2-00 22 of June.
14 microns (518). Received an order for combat alert in 3-30 22 June. 205 md is alarmed after 4-00, 30 td - in 4-15, 22 td - after the enemy began shelling.
17 microns (63). No data. Made by 23.06.41.
20 microns (94). In 18-00 22.06.41 without a combat alarm, received a combat order.
With ZOVOV everything is clear - it was already said that the military command ignored the General Directive. And this is strange, because The directive is addressed to the Military Council of the VO, which also includes the EOM. The CHVS was obliged to inform the Political Department of ignoring the Directive of the General Staff, and he “did not signal” ... And he was not shot for it ... And was there anything to report about?
LenVO. 1 mic. The outbreak of war met in places of deployment. 10 microns. 22.06.41 after the start of the war MK is alarmed.
OdVO: 2 microns и 18 microns. The 9 Army’s combat logbook reads: “In 24 00-21.06.41 XNUMX [meaning on the night of 21 on June 22] by army telegraphic order, units of the army covering the border are alerted on alert. An order has been given to occupy the areas according to the cover plan. ”
KOVO. 4 micron (979). By order of the commander of the 6 Army N.I. Muzychenko 20.06.41 on alarm raised 8 etc. The antiaircraft artillery divisions 8 td and 81 md, which were deployed to cover the locations of their divisions, were recalled from the Lviv camp. 32 TD - raised in 2-00, and 81 md - in 3-15 22.06.41g.
8 microns (898). Raised on alert in 5-40 22.06.41.
9 microns (298). Before the start of the war, he did not advance to the reserve area
15 microns (749). AT 4-45 alarm alert declared.
16 microns (482). No data. Nomination started on June 9-00.
19 microns (453) The night of 19 on 20 June at the disposal of the KOVO command, the corps was withdrawn from permanent locations and concentrated in the reserve area. 20.06.41 removed ammunition and food depots.
22 microns (712). No data, combat log is lost in the environment. It is known that with the start of the war, the MK acted according to cover plans.
24 microns (222). No data. He was part of the KOVO reserves.
We see that KOVO, OVO, LVO as well as Pavlov, do not seek to comply with the Directive of the General Staff of 18 June ...
I would like to draw your attention to the following detail. AT 1 It was mentioned that 18 June in the area of responsibility 15 sk crossed the border sergeant-major German army with information about the beginning of the war. From where he could get it, this is not a question of this topic. The very existence of this defector in the media is questioned - they say, it came up with the commander 15 sk Fedyuninsky. After a conversation with the defector I. Fedyuninsky called the commander of 5 – th army Potapov. If such a fact took place, then Potapov was obliged to report on him to the command of KOVO.
On the night from 19 to 20 June, with the consent of the KOVO command, the 19 MK rises (even food and ammunition are exported). Only one MK. 19 MK was intended for combat operations in the zone of the 5 army and was included in its structure 5-th after the start of the war. Perhaps they decided, under the specious pretext, to cover up the direction in which the provocation was expected ... With the permission of the commander of the 5 Army, I. Fedyuninsky advanced two regiments of 45 and 62 sf into the forests to the border (on the assumption of the UR), under the pretext of speeding up the construction of fortifications, and artillery regiments of the divisions were called up from the range. This is not a fiction, but a documented fact. 15 ck on the orders of Potapov goes up in alarm about 1-30 22 of June.
From the memoirs of K. Rokossovsky: "... But in the evening [21 June] someone from our headquarters reported on the line of the border troops that the German army had crossed over to the outpost ... and states: On June 10, the Germans would attack the Soviet Union. "Do you not find it strange? How can it be that the commander writes about rumors in his headquarters without specifying Nameless? Defector A. Liskov crossed the border to 22-21 00 June, but no one could talk to him in German and so he was sent to the frontier detachment. In the frontier detachment he testified about the beginning of the war only at 1 am on June 21 ... From the memoirs of I. Fedyuninsky: "June 22, returning from the exercise area, came to me l MK commander Gen. KK Rokossovsky. We talked frankly. Rokossovsky shared my concerns ... " So was the defector or not?
Let's see what is known about the Nomination of SK KOVO. 27 ck (5 th Army) - on the declaration of a combat alarm before the outbreak of war - no data. 6 ck (6-I army) - before the war did not rise. 12 Army I: 13 ck - no data, 17 ck - did not rise. 8 ck (26-I army) - no data. Corps of district subordination (some of them were nominated to the border by the Directive of the General Staff): 7 ck - at dawn, the General Staff transmitted information about the beginning of the war in clear text - the UK accepted the information; 31 ck - arrival at the place of deployment 28.06.41; 36 ck - arrival at 22-00 24.06.41; 37 SC - was in reserve VO; 55 ck - no data.
PribOVO. 3 micron (651) 18.06.41 all parts of the corps are alarmed and removed from the places of permanent deployment. 12 microns (749) 16.06.41 to 23-10 Received the directive of the PribOVO headquarters on covert redeployment. 18.06.41 com corps Shestopalov gave order №0033 “On bringing the corps into combat readiness. Here is an example of the executive command!
From the answers of the military commanders to Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky. THEIR. Bagramyan: “... Covering troops (the 1 th operational echelon) deployed directly at the border and began to deploy under the cover of the ERA with the start of hostilities. Their advance in advance to the prepared positions of the General Staff was forbidden, in order not to give a reason for provoking a war by fascist Germany ... MK in the points of permanent deployment were raised on alert and began to advance to areas of concentration with the start of hostilities ... "
N.P. Ivanov - the former chief of staff of the 6 Army: “... The 4-y MK was withdrawn from the city of Lvov and located in the forests west of the city ... At the time of the sudden attack of the enemy, artillery, machine-gunners, and sappers gathered. Because of this, the compounds were organizationally fragmented. A part of the troops was located in the camps, having stockpiles of armaments and materiel at the points of permanent deployment. ”
B.A. Fomin - the former deputy head of the operational department of Zapovo: “... By the beginning of the air strike (in 3-50) and artillery preparation (in 4-00), the enemy managed to turn around and take up the defense of the state border: in 3 army - control of 4 ck, 27 and 56 sd; in the 10 Army, control 1 and 5 ck, 2, 8, 13 and 86 cd; in the 4 army - 6 and 75 sd. In the process of promotion were attacked 85 and 42 sd ... "
It turns out that out of five VO only one fulfilled the directive. and one more performed its interest on 20-30. They are all conspirators or The directive of the General Staff from 18 Jun simply did not exist? What about PribOVO? Why in this VO troops were alerted in advance? We will examine the events in PribOVO in the next part of the report, in which it will be shown that the events in PribOVO are not related to the Directive ... It turns out that the unknown Directive of the General Staff is a figment of the imagination of those who did not understand the real reasons for military activities in the prewar period . Knowing now about the attitude of S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov to a possible beginning full-scale war (not provocative actions) on the 20 of June 1941 of the year, it is possible to understand why such a Directive could not be sent to the troops.
Now we look at some technical details Transfer Directive No. 1 from 21.06.41.
A large number of Directives on the redeployment of troops has a "SS / OV" stamp. Therefore, Directive No. 1 should have been of “special importance”. Documents with such a stamp can be transmitted over communication lines only after they are processed using a cipher. Below we will look at the various options of Directive No. XXUMX. The strange thing is that when writing it in the General Staff do not stamped secrecy, and in their own way they set "ss". This is another indication of the confusion when writing this Directive.
Consider the basics of encryption communication for that period. Each new military commander (from the commander and the NS division, and above), the head of the SHO was obliged to inform about the basics of a cryptographic link. The head of the General Staff, which is subordinate to the General Staff, was the supervisor of the SC's cryptographic communication. He was obliged to have an idea about encryption and temporary standards, including the equipment of SHO equipment of Western HE.
A cipher communication scheme can be individual (between two SHO) or circular (a higher SHO can send telegrams to a group of lower-level SHOs of the same level. For example, SHO VO directs SHT to SHO subordinate armies). For the cipher communication, the means of the so-called manual cipher or encryption technique could be used.
Manual cipher tools include ciphers and two thick books: one is designed to encrypt information (we use the conditional term: encryption - “З”, decoding - “P”), and the other for “P”. PCS were sets of five-digit groups of numbers. The cipherblock-note (the size of a cigarette case) had 40 sheets, which came off one by one, 50 of five-digit groups of numbers was printed on each sheet. The communication scheme for the manual cipher could be individual and circular.
The books "3" and "P" contain phrases that are used in operational documents of headquarters, phrases, individual words or their roots, prepositions, endings, individual letters, numbers and punctuation marks. In the book "Z", the search was carried out by combinations of letters (as in any dictionary), and in the book "P" by the first numbers.
The process of "3" text was fairly simple, but lengthy. For example, if PC began with the words: “Army Commander ...”, then in the book “Z” the phrase “Army Commander” was searched for, which corresponded to a five-digit number. To each digit, the cipherblock note was added to the digit of the first group of the sheet and the new digit was recorded. Thus, a new five-digit number was formed. When "P" was carried out inverse calculations. Depending on the qualification of the specialist, fatigue, time of day and other factors, information processing could be 300-500 groups / hour. With constant work with a manual cipher, it was possible (at times) to reach speeds of up to 600 groups / hour or more.
There was a standard according to which the processing time of STS in an SHO should not exceed 40 minutes (from receiving outgoing STS to transmitting it to a communication center or from receiving from a communication center to decrypting and reporting to the command (if there is urgent information)). Specialists worked quickly and a lot, but for exceeding the time limit (if not “flying by”) they were not particularly punished.
By June 1941, many SHOWs at large headquarters were equipped with the M100 ciphering equipment (CMM for communication between the General Staff, HE, People's Commissariat and other services, between which strategic and operational-strategic information circulates) and K-37 (at the operational-tactical level the army “Corps — division) K-37 was essentially an electromechanical compact disk coding machine (less robustness compared to BL). Both machines allowed encrypting telegrams at speeds up to 300 characters (up to 60 five-digit groups) per minute, but this was the design speed. CMM could exercise only individual connection.
CMM M-100 used disposable ciprotales for information (3) and (3) of the main nodes — a keyboard with contact groups, a tape drive mechanism with a transmitter, and a device installed on a PM keyboard. It was possible to print the text (“Z” or “P”) on the telegraph tape directly from the CM or on a sheet through the fixture on the PM. The CMM keyboard was not intended for typing punctuation marks. Therefore, when typing used the terms "point" and others. For a more beautiful design of PCs (after “P”), as well as due to the presence of official information, PCS were reprinted at the PM. The proprietary information contained in PCs was allowed to be painted over with black paint, but beauty requires sacrifices ... and encryption was reprinted at the PM. The PCs received from the SHO at the communication center were required to be redirected for transmission by telegraph or using radio communications. This required additional time costs.
The speed of information processing with “Z” depending on the qualifications, fatigue, time of day and the artist's handwriting could be from 1500 to 2900 groups / hour, and with “P” - from 1000 to 2100 groups / hour. The drop in speed is due to the fact that you had to type on the “abracadabra” cryptographic technique (text consisting of random letters).
On the night from 21 to 22 June, the HS and VO cryptographers could work at a speed of “3” - up to 2000 groups / hour, and with “P” - up to 1600.
The concept of “urgency category” for PCs did not exist in the prewar period — information was transmitted “as quickly as possible”, but not exceeding the specified standards. If necessary, the STS forms were accompanied by the text “Cipher. Decrypt (transmit) immediately. " Some PCS included the text “Report Immediately”. In wartime, specialists should be sent to the nodes of the People's Commissariat of Communications to monitor the time for passing information marked "Air".
Each outgoing PCN number means that it is sent to one address (for individual communication) or to several addresses (for circular). For its processing in all SHO uses the same cipher suite.
If the same PC has several numbersthen there are two options. Option 1 - PCS is sent to different addresses with which there is only an individual communication scheme. Option 2 - to speed up the passage of the PCS is divided into several parts and encrypt each part separately using a manual cipher, which can be sent to recipients circularly.
Consider the events of the last peaceful day, described in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova: “In the evening of June 21, KOVO’s Chief of Staff M. Purkaev called me and reported that a defector came to the border guards - German sergeant-major, arguing that German troops are entering their departure areas for an offensive that will begin on the morning of June 22. I immediately reported to the Commissar and I. Stalin ...
“Come with the People's Commissar for minutes in 45 to the Kremlin,” said Stalin.
Taking with them the draft directive to the troops, together with the people's commissar and lieutenant-general N. Vatutin we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed to at any cost achieve a decision on bringing the troops on alert ...
I read the draft directive. I. Stalin remarked:
- Now such a directive to give prematurely, perhaps the issue is still settled peacefully. It is necessary to give a short directive in which to indicate that an attack can begin with provocative actions of German units. The troops of the border VO should not succumb to any provocations so as not to cause complications.
Without wasting time, Vatutin and I went into another room and quickly drafted a draft directive of the People's Commissar. Returning to the office, they asked for permission to report. J. Stalin, having listened to the draft directive and read it again, made some amendments and handed it to the People's Commissar for signature ...
Approximately at 24 hours of 21 on June, the commander of KOVO, M. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on HF that, in addition to the defector, as reported by General M. Purkayev, another German soldier appeared in our units - 222 of the infantry regiment of 74 infantry division [corporal A. Liskov]. He swam across the river, came to the border guards and said that in 4 hours the German troops would go on the offensive. M. Kirponos was ordered to quickly send a directive to the troops to bring them to combat readiness. "
The author will further state his version of events, which is not supported by documentary facts and therefore cannot pretend to authenticity.
The military are quite sensitive to military ranks. If G. Zhukov wrote "sergeant", then it was hardly a "fendrich" or "corporal". There is information that Feldwebel crossed the 18 June border, and Ober-Feldwebel - 20. The author is more inclined towards the 18 number, when they could provide information about the war to the head of the General Staff. Until the evening of 21, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff did not conduct any actions known to us from the documents on bringing Western troops into combat readiness. Two orders of the People's Commissar of Defense against 19 and 20 of June are well known (Part 2) about the color of equipment and the masking of airfields with sufficiently long terms (from 1 to 20 of July). These orders have nothing to do with the expected war in 20-x of June.
June 20 G. Zhukov demanded that the commander of the troops PribOVO cancel the order on alerting the air defense system and the abolition of the blackout of cities.
The only thing that has been done by the GS is an indication of the organization of front-line control points, which only led to some confusion with the connection on the night from 21 to 22 June.
21 June in the early morning, the drug officer brought to L. Mehlis a new appointment to the position of the Head of the Political Administration.
From the diary of Dimitrov 21 June: “... I called Molotov in the morning. He asked to talk with Ios. Vissarionovich about the situation and the necessary instructions for the communist parties. Mol .: “The situation is unclear. Being a big game. Not everything depends on us. I will talk with I.V. If there is something special, I'll call you! ”
On the morning of June 21, the head of the RU received information from the source "X" from the German Embassy (Part 2):
“The embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. A Tippelskirch meeting is taking place at 4. Source convinced that the war will start in the next 48 hoursStalin could have seen this message in the afternoon. In the same period, messages from "Maro" ("... the attack is scheduled for June 22 ...") and "Costa" ("... a military clash of 21 or 22 of June ...").
According to the memoirs of General D. Zhuravlev, commander of 1 Moscow Corps of Moscow, 21 of June in 18-35 he received an order from J. Stalin to call from camps and put half of all the troops at his disposal.
The commander of the Moscow Military District, I. Tyulenov: “At noon, Poskrebyshev called me from the Kremlin:“ Comrade Stalin will talk to you ... ”In the telephone I heard a deaf voice:“ Comrade Tyulenov, what about the air defense of Moscow? ”I briefly reported to the head government on air defense measures taken on today, 21 Jun. In response, I heard: "Consider, the situation is restless, and you should bring the combat readiness of the air defense forces of Moscow to seventy-five percent." As a result of this short conversation, I had the impression that Stalin received new alarming information about the plans of Hitler's Germany. Link to this conversation Tyulenev present in the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov.
June 21 from 19-05 to 20-15 from Stalin is among others S. Timoshenko. J. Stalin dictates to Malenkov a document on the organization of fronts: “1. To organize the Southern Front as part of two armies with the seat of the military council in Vinnitsa.
2. The commander of the Southern Front is to appoint T. Tuleneva, leaving him the post of commander of the Moscow Military District ...
Assign the head of the GSh to t. Zhukov general leadership of the South-Western and Southern fronts, with departure to the site.
To entrust Meretskov with the general leadership of the Northern Front, on-site ... "
After 20-00, a special message from Golikov was delivered to Stalin: “In the morning the embassy was instructed to destroy all secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22.
Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. This is war».
Perhaps, I. Stalin feels that the leadership of the spacecraft is doing something wrong ... S. Timoshenko, G. Zhukov and S. Budyonny are invited to the meeting at 20-50. There are colleagues of Stalin: Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov (Budyonny among them). Vatutin, noted in his memoirs, is absent.
From the unpublished diary of S. Budyonny: “... Stalin informed us that the Germans, without declaring war on us, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. June 22 ... What we should and can do today and before dawn tomorrow 22.6.41.
Tymoshenko and Zhukov said that if the Germans attacked, we would break them at the border, and then on their territory.
I. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." He turned to me and asked: "What do you think?"
I suggested the following.
First, immediately remove all aircraft from the jokes and bring it into full combat readiness.
Secondly, the troops of the frontier guards, the military authorities, advance to the frontier and take up positions with them, proceed immediately to the construction of field fortifications.
Thirdly, in the same districts, to declare mobilization, as well as in the Moscow Military District, Volvo Military District and North Caucasian Military District.
Fourth, proceed to the establishment of a defensive line from the mouth of the river Pripyat, Zhlobin, Orsha, and along the river Zap. Dvina, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk and Riga ...
J. Stalin said: “Your considerations are correct” ... ”They decided to consider mobilization and rear defense lines in the future ...
S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov set off in 22-20 in the People's Commissariat of Defense to write a Directive.
People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov (November 1963, XNUMX): “... Naval Attachment Vorontsov arrived in Moscow around 18 hours 21 June 1941 g. At 21 an hour his report was assigned to me. He detailed his 40-45 minutes for a minute. “So — this is war?” I asked him. “Yes, this is war,” answered Vorontsov ...
In 23 hours I was called to Marshal S. Tymoshenko. With me was V. Alafuzov. When they entered the office, the People's Commissar, in his unbuttoned jacket, walked around the office and dictated something. The head of the General Staff, G. Zhukov, sat at the table and, without stopping, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notebook lay to his left: it means a long time has passed since they returned from the Kremlin ... and prepared instructions to the districts.
“The attack of the German fascist troops is possible, the fleets must be brought to full combat readiness,” S. Timoshenko began the conversation. According to him, the order to bring the troops on alert to repel the anticipated enemy attack was received personally from I. Stalin, who by then already had, apparently, relevant reliable information ...
S. Timoshenko showed us a telegram just written by G. Zhukov. Alafuzov and I read it. It was addressed to the districts, and only one conclusion could be drawn from it - as soon as possible, without wasting a minute, to give the order to transfer the fleets to operational readiness No. 1. I was particularly worried about the situation of the Baltic fleetlocated dangerously close to the enemy ...
Without losing time, V. Alafuzov ran (precisely by running) to headquarters to give an emergency radiogram with one conditional signal ... which the whole machine would turn on. A few more questions to the Commissar: what are his latest data, is it possible to open fire on the attacker without warning, and I also went to my place ... “Connect with the commander of the Baltic Fleet,” I ordered the adjutant as I passed through the reception room. It was already 23 30 hours minutes 21 June 1941 G. "
The spacecraft's leadership did not put on guard that Admiral Alafuzov escaped to transmit the order on the transfer of fleets to combat readiness No. XXUMX (readiness No. XXUMX had already been announced in the fleet). Who knows the oddities of the waterfowl ...
In the memoirs of N. Kuznetsov, it was not noted that the Commissar of Defense dictated the text of the Directive from a sheet of paper and, therefore, the Directive was born in this office. Below it will be shown that the variant of Directive No. XXUMX, shown by N. Kuznetsov, consisted of two sheets. Why, then, Admiral N. Kuznetsov wrote: "Several sheets of a large notebook lay to his left [Zhukov] "? Perhaps it was the drafts of previous versions of this document. This suggests that before the trip to the Kremlin, the spacecraft managers did not have a draft Directive and I. Stalin did not rule it. After returning from the Kremlin, they also did not have a full understanding, what should be reflected in the Military Directive. How could such a thing ever be?
The figure shows (supposedly) a draft of Directive No. XXUMX, signed by S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov. On the websites it is noted that on the back of the 1 sheet, among other marks, there is an indication of the last names of the coders: Agapov and Khramtsovsky. After G. Zhukov left the General Staff, Khramtsovsky would become his personal coder.
On the presented figure it is clear that Zhukov wrote in light purple ink, and Tymoshenko signed it in black. At the same time, the sheet contains edits in dark purple ink: “to mask her carefully”, Cross out a paragraph of text. According to reports published on sites, sheet 258 (2 Draft Sheet) written in pencil. The 258 sheet has a text that includes item d) of Directive No. 1.
The figure shows (supposedly) the text of Directive No. XXUMX. Since the form does not contain the name “Directive No. XXUMX” or “Order ...”, the term “Directive” will be used to refer to this document below.
The messages on the sites indicate that the PC contains the following notes: “Received by the SHO in 23-45 21 June 1941. The typist Gribova printed two copies in 23-50. The first copy of the typewritten copy was transferred to NKVMF. The second copy of the typewritten copy was given to Major General Pokrovsky A.P. The directive was sent to 00-30 in the LVO, ZOVO, KOVO, OdVO, PribOVO under the numbers: 19942, 19943, 19944, 19945, 19946 respectively. ”General P. Pokrovsky since October 1940 is adjutant of Marshal S. Budyonny.
1 SHS crossed out “at night"- the ruling text comrades, probably, considered that the attack would not occur on the night of June 22. Also, they should have understood that before the dawn, the command zone could not reach the troops. This shows that the top management of the spacecraft ignored the direct instructions of I. Stalin. If the CA leadership wanted to warn the troops about the attack on the night from 21 to 22 June, they were obliged to report the main provisions of the Directive to the HE through telephone. However, the top management of the spacecraft called the districts on another occasion ...
About 23-15 ... 23-20 Commissar N. Kuznetsov saw a draft of the Directive that got into the SHO in 23-45. Who saw the Directive and made edits after the departure of N. Kuznetsov? I. Stalin did not have time to show the Directive. Call? Stalin did not work with the texts on the phone. The information set out in the Directive belonged to the highest security classification, and telephone conversations with such a classification were forbidden to be conducted via HF. In addition, the leader could leave the Kremlin after 23 hours. It turns out that Stalin entrusted himself to the military and “didn’t fit in their affairs” that he didn’t watch the Directive? If the incredible happened and Stalin would give the amendment by phone (he literally complied with all the requirements and secrecy requirements too), we would see these edits on the draft Directive leaflet. And some edits appeared later ...
Who could edit the text of the draft PC after signing the Defense Commissar and the head of the General Staff? Only the person who expressed his proposals in Stalin's office is Semyon Budyonny. He sent a copy, which is not in the mailing list PC. S. Budyonny is located in the same building as Tymoshenko and Zhukov. Budyon does not need this lengthy Directive in the group of reserve armies (which he was assigned to command) - it can simply be destroyed in the same SHO GS, when the need for it disappears. It was he who could finish the text with a pencil on a sheet from Zhukov’s notebook, which was then assigned the number 258 in the archive (there can not be the last piece of PCS without a signature).
In 23-45 a draft got to the SHO. The typist to 23-50 printed copies. One copy was taken away by S. Budyonny, and the draft Directive went to the cryptographers.
In the Directive in blue underlined text that is not in the PC, adopted ZOVOVO. At the same time, it is present in the draft PC. This testifies to the fact that changes were made to the text of the PCS a second time. And this should have been done by a person who did not like the text of the Directive - it could have been Budyonny after receiving a copy. He could make changes with the consent of the signatories (or they were all in the SHO reception room). Editing deals with the deletion of the text "to keep troops dispersed and disguised" and "bring air defense to combat readiness." The above measures are carried out in the process of bringing the VO troops into combat readiness (go to the spare area, disguise and deploy air defense systems; to raise on alert all parts, including air defense units, both of the district subordination and of the divisions, corps, etc. that are part of). Of course, there is a version on the sites that the cryptographers were tired and missed the text. It does not happen ...
PC Directives have five numbers: from №19942 to №19946. This means that each VO has its own individual PC, each of which had to be dialed into a CMM.
The author estimated the length of PCs (according to PCs Zapovo for armies), which is about 205 groups. The length is approximate and we need only to estimate the time of transmission of PCs by different services. If the cryptographers worked with the above speeds, then it took about 6 minutes to process one PC with “Z”, and on its “P” it would take up to 8. We know that the draft is made on three sheets and two specialists worked with PC who were to work in parallel, passing the draft sheets to each other. The Deputy of the SHOD provided them with ciphers and collected the material to be sent to the communication center. In this case, one expert processed three PCs in a time around 18 minutes, and the other two PCS per 12. It turns out that, taking into account additional corrections, all five PCs could be handed over to the communications center before 00-30.
But there is another unaccounted factor: the SHO officer on duty had to find out where the VO command was and where to send the command post: to the VO headquarters or to the front command post. For each recipient had their own codes. PCs for HE headquarters will not be able to decipher at the front-line control point. Sending PCs to both addresses is to double the work that is under the control of the Chief of the General Staff.
From the memoirs of the Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Headquarters of the USSR M. Zakharov, who in June 1941 was the NS OdVO. In the evening of June 21, M. Zakharov was in Tiraspol on a field command post, equipped in case of war, and the commander of the military establishment still remained in Odessa.
“About 22 hours [probably a typo] 21 of June for the BODO apparatus I was summoned to negotiations from Odessa by the commander of the district. He asked if I could decipher the PC if I received it from Moscow. The commander was told that I can decipher any PC from Moscow. Again the question followed: "They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher PCs from Moscow?"
I was extremely surprised by the repetition of the request. I replied: "I report for the second time that I can decipher any PC from Moscow." The instruction was: “Expect receipt of special importance from Moscow. Special advice is given to you by the military council. ShT immediately decrypts and issues the appropriate instructions ...”
Assessing the situation, around 23 21 June I decided to call 14 th, 35 th and 48 st and NS 2 th QC commanders to the office ... All the following instructions were given to them:
1. Headquarters and troops to raise the alarm and withdraw from settlements.
2. Cover parts take their areas.
3. Establish communication with border units. ”
There is one inaccuracy - in the 9 Army Combat Log, it is written: “In 24-00 21.06.41, army units covering the border are put on alert by a telegraph order. An order was given to occupy the districts according to the cover plan. ”One thing can be said: NS OdVO assumed the responsibility to raise the district troops in alarm before receiving the Directive from Moscow. This is an act!
The author does not know how long it takes to send the PC by telegraph. Transmission of a PC text by telegraph is likely to be the same 8 minutes that are required for "P". Given the exchange of service information and preparation for reception (when a telegram is expected), this time may not exceed 10 minutes.
From Baghromian's memoirs: “... At 00-25 22 in June, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving a telegram from Moscow ... Only at half past two in the night did the reception of this lengthy Directive end ...”
Comment on this event and the time of "about half past two" is quite difficult - not enough information.
If this fact actually took place, then two reasons for such a long-term work with the Directive are likely.
1) a group of coders of the KOVO headquarters, moving to Tarnopol, mistakenly took ciphers related to the cipher communication scheme with the General Staff with the HE headquarters;
2) on the GSH communications node (or in the SHO) messed up the forms (each PCS is several forms of telegrams with a pasted telegraph tape with groups of letters). They transferred the forms in a different sequence to the communications center of the frontal control center or mixed up the forms from different PCs.
In the figure we see the Directive in the form of PC, printed on the PM in the SHO ZOVOVO. In order to reduce the time before sending from Zapovo to subordinate armies, the text was corrected directly on the letterhead of the incoming PC, turning it into outgoing with numbers 5203-5206.
PC entered SHO 01-45, sent 02-25. Forty minutes - met the standard. But time ?! Even if one person worked on the encryption technology, he would have managed, as we already know, in 20 minutes. Plus, the design of the outgoing journal is no more than five minutes. Total 25 minutes. The directive was waited at the HE and there should have been at least an 2-3 cryptographer in the SHO, which would shorten the processing time of the PC. Why did it take so long? From the presented materials only one follows - there was no encryption equipment in the subordinate armies. PCs from VO in the army were processed with a hand-held cipher (circular communication scheme). In this case, the text was conventionally divided into four parts, and each of them was encrypted as a separate PC. The length of PC in groups without books is impossible to determine. The time 02-35 is the time of sending from the communication node In the last part to all recipients.
The question is whether the head of the General Staff, the curator of the cipher service, should have known that the cipher communication and the time of transfer of PCs are missing in the transmission links of the VO-Armiya and Armiya-Korpus (not to mention the Korpus-Division). command) from the General Staff to the army will be at least 1,5 hours, and the “General Staff” to 3,5 hours? At best, packages would get a Directive around 4-00. In divisions, the cipher staff is even smaller - they would receive and decrypt the Directive around 6-00. Why did the leadership of NGOs and GSH do this? There are two options: 1) did not believe in the war at dawn of June 22 or 2) tried to shift all the responsibility "on the shoulders" of the VO leadership (by withdrawing from raising the troops in alarm and explaining how these troops act in the attack).
Also, no one from the top leadership of the spacecraft (including the leadership of the military academy and the army) thought about possible communication disruptions by enemy sabotage groups. It is simply not envisaged. You can’t blame them for this - they haven’t met with this yet ... Loss of communication at all levels is the "scourge" of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war. The author does not know who is to blame for this - but not the leader - that’s for sure.
About 23 of 21 on June 1941 of the year G. Zhukov warned the Western Military School NN about X-NUMX: “Expect special instructions!” General Klimovskiy reported on this to General D. Pavlov and ordered the commanders and 3, 10 and 4 Armies to be in their headquarters . No special instructions were given to them, except for “everyone to be ready.” At one o'clock in the morning 22, Generals Pavlov, Klimovskiy and ChVS, being at headquarters, received HF instructions from the People's Commissar of Defense in the morning to collect the heads of departments and divisions and a strange warning: "... be quieter and do not panic ... do not go on any provocation."
According to instructions received from Moscow, General Pavlov summoned the commanders of the armies to contact, ordering them to be constantly at command posts along with the heads of their headquarters and operational departments. The commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, at around one o'clock in the morning, 22 Jun, under his own responsibility, ordered to send sealed “red packets” to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the order of action for combat alert. These documents were kept in the army headquarters and were not handed over to the commanders of the formations because they were not approved.
The commander of the 3 Army, General Kuznetsov, who returned late on the evening of 21 June from a trip to the Avgustov region, received instructions from the district and summoned all the officers of the field administration and the political department of the army to the headquarters. In the second hour of the night, the commander ordered the corps and division commanders to be constantly at the telephones. About two o'clock in the morning 22 of June on HF Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov: "Raise troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately take up pillboxes and put them on full alert, put into action a plan to cover the state border."
At the same time, the district commander reported that an important document was being transmitted through secret communications. General Kuznetsov ordered to transfer the received text of the order to the corps and division commanders, to immediately return artillery and anti-aircraft units from training camps to their units. But by this time the connection with many of the army’s connections had already been lost.
At around midnight on 2 June, the wired communication between the district headquarters and the 22 Army, which could only be restored in 4-3, ceased. After the restoration of communication, the army commander received the order of General Pavlov to bring the troops on alert (PC with the order of the USSR People’s Commissar for Defense was received by the army leadership at 30 in the morning), transmitted by telegraph. To the question of General Korobkov, what measures were specifically allowed, the commander of the district replied: “Bring all units of the army on alert. Immediately begin to advance the 3 Division from the fortress to take up a prepared defensive position. Slowly occupy the pillboxes with parts of Brest UR. The regiments of the air division translate into field airfields. ”
Before 4 in the morning of June 22, General Korobkov managed to personally hand over the received order to NSN 6 and 42 sd, the commandant of Brest UR, and through 10 – 15 minutes the connection with the troops was again broken.
In the 10 Army, another 20 of June 1941 of the year, General K. Golubev, at a meeting with the command staff, ordered an increase in the combat readiness of the troops. The order to lift the troops to this army was received by phone personally from the district commander in 2-30 minutes on June 22, who ordered General Golubev: "Open the" red packets "and act as indicated." The order of the People’s Commissar for Defense No. 1, transmitted by cipher, was deciphered at the army headquarters after the outbreak of hostilities. The headquarters of the 10 Army immediately issued orders to the commanders of the corps and divisions to bring the troops into combat readiness and advance them to their defense sectors. To bring into combat readiness of artillery units that were at training camps in the area of Chervony Boer, the army artillery commander was urgently sent there. Everyone started to act too late ...
We now know that there were no directives from the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft to bring the military on alert from 18 on June 1941. The VO Directive on wearable ammunition, on equipped stores and ribbons for machine guns, on the number of loaded mines, shells, equipped combat equipment, etc. is present both in KOVO, ZAPOVO and OdVO - they reflected the position of the leadership of the General Staff.
The last thing we consider in this part of the message is the Directive PribOVO to the troops. It is different from all Directives. It can be seen how the leaders of PribOVO thought out their actions - they, too, were not given time to implement the actions set out in the Directive.
PC with the directive in the SHO IN was also typed in a hand-held cipher. PC came out a little longer and came out of six parts: №70 / w, №72 / w - №76 / w. Before the start of the war, the Directive did not reach the troops ...
MILITARY COUNCILS 8 and 11 ARMY 22 June 1941 2 hours 25 minutes
1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden attack of the Germans on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.
2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.
At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat the enemy.
I ORDER:
1. During the night on 22.6.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells.
In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.
2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.
3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.
4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.
5. The families of the commanding personnel of the 10, 125, 33 and 128 rifle divisions should be transported to the rear only if the border is crossed by large enemy forces.
6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:
a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;
b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.
7. The commander of the 11 Army immediately deployed the headquarters of the 126 Infantry Division and the possible number of infantry and artillery in the area of Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 Infantry Division will advance.
8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.
9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.
10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.
Commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov
Head of the Department of Political Propaganda of the District Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchy
District Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Maples
To be continued
Information