The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 4)

252
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 4)


Preface.
Further consideration of materials related to the German attack on the USSR will be difficult due to the lack of information about the pre-war period. To focus only on the memoirs of the participants of those actions that are not supported by documents (at least indirectly) is not advisable.



For example, the memoirs of the respected admiral N. Kuznetsov, published after the publication of G. Zhukov’s memoirs, lost some fragments of text that did not correspond to the official version of the beginning of the war. It cannot be ruled out that other participants in the initial period of the war under pressure from “above,” or in order to eliminate their mistakes, or “fitting into the general version of events” could correct the chain of events. Therefore, the author will describe his version of events, which is also not supported by documentary materials. I apologize in advance to those readers who have a different point of view. Perhaps it is better to stop and not read the author's nonsense ...

The following abbreviations are used in the text: VO - military district, Armed forces - General Staff, KA - Red Army, md - motorized division, mk - mechanized corps, NS - chief of staff, PM - typewriter, RU - intelligence agency , sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), UR - fortified area, etc. - tank division, PMC - member of the military council, SHO - encryption department (department), CMM - encryption machine, ST - cipher telegram (encryption).


The 3 portion of the message stated that from April 27 to 9, 1941 of the year changed conceptual concept building "Cover Plans ..." spacecraft.

16.04.41 - The People's Commissar and the Head of the General Staff presented to I. Stalin a “Note ...”, in which they set forth their vision of the “Plans ...” built on the preemptive attack of the German Armed Forces until the end of their concentration against the USSR.

Since July, 1940, the scenarios of the war games envisaged an attack by Hitler's Germany on the USSR. After repelling aggression, Soviet troops transferred military operations to the territory of the Third Reich. Information about games regularly reaches the leader. In March, 1941, the senior management of NGOs and the General Staff, decided that it was not worthwhile to “waste time on trifles” and “aim a blow” at a preemptive strike against the non-concentrated German armed forces.

26.04 - Directives for the development of “Plans ...”, based on the provisions of the specified “Notes ...”, have been sent to cross-border HEs. The author believes that the leaders of the SC without informing Stalin would not have decided to send such Directives to the troops.

10, 12 and 14 of May - S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov are present at the meetings with I. Stalin. 14-th numbers in VO leave the new Directive on the urgent development of "Plans ...". New plans should include only defensive actions of spacecraft with a possible retreat to the old boundaries.

With the departure of the new Directives, the previous “Plans ...” were canceled. The result was a paradoxical situation: old cover documents (red bags) were removed from the KA troops and no new ones were introduced.

THEIR. Baghramyan - the former head of the operations department of KOVO: “... The troops directly involved in covering the state border ... had detailed plans and documentation up to the regiment inclusive.”

P.I. Abramidze - commander of 72 sd (8 ck, 26-I army): "...The division command did not know the contents of the defense plans. After opening the red packets, everyone was convinced that all the defensive work on securing the state border, all command and staff exercises with access to the field in June proceeded from the plans... »

P.I. Lyapin - former NSH of the 10 Army ZOVOV: “...We repeatedly reworked the defense plan of the state border of 1941 from January to the very beginning of the war, but we didn’t finish it. The last change to the operational directive of the district was received by me on May 14 in Minsk. It ordered 20 in May to complete the development of the plan and submit it for approval to ZOVOVO headquarters. I reported to 20 on May: “The plan is ready, approval by the district commander is required in order to start developing the executive documents”. But the call did not wait until the beginning of the war ...»

P.P. Sobennikov - Commander of the 8-th Army PribOVO: “...The plan was not brought to the troops. However, the troops stationed at the border were engaged in the preparation of field fortifications at the border and were focused almost on their tasks in the defense sectors.»

I.P. Shlemin, the former chief of staff of the 11 Army, PribOVO: “... I did not see such a document, where the tasks of the 11 Army would be set out. In the spring of 1941, the district headquarters was an operational game, where each of the participants performed duties according to their position. It seems that this lesson explored the main issues of the state border defense plan. After that, with the commanders of divisions and their headquarters (5, 33. 28 sd), defensive lines were studied on the ground. Basic requirements and their training were communicated to the troops. A reconnaissance of the terrain was carried out with the headquarters of divisions and regiments in order to select defense lines and their equipment. ”

It turns out that only one variant of actions of the border troops of the spacecraft was developed - a full-scale war with Germany. Most likely, there was a short signal for action on this scenario. Additional instructions in the Directive led to the fact that there was no signal for such actions by the troops. This is a clear defect of the General Staff ...

The figure shows a draft of the first page of the document of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff I. Stalin on the deployment of the spacecraft (the document also discusses the option of a preemptive strike on Lublin). Changing the concept of "Plans ..." led to the fact that the document was probably not sent to the leader and remained in the form of a draft copy in the archive.



What could cause an unexpected change in the concept of spacecraft?

Maybe Stalin agreed with the opinion of the military about a preemptive strike on Germany, and then he realized that this was a wrong decision? On the actions of Stalin is somehow not similar.

Perhaps Stalin received a document justifying the erroneous concept of the leadership of the spacecraft and "opening his eyes"? If after so many years we do not know about such a document, then this version is unconvincing.

Received new intelligence information? If you look at the intelligence messages for the period from 27.04 to 10.05.41 (part of 1 and 2), then there is nothing special about them that could alarm Stalin. The number of German divisions on the border with the USSR on April 25 was estimated by XR KU was 95-100, and on May 5 - 103-107. Intelligence probably could not have caused the change in concept.

Received some political information about the possible collusion of third countries with Germany? And a pre-emptive strike by a spacecraft on Germany could lead to the creation of a united front against the USSR or to the transfer of all the power of German troops to the East?

Note NKGB №1451 / m 05.05.41 We are sending the contents of the telegrams of the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps on April 23 from 1941. "... Below I give a summary of my impressions of the state of Soviet-German relations in the context of recent events: ... 2. MilitaryThat beginning to be a force outside the partyare convinced that war is inevitable, but they long to delay it at least until winter...
8. The strongest counterweight is the fear that we can make a separate peace subject to the evacuation by Germans of the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler free hand in the East... »

Late in the evening on May 10 Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could learn about this on 11-12 May. Soviet intelligence reports published on Hess's flight date back to 14 in May (May 14 developed guidelines are already sent to the HEI). There is not enough information to review this version. We do not know what our intelligence reported on the “flirting” of Germany and England. until 10 May 1941 of the year. One can say that the Hess case is “dull and muddy”. The materials on the Hess case are classified, and we are unlikely to see them with the existence of England. A few months before the release of Hess, they were hanged (the British guarded the prison at that time). Very similar to B. Berezovsky’s murder after he asked V.V. Putin's take it back. And the brazen ones "lit up" ...

Readers can choose any version that they like best, or push their own, but what was really the root cause - we will not know.

For the presented variants of events, it turns out that it was I. Stalin who initiated the change of concept. He convinced (or better to say - forced) the Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff to change his vision for the concept of "Plans ..." and for the initial period of hostilities. If a person is forced to do what he does not want (does not believe), then he happens to work "carelessly". The leadership of the spacecraft knew that once there would be a war with Germany, but it could not believe that Germany would attack the USSR in the near future by such “insignificant” forces (part of 2 and 3). In addition, the military was confident that after the start of the battle on the border, the collision of the main forces of the warring countries would happen only in 3 days. Consequently, they will have time to bring their main forces on alert.

24 May 1941 was held a large meeting with Stalin with the command of the spacecraft and military academy, where the issues developed by (KOVO and ZOVOVO) and the plans being developed (PribOVO and OdVO) were to be discussed. The meeting from the VO was attended by the commanders of the districts and the Air Force, the FVS VO, and the NS were not present. Although it was the NS (with the heads of operations departments) that developed new plans. The version that they needed to lead the districts during the absence of commanders is not consistent due to the presence of deputy commanders in the higher education institutions.

And what is happening in the troops of the Western IN in the last peaceful days? The leader “pushed” the military to prepare the troops of the Western Military Institution for defense ...

The KOVO concentrates the SK from the North Caucasian Military District, which does not obey the command of the VO. The arrival of the 16th Army, which will be part of the KOVO, is expected. Other armies are coming. From June 11-12, the KOVO SK reserves (later, ZAPOVO) begin to move with a deadline of reaching the border until 01.07.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. It seems that there is a buildup of forces that the NGO is trying to equalize with the German Armed Forces at our border. But nothing changes regarding the divisions already located at the border. There is even an order from the chief of the General Staff that these compounds are allowed to be moved only on his special order. Aviation located at major airfields. The AC leadership is actively fighting the VO command: not allowing it to give a command to occupy the pre-field and the bunkers (viewed from the German side - in the telegram of the General Staff there was such a wording).

The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff are obliged, of course, to know that according to the cover plans, the time for occupying the defense with the first echelon divisions was:

- PribOVO - 13-16 hours (average operational density per division - 33 km);

- Consumers - 3-16 hours (average operational density per division - 47 km). Exit to the concentration areas of the 2 tier troops - 4-24 h (6 kk - up to 48 h);

- KOVO - 3-19 hours (average operational density per division - 50 km). Exit to the concentration areas of the 2-tier troops - 7-24 h;

- OdVO - 4-70 hours (average operational density per division - 90 km). Exit to the concentration areas of other troops - in 30-100 hours.

18 June, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff is sent on bringing the troops of the border VO into combat readiness by June 21. True, no one saw this Directive, but many know that it is.

What could be an indicator of military training for war? First of all, these are the compounds that are most important and may be affected by an unexpected attack: the Air Force and the Air Force. About the movement of aviation less published information compared with the data on the MK. What happened to the MK before June 22?

SOBOVO. 6 micron (1131 tanks). Received an order for combat alert in 2-20 22 of June.

11 microns (414). No data. 29 TD was displayed in the area of ​​concentration under the attacks of the enemy aircraft.

13 microns (282). Received an order of combat alarm after 2-00 22 of June.

14 microns (518). Received an order for combat alert in 3-30 22 June. 205 md is alarmed after 4-00, 30 td - in 4-15, 22 td - after the enemy began shelling.

17 microns (63). No data. Made by 23.06.41.

20 microns (94). In 18-00 22.06.41 without a combat alarm, received a combat order.

With ZOVOV everything is clear - it was already said that the military command ignored the General Directive. And this is strange, because The directive is addressed to the Military Council of the VO, which also includes the EOM. The CHVS was obliged to inform the Political Department of ignoring the Directive of the General Staff, and he “did not signal” ... And he was not shot for it ... And was there anything to report about?

LenVO. 1 mic. The outbreak of war met in places of deployment. 10 microns. 22.06.41 after the start of the war MK is alarmed.

OdVO: 2 microns и 18 microns. The 9 Army’s combat logbook reads: “In 24 00-21.06.41 XNUMX [meaning on the night of 21 on June 22] by army telegraphic order, units of the army covering the border are alerted on alert. An order has been given to occupy the areas according to the cover plan. ”

KOVO. 4 micron (979). By order of the commander of the 6 Army N.I. Muzychenko 20.06.41 on alarm raised 8 etc. The antiaircraft artillery divisions 8 td and 81 md, which were deployed to cover the locations of their divisions, were recalled from the Lviv camp. 32 TD - raised in 2-00, and 81 md - in 3-15 22.06.41g.

8 microns (898). Raised on alert in 5-40 22.06.41.

9 microns (298). Before the start of the war, he did not advance to the reserve area

15 microns (749). AT 4-45 alarm alert declared.

16 microns (482). No data. Nomination started on June 9-00.

19 microns (453) The night of 19 on 20 June at the disposal of the KOVO command, the corps was withdrawn from permanent locations and concentrated in the reserve area. 20.06.41 removed ammunition and food depots.

22 microns (712). No data, combat log is lost in the environment. It is known that with the start of the war, the MK acted according to cover plans.

24 microns (222). No data. He was part of the KOVO reserves.

We see that KOVO, OVO, LVO as well as Pavlov, do not seek to comply with the Directive of the General Staff of 18 June ...

I would like to draw your attention to the following detail. AT 1 It was mentioned that 18 June in the area of ​​responsibility 15 sk crossed the border sergeant-major German army with information about the beginning of the war. From where he could get it, this is not a question of this topic. The very existence of this defector in the media is questioned - they say, it came up with the commander 15 sk Fedyuninsky. After a conversation with the defector I. Fedyuninsky called the commander of 5 – th army Potapov. If such a fact took place, then Potapov was obliged to report on him to the command of KOVO.

On the night from 19 to 20 June, with the consent of the KOVO command, the 19 MK rises (even food and ammunition are exported). Only one MK. 19 MK was intended for combat operations in the zone of the 5 army and was included in its structure 5-th after the start of the war. Perhaps they decided, under the specious pretext, to cover up the direction in which the provocation was expected ... With the permission of the commander of the 5 Army, I. Fedyuninsky advanced two regiments of 45 and 62 sf into the forests to the border (on the assumption of the UR), under the pretext of speeding up the construction of fortifications, and artillery regiments of the divisions were called up from the range. This is not a fiction, but a documented fact. 15 ck on the orders of Potapov goes up in alarm about 1-30 22 of June.

From the memoirs of K. Rokossovsky: "... But in the evening [21 June] someone from our headquarters reported on the line of the border troops that the German army had crossed over to the outpost ... and states: On June 10, the Germans would attack the Soviet Union. "Do you not find it strange? How can it be that the commander writes about rumors in his headquarters without specifying Nameless? Defector A. Liskov crossed the border to 22-21 00 June, but no one could talk to him in German and so he was sent to the frontier detachment. In the frontier detachment he testified about the beginning of the war only at 1 am on June 21 ... From the memoirs of I. Fedyuninsky: "June 22, returning from the exercise area, came to me l MK commander Gen. KK Rokossovsky. We talked frankly. Rokossovsky shared my concerns ... " So was the defector or not?

Let's see what is known about the Nomination of SK KOVO. 27 ck (5 th Army) - on the declaration of a combat alarm before the outbreak of war - no data. 6 ck (6-I army) - before the war did not rise. 12 Army I: 13 ck - no data, 17 ck - did not rise. 8 ck (26-I army) - no data. Corps of district subordination (some of them were nominated to the border by the Directive of the General Staff): 7 ck - at dawn, the General Staff transmitted information about the beginning of the war in clear text - the UK accepted the information; 31 ck - arrival at the place of deployment 28.06.41; 36 ck - arrival at 22-00 24.06.41; 37 SC - was in reserve VO; 55 ck - no data.

PribOVO. 3 micron (651) 18.06.41 all parts of the corps are alarmed and removed from the places of permanent deployment. 12 microns (749) 16.06.41 to 23-10 Received the directive of the PribOVO headquarters on covert redeployment. 18.06.41 com corps Shestopalov gave order №0033 “On bringing the corps into combat readiness. Here is an example of the executive command!

From the answers of the military commanders to Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky. THEIR. Bagramyan: “... Covering troops (the 1 th operational echelon) deployed directly at the border and began to deploy under the cover of the ERA with the start of hostilities. Their advance in advance to the prepared positions of the General Staff was forbidden, in order not to give a reason for provoking a war by fascist Germany ... MK in the points of permanent deployment were raised on alert and began to advance to areas of concentration with the start of hostilities ... "



N.P. Ivanov - the former chief of staff of the 6 Army: “... The 4-y MK was withdrawn from the city of Lvov and located in the forests west of the city ... At the time of the sudden attack of the enemy, artillery, machine-gunners, and sappers gathered. Because of this, the compounds were organizationally fragmented. A part of the troops was located in the camps, having stockpiles of armaments and materiel at the points of permanent deployment. ”

B.A. Fomin - the former deputy head of the operational department of Zapovo: “... By the beginning of the air strike (in 3-50) and artillery preparation (in 4-00), the enemy managed to turn around and take up the defense of the state border: in 3 army - control of 4 ck, 27 and 56 sd; in the 10 Army, control 1 and 5 ck, 2, 8, 13 and 86 cd; in the 4 army - 6 and 75 sd. In the process of promotion were attacked 85 and 42 sd ... "

It turns out that out of five VO only one fulfilled the directive. and one more performed its interest on 20-30. They are all conspirators or The directive of the General Staff from 18 Jun simply did not exist? What about PribOVO? Why in this VO troops were alerted in advance? We will examine the events in PribOVO in the next part of the report, in which it will be shown that the events in PribOVO are not related to the Directive ... It turns out that the unknown Directive of the General Staff is a figment of the imagination of those who did not understand the real reasons for military activities in the prewar period . Knowing now about the attitude of S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov to a possible beginning full-scale war (not provocative actions) on the 20 of June 1941 of the year, it is possible to understand why such a Directive could not be sent to the troops.

Now we look at some technical details Transfer Directive No. 1 from 21.06.41.

A large number of Directives on the redeployment of troops has a "SS / OV" stamp. Therefore, Directive No. 1 should have been of “special importance”. Documents with such a stamp can be transmitted over communication lines only after they are processed using a cipher. Below we will look at the various options of Directive No. XXUMX. The strange thing is that when writing it in the General Staff do not stamped secrecy, and in their own way they set "ss". This is another indication of the confusion when writing this Directive.

Consider the basics of encryption communication for that period. Each new military commander (from the commander and the NS division, and above), the head of the SHO was obliged to inform about the basics of a cryptographic link. The head of the General Staff, which is subordinate to the General Staff, was the supervisor of the SC's cryptographic communication. He was obliged to have an idea about encryption and temporary standards, including the equipment of SHO equipment of Western HE.

A cipher communication scheme can be individual (between two SHO) or circular (a higher SHO can send telegrams to a group of lower-level SHOs of the same level. For example, SHO VO directs SHT to SHO subordinate armies). For the cipher communication, the means of the so-called manual cipher or encryption technique could be used.

Manual cipher tools include ciphers and two thick books: one is designed to encrypt information (we use the conditional term: encryption - “З”, decoding - “P”), and the other for “P”. PCS were sets of five-digit groups of numbers. The cipherblock-note (the size of a cigarette case) had 40 sheets, which came off one by one, 50 of five-digit groups of numbers was printed on each sheet. The communication scheme for the manual cipher could be individual and circular.

The books "3" and "P" contain phrases that are used in operational documents of headquarters, phrases, individual words or their roots, prepositions, endings, individual letters, numbers and punctuation marks. In the book "Z", the search was carried out by combinations of letters (as in any dictionary), and in the book "P" by the first numbers.

The process of "3" text was fairly simple, but lengthy. For example, if PC began with the words: “Army Commander ...”, then in the book “Z” the phrase “Army Commander” was searched for, which corresponded to a five-digit number. To each digit, the cipherblock note was added to the digit of the first group of the sheet and the new digit was recorded. Thus, a new five-digit number was formed. When "P" was carried out inverse calculations. Depending on the qualification of the specialist, fatigue, time of day and other factors, information processing could be 300-500 groups / hour. With constant work with a manual cipher, it was possible (at times) to reach speeds of up to 600 groups / hour or more.

There was a standard according to which the processing time of STS in an SHO should not exceed 40 minutes (from receiving outgoing STS to transmitting it to a communication center or from receiving from a communication center to decrypting and reporting to the command (if there is urgent information)). Specialists worked quickly and a lot, but for exceeding the time limit (if not “flying by”) they were not particularly punished.



By June 1941, many SHOWs at large headquarters were equipped with the M100 ciphering equipment (CMM for communication between the General Staff, HE, People's Commissariat and other services, between which strategic and operational-strategic information circulates) and K-37 (at the operational-tactical level the army “Corps — division) K-37 was essentially an electromechanical compact disk coding machine (less robustness compared to BL). Both machines allowed encrypting telegrams at speeds up to 300 characters (up to 60 five-digit groups) per minute, but this was the design speed. CMM could exercise only individual connection.

CMM M-100 used disposable ciprotales for information (3) and (3) of the main nodes — a keyboard with contact groups, a tape drive mechanism with a transmitter, and a device installed on a PM keyboard. It was possible to print the text (“Z” or “P”) on the telegraph tape directly from the CM or on a sheet through the fixture on the PM. The CMM keyboard was not intended for typing punctuation marks. Therefore, when typing used the terms "point" and others. For a more beautiful design of PCs (after “P”), as well as due to the presence of official information, PCS were reprinted at the PM. The proprietary information contained in PCs was allowed to be painted over with black paint, but beauty requires sacrifices ... and encryption was reprinted at the PM. The PCs received from the SHO at the communication center were required to be redirected for transmission by telegraph or using radio communications. This required additional time costs.

The speed of information processing with “Z” depending on the qualifications, fatigue, time of day and the artist's handwriting could be from 1500 to 2900 groups / hour, and with “P” - from 1000 to 2100 groups / hour. The drop in speed is due to the fact that you had to type on the “abracadabra” cryptographic technique (text consisting of random letters).

On the night from 21 to 22 June, the HS and VO cryptographers could work at a speed of “3” - up to 2000 groups / hour, and with “P” - up to 1600.

The concept of “urgency category” for PCs did not exist in the prewar period — information was transmitted “as quickly as possible”, but not exceeding the specified standards. If necessary, the STS forms were accompanied by the text “Cipher. Decrypt (transmit) immediately. " Some PCS included the text “Report Immediately”. In wartime, specialists should be sent to the nodes of the People's Commissariat of Communications to monitor the time for passing information marked "Air".

Each outgoing PCN number means that it is sent to one address (for individual communication) or to several addresses (for circular). For its processing in all SHO uses the same cipher suite.

If the same PC has several numbersthen there are two options. Option 1 - PCS is sent to different addresses with which there is only an individual communication scheme. Option 2 - to speed up the passage of the PCS is divided into several parts and encrypt each part separately using a manual cipher, which can be sent to recipients circularly.

Consider the events of the last peaceful day, described in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova: “In the evening of June 21, KOVO’s Chief of Staff M. Purkaev called me and reported that a defector came to the border guards - German sergeant-major, arguing that German troops are entering their departure areas for an offensive that will begin on the morning of June 22. I immediately reported to the Commissar and I. Stalin ...

“Come with the People's Commissar for minutes in 45 to the Kremlin,” said Stalin.

Taking with them the draft directive to the troops, together with the people's commissar and lieutenant-general N. Vatutin we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed to at any cost achieve a decision on bringing the troops on alert ...

I read the draft directive. I. Stalin remarked:
- Now such a directive to give prematurely, perhaps the issue is still settled peacefully. It is necessary to give a short directive in which to indicate that an attack can begin with provocative actions of German units. The troops of the border VO should not succumb to any provocations so as not to cause complications.

Without wasting time, Vatutin and I went into another room and quickly drafted a draft directive of the People's Commissar. Returning to the office, they asked for permission to report. J. Stalin, having listened to the draft directive and read it again, made some amendments and handed it to the People's Commissar for signature ...

Approximately at 24 hours of 21 on June, the commander of KOVO, M. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on HF that, in addition to the defector, as reported by General M. Purkayev, another German soldier appeared in our units - 222 of the infantry regiment of 74 infantry division [corporal A. Liskov]. He swam across the river, came to the border guards and said that in 4 hours the German troops would go on the offensive. M. Kirponos was ordered to quickly send a directive to the troops to bring them to combat readiness. "


The author will further state his version of events, which is not supported by documentary facts and therefore cannot pretend to authenticity.

The military are quite sensitive to military ranks. If G. Zhukov wrote "sergeant", then it was hardly a "fendrich" or "corporal". There is information that Feldwebel crossed the 18 June border, and Ober-Feldwebel - 20. The author is more inclined towards the 18 number, when they could provide information about the war to the head of the General Staff. Until the evening of 21, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff did not conduct any actions known to us from the documents on bringing Western troops into combat readiness. Two orders of the People's Commissar of Defense against 19 and 20 of June are well known (Part 2) about the color of equipment and the masking of airfields with sufficiently long terms (from 1 to 20 of July). These orders have nothing to do with the expected war in 20-x of June.

June 20 G. Zhukov demanded that the commander of the troops PribOVO cancel the order on alerting the air defense system and the abolition of the blackout of cities.

The only thing that has been done by the GS is an indication of the organization of front-line control points, which only led to some confusion with the connection on the night from 21 to 22 June.

21 June in the early morning, the drug officer brought to L. Mehlis a new appointment to the position of the Head of the Political Administration.

From the diary of Dimitrov 21 June: “... I called Molotov in the morning. He asked to talk with Ios. Vissarionovich about the situation and the necessary instructions for the communist parties. Mol .: “The situation is unclear. Being a big game. Not everything depends on us. I will talk with I.V. If there is something special, I'll call you! ”

On the morning of June 21, the head of the RU received information from the source "X" from the German Embassy (Part 2):

“The embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. A Tippelskirch meeting is taking place at 4. Source convinced that the war will start in the next 48 hoursStalin could have seen this message in the afternoon. In the same period, messages from "Maro" ("... the attack is scheduled for June 22 ...") and "Costa" ("... a military clash of 21 or 22 of June ...").

According to the memoirs of General D. Zhuravlev, commander of 1 Moscow Corps of Moscow, 21 of June in 18-35 he received an order from J. Stalin to call from camps and put half of all the troops at his disposal.

The commander of the Moscow Military District, I. Tyulenov: “At noon, Poskrebyshev called me from the Kremlin:“ Comrade Stalin will talk to you ... ”In the telephone I heard a deaf voice:“ Comrade Tyulenov, what about the air defense of Moscow? ”I briefly reported to the head government on air defense measures taken on today, 21 Jun. In response, I heard: "Consider, the situation is restless, and you should bring the combat readiness of the air defense forces of Moscow to seventy-five percent." As a result of this short conversation, I had the impression that Stalin received new alarming information about the plans of Hitler's Germany. Link to this conversation Tyulenev present in the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov.



June 21 from 19-05 to 20-15 from Stalin is among others S. Timoshenko. J. Stalin dictates to Malenkov a document on the organization of fronts: “1. To organize the Southern Front as part of two armies with the seat of the military council in Vinnitsa.
2. The commander of the Southern Front is to appoint T. Tuleneva, leaving him the post of commander of the Moscow Military District ...
Assign the head of the GSh to t. Zhukov general leadership of the South-Western and Southern fronts, with departure to the site.
To entrust Meretskov with the general leadership of the Northern Front, on-site ... "

After 20-00, a special message from Golikov was delivered to Stalin: “In the morning the embassy was instructed to destroy all secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22.
Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. This is war».

Perhaps, I. Stalin feels that the leadership of the spacecraft is doing something wrong ... S. Timoshenko, G. Zhukov and S. Budyonny are invited to the meeting at 20-50. There are colleagues of Stalin: Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov (Budyonny among them). Vatutin, noted in his memoirs, is absent.

From the unpublished diary of S. Budyonny: “... Stalin informed us that the Germans, without declaring war on us, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. June 22 ... What we should and can do today and before dawn tomorrow 22.6.41.

Tymoshenko and Zhukov said that if the Germans attacked, we would break them at the border, and then on their territory.

I. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." He turned to me and asked: "What do you think?"

I suggested the following.

First, immediately remove all aircraft from the jokes and bring it into full combat readiness.

Secondly, the troops of the frontier guards, the military authorities, advance to the frontier and take up positions with them, proceed immediately to the construction of field fortifications.

Thirdly, in the same districts, to declare mobilization, as well as in the Moscow Military District, Volvo Military District and North Caucasian Military District.

Fourth, proceed to the establishment of a defensive line from the mouth of the river Pripyat, Zhlobin, Orsha, and along the river Zap. Dvina, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk and Riga ...

J. Stalin said: “Your considerations are correct” ... ”They decided to consider mobilization and rear defense lines in the future ...

S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov set off in 22-20 in the People's Commissariat of Defense to write a Directive.

People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov (November 1963, XNUMX): “... Naval Attachment Vorontsov arrived in Moscow around 18 hours 21 June 1941 g. At 21 an hour his report was assigned to me. He detailed his 40-45 minutes for a minute. “So — this is war?” I asked him. “Yes, this is war,” answered Vorontsov ...

In 23 hours I was called to Marshal S. Tymoshenko. With me was V. Alafuzov. When they entered the office, the People's Commissar, in his unbuttoned jacket, walked around the office and dictated something. The head of the General Staff, G. Zhukov, sat at the table and, without stopping, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notebook lay to his left: it means a long time has passed since they returned from the Kremlin ... and prepared instructions to the districts.

“The attack of the German fascist troops is possible, the fleets must be brought to full combat readiness,” S. Timoshenko began the conversation. According to him, the order to bring the troops on alert to repel the anticipated enemy attack was received personally from I. Stalin, who by then already had, apparently, relevant reliable information ...

S. Timoshenko showed us a telegram just written by G. Zhukov. Alafuzov and I read it. It was addressed to the districts, and only one conclusion could be drawn from it - as soon as possible, without wasting a minute, to give the order to transfer the fleets to operational readiness No. 1. I was particularly worried about the situation of the Baltic fleetlocated dangerously close to the enemy ...

Without losing time, V. Alafuzov ran (precisely by running) to headquarters to give an emergency radiogram with one conditional signal ... which the whole machine would turn on. A few more questions to the Commissar: what are his latest data, is it possible to open fire on the attacker without warning, and I also went to my place ... “Connect with the commander of the Baltic Fleet,” I ordered the adjutant as I passed through the reception room. It was already 23 30 hours minutes 21 June 1941 G. "

The spacecraft's leadership did not put on guard that Admiral Alafuzov escaped to transmit the order on the transfer of fleets to combat readiness No. XXUMX (readiness No. XXUMX had already been announced in the fleet). Who knows the oddities of the waterfowl ...

In the memoirs of N. Kuznetsov, it was not noted that the Commissar of Defense dictated the text of the Directive from a sheet of paper and, therefore, the Directive was born in this office. Below it will be shown that the variant of Directive No. XXUMX, shown by N. Kuznetsov, consisted of two sheets. Why, then, Admiral N. Kuznetsov wrote: "Several sheets of a large notebook lay to his left [Zhukov] "? Perhaps it was the drafts of previous versions of this document. This suggests that before the trip to the Kremlin, the spacecraft managers did not have a draft Directive and I. Stalin did not rule it. After returning from the Kremlin, they also did not have a full understanding, what should be reflected in the Military Directive. How could such a thing ever be?

The figure shows (supposedly) a draft of Directive No. XXUMX, signed by S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov. On the websites it is noted that on the back of the 1 sheet, among other marks, there is an indication of the last names of the coders: Agapov and Khramtsovsky. After G. Zhukov left the General Staff, Khramtsovsky would become his personal coder.



On the presented figure it is clear that Zhukov wrote in light purple ink, and Tymoshenko signed it in black. At the same time, the sheet contains edits in dark purple ink: “to mask her carefully”, Cross out a paragraph of text. According to reports published on sites, sheet 258 (2 Draft Sheet) written in pencil. The 258 sheet has a text that includes item d) of Directive No. 1.



The figure shows (supposedly) the text of Directive No. XXUMX. Since the form does not contain the name “Directive No. XXUMX” or “Order ...”, the term “Directive” will be used to refer to this document below.

The messages on the sites indicate that the PC contains the following notes: “Received by the SHO in 23-45 21 June 1941. The typist Gribova printed two copies in 23-50. The first copy of the typewritten copy was transferred to NKVMF. The second copy of the typewritten copy was given to Major General Pokrovsky A.P. The directive was sent to 00-30 in the LVO, ZOVO, KOVO, OdVO, PribOVO under the numbers: 19942, 19943, 19944, 19945, 19946 respectively. ”General P. Pokrovsky since October 1940 is adjutant of Marshal S. Budyonny.

1 SHS crossed out “at night"- the ruling text comrades, probably, considered that the attack would not occur on the night of June 22. Also, they should have understood that before the dawn, the command zone could not reach the troops. This shows that the top management of the spacecraft ignored the direct instructions of I. Stalin. If the CA leadership wanted to warn the troops about the attack on the night from 21 to 22 June, they were obliged to report the main provisions of the Directive to the HE through telephone. However, the top management of the spacecraft called the districts on another occasion ...

About 23-15 ... 23-20 Commissar N. Kuznetsov saw a draft of the Directive that got into the SHO in 23-45. Who saw the Directive and made edits after the departure of N. Kuznetsov? I. Stalin did not have time to show the Directive. Call? Stalin did not work with the texts on the phone. The information set out in the Directive belonged to the highest security classification, and telephone conversations with such a classification were forbidden to be conducted via HF. In addition, the leader could leave the Kremlin after 23 hours. It turns out that Stalin entrusted himself to the military and “didn’t fit in their affairs” that he didn’t watch the Directive? If the incredible happened and Stalin would give the amendment by phone (he literally complied with all the requirements and secrecy requirements too), we would see these edits on the draft Directive leaflet. And some edits appeared later ...

Who could edit the text of the draft PC after signing the Defense Commissar and the head of the General Staff? Only the person who expressed his proposals in Stalin's office is Semyon Budyonny. He sent a copy, which is not in the mailing list PC. S. Budyonny is located in the same building as Tymoshenko and Zhukov. Budyon does not need this lengthy Directive in the group of reserve armies (which he was assigned to command) - it can simply be destroyed in the same SHO GS, when the need for it disappears. It was he who could finish the text with a pencil on a sheet from Zhukov’s notebook, which was then assigned the number 258 in the archive (there can not be the last piece of PCS without a signature).

In 23-45 a draft got to the SHO. The typist to 23-50 printed copies. One copy was taken away by S. Budyonny, and the draft Directive went to the cryptographers.

In the Directive in blue underlined text that is not in the PC, adopted ZOVOVO. At the same time, it is present in the draft PC. This testifies to the fact that changes were made to the text of the PCS a second time. And this should have been done by a person who did not like the text of the Directive - it could have been Budyonny after receiving a copy. He could make changes with the consent of the signatories (or they were all in the SHO reception room). Editing deals with the deletion of the text "to keep troops dispersed and disguised" and "bring air defense to combat readiness." The above measures are carried out in the process of bringing the VO troops into combat readiness (go to the spare area, disguise and deploy air defense systems; to raise on alert all parts, including air defense units, both of the district subordination and of the divisions, corps, etc. that are part of). Of course, there is a version on the sites that the cryptographers were tired and missed the text. It does not happen ...

PC Directives have five numbers: from №19942 to №19946. This means that each VO has its own individual PC, each of which had to be dialed into a CMM.

The author estimated the length of PCs (according to PCs Zapovo for armies), which is about 205 groups. The length is approximate and we need only to estimate the time of transmission of PCs by different services. If the cryptographers worked with the above speeds, then it took about 6 minutes to process one PC with “Z”, and on its “P” it would take up to 8. We know that the draft is made on three sheets and two specialists worked with PC who were to work in parallel, passing the draft sheets to each other. The Deputy of the SHOD provided them with ciphers and collected the material to be sent to the communication center. In this case, one expert processed three PCs in a time around 18 minutes, and the other two PCS per 12. It turns out that, taking into account additional corrections, all five PCs could be handed over to the communications center before 00-30.

But there is another unaccounted factor: the SHO officer on duty had to find out where the VO command was and where to send the command post: to the VO headquarters or to the front command post. For each recipient had their own codes. PCs for HE headquarters will not be able to decipher at the front-line control point. Sending PCs to both addresses is to double the work that is under the control of the Chief of the General Staff.

From the memoirs of the Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Headquarters of the USSR M. Zakharov, who in June 1941 was the NS OdVO. In the evening of June 21, M. Zakharov was in Tiraspol on a field command post, equipped in case of war, and the commander of the military establishment still remained in Odessa.

“About 22 hours [probably a typo] 21 of June for the BODO apparatus I was summoned to negotiations from Odessa by the commander of the district. He asked if I could decipher the PC if I received it from Moscow. The commander was told that I can decipher any PC from Moscow. Again the question followed: "They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher PCs from Moscow?"

I was extremely surprised by the repetition of the request. I replied: "I report for the second time that I can decipher any PC from Moscow." The instruction was: “Expect receipt of special importance from Moscow. Special advice is given to you by the military council. ShT immediately decrypts and issues the appropriate instructions ...”

Assessing the situation, around 23 21 June I decided to call 14 th, 35 th and 48 st and NS 2 th QC commanders to the office ... All the following instructions were given to them:

1. Headquarters and troops to raise the alarm and withdraw from settlements.
2. Cover parts take their areas.
3. Establish communication with border units. ”

There is one inaccuracy - in the 9 Army Combat Log, it is written: “In 24-00 21.06.41, army units covering the border are put on alert by a telegraph order. An order was given to occupy the districts according to the cover plan. ”One thing can be said: NS OdVO assumed the responsibility to raise the district troops in alarm before receiving the Directive from Moscow. This is an act!

The author does not know how long it takes to send the PC by telegraph. Transmission of a PC text by telegraph is likely to be the same 8 minutes that are required for "P". Given the exchange of service information and preparation for reception (when a telegram is expected), this time may not exceed 10 minutes.

From Baghromian's memoirs: “... At 00-25 22 in June, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving a telegram from Moscow ... Only at half past two in the night did the reception of this lengthy Directive end ...”

Comment on this event and the time of "about half past two" is quite difficult - not enough information.

If this fact actually took place, then two reasons for such a long-term work with the Directive are likely.

1) a group of coders of the KOVO headquarters, moving to Tarnopol, mistakenly took ciphers related to the cipher communication scheme with the General Staff with the HE headquarters;

2) on the GSH communications node (or in the SHO) messed up the forms (each PCS is several forms of telegrams with a pasted telegraph tape with groups of letters). They transferred the forms in a different sequence to the communications center of the frontal control center or mixed up the forms from different PCs.



In the figure we see the Directive in the form of PC, printed on the PM in the SHO ZOVOVO. In order to reduce the time before sending from Zapovo to subordinate armies, the text was corrected directly on the letterhead of the incoming PC, turning it into outgoing with numbers 5203-5206.

PC entered SHO 01-45, sent 02-25. Forty minutes - met the standard. But time ?! Even if one person worked on the encryption technology, he would have managed, as we already know, in 20 minutes. Plus, the design of the outgoing journal is no more than five minutes. Total 25 minutes. The directive was waited at the HE and there should have been at least an 2-3 cryptographer in the SHO, which would shorten the processing time of the PC. Why did it take so long? From the presented materials only one follows - there was no encryption equipment in the subordinate armies. PCs from VO in the army were processed with a hand-held cipher (circular communication scheme). In this case, the text was conventionally divided into four parts, and each of them was encrypted as a separate PC. The length of PC in groups without books is impossible to determine. The time 02-35 is the time of sending from the communication node In the last part to all recipients.

The question is whether the head of the General Staff, the curator of the cipher service, should have known that the cipher communication and the time of transfer of PCs are missing in the transmission links of the VO-Armiya and Armiya-Korpus (not to mention the Korpus-Division). command) from the General Staff to the army will be at least 1,5 hours, and the “General Staff” to 3,5 hours? At best, packages would get a Directive around 4-00. In divisions, the cipher staff is even smaller - they would receive and decrypt the Directive around 6-00. Why did the leadership of NGOs and GSH do this? There are two options: 1) did not believe in the war at dawn of June 22 or 2) tried to shift all the responsibility "on the shoulders" of the VO leadership (by withdrawing from raising the troops in alarm and explaining how these troops act in the attack).

Also, no one from the top leadership of the spacecraft (including the leadership of the military academy and the army) thought about possible communication disruptions by enemy sabotage groups. It is simply not envisaged. You can’t blame them for this - they haven’t met with this yet ... Loss of communication at all levels is the "scourge" of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war. The author does not know who is to blame for this - but not the leader - that’s for sure.

About 23 of 21 on June 1941 of the year G. Zhukov warned the Western Military School NN about X-NUMX: “Expect special instructions!” General Klimovskiy reported on this to General D. Pavlov and ordered the commanders and 3, 10 and 4 Armies to be in their headquarters . No special instructions were given to them, except for “everyone to be ready.” At one o'clock in the morning 22, Generals Pavlov, Klimovskiy and ChVS, being at headquarters, received HF instructions from the People's Commissar of Defense in the morning to collect the heads of departments and divisions and a strange warning: "... be quieter and do not panic ... do not go on any provocation."

According to instructions received from Moscow, General Pavlov summoned the commanders of the armies to contact, ordering them to be constantly at command posts along with the heads of their headquarters and operational departments. The commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, at around one o'clock in the morning, 22 Jun, under his own responsibility, ordered to send sealed “red packets” to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the order of action for combat alert. These documents were kept in the army headquarters and were not handed over to the commanders of the formations because they were not approved.

The commander of the 3 Army, General Kuznetsov, who returned late on the evening of 21 June from a trip to the Avgustov region, received instructions from the district and summoned all the officers of the field administration and the political department of the army to the headquarters. In the second hour of the night, the commander ordered the corps and division commanders to be constantly at the telephones. About two o'clock in the morning 22 of June on HF Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov: "Raise troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately take up pillboxes and put them on full alert, put into action a plan to cover the state border."

At the same time, the district commander reported that an important document was being transmitted through secret communications. General Kuznetsov ordered to transfer the received text of the order to the corps and division commanders, to immediately return artillery and anti-aircraft units from training camps to their units. But by this time the connection with many of the army’s connections had already been lost.

At around midnight on 2 June, the wired communication between the district headquarters and the 22 Army, which could only be restored in 4-3, ceased. After the restoration of communication, the army commander received the order of General Pavlov to bring the troops on alert (PC with the order of the USSR People’s Commissar for Defense was received by the army leadership at 30 in the morning), transmitted by telegraph. To the question of General Korobkov, what measures were specifically allowed, the commander of the district replied: “Bring all units of the army on alert. Immediately begin to advance the 3 Division from the fortress to take up a prepared defensive position. Slowly occupy the pillboxes with parts of Brest UR. The regiments of the air division translate into field airfields. ”

Before 4 in the morning of June 22, General Korobkov managed to personally hand over the received order to NSN 6 and 42 sd, the commandant of Brest UR, and through 10 – 15 minutes the connection with the troops was again broken.

In the 10 Army, another 20 of June 1941 of the year, General K. Golubev, at a meeting with the command staff, ordered an increase in the combat readiness of the troops. The order to lift the troops to this army was received by phone personally from the district commander in 2-30 minutes on June 22, who ordered General Golubev: "Open the" red packets "and act as indicated." The order of the People’s Commissar for Defense No. 1, transmitted by cipher, was deciphered at the army headquarters after the outbreak of hostilities. The headquarters of the 10 Army immediately issued orders to the commanders of the corps and divisions to bring the troops into combat readiness and advance them to their defense sectors. To bring into combat readiness of artillery units that were at training camps in the area of ​​Chervony Boer, the army artillery commander was urgently sent there. Everyone started to act too late ...

We now know that there were no directives from the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft to bring the military on alert from 18 on June 1941. The VO Directive on wearable ammunition, on equipped stores and ribbons for machine guns, on the number of loaded mines, shells, equipped combat equipment, etc. is present both in KOVO, ZAPOVO and OdVO - they reflected the position of the leadership of the General Staff.

The last thing we consider in this part of the message is the Directive PribOVO to the troops. It is different from all Directives. It can be seen how the leaders of PribOVO thought out their actions - they, too, were not given time to implement the actions set out in the Directive.

PC with the directive in the SHO IN was also typed in a hand-held cipher. PC came out a little longer and came out of six parts: №70 / w, №72 / w - №76 / w. Before the start of the war, the Directive did not reach the troops ...



MILITARY COUNCILS 8 and 11 ARMY 22 June 1941 2 hours 25 minutes

1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden attack of the Germans on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.

2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.

At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat the enemy.

I ORDER:

1. During the night on 22.6.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells.

In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

5. The families of the commanding personnel of the 10, 125, 33 and 128 rifle divisions should be transported to the rear only if the border is crossed by large enemy forces.

6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

7. The commander of the 11 Army immediately deployed the headquarters of the 126 Infantry Division and the possible number of infantry and artillery in the area of ​​Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 Infantry Division will advance.

8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.

Commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov
Head of the Department of Political Propaganda of the District Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchy
District Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Maples



To be continued
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

252 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +3
    August 8 2017
    I don’t even know what to say!

    The work is great, but in order to fully analyze and understand it, you need a lot of time, which is not there, access to the archives (also not!) And the education of a historian (I am silent, I am silent ...).

    And then the question is the purpose of these publications?

    I don’t even want to come up with an answer!
    1. +5
      August 8 2017
      On the topic "June 22" there are good books by Arsen Martirosyan that reveal events that preceded the Second World War and its beginning.
      The books reveal a lot of material about the illegal replacement of the 1940 State Defense Plan ("Considerations") by the Tymoshenko-Zhukov tandem, developed by Marshal Shaposhnikov on the basis of the principle of active defense and approved by the USSR Government, to the plan that was not approved by the top leadership of the country defense with counterattacks. " Tymoshenko-Zhukov also changed in their plans the “main blow of the Germans” from the Belarusian direction Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow to a strike against Ukraine, having concentrated most of the Red Army there, which was one of the reasons for the rapid defeat of the military missile defense.
      Martirosyan’s books on this subject:
      - "The tragedy of June 22. Blitzkrieg or treason";
      - “Blitzkrieg betrayal. From the sources to the eve ";
      - "Detailed anatomy of betrayal."
      Martirosyan has a lot of books on the Great Patriotic War, I.V. Stalin and his associates. I advise who did not read, be sure to read.
      1. +8
        August 8 2017
        separate ST for Pribvo is a special colonial policy in the new republics (aliens in a stranger)
      2. +3
        August 8 2017
        These books on the fan - if you think there is not enough little blunders. You already read it yourself)))
        1. VS
          -2
          August 9 2017
          "" These books are for everybody - if you think there are quite a few blunders. You yourself read ""

          Did not read but condemn? But - if you didn’t read, then where and about what mistakes do you approve of Martirosyan?)))
          1. +4
            August 9 2017
            I, however, pleased that for me you came to the site.
            “I didn’t read it but condemn it? But - if you don’t read it, from where and about what mistakes do you approve of Martirosyan?)))
            How we love to hang tags))) For more than two months of preparing 4-x parts, you will perforce read fragments.
            For one sensation, the "conspiracy of generals" about which the young (who have read) chirps would give it to the eye.
            Standard - we need sensations - an unknown directive 18 of June - yyu reptiles and other things not a little. Read it - and for God's sake
            1. VS
              -2
              August 10 2017
              "" so we love to hang tags))) For more than two months of preparation of 4 parts, you will readily read the fragments. ""

              that is, for a couple of months you learned on the topic MORE THAN Martirosyan for 15 years or Kozinkin for 7 years of work in the topic ??)))) BRAVO !!)))))

              "" For one sensation, the “conspiracy of the generals" about which young (read) chirps - would give in the eye. ""

              great - give YOU an explanation - what the maples and the boxes did, who received orders and did not execute them AS WELL))

              I do not like the opinion of Martirosyan generals - read what Brest commanders answered Pokrovsky. You can at Kozinkin or you can - wait for the two-volume Chekunov and with their full answers))))

              "" Standard - need sensations - an unknown directive on June 18 - oooo bastards and other things. They read it - and for God's sake ""

              if you want to be read, don’t ignore the FACTS that you personally don’t like and be able to accept criticism and tips))) from those who LARGE and LONGER dig a topic)))) not for a couple of months exactly)))
              And then their anonymous authors on the network you will become an author with a surname on books))))

              June 18 was not a directive on casting in gg troops and in later works Martirosyan corrected this))) ..and expanded. There were directives on bringing in bg. increased - for the Air Force, Air Defense and Fleets, and the troops were given orders that OBLIGATED to bring these troops to their commanders in a higher battlefield.

              Finally - to undermine the brain - in the Red Army of those days there was no concept - increased B.G. more)))) Or constant or immediately complete)))
              Therefore, there could not have been even one order for all troops to bring in a higher base, Guy from a constant. ))))

              Therefore, there were orders and they were not the only one for everyone - June 18 - about being brought to b .. d but at the same time - the commanders who received them understood what was required of them to do this))) but what kind of orders they were - and writes and Martirosyan and Kozinkin the same)))

              Well, deer. b / n - this is a directive on the transfer of all troops, air forces, air defense and fleets to FULL bg. and so and understood in the districts) those who wanted to understand)))

              So - knowing the texture - you will see that there is no conspiracy theories and no "sensation" invented by Marptirosyan or Kozinkin)))).
            2. VS
              -1
              August 10 2017
              "" it's nice that you came to the site for my sake. ""

              not for your sake)) just for the sake of truth))) and a desire to help someone who decided in a couple of months that he figured out everything)))
            3. +4
              23 September 2017
              On 1 June 1941, there were more than 25 000 tanks in the Red Army. A valid 18 844 unit. In June, 1941 was also produced 305 tanks.
              Types of tanks and their number, in brackets - serviceable:
              - T-35 (76 mm gun, 2 guns 45 mm, 5 machine guns 7,62 mm) - 59 pcs. (42 pcs.)
              - KV -1 (76 mm gun, 4 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 412 pcs. (410 pcs.)
              - HF-2 (152 mm howitzer, 4 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 135 pcs. (134 pcs.)
              - T-28 (76 mm gun, 4 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 442 pcs. (292 pcs.)
              - T-34 (76 mm gun, 2 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 1030 pcs. (1029 pcs.)
              - BT-7М (45 mm gun, 1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 704 pcs. (688 pcs.)
              - BT-7 (45 mm gun, 1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 4563 pcs. (3791 pcs.)
              - BT-5 (45 mm gun, 1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 1688 pcs. (1261 pcs.)
              - BT-2 (37mm gun, 1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 594 pcs. (492 pcs.)
              - T-26 (45 mm gun, 2 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 9998 pcs. (8423 pcs.)
              - T-40 (2 mm machine gun 12,7 mm and 7,62 mm) - 160 pcs. (159 pcs.)
              - T-38 (1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 1129 pcs. (733 pcs.)
              - T-37 (1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 2331 pcs. (1483 pcs.)
              - T-27 (1 machine gun 7,62 mm) - 2376 pcs. (1060 pcs.)
              - Su-5 (1 gun 76 mm) - 28 pcs. (16 pcs.)
              Total: 25 621 tank, which is registered, of which 19 997 are serviceable (combat-ready) over 78%.
              It follows that the Germans shot down and captured 70% of all available Soviet tanks in 1 month.
              Back in 1960, Lieutenant Colonel M.P. Dorofeev, in a brochure published at the Military Academy of Armored Forces, reports the exact number of personnel, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces and mortars, cars, tractors and motorcycles of mechanized corps of the western border districts (no more than 11 000). Therefore, the figures given in the article cause fair doubt. Most likely they are taken from German memoir sources. Recently, our authors have liked to use it. "This is not mine, I am quoting someone else. But these numbers prove that the General Staff operated with virtual, not real tanks and troops in general. A tank without a crew is a crowbar that will lie there where they left him. The crew of the tank is an average of 3-4 people. We have 11000 thousand crew members on 22.06.41/4000/3000. This means that our western fronts, dispersed across the width and depth of our Baltic, western and southern territories of the USSR, are not in principle, they could have brought and commissioned more than 1 tanks, tankettes and armored vehicles.In real life, in the first front line there were more than 3 vehicles, non-combat losses of which (minor and medium breakdowns) occurred for 100/20 of the vehicles after 25 km of movement at an average speed of 22 -2000 km / h, that is, by the end of the day on June 23.06 only 1400 could remain “alive” without taking into account losses from the enemy’s influence. By the end of the day, June 24.06, no more than 1000 units. As of June 25.06, no more than 700. - no more than 26.06. As of June 500. - 27.06. As of June 400. - 28.06, and this is itself th optimistic figure. On the day of delivery of Minsk - June 300. - in the absence of repair and replenishment in our cover troops, there should not have been more than 1937 tanks, wedges and armored vehicles on the entire front line in the west of the USSR. So the main conspiracy was drawn up and carried out before XNUMX in the field of armament and manning of the Red Army.
              1. 0
                24 September 2017
                I apologize. The number of tanks given in the article (as reference data) does not take into account tanks that have only machine-gun armament.

                "So the main plot was drawn up and carried out even before 1937 year in the field of armament and manning of the Red Army." I think it is not necessary to look for conspiracies in the field of weapons - they were not. In the period before 1937, the military of all countries did not yet know exactly what tanks would be needed to conduct combat operations in the 1939-41 years. Erroneous theories soared in the atmosphere ... But we know this, but the specialists living at that time did not know
                1. +1
                  25 September 2017
                  On the T-34-76 there was a regiment gun of 76,2 mm caliber with a muzzle projectile speed of approx. 350 m / s with a direct firing range (direct fire distance) of 350 m. On the KV-1 - a 76,2 mm divisional gun with a muzzle velocity of 460 m / s, a direct shot of 460 m. The average gunner hits only with a direct shot, hinged trajectories - this is for pro-gunners. Those. our average T-34 could AIMLY hit the German T-3 from a distance of less than 350 m. HF - less than 460 m. And the German had a 50 mm gun with a muzzle velocity of more than 700 m / s and a direct shot of 700 m. And from this distance 500 He beat ours at -700 m, but ours could get into him only by approaching closer than 460 (KV) and 350 m (T-34). Plus he beat with armor-piercing ones, but ours didn’t have them, and the shrapnel didn’t take him. He pierced the T-34, but did not penetrate the HF. But he hit him in the track with 500 m, and KV got up. Then he was finished off by a gun of 75 or 88 mm. Plus, the German was faster, more maneuverable and smaller in silhouette (dimensions). Long to explain all the troubles with the selection of guns for a tank or anti-tank work. But the fact that guns were better in the Red Army. It was 57 mm, with a muzzle velocity of the projectile 750 m / s, with a direct firing range (direct fire) of 750 m. It was examined, even experimentally and successfully put on tanks - but the commission of Marshal Kulik rejected it - both for tanks, and as an anti-tank gun . With a mockingly impudent wording - "For excessive armor penetration". We also had a 76 mm mountain cannon with a muzzle velocity of 500 m / s - but for some reason, too, they did not give it brazenly to tanks, like it was for mountains only. And our anti-aircraft guns of 45 mm caliber with a muzzle velocity of 330 m / s could penetrate the German T-3 only at point blank range, from a distance of less than 300 m (forehead - from 50-100 m), although our charter required to open fire on the tank from 1000 m. Thus, unmasking their position without harm to the Germans, who simply shot our batteries from 500-700 m. So, tens of thousands of lives and the success or failure of many important operations depended on Marshal Kulik. As a result, a 45 mm cannon was released with a circulation of about 35 thousand copies, and a 57 mm cannon was about 5000. Conspiracy? Stories with guns began under Tukhachevsky, Kulik continued. There, on this topic, muddy things and a lot of blood - on the selection of designs for mass production. They buried and dug breakthrough prototypes, and modified the weak and even worthless.
                2. +1
                  27 September 2017
                  Author! You’re dark in tanks - it’s dark in a tank ... The armament is mentioned in the list. Our first serial T-18 (MS-1), which also still stood somewhere and even started, was not mentioned there, 963 pieces from the end of the 20s of this iron were riveted. And they added - I quote someone else's opinion about our military-industrial complex in 1941: the mobilization plan for the deployment of industry was not approved - they only had time to consider it, since the Chairman of the Defense Committee, K. E. Voroshilov, had not taken it out of the safe for more than a month, while G. K. Zhukov did not turn to I.V. Stalin. A light tank T-50 was adopted, intended to replace the obsolete BT and T-26, although initially it was known that the organization of its production and development of the technological process was very difficult, as well as the not very satisfactory performance characteristics. For the same reason, those accepted for service in 1938-1939 were discontinued. 76-mm anti-aircraft, 107-mm mountain, 210-mm guns, 280-mm mortar, 305-mm howitzer. But the production of 45-mm anti-tank guns, the production of which was also discontinued, had to be restored during the war, as well as the production of anti-tank rifles. The IL-2 attack aircraft, created as a double, was converted into a single, which caused him heavy losses and forced him to return to the original version already in 1942.

                  In the years 1939-1940. 31 aircraft, 10 shipbuilding, 28 ammunition plants and a number of other enterprises were reconstructed. The vast majority of enterprises, primarily large ones, switched to the production of military products. For example, only 146 were involved in the release of clothing and property. Most factories produced several types of weapons and military equipment. So, the Chelyabinsk Tractor had a task to produce both KV tanks, tractors, engines, and 152 mm shells, Plant No. 183 in Kharkov, in addition to T-34 tanks, also produced steam locomotives, tractors, and various spare parts for tanks of old designs (adj. . 13.3). In the first half of 1 alone, 1941 aircraft, 5 tanks, 958 guns, 1 mortars, 672 thousand rifles and many other weapons were produced.
        2. VS
          -3
          August 11 2017
          "bloopers" they are bloopers))))

          I hope you saw and took into account that Pavlov did not use the text deer. b / n from the General Staff - for sending in the army - literally and on the same form that the cryptographers brought him at 1.30 approximately?))) Did you understand that he wrote his text ??)))

          The robin from which you drew your knowledge and for a couple of months everyone understood about the tragedy of June 22 - is replete with such jambs))) But in any case - the “deer. Pavlova” cited there is a fake. The real text - you yourself brought - a photo from TsAMO)))

          And now what you in the messengers of stupid will never know))))

          Having received in the districts around 1 o’clock in the morning their texts are deer. b / n and deciphering them by 1.30 at the latest - there they started m .. wondering differently))

          After reading the text at 1.30 in Pribovo, Klenov roughly composes (or maybe it was a blank - it doesn’t matter) the text and sends it to the army at 2.25. But he DOES NOT RAISE the district on alarm and as a result EVERYONE is there sleeping until the moment of the attack.
          Having received the test at 2.30 in the armies, they spent real time deciphering and comprehending and started calling to Riga and the field CP - to clarify and find out what kind of crap this was and as a result - the Germans woke up these armies.
          Klenov searches for Kuznetsov in the armies at 2 o’clock and calls Morozov but does not report ANYTHING to him about the alarm! He did not even call Sobennikov.

          In Minsk, the text was decoded by 1.30, and Pavlov at 1.30-1.45 notified both the army and Koptsov “to bring the troops into combat condition”. At the same time, Kopets is lying in the eyes - the one that canceled BG on the evening of June 21 No. 2 in the Air Force-Air Force are given and dispersed and awakened. The result - the 4th Army and Brest - the KEY defense point is sleeping and the Air Force is sleeping.
          And before that, Sandalov disarmed Brest’s barracks with Korobkov in a week — they removed a portable stock of cartridges (90 pieces per rifle and 4 boxes = 250 in a tape for Maxim and 4 disks for PPSh each) - to be handed over to the warehouses, and Kopets disarmed IAPs on the evening of June 21.

          KOVO - there the cryptographers were not at the headquarters but rode with Baghramyan and arrived at the headquarters only at 6-7 a.m. Encryption Deer they were able to accept bn, but decrypt - no. ITS was taken for decryption only at 8 o’clock in the morning and decrypted at noon only. But at the same time, Nur Purkayev completely started - not Kirpanos who was sticking out at the headquarters but was obviously engaged in sabotage - but Purkayev-he raises the army at 3 o’clock. And what was in the Deere. b / n he quite knew))) But while his calls reached the divisions, it was already 4 hours ...

          OdVO - nsh Zakharov - without waiting for the text of an important encryption to come, about which he was warned from Zhukov - he raised the district in and opened the packets - at midnight practically ..

          It’s easier with LenVO - everything was done there as it should and normally.

          At the same time - in a deer. b / n There is nothing about opening the package !! And at the same time at 3 o’clock in the districts according to the TEAM they open their packages. What happened - I repeat - is FORBIDDEN by deer. b / n to do)))

          There is a deer. No. 2 and No. 3, but deere. from 22.20 on June 21 - does not have a number))
          That is, at 3 o’clock, or rather around 2.30, the okrug received a real deer. No. 1 - to enter the software and to open the packages - "Proceed to the software of 1941")))

          Now the question is - so that Zhukov was carrying to Stalin’s office at 21 p.m. what kind of deer. which Stalin slowed down calling it premature - replacing it with a directive on the transfer of ALL troops of the Air Defense Forces and fleets about to FULL BG?)))

          According to Zhukov, he carried the same directive on June 11 even to Stalin)))) To which the tyrant replied - mobilization cannot yet be introduced .. formally))))
    2. +21
      August 8 2017
      Quote: Titsen
      I don’t even know what to say!

      Yes, everyone has their own answer to these questions, but the author is grateful for the work done using previously unknown archival materials and facts, and not his own speculations, which many modern researchers sin. We look forward to continuing ....
      PS An interesting moment, unlike most of our warlord commanders, Marshal Tymoshenko did not leave his memoirs. He replied to offers to write memoirs, they won’t let the truth go, but he didn’t want to write a half truth .... It’s a pity, of course, he knew and saw a lot, but if you remember, for example, how many corrections and changes were made to the same memoirs Zhukov, perhaps Tymoshenko, in his own way, was right.
      1. +2
        August 8 2017
        Thank! Do you like hit books?
        1. 0
          August 12 2017
          Hitadans?
    3. +3
      August 8 2017
      The point of view is different for historians and this author
    4. +3
      August 8 2017
      Quote: Titsen
      I don’t even know what to say!
      Great work, but in order to fully analyze and understand it

      That's right! wink
      But not always for understanding the essence of events you need to climb with a "magnifying glass".
      What does the author want to say?
      What, they say, if the directive on putting the troops on combat alert had been sent earlier, and the command of the districts was more resolute, was not afraid that they would write him down as wreckers, then they would have repulsed the Germans in June of the 41st year.
      That is unlikely...
      Firstly, because history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, i.e. if grandmother had ..., then ....
      Secondly, we then lost, in 1941, Germany and its military machine, as G.K. Zhukov said "in all respects."
      Indeed, in order for any directive or order to be implemented, well-trained troops and commanders are needed who can do this.
      Such preparation requires years of hard work without purges and identifying all kinds of Trotskyists and “spies” among the guilty and, mainly, the innocent.
      Otherwise, it will turn out as one would expect: the General Staff sends directives to the VO command, but it thinks "succumb to provocations" or not.
      At that time, we did not have the opportunity to successfully repel the German invasion on the border with small blood, a mighty blow, because in terms of management quality, organizationally, technically, and, often, morally we conceded ...
      "The main danger of surprise was not that the Germans suddenly crossed the border, but that the striking power of the German army turned out to be unexpected for us; their six-fold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions turned out to be surprise to us; the concentration of their troops and the strength of their strike "
      G.K.Zhukov
      That is, in simpler terms, a surprise for our political and military leadership was that the Red Army in many battles, even with the necessary weapons, could not withstand so strong, perhaps the strongest, at that time in the world, German troops.
      Moreover, both at the level of senior staffs, and, often, at the level of troops.
      For example, near Vyazma, a strong group of forces was created for the defense of Moscow, everyone knew that the Wehrmacht was preparing the operation "Typhoon" - an attack on Moscow, took measures, but despite this, almost all the troops were surrounded and destroyed or captured.
      To prevent the encirclement of the South-Western Front troops in the Kiev region, the forces of the Bryansk Front were attracted, the commander of which, Gen. Eremenko, promised Stalin that "the scoundrel of Guderian would certainly be defeated," as a result, despite the measures taken, the Bryansk Front was defeated, and Eremenko almost died .
      So the reasons for the 1941 tragedy were not the presence or absence of “directives” and instructions, it logically flowed from the entire history of the development of the Soviet state in the 20-30 years of the last century.
      1. +16
        August 8 2017
        Quote: Alekseev
        So the reasons for the 1941 tragedy were not the presence or absence of “directives” and instructions, it logically flowed from the entire history of the development of the Soviet state in the 20-30 years of the last century.

        Still not tired of mocking the history of the Great Patriotic War? Or is Gozman your idol? Those who wish long ago found the research of serious domestic historians about the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in 1941. And on the pages of VO these moments only in recent months have been repeatedly discussed. But .. Or you "precipitate" from time to time, or you have in honor rezuni-Bunichi-Nekrichi-Beshanov ...
        1. +1
          August 8 2017
          wink
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          Still not tired of mocking the history of the Great Patriotic War?

          No need to make waves in the basin.
          If I'm wrong, then specify in what specifically, without stupid cliches.
          And then mockery, disgrace fool
          By the way, I’m not a Gotzman,
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          Rezuni-Bunichi-Nekrichi-Beshanov ...

          I don’t know, but how do you know how many?
      2. +2
        August 8 2017
        "The main danger of surprise was not that the Germans suddenly crossed the border, but that the striking power of the German army turned out to be unexpected for us; their six-fold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions turned out to be surprise to us; the concentration of their troops and the strength of their strike "
        G.K.Zhukov

        Not true. Our leadership knew all this, including G.K. Zhukov. Zhukov is simply lying in his memoirs, which repeatedly change from publication to publication in order to shield himself, to evade historical responsibility for the disastrous beginning of the war, and write off everything to I.V. Stalin.
        The same Martirosyan writes about this on documents in the June 22 Tragedy.
        1. +2
          August 8 2017
          Quote: vladimirZ
          Just lying Zhukov in his memoirs, which repeatedly change from publication to publication,

          Quote: vladimirZ
          and write off everything to I.V. Stalin.

          I bring to your attention that the quote I quoted is not from "Memoirs and Reflections" at all. By the way, there is a big doubt that you read them.
          And you, as well as "some civilians" do not bother yourself, just like the current American media, with evidence.
          What G.K. Zhukov lied, even in the above statement?
          1. +1
            August 9 2017
            I bring to your attention that the quote I quoted is not from "Memoirs and Reflections" at all. By the way, there is a big doubt that you read them. - alexeyev

            I read and more than once. Since my youth I have been fond of history and especially the period of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - the whole time I was occupied with the question "Why did the Red Army, with all its might and quantity of military equipment, fail in 1941-1942?"
            I re-read a lot of books, historical and documentary, non-fiction, various authors of ours, German and others, including anti-Stalinist orientation.
            And in few places he found an objective evidence-based explanation for the tragedy that happened.
            Now I am pleased to read A. Martirosyan, I have read it before, but these books, “June 22 Tragedy,” did not come across. In some matters, especially concerning the political and ideological component, Martirosyan strongly disagrees. But what he analyzes from the point of view of a former intelligence officer, a military officer, is difficult to disagree with.
            Zhukova G.K. he exposes in an unusual, unsightly for many others people who know little about that period - the light of a liar who seeks to shift his historical responsibility for the events that happened then to I.V. Stalin.
            Personally, I have not considered Zhukov as a “Marshal of Victory” for a long time — there is so much historical negativity on this person, although I do not detract from his merits as the deputy Supreme — fist and stick pressure of Stalin on careless generals in a difficult war. These are also needed, but they did not solve the war - the clever generals I.V. decided the war Stalin, K.K. Rokossovsky, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, Antonov, and others.
            In his studies, A. Martirosyan may be “overreacting" and the truth lies somewhere in the middle, but his point of view is well-reasoned and has a right to exist, and in my opinion is close to the events that really happened.
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. +1
                August 10 2017
                This is because you did not serve in the army. And if you had been there, even if you were in the SA, you would understand that the army in the USSR basically did not exist for the defense of the country. - 310

                Number commentator 310, from what information did you get that I did not serve in the Army, was picking from my nose?
                He served in the Army when you probably still walked under the table, and maybe you were not born into the light of day, in the 70s of the last century, senior lieutenant of the IAS Air Force.
                And what you wrote about our Army is complete nonsense.
                The “degraded” Army cannot, as you write, “exist not for the defense of the country,” withstand the blow of the most powerful army of Nazi Germany at that time, which relied on the entire economic potential of Europe, uniting under its leadership a number of other satellite armies, and all of which together defeated one red army. Moreover, in the very first months of the war, the Red Army frustrated the German Blitzkrieg, which failed to make a single European army, and doomed Germany to a long war, in which she had no chance of victory.
                After the war, the USSR Army was the strongest in the world, which even the US with nuclear weapons and with a bunch of its allies in NATO and a number of other similar military alliances could not encroach
                These are undeniable facts!
                You are simply an ignoramus, unaware of history.
                1. The comment was deleted.
              2. +2
                August 10 2017
                Freshly. And I personally agree with you. All pre-war conflicts simply shouted that something was wrong. But I'm interested in your opinion on
                She was for another. And now it doesn’t matter why.
                If not difficult, articulate. hi
                1. +5
                  August 10 2017
                  Yeah ... The memory of the definition of one nonsense from a story about an aggressor tank, a flying jackal ....
                  laughing
      3. VS
        -2
        August 10 2017
        "" if the directive on putting the troops on combat alert had been sent earlier, and the command of the districts was more resolute, was not afraid that he would be written down as wreckers, they would have repulsed the Germans in June of the 41st year.
        It is unlikely...""

        not this way.
        If EVERYTHING, as it should be, fulfilled the orders of the General Staff in those days, then there would be a retreat organized but NOT A Pogrom that occurred in reality. And these are different Veschi)).
        Those who study the pre-war days and how the orders of the General Staff were executed in the districts write about it.
    5. +4
      August 8 2017
      The goal is to provide those who will be able to read a set of information for their own analysis of the problem 22 June. And your version of these publications?
  2. +2
    August 8 2017
    And yet Martirosyan is right!
    -----------------------------------------
    I will add my own thoughts.
    A very significant part of the causes of the disaster of the 41 year is The ill-conceived food system of soldiers in the Red Army.
    ------------------
    A hungry soldier loses most of his fighting efficiency. Loses the sense of connection with the rear.
    In the Red Army, soldiers ate separately from officers and generals. This fact created the illusion that soldiers are like robots, and that nutrition is less important than ammunition. No .. it is no less .. maybe more important.
    And the fact that none of the "experts" over the past 70 years paid attention to the unsuitable power supply system for soldiers in conditions of maneuverable war is an eloquent fact that all theorists consider soldiers to be such robots.
    ------------
    The Germans focused on dry land !!! And the mandatory 3's, a three-day supply of food for each soldier.
    And this despite the fact that the Germans were about to advance, that is, the kitchens and food of the Germans were in less dangerous situations.
    --------------
    It is a reliable fact that at the beginning of the war .. the Germans first of all strove to destroy the field kitchens of the Red Army.
    ---------------
    To understand what food means for soldiers during the war .. all the more so during devastation and confusion, only those who are able to serve as ordinary soldiers are capable .. under similar conditions.
    -----------
    And further.
    Separate food for soldiers and officers in the Red Army, inevitably detached officers from the issues of food soldiers.
    German officers ate with soldiers from the same boiler. And this meant that they cared about the nutrition of the soldiers, because they cared about their nutrition.
    1. +2
      August 8 2017
      Even in the conditions of defeat, when the soldiers remained groups of 15 - 20 people, the hungry soldiers of the Red Army were forced to look for food. ((If they had dry land in the sidors for 3 of the day, they would not be looking for food but the enemy. sad
      1. 0
        August 8 2017
        In the conditions of defeat, I would go in the direction of the alleged location of my troops, with my part, I would look for units with which to unite. Enemies would probably not be a paramount task in the rout. To survive.
      2. +1
        August 8 2017
        Quote: ammunition
        If they had dry land in the sidors for 3 days, they would not look for food but the enemy.

        Blessed are the believers ...
        It’s kind of about a directive, but he’s looking for enemies ...
        Food in the Red Army was better established than in the Wehrmacht, and there was dry tea and vodka, but it was usually eaten before the environment. wink
        And the officers did not gobble up at all. Especially the company-battalion unit.
        Or do you think that a soldier in a war is not separated from his cider for a second? And the attack with him, and in the trench, for a machine gun or PTR?
    2. +1
      August 8 2017
      It is a reliable fact that at the beginning of the war .. the Germans first of all strove to destroy the field kitchens of the Red Army.
      A company of German eaters could completely empty a regimental kitchen at a time, along with a cook and a cook
    3. +2
      August 12 2017
      There was a big and very interesting discussion about the feeding of the Red Army
      https://topwar.ru/120910-rkka-protiv-vermahta-kuh
      nya-bez-shansov-na-pobedu.html # comment-id-7175112
  3. +21
    August 8 2017
    Thank you for the great work done. It seems that what I suspected before this turns out to be true: the algorithm for transmitting command and control signals to the Red Army was simply missed and not worked out. The obvious fault of all NGSH, including Zhukov, in the prewar period. True, there is some justification for this phenomenon: the backwardness of the USSR in this industry. Well, Stalin could not physically possess excellent knowledge of not only aviation and armored vehicles, and also delve into the subtleties of the organization of all types of communication. But the NHS and NAF were required. this is the reason for such a mess, otherwise you can’t tell, the alert of 22.06.41. Let it be a bitter lesson for the RF Armed Forces in the 21 century.
    1. +9
      August 8 2017
      But the NHS and the NSA were required. this is the reason for this gloomy, otherwise you can’t put it on alert 22.06.41.

      For 1941, the spacecraft is calculatedly put on alert for a month, on the days and hours of June, units and formations could leave the RPM, leaving / destroying faulty equipment, weapons and ammunition that could not be removed. Miracles do not happen, to quickly bring the army in readiness, you need a whole range of activities carried out in advance.
      1. VS
        -3
        August 10 2017
        "" For 1941, the spacecraft is put on alert for a month, on days and hours of June, units and formations could leave the RPM, leaving / destroying faulty equipment, weapons and ammunition that could not be removed. Miracles do not happen, to quickly bring the army in readiness, you need a whole range of activities carried out in advance. ""

        well, so study - what events were held in those weeks of June until June 22 in the districts - according to which directives and other invoices)))
    2. +4
      August 8 2017
      Thank. That's right, just none of my colleagues did not get to the topic)))
  4. +7
    August 8 2017
    In March 1941, the top management of NGOs and the General Staff decided that it was not worthwhile to “trifle” and that it was worthwhile to “swipe” at a preemptive strike against German forces that were not concentrated.

    ---------- as now, the military rod forehead forward. and meanwhile, money then rules the world. not so dollars will be dr!
    The IVS looked (or was controlled by secret advisers) at the fin flows and power of the USA and other industrialized countries.
    1. +3
      August 8 2017
      In March 1941, the top management of NGOs and the General Staff decided that it was not worthwhile to “trifle” and that it was worthwhile to “swipe” at a preemptive strike against German forces that were not concentrated.

      It’s not entirely, they had earlier assumed an offensive in 1938 (war with Poland and Germany), in 1940 it was mainly defense, but there were also offensives. It’s normal practice to gain time, because the enemy must mobilize at the same time.
      1. +4
        August 8 2017
        any employee should see several ways to solve their problems, including military - different options and at different times.
        GL ARMY OR PREPARING FOR WAR OR WAR.
        And the ORDER PAYS POLIT MANUAL.
        I (the small worm) believe that the IVS played a giveaway with the axis countries: "we are not capable of victory. It all depends on England and the USA."
        In PM and IVS played too much. but the dogs of the war (and the Red Army and other armies) paid for everything with blood.
        The solution (giveaway) was with an eye on the %% prom potential of all countries of the world.
        to give raw materials to Hitler - how much he needed, it turned out to be few, it was also necessary territories. Strengthen Hitler to the level unacceptable for other great countries. The price of the issue is not worth it. million lives.
        Before the war, any lies and intrigues-intrigues against all are justified. (the geniuses of this Brita)
        And then ...?
        1. +2
          August 8 2017
          I mean, I played a giveaway, and then in 1942-1943 I got overwhelmed ???? Well this is ridiculous. In this case, France and the British Expeditionary Force also played with the Germans in giveaways in May 1940.

          IMHO, Stalin simply overestimated the ability of the demoniac to sound thinking, hoped for a contract, and he carefully carried out it. Maybe a deployed army, not necessarily on the border, would have served Hitler as the best argument not to go to war.
          1. +2
            August 8 2017
            In this case, France and the British Expeditionary Force also played with the Germans in giveaways in May 1940.
            until May 40, they played giveaways and were late to start a "tough" war.
            and the ITT also pacified - any lie is better than previously known expenses and losses
            1. +1
              August 8 2017
              Excuse me, but this is nonsense. There were no giveaways in May 1940, hard fights, not always with a clear outcome. All commonplace Germans were better prepared for war than the Allies (for example, 3 out of 6 French tank divisions formed in January-March 1940), and therefore lost.
              Similarly with the spacecraft in 1941, the Germans were stronger, all the difference is that we had a spare set of figures.
              1. +2
                August 8 2017
                until May 40, they played giveaways and were late to start a "tough" war.
                --This is not a readiness .-- From September 39, what happened?
  5. +6
    August 8 2017
    In short, as in the old riddle. And eat cake, and not to take. The answer is simple - there are no hemp on a swamp!
  6. +8
    August 8 2017
    The figure shows a draft of the first page of the document of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff I. Stalin on the deployment of the spacecraft (the document also discusses the option of a preemptive strike on Lublin). Changing the concept of "Plans ..." led to the fact that the document was probably not sent to the leader and remained in the form of a draft copy in the archive.

    The problem is that "Considerations for a strategic deployment plan for the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies"- this is not so much a deployment plan as a well-reasoned response from the army, why in the near future a pre-emptive strike by the Red Army is impossible. For the health plan has been launched:
    Given that Germany is currently keeping its army mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the ability to warn us of deployment and deliver a surprise strike. To prevent this and defeat the German army, I consider it necessary in no case to give the German Command initiative, to forestall the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and cooperation of the armed forces .

    And finished - for peace:
    The deployment of troops and their military operations with the available reserves are provided: for ammunition: small-caliber shells for three weeks; medium-caliber - for a month; heavy caliber - for a month; minami - for a fortnight; for anti-aircraft shots: 37 mm - for 5 days; 76 mm - for a month and a half; 85 mm - for 11 days; for ammunition: high-explosive bombs - for a month; armor-piercing - for 10 days; concrete slaughter - for 10 days; fragmentation - for a month; incendiary - for a fortnight; for fuels and lubricants: B-78 gasoline - for 10 days; B-74 - for a month; B-70 - for 2 1/2 months; gasoline - 1 1/2; diesel fuel - for a month;
    Fuel reserves destined for the western districts are echeloned in a significant amount (due to lack of capacity on their territory) in the internal districts.

    Well, will we deliver a preemptive strike, having fuel and shells for a month, and even for the most part in the internal districts? wink
    Second: this plan involves a preemptive strike at a time when war and an enemy strike are already inevitable. For deployment lead suggests that a threatened period has come and the enemy has already begun mobilization (which is war) and concentration. Actually, without the deployment of enemy forces, this plan does not make sense at all - for then the attacks will fall into the void or into German fortified areas.
    The first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army is to defeat the main forces of the German army, deployable south of the Brest - Deblin line and reaching the front of the 30th day of operations on the front of Ostroleka, the river Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc.

    And one more thing: in this plan there is one very interesting paragraph with a date:
    At the same time, it is necessary to speed up the construction and armament of fortified areas in every possible way, begin the construction of fortified areas on the rear line of Ostashkov, Pechep and provide for the construction of new fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary, as well as continue the construction of fortified areas along the old state border.
    1. +4
      August 8 2017
      Argumentally approach your answers.
      Such a question: if the spacecraft pulled to the border 1, 2 echelons and concentrating armies - would it be good for the country or not?
      Simply, your opinion is interesting ...
      1. +7
        August 8 2017
        It is an oxymoron - to consider the initial course of the Great Patriotic War in the perspective of “What if?”
        To you, as the author of the publication, a big bow for the work done on a large scale. But, with all due respect, this is not the first such attempt at VO. Someone like Martirosyan. I have great respect for other authors, with MUCH MUCH a longer list of published books.
        In the final, I want to answer your question "It is difficult to look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if it is not there."
        1. +1
          August 8 2017
          "about the bald man and the comb" he already wrote.
          now as a woodpecker I will be "about a cat" - 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          the truth about the outbreak of war - in the archives of politicians and foreign ministries + spheres of semi-influential talkers (private foundations, NGOs now)
          without orders and directives, and who blabbed something (brought to the boiling point of someone’s brain) diaries of lords and supposedly “waiters” - “journalists” (Sorge)
          and the plans of the General Staff, dust in “I’ll lose xxxxx million marks or“ pound sterligov ”,“ -doll. ”how to get out7 who to hand over? Coco not to hand over?
          this is the most obvious-- the insurance premium-payment from people of life (in the West they insured a lot and then) multiplied by the number of Hans and John in uniform.
          The archives of the British Foreign Ministry were waiting for someone to read 25 years ago and postponed their display to the public. In them ---
          1) Brit’s consent to the USSR for Western Ukrainian and Bel-U (surrender of their "ally" Psheks. "Given the strengthening of Germany, they agree to transfer to the USSR industrial potential ... and then NUMBERS (not the fate of people in the Gulag) - if only Hitler saw on the map "USSR nearby."

          these are my speculations and there may be many
          the truth is waiting for our grandchildren. not grandfathers !!!!!!!!!!! WHO Fought AND DIDN'T UNDERSTAND ---------- --------- "HOW IT ALL STARTED? REALLY WASN'T WAY TO GO FROM SUCH NUMBER OF BLOOD AND RIGIDITY?"
          I will not continue
        2. +1
          August 9 2017
          Thanks for the feedback and for the answer to the question. I am not interested in the topic, what would it be if ... I am interested in Alexey’s way of thinking.
          I am interested in the answer to the question of this person.
          1. +1
            August 9 2017
            By the way, if you wish, you can repeat the attempt to answer the question)))
            1. +4
              August 9 2017
              There is a very good study on this subject - A. Isaev "Alternative history"
              The author has investigated this topic in sufficient detail.
      2. +6
        August 9 2017
        Quote: aKtoR
        Such a question: if the spacecraft pulled to the border 1, 2 echelons and concentrating armies - would it be good for the country or not?

        Without a mobilization (and even better - first a BUS and then mobilization), any movements of the Red Army lead to only one result - defeat in a border battle.
        And mobilization should begin at least in May. In the midst of agricultural work, yes ... * wall *
        Ways to reduce the period of mobilization and concentration were. And the Red Army used them - the same advance transfer of formations of the internal districts (with the states of peacetime) to the rear areas of border districts.

        The problem is that the country's leadership and the General Staff of the Red Army laid at the traditional beginning of the war - with diplomatic preludes and a threatened period. And the experience of the war in Europe seemed to confirm this point of view - Poland was "persuaded" for half a year, and the Poles managed to conduct partial mobilization during this time. Nobody expected a sudden (that is, without preliminary diplomatic requirements) attack by a mobilized army. And there was probably no way to counter such a blow. The only option was 146% to know the exact date of the strike in order to reasonably begin mobilization - but this option was calculated by the Germans and buried under a rampart.

        And even in the case of the timely mobilization and deployment of the Red Army, the army still has problems - the low level of training of command and rank and file personnel, lack of personnel (especially junior command personnel in the infantry), lack of equipment (especially for tractors and special vehicles), eternal communication problems and lack of fuel and ammunition (the largest fifth point was with high-octane and armor-piercing shells of all calibers, however, there was not even enough diesel fuel and gasoline). Actually, the option "actions of mechanized corps in a border battle after mobilization"was played in the Senno-Lepel region. The result is known ...
        1. +1
          August 9 2017
          Thank. Enough detail.
          1. +1
            27 September 2017
            I will add another Pts. important: according to cover plans in 1939 and 1941, mobile hospitals were to be deployed - in cars and railway wagons, and a lot of military-medical ones. Literally NOTHING was done.
      3. +1
        26 September 2017
        The first echelon of cover was quantitatively sufficient, but not qualitatively. And they could have managed to eliminate not all, but a number of shortcomings, if they had not gone to the bait: with little blood on foreign territory. The Finns have proved to us that this will not work. IVS understood this. Belarusian partisans later proved this to the Germans. They crushed Germans in the same territory many times more than the Red Army in 1941 - more than 400 thousand. Without planes and tanks, without artillery even. But they themselves lost one million two people, about the same as the entire USSR lost from prisoners. Sudoplatov proposed such tactics of war, and in 1938-40. it was started to be prepared technically and personnelly, but then it was abandoned, so that later it would be too late to catch on. You do not know this story, how much the NKVD did on these lands, repressing the "reunited" population by class criteria! About 10% of it was exiled and another percent or two shot, for the past "bourgeois" way of life and service to the former "bourgeois" state. Plus there was a "settlement of farms", breaking in those places is deep, if not deep. This had to be stopped, as well as attacks on religions and their ministers. This could be done all over the country, but Mehlis chain dogs did not. Hitler took all this into account. It is painful to realize that each Mehlis or Dibrova produced thousands of enemies for us and deprived thousands of soldiers. In those places - about 700 thousand deserted and went to serve the Nazis. But the struggle continues! We are getting smarter! We needed a smart army there, but we only had a red one.
  7. +1
    August 8 2017
    The author reiterates his erroneous assertion that the Soviet military-political leadership was guided by a certain number of German divisions on the Soviet border as a criterion of Germany’s readiness for an attack on the USSR. This statement is refuted by a draft report of the People’s Commissar of Defense in the name of Stalin of May 1941, which clearly indicates both the total strength of the Wehrmacht and its strength on the border with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the leadership of the NPO was aware of the possibility of a quick buildup of German troops and had no illusions about their relatively small numbers at the border.

    The problem was different - at an emergency meeting in the Kremlin on 21 on June 1941, ending at 23 hours, Tymoshenko and Zhukov failed miserably with the official plan to defeat the Germans in a border battle and transfer hostilities to enemy territory. Stalin gave an unambiguous assessment of this plan: "This is not serious."

    Those. 5 hours before the war, Stalin sent the entire plan of warfare, developed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov for many months, reflected in red packets (which were in the vaults of the commanders of military districts, armies, corps and divisions), and most importantly - implemented in actual the deployment of the Red Army cover armies, pushed directly to the border.

    The plan turned out to be absolutely worthless and, moreover, adventurous (to defeat the enemy in a border battle and immediately transfer hostilities to its territory).

    Stalin’s reaction to the proposal of the commander of the strategic reserve troops about the need to proceed with the construction of a defensive line from the mouth of the Pripyat, Zhlobin, Orsha rivers and the Zapadnaya Dvina, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk and Riga rivers is indicative: “Your thoughts are correct.”

    But for 5 hours before the war, it was too late to change the plan of warfare, while together with Tymoshenko (who signed the plan) and Zhukov (who developed the plan), Stalin (who approved the plan) was also responsible.
    1. +5
      August 8 2017
      Quote: Operator
      Stalin’s reaction to the proposal of the commander of the strategic reserve troops about the need to proceed with the construction of a defensive line from the mouth of the Pripyat, Zhlobin, Orsha rivers and the Zapadnaya Dvina, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk and Riga rivers is indicative: “Your thoughts are correct.”

      Pfff ... for the summer of 1941 already half a year now there is planning and arrangement of a much deeper Rzhevsko-Vyazemsko-Bryansk line (see. "Scheme of fortified areas of the third line along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk" (fund 208 inventory 2511 Case 309) - dated May 17, 1941).
      Terms of readiness: the first stage was to be completed by June 1, 1942, an intermediate stage by January 1, 1942.
      Preventive strike and offensive strategy, yes ... laughing
      1. +1
        August 8 2017
        Planning is on, arrangement is not.

        Budyonny did not mean the arrangement, but the deployment of troops on this line. Moreover, it was necessary to place (in the sense of the answer to Stalin's question) in June 1941 and earlier, and not in January 1942.

        The adventure of Stalin - Timoshenko - Zhukov on planning a border battle with the transfer of hostilities to enemy territory ended predictably.
        1. +4
          August 8 2017
          Quote: Operator
          Planning is on, arrangement is not.

          There is an estimate, there is a project, DOS is linked to the area. Actually, the future Rzhevsky and Vyazemsky SDs were built in 1941 so quickly precisely because they had been planned before the war.
          1. +1
            August 8 2017
            Nobody argues with this.
    2. +1
      August 8 2017
      But 5 hours before the war it was too late to change the plan of warfare, while together with Tymoshenko (who signed the plan) and Zhukov (who developed the plan), Stalin (who approved the plan) was also responsible. - operator

      There are no documents of the Timoshenko-Zhukov Plan for Defense and counterattacks signed by Stalin. There is only a signed and approved USSR Defense Plan (“Considerations”) of 1940, developed by Marshal Shaposhnikov.
      The "Tymoshenko-Zhukov Plan" is their own initiative development, not approved by any higher authority or Stalin. Therefore, two Tymoshenko-Zhukov are responsible.
      About evidence written by Martirosyan "June 22 Tragedy".
      1. +1
        August 8 2017
        Stalin, therefore, was slamming his ears for half a year when he was informed of increasing concentration of the Red Army units on the direct border with Germany and its satellites - such as Iosif Vissarionovich forgot, which was written in the beautiful plan of Shaposhnikov laughing

        And on June 21 of 1941 of the year at 23 of the hour, Stalin, therefore, received his sight after Budyonny had cut the truth, the womb.
        1. +1
          August 8 2017
          Stalin, therefore, flapped his ears for half a year when they reported to him on increasing concentration of the Red Army units on the direct border with Germany and its satellites - such as Iosif Vissarionovich forgot, which was written in the beautiful plan of Shaposhnikov - Operator

          Marshal Shaposhnikov’s defense plan was approved at the end of 1940, and Stalin knew about it.
          For the implementation of its implementation, it takes many months, and what do you think of Stalin as a fool who, after 3-4 months, agrees on the threshold of the war to change the Defense Plan to something else than bring confusion and chaos to the Red Army?
          No, Stalin could not do this. But the “Kiev” team in the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, headed by Timoshenko-Zhukov, who had just become the heads of NPOs and the General Staff, could do this enthusiastically with the “new broom” without Stalin’s knowledge, “with their own mustaches.” And most importantly, we look at the result - after all, I did it. Stalin could not do this, allow shy in the "Considerations" of the beginning of the war in a few months before it began.
          The Tymoshenko-Zhukov tandem with a high degree of probability could have violated Shaposhnikov’s Defense Plan independently, without reporting to Stalin in the order of his initiative. What are the goals is hard to say. For example, the same Martirosyan suggests general sabotage-betrayal in order to overthrow Stalin’s power during the unsuccessful start of the war, and provides fairly good evidence for this.
          To prove Tymoshenko-Zhukov’s independence, one can cite an example widely described by historians of the unapproved “Defense Plan Considerations” of May 1941, which were discovered and archived from papers, then Major General Vasilevsky, and providing for preemptive strikes against concentrated Germans.
          And what about the earlier “Note ...” subject to Stalin on April 16.04.41, XNUMX, in which the People's Commissar and the chief of the General Staff stated their vision of “Plans ...” built on a preemptive attack by the German armed forces before their concentration against the USSR?
          And then on May 10, 12 and 14 - S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov are present at the meetings of I. Stalin. On the 14th, new Directives on the urgent development of “Plans ...” go to HE. New plans should include only defensive actions of the spacecraft with a possible retreat to the old borders.
          With the sending of the new Directives, the previous “Plans ...” were canceled. - from article

          What does this mess in the Plans say? Yes, that when Stalin
          learned about the initiative of Tymoshenko-Zhukov and their actions to move away from the Shaposhnikov plan, then immediately demanded that they return to the Shaposhnikov Plan, and then the Directives flew urgently to the troops providing only defensive actions of the spacecraft with a possible retreat to the old borders, i.e. the rejection of Zhukovsky counter-attacks and “preemptive strikes”, and the transition to defensive actions provided for in the Shaposhnikov Plan.
          1. +1
            August 8 2017
            What "Shaposhnikov's Plan" are you talking about? Where can I get to know him?
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. +1
                August 9 2017
                What you call the “Shaposhnikov Plan” is called “On the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR” from the second half of the 1940 year (and not ““ Considerations for the Strategic Deployment Plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies ”from 15 May 1941 of the year).

                In the document "On the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR", an adventurous idea was spoken word for word repeated by Tymoshenko and Zhukov at the meeting of Stalin on 21 on June 1941, namely the defeat of the Wehrmacht in a border battle and the transfer of military operations to German territory:

                "The main task of our troops is to defeat the German forces concentrated in East Prussia and in the Warsaw area: with an auxiliary blow, defeat the enemy group in the Ivangorod area. Lublin, Grubeshov. Tomashev. Sandomierz. For which to deploy the North-West Front - the main task - by concentration, attack the enemy with the ultimate goal, together with the Western Front, to defeat his group in East Prussia and take control of the latter. "

                Zhukov in his post-war memoirs rejoiced as a child that by the 22 June 1941 of the year the Red Army had managed to concentrate on the Soviet-German border only half of the troops intended according to Shaposhnikov’s plan, otherwise we would not have had three million soldiers, but all six, and the outcome make war unpredictable.
                1. 0
                  August 9 2017
                  What you call the "Shaposhnikov Plan" is called "On the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR" from the second half of 1940 (and not "" Considerations for the Strategic Deployment Plan of the Armed Forces - Operator

                  I don’t know if you had time to read my comment completely, it was deleted by someone about the Shaposhnikov Plan - “Considerations” or how you write “ABOUT THE BASIS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION” No. 103202 / s on September 18, 1940? But judging by what was written, they seemed to have time.
                  Martirosyan, since I refer to him, he is called "Considerations ..." of September 18, 1940, and it is evident that he had reason to call them that. Well, okay, that doesn't matter.
                  Have you carefully read these Deployment Basics ...?
                  Section III, “Probable Operational Plans of Opponents,” records:
                  "Germany is most likely to deploy its main forces north of the mouth of the San River so that, from East Prussia, through the Lithuanian SSR, to strike and develop the main attack in the directions to Riga, to Kovno and then to Dvinsk - Polotsk, or to Kovno - Vilno and further to Minsk.
                  At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary concentric strikes from Lomzhi and Brest, with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranovichi, Minsk. "
                  and further
                  "It is also likely simultaneously with the main blow of the Germans from East Prussia their blow from the front Hill, Grubeshov, Tomashev, Yaroslav on Dubno, Brody with the aim of reaching the rear of our Lviv group and capturing Western Ukraine. "

                  That is, clearly the main blow of the Germans in Shaposhnikov’s plans was expected in the Minsk direction to Moscow. Why did he suddenly change from Tymoshenko-Zhukov to the Ukrainian main blow is incomprehensible?
                  In the V section "Basics of our strategic deployment in the West" in the First version, 1 point is written first "Active defense firmly cover our borders during the period of concentration of troops"and only then, in the following paragraphs, proceed to “inflict decisive defeat” on the enemy’s groups.
                  There is a difference with what you write
                  "The main task of our troops is to defeat the German forces concentrated in East Prussia and in the Warsaw area: with an auxiliary blow, defeat the enemy group in the Ivangorod area. Lublin, Grubeshov. Tomashev. Sandomierz ...

                  In my opinion, there is, first, active defense to deter and exhaust the enemy, and then actions to defeat the enemy from the Ukrainian direction, and not in East Prussia - the stronghold of German militarism.
                  The term "Active Defense" itself provided for the exhaustion of large enemy groups by active maneuvering on its own, including retreat.
                  Zhukov and Tymoshenko decided, without the knowledge of Stalin, to replace him with principle of "persistent defense" (in the guidelines of NPO and GSH 1941):
                  “... 2. The stubborn defense of fortifications along the state border firmly covers the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district’s troops ...
                  II. To organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following instructions:
                  1. The basis of defense is to put up a stubborn defense of fortified areas in field fortifications created along the state border using all forces and opportunities for their further development. ”

                  and later on Zhukovsky "lead" (in the Considerations of the General Staff from May 1941):
                  "In order to prevent this [and defeat the German army], I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative to the German command, preempt the enemy in the deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and interaction of the armed forces. "

                  The difference, as you know, is in the plans of B. M. Shaposhnikov. "active defense" and Zhukov-Tymoshenko plans "persistent defense".
                  So, it’s not Shaposhnikov’s “word for word” with “adventurous ideas”, as you say “repeated by Tymoshenko and Zhukov”.
                  1. +1
                    August 9 2017
                    Martirosyan was mistaken in the title of the document - he mixed up the contents and the title.

                    The main thing is not how to "cover up with defense", but where to do it - directly on the border or on the rear line, designated by Budenny at the meeting with Stalin on 22 on June 1941 of the year. Shaposhnikov's miscalculation in the second half of the 1940 of the year was that he planned defense at the border, which is already an adventure.

                    Plus, you ignore the second component of Shaposhnikov’s plan - the immediate attack of the Wehrmacht on its territory and the occupation of East Prussia. This is a double gamble.

                    Total we have on 22 on June 1941 of the year - mobilization in the USSR was not announced, directly on the western border (within the reach of artillery and attack aircraft of the enemy) are not fully equipped Red Army units with raw equipment and weapons, the troops are in places of permanent deployment (barracks and camps), there are no field facilities, there is no front line, command posts and communication centers are not deployed, rear bases are practically on the front line, aviation is not dispersed across field airfields, etc. etc.

                    But Tymoshenko and Zhukov continue to talk at a meeting with Stalin five hours before the war in strict accordance with Shaposhnikov’s plan on the need for defense on the border with a further transition to the offensive.
                    1. +1
                      August 9 2017
                      Shaposhnikov's miscalculation in the second half of 1940 was that he planned defense on the border, which was already an adventure. - operator

                      Well, you give. And where to start the defense? On the old border - the "Stalin line" or maybe even further immediately start on the Volga? Not serious.
                      And further in the Shaposhnikov Plan there is no “immediate attack by the Wehrmacht, as you write. Active defense of deterrence, and only then defeating the Germans. Read carefully these sources.
                      By mobilization. In no case could it be declared before the outbreak of war, otherwise the USSR would have looked in the eyes of the whole world as the initiator of the outbreak of war, which would certainly deprive its future allies. Stalin understood this perfectly, and therefore did not go to her, the experience of the First World War was in his memory. Don't you really know that? Although a partial mobilization under the guise of large VUSov he spent.
                      As for other issues, the shortage of military personnel, their presence in places of deployment, etc. is true, but in many respects they are explained by shortcomings in command, and sometimes by direct betrayal, as was the case in military missile defense.
                      Well, and the last, our discussion with you has dragged on. Tymoshenko-Zhukov did not act "in strict accordance with Shaposhnikov’s plan." The active defense proposed by Marshal Shaposhnikov provided for maneuverable defense, including with a possible retreat in order to restrain the enemy and save troops, and only after that defeat the enemy, and Zhukov-Tymoshenko stubbornly defends the border until the last soldier, or even worse a counter strike on the entire front against the enemy who was prepared for the attack, or the advancing that led to the inevitable defeat of the Soviet troops.
                      All. Want to stay with your opinion, stay, want to know more on this topic, read the same Martirosyan, with his evidence and facts, and internally argue with him.
                      1. +2
                        August 9 2017
                        Fire me from reading Martirosyan laughing

                        You can continue to juggle the adjectives "active" and "persistent."
                2. VS
                  -1
                  August 10 2017
                  "" You can continue to juggle the adjectives "active" and "persistent." ""

                  as I understand it - is this the same for you?
                  1. +2
                    August 10 2017
                    I understand that for you a noun (defense) is an empty phrase laughing
                    1. +2
                      August 10 2017
                      Operator, do not show your illiteracy. Behind the grins, the essence of everything is not to hide.
                      Defense is different. Enrich your knowledge.
                      1. +2
                        August 10 2017
                        Damn - what's the difference with the noun “defense”, if it is known for sure that Tymoshenko and Zhukov defended the entire first week of the war exclusively according to Shaposhnikov’s plan - actively throwing mechanized corps into counterattacks in an attempt to stop the Wehrmacht’s strike units?

                        So these two were faithful executors of Shaposhnikov’s plan, despite the prettiness of the syllable that they used in their memos and radiograms resembling “stubborn defense”.

                        But everything was useless, because for defense (except for counterattacks) the defense line itself was needed, and it (even in its infancy) was destroyed in the very first hours of the war by artillery fire and air strikes.

                        As a matter of fact, as of July 22 and 1941, the cover armies were deployed (if you can say so at all) into attacking orders - the rear lines are pulled directly to the border line, the units are concentrated at deployment points in the border zone - I do not want to counterattack.

                        Everything is purely concrete according to Shaposhnikov’s plan - "with little blood, a mighty blow, on foreign territory" am

                        Shaposhnikov’s plan was so adventurous that after the war, many historians and writers (such as Viktor Rezun) had an erroneous opinion about the planning of the Red Army’s preemptive strike against Nazi Germany.
                    2. VS
                      0
                      August 11 2017
                      those. you don’t know that there are several types of defense))) And by the way - and a preemptive strike - which raved Meretskov and Zhukov - also generally defense ")))
                      1. +2
                        August 11 2017
                        Oh well - does it mean that Hitler defended himself on 22 on June 1941?

                        "War is peace" (C) bully
  8. +5
    August 8 2017
    World history is full of understandable defeats and unexpected victories. Unfortunately, in our case (1941-42), German military specialists were right at almost all levels of responsibility. I would like to hope that our current military specialists are trained fairly objectively, up to moderate cynicism regarding the "great victories" of their fathers.
  9. +3
    August 8 2017
    Quote: Yuri Guliy
    World history is full of understandable defeats and unexpected victories. Unfortunately, in our case (1941-42), German military specialists were right at almost all levels of responsibility.

    In tactics, operational art, I agree, in strategy, full 0, even minus. The territory captured in 1939-1940 did not provide itself with energy and food, they were exported to Europe. That is, either the Reich sits on the supply of oil and grain from the USSR, or climbs for oil in the Middle East, and there the supply shoulder is such that it is easier to drag a camel through a coal ear. They attacked the USSR, requisitioned civilians against grain, did not fulfill the Barbarossa plan, received a protracted war on two fronts — on land with the USSR and in the air / at sea with England / USA. The year since 1942, the Reich did not shine, the question was not who would win, but when Germany would lose.
    1. +4
      August 8 2017
      I emphasize once again - we are talking about the situation 41-42
  10. +3
    August 8 2017
    Quote: Yuri Guliy
    I emphasize once again - we are talking about the situation 41-42

    And what are the prospects for the Reich after the failure of Barbarossa? A long exhausting war without much hope of victory.
  11. Alf
    +2
    August 8 2017
    For example, the memoirs of the respected admiral N. Kuznetsov, published after the publication of the memoirs of G. Zhukov, lost individual fragments of the text,

    Someone would try to compare Zhukov’s “memoirs” from the first edition to the tenth. It will be interesting.
    It cannot be ruled out that other participants in the initial period of the war, under pressure "from above", or to exclude their mistakes, or "fit into the general version of events" could adjust the chain of events.

    The same beetles successfully rule their memoirs from the other world.
    1. +6
      August 8 2017
      Quote: Alf
      Someone would try to compare Zhukov’s “memoirs” from the first edition to the tenth. It will be interesting.

      Yes Yes Yes... laughing
      We wanted to consult about this with the head of the political department of the 18th Army, L.I. Brezhnev, but he was just on Malaya Zemlya, where there were fierce battles.

      Memoirs are generally extremely inaccurate - just remember the same Popel.
      On a spread out raincoat, leaning against a tree, Vakhrushev reclined. In some boots and trousers. The chest and right shoulder are bandaged widely with a bandage. Vakhrushev sewed a tunic with a long thread. And without that, manly awkward movements now seemed completely ridiculous. At first, I did not realize what was the matter, and then I realized: Vakhrushev sewed with his left hand. Each gesture was grimaced on a pale, bloodless face. Nearby sat a barefoot instructor for information political instructor Fedorenko. Concentratedly observing how his toes move, he monotonously, without looking at Vakhrushev, repeated:
      - Let me sew, Comrade Senior Battalion Commissar, let me ...
      - He said - do not bother. Examine your fingers and do not go ... I broke the "idyll".
      - Is this invalid team the political propaganda department?

      A bright, colorful picture ... exactly until you know that in the spring of 1941, the battalion commissar Vakhrushev was transferred to the 24th mechanized corps, was captured during the summer battles of 1941 and was shot by the Germans on August 2 1941 year. In the war with Popel did not meet.
      © D. Shein
      And this is the case for everyone - it’s enough to recall the same Routh, who heroically rolled out the stormtrooper airfield in Yastrebino with tanks in his post-war memoirs, and he wrote in official documents of 1941 that:
      Thanks to local residents, it became known that in Yastrebino there is a temporary enemy airfield. Grabert’s detachment from the 800th Special Forces Regiment, reinforced with one platoon of the 65th Tank Battalion, was tasked with attacking the airfield. This company had to be abandoned due to a strong attack by attack aircraft around 17.45.
      smile
  12. +2
    August 8 2017
    Thanks to the author for the article. Moved from the army news website - there are many questions left that the author did not answer. About Hess - is your version the author?
    1. +4
      August 8 2017
      Yes, pzhl, crazy hypothesis - scout arrogance.
  13. +5
    August 9 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    These books on the fan - if you think there is not enough little blunders. You already read it yourself)))

    You promised me something that I don’t know. And where ?!
    Regarding the article, where is the mention of the border flying with landing every 100-150 km with data transmission (consider that in real time) to Stalin ?! And you didn’t find an order. And you won’t find it, some of the archives are simple. .. well, they weren’t, but there were. Only the date is 1953. And besides there is a gap in the numbers of cipher telegrams, pay attention to this, but where are those ciphers ...... they aren’t there again (they ended up in that part from 1953) .Therefore, it was believed that the Kremlin had raised the alarm, put them on alert. Well, this would not have saved the Red Army from defeat and tragedy. Time was lost (I wrote that the mobilization had to be carried out in July-August 1940). Not those groups and not there ...... but a lot of things are not right.
    1. +2
      August 9 2017
      About the fact that you do not know - this was not written))) The information is different: it is already somewhat different than what we discussed ... Is it not quite clear about the breakdown of pc numbers? Explain.
      Flyby is too slippery; there is not enough information to cross-reference to the memories or any indirect evidence in the form of facts. Explain what order is in question ....
      1. VS
        -1
        August 9 2017
        I apologize - dear author - have you read any works about pre-war events?
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. +1
            August 9 2017
            Thanks for the comment. I will answer you in more detail later.
            I see one thing: apart from emotions, there is little that you have written. Techies usually rely on facts. Can you clarify specifically that of linden in the article? Not the general were-were, and specifically ...
            By Pribovo - the next topic.
        2. +3
          August 9 2017
          And not a little. Interesting articles are in different series "Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences"?
          You have to browse through work ... Did you manage to watch anything?
          1. VS
            -1
            August 10 2017
            Interesting articles are in different series of "Bulletins of the Russian Academy of Sciences"? ""

            This is to blame for one Stalin who did not give the military permission to mobilize and bring to b..d until June 21? Who did not believe intelligence and military but believed Hitler?)))

            fire .. I’m "ranked" by "scientific" authors are not interested)) And in such messengers there they rule like that)))

            I asked about the research on the pre-war days and plans - what did you read?
    2. +9
      August 9 2017
      PredatorYou are a little inattentive))) When discussing the 1 part, you said the following: "But on the continent another rival like the USSR has no Germany. Who would believe that 220-240 divisions are necessary for a war with England?! There’s enough for 10-12 ... "
      The author replied: "Predator, and if the information will be somewhat different?"
      This was not in the text: "You promised me something that I do not know. And where ?!")))
      The second part was attended by reconnaissance aircraft of the GS GSh KA with a description, as was believed at that time, of the location of the German divisions. And there was no "10-12 divisions against the British." Forces were comparable. The information provided is "somewhat different" wink Will you challenge this?
      [iPro order, which you did not find] [/ i] - did not quite understand what it was about. If about the Directive from 18 of June - it is shown that no one carried out (the PribOVO phenomenon - in the next part).
      Gap in rooms - Sori, is also not clear. If you are about PribOVO, then there is a sea of ​​options: wink
      - from PC 71 / w just did not scan and did not post on the Internet;
      - to the service unit from the head of the SHO IN to the heads of the SHO armies (the SHO head had the right and now has the right to do so) with the requirements for processing speed and confirmation of receipt and (or) a report to the command.
      1. +11
        August 9 2017
        Regarding the article, but where is the mention of border overflight with landing every 100-150 km with data transfer (consider that in real time) to Stalin ?!
        Why precisely Stalin? Historians justified simply - and who else can command two different departments? - You can see a blunder ...
        The application could be submitted by the head of the NKGB, RU GSH KA. Why couldn't Kobets himself with the filing of the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Air Force Zapovo? Simply - Stalin is a sensation ...
        In fact, this is an even more “slippery” topic - the only mention in the memoirs. There is no indirect confirmation.
        What is suspicious about the memoirs about the June 17-18 flight?
        Infantry divisions were located at a distance from 7 to 15 km in waiting areas. For the most part, field artillery has not yet been taken to the border to the position.
        17 June, while still some parts of the moto-tank units, were unloaded far enough from the border and left for the waiting areas (at a distance of 20-30 km from the border), from which only 21 numbers moved to the border (after 17-18 hours). Soviet intelligence believed for a specified period that there was on the border of 6, etc. and md.
        Flying U-2 along the length of the border is great — the horizon can be seen from 120 to 200 km, depending on the altitude of this airplane. The problem is, and any scout knows, that even with binoculars, a dimensional target like T-IY can only be seen from a distance to 10 km (even less). 99,99% pilot was not allowed to fly into enemy territory. So, they almost could not see tanks, but could where intelligence knew about them. What is this sdineya? Dust machines, separate units were camped.
        Further, the pilot writes: "I often landed a plane on any suitable sitewhich might have seemed random. ”And under each bush there stood a border guard vigilantly. Venues had to be negotiated before departure - the pilots did not fly as it was written.
        Why it was necessary to sit through 30-50 km? Who so urgently wanted to know what was going on abroad? If it is not known from the landing site to the outpost how many kilometers and then to keep a message even before the detachment. Why did not write on pre-specified sites - it means it was not agreed.
        What neck was his reports? At least "ss". And to give the border guard a visor a sealed report - God forbid - this is complete nonsense.
        A simple example. Khramtsovsky, as already mentioned, was Zhukov's personal coder. In 1942, the Directive was written and given to Khramtsovsky. When leaving Zhukov, the adjutant proposed to seal the Directive in an envelope. The cipherman put it there and gave it to be sealed. Zhukov came out and said: "Why is the document in the hands of a stranger? ...... In the civil war for the communists there were three punishments: remark, reprimand and execution. You already reprimanded."
        There are still bloopers, but even so the message is long
        1. +12
          August 9 2017
          Pushing on a crime is from the sixth part ...))) And who could order the flight, so at least Colonel Tarasenko is a good man - the kingdom of heaven (not shot for SH) through Kobets
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. -1
          August 9 2017
          aKtoR

          Your version of the deployment of the advanced units of the Wehrmacht is at variance with the version of the direct eyewitness - the commander of the 43 IAD ZAPOVO Colonel Zakharov:

          “Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week ... I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District [Kopts] to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and had to fly from south to north - to Bialystok. I flew to the U-2 [as a pilot] with the navigator.

          The adjacent territories were clogged with troops. In villages, on farms, in groves, poorly disguised, if not completely disguised tanks, armored vehicles, and guns stood. Motorcycles and staff cars snooped along the roads.

          We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane at any suitable site, which might have seemed random if the border guard had not immediately approached the plane. The border guard arose silently, silently took under the visor and waited several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30 – 50 kilometers, sat down again. And again I wrote a report, and the other border guard silently waited and then, trumped, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok. ”

          As you can see, the deployment of the German units of the first echelon of the invasion as of 17-18 on June 1941 was within sight with the naked eye from a U-2 flight altitude.
  14. +2
    August 9 2017
    Quote: antivirus
    separate ST for Pribvo is a special colonial policy in the new republics (aliens in a stranger)

    Do not distort! The peoples of the Baltic states themselves became part of the USSR, so that they don’t say all kinds ... speed up .. laughing
  15. The comment was deleted.
    1. VS
      -2
      August 9 2017
      "" These books are for everybody - if you think there are quite a few blunders. You yourself read ""
      Did not read but condemn? But - if you didn’t read, then where and about what mistakes do you approve of Martirosyan?)))
      1. +6
        August 9 2017
        As far as I understand, historians have no more truthful version of the transfer of Directive No. 1 and Martirosyan, in particular)))
        True, this is not my merit, but work and the ability to link different events.
        1. VS
          -1
          August 9 2017
          I understand that you did not read it at all))) And the more works on this directive and its sending from Kozinkin the same)))

          There is no version with the transmission of dir. non-cash A draft of it was written by Stalin at 22.20. Then Zhukov and Tymoshenko from the draft wrote it at 23 p.m. in Tymoshenko’s office on cipher block forms. Zhukov under the dictation of Tymoshenko and rewrote))) And this is what N. G. Kuznetsov saw. And at 23.45 she was transferred to the SHO Shelter University for encryption and transmission in the okrugs))) For half an hour for encryption - and they started sending the text - at 0.25 approximately - there are marks on each okrug)) The last sent to OdVO - at 1.15 approximately)) To Riga sent at 0.30 approximately)) To Minsk - sent with a delay - there was a distortion of the text but still at 1.10 they accepted it completely and decrypted)))

          In KOVO - the signalmen accepted at 1.30 but could not decrypt because there were no cryptographers in Ternopol, they went to Baghramyan and arrived only at 7 o’clock in Ternopol)))

          Well, in OdVO Zakharov, waiting for the order to open the packages - he was given Zhukov’s command from Stalin’s office at 22 o’clock to wait for an important encryption - he overdid it and gave the command to open the package at midnight))

          To bind events you need to know them maximum, and so far you have imposed them from a minimum - from the ones you know)))
          1. +13
            August 10 2017
            Therefore, I do not like historians. Their as fanatical old women can not be convinced that contradicts their logic.
            What they wrote about SHT - N. Kuznetsov's memoirs, to which you refer me, 1963 and included in the Leningrad compilation 1968 of the year - there is a speech about sheets of a regular notebook (of course, recorded in the secret section). In the memoirs of 1969, for the first time, large sheets of cipher block note are mentioned. On the draft (which is on three pages) on the back of the 259, there are the names of the coders: one last name is identified. Such marks are put only on sheets that have been processed by ciphers. There is simply no copying of the PC from the draft (you can show me the scan, just don’t hide behind the formula - it is SECRET). I explain the details that are known to specialists - they can write that the author is a lie.
            The fact that the PC was sent in a manual cipher - you wrote it. Here is a link to the coryphaeus cryptographic equipment, respected by me.
            http://cryptohistory.ru/information/pionery-sovet
            skoj-mashinnoj-kriptografii /
            When the author wrote about 15 people in the SHO GSH - this is a change, and the text clearly says - two cryptographers worked (there are two names), the author described in detail the work process of these specialists and deputy mode. During the war, these people were divided into 4 branches (independent) in directions.
            Before everything, as you wrote there, it takes half an hour to encrypt (then the truth is blooded))) - any encrypter will tell you (me).
            Well, let's do it. I know on this site 4-cipher clerks, one of them read this text and thanked him - a respected and good person.
            Now let us confirm your involvement in our kagort - try to find out from any encrypter.
            In order not to push working specialists unwittingly on an official crime, let's take a look at the Soviet theme, which the author considered in this part.
            The author is ready to continue the public discussion with you as soon as you answer two well-known questions (cryptographers) out of four. Any two and you can continue the discussion)))
            1) What warning text has the cryptographer always seen working with encryption technology (on the same M101, the updated version of the M100 immediately after the war)?
            2) What is dummy?
            3) any standard for classiness - cryptographers should remember)))
            4) How was it necessary to check the special (I mean not according to the security classification) PC, processed on the encryption technique, during the war and in the post-war period?
            Show that you understand the topic that you are trying to discuss in detail.
            You can reduce with the specialist who will vouch for you and we will be able to “identify” with him.
            Without answering two questions, I stop further controversy.
            1. VS
              -3
              August 10 2017
              Judging by the fact that you deleted all my answers to you in which I showed you no more than the texture of pre-war events and began to show nonsense how smart you are - do you not accept criticism or hints in principle?)))) How did you get the idea that I am a historian ?))) Why did you get the idea that you are able to understand topics in which you obviously have a lack of information and analyze events only because you were engaged in encryption or are doing it?)))

              I’m not a cryptographer, but it’s not a problem to consult one of them - one FAPSI subfield working with that equipment back then and the other is GRU colonel a signalman - and I wouldn’t have a problem to answer your tricky questions of course)))) But - you do not accept criticism and new information and means - I will not show how smart I am.

              How much time was spent encrypting the deer. b / n - NOT IMPORTANT, in principle, and rushing around with it does not make sense))). On the one hand, there are notes on the ciphers and on the draft deer. non-cash This is enough to see when they gave it to the encryptors and when they started sending the text. And time - just half an hour and goes. You do not like this, but such is the texture)))
              On the other hand, the transmission of the encryption was duplicated by Zhukov's calls to the okrugs))) And with those more in the districts themselves, the ordering of the b..d didn’t go through the encryption but — by phone or BODO — in "direct" text))))
              So - cleverness about minutes in this case - does not make sense in the investigation of the causes of the tragedy of June 22.

              Kuznetsov in both cases wrote that Zhukov copied the text into cipher block sheets. He called it a notebook for radiograms and now you have such a knowledgeable question - why did he call that notebook?)))
              Of course, I’m not a cryptographer, but you don’t understand the topic, alas)) The topic of the tragedy is June 22, because knowledge in the cryptographic case will not help you if you ignore how Klenov did NOT LIFT Pribovo to receive a deer. non-cash but you rushed to defend him at once without understanding what he was shot at and what he was to blame for.

              It’s always like that with specialists like you "- grab the tops and fantasize for the Zhukovs - that they did not believe there was an attack from scratch and when they give you the texture dug up to YOU ​​by others - you throw tantrums and wave banans)))))

              As for YOUR questions - and joyfully rubbing the cute pens in anticipation of banning me for not answering them even if I can)) I also asked you a couple of questions - you did not answer ignoring them. So - if you want to communicate and receive information unknown to you - we’ll chat. You don’t want, but you obviously don’t want imagining yourself a super specialist in everything - of course there will be no sense))
              So - it’s up to you to choose to communicate with those who don’t know the topic here at all or those who are enthusiastic about - ignorance of the topic all the more - or - chat with an adult, with those who have been digging in the topic for a long time and know you more clearly from pre-war events. ))) while not being either an enemy or an opponent by and large)))
              1. +3
                August 12 2017
                The author is not a moderator and can NOT delete user posts. Messages are deleted with insults and with large amounts of messages that are not related to this topic.
                For similar violations, the author was banned for two weeks - and, as it is not strange, thanks to the moderators.
                1. VS
                  -1
                  August 12 2017
                  Ie you did not have time to read what I wrote to you?))) Do you want to chat on an adult topic? Let's in PM your email. the address)))
                  1. +11
                    August 12 2017
                    What do you answer?
                    You wrote: “I am not a cryptographer, but to consult with this is not a problem — one FAPSI sub-cadre who worked with this equipment at one time and another — the colonel of the GRU communicator — and I would have no problem answering your tricky questions ...” It is doubtful that you may have such acquaintances - this is just boasting. At the same time, in FIVE (including deleted) messages YOU question the author’s text on PC. It turns out that you don’t know anything about this question - only what you wrote in the books. (By the way, the term “Receipt” is not used in this service - this is for communications workers). Therefore, you personally can not dispute everything that is written in the article about encryption correspondence. The presence of information in the article, which cannot be found in the media, and the absence of claims to the author by the experts - testifies to the awareness of the author in this matter.
                    Until now, until this is challenged by your “friends” the author is an expert in this field. As an expert, he argues:
                    1) SHO GSH had encryption technique. The author dropped the link to the article. SHO received more than a hundred units of encryption tools. Naturally, they went to 1-th line at the SHO GSH. In order for the General Staff to correspond with anyone — they need the recipients — this is the SHO of the military districts. The directive from the General Staff to the districts was not sent by hand-code - this is yours and your "colleagues" fiction. The speed of 300 characters (60 groups) / per minute is the design speed, which does not take into account the replacement of encryption tapes and the fatigue of specialists. Sorry, this is not a printer for you ...
                    2) Memoirs of N. Kuznetsov. You wrote about a large notebook of radiograms. Read the source - 1963 of the year, or their reprint in the Leningrad collection. This text is given in the 4 part of the article. There are mentioned notebook sheets, which are shown on the scan. You reproach that the source is not indicated. The article indicated on the "sites." Well, I will clarify, the scan of the Dear user under the nickname "Sergey Art" (if he were connected with the AL - could draw the same conclusions.
                    3) The draft material used by the SHO is destroyed as the containers are filled for them. Otherwise, this is a violation of the “Inscriptions on the encryption service” of that time. The draft material (according to your version, which was used to rewrite the text) is never accompanied by surnames (or encryption signatures). Only those documents that are used for encryption have such details (the specialist worked with PCs and left his details after work. On the back of the 259 sheet, there are TWO last names). Therefore, the text on the presence of a clean copy of the CT Directive - it is your fiction and groups of persons whose opinions you express.
                    This misconception contributed to the fact that in Soviet times it was forbidden to take STS forms with blots (each of the blots was required to be negotiated on the back). If historians had consultations, they affected a later time and could not reflect the events of the period in question.
                    4) Scanning WORD SECOVO - is the text that was deciphered in the SHOW SOVOVO. It reflects exactly the text that was sent from the General Staff. The statements of persons that there is also an incoming number of PCs in ZOVOVO is the same fictionas above.
                    4) In your version and the version of historians does not fit a copy of S.M. Budenny, which is not in the addressing PC. NKVMF is, but there is no Budyonny. The discrepancy between the text of the 1 Directive, set out by Zhukov and the COVO, is not consistent with the version of historians and history just corrected - there is no one to challenge ...
                    5) “KOVO - the coders were not there at headquarters but were traveling with Baghramyan and arrived only at 6-7 in the morning at headquarters ...”.
                    In the SEC department of KOVO there were about 16 personnel and two sets of technical equipment for work. The only mention of the lack of encryption is in Bagramyan’s memoirs. Is it really so - other sources of information are silent. What Bagramyan writes specifically in 1952 year: “There were no orders about bringing the troops on alert through the operational department of KOVO headquarters. Whether the commander of the troops and the chief of staff of the district received such orders to me is UNKNOWN. ”
                    Therefore, the statement about non-receipt of the Directive not proven.
                    Five of your posts (part removed) with arguments about the transfer of PCs and handling of draft material is fiction. It is on this legal field. I can reveal a lie. How can you believe your other reasoning that cannot be verified, for example, in view of the “secrecy” of the Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft of 18 June and others ...
                    By the way, in December 2017 of the year it was mentioned about the structure created in the USA to counter the election of V.Putin 2018 of the year. The main rate there was made on the connection "Corruption-power-Putin-leaving old Putin". The partners quickly reoriented ...
                    Your sayings: "Who now has the highest support of the population? Putin, who calls the enemies "partners," goes to congratulate Alexievich, keeps the same Serdyukov in a dust-free position, or returns Kudrin to advisers. Probably Putin is also a traitor ... Or we will find out in 20 years. Will you vote for him soon?)))
                    Correctly think, overseas partners need Democrats!
                    1. VS
                      -2
                      August 13 2017
                      "" It is doubtful that you may have such acquaintances - this is simply bragging. ""

                      ))) FAPSI subfield - my neighbor on the landing))) GRU Colonel - my good friend in Moscow and a "consultant" on books))))

                      "" YOU question the author’s text on the PC. ""

                      but you are mistaken with deer. Pavlova?)))
                      Or maybe - we will not be measured by the fact that we have different things and move on to adult communication?)))

                      "" "Receipt" is not used in this service - this is for signalmen ""

                      so the signalmen and give it - to the General Staff from the districts ..))) Since then I said that))) But the signalmen and cryptographers - in general - one profession in military schools (I have a classmate in school - I studied in Krasnodar))))

                      "" You can not dispute everything that is written in the article on encryption correspondence "" - and did not intend to)))
                      I’m just trying to point out your mistakes in some issues and help not to make mistakes in a topic that you’ve been studying only a couple of months and I’ve been several years)))

                      "" 1) SHO GSh had encryption technology. ""
                      and thank God)) I did not argue with THIS)))
                    2. VS
                      -3
                      August 13 2017
                      "" The directive was not sent from the General Staff to the okrugs with a manual code - this is your fiction and your “colleagues”. The speed of 300 characters (60 groups) / per minute is the design speed, which does not take into account the replacement of cipher tapes and the fatigue of specialists. ""

                      I do not state this))). Time spent - at least half an hour on
                      THIS text - this is what I showed and how someone got tired there - in principle, the aspects of how and who poked your fingers somewhere or somehow encrypted are NOT IMPORTANT)) IMPORTANT - the time was spent and it always was and everyone had - and in the General Staff and in the districts - 20-25 minutes for this test)))

                      "" Read the source - 1963, or their reprint in the Leningrad collection. ""

                      And read and compared))) among themselves. Kuznetsov only specified in the memoir - they copied the text .. from the draft to the forms .. The admiral called them - for radiograms, and I asked you why he called the cipher block so?)))

                      "" is indicated on "sites". Well, I’ll clarify, the scan of the Dear User under the nickname “Sergey St” (if he was connected with the AL, he could draw the same conclusions. ""

                      Chekunov, his last name is Sergey Leonidovich, and the other day he came up with a two-volume edition - FULL answers of the commanders of Pokrovsokmu))) Have you heard of such? You cite what Kozinkin posted on the network - answers from VIZH and Chekunov made the publication of ALL answers)) Kozinkin made a two-year-old a year ago, but there a third of the respondents show a maximum))))

                      But Chekuneov has one problem - he is not a military man and with this draft a lot of bubbles that year when he put him out ..))) Now he interprets it more competently)))

                      "" The rough material used by the SHO is destroyed as they fill their containers. Otherwise, this is a violation of the “Encryption Service Manual” of that time. ""

                      Or given = returned in some cases to the performers)))

                      "" Draft material (according to your version, which was used to rewrite text) is never accompanied by surnames (or signatures of encryptors). Only those documents that are used for encryption have such details (the specialist worked with the PT and left his details after work. 259 as many as TWO names on the back of the sheet). Therefore, the text about the presence of the draft law of the Directive is your fiction and the group of persons whose opinion you express. ""

                      practical work sometimes diverges from "instructions")))

                      “This misconception was promoted by the fact that in Soviet times it was forbidden to accept SHT forms with blots (each blot needed to be negotiated on the back). If there were consultations with historians, they affected a later time and could not reflect the events of the period under consideration." "

                      want to say that in the 41st encrypted only from drafts?)) Bypassing the SHO forms?)))
                      By the way - Shtemenko described the situation in Stavka this way - he and Stalin simplified the procedure - to reduce the time they send ciphers - they began to make encryption from drafts in the next room)))

                      "" 4) Scan of SH ZAPOVO - is the text that was decrypted in SHO ZAPOVO. It reflects exactly the text that was sent from the General Staff. Statements by persons that there is also an incoming ST number in ZAPOVO is the same fiction as the above. ""

                      is it really so difficult to compare MOST - TEXT from DRAFT Chekunov and the text that you brought in the photo scan from TsAMO?))))

                      Let me tell you - in draft dir. b \ n there is a provision on air defense and in the text of Pavlov - it is not - he combined n). g and d)))

                      Unlike you, I have been communicating with Chekunov for several years on a milter (up to a complete loss on his part), and he quoted this - in the encryption in Minsk there is a provision - as it should be - about air defense)))

                      it looks like this - “) Lead the air defense into combat readiness without additional measures. Prepare all activities to darken cities and objects;
                      e) Do not carry out any other events without special order. ” )))

                      "" ""
                    3. VS
                      -2
                      August 13 2017
                      Five of your messages (part deleted) with arguments about the transfer of PT and handling rough material is fiction. It is in this legal field that I can identify a lie. How can you believe your other reasonings, which cannot be verified, for example, in view of the "secrecy" of the General Staff Directive dated June 18 and others ... "" - actually - these are not my words))))
                    4. VS
                      -2
                      August 13 2017
                      "" "KOVO - there the cryptographers were not at the headquarters but were traveling with Baghramyan and arrived only at 6-7 a.m. at the headquarters ...".
                      In the SEC department of KOVO there were about 16 personnel and two sets of technical equipment for work. The only mention of the lack of encryption is in Bagramyan’s memoirs. Is it really so - other sources of information are silent. What Bagramyan writes specifically in 1952 year: “There were no orders about bringing the troops on alert through the operational department of KOVO headquarters. Whether the commander of the troops and the chief of staff of the district received such orders to me is UNKNOWN. ”
                      Therefore, the claim of non-receipt of the Directive is not proven. ""

                      You clearly didn’t read Gretzov’s work))) that night and how anyone took the text in Ternopol)) Gretzov — nsh Belov and then in OdVO and then teacher in ak Frunze)))
                      He showed both the time of reception and the time of return to encryptors - 8.45, and the time of decryption - 12.45)) with reference to the details of the storage of incoming encryption in KOVO)))


                      "" Your statements: "Who now has the highest support from the population?" Putin, who calls enemies "partners," goes to congratulate Aleksievich, ""

                      it's not my words just that)))

                      you ochatyat - = heard something and began to wave a saber .. For a couple of months to deal with the topic - it's cool of course, but it's better if you accept and use the help of those who dig this topic for years)))
            2. VS
              -3
              August 10 2017
              You gave a link to an article where it is shown that the encryption machine gave up to 300 characters. per minute

              "" The car was called the M-100 "Spectrum" and began to be produced simultaneously with the B-4 machine since 1940. The machine allowed encrypting letter telegrams at a speed of up to 300 characters per minute. ""))

              great))

              In the text deer. b / n characters - about 1000 and on this you wrote that it takes five minutes to encrypt a maximum and no more than ????))))
            3. VS
              -3
              August 10 2017
              "" There is simply no rewritten PC from the draft (you can show me its scan, just do not hide behind the formula - it is SECRET). ""

              so if the letterhead form where Zhukov wrote the text from the draft photo of the last page from which you brought to declassified - how will I show it to you?)))

              The fact that the names of the encryptors were indicated on the back of the third sheet does not say that they worked with the draft and not with the text written (rewritten) on the cipher block form))) Encryptors are given both the clean version and the draft as well. Then the fine one remains in storage at the SHO Shelter and the draft can be returned to the performer))) I don’t know how you were taught and in what structures (at railway stations you also have your own cryptographers, but specialists from the General Staff tell me this))))

              But - you understand - fussing with minutes on the drafts is not worth the time spent on searching for intrigue))) Zhukov didn’t spend much time - more precisely, he pulled it when he didn’t go straight to the General Staff and thrashed Tymoshenko into an NGO and began to rewrite the text. But - he, like the People's Commissar, began to ring the districts from 23 hours and tell them about this encryption))))
              You don’t worry - you weren’t the only one who rummaged in these minutes in the hope of finding the secret of the June 22 tragedy. ))) Zhukov, of course, is still a miracle and bears full responsibility for the tragedy of June 22, but in some matters you need to know how to kick someone like him)))

              "" Oh, that the PC was sent in a manual code - you wrote this. ""

              I wrote that the encryption itself takes such text up to half an hour and most likely the encryptors in the GS did so - they encrypted in manual mode)))
              And the notes indicate that the draft came to them at the General Staff at 23.45, where the typist typed another copy from PURE text — to Pokrovsky with Budyonny, and for the Navy, and at 0.25, the text began to be sent. Those. It was spent on encryption for at least 20-25 minutes at least))))
    2. +13
      August 9 2017
      about the January games - not quite right. After Zhukov "hooked" one of Pavlov's flanks, and he continued the offensive - the game was stopped. Later in the consultations for the film, Zhukov presented a phrase that allegedly such a syndrome was with the environment of Minsk. So, what ass - not your correct remark ...
      And others dug a lot of bad. For example, it is YOU. Twice about the executed, but you don't know the main thing. How so? And still in-learning.
      Did you write that you read all the 4 parts? How is it that you did not see about the three draft copies in the 4 part? This happens with people who are confident of being right and flipping diagonally, sometimes))))
      "add text in pencil on a sheet from Zhukov’s notebook, which was later assigned a number in the archive 258 (can not be the last sheet of PCs without a signature)."
      If you came to the site precisely in order to “catch” me, then you are sure that you are well versed in this topic!
      How did you not find in the text the mention of the sheet 258 - the third sheet, which was placed in the middle (second).
      "according to - published intelligence reports (and there are unpublished ones))) - not declassified)" - God forbid me from a non-thinking person. The "Calendar" and the "List" were prepared for the leader just before the start of the war and there included messages about the beginning of the war - the hottest ones. “not declassified” - are they also secretly told by the leader?
      You have not even figured out with historians who framed DG Pavlov ...
      And about Pyotr Semyonovich Klenov, there is no need to slander (this is a trick) - and even then I understood better than you.
      Conclusion - you are not interesting to me, good luck
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. VS
        -1
        August 10 2017
        "" If you came to the site just to "catch" me - it means you’re well versed in this topic! ""

        definitely. I’m on the topic of the “June 22 tragedy” and you’re not very good))) And the “knowledge” of the cryptographic case, ignoring the FACTS and events - as well as the prompts of those who LONGER understand you in the topic - will not help you, but it will only hinder you to figure out what happened and why)))
      4. VS
        -3
        August 10 2017
        "" "Calendar" and "List" were prepared for the leader just before the start of the war and there included messages about the beginning of the war - the hottest. "not declassified" - were they also secret from the leader or what? ""

        Escho times - you have not seen the SCAN of these "lists". Only publication in a rather odious collection of Russophobes and anti-twigs in Yakovlev.

        I gave you an example - the publication in the robin of Pavlov’s directive “convinced everyone” that there was a deer in Minsk. b / n was accepted only at 1.45 and then idiotic fantasies were also built on it - oh, how late the General Staff sent the text to the okrugs - they were late !!))) And the publication of Pavlov’s text itself showed that 1.45 is the time for Pavlov’s text to be sent to the clerk of his Operations department.

        Deere the b / n was received in Minsk at 1.10, decrypted in 20 minutes, and at 1.30 Pavlov began to raise the army by PHONE!)) "Bring them into combat condition")))

        Then his text was compiled - without provisions for air defense - for air defense he gave at the same time a separate separate order - and at 1.45 cryptographers in Minsk and took him to work and at 2.25 and sent him to the district army - i.e. they also spent time on encryption for at least 20 minutes))))

        "" about Pyotr Semenovich Klenov - no need to slander (this is vile) - I’ve figured it out better than you in this matter. ""

        those. in your opinion, if the nsh who remains behind his commander does not raise the DISTRICT on alarm, he receives a deer. is GSh an innocent victim of Stalin’s repressions?

        He gave the directive at 2.25 - in the army - to a full b ... g and it could be decrypted in the armies, God forbid, at 3 o’clock, but he did NOT pick up the district as Zakharov or Pavlov did - by telephone - URGENTLY - at 1.30 minimum. Zack is - the shooting is provided at least. And worry about such heroes is not worth it.

        You brought Zhukov’s memoir as he set the task to Kirpanos at midnight - quickly pass the directive to the troops! And he called ALL the districts unambiguously. Zhukov in the evening, at about 18 p.m., informed the okrug - to wait for the attack and to be in touch with everyone - at 22 p.m. he gave EVERYONE a command from Stalin's office - to wait for an important encryption - AND THESE FACTS - and in your opinion he did not believe in an attack and maple could have a bulldozer to kick and not to raise the district ???
        1. VS
          -3
          August 10 2017
          this is how they presented the text from the robin of Pavlov’s directive))

          Directive No. 1 of June 21, 1941
          I transmit the order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:

          1. During the period of June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack is possible on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
          2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
          At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.
          I ORDER:
          a) during the night on 22 June 1941, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
          b) before dawn on 22 June 1941, disperse all aircraft, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
          c) bring all parts to combat readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and disguised;
          d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
          e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
          Tymoshenko Zhukov
          Pavlov Fominykh
          Klimovsky

          TSA MO RF. F.208. Op. 2513. D.71. L.69. Typescript. There are notes: "Received June 22, 1941 at 01-45", "Sent June 22, 1941 at 02-25 - 02-35" "" "

          ))))))

          And in the photo of Pavlov’s text you quoted - there is no paragraph on air defense))) In Minsk, paragraph d) was combined and c) removing the mention of air defense. Because Pavlov at the same time had already prepared a separate order for air defense)))

          And judging by the robin - the time of arrival of the test in Misnk is 1.45. And the illiterate will decide that 1.45 is generally the time the text arrives at the GS encryption))) and 2.25 is the time the directive was sent from Moscow)))

          That is - publications in the robin with their lists - until scans and photos of the docks themselves have been published - MUST be doubtful)))

          by the way - this is what the text adopted in Minsk looks like - on these points)))

          “D) Put the air defense in combat readiness without additional measures for taking measures. Prepare all activities to darken cities and objects;
          e) Do not carry out any other events without special order. ”
          And Pavlov removed the air defense clause))))
      5. VS
        -1
        August 10 2017
        “to add the text in pencil on a sheet from Zhukov’s notebook, which was later assigned the number 258 in the archive (there cannot be the last sheet of PT without a signature).”

        Of course, the question you didn’t want to answer is WHERE did you see the pencil text?

        Solonin photographed TWO times the last page and a certain "Zakoretsky" brought them together in one shot, which you brought (by the way, without referring to what should be done in those matters by the author of this photo))) - otherwise you might think that you were such a discoverer this photo) - but there is no pencil. You claim that the middle sheet is written with a pencil - which supposedly someone put between the first and second - but who will confirm this? Neither Solonin nor Chekunov, who in 2009 still drafted "published" on the miller - do not confirm YOUR allegations)) Thus - either bring a scan to this page - a photo - or - correct your statements)))
  16. +2
    August 9 2017
    Extremely important information passed by the author’s attention: on 22 on May 1941, all German railways switched to a military (so-called tightened) train schedule, on 23 on May intelligence information was reported to Stalin, on May 24 he held a meeting with Tymoshenko and Zhukov, which stated that the countdown to the war began.

    On 12 of June 1941 of the year, Stalin received from the Soviet agents in British intelligence the text of the decrypted radiogram (using the Enigma cryptographic machine analogue) of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command to the commanders of the invading army groups on setting the date for the start of hostilities - 22 of June 1941 of the year (with final confirmation until 13 hours 21 June).

    The advance of the Wehrmacht's advanced units to their starting positions began at 4 on the 18 of June and it was recorded by the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR with corresponding reports to Moscow. On the same day, the command of the western districts was given the cipher program of the General Staff of the Red Army with the estimated date of the German attack on the Soviet Union (still not published).

    All this testifies that there was no surprise in Germany’s attack on the 22 of June 1941 of the year for the military-political leadership of the USSR.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. VS
      -1
      August 9 2017
      "" On the same day, the command of the western districts was given the cipher program of the General Staff of the Red Army with the estimated date of the German attack on the Soviet Union (still not published). ""

      They brought the date and time as soon as the threat arose))) For example, in PribOVO they were brought to the regiments around the 17th — wait for the attack on the night of June 20))) And drove along the border to the borders closer)))
      1. +3
        August 9 2017
        Everything that was done in the western military districts of the USSR in the first half of the 1941 year - a dead poultice: the initial period of the war was strategically lost back in the 1940 year, when Shaposhnikov’s adventurous plan for conducting border battles was adopted.

        After that, it doesn’t matter anymore, who, when, what, scouted, who fashioned which directive, who brought it / didn’t bring it to the performers, who spent a lot of time on encryption / decryption, who got along with the assessment of the specific date of the war, etc. etc.

        The planned deployment of cover armies from the second half of the 1941 of the year to the rear defense line of Budenny would solve all the problems of the Red Army and provide an organized rebuff to the Wehrmacht at any time in the 1941 of the year.
        1. VS
          -1
          August 9 2017
          "in 1940, when Shaposhnikov’s adventurous plan for conducting border battles was adopted." "

          You seem to have studied at the academies of the General Staff?))) You know how to "fight" better than the Shaposhnikovs)))
          And Stalin - a "seminary dropout" - for some kind of vegetable pushed the border away in the 39th)))

          "" Planned deployment of cover armies from the second half of 1941 on the rear line about ""

          And what “number” did you have to do?))) If it doesn’t matter what date of the attack is drawn, then it means you had to withdraw the troops — and from the border, including — the number so — what?)))

          It was necessary - to move in advance and type on the old border to wait for the Germans?)) And where is this - the rear line of Budeny? Under Mozhaisk type?)))

          Let me tell you - EXACTLY THE SAME Plans in the General Staff - in essence - were AFTER WWII)))

          "" who went wrong with the assessment of a specific start date for the war ""

          And who went wrong?
          1. +3
            August 9 2017
            According to the memoirs and articles - everyone went wrong with the date.

            Budyonny Line: Pripyat, Zhlobin, Orsha, Zapadnaya Dvina, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk, Riga.

            The troops would be deployed there - they would not be worn with a date like with a written shell.
            1. VS
              0
              August 10 2017
              that is, do you think of Stalin as a fool who joined the territories pushing the border - do not understand that they are not needed?)))

              Eso times - EXACTLY SUCH same plans in the General Staff and the PP under them were written AFTER the War. According to your rule and after the war in the Soviet Socialist Republic - composing "border battles" and then?)))

              And - so in which academy of which GS did the respected be trained?
              1. +2
                August 10 2017
                Stalin’s “stupidity” is not that he increased the depth of defense by annexing Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova and the Karelian Isthmus, but that he did not understand that in order to repulse a stronger enemy, we need an 200-300 km depth of field for exclusion of surprise attacks, opening the direction of the enemy’s main strikes, gaining time to relocate their troops for the period of advancing the enemy from the border, hiding the configuration of strong points from direct observation by the enemy to the outbreak of hostilities etc. etc.

                Stalin burned himself on his own slogan: "With little blood, a mighty blow, on foreign territory."
                1. +6
                  August 11 2017
                  If you are an “Operator”, then you should know that in the summer of 1942, when the Germans were marching towards Stalingrad, the Soviet troops threw forward forward forces in order to reveal the direction of the main attack. All these advanced units were destroyed by the Germans. Then there was the recommendation of the General Staff that this tactic does not work. For any serious resistance, it is necessary to allocate up to a third of the division, which sharply weakens the main core of the compound. And small groups are destroyed by the enemy very quickly.
                  In the summer of 1943, Vatutin created the foreground. Goth launched the offensive not on July 5, but on the 4th and in the afternoon. In the second half. By evening, that is, after 2-3 hours, all the advanced battalion points were captured by the Germans. But they were not 200 km away, but 2-3 km from the front line.
                  Theory completely diverged from practice.
                  By the way, in this connection it is interesting to read the officialdom of the Battle of Kursk. What passions about whether or not to begin counter-training ..... In reality, by the evening of July 4th, the Soviet command knew that the offensive had begun. And by the way, the battle at Prokhorovka Goth was planned at the preparation stage, approximately in May-June 1943.
                2. VS
                  -1
                  August 11 2017
                  "Stupidity" of Stalin is not that he increased the depth of defense by joining Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova and the Karelian Isthmus, but that he did not understand that to repulse a stronger enemy, we need a field of 200-300 km deep to exclude surprise attacks, opening the direction of the main attacks of the enemy, ""

                  you in what military academy studied then ??)))
                  they knew the directions of the main strikes from AUTUMN in our GS - on the 40th)))) And in May of the 41st, German intelligence reported that they know about our main forces in the Russian GS, but concentrate their efforts elsewhere - south of woodland)))
            2. VS
              -2
              August 10 2017
              No one got along with the date. Everyone knew about her well and you can find the same "memoirs" on it and the more docks)))

              And about the fact that it was necessary to move away from the border, leaving hundreds of kilometers to the Germans that they stupidly travel for hours - I’m more interested and important about the opinion of such marshals as Shaposhnikov or Zakharov - one was most often the beginning of the General Staff and the other- MORE THAN anonymous on the network which, apparently, served in the army, God forbid, a couple of years)))
              1. +2
                August 11 2017
                Stalin’s “stupidity” is not that he increased the depth of defense by joining Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova and the Karelian Isthmus, but that he did not understand that to repulse a stronger enemy, we need a field of 200-300 km deep for exceptions of surprise attacks, opening of the direction of the main attacks of the enemy, time guessing - Operator

                Do you think such a “pre-field” of 200-300 km would save the Germans from the initial defeat?
                This is in the game "Victory Day" a similar strategy works. In reality, no. The Germans would have skipped these 200-300 km in a matter of hours, as they already wrote here, and once again applied for our troops covering mechanized mites surrounded by large numbers of troops, not only in the border areas, but in the interior, which they did later in Vyazemsky boilers.
                The only and correct way out for our troops was the grinding and gradual destruction of German troops in active, maneuverable, flexible defense, starting from the border, with the preservation of our troops, and it was useless to surrender hundreds of kilometers of territory without a fight.
                The “strategy” you propose would lead to the rapid advance of German troops, and the surrender of numerous Soviet regions with millions of inhabitants without any resistance, with unpredictable military and political consequences.
                The sensible, sound core of the Soviet generals, not like Zhukov G.K., who did not like and did not tolerate staff work (from the description on Zhukov given by K.K. Rokossovsky when Zhukov was a subordinate of Rokossovsky), they knew and reasonably applied the knowledge of military science in the development of pre-war defense plans.
                Another question is that these plans were violated by the illiterate military commanders Zhukov and Tymoshenko, who were struck by changes to these plans, with the introduction of decisions that were destructive for our troops, up to the absurd "preemptive strikes" of the enemy at the deployment stage in places of pre-war deployment.
                1. VS
                  0
                  August 11 2017
                  "" The only and correct way out for our troops was the grinding and gradual destruction of German troops in active, maneuverable, flexible defense, starting from the border, with the preservation of our troops, and it was useless to surrender hundreds of kilometers of territory without a fight. ""

                  if they acted strictly according to Shaposhnikov’s plan)))
  17. +12
    August 10 2017
    Quote: ammunition
    Even in the conditions of defeat, when the soldiers remained groups of 15 - 20 people, the hungry soldiers of the Red Army were forced to look for food. ((If they had dry land in the sidors for 3 of the day, they would not be looking for food but the enemy. sad

    Uncle, were you in combat ?! If you didn’t ... l, when choosing a pack of cartridges or a can of stew, all for some reason chose a pack ....
    1. +4
      August 10 2017
      This is when they wanted to fight for their homeland. The defendant has a different purpose))))
  18. The comment was deleted.
    1. +5
      August 10 2017
      Uncle author needs to live well, and to do this you need books. To buy them you need sensations, if you don’t have them, you can correct the story)))
      1. VS
        0
        August 11 2017
        the circulation of modern research is a couple of thousand copies)) The fee for them is a maximum of 30 thousand- less than the pension of a security officer - colonel of the SVR of the State Committee of the USSR))))
  19. +12
    August 10 2017
    The work, of course, has been done by the author.
    I agree that there is a lot of material and it is difficult for us, as lovers, to appreciate it.
    Directive on putting troops on alert. Not sure if she was gone. The fact is that the troops rose from June 16 to June 19 and advanced to areas of concentration. There is already a ton of evidence on this subject. And in all the Districts. It is unlikely that this could be the initiative of individual commanders. So far I see evidence that, starting from June 16, the Soviet leadership already knew that war was inevitable.
    The most valuable remark in this article is given by the deployment time and the defense strip of the divisions in different Districts. With a defense front of 22 to 40 km (in Odessa to 90 km), no directives and other wisdom already mattered. The division cannot fully defend itself at a 40 km front. So immediately any fairy tales that the Red Army was preparing to advance disappear. It is impossible to defend in such densities. So, regardless of any warnings from telegrams and other intelligence reports, the defeat at the border was programmed.
    But this does not mean that there was a betrayal. Just such were the charters and moods of that time. It was believed that this is the right tactic. The fallacy of such constructions became clear only in the summer of 1942. But even on the Kursk Bulge in the strip of the Voronezh Front, Vatutin advanced forward battalion strongholds. They were destroyed by the Germans in the very first hours of the offensive.
    1. +7
      August 10 2017
      Quote: Bakht
      So, regardless of any warnings from telegrams and other intelligence reports, the defeat at the border was programmed.
      But this does not mean that there was a betrayal.

      That's right !!!
      From the first to the last word.
      The only explanation of these facts is not entirely true.
      1. +8
        August 10 2017
        No one gave an explanation of these facts. At a density of 40 km per division, it will not hold the front. The reason was named by Zhukov. But for some reason everyone misses it. Zhukov’s memories poured a lot of dirt. But there is an explanation of the reasons for the defeat.
        In general, I'm interested in the logic of betrayal lovers. Is this a typical Russian trait? Have you read about the defense of Eben Emael? So the exact picture of the Brest Fortress. Or defense of the borders of Poland. But not in one country their generals are so harassed as in the Russian Federation or in the USSR.
        1. +2
          August 11 2017
          In general, I'm interested in the logic of betrayal lovers. Is this a typical Russian trait? - Bakht

          Unfortunately, it has a place to be. It will be enough to be convinced of this by looking at our present modern "elite", which has laid down and surrendered the USSR, and now Russia, to the West, its centuries-old adversary.
          And the betrayal of Judah Gorbachev, who surrendered everything and everything, and accordingly the then military leadership?
          But the betrayal of generals and senior military personnel in the Chechen war?
          But what about the "reform" of the Army until its combat effectiveness was completely lost during the period of the drunk Yeltsin and the "furniture maker Serdyukov" to please the West, with the aim of joining the Western world elite through the sale of the Motherland?
          1. +8
            August 11 2017
            I meant the search for "enemies of the people." And an explanation of all the failures by the machinations of traitors. The commander of the fort EbenEmael sold off with giblets to Hitler. He was tried, but no one called a traitor. The Poles concentrated troops on the border, but for some reason in Poland the generals are not called traitors.
            Those facts that you brought have a place to be. But who now has the highest support of the population? Putin, who calls the enemies "partners", goes to congratulate Aleksievich, keeps the same Serdyukov in a dusty position, or returns Kudrin to his advisers. Putin must be a traitor too ... Or in 20 years we’ll find out
            As Vysotsky sang
            "And if someone accidentally dies, then we will find out the whole truth about him."
            Or as American political scientists said
            "Russia has the most unpredictable past in the world"
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. +4
                August 11 2017
                I will not. The passport is not the same. :-)
                Of course, Putin is not a traitor. So Gorbachev is not a traitor. The guys were mistaken. Of course, against the backdrop of the past 25 years, Putin looks like a win. But ... This is a forced game for him. Do not forget about the mood to Ukraine. For example, these paratroopers until 2014 thought so
        2. VS
          -2
          August 11 2017
          "" On the memories of Zhukov poured a lot of dirt. But there is an explanation of the reasons for the defeat. ""

          Stalin is to blame?))
        3. +6
          August 12 2017
          Quote: Bakht
          At a density of 40 km per division, it will not hold the front.

          Where there was such a density, no one should have held any fronts.
          Because they were not supposed to arise there.
          And even if they arise ... The Red Army is all the stronger !!!

          But in the Bialystok ledge, the density was different:
          3 and 10 armies of the Western Front, located in the Bialystok ledge, are famous. Here, as part of the 10th army, the 6th mechanized corps of General Khatskilevich, the most powerful in terms of number and quality of tanks, was perfectly provided with vehicles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6th_mechanized
          corpus__ (1st formation)
          The number of tanks varies according to different sources from 1021 to 1131, including more than 450 of the latest T-34 and KV. As of June 1, 1941, there were: 242 armored vehicles, 4779 cars, 294 tractors, 1042 motorcycles. According to Semidetko on June 13-19, 1941 there were: 1021 tanks (352 KV-1 and T-34), 229 armored vehicles, 163 mortars, 96 guns, 76 howitzers. 80% of tractors.

          https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/11-й_механизированн
          corpus
          29th Panzer Division - Colonel N.P. Studnev. The division has 70 tanks: 6 KV, 26 T-34, 38 T-26 and 58 armored vehicles.
          33rd Panzer Division - Colonel M.F. Panov. The division has 128 tanks: 1 KV, 12 T-34, 44 BT, 71 T-26 and 72 armored vehicles.
          204th Motorized Division - Colonel A.M. Pirov. The division includes 57 T-26 tanks and 11 BA-10 armored vehicles.

          And this is only for the fur corps, not counting the usual SD and Cavalry
          1. +8
            August 12 2017
            Densities along the entire front were much lower than the authorized ones. And in the same 3rd and 10th armies, too. The article gives the figure of 47 km per division. In addition to the mechanized corps of Khatskilevich, there were the same equipped corps of Vlasov. And in the Baltic states too. And what does it give ?. The number of tanks is very good, but how to manage such a colossus?
            For comparison. The tank army of the Red Army of the 1945 model had no more than 400 tanks, and in terms of striking power it exceeded the mechanized corps of the 1941 model.
            The Germans in 1939 had almost 400 tanks in the tank division, and in the 1941 model year approximately 200.
            Ask the reason.
      2. +5
        August 12 2017
        Both of you are absolutely right! The author holds the same opinion.
        Just the military at that time did not know ...
        1. +8
          August 12 2017
          Quote: aKtoR
          Both of you are absolutely right! The author holds the same opinion.
          Just the military at that time did not know ...

          The military naturally could not know this.
          They only knew about a victorious war with little blood on a foreign land.
        2. VS
          -2
          August 12 2017
          alas - all the military knew - in terms of the plans and plans of the Germans and the timing of the attack ..
    2. VS
      -1
      August 11 2017
      With a defense front of 22 to 40 km (in Odessa to 90 km), no directives and other wisdom already mattered. The division cannot fully defend itself at a 40 km front. So immediately any fairy tales that the Red Army was preparing to advance disappear. It is impossible to defend in such densities. So regardless of any telegram warnings and other intelligence reports, the defeat at the border was programmed. ""

      this school is a consequence of the plans of our ingenious non-commissioned companies whom they later admired as lieutenants in memoirs. Who wrote plans for the defeat of the Soviet Socialist Republic in the war with Germany.
      1. +8
        August 11 2017
        Stalin had nothing to do with it. Everything was done in accordance with the plans that protect here. Of the 200 divisions, 57 are in cover armies. By the way, they were called that. The main line of defense along the Dnieper is 200-300 km from the border. And three (it seems) armies in reserve. Mechkorpusa in the ledges for attacks on the flank of the enemy.
        It was believed that covering armies would delay the enemy and identify the directions of the main attacks
        As Zhukov wrote, the miscalculation consisted in the fact that “we did not expect that the enemy would strike immediately with all our forces in compact groups, practically leaving no reserves” The memoirs of German generals serve as confirmation. If the Germans had 42 divisions in reserve when attacking France, then only 20 were in reserve when attacking the USSR. Bok constantly complained about the lack of reserves.
        Result? According to Isaev, three army corps conducted an offensive at six infantry battalions on the border. What does the directive have or not? With this balance of power, Soviet Aoysk could only delay the enemy for a more or less long period.
        1. VS
          -1
          August 12 2017
          "" Everything was done in accordance with the plans that protect here. ""

          not really. the tyrant signed on to the plan that our main will be exhibiting against the main forces of the Germans. Those. - under the plan of Shaposhnikov. According to this plan, if we are not the first to hit and give the "right to first strike" to the Germans, we will HAVE to build a serious defense and then everything will be fine with us in the directions of the main strike. quite. But the great straggt decided that he was smarter than the tsarist officer and the seminarite of undergraduate and nachs drags the idea of ​​the Meretskov and our main stavm in the south - expecting the main blow in the north from woodland, and in this case they got what they got. In this case, following Meretskov, he was an active supporter of a preemptive strike or at least an immediate retaliatory strike, but the tyrant didn’t give a go and it turned out - the troops are preparing for offensive operations under the plan of a preemptive strike - of May 15 - we will strike back immediately and quickly transfer the war to that side. Although the tyrant answered the 21st - this is not serious - he clearly could not imagine what they started to create. That is why Pokrovsky’s first question to the generals became - what defense plans were in the units and the division commanders answered - there were none. But it was a question here - about plans for Zhukov’s May plans .. In general, the non-starter quashed everyone in May June with his fantasies, and in the end - they got what they got .. Madhouse with plans overlapped with sabotage of maple and other boxed ones especially ....
          1. +8
            August 12 2017
            My opinion is that the "tyrant" calculated everything correctly. We are all obsessed with the Barbaross plan. Adopted in December 1940. 6 months before the war. The pumping of German troops has been intensive since May. It seems that the Germans had 11 "levels of displacement." The last to go were tank divisions in mid-June. Stalin quite rightly believed that Ukraine was more important than Belarus. And the course of the war showed this very clearly. The loss of Belarus and the Baltic states by the end of the summer did not cause a collapse. By the way, the loss of the Baltic was more sensitive than Belarus. But the loss of Ukraine immediately put the country on the brink of survival. So pumping troops of the Kiev Special was necessary.
            And of course, the uncertainty of the enemy’s plans. There was a "Lossberg study", there were plans by the General Staff of Germany to attack in the south, there was a plan of a direct attack on Moscow through Belarus. But there is no time ... It is impossible to wait until Stirlitz steals the German plan directly from Hitler’s safe. We must try to guess. By the beginning of summer, when it became clear that the Germans were still concentrating north of Polesie, the Soviet leadership began to redirect reserves to the Western direction.
            Making decisions is always difficult. As the military says, "a military leader can be judged only on the basis of the facts that he had at the time of the decision." Well, it is impossible to make a decision in an office in the Kremlin and wait for two troops to be reconstructed in two minutes. The decision was made a few months before the war. And at that time it was quite justified.
            1. VS
              -1
              August 13 2017
              "" "

              he did not give the go-ahead - to beat from there to Lublin - in plans. The reinforcement of the KOVO because Shaposhnikov had already underestimated the expected Germans forces against Ukraine — a reasonable but immediate response from the KOVO — this is already self-serving military already ...
              1. +4
                August 13 2017
                Isaeva look. While I used his earlier books. I don’t think he changed his mind. But I'll see.
                And then, so as not to write a lot. I have a document (everyone has it, I think) where it is written in black and white that in mid-May 1941 the General Staff of the Red Army assumed the main blow of the Germans against Ukraine. So your words that Stalin knew everything and that he was preparing to attack, and all the more so since intelligence has reported everything - they are not true. Intelligence was wrong. However, as always.
                The fact that the Germans the main grouping in the Western direction in Moscow realized only by the beginning of June.
                1. VS
                  -1
                  August 14 2017
                  "" I have a document (everyone has it, I think) where it is written in black and white that in mid-May 1941 the General Staff of the Red Army assumed the main blow of the Germans against Ukraine ""

                  This is the so-called "the plan of May 15th." Zhukov’s plan for a preventive strike. On paper, the General Staff wrote that they were waiting for the main blow to the KOVO but really - EVERYTHING knew that the main one would be north of woodland. But the Germans in May knew that we know where their main blow was and noted that the Russians are concentrating their main efforts on Ukraine anyway.

                  "" Your words that Stalin knew everything and that he was preparing to attack, ""

                  a club has formed here already)) - those who ascribe to me what I am not saying)))

                  NOT Stalin was about to attack, but our wonderful strategists in the General Staff.

                  "" Intelligence reported everything - do not correspond to reality. Intelligence was wrong. ""

                  but how do you know these things?))) According to the marshals that they got scammed at the beginning of the war and covered their shoals with something that they blamed on the tyrant who intelligence and everything that they needed REPORTed, but believed Hitler then they changed the "memoirs" - intelligence nothing did not report?)))

                  "" The fact that the Germans the main grouping in the Western direction in Moscow realized only by the beginning of June. ""

                  If you already believe the GS docks, then a week before the attack, our strategists assured the tyrant that the main forces were against the KOVO among the Germans))) For example, in "Vatutin's notes" of June 13 and 14
                  1. +7
                    August 14 2017
                    The note by Vasilevsky (if you read it) clearly states where the main forces of the German army are. But, you still didn’t read it.
                    About intelligence. You can throw Martirosyan’s book into the trash. From the very first pages, he gives a brilliant example of how Soviet intelligence was cast off. In particular, R. Sorge. But Martirosyan does not even understand what he is writing.
                    Well, according to Vatutin, the main forces in the Southwest. So where should the reserves be located? I look at those DOCUMENTS that are. And the movement of Soviet troops. Since June, reserves reserved for KOVO have been redirected to ZAPOVO. This is the criterion.
                    Everything else is just verbiage. There is a reality. This is a transfer of reserves. And the places of their deployment.
                    1. VS
                      -2
                      August 14 2017
                      The note by Vasilevsky (if you read it) clearly states where the main forces of the German army are. But, you still didn’t read it. "

                      And if Vasilevsky lied with Zhukov about this?) Again - on May 15, there were NO forces and could not be against the SSR at the border of the Germans - in the directions and in this note there is no more than an ASSUMPTION)) - where are the main German forces EXPECTING Zhukov. Do you feel the difference between - there are those already identified by intelligence and are expected by Zhukov personally that are not clear on what?))) So - you're just trying to engage in verbiage. Not understanding what the document says)))

                      "" You can throw Martirosyan’s book into the trash. From the very first pages, he gives a brilliant example of how Soviet intelligence was cast off. In particular, R. Sorge. But Martirosyan does not even understand what he is writing. ""

                      And in your opinion - what did Sorge do in Japan? What is HE discerned about?

                      "" according to Vatutin, the main forces in the Southwest. So where should the reserves be located? I look at those DOCUMENTS that are. ""

                      and believe sacredly that our marshals didn’t lie by tailoring the facts to their plans?))) of which the Yeremenki then spoke.

                      You read the answers to the divisional commanders - that they were reported by the Intelligence and whether they knew what forces were in front of them.

                      "" Since June, reserves reserved for KOVO have been redirected to ZAPOVO. ""

                      from what date? AT THE BEGINNING OR - AFTER JUNE 22 ??
                      And - and why if the main expectation is supposedly in the south to throw troops Pavlov- ??
                      1. +4
                        August 14 2017
                        You do not give a single fact. All that is needed, I already wrote. You have no analysis. The most important thing. Documents are given for current events. What they had, they gave. On May 15, the grouping of German troops was not completed. By order of Keitel. mass transportation began on May 22.
                        R. Sorge drove such a misinformation that you are simply amazed. And Martirosyan does not see this. Therefore, his book should be thrown away. A person does not even understand what stupidity he wrote. And I already have no strength to explain and chew. If you inattentively read your own links, or don’t understand them, then I can’t help
                  2. +5
                    August 14 2017
                    If you already believe the GS docks, then a week before the attack, our strategists assured the tyrant that the main forces were against the KOVO among the Germans))) For example, in "Vatutin's notes" of June 13 and 14

                    Oh, and it's hard to talk to you .... You write lies all the time. I explain. In a note from Vatutin dated June 13, 1941, NOTHING is said about the German troops. The note is called "Information on the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West" and only Soviet troops are listed. And you do not have an analysis of these data. According to the same certificate, the number of divisions in KOVO decreased, while in ZAPOV it increased. So your link works against your version and vice versa confirms mine. The composition of the KOVO decreased "by 11 rifle divisions, 8 tank divisions, 5 motorized divisions, and 1 cavalry division." The composition of ZAPOVO and PRIBOVO accordingly increased.
        2. VS
          -1
          August 12 2017
          "" Everything was done in accordance with the plans that protect here. ""

          not this way. Directions - Intelligence sets up and not cover troops. And at the beginning of May, everyone in our GNS knew exactly where the main forces of the Germans would be. Moreover - in January even our strategists hoped - God forbid the Germans change their minds and put their main ones not north of woodland and drive to the USSR and to the south.
          1. +6
            August 12 2017
            Intelligence will not install anything. The whole war is a direct indicator that intelligence was mistaken all the time. And from our side and from the German. And even when intelligence brought ready-made cards with a balance of power, they often did not believe her. The Bly plan was at the Soviet command on the table. So what? And nothing .... It was too late to change something. They didn’t believe intelligence.
            1. VS
              -1
              August 13 2017
              Intelligence will not install anything. The whole war is a direct indicator that intelligence was mistaken all the time. And from our side and from the German. And even when intelligence brought ready-made cards with a balance of power, they often did not believe her. The Bly plan was at the Soviet command on the table. So what? And nothing .... It was too late to change something. They didn’t believe intelligence. ""

              who did not believe and what intelligence? Bikes crap one's pants about these things - not interesting for a long time)))
        3. VS
          -1
          August 12 2017
          "" As Zhukov wrote, the miscalculation consisted in the fact that "we did not expect the enemy to strike immediately with all our forces in compact groups, practically leaving no reserves" ""

          lying. But he and others like him played at KSHU of various kinds - Germans like attack and with all their might, but then all of a sudden they stop for some reason and give us time and opportunity to respond. Specialists on such exercises - at the level of deputy counterintelligence of the Red Army reported about such introductory strange for the enemy - but these reports were suspended in NGOs and did not get to the Kremlin .. alas ..
        4. VS
          -1
          August 12 2017
          "" As Isaev writes, three army corps led the offensive on six infantry battalions on the border. What does the directive have or not? With this balance of power, Soviet Aoysk could only delay the enemy for a more or less long period. ""

          in recent writings about the “June 22nd,” Isaev admits that if all the directives were implemented as expected, then there would be no such ass. But - Isaev didn’t do a single book and WILL NOT DO it - on the analysis of pre-war days. and the more GS plans. After all, he can’t show Zhukov like he was - guilty (at least responsible) for the tragedy of the outbreak of war ((((
          1. +8
            August 12 2017
            Just Isaev writes that directives and combat readiness are good. Not prevent. But more important is the density of troops and security. Where did you find this from Isaev I don’t understand. Tell me.
            And Zhukov is not lying. He spoke more. But this is what Rzhevskaya needs to read. Literally, "we don’t understand that we fought with the best army in the world." And he is absolutely right.
            The plan was according to the Charter of the Red Army. Cover armies will detain the enemy and withdraw to the main line of defense. Moreover, the Germans backswing to Minsk was not taken into account in any way. Depth of operation is too great. By the standards of that time, it is really too far. The Soviet leadership worked out the option that the Germans would go to Baranovichi. Another miscalculation.
            Clausewitz said, “In principle, military affairs are uncomplicated and simple for a simple person. But it’s difficult to fight”
            1. VS
              -1
              August 13 2017
              Isaev writes that directives and combat readiness are good. Not prevent. But more important is the density of troops and security. Where did you find this from Isaev I don’t understand. Tell me. ""

              in the last book - “Invasion. June 22, 1941 "(M. 2016) ... well ...
              1. +5
                August 13 2017
                Hmm ... I think the discussion is useless. I was sure that Isaev could not change his mind. And he was completely right. How do you read? Maybe you do not know Russian very well?
                I am now skimping through this book. In principle, the same arguments as in the book Stopped Blitzkrieg. I advise you to look at the description of the first day of the war performed by the 125th page of the division of the Baltic Region. Perfect option. The troops received an order for military equipment position. The division occupied the defensive yurubezh and equipped the foreground. She received all the necessary messages on time and was almost fully equipped. Germans passed the forecourt and 2 hours. All rifle companies in the foreground were surrounded and destroyed. Then the assault on the main defense line began. By the end of the day, the division was defeated and left Taurage. Cause? Read in the same source that you yourself recommended.
                The command of the 125th division, evaluating the results of the first day of battles, noted: “The initial success of the enemy on the front of the division (the enemy advanced 12 km in a day) is due to his numerical superiority and the fact that the division fought on a 40-kilometer front. We didn’t have tanks, there were not enough VET means and vehicles for the transportation of ammunition. There were few hand grenades. ”[53] Just in case, I note that by the beginning of the war the division had a full set of full-time anti-tank guns - 54 guns with a caliber of 45 mm. The point here, rather, is the technical capabilities of the "forty-five" to hit the new German tanks of the 1st Panzer Division. The artillery of the 125th Infantry Division, according to German data, suffered heavy losses on the first day of the war. In the journal of operations of the 1st Panzer Division, it was stated: “It was established that the 466th joint venture of the Russian 125th SD was in front of the division. The artillery of this division is most likely eliminated. 9 batteries destroyed in battle, 5 - tanks.

                By the way, the 125th Infantry Division even had aviation support. The 40th air regiment of high-speed bombers of the 6th SAD flew to the Taurage region.
                1. +5
                  August 13 2017
                  I continue to study the book at your link. Description of the 10th SD in the coastal direction. The division defended itself on an 80 km front. Quote
                  Already in these first battles on the coastal flank appeared common tendency for the entire Soviet-German front. Even on the auxiliary lines for the Germans, Soviet troops were weak and simply defeated due to the length of the front border divisions. This forced the high command to waste a resource of the most valuable mechanized formations not only in the direction of the enemy’s main strike, but also in purely secondary areas. At least so that the front here does not crumble at all.

                  By the way, the commander of the Soviet 10 SK was a military man. In World War I rose to the rank of captain. This is not a corporal and not a seminarian. His reports are also in the book.
                  1. VS
                    -1
                    August 14 2017
                    "" I continue to study the book at your link. Description of the 10th SD in the coastal ""
                    if the border has 10-12 thousand each and their border is under 50 km — and on them there are three Germans divisions under 17 thousand and with tanks — then who is to blame according to Isaev — who composed such plans in our General Staff? FIND Isaev’s answer about this ??)))) I’ll tell you - the general deployment of our troops is the result of the plans of the General Staff))) And then the divisional officers couldn’t change ANYTHING, even if they were ALL and not half — the former tsar’s guarantors were dying and the more so where they were "forgotten" to raise the alarm, the more on the night of the attack.

                    You will find with Isaev - what was happening in Brest - why was there Lieutenant Korobkov out of the barracks a week before the attack with Sandalov seized ammunition cartridges for a couple? Find the answers to the commanders Pokrovsky Isaev and their analysis? Let me tell you - Isaev will NEVER write about it))) - about Zhukov’s role in the plans of the General Staff about that mu .. he was strange with the deployment of troops - as Eremenko spoke from the rostrum - Zhukov is operatively illiterate - he did not place our troops where the German is rushing and where he himself wanted to advance. and then it was necessary to drive troops along the front, plugging holes pierced by the Germans at a time. And then Zhukov blamed Stalin for this ...
                    What do you think - Isaev will show in books about the beetle how and who wrote the article to Pravda to Konev in November 57th where the non-commissioned officer is directly accused for the tragedy of June 22? Isaev will write in books about Zhukov — why he did not allow Pokrovsky to publish at least a hundred copies, under the heading “ss” at least — the answers of the commanders Pokrovsky, why they rushed to rehabilitate from the supply of Sanadlov box and others - which he insisted on shooting in 41- m?
                    1. +5
                      August 14 2017
                      You have a strange logic. The dispute began with the fact that there was no directive on putting troops on alert. I wrote that if there were at least ten directives, the troops would not have kept the border. Now you are proving to me that the extension of the divisions is to blame. Although they wrote yesterday, Isaev refutes this. Your thought rides like a squirrel on a tree. I can’t keep up with her.
                      Plans were built on the assumptions that were before the war. They were in all the armies of the world. Zhukov absolutely did not want to advance. Zhukov wanted to counterattack. This must be easily understood.
                      And finally. And you didn’t read Isaev either. Contrary to your claims, Isaev completely clearly explained why there were overlays in Brest. Although the presence of troops in Brest, he also could not understand. There was definitely a mess there at Pavlov’s headquarters. But why there were no cartridges and other overlays, Isaev has a whole chapter. Seek and find.
                      1. VS
                        -2
                        August 14 2017
                        The dispute began with the fact that there was no directive on putting troops on alert. ""

                        From what date? From June 18th? You have no idea what the directives were on that day and you have no idea what divisions and other Pavlovs SHOULD do on them.

                        "" If there were at least ten directives, the troops would not have kept the border. Now you are proving to me that the extension of the divisions is to blame. "

                        So this is the reason 0 laid down in pre-war plans. But - Isaev admitted - that the cast in B.G. the sleeping divisions and withdrawn in advance according to the BCP played their role - nevertheless they differ in the result of their activity against the Germans. Earlier - Isaev persistently insisted - it was not important whether or not the orders to bring him to B.G. and now he admits - yes, if everyone came out as in the same PribOVO - there would be more sense.
                        I’m talking about this - what is still unclear in my words?)))

                        "" You prove to me that the extension of the divisions is to blame. Although they wrote yesterday, Isaev refutes this ""

                        maybe quote SUCH my words? You do not understand what your opponents say to you, but am I to blame?)))

                        "" Zhukov absolutely did not want to advance. Zhukov wanted to counterattack. You just have to understand that. ""

                        yes well .. And did I write a plan of May 15 or what?

                        "" why there were no cartridges and other overlays Isaev has a whole chapter. ""

                        or maybe you’ll call this chapter - where Isaev explains on what basis the cartridges were removed in spite of the PP ammunition for a week in Brest?)) laid there according to the directives GSh = Zhukov)))
                      2. VS
                        -1
                        August 14 2017
                        Isaev completely clearly explained why there were overlays in Brest. "

                        I am waiting for a quote - where and how Isaev otmazyvaet Korobkov seized cartridges in Brest from the barracks - DOCUMENT give and not just one verbiage of Isaev with HIS suggestions why they did this box)))
                2. VS
                  -1
                  August 14 2017
                  "" I think the discussion is useless. I was sure that Isaev could not change his mind. And he was completely right. How do you read? Maybe you do not know Russian very well?
                  I’m fluent through this book.
                  but try to read it carefully))

                  I said - Isaev admits - bringing in B.G. in a timely manner - it could reduce the pogrom of the Red Army)) And before he assured - it doesn’t matter - the troops would be brought to the military base .. or not)) The pogrom of the border divisions that you got from him is an example of the influence of our plans when at the border stretch into a thin line - up to 50 km our divisions 10-12 thousand each against the Germans - up to 3 divisions 17 thousand each.

                  "" By the end of the day the division was defeated and left Taurage. Cause? ...
                  the division fought on the 40-kilometer front. We didn’t have tanks, there were not enough VET means and vehicles for the transportation of ammunition.
                  ""
                  I told Isaev about something else - he admitted that, nevertheless, the cast in B.G. played a role - and where the border ones nevertheless occupied the trenches Before the attack - they could at least do something. And the PribOVO example just shows - there were no training camps in May June and there were divisions there - 10-12 thousand each and of course they could not stand for long without delivering shells. But I told you about something else with Isaev.
                  By the way - you pray less for this wise guy. He then cheated on Panfilov’s - praying for German data - they say they are the most honest and our lies. That about pr. 227 began to carry garbage is not the case)))
                  1. +5
                    August 14 2017
                    You clearly do not understand Russian. Example 125 of the division just shows that no directives could save the situation. And again, you have a lie. It was in PribOVO that they carried out all the necessary training and the troops occupied defensive lines.
                    You do not want to understand that the very concept of a 200 km foreground is erroneous and vicious. This was understood only by 1943. The result was only a counterattack by mechanized corps. What Zhukov did. Try not just reading, but analyzing what you read. The result is amazing. You will understand.
                    1. VS
                      -1
                      August 14 2017
                      Example 125 of the division just shows that no directives could save the situation. ""

                      that is, what AFTER June 22, shells were not brought into this division - it doesn’t matter = they brought it to the base station. and deduced on software in advance and therefore it was not necessary to give those directives that were given?)))

                      "" You again are not true. It was in PribOVO that they carried out all the necessary training and the troops occupied defensive lines ""
                      Before you convict opponents of a lie, you first learn to understand what they say)))

                      Did I say that vPribovo did something or didn’t do it?))

                      But - there not everything and not everyone did what they needed)) For example - the collections of attributed were disrupted in May June.
                      \
                      "" You do not want to understand that the very concept of a 200 km foreground is erroneous and vicious. ""

                      but why did you decide that I did not understand these things?)) You did something for me and immediately debunked me .. Bravo)))
  20. VS
    0
    August 11 2017
    "" what difference does it make with the noun “defense”, if it is known for certain that Tymoshenko and Zhukov defended the entire first week of the war exclusively according to Shaposhnikov’s plan - actively throwing mechanized corps into counterattacks in an attempt to stop the Wehrmacht’s strike units? ""

    they have already shown you - NO in terms of Shaposhnikov - for which they did NOT start fighting Zhukov and the people's commissar - NOTHING about immediate retaliatory strikes))))

    IMMEDIATE retaliatory strikes - this follows from the plans of Meretskov and Zhukov - when our main forces are not placed against the main forces of the enemy)))

    Shaposhnikov’s plan is neither “offensive” nor “defensive”. He is a concept. Our main MUST be opposed to the main German forces. And if we are not the first to hit, but they - then there are no immediate retaliatory strikes - there can be according to this plan)))

    But at the Plenum where Zhukov was filmed, ALL marshals and especially Eremenko were directly accused - Zhukov of the tragedy of June 22! Unther placed our main forces not where the German trampled but where the Zhukov himself dreamed of advancing.
    1. +10
      August 11 2017
      Quote: V.S.
      But at the Plenum where Zhukov was filmed, ALL marshals and especially Eremenko directly accused Zhukov of the June 22 tragedy! Unter placed our main forces not where the German trampled, but where Sam Zhukov himself dreamed of advancing

      Was Rotmistrov there too? Lovely couple to Eremenko .... laughing
      1. VS
        -1
        August 14 2017
        "at the Plenum where Zhukov was filmed by ALL marshals and especially Eremenko directly accused Zhukov of the tragedy of June 22! Unter placed our main forces not where the German trampled, but where Zhukov himself dreamed of attacking
        Was Rotmistrov there too? Lovely couple to Eremenko .. ""

        can you refute the words of the marshals to Zhukov at the Plenum ??))) Zhukov forbade the military to evacuate families from the border strip in the pre-war days AT ALL! Hundreds of wives and children of Yeremenok were killed .. Those. - Their personal hostility was completely untrue. BUT - refute the WORDS Eremenko - if you can)))
        1. +5
          August 14 2017
          Not to me. But there is one person who gave an exact definition to General Eremenko - "nonsense"
          1. VS
            -2
            August 14 2017
            there is one person who gave an exact definition to General Eremenko - "nonsense"

            who and what about?
            1. +4
              August 14 2017
              About Eremnko. The only true definition of this general is a nonsense .. But who gave it .... Well, I said that I read a lot and all in a row. I had books by Eisenhower and Potter 30-40 years ago. German generals began to be transferred later. But I have had Halder almost since the 70s. Read. And don't just read. Think. It’s always been interesting for me to read Guderian. That fool. In the same chapter he writes such things ... Yes, for half of his actions he would have been shot in the basement long ago.
              So it is with modern scribblers. Why do I like Isaev? I always considered his books overloaded with numbers. But he gives a lot of vaccine material. And I can think without his prompts.
              So, find the one who called Eremenko a nonsense. This is an interesting person.
    2. +9
      August 11 2017
      Zhukov never threw a mechanized corps in the forehead. His chip is always, starting with KhalkhinGol, a counterattack on the flank. He also started in the Southwest. Pavlov tried to do the same by throwing Khatskilevich’s mechanized corps in a counterattack. Poppel was lucky and he detained Kleist for several days. Khatskilevich is not and Got did not even notice his counterattack
  21. +9
    August 11 2017
    I already wrote in more detail, but I want to repeat it again. At the beginning of 1941, confidence reigned in the Red Army that Hitler would go to England in the spring of summer 1941. Based on such confidence, the reorganization of mechanized and aviation units was begun. Under the new reforms of the mechanized units, which were supposed to end in general in 1943, and at the beginning of 1941 a plan for covering the borders was being prepared. At the end of April, the deployment of the Wehrmacht to the East began. In early May 1941, this became already obvious to the leadership of the USSR. There were different thoughts to react to a sharply changed situation, including Vasilevsky’s plan, but the defensive version of the cover plan was finally adopted in May, taking into account the unpreparedness of the Red Army for the upcoming war. It must be understood that Zhukov’s orders at the beginning of the war to cut off the Sokalsky and Suvalka ledges were defensive. Zhukov did not have clear information about the exact location and direction of the German tank wedges and tried to fend off them by cutting off the protrusions from which these wedges grew. Due to the complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for the war of 1941, the leadership of the USSR tried in every possible way to avoid the war.
    1. VS
      -1
      August 12 2017
      "" At the beginning of 1941 in the Red Army, there was confidence that Hitler would go to England in the spring of summer 1941 ""

      stupid things. for this there are no docks or even references to the military in his memoirs even more then.

      "" Based on such confidence, the reorganization of mechanized and aviation units was launched. Under the new reforms of the mechanized units, which were supposed to end in general in 1943, and at the beginning of 1941 a plan for covering the borders was prepared ""

      not this way. This was Zhukov’s stupidity personally. No more. And about this he was poked in the nose of the marshal then at the Plenum. the same Zakharov in the book "General Staff in the Pre-war Years", classified for 20 years "(the bar was literally removed in the 91st it seems)
      And PP were written as if our MK are fully combat-ready. And the same Rokosovsky then complained about it - his mk is combat-ready for a third and plans are written to him as complete.

      "" Zhukov did not have clear information about the exact location and direction of the German tank wedges and tried to fend off them by cutting off the protrusions from which these wedges grew. ""

      Yes, he knew everything ..
      German intelligence reported to Hitler - the Russians in their General Staff know exactly where our main attacks will be, but they still concentrate their forces in the south ..

      .

      "" Because of the complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for the war of 1941, the leadership of the USSR tried in every possible way to avoid the war. ""

      yes ... but then all the necessary measures were taken and could ..
      1. +7
        August 12 2017
        You have some kind of reverent attitude towards intelligence. She knew nothing and did not communicate. Which of the German generals wrote "After the outbreak of hostilities, I realized that everything that was said about the Red Army turned out to be wrong"
        1. +5
          August 12 2017
          Question to those who know everything.
          Right now there is an escalation of the situation around the DPRK. Who knows for sure whether there will be a war or not? Prompt. According to media reports, the air defense forces in the Far East are on high alert.
          1. VS
            -2
            August 13 2017
            You have some kind of reverent attitude towards intelligence. She knew nothing and did not communicate. ""

            those who know about Trump's plans))))) Stalin knew about Hitler's plans))) But to compare this and that war, compare horseradish with a finger)))
        2. VS
          -2
          August 13 2017
          You have some kind of reverent attitude towards intelligence. She knew nothing and did not communicate. ""

          Read Martirosyan - "Stalin and intelligence on the eve of the war"))))
          1. +6
            August 13 2017
            Did not notice this your message. The comparison is very appropriate. No one can know exactly what will happen. Neither then nor now. Even in the morning of June 21, there was no certainty that Hitler would not attack. And now no one knows anything. By the way, when was it decided that the attack would be on June 22?
            Martirosyan's suggestion to read is aerobatics. I suggest you read the documents from the archive. Fortunately they are declassified. So, on May 15, the General Staff of the Red Army suggested that the direction of the main strike is Ukraine. Only the lazy did not refer to this document. And you watched it inattentively. Or do not know about its existence ...? It is written in black and white that the main forces of the German army are deployed south of Brest with a direction to Kiev. What will reading Martirosyan give me after this?
            1. VS
              -2
              August 14 2017
              "" No one can know exactly what will happen. Neither then nor now. Even in the morning of June 21, there was no certainty that Hitler would not attack. And now nobody knows anything ""

              the only question is whether measures will be taken))) during the threatened period. And they were completely accepted .. and quite adequate.

              "" when it was decided that the attack would be on June 22? ""

              at the end of April already)))

              "" To offer Martirosyan to read is aerobatics ""

              suggest you read one Isaev and not docks ..)))

              "" On May 5, the General Staff of the Red Army suggested that the direction of the main strike is Ukraine. Only the lazy did not refer to this document. And you watched it inattentively. Or do not know about its existence ...? ""

              actually - the analysis of this and other docks where an alleged attack by the main ones on the KOVO book is supposedly made)) A - did you hear the thread about the "Pavlov's note of January 41st"?)) This is the "analogue" of the Note by Purkayev (Zhukov) "dated December 40th))
              You heard a thread about the May KSHI - which ended with a meeting with the tyrant on May 24, the 41st, you heard a thread about the fact that German intelligence reported to Hitler in MAY, but the Russians in their General Staff know that we will be the main forces to beat NORTH Polesye? )))
              YOU know when and how Zhukov began to write this plan - a preventive strike "from May 15" ??)))


              "" What will reading Martirosyan give me after that? ""

              Do you want to study the history of the issue one by one Isaev?))) Or do you think that after reading a dozen docks in a robin - stuffed with fakes including - did you already know everything?)) So - study ALL authors who write on the topic))). Even Solonin Markusha - with the complete idiocy of his conclusions and statements - shows documents and he photographed a draft deer. b / n - at least the last page - which Isaev will NEVER do in principle))) Read even Vovka Rezun - it won’t get any worse))) Who said wonderful words - DO NOT criticize me with garbage every little thing - for tanks and airplanes jackals)) Give a complete and accurate picture of events)) Show how everything was on the matter itself))) Especially according to the pre-war plans of our General Staff - who was waiting for whom somewhere and what was happening on the pre-war days by the clock - which Isaev did not do and DO NOT BEGIN ever)))
              1. +7
                August 14 2017
                I read all the books and all the authors that I can get. And he began to do it 40 years ago. You absolutely do not know how decisions are made. The decision to start the war on June 22 was made on June 21 at 13:00. If the Germans began the regrouping in March and intensified it in May. And the tank divisions went to the original areas just a few hours before the start of the war, what can intelligence reports from January, March and even May give?
                Isaev wrote in detail what the General Staff was doing, and in particular Zhukov, in the prewar months. Thank God that he managed to fix something.
                About Martirosyan already said. Hang in the restroom. Only this opus is suitable there. Together with Solonin.
                1. VS
                  -3
                  August 14 2017
                  "" I read all the books and all the authors that I can get. And he began to do it 40 years ago. You absolutely do not know how decisions are made. The decision to start the war on June 22 was made on June 21 at 13:00. ""

                  alas - not feed the horse)) on June 21, it was not decided to start a war - attack the Soviet Socialist Republic))) You do not seem to understand what you see in front of you)))

                  "Panzer divisions entered the original areas just a few hours before the start of the war, what can intelligence reports from January, March and even May give?"

                  YOU Sandalova read the work - how they have already been brought to them on June 5 the summary of the General Staff - only 16 infantry and 5-6 tank divisions of the Germans were found against Brest? What do you think - and how is it so - the Germans of the current (in your opinion) brought their tanks to the border of the number on the 21st and the Sandalovs knew about them THREE weeks before that?)))

                  And - and in your opinion - the "source areas" of the Germans - this is a lope km from the border - and type - BEFORE that, intelligence could not know ANYTHING about these tanks?
                  Let me tell you - only border guards tracked that side - for 400 km))) Do you not know such things? not my problems ...)))

                  "" Isaev wrote in detail what the General Staff was doing, and in particular Zhukov, in the prewar months. ""

                  it’s not worth lying. Isaev has nothing about pre-war plans, only praises to Zhukov.
                  Example - Have you at Isaev at least something about May’s CSI read in the General Staff?)))) Or maybe a serious and detailed analysis of the General Staff’s plans was seen from him - how was it done in “lessons and conclusions” or by Zakharov? Did you read Gretsov’s work, or did you read a lot about Esau’s work? And he DETAILED just showed the stupidity of pre-war plans, including Zhukov)))
                  "" Thank God that he managed to fix something. "

                  to fix ?? And what did Zhukov fix ??
                  Composed a plan of a preemptive strike and under him began the withdrawal of troops in June?

                  "" About Martirosyan already said. Hang in the restroom. Only this opus is suitable there. Together with Solonin. ""

                  those. you are not able to read the facts cited by others and understand them - without paying attention to the "conclusions" of the authors?)))
                  1. +4
                    August 14 2017
                    Sandalov cited incorrect data. And by the way, are you stubbornly asking who ordered the removal of cartridges and sending them to warehouses? Sandalov’s order for the 4th Army. It seems like June 18th. Read, read,. You definitely need this food.
                    1. VS
                      -2
                      August 14 2017
                      "Sandalov cited incorrect data."

                      Well, kaneshno - like the fact that I like the fact of NP - let's declare it incorrect)))

                      "" And, by the way, you so stubbornly ask who gave the order to seize the cartridges and send them to the warehouses? ""

                      I do not ask but affirm.

                      "" Order of Sandalov for the 4th Army. It seems like June 18th. Read, read ""

                      ?? where ??)) There is no such order. Calm down Ammo seized days from June 10 to 22 yet.

                      But - you already figured out that on May 15 Zhukov could not know where the main forces of the Germans were standing because they were not standing yet?))) He could assume the current - in the plan of May 15 and impose his lies on Stalin. After all, German intelligence knew for sure that in our General Staff they know WHERE the main forces of the Germans WILL BE)))
                      1. +3
                        August 14 2017
                        I will have to look for exactly where it was. But believe the order for the 4th Army signed Sandalov.
                        If transportation (mass) began on May 22, then no one knew specifically. But you do not understand one simple truth. It is impossible to wait for when exactly the intelligence will reveal the main group. Yes, and she could be wrong. Troops are deployed in advance based on the configuration of the front (border), economically important areas, the capabilities of the transport network, and a dozen other other equally important things. According to the plan of 1940 (also Barbarossa was not signed), the direction of the main blow of the Germans was determined Ukraine. And almost until the very beginning, it was considered a priority. I already wrote why. The loss of Ukraine immediately put the USSR on the brink of defeat. So regardless of German plans, Ukraine had to be defended. And only in June, when it became clear that the main blow was delivered north of Pripyat, troops began to be transferred to Belarus. But in June they did not forget about KOVO. In the same note by Vatutin that you referred, it says that the grouping in Ukraine has decreased, but remained about the same in number as in Belarus. With the exception of MechCases. It was already too late to transfer them. For pumping troops of Belarus it was necessary only the planned 600 echelons. The transport network could not provide this.
                        Now for intelligence. R. Sorge gave a bunch of conflicting information. For example, on June 1, he wrote that there would be no war, and on the 17th that the war would begin on June 22. The timing of the war was postponed many times. It was supposed to begin in mid-May, in late May, in mid-June. The date of June 22, 1941 was determined by Keitel’s order on June 10, 1941. The order clearly states that at 13:00 on June 21 the signal Dortmund will be transmitted to the troops. This means that the war will begin on June 22 at 03:00 Berlin time. If Alton receives a signal, then the start of the war is again delayed. Remember this date. Even June 10th, nothing was known. The date of June 22 was determined by Hitler only at 13:00 on June 21. Everything that intelligence transmitted before this was transferred and changed a hundred times.
                        The reason for the defeat of the Frontier Battle is in the wrong initial premises. It was expected that the covering armies (that was what they were called) would detain the Germans and allow them to carry out some kind of mobilization measures. The Poles did the same. And in general - this is a general rule. But could not hold. You can say anything about directives. But always remember that against 4,5 million soldiers in shock groups, the USSR had 3,5 million in the West scattered over up to 600 km in depth and 3 km along the front. Bringing them all to the border is a bad idea. Yes and no opportunity. Poland lost the war. The bulk stood in the depths of 000-200 km from the border. The surprise was not war, but the depth and speed of operations. The Germans' breakthrough to Minsk on the 300th day of the war no one could imagine in a nightmare. (This is another pebble in the Martirosyan garden, which is definitely not worth reading).
                        The cause of the lesion is in many factors. Your mistake is that you persistently repeat about offensive plans, the USSR, or Zhukov or someone else. There were no offensive plans. If the divisions are stretched on the front from 20 to 80 km, then there can be no talk of any offensive. A counterattack is not an offensive. A counterattack is applied to fend off an enemy breakthrough. This is what Zhukov did.
                        It is useless to argue. I outlined my point of view. And while I do not see a reasonable refutation. And our whole pick looks like a debate about which of us is smarter. Stay with your opinion. It does not seem reasonable to me.
  22. VS
    0
    August 12 2017
    "" So Hitler defended himself on June 22, 1941? ""

    HE SO tried to present these things in the Note. But it did not work out - the Soviet Socialist Republic (Stalin) proved that we are a peaceful country and an attack both treacherous and sudden.

    But if you don’t know that there are MUCH SPECIES and DEFENSE options - it seems that you didn’t study at military academies (or even military schools)?
  23. +5
    August 14 2017
    This is not a discussion, but just a pun. Give a quote where Isaev changed his mind. Just a quote and source. Then you can talk.
    1. VS
      -1
      August 14 2017
      "" Give a quote where Isaev changed his mind. Just a quote and source. Then you can talk. ""

      and why did you decide that it would be interesting for me to speak with you?)))

      Prior to this, Isaev often repeated such stupidity, they say, there was no sense in the fact that in PribOV they had exactly followed the order of Moscow and brought their troops on alert. And therefore, they say, it is not worth raising the topic at all - who and how did NOT RAISE their troops in those pre-war days, and did not bring them into combat readiness. Like - there, in Pribovo, after all, all the same, the Germans defeated our troops easily! But already in the new book, he writes already in a slightly different way:
      “However, it should be noted that breaking into the defense of the Soviet infantry division, which had timely defended the defense, was quite expensive for the Germans. Losses of the 1st Panzer Division (including the 489th infantry division assigned to it) during the day of June 22, 1941 amounted to 88 people killed, 225 wounded and 33 missing [NARA T315 R21 frame 508]. This was a kind of record in the summer company. According to the results of the day on June 22, the XLI Corps ZhBD stated explicitly that the losses are above the normal level ".." (p. 71) But in the end, the 125th pearl of the pearl of THREE German divisions!
      1. +3
        August 14 2017
        Ha ha ha
        You read interestingly. I’m saying that you have problems understanding what you read. "however, it should be noted" that the directive did not matter. A little earlier from the same source
        Quite often one can come across the assertion that the catastrophe in the summer of 1941 could have been easily avoided if on June 20–21 from Moscow an order had been issued to the covering armies to bring the troops to combat readiness and take up defenses in the URs. But we have a great example of how events would have developed had the first-echelon formations in all covering armies nevertheless met the aggressor at positions on the border. These are military operations in the strip of the 125th Infantry Division of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front.
        1. VS
          -1
          August 15 2017
          Are you not Russian? If everyone is asleep, then there will be NO loss to the Germans - AT ALL. .
          T..e - cast to bg in advance - Isaev, who likes Bondarchuk’s film Stalingrad but doesn’t like “28 Panfilov’s”, also gave his effect, and he already went to shit about this - admitted this.

          "However, it should be noted that breaking into the defense of the Soviet infantry division, which had timely defended the defense, was quite expensive for the Germans."

          Those. - if there hadn’t been a timely occupation of the defense of the 125th, it would not have been expensive for the Germans to pass by this division sleeping in the barracks.

          But the reason for the destruction of this division was precisely because SUCH PLANS for the districts were composed by ZhUKOV, and Isaev will NEVER write about it.
        2. VS
          -2
          August 15 2017
          "" you have trouble understanding what you read. ""

          So they found at Isaev - the great guru and wrestler unsurpassed with rezunayim - about the May KSHI?))
          And - so who corrected Zhuokuv being an NGS? To come up with a first attack plan and spit on Japan - is this a correction?
          To place our main ones not where the German trampled - under your plan, but where he dreamed of attacking (in return or better preventively) - is this a correction of what?
          To lie to Stalin that the Germans should wait for the main forces ONLY in the south - is this a correction of what :? Doing juggling at KSHs is a fix for what?
          To drive directives for new BCPs in the districts at the beginning of May without waiting for the tyrant to sign the plan of May 15 - for a preemptive strike, and when Stalin sent morons to the hell out of the morons who were operatively illiterate and politically stupid - anyway, withdrawing troops under THIS plan is a correction of what ?
          Find Isaev answers to SUCH questions?
  24. +3
    August 14 2017
    Because they did it everywhere. Isaev "10 myths of the Great Patriotic War." Chapter Who and how prepared the defense of Belgium. This is a general rule.
    1. VS
      -1
      August 14 2017
      they did it everywhere. Isaev "10 myths of the Great Patriotic War." Chapter Who and how prepared the defense of Belgium. This is a general rule. "

      What are you talking about now?
      WHO HOW and where so "did everywhere"?)))
      Do you want to chat - you deny my words - quote it))) And then you can’t follow all of you — who said what and what stupidity ..)) So Isaev, the great guru and wrestler who was unsurpassed with the rezunayim, found about the May KSH? )) And - so who corrected Zhuokuv being an NGS? To come up with a first attack plan and spit on Japan - is this a correction? To place our main ones not where the German trampled - under your plan, but where he dreamed of attacking (in return or better preventively) - is this a correction of what? To lie to Stalin that the Germans should wait for the main forces ONLY in the south - is this a correction of what :? Doing juggling at KSHs is a fix for what? To drive directives for new BCPs in the districts at the beginning of May without waiting for the tyrant to sign the plan of May 15 - for a preemptive strike, and when Stalin sent morons to the hell out of the morons who were operatively illiterate and politically stupid - anyway, withdrawing troops under THIS plan is a correction of what ?

      Find Isaev answers to SUCH questions?

      again - its 10 myths when they were written? How many years have passed? During this time, a lope of new information got out and Isaev stupidly cuts loot on the reprints of this junk and praises to Zhukov for years?
    2. VS
      -1
      August 14 2017
      On page 50-52, Isaev spoke about the so-called “Directive No. 1”: “As a result, a document that remained in history as Directive No. 1 was sent to the troops from Moscow.” Isaev cited her text and literally literally gave Zhukov out of his “Memoirs and Reflections” - how this directive went to the okrugs: “With this directive, NF Vatutin immediately went to the General Staff to immediately transfer it to the okrugs. The transfer to the okrugs was completed at 00.30 Moscow time on June 22, 1941. ” Zhukov’s second sentence looks like this: “The transfer to the okrugs was completed at 00.30 minutes on June 22, 1941.”
      Those. Isaev did not bother to understand how everything was really that night, he simply torn Zhukov’s words. Maladie ...
      He betrayed this, speaking of PribOVO, but for some reason did not show it - but how Klenov, who remained for Kuznetsov, did not raise the district in alarm until the very moment of the attack. Although he called Morozov in his army in search of Kuznetsov at about 1.20 a night more. Kuznetsov himself also ignored the orders of Moscow later - on the evening of June 22, having received the “No. 3” directive on a counterattack from PribOVo by the 3rd mechanized corps to the German Suwalki, Kuznetsov did not even give an order for it. But in his case, he acted quite reasonably, preferring to keep the tank divisions to solve the tasks of saving the front at hand, rather than throw them in a bad offensive at the whim of GSh-Zhukov on German territory ...
      1. 0
        25 September 2017
        Kuznetsov already knew that 5 TD was deduced from 3 microns by him, and on June 21.06.41, 11. subordinated to the 4.00th army of Morozov, and already from 22.06 on 80. It is fighting the hardest battle with the border guards and the army for Alytus and other Germans crossing points, under the continuous fire of German heavy artillery and air attacks. That the Lithuanian divisions were 22.06% betrayed and controlled by the Germans. And the castle Zapovo General Boldin, appointed 6. to command KMG as part of the 10th mechanized corps of the 3th army and the cavalry corps of the ZF, he was waiting for communication with the 11kk 23.06 army of the NWF “for a concentric strike on Suwalki” on the orders of strategists from Moscow. He waited on 10. Ukrainian Marshal of the USSR K., sent from Moscow by Ukrainian Marshal of the USSR T., detailed the plan of the "offensive operation", after which the Marshal said "Yes ..." - he got into an armored car and left, swearing, to swear at the headquarters of the 2th Army. As a result, KMG didn’t go to Suwalki, but to Grodno, which the Germans had already passed and KMG only went to Grodno 150 times through fresh German minefields, back and forth to Bialystok, 30 km under bombing and shelling, lost 5% of tanks and only I realized that she was already surrounded. The Ukrainian marshal came out of this environment in peasant clothes, moving along the road in a horse-drawn cart with the advancing Germans. Pictures, huh? There is documentary and memorial evidence for everything. Including investigators - the marshal was still shot, but only 56 years after the war. But Khrushchev rehabilitated him in the XNUMXth and laid the ashes in the Kremlin wall, like the ashes of a Hero. The hero spoiled large and brazenly before the war, during the war and after it. Ruined many, however. Pictures, huh?
  25. VS
    -1
    August 15 2017
    "" an order for the 4th Army was signed by Sandalov ""

    I know that Sandalov. And Korobkov, in your opinion - nothing to do with it? It was not June 18 but a few days earlier. But in any case - the order was criminal. As the orders of the Kopts on June 2 to cancel the introduction of June 1 increased b. in the air force.
    1. 0
      October 15 2017
      The DB 7td 6 microns 10A ZF journal has been fully preserved and published, see Wikipedia and links. From 22.6.41. !! At 2.00, the headquarters of the armies of the ZF raised the alert, with the change of deployments according to the 1941 Cover Plan. Almost all the corps and divisions managed to get out of the old places BEFORE the bombing, he did. But the thing is that this project is PP-41, which they gave to the General Staff and the district by 20.5.41. has not been approved by NPO and GSH (!!!). Divisions and corps went to their designated places according to the NIKEM not approved (!!!) plan developed as a PROJECT in army headquarters. In the 4 army until night at 22.6. 10 battalions out of 18, stationed there in the fortress, were withdrawn from Brest. The remaining 8, apparently, were supposed to defend Brest along with the border guards and other parts of the NKVD. And here they did not succeed in organized defense - the bridges were not mined and were not blown up, for which the NKVD was responsible, including Beria. But when disassembling DB 4A in Moscow, a switchman was needed, it was better to shut up forever. But for the collapse of the defense of Brest, the main culprit was clear - the commander of 4A and further up to Minsk and Moscow. Or to Moscow and Minsk. 340 thousand irretrievable losses of the ZF in June 1941 had to be blamed on local generals - this is already politics! Who is "lucky" with the environment and getting out of it is not under the "hot hand" - he remained alive after a "big showdown", such as Boldin and Sandalov.
  26. VS
    -1
    August 15 2017
    “If the transportation (mass) began on May 22, then no one knew specifically.”
    Oban .. And you claimed that in the plan of 15 !! May already INSTALLED !!! - The Germans will hit Ukraine the main ?? ?? !!
    To which I replied to you - not installed but it is assumed)))
    And now you have started talking - at the end of May they didn’t already know)))
    “You do not understand one simple truth.”
    Well, where are we to Isaev and their enthusiastic fans)))
    “It is impossible to wait for when exactly the intelligence will reveal the main group. Yes, and she could be wrong. The troops are deployed in advance based on the configuration of the front (border), economically important areas, the capabilities of the transport network, and a dozen other other equally important things. ”

    Therefore, in academies before and taught the subject - military geography)))
    “According to the plan of 1940 (also Barbarossa has not yet signed), Ukraine was determined by the direction of the main blow of the Germans.”

    Are you sorry? HOW can you DETERMINE something for the enemy if he himself has not decided where he will trample - with the main forces?))
    Based on various factors, you can ASSUME the current, And Shaposhnikov rosary indicated - the main German trample north of woodland. And if you read the “Lessons and Conclusions” - the IVI’s answer to the ravings of Rezun — or Zakharov carefully — his classified book for 20 years, you would know - NEVER in the General Staff’s plans the main strike direction of the Germans has changed - THE MAJOR strike was WAITED ONLY north of woodland . IS ALWAYS.
    And if you had read more than one Isaev’s lies according to “pre-war plans”, you would have known about the existence of a “Pavlov’s note” in the General Staff dated January 41st where we can see - we not only know where the Germans will trample but also hope that the Germans will not change their minds and trample it is north of woodland. And here we are - we will expose our main against the UNEASABLE forces anyway !!!

    For stubborn fans of Isaev, I will tell you - ONLY the Shaposhnikov-Meretskov plan was APPROVED. Where our main forces are set ONLY against the main forces of the enemy. And on the basis of THIS plan, instructions were given - by May 1, the 41st, right up to the districts, to work out all the necessary documents - according to two options - northern and southern. And in the "lessons and conclusions" there are schemes for these options. And here Meretskov’s proposal already appears - the northern option - the Germans will strike the main north and there we will have our main and - the Germans in the NORTH woodland put their glove but we put our - s SOUTHERN. And this is the southern option.
    Have you ever seen these patterns when a thread - “1941 — lessons and conclusions”, read when a thread? On the miller “lessons and conclusions” there are these Kozinkin schemes for the ignorant in ac. Frunze copied and posted to the text of this study chipboard)))) (by the way, I have one copy standing on a bookshelf))))
    1. VS
      -2
      August 15 2017
      “Almost until the very beginning, it was considered a priority.”
      What does it mean - almost until the very beginning, it was considered a priority area. ?? And what - to the north of Polesya - became at some moment - important?)))
      This direction was not considered - as the main goal of Hitler - that there would be his main forces.
      Stalin, having read Shaposhnikov’s plan in which he against the KOVO, too weak forces suggested –– gave instructions –– to strengthen the KOVO –– and wait for more powerful forces of the Germans and their allies –– see schemes of options for the Meretskov (Shaposhnikov) plan. And already Meretskov both strengthened and began to drive bullshit - that we need to embed from KOVO according to the NON-BASIC forces of the Germans. And there we need more strength to have more.
      Stalin ridiculed the idiots and they began to drive the misinformation - WE EXPECT THE MAJOR FORCE OF THE GERMANS AGAINST UKRAINE !!

      BUT ONCE AGAIN - in the GSH WORKERS i.e. The plans were APPROVED - the main forces of the Germans will be NORTH woodland and therefore we need to have our main ones there. And according to this option - the northern one - the density of our divisions on the border would NOT be so low !!

      CLEAR or nothing? 40-year-old reader)))
      You don’t read it from Isaev, but the lessons and conclusions, and Zakharov was PRO and WRITTEN ALWAYS !!! Well, Kozinkin shows in his books too)))

      “Regardless of German plans, Ukraine had to be defended. "

      And who argues that it was necessary? Therefore, Stalin gave the command to Meretskov - strengthen KOVO - it is necessary to protect the industrial zone of the USSR.
      And he suggested - let’s smash the Germans from KOVO on weak forces.
      “Only in June, when it became clear that the main blow was being taken north of Pripyat, troops began to be transferred to Belarus”

      What are you talking about ?? WHO in June decided that the main blow would be at ZAPOVO?
      It has been clear and known since AUGUST 40th yet)))
      There was NO special troop transfer to Belarus - to the “detriment” of the CWO. The reserve armies from the internal districts marched “evenly” —to the ZAPOV and the KOVO. But when the non-profit in the KOVO crap with his blow to Lublin, they began to drive the army from KOVO to ZAPOVO - after June 22.
      1. VS
        -1
        August 15 2017
        “Vatutin’s note itself that you referred to says that the grouping in Ukraine has decreased, but remained about the same in number as in Belarus. Except FurCases »

        You prompt lope was the divisions in Zapovo ive KOVO on June 13-21?
        MK - this is the shock - for the offensive force - according to Zhukov.

        “R. Sorge gave a bunch of conflicting information”

        yes you leave poor Ramzai alone. This was not his task - to set dates. Moreover, he gave the most important thing - the direction of the main blow that Ignored in the General Staff of the General Staff - Zhukov.
        “The date of June 22, 1941 was determined by Keitel’s order on June 10, 1941.”
        “The date of June 22 was determined by Hitler only at 13:00 on June 21. Everything that intelligence transmitted before that was transferred and changed a hundred times. ”

        Hitler still determined the date - at the end of April already. At an extended meeting voiced. And on June 10, the date - ESTABLISHED as final - and further - gave instructions - that there will be such an order on the 21st - either we attack or not.

        “The timing of the war has been postponed many times”

        TWO DATES were with the GERMANS. TWO - May 15 and June 22. ALL.
        “The reason for the defeat of the Frontier Battle is in the wrong initial premises. It was expected that the covering armies (that was what they were called) would detain the Germans and allow them to carry out some kind of mobilization measures. ”

        I’ll tell you a terrible secret - EXACTLY THE SAME scripts were written PLANS AND AFTER WAR !!))) - the cover armies (that is what they were called AFTER WWII) will detain the Germans and allow them to carry out some kind of mobilization measures.

        The problem was different - if you stretch the cover armies as Zhukov did - at the border, giving the division not 6-10 km - in the directions of the MAIN enemy attacks - and 50 then there will definitely be an ass.
        1. VS
          -2
          August 15 2017
          “The surprise was not war, but the depth and speed of operations. "

          For whom was this a surprise? For Zhukov and Isaev? )))

          “Nobody could imagine the Germans breaking through to Minsk on the 5th day of the war in a nightmare
          (This is another pebble in the Martirosyan garden, which is definitely not worth reading) "

          What are you ...))) Who could not imagine - Zhukov? Is this the one who screamed the most about such operations ALWAYS? And - so we will read whom - Isaeva who writes NOTHING about pre-war plans and what I showed you - about the northern and southern versions of the scheme of which you EXACTLY never saw - HE NEVER showed and will not show - because will Zhukov offend ???)))
          And - to throw stones - you need to understand the topic. For intelligence - since Martirosyan. According to pre-war plans - like Kozinkin)))) And they have NO competitors in their books - from the word sapsem))))

          “The cause of the defeat is in many factors.
          Your mistake is that you persistently repeat about offensive plans, the USSR, or Zhukov or someone else. There were no offensive plans. ”

          You tell Isaev this)))) He answered the cutters ONLY SO and writes - ALL countries had OFFENSIVE plans completely))) and he is completely RIGHT in THIS)))

          “If the divisions are stretched on the front from 20 to 80 km, then there can be no talk of any offensive. A counterattack is not an offensive. A counterattack is applied to fend off an enemy breakthrough. This is what Zhukov did. ”

          For 40-year-old readers who haven’t studied, it’s clearly not only in academies but also in military schools — the border divisions will NEVER plan an offensive or counter-attacks)))
          Their task is to cover up the preparation of the second echelons of the same mk to retaliatory actions.
          You can call Zhukov’s strikes - IMMEDIATE - as counterattacks or, perhaps, as offensives))) This is not important. It is important - that it was NOT possible to do this in principle - to write plans so that such divisions remained on the border - 10-12 thousand (instead of 14 000 and without deployed rear) stretched for 30-50 km. Against the main forces of the Germans - with their mobilized divisions. With dreams, embed mk from KOVOR and other districts to the heap according to the "non-core enemy forces" - as they later wrote "Lessons and Conclusions" (from the Institute of Military History from where Isaev was kicked out quickly)))

          “To argue is useless. I outlined my point of view. And while I do not see a reasonable refutation. And our whole pick looks like a debate about which of us is smarter. Stay with your opinion. It does not seem reasonable to me. ""
          .
          Yes, you have not shown ANYTHING competent in military matters ... till)))
          You obviously didn’t read, according to the pre-war plans, GSh = Zhukov neither Zakharov nor Lessons and conclusions nor Gretsov the same))) Isaev alone - with his re-singing untied untruths, etc. scribbling ..)))
          So you’re right - it’s hard for us to “argue” on a topic in which you don’t really know anything)))
          Are you aware, for example, that GSH NEVER play CWS according to REAL, approved, work plans?)) This is a question about the January CWS))))
          So what did Zhukov “correct” in pre-war plans? What did they hear about KSHI in May of the 41st ??))) - after which the “mysterious” meeting took place - on May 24 at Stalin)))
    2. 0
      October 15 2017
      From Zhukov’s order on the eve of the war ON THE BACKGROUND, a LIMITED issue from warehouses and expenditure of ammunition for each caliber, including air defense equipment, and food supplies in the first 15 days of the war and mobilization were allowed - up to 15 days, for example. What logic of events could it fit into? In border fights in a strip up to 30 km? up to 50 km? When was the defense line from 9300 to 30 km (80 sd 10A NWF, for example) for a division near the border of an average strength of 8? The Germans passed such a “defense” in the main directions in 2 hours, with infantry divisions (!), And with mechanized vanguards and reconnaissance of infantry divisions in one day 22.06.41/65/70. marched to a depth of 23.06-XNUMX km, they mainly entered the tank divisions on XNUMX. into gaps already breached by infantry divisions. And the projection flanking and oncoming "tank counterattacks" in two days were drowned out by aviation and anti-aircraft defense barriers. Classic! She was even clear to a graduate who was an excellent pupil of machine gun courses from the very beginning, but he was from the "striking forehead" by nature. So it’s easier to draw arrows on maps and report to party amateurs to report. Amateurs of time and space amateurs do not have.
  27. +1
    August 24 2017
    Quote: avia12005
    Thank you for the great work done. It seems that what I suspected before this turns out to be true: the algorithm for transmitting command and control signals to the Red Army was simply missed and not worked out. The obvious fault of all NGSH, including Zhukov, in the prewar period. True, there is some justification for this phenomenon: the backwardness of the USSR in this industry. Well, Stalin could not physically possess excellent knowledge of not only aviation and armored vehicles, and also delve into the subtleties of the organization of all types of communication. But the NHS and NAF were required. this is the reason for such a mess, otherwise you can’t tell, the alert of 22.06.41. Let it be a bitter lesson for the RF Armed Forces in the 21 century.

    How much can it be said that a peacetime army CANNOT adequately respond to a Wartime army. The Wehrmacht was completely mobilized, concentrated in attack groups, the offensive was played on the maps to the Battalion! How can a halt be stopped by a battalion or regiment ?! With a density of 2 machine guns and 1 guns on the front km?! The Wehrmacht broke into the defense of the Red Army in 1943 with a density of up to 50-70 guns per km, and the army on 26-40 km of the front, and in 1941 it was the front of one division.
  28. +3
    August 25 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    I, however, pleased that for me you came to the site.
    “I didn’t read it but condemn it? But - if you don’t read it, from where and about what mistakes do you approve of Martirosyan?)))
    How we love to hang tags))) For more than two months of preparing 4-x parts, you will perforce read fragments.
    For one sensation, the "conspiracy of generals" about which the young (who have read) chirps would give it to the eye.
    Standard - we need sensations - an unknown directive 18 of June - yyu reptiles and other things not a little. Read it - and for God's sake

    Well, let’s say it’s blunders! And there is the same rigging of facts. The deployment of troops was organized not by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. Zhukov at the post of General Staff from December 1940 simply wouldn’t have time to do anything, and in winter as in spring it’s not realistic. As we reasoned, the USSR was late with mobilization for the YEAR. It is not enough to call in the contingent, it needs to be run in, and coordination is carried out on the course: battalion-regiment-division-corps-army-front.
    to organize it into compounds and groups and run them in the same way. Repair the equipment received on the mob, transfer it to the unit, in general, it takes time, but it didn’t exist. And the directive doesn’t play any role here, it could even not be (although it is much easier to send it by BODO and would have received it immediately)
    1. VS
      -1
      August 25 2017
      "" There is the same rigging of facts. The deployment of troops was organized not by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. Zhukov at the General Staff post from December 1940 simply wouldn’t have time to do anything, and in winter as in spring it’s not realistic. ""

      alas .. it was Zhukov who accused Eremenko of this from the rostrum of the Plenum.

      "" we reasoned, then the USSR was late with mobilization for a YEAR. It’s not enough to call in the contingent, it needs to be run-in, and coordination is carried out at the rate: battalion-regiment-division-corps-army-front.
      To organize ysk into formations and groups, and also run them in. Repair the equipment received via mob, transfer it to the units, in general, it takes time, but it wasn’t there. ""

      as I understand it, and you did not serve in the army - except for urgent))))

      In the 39th and 40th - conducted BUS - mobilization. AND EVERY time, they called for these collections of DIFFERENT attributed .. as well as equipment from the military))) and in the 41st - for the fees according to the BUS scheme - with the placement of the assigned in the barracks for conscripts and with their introduction to the crews and crews - and with the issue of weapons to them in these barracks - they called on those who were not called up in those years)))

      and at such training camps - on the BUS and they are knocking together and the charges are like this - they don’t go on for a couple of days - there is enough time for knocking together)))


      "" the directive does not play any role here, it might not exist at all ""
      what directive? )) You seem to just not understand what directives were in the prewar days)))

      "" it is easier to send it by BODO and would have received it immediately) ""

      you are about the so-called deer. No. 1, which doesn’t have a number?))) They got it that way - quite quickly and already at 1.30 they began to raise the armies where they wanted))) and at 3 o’clock they also opened the red packets - where they wanted to obey the orders of Moscow.

      Instead of writing up some theories - what should anyone do there - you would simply study what really happened in those days before the war))) what orders were issued and who and how executed them in the districts.
    2. +4
      August 26 2017
      Hi, Predator!
      The dislocation of the troops was organized not by Tymoshenko with Zhukov, but by Voroshilov with Shaposhnikov. Zhukov at the GSH post from December 1940 would simply not have had time to do anything, and in the winter, as in the spring, this is not realistic.
      It seems to me that you are a little hotter))) S.Timoshenko 7 May 1940 was appointed to the position of People's Commissar of Defense. On the territory of Lithuania at that time there were about 20000 Soviet military personnel. In the summer, the Lithuanian SSR appeared and after this period the deployment of Soviet troops on the border of the Baltic States began to be refined. Voroshilov, it seems, is no longer in business))) Shaposhnikov left 7 August 1940.

      March-May 1941 constantly updated plans for the Cover, as Zhukov wrote in his memoirs. Within a month and a half, it was planned to deliver up to five armies to the Western IN.

      Information about the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West 13.06.1941
      "... On the remaining (secondary) sections of the state border. Total 66 divisions ... With such a distribution of forces, it is necessary to additionally plan transportation by rail ... Total 33 divisions ... What will be about ... 1700 echelons. For transportation it will take about 13 days from calculating 130 trains per day. Warheads can be transported in 10 days. ”

      We are talking about the transfer of parts and equipment through 1 / 4-1 / 2 territory of the country. For 4 a month, if desired, it was possible to organize the necessary redeployment of troops within military districts - there the distances are much smaller. Only the desire was not due to a misunderstanding: how the Germans wanted to beat the Soviet divisions ...

      If you look at the connections, you can see that some of them migrated from district to district.
      Regarding combat coordination - five points !!! This should have been in the 6 part, as a response to the rezunintam
      1. VS
        -1
        August 26 2017
        "" Regarding combat coordination - five points !!! This was supposed to be in the 6th part ""

        I hope you still will not rush into the following parts of your imagination?)))

        I love when not serving, and even more ladies talk about co-ordination))))
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. VS
            -1
            August 26 2017
            "" To continue the controversy - I am waiting for answers to questions ............ ""

            which ones?
          3. The comment was deleted.
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. The comment was deleted.
      2. +5
        August 26 2017
        Bodo. In 1940, the lead designer P.A. Sudakov and a group of P.A. Sudakov, N.M. Sharygin, V.N. Rytov, B.K. Kuznetsov and O.A. Primazov developed a direct-printing military start-stop telegraph-ciphering device for intra-military communications of the CT-35 (Soviet 1935 development teletype of the year) with a removable encryption block NT-20. It is hard for me to say: what heading was the transmission of information in peacetime through these means of communication allowed?
        1. VS
          -2
          August 27 2017
          "" It is difficult for me to say: which neck was allowed to transmit information in peacetime through these means of communication. ""

          learn the full answers zabybalovyh)))
      3. 0
        25 September 2017
        I remind you that the Red Army began to re-create full-blooded regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies (from cropped) under the People's Commissar Voroshilov and early. General Staff Shaposhnikov in 1938, after the invasion of Germany and Poland and their occupation of Czechoslovakia, after the Munich conspiracy of 1938, the ITT it became clear that WWII began in Europe. Three divisions were identified - wartime (14000), peacetime (8000) and shortened (4000). It is without details on the branches of service and rounded. We started from the western districts, of course, and from the states of peacetime. On the Polish campaign on September 17, 1939, the divisions of all three complete sets went, a total of 70 divisions. On September 1, 1939, a general military duty was introduced, according to which more than 1 million people were mobilized and tested the mobilization mechanism in action. K 22.06.41/2,5/1940. the number of the Red Army brought up to 1916 million people. They were fed daily, including meat, which the USSR in 1939 produced less than Russia in 1942. The strain on the national economy was steep, but the people understood the threat from the outside. He understood even the Winter War of 1941, despite the losses. By 2000, the General Staff planned to deploy all divisions to the states of peacetime, but did not have time. Many hidden objectively and many hidden subjectively prevented this. Leapfrog and partying of command personnel, in particular, their lack of training and education. Coherence after the Great Purge of the conspiracies (were) too. So coherence in general in the multinational Red Army was achieved very difficult. Both before the war, and especially at its beginning. Then somehow in the battles I adjusted myself. When in the winter of XNUMX the division formed in a month at XNUMX l / s was already considered almost combat ready and sent to the front, replenishing front-line soldiers who left the hospitals along the road. For experience, they say, you will not overpay.
  29. +8
    August 26 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "" There is the same rigging of facts. The deployment of troops was organized not by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. Zhukov at the General Staff post from December 1940 simply wouldn’t have time to do anything, and in winter as in spring it’s not realistic. ""

    alas .. it was Zhukov who accused Eremenko of this from the rostrum of the Plenum.

    "" we reasoned, then the USSR was late with mobilization for a YEAR. It’s not enough to call in the contingent, it needs to be run-in, and coordination is carried out at the rate: battalion-regiment-division-corps-army-front.
    To organize ysk into formations and groups, and also run them in. Repair the equipment received via mob, transfer it to the units, in general, it takes time, but it wasn’t there. ""

    as I understand it, and you did not serve in the army - except for urgent))))

    In the 39th and 40th - conducted BUS - mobilization. AND EVERY time, they called for these collections of DIFFERENT attributed .. as well as equipment from the military))) and in the 41st - for the fees according to the BUS scheme - with the placement of the assigned in the barracks for conscripts and with their introduction to the crews and crews - and with the issue of weapons to them in these barracks - they called on those who were not called up in those years)))

    and at such training camps - on the BUS and they are knocking together and the charges are like this - they don’t go on for a couple of days - there is enough time for knocking together)))


    "" the directive does not play any role here, it might not exist at all ""
    what directive? )) You seem to just not understand what directives were in the prewar days)))

    "" it is easier to send it by BODO and would have received it immediately) ""

    you are about the so-called deer. No. 1, which doesn’t have a number?))) They got it that way - quite quickly and already at 1.30 they began to raise the armies where they wanted))) and at 3 o’clock they also opened the red packets - where they wanted to obey the orders of Moscow.

    Instead of writing up some theories - what should anyone do there - you would simply study what really happened in those days before the war))) what orders were issued and who and how executed them in the districts.

    Well, what are you talking about?! The contingent should not come and go, but be part of it all the time. When was this co-ordination of troops before the war?! If the groups themselves weren’t there! Or do you think that the corps was scattered around 200 sq km ?! Put your packages to hell. They all envisaged actions by a MOBILIZED unit, and they were?! And how much time does it take to exit?! On-duty units-45 minutes, here are the divisions of the 56th SD — 3-9 hours; 86th SD - 6-16 hours; 113th diabetes mellitus - 6-12 hours; 49th SD - 8-16 hours; 42nd SD - 3-9 hours; 75 SD - 4-10 hours. And you are about to open the packages at 3-00! So when should the team for the packages be?! Yes, even on the afternoon of 21.06/XNUMX! Maybe then we could! But you don’t have to touch my service! Especially if it’s about you don’t know anything!
    1. VS
      -2
      August 26 2017
      "" what are you talking about ?! The contingent should not come and go, but be part of it all the time. When was this co-ordination of troops before the war ?! "

      you just understand - what these things are - military fees and even more so - BUSES ??)) Can you imagine what these things are ascribed and what they do and what they are for?)))

      Let me tell you - the company has lists of assigned which are assigned to his company - surname - from RVK)))

      And - the BUS that started in May - never ended - the inscribed were not allowed to go home until June 22)))

      "" "Put your packages to hell. They all included actions with a MOBILIZED unit, but were they?" "

      as I understand it - and in packages you can’t do it with a foot))))
      "" How much time does it take to exit?! On-duty units-45 minutes, here are the divisions of the 56th SD - 3-9 hours; 86th SD - 6-16 hours; 113th diabetes mellitus - 6-12 hours; 49th SD - 8-16 hours; 42nd SD - 3-9 hours; 75 SD - 4-10 hours. And you are about opening packages at 3-00! So when should there be a team for packages ?! ""

      in fact - THESE border divisions - from June 18 MUST go to their borders and have them open their packages at 3 a.m. on June 22 - provided that the alarm was raised at 2 a.m. - - no more than a team - would be - to occupy the trenches - IMMEDIATELY)))

      Do not invent it - just stupidly study WHAT orders went in the pre-war days and how they were executed ..)) And for that, stupidly study FULL answers of the commanders Pokrovsky - - 1st volume - "I write exclusively from memory ..." - it’s already coming out to shops)))

      "" You don’t need to touch my service! Especially if you don’t know anything about it! ""
      judging by the nonsense that you carry - you did not serve a day as an officer))) since you have no idea about fees - what are they for)))
      1. +5
        August 26 2017
        Name at least one RKKA division, staffed by the state ?! How many closed the shortage of combat units by the BUS? when there was an alarm, still reach the deployment site and ...... no field defense was there! It was still necessary to prepare it. But the directive dated 1940/18.06.1941/XNUMX to the studio!
        1. VS
          -2
          August 26 2017
          "" directive dated 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX to the studio! ""

          which one?)))
        2. VS
          -3
          August 27 2017
          Name at least one staffed Red Army division ?! "

          Division Commander Abramidze assures us that this was quite a bliss))))

          "" How many uncompleted combat units were closed with a bus? ""

          read Marshal Zakharov - his book, secret for 25 years, "The General Staff in the prewar years"))) there are exact numbers - how many divisions and how it was replenished with those BUSs)))

          “” to the border divisions, it was necessary to trample down to the deployment site in case of alarm and ...... there wasn’t any field defense there ”
          in the directives of June 11-12 it was indicated - when withdrawing second echelons and reservers - the border did not raise a special order of the people's commissar. .. a special order - on the conclusion of the border and went - from June 18. But at the conclusion on the PP and - it is required from the commander to automatically - to bring his SD in combat readiness. ))))

          but what kind of "field defense" and where it was - read the FULL answers of the division commanders)))
          1. 0
            25 September 2017
            If in the ZapOVO, the most equipped with military equipment and ordinary soldier’s 6th military unit of the 10th Army, the junior command staff was 40% less, platoon commanders 30%, technicians 75%, what kind of combat readiness of the main shock mechanized corps of the front could be said ?! The only question is who is responsible for these things more - and all the messes are guilty from top to bottom. And even regiment commanders, with regimental commissars equally. And with commissars higher and wider geographically.
  30. +4
    August 26 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    Hi, Predator!
    The dislocation of the troops was organized not by Tymoshenko with Zhukov, but by Voroshilov with Shaposhnikov. Zhukov at the GSH post from December 1940 would simply not have had time to do anything, and in the winter, as in the spring, this is not realistic.
    It seems to me that you are a little hotter))) S.Timoshenko 7 May 1940 was appointed to the position of People's Commissar of Defense. On the territory of Lithuania at that time there were about 20000 Soviet military personnel. In the summer, the Lithuanian SSR appeared and after this period the deployment of Soviet troops on the border of the Baltic States began to be refined. Voroshilov, it seems, is no longer in business))) Shaposhnikov left 7 August 1940.

    March-May 1941 constantly updated plans for the Cover, as Zhukov wrote in his memoirs. Within a month and a half, it was planned to deliver up to five armies to the Western IN.

    Information about the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West 13.06.1941
    "... On the remaining (secondary) sections of the state border. Total 66 divisions ... With such a distribution of forces, it is necessary to additionally plan transportation by rail ... Total 33 divisions ... What will be about ... 1700 echelons. For transportation it will take about 13 days from calculating 130 trains per day. Warheads can be transported in 10 days. ”

    We are talking about the transfer of parts and equipment through 1 / 4-1 / 2 territory of the country. For 4 a month, if desired, it was possible to organize the necessary redeployment of troops within military districts - there the distances are much smaller. Only the desire was not due to a misunderstanding: how the Germans wanted to beat the Soviet divisions ...

    If you look at the connections, you can see that some of them migrated from district to district.
    Regarding combat coordination - five points !!! This should have been in the 6 part, as a response to the rezunintam

    What are the 13 days for transportation? Not realistic, and the NGOs and General Staff knew about this. NKPS does not have a mobilization plan for transportation and there is not even an oral agreement with an NPO on a plan for military transportation. (And January is already ending 70!) per day.
    So what ... excuse 130 trains per day ?! Here traffic with such capacity for half a year! Consequently, again we were late and hard.
  31. +2
    August 27 2017
    Quote: Predator
    What are the 13 days for transportation? Not realistic, and the NGOs and General Staff knew about this. NKPS does not have a mobilization plan for transportation and there is not even an oral agreement with an NPO on a plan for military transportation. (And January is already ending 70!) per day.
    So what ... excuse 130 trains per day ?! Here traffic with such capacity for half a year! Consequently, again we were late and hard.

    In my message as an example provides an estimate of the GSA spacecraft on the timing of the redeployment of 33 divisions (if necessary). Link to the certificate))) This is about redeployment (if necessary, 33 divisions: from the Far East, Siberia, Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus, the Volga and Arkhangelsk IN, All these echelons are separated in time and across the expanses of the USSR. In my message there is no even a hint of the redeployment of troops to the westernmost border))) Clearly, if you transfer these divisions, the reserve army, concentrated from Moscow, should be transferred to the west. What do you literally "cling to the words" ... And if I had to move these divisions, then about any plan mobilization transport would not go. Parts and connections were transferred by order of the government out of turn.

    If you remember - we started talking about the redeployment of troops, if there was such a desire for Tymoshenko or Zhukov. The author tried to show that for three and a half months the head of the General Staff could shuffle the connections of the western districts as he wanted. It was only about this)))
    1. VS
      0
      August 28 2017
      "" for three and a half months the chief of the General Staff could shuffle the formations of the western districts as if he wanted to. ""

      that Eremenko at the Plenum and noted - the Chief of the General Staff under the guise of training shuffled the troops under his plans - to embed the enemy on non-core forces))))

      So what miracles did you find in APRIL 41 - what are the plans for preemptive strikes and what other directives?)))

      And - so when you please the following parts - definitely sensations?)))
    2. +4
      August 28 2017
      Have a conscience! Where can you relocate dozens of divisions in winter or early spring?! In the field into tents?! In the virgin lands not equipped?! With all their belongings?! Where there are so many tents, stoves, fuel, etc. take it ?! And it’s necessary to transport it, but where’s the equipment? Look at the map, let’s say ZAPOVO, will you find many roads there?! There are only three normal roads. The remaining primers. I want to take you through them (In the Smolensk region) in winter and there and with difficulty walking (and this is in the 21st century), transport on the first axis along the very axis. Moreover, you need to supply all this, but to the warehouses .... uuuu and again expensive ..... This is on the map easy, but in fact a complete northern fox.
      1. VS
        0
        August 28 2017
        "" It’s easy on the map, but in fact a complete northern fox. ""

        if it were all so terribly military - looking at the impassability and lack of belongings - wars would not have led))))
    3. 0
      25 September 2017
      There are still nuances - around March 1941, Tymoshenko carried away Zhukov's “offensive in the forehead” with the development of a “preventive” strike. In addition to setting him up as a politician, internal and external, he thereby loaded to the limit the entire General Staff apparatus, district headquarters, the minds of defense commissariats, forced them to work on a deliberately disastrous and dangerous project, setting aside the really necessary things. Raising questions that should have somehow reached the IVS, which the team did not give the project work. The leader’s anger was expected, and he came, hitting Tymoshenko himself only indirectly. Zhukov, in the staff of the General Staff, received silent opposition, and in the people's commissariats. Omissions from the NKPS fell on him, too, not by accident in this context. Both with fuels and lubricants (actually there were only 28% of the application in the reserves of the Red Army) and in the reserves of armor-piercing tank artillery ammunition (10-15% of the application). In the border districts they were almost absent, and fragmentation shells did not penetrate German armor - even at point blank range, they did not burn the Germans, but could only temporarily damage them. It got to the point that on our fragmentation shells we placed wooden corks instead of fuses - then a 76 mm fragmentation shell worked just like a monolithic blank and broke through armor.
  32. +7
    August 28 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "" It’s easy on the map, but in fact a complete northern fox. ""

    if it were all so terribly military - looking at the impassability and lack of belongings - wars would not have led))))

    And you look, all the strike groups of the Wehrmacht on the roads, and what 6 mk in the swamps with one rocky road to Volkovysk ?! And in general what .... it was necessary to drive 1025 tanks into a situation where there are no roads, and if there is a nightmare, with one refueling (refueled 18..06) and to 22.06. burned half ?! When the entire air defense of the troops was east of Minsk?! And machine-gun platoons at the training camp?! And the fuel in Maykop?! And the ZAPOV cover was 10 peacetime divisions?! With a density of up to 40 km per division? in reach even VET of the Wehrmacht
    1. VS
      -2
      August 28 2017
      "what .... it was necessary to drive 1025 tanks into a situation where there are no roads, and if there is a nightmare, with one refueling (refueled 18..06) and by 22.06. burned half?! when all the air defense of the troops was east of Minsk? ! And machine-gun platoons at the training camp?! And fuel in Maykop?! And the ZAPOV cover was 10 peacetime divisions ?! With a density of up to 40 km per division?

      And isn't the answer obvious? Read the books of Kozinkin — he showed such facts more than yours)))) Better - a two-volume book on the complete answers of the divisional commanders - “The Secret of the Tragedy of June 22”)))) If I feel sorry for spending money - I can throw the text on the box)))))
  33. +7
    August 29 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "what .... it was necessary to drive 1025 tanks into a situation where there are no roads, and if there is a nightmare, with one refueling (refueled 18..06) and by 22.06. burned half?! when all the air defense of the troops was east of Minsk? ! And machine-gun platoons at the training camp?! And fuel in Maykop?! And the ZAPOV cover was 10 peacetime divisions ?! With a density of up to 40 km per division?

    And isn't the answer obvious? Read the books of Kozinkin — he showed such facts more than yours)))) Better - a two-volume book on the complete answers of the divisional commanders - “The Secret of the Tragedy of June 22”)))) If I feel sorry for spending money - I can throw the text on the box)))))

    Well, I can provide a lot of facts, more than the whole article .... why?! Who will find it interesting, answers of the divisional commanders ... well, what will they admit to their mistakes ?! What have they been doing there for 1.5 years ?! But obviously not defense ....
    1. VS
      -2
      August 30 2017
      "" Who will find it interesting himself, the answers of the divisional commanders ... well, what will they admit to their mistakes ?! ""

      I trudge from people like you. I did not read and I will not read !!!! Do you even know what questions were asked to the commanders? At first, Malandin - in AUGUST 41, raised questions and then Pokrovsky - with his questions in the 49th. DO YOU KNOW - what kind of questions did they have at all - with Malandin or Pokrovsky - what were they about? Responding to them, the divisional commander could NOT acknowledge or not acknowledge his mistakes. THEY DESCRIBED events !!! not your mythical - or alien - "mistakes."

      A real, serious researcher does not disdain the work of OTHER researchers, even the Stalinists, even the rezuns, even the Isaevs ..))) And he can only think that he himself can figure it out - ONE - without having any professional knowledge — having read a couple of books like “robins”) )
      (By the way, at least you know what this is - a robin? I noticed that the author of the articles, dear lady, stupidly does not answer my questions about the mythical plan of the preventive strike from April 16, which she clearly came up with ??))))
  34. +7
    August 30 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "" Who will find it interesting himself, the answers of the divisional commanders ... well, what will they admit to their mistakes ?! ""

    I trudge from people like you. I did not read and I will not read !!!! Do you even know what questions were asked to the commanders? At first, Malandin - in AUGUST 41, raised questions and then Pokrovsky - with his questions in the 49th. DO YOU KNOW - what kind of questions did they have at all - with Malandin or Pokrovsky - what were they about? Responding to them, the divisional commander could NOT acknowledge or not acknowledge his mistakes. THEY DESCRIBED events !!! not your mythical - or alien - "mistakes."

    A real, serious researcher does not disdain the work of OTHER researchers, even the Stalinists, even the rezuns, even the Isaevs ..))) And he can only think that he himself can figure it out - ONE - without having any professional knowledge — having read a couple of books like “robins”) )
    (By the way, at least you know what this is - a robin? I noticed that the author of the articles, dear lady, stupidly does not answer my questions about the mythical plan of the preventive strike from April 16, which she clearly came up with ??))))

    And I know the questions and the answers to them and 10 Stalin’s questions about the start of the war- “Who said winners are not judged ?!” But, the fact that NPO turned to the country's leadership about a preventive strike is Stalin’s answer to you that Finnish is not enough ?! But in general, Stalin had to agree with the opinion of the "comrades", maybe then an NGO would zealously mobilize troops, bring equipment to the states, troops would be driven into shock groups, and in general they would carry out all the events before the GREAT war. How do you like this theory ?! But declaring war or not is STALIN, but the troops would be in good shape!
    1. VS
      -2
      August 31 2017
      "" 10 Stalinist questions about the start of the war- "Who said winners are not judged ?!" "

      the first time I hear - what is this?))

      Malandin’s questions of August 41st - I know the answers to them, Pokrovsky’s questions — all the more, but what’s there for Stalin’s 10 questions — I’ve heard for the first time (((

      "" An NGO turned to the country's leadership about a preemptive strike. Is there a response from Stalin — do you think Finnish is not enough? ""

      unequivocally))) Not only they asked, but really - our wise men prepared for this ... Then they changed their shoes and turned the preventive strike into an immediate retaliatory one.

      "" Stalin had to agree with the opinion of the "comrades", maybe then an NPO with zeal and full zeal would mobilize troops, bring equipment to the states, troops would drive into shock groups, in general, they would carry out all the events before the GREAT war. How would you like this theory ? ""

      stupidity .. meltyuhovschina)))

      Zeal in execution - and so it was necessary to show - following the orders of the tyrant. . which were aimed at this - all that you have listed.

      "" To declare war or not is STALIN, but the troops would be in good shape! "

      if everyone had fulfilled everything as expected - Stalshin's pre-war orders - to NPOs and General Staff districts - then everything MUST be in a “tonus")))
      But the main problem was - in the very pre-war plans of the General Staff = Zhukov. It was they who initially condemned the country to defeat ..
      1. 0
        October 5 2017
        In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

        Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

        It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

        Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  35. +8
    August 30 2017
    [quote = В.С.] ""

    I trudge from people like you. I did not read and I will not read !!!!
    And what are you dragging from me ?! I’m not a red girl. But I don’t know deeply about education. I have three higher ones (and all are red), and you?! I fought pretty well, and you ?! I’ve been dealing with the issue for a dozen years. And I dig the same amount, and you?! Tread on the sofa and carry cartoons on the Internet, do not upset those you don’t know! I respect you ......
    1. VS
      -1
      August 31 2017
      "" And I know the questions and the answers to them ""

      read and go - answers to Pokrovsky from the divisional commanders - in the VIZH that I posted on the network a few years ago?))) Did you read the full ones - from Kozinkin? He made 7 books on the topic of June 22nd and the last is a two-volume book on the complete answers of the divisional forces just))) Released a year ago in EVERYTHING)))
      But - I'm afraid you have not read ALL the full answers yet - Chekunov’s collection will only go to stores the other day))))

      "" I have three higher ones (and all are red), and you?! "

      and all go military?)))

      "" I fought pretty well, and you?! And I’ve been dealing with this issue for a dozen years. And I dig the same amount, and you?! Trample the sofa and carry cartoons on the Internet, do not upset those you don’t know! Regards ...... ""

      sorry))))

      But - if you want to chat, then let's in PM your email. address - at the same time and see who is who)))) I’ll be happy to talk with someone who is really interested in the topic and, more than a couple of months, digging into the robin - trying to please the audience with discoveries - who the cho was "thinking" in GS)))
    2. The comment was deleted.
  36. +2
    7 September 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "" It is difficult for me to say: which neck was allowed to transmit information in peacetime through these means of communication. ""

    learn the full answers zabybalovyh)))

    Sorry! When the priest doesn’t peck at the vultures! Who prevented you from taking a straight line and saying, Grigorich !! Raise your mustache! Immediately!
    1. VS
      -3
      8 September 2017
      "" ""

      they did so - read the full answers - from divisional commanders to nsh districts - EVERYTHING without quite encrypting the army that night was completely raised)))) The first volume of Chekunov’s collection of complete answers from generals in Moscow stores already exists - the circulation is very small))) I I ordered 1 +4 volumes (4 rubles per book) for the libraries of the military academies and for the IVI library immediately at the publishing house and they will be picked up there for myself - I ordered through the city - through their online store - 600 rubles each))) In these answers - there are answers to many questions))) But I already showed these answers - in my two-volume edition - I went out last year and should still be on the shelves in stores)))
  37. +3
    7 September 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    "" And I know the questions and the answers to them ""

    read and go - answers to Pokrovsky from the divisional commanders - in the VIZH that I posted on the network a few years ago?))) Did you read the full ones - from Kozinkin? He made 7 books on the topic of June 22nd and the last is a two-volume book on the complete answers of the divisional forces just))) Released a year ago in EVERYTHING)))
    But - I'm afraid you have not read ALL the full answers yet - Chekunov’s collection will only go to stores the other day))))

    "" I have three higher ones (and all are red), and you?! "

    and all go military?)))

    "" I fought pretty well, and you?! And I’ve been dealing with this issue for a dozen years. And I dig the same amount, and you?! Trample the sofa and carry cartoons on the Internet, do not upset those you don’t know! Regards ...... ""

    sorry))))

    But - if you want to chat, then let's in PM your email. address - at the same time and see who is who)))) I’ll be happy to talk with someone who is really interested in the topic and, more than a couple of months, digging into the robin - trying to please the audience with discoveries - who the cho was "thinking" in GS)))

    That's the fact of the matter, that everyone is different! Economics, war and jury, I also wanted a literary faculty. But probably not fate .... I won’t have time .....
    1. VS
      -1
      8 September 2017
      "" all different! Economics, war and yuri, I also wanted a literary faculty. but probably not fate .... I won’t have time .. ""

      one hand for a squeak and a pussy did not grab))))

      What does war mean - what kind of education is this?)) I know - a military school at a military man plus well then there is an academy in appendage ..... well, you can learn in absentia on all sorts of jurisprudence and bookkeeping)) But what is this - war?) )))
  38. +1
    25 September 2017
    The author is too excited, passing this fever in the Kremlin, NPO, NKVMF, General Staff and so on. 21.06.41. The details of the ST mailing process are interesting, but distract from more important things. The countries of the German bloc were to - according to their insidious political plan of the war - to act at the same time, with a gap of 1-3-5 days after the German attack on the USSR. It is important! If the USSR from 22.06.41. attacking Romania, Hungary and Finland, he would get a conflict with London, Washington, Ankara and MANY other capitals, governments and political forces, including even underground communist parties. Romania, Hungary and Finland OPENLY went to the USSR through a tangible pause - from 23 to 25.06., And the Finns - after our military movements, although they and the Germans conducted mining of the Gulf of Finland secretly from 16.06., And our sailors spotted this. But in the diplomatic sphere, the USSR had to wait for an explicit, world-wide media coverage, attack on its borders on their part after 22.06. And plans to cover the borders on their sections should have taken this into account. There is a fear that this was not taken into account everywhere (for example, with the Finns), although there were other formal “incident bellies” on their part. Next is the unified Border Cover Plan of 02.06.41/21/21. it was communicated to each frontier military unit only as far as the troops of the given military district were concerned, and for each military district there was its own signal to bring it into action (code word), and its response. For PribOVO this word from the General Staff was "Elephant". See the publication of this document on Wikipedia. Upon receipt, the district had to respond with a response and duplicate this answer FOR ALL CHANNELS CLOSED - and even open in case of difficulties with a closed - COMMUNICATION. That is, "Elephant" instantly, AUTOMATICALLY put into action all the red envelopes of all levels with a top-secret plan for covering the state border of the USSR in this district. Zhukov and Tymoshenko in the evening of the 22.06.41st and at night from 02.06.41 to 1. duplicated and modified software from 20. its new directive No. 80, which apparently took into account the strengthening of troops in the districts over the past XNUMX days. As if they knew exactly the real situation in the districts! According to PribOVO, Zhukov considered the local territorial divisions to be combat-ready, when there Soviet officers were already killed in the back and XNUMX% of the l / s were planned either to openly rebel or to defect in an organized manner with the outbreak of war! It’s just that Zhukov and Tymoshenko stole another cipher to justify the failure that they intuitively foresaw. Either they cooked in something, or they knew those who INTENTIONALLY cooked. Forgive me this WILD assumption, but nowadays crawling UKRAINE existed in certain circles of the Red Army since the Civil War! The topic is acute, but it is, no matter how we want it to be gone. And Hitler counted on it, on the general "national question" in the Red Army and the USSR as a whole. Very much counted.
  39. +1
    27 September 2017
    I will add about our military-industrial complex (hereinafter referred to as someone else’s excerpt) of that fateful year: the mobilization plan for the deployment of industry was not approved - they only had time to consider it, since the Chairman of the Defense Committee, K. E. Voroshilov, had not taken it out of the safe for more than a month, until G. K. Zhukov turned to I.V. Stalin. A light tank T-50 was adopted, intended to replace the obsolete BT and T-26, although initially it was known that the organization of its production and development of the technological process was very difficult, as well as the not very satisfactory performance characteristics. For the same reason, those accepted for service in 1938-1939 were discontinued. 76-mm anti-aircraft, 107-mm mountain, 210-mm guns, 280-mm mortar, 305-mm howitzer. But the production of 45-mm anti-tank guns, the production of which was also discontinued, had to be restored during the war, as well as the production of anti-tank rifles. The IL-2 attack aircraft, created as a double, was converted into a single, which caused him heavy losses and forced him to return to the original version already in 1942.

    In the years 1939-1940. 31 aircraft, 10 shipbuilding, 28 ammunition plants and a number of other enterprises were reconstructed. The vast majority of enterprises, primarily large ones, switched to the production of military products. For example, only 146 were involved in the release of clothing and property. Most factories produced several types of weapons and military equipment. So, the Chelyabinsk Tractor had a task to produce both KV tanks, tractors, engines, and 152 mm shells, Plant No. 183 in Kharkov, in addition to T-34 tanks, also produced steam locomotives, tractors, and various spare parts for tanks of old designs (adj. . 13.3). In the first half of 1 alone, 1941 aircraft, 5 tanks, 958 guns, 1 mortars, 672 thousand rifles and many other weapons were produced.
  40. +1
    October 5 2017
    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  41. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: Titsen
    And then the question is the purpose of these publications?
    I don’t even want to come up with an answer!

    The cost of certain types of Soviet tanks by years
    ATTENTION! When using the materials in this table, a link to it is required!
    Wartime tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
    T-34 (Plant No. 183*) 596 373 429 256 249 256 165 810 141 822 140 996 136 380
    T-34 (Plant No. 183**) - 510 - 000 166 300 136
    T-34 (Plant No. 112) - - - 209 700 179 300
    T-34 (Plant No. 174) - - - 3 127 000 2
    T-34 (UZTM) - - - 273800 190800 179400 -
    KV-1s (ChKZ) - - - 300 200 246 000 - -
    IS-2 (ChKZ) - - - - 347 900 264
    IS-3 (CHKZ) - - - - - - 267200
    Notes:
    * - figures from the plant report
    ** - figures from the report of the People’s Commissariat
    Self-propelled artillery mounts
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1942 1943 1944 1945
    2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y
    SU-122 203 900 175 - - - -
    SU-85 - - 201 000 175 - -
    SU-100 - - - - 176 500 176
    Pre-war tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
    BT-2 (KhPZ) 93 313 - - - - - - -
    BT-5 (KhPZ) - - 66 830 - - - - - -
    BT-7 (KhPZ) - - - 91 309 96 453 95 326 104 168 101 094 -
    BT-7M (KhPZ) - - - - - - - 168 196 177 609
    The tables are compiled according to the NKTP reports in 1940-1945. (RGAE)
  42. +1
    October 9 2017
    7 TD was formed in July 1940. in the ZOV, as part of 6MK (Major General Khatskilevich MG). The management was created on the basis of the management of the 3rd cavalry corps. The division was formed in Volkovysk and the towns around it on the basis of the 11th cd. In addition, the tank battalion of the 21st heavy tank brigade, two tank battalions of infantry divisions (33rd and 125th), units of the 6th light tank and 43rd motor transport brigades arrived to equip the tank regiments of the division. The motorized rifle regiment was formed from the 100th and 117th cavalry regiments, the howitzer artillery regiment from the 17th cavalry artillery division of 11 cd. The formation of the corps was completed on 30.07.40/368/51., The division at the beginning of the war had 34 tanks (of which: KV - 150, T-26 - 42, T-125 - 7, BT - 22.6.1941). From the report of the commander of the 98th TD S.V. Borzilov: On 60/80/51, the Division was manned with ordinary personnel - 34%, ml. Navy personnel - 150%, command personnel - 5%. Material part: KV - 7, T-125-26, BT-42-76 approximately 76, T-45-1,5. In addition, armored cars, vehicles and special vehicles. Security of the division with military equipment: 1,25-mm shells - one ammunition, 70-mm armor-piercing shells - were missing, 70-mm shells - 3 bk, cartridges of all grades - 1 bk, fuels and lubricants B-120 and KB-XNUMX - XNUMX refills. Diesel - XNUMX refueling. The air defense divisions of the divisions were located at the district training ground near the village of Krupki XNUMX km east of Minsk and later departed as part of other units.
    Shells were loaded into the tanks, security of parks and warehouses was strengthened. It was ordered "to do everything without hype, not to tell anyone about it, continue studies according to plan." In 2.10 22.06. a combat alert was announced. Divisions were withdrawn from military camps to their concentration areas. The first enemy air raids fell on empty camps. In the 7th TD there were several wounded. All day the units that made up the reserve of 3 and 10 armies, including motorized infantry 6 and 13MK, prepared the defensive line along the Narev River. According to the operational report No. 1 of the headquarters of the ZF “6th MK conducted reconnaissance during the day, until 17.40. did not participate in battles and occupied the area of ​​Khoroshch, Batsyuty, Surazh. The headquarters of the corps - Bialystok - was bombarded, there are killed and wounded. "
    By the end of June 22.06. 6MK compounds occupied the area west and southwest of Bialystok: 7 TD - Khoroshch, Gaevniki, Neroniki; 4 TD - Turchin, Podukhovyy, Oil Seals; 29th MD - Supra industry and forest south. In the evening 22.06/3. Directive No. 24 Tymoshenko set the task - with strikes in the Grodno region, in the direction, Suvalki together with the troops of the North-West Fleet to surround and by the end of June 6 destroy the Suvalkin group of Germans. The 10th mechanized corps of the 11th army, the 3th mechanized corps of the 6rd army and the 3th cavalry corps (Major General I.S. Nikitin) were involved in a counterattack. The general leadership of the horse-mechanized group was assigned to the deputy commander of the front, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin. To unite the actions of the 10rd and 10th armies and control the actions of KMG, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik left for Bialystok, who arrived at the headquarters of the 23.06th army on 23.06. In the morning of June 6. 7 mk compounds, having received an order to relocate to the Grudek region even at night, began the transition. XNUMX TD was supposed to concentrate in the area of ​​Valpa station (east of Bialystok) - with the subsequent task of beating up a tank division in the Bialystok area.
    Almost simultaneously with the completion of concentration in the Valila area, the corps received a new task: to move to Grodno. 4 td in the direction of Indura - Grodno, and 7 td on the line Sokulka - Kuznitsa - Grodno. The 29th motor division was supposed to cover the blow of the body from the left flank on the Sokulka - Kuznitsa line. The divisions immediately began to carry out this order. The report of the commander 7 TD does not say about new enemy raids. Continuous marches (up to 90 kilometers) conducted by the corps on 23.06. undermined the combat effectiveness of units and formations. The fatigue of the personnel, especially the driver mechanics, began to affect, but most importantly, the corps began to experience difficulties in supplying fuels and lubricants and other types of supplies. In addition, for various reasons, the hull suffered significant losses in materiel. Itself 7td on the march and in the area of ​​concentration from 4 to 9 hours and from 11 to 14 hours 23.06. all the time under air strikes, until 14 p.m. the division suffered losses: 63 tanks were destroyed, all the rear regiments were destroyed. In accordance with the order of the front commander, from 10:00 on June 24.06. Boldin’s group was supposed to attack in the direction of Grodno, Merkine with the task of capturing Merkine by the end of the day. 6 mk should attack in the direction of Grodno, Druskipinkai, Merkine. The 29th motor division came from the line of Kuznitsa, Sokulka, 4th, 7th Panzer Divisions and 6th Cavalry Corps - from the Shuzyalovo, Vezhkhles (Troszyano Nove (10 km south of Sokulka) and further along the eastern bank of the Neman River. The task of the group was increasing: it was necessary not only to stabilize the situation in the Grodno and Lipsk areas, but to continue the offensive in the NWF zone to the area of ​​the Neman crossings at Druskininkai and Merkina.
    However, there was no connection and interaction between the corps and divisions involved in the strike. 11 mk was not included in the KMG and acted in the 3rd army. For KMG Boldin, the 124th howitzer regiment of the RGK (Major Divizenko) was included, consisting of 48 guns. 23.06/XNUMX. the regiment withdrew from firing positions in the Zambrow area and moved to the area northeast of Bialystok. In addition to significant difficulties in the combat supply of troops, the corps had absolutely no air cover. The regular means of air defense, as mentioned above, he was deprived.
    The 162nd and 256th Infantry Divisions of the XXAK, as well as the 8th VIIIAK advancing south of Grodno, acted against KMG Boldin. It was the 256th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General G. Kaufmann (Gerhard Kauffmann), having organized a powerful anti-tank defense, stopped the advance of KMG. The 6 mk tank divisions, which initially had no contact with the enemy, marched along the routes indicated by them. 4 TD moved to Indura, 7 TD went in two columns: 13 TP - to Kuznitsa, 14 TP - to Old Dubovoy. The movement of the tanks was detected by enemy aircraft, which began to deliver bombing attacks. The German ground forces were 20-30 km from the starting line of attack of the corps and got time to go on the defensive and pull up their anti-tank artillery. Settlements along the line Kuznitsa — Podlipki — Staroe Dubovoe were turned into defense nodes.
    As part of the German XXAK, the Shtug sau battery operated in the amount of one battery (3 pieces). In addition, the 256th anti-aircraft guns were attached to the 88th Infantry Division. So the enemy of the new Soviet T-34 and KV tanks was heavy artillery (up to 150 mm caliber) and anti-aircraft guns. To slow down the movement of 6 microns, the enemy attracted the 8th air corps of diving bombers. German planes fiercely attacked Soviet tanks, and in addition to bombs, a special phosphorus mixture was used. The corps commander, Major General Khatskilevich, was forced to withdraw units from the air strikes. 24.06/7. 27 TD by the end of the day went to the area Kuznitsa - Old Dubovoye, where she started fighting with the German infantry. Parts of the 3th Army of the 162rd Army retreated to the same line under pressure from the 87nd and parts of the 25.06th Infantry Divisions. 14/14. the fighting continued. Due to artillery lag, artillery preparation before the attack and escort were not carried out. The enemy’s anti-tank defense was destroyed by tanks, which at the same time suffered heavy losses. Practically no roundabout maneuvers of German strongholds were used, and attacks on the forehead did not bring success. In the area of ​​Old Dubovoe, he tried to attack 36 mp of the same division. With only a quarter of the refueling, the connection by the end of the day went over to the defense on the line Skoblyanka, Bylovina. The division commander wrote: “Fuel and lubricants were running out in parts of the division, there was no possibility of refueling due to the lack of containers and head depots, however, we managed to get one refueling from the burned warehouses Kuznitsa and M. Krinki (in general, they fuels and lubricants ) ". In the strip of the 24.06th regiment in the area of ​​Zubrutz, Gorchaki-Gurne, Babiki, units of the XNUMXth Cavalry Division, assembled after the defeat by enemy aircraft on June XNUMXth, operated. Both formations were exposed all day to enemy aircraft.
    Having received information about the exit of large motorized enemy forces to Minsk from the north and about the breakthrough of 2Gy Gudarian in the Baranavichy region, the commander of the ZF D.G. Pavlov gave the commander 25 mk order in the evening of June 6: to the 3rd and 10th armies. To the commander of the 6th mechanized corps. Immediately interrupt the battle and force march, following night and day, focus on the elephant. Contact the radio Golubev and directly by me. Begin the movement, on the morning of 26, and report the end of the march. Radiate the condition of fuel and ammunition. Pavlov, Klimovsky, Fominyh. Posted on 25.06.41/16.45/3. at 10. So the counterattack of the Boldin group ended. In the meantime, troops of the XNUMXrd and XNUMXth armies of the ZF were in a double “bag”. One circle of encirclement was organized by German infantry divisions in the Białystok region, and the second ring was closed with the help of the motorized corps of Gotha and Guderiaia. Bursting into the "infantry" ring and able to break out of it to the east, the parts fell into the encirclement ring in the Minsk region.
    7 TD 26.06. while still maintaining combat effectiveness, it kept the 128th MSP 29 SD and the remnants of the 36th Cavalry Division from fleeing. During the day, the division moved back south. But at 21.00 p.m. on the same day, the 7th TD will turn the defenses off Krynka and cross the Svisloch River east of it. 29.06/7. 3th Borzilova (29 tanks, an infantry and cavalry detachment) approached the forests east of Slonim, where he fought on 30.06 and 30.06. A 22. at XNUMX o'clock he moved with a detachment into the forests and further to the Pinsk Marshes along the route Bulka, Velichkovichi, Postoli, Gomel, Vyazma.
    If 6 microns appeared in operational reports, then only for 24-25.06. ZF headquarters until 29.06. in reports in the General Staff "specified the details" of the actions of the 6th MK 24 and 25.06. After 25.06/7. the connection was lost. The remains of 34th (three T-51s) left the encirclement along the route Vulka, Velichkovichi, Postoli, Gomel, Vyazma. General Borzilov was appointed head of NABABU 28.09.41A and 6.7.41/7/XNUMX. died at Perekop. XNUMX. its XNUMX td was disbanded.
  43. +1
    October 16 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    “The date of June 22, 1941 was determined by Keitel’s order on June 10, 1941.”
    “The date of June 22 was determined by Hitler only at 13:00 on June 21. Everything that intelligence transmitted before that was transferred and changed a hundred times. ”

    The headquarters of the German strike groups "North", "Center" and "South" completed the development of offensive plans and executive documents for army corps and divisions only by 15.06.41. That is, Keitel (General Staff of the Wehrmacht) could not 10.06. already set a start date for the war. It took them 3-4 days to consolidate specific plans into a common whole and to approve this whole (turning it into a combat order), and the tank divisions secretly went to the deployment areas (20-30 km from the border) 4 days before the start of the war, or June 17-18, 1941 Until June 20.06. Keitel received reports on the implementation of the deployment plan and reported to Hitler about the complete readiness of the German ground forces to attack the USSR. Goering reported on the readiness of the Luftwaffe, including about the mess at our airfields, the Abwehr on the basis of reconnaissance of targets on 18.06/21.06.41. The Navy reported their intelligence and plans ... Someone also reported on the readiness of the Finns, Hungarians and Romanians. Hitler looked at the cards, at aerial reconnaissance photographs, and consulted with astrologers on June 13.30, 3.30. at 21 appointed the final time - 22.06.41 nights from 21.06 to 14.00. Miraculously, the military attache and naval attache of the USSR in Germany, Tupikov and Vorontsov managed in the afternoon of June 18.00. (around 21.00:21.06 p.m.) on the last Aeroflot flight Berlin-Moscow and at 19 p.m. landed in Moscow, taking away the most important codes, lists and other documents. At 20.00 they reported to their people's commissars and headquarters. The German military attaché is also 21.06.41/70. urgently departed from Moscow to Berlin, with the same suitcases. And they also managed to report the situation on time. Thus, already from 80-110 00.00. the Kremlin already knew for sure at least the time of the outbreak of war, and 22.06.41-1.00% (and even 2.00%, since our intelligence, as a rule, exaggerated them) German forces and their deployment. But some cautious and dangerous political sharks tried to whine something else about the "possible provocation of the German military" and the "German working class" ... And Beria was whispering about the internal provocateurs. As a result, the necessary directive went for encryption and encryption in the okrugs and fleets only around XNUMX on XNUMX., Where it was decrypted and reported to XNUMX - XNUMX of that fateful night.
  44. +1
    October 16 2017
    Quote: Operator
    rear bases are practically on the front line

    The back base of spare parts for ALL PribOV armored vehicles was in Dvinsk, aka Daugavpils, and this is approx. 230-250 km delivery shoulder to the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps, located in the area of ​​Alytus-Šiauliai (3rd) and along the 12th - one at Riga (230 km), the second at Libava (aka Liepaja ) (230 km). Solitary one and a half in forested rear areas, where armed and organized units of the national underground were already shooting - how do you like it? Front-line bases were in Riga and Panevezys, in Idrits (Pskov Region, Moscow Military District), army warehouses for foodstuffs and property, fuel and lubricants and ammunition of the 11th Army were in Kaunas and its environs, including railway stations and a military airfield. 8th Army - in Šiauliai and Libau. These are all cities for which in any way it was supposed to fight and where the mobilization was to take place. The Germans blocked the KBF base with a fortress and 16 submarines under repair by the night of 22.06.41. Siauliai and partly Alytus were taken on the morning of 23.06/24.06., Kaunas took on 22.6., And in the morning, 11. there they were already fighting on the streets with armed national gangs, and the 22.06th army headquarters left Kaunas under bombing at a command and control field on the orders and plans in the afternoon of 24.06/5, and the army’s rear troops, fighting off the gangs, partially removed ammunition, food stuff and property , partly blew up warehouses and fought out of town until 3/22.6., in vain with the remnants of 28.06 td 180 mk, broken for 60. in Alytus in a tank battle. They defended themselves in Libava until June 26.6, partially leaving the encirclement on ships and ships of the Baltic Fleet, partially breaking through land to Ventspils. In addition to the error with spare parts in Dvinsk (about 28.06 wagons, 4000 managed to be taken out before XNUMX), there is no particular mistake in the location of the warehouses. In Riga we managed on XNUMX. to blow up stockpiles with ammunition and a fuel and lubricant base (about XNUMX tons), and evacuate a couple of dozen cargo trains, take out heavy artillery and air defense artillery, relocate the remains of the fleet and aviation, hospitals and headquarters.
  45. +1
    October 18 2017
    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  46. 0
    October 18 2017
    Quote: Predator
    economy, war and yuri, I also wanted a literary faculty. but probably not fate .... I won’t have time.

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  47. The comment was deleted.
  48. +6
    December 10 2017
    The version presented by the author is interesting. The standards of that time might not correspond to the standards of the post-war period. In my opinion, the information is fairly true as far as it can be estimated.
    I can also confirm that the signature of the encryptor on the back indicates the processing of this material. When there are two signatures there is even no question: one on duty (or his deputy or one of the performers), the second surname is the performer (or the second performer). It is unlikely that G.K.Zhukov would begin to rewrite the text of the Directive from a draft to a cipher telegram form. On June 30, 1941, the SHO GSh Red Army was checked. The report noted: “As for the eighth (encryption) department of the Operational Directorate, there were no significant deficiencies in the processing, passage, accounting and storage of encrypted military-operational telegrams, except that the department sometimes receives cipher telegram texts written not from hands by performers, and printed in several copies in a typewritten bureau. Thus, typists are unacquainted with the contents of telegrams sent. ” Copies of Directive No. 1 were handed over to the Navy Commissar and S.M. Budenny. Nothing prevented laying another sheet and presenting the first copy as an outgoing cipher telegram. It can be seen from the memorandum that this happened at the General Staff and the chief of the General Staff should have known this. So, the version of Zhukov’s correspondence of the text from the draft to the white paper does not withstand criticism of specialists. It can be supported only by people far from cipher communication and using their texts to their advantage
  49. -3
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    It is unlikely that G.K.Zhukov would begin to rewrite the text of the Directive from a draft to a cipher telegram form. On June 30, 1941, the SHO GSh Red Army was checked. The report noted: “As for the eighth (encryption) department of the Operational Directorate, there were no significant deficiencies in the processing, passage, accounting and storage of encrypted military-operational telegrams, except that the department sometimes receives cipher telegram texts written not from hands by performers, and printed in several copies in a typewritten bureau. Thus, typists are unacquainted with the contents of telegrams sent. ” Copies of Directive No. 1 were handed over to the Navy Commissar and S.M. Budenny.

    First, Zhukov could instruct his subordinate who was allowed to compose cipher telegrams to copy the directive from a draft to a blank sheet.
    Secondly, if you had sent the cipher telegrams at least once, then you would have known that the octagon in your presence MUST check the entire text of the written text, and all corrections (and there should be practically none) must be certified by the signature of the executor. Where did you see them on a draft scan?
    Thirdly, the octagon is not so stupid as to take responsibility and solve the crosswords of the boss, which is why he checks the readability and comprehensibility of the text down to the comma.
    It is strange that you do not know elementary labor, and undertake to discuss documents of the past - apparently you prematurely imagined yourself to be a major military expert.
    1. +5
      December 10 2017
      and I am a specialist in this matter, and you are an amateur.
      Zhukov could not instruct him to do this, as Kuznetsov saw him. There was no time to attract anyone else. You give the requirements for the design of outgoing cipher telegrams from the point of view of Soviet and modern office work. We do not know how encryption was accepted at that time. No need to say that nothing has changed. Personally, I do not believe that Zhukov meticulously on the back of the sheet described his changes: delete the text "....". Surname, signature, date, etc. Too harsh he was a man. you can cite the facts that he took differently, let's read. I do not believe you in a word
      1. -5
        December 10 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        Zhukov could not instruct him to do this, as Kuznetsov saw him.

        Zhukov could work with a draft version of the directive that Stalin had with them. And he could already rewrite it on the cipher organ form.
        Personally, I do not believe that Zhukov meticulously on the back of the sheet described his changes: delete the text "....".

        Do not smack nonsense - the encryption is written only on one side of the form, and on the contrary of any correction, the contractor puts his signature.
        You are a balabol, and you yourself seem to have never taken cipher telegrams from performers. Why did you get that a document signed by the People's Commissar Zhukov could not personally be rewritten on a cipher telegram form? He is actually a subordinate, and if Tymoshenko ordered him to “comb” the text, then Zhukov could have lost his pride. So it’s accepted in the army, but this was not respected by your collective farm.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"