The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 10)

189
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 10)

The message used material from the book Mark Corned beef “Another Chronology of the Catastrophe 1941. The fall of the "Stalinist Falcons."

Unlike PribOVO, the neighbors in Zapovo in the evening of 20, June, noted an increased activity of the Germans at the border in the area of ​​the Suvalki lug: «To the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft immediately... To the report of the commander of the 3 Army, the wire barriers along the border along the Augustow, Sejny road, which were still in the afternoon, were removed by evening. In this area of ​​the forest, it is as if the noise of ground motors is heard ... Klimovsky» On the document mark: "Sent 21 June 1941 g. In 2 hours 40 minutes". This message in the morning and afternoon 21.6.41 was not particularly alarmed by the head of the General Staff. It is not known what the Klimovsky or Pavlova responded from Moscow. Probably the same as the night before the war. About 23 21.6.41 watch G. Zhukov on the HF unit warned the NS of Western IN: “Expect special instructions!” General Klimovsky reported on this to General D.Pavlov and ordered the commanders of the 3, 10 and 4 armies to be in their headquarters.



FSD XOVUM 22.6.41 “Around one in the morning [00-45 22.6.41] encryption was received from Moscow [cipher telegram - PC] with an order to immediately bring the troops on alert in case of a German attack expected in the morning. At about 2 hours - 2 hours 30 minutes a similar order was made by ciphering the armies, parts of the SD ... " We already know that this PC was delivered to the cryptographic branch on 01-45 and sent to 02-25. Since the district authorities didn’t take any action before getting the command line, it turns out that they didn’t report anything about the content of Directive No. XXUMX from Moscow on HF. Perhaps, as in the case of the ODVO, they only said: "... A telegram of special importance has been sent to you for immediate execution ..." Next, "wring the tail", so as not to succumb to the provocations of the German troops.

General Klimovsky understood the cryptographic business better than the head of the General Staff. The operational department of Zapovo headquarters included the 3 branch in the number of 100 coders (of whom 61 was a man from the coders' school). NS needed to know the cipher case guidance to work with this lineup. Therefore, on his order, immediately after the decoding of PCs, the Military Council was presented with draft material. It was on this material that the leadership of the district left the resolution, making it out as incoming PC. Printed on a typewriter on a typewriter, later the telegram was turned into outgoing PC of ZOVOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on declassified PCs is crossed out with a red pencil, and the addressing and names of the signers are added later. An incident happened: at that time no one decided to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text. PC went to the army for four signatures, which is not practiced.

According to General D.Pavlov, at one in the morning 22.06.41 called the people's commissar Tymoshenko: “Well, how are you, calmly?” I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank: according to the report of Kuznetsov, the commander of the 3 army, the German motor-mechanics were constantly going to Suwalki over one and a half day. According to his report, barrage wire was removed in many places by the Germans in the Augustow — Sapotskin section. The people's commissioner replied to my report: “You should be calmer and do not panic, but collect headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations - call ". After a conversation with the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the leadership of ZOVOVO still about half an hour decided: what instructions should be given to the troops.

The commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, at about one o'clock in the morning, under his own responsibility, ordered to send sealed “red bags” to all the subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the order of actions for combat alert that were kept in the army headquarters. About two o'clock in the morning 22 of June on HF, the commander of the 3 Army V. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov: “To raise troops in combat alert, parts of the UR immediately take up the bunkers and put them into full combat readiness, put into action a plan to cover the state border” . The management of ZOVOVO assumed the responsibility from which the top management of the spacecraft was discharged. 3 hours the time lost from the delivery of Directive No. 1 to the cryptographic department of the General Staff before sending PCs in the army cover. Encryption reached the addressee by the beginning of the war ...

Something similar happened in PribOVO-SZF. Order commander 16 ck, given to 1-30 22.6.41:

«5, 33 and 188 commanders No.0012 The army commander 11 ordered:

1. Min not to put.

2. For the protection of the subsidiary of the private education institution leave small groups of patrols under the command of the average commander. The rest of the people mouth, providing a band predpole, remove immediately.

3. Work on the main page to continue. Commander 16 sk Major General Ivanov»


A very strange order, which had to go from the headquarters of the NWF through the headquarters of the 11-th army. This order of the headquarters of the NWF is in conflict with the previously given orders and initiatives. This could happen only if this instruction came from Moscow. After the arrest of A.D.Loktionov, with whom PSKlenov served since the summer of 1940, the NSH of the NWF was obliged to follow all instructions from Moscow without showing initiative.

From the 4 part, we already know that in the cryptographic offices of armies and corps, Pribovo PCs were processed using a manual cipher. In order for the PC to be sent from the 16 headquarters in the division in 1-30, it was necessary to prepare it at the NWF headquarters in the 23-30… 00-00 area. It turns out that, having passed the SC with Directive No. 1 to the encryption department, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff organized a “cheat” on the phone to the heads of the border HEs, issuing some “valuable instructions” on possible provocative actions of the enemy troops and how to proceed in this case in the counties. It is about these instructions that little is known in our time. In the 4 part, you were presented with the author’s version that the top management of the spacecraft in the evening 21.6.41 was not ready to send Directive No. 1 to the troops. The spacecraft managers were forced to prepare and send this document to I. Stalin. Therefore, the leadership of the spacecraft probably found it necessary to express their views on the HF leadership of the districts. They didn’t get through to OdVO MV Zakharov, who took responsibility for the rise of district troops somewhere between 23-00 21.6.41 and 00-00 22.6.41. Let us again consider the text of Directive No. XXUMX, prepared by Tymoshenko and Zhukov.



It should be noted that from the draft material of this document at the last time point after the words "All parts to bring on alert" The following text has been deleted: "In the case of any provocations by the Germans, or their allies, not to give in to any provocations, by taking steps to immediately resolve misunderstandings by peaceful means. " What else to add to the crossed out text? For 5-6 hours before the war, the wording on provocations and the peaceful settlement of the issue is specified, and not on the preparation of border district troops for war. Very reminiscent of the instructions of KA Meretskov, Commissar of Defense It is likely that it was a similar order that was brought to VO by the senior management of the spacecraft in a rather sharp form. The “valuable instructions” from Moscow and Directive No. XXUMX itself should have been reflected in the instructions of the headquarters and the Military Council of the NWF. Thus distinguish "Provocation" from "Sudden strike"and solvewhat exactly should be transferred to the troops shifted on the shoulders of the command of the frontier districts, which had previously “intimidated” before making a decision ...

«Military Councils 8 and 11 ARMY 22th of June 1941 2-25

1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden German attack on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.

2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.

At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat

I ORDER:

1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

5. Families of the commanding staff 10, 125, 33 and 128 to be transported to the rear only in case of border crossing by large enemy forces.

6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.

Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov, Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchy, Lieutenant-General Maples»


Note the 9 listing. For 2 hours before, the opposite order was given. So what is different from the one set out in Directive No. XXUMX, ordered the people's commissar of defense on the HF NSH of the NWF, if at first they decide "Do not put mines", And after receiving the encryption with the text of Directive No. XXUMX, the headquarters of the NWF decides on their "Immediate installation"?

PCS from SZF headquarters is not sent to the 27 Army. Units 67-th SD (from the 27 army) have already been alerted, and the army headquarters is not notified of the Directive. Probably, the leadership of the front does not expect the start of a full-scale war. Why inform the army headquarters, located in the rear? This misinformation is contributed by incorrect intelligence data, which we talked about in the 7 and 8 parts. In addition, they were convinced of this, ordered by the highest ranks of the SC. Unfortunately, there is no longer any time left to carry out the activities specified in the NWF Directive from 22.6.41 ... For example, the mines near the roads were left to lie away from the dug holes under them ...

Let us consider how the commanders of 8 and 11 armies answered the question of Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky: “When was the order to bring the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22?”

Former commander of the 8 Army, Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov: "It should be noted that even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the Klenov Front School to withdraw troops from the border at dawn of 22.6.41 g in a very categorical manner, which I categorically refused to do ..."

Former commander of the 11 Army, Lieutenant-General V.I. Morozov: “Such an order was received by telephone around one o'clock in the morning 22.6.41 of the front NSH looking for the front commander made it clear to me that it was necessary to act, withdraw troops to the border, saying that an order was prepared about this and you would receive it. Based on this, I have a conditional code on the phone between the 1-2 hour. 22.6.41 was given orders to the troops ... "

What I would like to note in the answers of two army commanders:

1) both talk about the actions of the NSH completely opposite opinions. It turns out that one of them provides some distorted information.

2) both generals answer the questions of General A.P. Pokrovsky in 1952, in the era of omnipotence of organs. In October, 1941, General PP Sobennikov was arrested in connection with the investigation of the hostilities in the Baltic States, and in February, 1942 was released at the request and sent to the front with a demotion.

In responses to General A.P. Pokrovsky, P.S. Sobennikov expresses an opinion on General Trukhin (in October 1941, he deliberately goes to cooperate with the Nazis).



General PP Sobennikov, when he was under arrest, had to ask questions related to this traitor. It can be seen that PPSobennikov (who miraculously survived in prison), even in 1952, distanced himself from this man, emphasizing that he was "The enemy of the people of Vlasovite". At the same time, he expresses his opinion that this person was the author of the cover plan. Further it is easy to understand: “the plan of the enemy of the people” - “unsuccessful actions of the spacecraft forces in the initial period of the war”. Once in prison it was necessary to somehow cooperate with the investigation. Without cooperation, he would have simply been killed and would not have survived ... General PP Sobennikov should have been asked questions about NS Pribovo. We see that in the list of witnesses Sobennikov is missing. Being under investigation, he did not “sink” PS Klenov - surviving at his expense - this is an act! Not everyone was capable of that. Many of those arrested, to escape from torture, unfortunately, turned in friends ...

What we saw in his answers to General Pokrovsky about Klenov is the smallness that PPSobennikov was forced to say. If he spoke about Klenov only good or neutral - he would have signed a death sentence for himself. Moreover, he did not cheat - he just said not everything ... The author tried to show above that, according to the “telephone right”, “pumping” from Moscow started in order to prevent the Germans from causing a conflict. Since the commander of the troops at the front headquarters was not at this time, the NSH brought the latest "particularly valuable instructions" from Moscow to the army commanders. PP Sobennikov simply did not mention in his testimony whether there was another phone call from NSH after the transfer of the “valuable instructions” ... Besides the “plans of the enemy of the people”, General P.P.Sobennikov was blamed for the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the 8 Army laid on the Air Force using this version as a "lifeline." This will be discussed below.

The events of the first days of the war are studied in sufficient detail in the books. Therefore, the author, in concluding the theme “About PribOVO”, will quite briefly provide publicly available information on participation in battles of the air forces of the North-Western Fleet, the ground forces and the ZhBD North-Western Fleet.

In the 2-55 22 June 1941, the Me-110 fighters attacked the Alytus airfield.

At 3-57, the airfield and port in Libau were bombed. The city, port, naval base, located 50 km from the border with East Prussia, became the object of multiple German attacks aviation. In the report signed on 30.07.41 “On the military work 6 th garden"As a cause of large losses materiel noted “Total absence of VNOS posts at sea” и “The airfield in the open was well known to the Germans”. During 22, June Libava was bombarded 13 times.

In 4-00, German aviation struck air strikes in the Baltic States against airfields, major railway junctions, ports, cities of Riga, Vindava, Šiauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Alytus and others. At the same time, heavy artillery, including the enemy’s railway batteries, began shelling settlements and troops along the border.

Excerpt from 57 Headquarters XOUMX 10 00 "Xnumx garden in 3-25 22.06.41 has declared alarm and to 4-00 was ready for combat missions ... "

Order commander 7 garden 22.6.41 4-15 “Regiment commanders.

1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

Commander 7 garden Colonel Petrov».


At 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4 garden to deliver a three-bap attack on the city and port of Memel. On 4-53, the 7 Garden Commander issues an order to the 9 bap commanders and the bap 46 commanders: “... Destroy the enemy grouping and aviation in the Tilsit, Ragnit, Zhilen area. Departure immediately». At 5, the squadron of 9, bap under the command of Captain M. Krivtsov, took to the air in the morning and headed for Tilsit. The route of the squadron ran in the area of ​​Suvalka ledge. Bombers reached the target at an altitude of 7500 m.

The report of the NWF Commander to the People's Commissar of Defense on 6-10 states: “... Our air force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... Took measures to bomb the enemy without flying the border ... ” NSH VVS NWF commander Krupin in 6-15 orders: “... to the commander of the 7 garden. State borders do not break. Destroy the enemy aircraft in your area. Airplanes take off on the radio to land on airfields ... " Captain Krivtsov received by radio an order to return to the airfield when he was on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed bombs, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. In the 7-10 squadron, without losing a single aircraft, she returned to the airfield. The first combat sortie for two other squadrons of 9-Bap was not so successful - during a bombing attack on a gathering of German troops in the Tilsit area, they were met by German anti-aircraft fire; three aircraft were shot down.

About an hour after receiving the order from the headquarters of the 7 garden, three squadrons of the 46 were lifted into the air. In 5-30, the commander of the 7 garden ordered the commander of the 10 iap: “One nine to cover the departure 46 bap”. None of the fighter escort flew.

Operational summary №1 46 bap: “... In 6-40 / 6-45 22.6.41. 2-I and 3-I squadrons 46 Bap made a bombing in the number of 18 aircraft. 2-th AE destroyed the accumulation of troops in the area of ​​Tilsit, Tauragen ... During the bombing of the 2-th AE did not return 5 SB aircraft with crews ... 3-A A destroyed railway station Zhilin [17 km from Tilsit] ..., 5 crews did not return from the flight ... "

Major Mogilevsky (commander of 40-th bap): “... The raid on Koenigsberg, Touragen and Memel ended successfully. There was a powerful anti-aircraft fire, but the bombs dropped exactly on the objects. We have no losses ... "

The 10-iap was alerted on 4-20: "... the fighting began after 5 in the morning ... It was my [komesk V. Borovoy] the second sortie between the 6 and 7 watches ... A link of V.Loboda was attacked by fighter jets, and we hit from the bottom. From the first attack, V. Loboda shot down Bf-109, and my shock group - two Ju-88. During the second attack, we shot down three more Ju-88. It was here that Vasily Loboda, helping a friend, rammed Bf-109 ... "

Fighters 21-iap met the first raid at the airport: the order for the opening of hostilities have not yet been received. but thanks to disguise losses were avoided. The order was soon received, and the second regiment met in full readiness, shooting down 9 German aircraft.

It is possible that the morning of June 22 the obscure provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the situation of confusion, lack of communication and firm leadership in the troops caused more damage than the actual bombing and shelling by German aircraft.

Often, the fighters, taking off in alarm, were aimlessly circling over the airfield, having received no targets, and after landing landed new strikes. AT special messages The 3 NKO Directorate noted: “... VNOS posts do not work well, they confuse signaling to the command post, which is why 22 June this year. the flight personnel of the regiment deployed at the Rende airfield six times flew into false air, and with the actual attack of the enemy, our fighters, being not warned, took to the air when the enemy bombarded the outskirts of the city ... ”

When planning a war in the air, the leadership of the spacecraft assumed that tens to hundreds of aircraft would participate in the battles at the same time. The command of all levels of spacecraft faced a new tactic for conducting military operations on the ground and in the air. New experience they will have to continue to receive at the cost of many lives and material resources.

In 8-10 “Commander 7 garden. Hand in immediately. The commander ordered fighter aircraft to be protected to repel powerful air raid of the enemy. Spend carefully. A large group raid is expected... »

Around 12 of the day 22.06.41. Investigation number 03 headquarters SZF: "... The enemy has not yet brought into operation significant air forces, limited to the action of individual groups and single planes ...". In the second half of the day 22 of June, the estimate of the number of enemy aircraft introduced into the battle became more specific: “An adversary with 4-15 to 13-00 groups up to 40 aircraft and single planes totaling more than 150 aircraft attacked airfields ...”

By 12-00, small parachute assault forces were thrown from Alyutus, Rossiena, south-west of Vilnius and other places from transport planes of the 106 th special-purpose air group to other places, which broke communications, created panic and confusion. At that time, the “fifth column” was operating on the territory of the Baltic states. Enemy airplanes attacked nine airfields in the county, and in the evening - to 11. The raids were carried out in echelon, mostly by small subunits of the aircraft throughout the day. As an example, consider the raids on the Orana airfield 57-th garden in the morning: 4-25 - 1 Me-109 and 3 To-17; 6-25 - 2 Me-109; 9-00 - 5 Me-109; 9-30 - 2 Me-109; 11-10 - 10 Me-109. Methodical raids to block the airfield. Many advanced airfields have been bombed and attacked 6-7 times.

Failures in the actions of the Air Force KA, of course, affected the ground situation. An interesting fact is that the German aviation avoided the places where the anti-aircraft artillery units of the SC were deployed, did not bomb the strategic bridges, keeping them for themselves. And these bridges covered anti-aircraft guns, which were needed in other places. At the same time, the fighter regiments could not provide a full-fledged defense of their airfields from enemy air raids.

According to special report 3 Management of NKO No. 35134 from 25.6.41 at SZF: “Our aviation suffers heavy losses: there were 880 aircraft, from June 24 remained in service around 500. The planes were out of action mainly at the airfields, due to their crowded placement, lack of the required number of alternate aerodromes, sites ”. In fact, the remaining 500 aircraft after two days of fighting, when the Germans advanced to great depth, capturing part of the airfields with damaged aircraft - this is a good result. The losses of the SZF Air Force aircraft on the first day were about 96 ... 98 (of which around 20 was shot down during raids on objects located in Germany). For comparison, ZOVOVO Air Force lost more than 600 aircraft during the same period, and KOVO Air Force lost up to 500 aircraft.

Special message from 25.06.41: “... As of June 24 this year. from each aviation regiment of PribOVO, on average, 10 – 20 aircraft remained. In the entire 7 garden there are about 60 planes ..., aviation combat supplies will be enough for 1 – 2 days ... According to the promised alongside transport of aviation ammunition from Estonia is not ensured due to the lack of transport. In connection with the withdrawal of units, there is a shortage of airfields, since airfields are mainly built in the southwestern parts of the Lithuanian and Latvian republics with the calculation of the offensive. The present leadership of the air force units of the air force by the deputy commander of the air force, Major General Aviation Andreev and the Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Rasskazov is not provided due to the lack of communication with some units and the front command post ... "

From the ReportOn the combat activities of the Air Force ...": "... On the second day of the war, the situation created dictated the need to relocate the IAP into the second and third airfield-based zones ... The second and third zones were not developed, which is why the depth maneuver was extremely difficult ..." Thus, the rapid advance of the German troops led to the fact that a lot of damaged aircraft were thrown or destroyed on the airfields, and some of the aircraft were destroyed at the airfields in the absence of flight personnel. Given the above, the number of lost aircraft of the NWF air force has increased dramatically ...

On June 25, the leadership of the NWF Air Force was removed: commander General A.P. Ionov, his deputy for the political affairs of the regimental commissioner I.V. Mashin, NSH of the brigade commander S.S. Krupin were sent to the personnel department of the Air Force. 26.6.41 A.P.Ionov arrested. Shot 23.02.42. Rehabilitated in 1955.

Of course, in special reports of the 3 NKO Directorate, the NKO issues were to be noted, noting the guilt of the Air Force commander. And a mess when planning combat work, and large losses of aircraft, and abandoned (often abandoned) aircraft on airfields. Therefore, the position of the 3 Office should have been taken into account when compiling the Report “On the combat activity of the air forces of the North-Western Front for the period from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42.": “... 19.6.41, in connection with the unfavorable situation, the units were ordered to go on combat readiness and disperse the materiel from base airfields to operational ones, and no Pribevezhis command headquarters to the Panevezys area were issued, no command was given to the command and air units, on the contrary, on the night from 20 to 21 and from 21 to 22.6.41, the aviation units were ordered to conduct night training flights. As a result, most of the bapes were subjected to enemy bomber raids at the time of the postflight inspection of the materiel and refueling it with fuel. The flight crew has just been dismissed to rest after night work ... "

If you look at the material detailed in the books, you can see that the losses during the first raid were quite small. This material in the report came from the message of counterintelligence. At that time, they still did not understand the scope of the Air Force disaster in other districts. It was a false accusation ...

For the last three pre-war months, the average flight time in KOVO was 4 hours, in ZOVOVO - 9, in PribOVO - 15,5 hours. Parts of the District Air Force turned out to be prepared for war, let's say, better than all the other districts. A.P.Ionov associates did everything he could. He, like other commanders, simply did not know how the Germans would fight. I foresee the stormy indignation of some readers and therefore I will clarify: "The charge of incompetent command, criminal negligence and betrayal of A. Ionov was not submitted. "

NKVD data: “Aleksei Pavlovich Ionov 1894 Born, a former member of the CPSU / b / s 1938, from the fists. Before his arrest - Air Force Commander PribOVO, Major General Aviation. 26 / VI-1941 of the year arrested. Condemns the testimony of Smushkevich, Levin and Yusupov as a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. He admitted that since 1939, he was a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy, recruited by Smushkevich. He was connected by conspiracy with Levin and Yusupov. Conducted sabotage in aerodrome construction. "

A.I.Ionov was forced to admit under torture the mutual accusations of the previously arrested air force generals. He, like PS Klenov, did not drag anyone along. He "confessed" only to sabotage in the airfield construction. In terms of position, he could not influence the construction sites of airfields, the sequence of their construction, he did not have the resources to speed up their construction, he was not given instructions about the necessity of basing aircraft at field airfields. In the period of the growth of the “Case of Aviators”, based on increased accident rate, AP Ionov contributed to improving the composition of his flight training, unlike other VOs. 22.6.41 NWF pilots were the first to strike at enemy territory.

The information contained in the responses to General A.Pokrovsky, for various reasons, may be incorrect. For example, P.P.Sobennikov writes:





It is clear from the CCD that 7-th garden 22.6.41 was part of the 8-th army, and did not support it. Battle Order of the Air Force Commander SZF No. 01 / OP 22.6.41 "... the rest of the 7 and 8 garden units operate according to the plan of the army commanders ..." Among the regiments to which tasks are assigned by the command of the Air Force of the front, there are no 7 th garden regiments. Consequently, the combat missions of this division must be set by the headquarters of the 8 Army.

For reference. The 7 garden on 22.6.41 included: 9 sbap (good 51 SAT), 46 th sapap (good 51 Sat and Ap-2), 241 cap (good 27 I-15 bis), 10 ip (23 MY) 3 (not completed mastering) and 26 serviceable and 16 "type 5" - 1935 year of release), 238 ip (30 and 153, had in combat about 11 pilots). 22.6.41 9-th bap made 43 of the departure plane, while 5 bombers were shot down or badly damaged. 46-th bap made 18 sorties, having lost up to 20 airplanes (of which 10 was on the ground). Thus, by the end of 22.6.41, more than 60 SB and Ap-2 bombers should have remained in the shelves. It turns out that the 15-00 22.6.41 as part of the 7 garden could not remain 5-6 SB aircraft. In 241, by the end of 22.6.41, the 3 of the aircraft was shot down and destroyed at the 5 airfield (including 3 burned during the retreat). In the 10 IAP, by the end of 22.6.41 there were about 12 serviceable aircraft. 238-iap on 21.7.41 had 5 and-153 (the vast majority of the aircraft was left at the airport in the absence of flight personnel).

In 5-30 ... 6-00, the enemy infantry went on the offensive after a repeated air raid. In 8-30 ... 9-00, the Germans threw large forces of the moto-armored troops into battle. 125 SD, deployed at the front in 40 km, was attacked by parts of three TD and two PD, followed by another three MD in the second echelon. Against the five regiments of 188, 126 and 128 sd 11 th army, deployed on the 100-km front, there were six and three TD, followed by one, three MD and one TD.

It is well known that the divisions of the cover with their units did not occupy long-term structures and did not proceed to the construction of debris on the roads that could be viewed from German territory. The units had about one BC and did not have an order to open fire on the enemy. Despite instructions to increase ammunition in defensive positions, this did not happen. Despite the instructions of the PribOVO headquarters to the commanders of the armies and corps to withdraw from the NZ and to issue helmets to the troops, this did not happen in full. The commander of the 533 JV P.A.Bochkov: “... only the 1 th battalion was wearing metal helmets when it went out to the area of ​​staff exercises in alarm, and that was only because it was allowed by the army commander in his order. All other units began the war in the caps ... "

Colonel-General MSShumilov (former commander of 11 sk): “... The war began in 4-00 22.6.41. I was immediately reported to the commander of the 8 army ... Received no fire order. Not to give in to provocation. But the troops without an order opened fire... "

125-Rifle Division withdrew to defensive positions almost all the artillery (136 ... 137 guns and mortars 76-mm caliber or more of the provisions of 148 state. Three artillery regiment (414 light up, 459 howitzer up and 51-th cabinet up), covering division , they opened fire only after 8 hours of the morning. Before 11-00 ... 11-30 they shot their own ammunition, a significant part of the artillery was left in position. A similar situation was in all covering divisions.

The preemptive operational deployment of powerful forces with extensive war experience, the massive use of aviation and mechanized troops ensured the Germans success on the first day of the war.

The loss of the 1 td (XXXXI MK) 22.6.41 amounted to 313 people killed and wounded and 34 people missing. 6-I TD (XXXXI MK) moved to the border on the night of June 22 and went on the offensive from the march. According to the memoirs of Colonel Ritgen: “The enemy’s resistance in our sector turned out to be much stronger than expected. We were blocked by six anti-tank ditches, covered by infantrymen and snipers entrenched in trees. Fortunately for us, they did not have anti-tank guns and mines. Since no one gave up, there were no prisoners. However soon Tanks were left without ammunition, which had never happened before during the campaigns in Poland and France ... ” В RCB XXXXI MK On the day of June 22, it was noted: “Losses exceed normal level”.

RCB 8 th TD (XXXXXVI) 7-55: “Parts are moving east quickly. The division had the impression that it had not yet come in contact with the enemy’s regular troops. ”. Soon the situation has changed. Scheller's battle group got bogged down in battles for Soviet pillboxes and lost pace.

The headquarters of the NWF, the 8 and 11 armies due to the systematic disruption of communication by saboteurs and as a result of the bombings could not properly assess the situation, quickly take the necessary decision and organize the management of subordinate units. Retractable reserves were commonly used to launch hasty counterattacks. The troops were brought into battle on the move, not having enough ammunition, without the support of artillery and aircraft. German aviation detected convoys of our troops and struck them. This did not allow to significantly slow down the advancement of the enemy moto-armored groups.

Consider two Reports. «To the Commander of the North-Western Front, Colonel General Comrade Kuznetsov

From the very first days of the operation, daily operational orders or combat orders contradicting each other began to arrive on 2-3 times. As a result, the troops twitched in vain, and this provision made it impossible to expediently use the forces and means to carry out the order ...

Combat material in the compounds remained old, worn ... After the first day of the march, and especially after the first day of the battle, the cars began to quickly fail out of dozens. Due to the lack of spare parts, both on the routes and in the fighting, they were not restored, and if they were restored ... only on the battlefield, since the absence of tractors did not allow them to be towed to the collection points of emergency vehicles. For the same reason, a lot of the material part was left in the territory of the enemy ...

Troop control was weak due to the lack of radio communications. There were no permanent wires. Regular wire communications due to the excessive dispersion of the divisions was not enough. Radio almost did not work at all. The only means of communication for the entire operation was the delegates of communication.

The commander of 12 mk Major General Shestopalov 27.6.41 12-00 »


Report on the combat activities of the 8 Army artillery in battles with 22.6. by xnumx. "... The artillery of the army went to the front and entered the fighting with a large shortage in peacetime states ... Parts not only were not ordered to take property to wartime states, but they were not informed about the possibility of fighting, therefore, the property supposed to be replaced, transport , means of observation, means of observation were not taken to wartime states ... Due to the lack of an adequate amount of transport, the existing transport was overloaded and was out of service ahead of time, as a result of which it was not always ensured odvoz ammunition and evacuation during the withdrawal ...

From the first days of the fighting the disguise was good, the digging was bad. In the last battles, self-digging measures improved, artillery, as a rule, began to go deeper into the ground, stamina and survivability increased ... Divisional artillery mostly remained with infantry retreat one... reflecting the enemy with his fire, taking the material part in the echelon of his infantry, with great losses ...

Colonel Ivin, Chief of the 8 Army Artillery, 8 Army Artillery Colonel Colonel Ivanov


The deficiencies in the organization of combat activities indicated in the reports are well known and discussed many times. Of course, it is clear that the scattered connections of the PribOVO satellites would not have been able to hold back the German strike forces due to a huge number of reasons. With proper deployment, they could only slightly damage the enemy and sell their lives at a higher price (whoever would want to). There was no fierce hatred for the German invaders at that time ...

JBD SZF. This refers to the so-called "JBD SZF”, Which was to lead an operational staff of the front headquarters.



The document consists of two conditional parts: the 1-part I is the restored part of the journal from 22 June to 12 July 1941 of the year, the 2-I part - entries from 12.7.41 to 18.08.41. The feature of this declassified document is that original source. Information before 12.7.41 was restored by an unknown person.



Another feature of the OBB SZF is that it is reprinted (perhaps not once). The order to reprint the reinforced concrete bollard cannot even be given by the front commander if he is sent to the archive of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown. The log filed in the archive does not have a witness signature, which is a violation of the secrecy regime.



Why did the author decide that the cbd was reprinted? Let's see a piece of text: “... The skillful organization of the concentration of groups and the conduct of operations, the supply of reserves from the depth, the rapid regrouping of troops, perseverance in carrying out the goals set and the tasks assigned to the troops draw attention to themselves. All these positive qualities of the German troops played a role. in the first months of the warBut as soon as the Red Army learned reflect the notorious "wedges", such repeatedly repeated patterns of conducting operations could not lead to success ... " At a reprint of the document even one conclusion was left, with which the person connected with the reprint of the OBD probably does not agree.



It turns out that during the reprint they tried to preserve as much as possible all the existing text. Perhaps the CIA prepared for work some high-ranking person after February 1942, and at the same time, the magazine was generously supplemented with generalizations and conclusions. Why after February 1942? Because in February all this could be clarified with the former NSh SZF ...

Without having a primary source, it is inappropriate to evaluate the actions of the PribOVO-SZF management on the published document. Within the framework of the topic under consideration, I would like to mention only one place in the OBD, referring to the period 18-22.6.41. The assessment was conducted by a person much later than the specified time period. The man who is quite well owned events of the prewar period.

"... Thus, the war became a fact events demanded urgent action on both sides and primarily in the area operational deployment of military units of all the armed forces and their concentration on the mobplan for conducting operations. The command of the NWF in the last days before the war it was possible to relocate immediately a number of parts closer to the border. However, the pace of concentration and deployment was extremely slow. It was necessary to take into account the weak throughput of the Baltic railways, the dispersion of troops over a large territory and their remoteness from the state border.

At the same time the opportunity presented itself under the guise of withdrawing parts to camps, to make a hidden concentration of the main forces at the state border, to occupy and improve field defenses, subject to the correct assessment and prediction of impending events at the SPF. Only 90, 188, 5 sd were withdrawn in due time, but most of them were also engaged in the equipment of the camps, less in combat training. 3 and 12 MK occupied the concentration areas according to the plan ... "


What is unusual about this piece of text? There is not a single word in it about instructions or directives of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. The point is that the command of the NWF opportunity presented relocate a number of parts to the border. All redeployment of troops agree with the General Staff ?! How could the district command redeploy parts, ignoring the attention of the high command of the spacecraft? Who has the right to make such a conclusion in a closed document? This refers to a complete and sealed secret document. It is already a big problem to solve it - not every multi-star general can allow it ...

The same phrase "the opportunity presented itself"Is used when discussing the withdrawal of parts" under the guise of output to the camps, "and in fact concentrate them near the border. And again, does this seem to be a personal initiative of the PribOVO command, which would be unused to the end?

Who could have expected something unexpected from the PribOVO management? Who could give a carte blanche to the district command? If we were talking about a book about alternative stories about the "hitches", then everything is clear. “The Hitchers” immediately send a memo to the leader. The leader would, perhaps, give carte blanche, and the shooting of the protagonist is a failure to justify the hopes of a great man. But we are not in the book ...

There is not a single word about the NSH SZF PS Klenov. Neither bad (he was already arrested as an enemy, but no one “threw a stone”), nor good (fraught, however). Regarding commander F.I. Kuznetsov, there are two references.

“The 3-00 24.6. Decision of the NWF Command: The meeting was attended by: Gen. Col. Kuznetsov, corps Commissar DIBROV, Army Commissar 2 of the rank of Borisov and a number of other responsible commanders. Colonel-General KUZNETSOV ordered Captain NAZAROV and a group of commanders of the headquarters to immediately go and restore the position under KAUNAS. The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS ... "

The order for an attack on Kaunas was signed by Kuznetsov and Dibrova. Army commissar 2 rank Borisov arrived in PribOVO on a business trip just before the war. 24 of June, at his insistence, which was supported by DWI's FWS, it was decided to go over to the 16 sk offensive in order to fight off Kaunas occupied by the enemy. The offensive ended with encirclement. With the help of 46 tp, the encirclement was broken at the turn of the river Viliya and the remnants of the hull (along with 46 tp), having lost almost all heavy weapons, began to retreat in the direction of Polotsk. Borisov voluntarily departed to Moscow, where he was convicted. It seems that it was not in vain that an eyewitness to those events who filled the ZhBD NWF mentioned only two high-ranking political workers who could convince Kuznetsov to carry out this operation.

How does the person who participates in the reprint of the RCB evaluate this event: “... The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS. However, the situation for 16 ck was created extremely hard, parts were not put in order, there were no tanks, aircraft, the connection with the army was lost, the enemy had pulled up to two fresh traffic police stations and put himself in order. The right decision would be to take up defense with parts of 11 A along the river Vilia and put them in order. 8 A to take over the river VENTA, the edge of the forest southern SHULYAY. The operation was not prepared. NWF handed an order around 12.00 24.6, therefore, the troops had too little time to organize an offensive. The absence of aviation and the poor organization of ground reconnaissance did not allow opening the approach of two fresh enemy forces, which decided the fate of the operation. The troops were not put in order, there was no command ... Only not knowing the operational situation and not imagining the whole destructiveness of this business, pushed Colonel General Kuznetsov to give an order to attack KAUNAS... » As we know, the front commander was not shot ...

In the topic devoted to PribOVO, the author mentioned A.D.Loktionov, I.F. Kuznetsov, P.S.Klenov and A.P.Ionov. The bright memory of people who tried to prepare their troops for a meeting with the Nazi invaders. Not everything worked out for them. No one at that time could have kept the Germans ...



PS Quite a lot of readers left asterisks under parts of the cycle. Thank. Many people disagree with the proposed version - this is their right. The main thing for the people left is memory. The author appeals to people who put stars (if it is not contrary to their conviction) to put candles in a church, temple, or to remember these people. Below when discussing this part, the author will post a comment. Please put asterisks under this comment only people who were able to fulfill (personally or through relatives, friends) the request of the author. Thank. Perhaps another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

189 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +36
    November 29, 2017
    ... for many decades historians will rethink facts, materials, documents, eyewitness accounts, etc. of that time - the time of the beginning of the Second World War and its first days ... thanks to the author for the material ... an interesting feature: in the "Military Journal 8A" the word LENINGradsky was later attributed to another composition of the writing medium, possibly with a simple pencil ... most likely this was for the sake of secrecy ...
  2. +55
    November 29, 2017
    Thanks aKtoR for the article hi ... as always, I read your article with great interest.
    Add to it about the confusion ...
    I think many middle and senior commanders were completely devoid of any initiative in a difficult environment ... did not know what to do if they lost contact with the higher command ... did not know how to behave in the environment in the absence of an order to withdraw from their positions .. .a fear of being arrested in case of violation of data orders before the outbreak of war fettered any initiative of the commanders ... rarely did anyone decide to conduct a maneuver war on their own initiative.

    The Germans took advantage of this fully inflicting very large losses on our troops.
    1. +15
      November 29, 2017
      Yeah, I agree.
      Anti-aircraft gunners sometimes didn’t even open fire when the Germans were already bombing. I even read that the commander of some anti-aircraft gunner was Shot for the fact that he gave the order to shoot at German planes.
      This is some kind of horror.
      1. +10
        November 29, 2017
        Plus, not everyone wanted to fight, some Germans were waiting, not only in the Baltic states and Ukraine, but even in Russia.
        I remember reading in the memoirs of a veteran that in the rear of the Germans they encountered a column of our prisoners who went into German captivity without a German convoy, that is, without security. Somewhere in August 1941, east of Novgorod somewhere.
        1. +4
          December 1 2017
          Here about Chernyakhovsky at the beginning of the war .-
          https://topwar.ru/32525-genialnyy-voenachalnik-iv
          an-chernyahovskiy.html
          In the same places. Near Šiauliai. So at Chernyakhovsky everything is not so at all.
          -------------
          Kind of weird. From the first minutes of the war, Chernyakhovsky fought very effectively with his division. Even if every other division would do the same, there would be no disaster for the 41 year.
  3. +52
    November 29, 2017
    It is read with great interest, thanks again to the author ....
    1. +27
      November 29, 2017
      Thank you Parusnik, Mu Dialer, The same Lech and the rest who put the likes.
      I also apologize to those whom this message annoyed ...
      Subject, in principle, completed. Perhaps for the New Year holidays I decide to add.
      thanks everyone !!!
      1. +59
        November 30, 2017


        Thanks to whoever responded
        1. +8
          December 9 2017
          Fulfilled your request
        2. +1
          December 14 2017
          Was put a candle for each
          1. +5
            December 24 2017
            Thanks again to thirty-eight readers who responded and remembered the departed generals!
            1. VS
              -5
              December 25 2017
              These are those by whose grace hundreds of thousands died in vain?
      2. -6
        December 7 2017
        PS Quite a lot of readers left asterisks under parts of the cycle. Thank. Many people disagree with the proposed version - this is their right. The main thing for the people left is memory. The author appeals to people who put stars (if it is not contrary to their conviction) to put candles in a church, temple, or to remember these people. Below when discussing this part, the author will post a comment. Please put asterisks under this comment only people who were able to fulfill (personally or through relatives, friends) the request of the author. Thank. Perhaps another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.

        It is better to listen to the opinion of professionals about such "revelations", especially since V.V. gave an exhaustive description to such authors. Slavin:

        “But, unfortunately, the trouble with almost all domestic historians (even military historians) is that when they receive a document of operational or strategic planning, they cannot understand it in principle. Our researchers of the past, as a rule, are so professionally distant from the process of planning the use of troops that attempts to confirm their premises on the basis of a full analysis of the sources do not lead to anything worthwhile.This fully applies to the last book of Mark Solonin, and to other publications devoted to the same time.

        But letting our scientists and publicists fail is not only unprofessionalism. "

        http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2007-10-12/5_theories.ht
        ml
  4. The comment was deleted.
  5. +46
    November 29, 2017
    It remains only to regret that articles prepared at such a high, professional level in VO are rare. Success to the author in his necessary and useful work where there is still an unplowed field ...
    As for the suddenness, in our country winter comes suddenly and snow falls in the winter unexpectedly ... It was just that the Great Patriotic War of the Red Army met in a “semi-dismantled” state - the war with Finland brightly highlighted all this. The state of affairs was reflected in the corresponding ACT, on the transfer of cases to Voroshilov (with a bang removed from his post) to the new new Drug Tymoshenko in 1940.
    This ACT sets out all the reasons for the tragic outcome of the initial period of the Second World War, familiarization with it removes many questions. Objectively, he could not be different, despite the news of heroism and fidelity to the duty of soldiers and commanders ... General Gorbatov, one of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, clearly and unequivocally said this in his own words - it was a complete spoonful of victories and defeats in its time ... .
    1. +13
      November 29, 2017
      It could have been different if Stalin had reached a real state of affairs at least on June 19-20. Even those troops that were already at the border could have created serious difficulties for the Germans. Stalin personally is guilty - for all this surprise, the 22nd. All one troops our people would retreat - if there were no surprise attacks, but would retreat more slowly, plus the Germans would pay a higher price for their advancement. And so surrender Brest in 4 hours ...
      1. VS
        0
        November 29, 2017
        “After a conversation with the people's commissar of defense, which did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. 1, the ZAPOVO leadership decided for about half an hour: what instructions should be given to the troops”

        - Do not invent - EVERYTHING IS UNDERSTANDED from the text of the adopted directive - Cho must do it - TRANSFER ALL the troops, Air Force, Air Defense and Navy to FULL BG)))
        Another thing is that Pavlov then lied during the investigation that he gave the command at 1.30 - verbally by phone - “puts the troops in combat”, which seems to be brought back to the base station, but in reality - he only gave the staffs the command to assemble on alarm. .))
        MADAM - yes, you read the answers of the finally commanders for this night - in Chekunov's collection - he published these answers especially for the ignorant)))

        "The commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, at about one in the morning, on his own responsibility, ordered the sealed" red packets "to be sent to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the combat alert procedures stored at the army headquarters"

        - Madame - THESE PACKAGES - STORED in safes at comcor ALWAYS !!))) if they are fully approved as valid)))
        Korobkov, he gave the packages under the NEW Cover Plans - in May)) that did not work out in the armies of the ZAPOVO in general !!)) But the old ones were there anyway - or the old ones have not been approved by the NPO and the General Staff but they have not been approved yet ))))

        “At about two o’clock on the night of June 22nd on HF, the commander of the 3rd Army V.I. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov:“ Raise the troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately to take the bunkers and bring them into full combat readiness, put into effect a plan for covering the state border ". The management of ZAPOVO assumed the responsibility from which the senior management of the spacecraft was removed. "

        - yes, enough already to carry the blizzard about the innocent generals that they opened packages on "personal initiative")) - if you don’t know HOW IT ALL WAS REALLY)))
        This was done ONLY by Zakharov in OdVO - about 1 o'clock in the morning already - without waiting for the arrival of and decoding of the text of the directive about full bg. , he received a call at 22 o’clock on the telephone from the General Staff - “Wait for an important encryption” and took the initiative, thinking that an unambiguous order would come - “Proceed to the 1941 RP — and gave the alarm command at midnight already, and at 1 o'clock in the OdVO and open packages - read the answers of the commanders - HOW IT WAS - to Pokrovsky’s question No. 3)))
        SO. This “b / n” directive of 22.20 on June 21 informs the districts of the date of a possible attack, warns that the attack can begin suddenly (in the sense - without declaring war) and with provocations that cannot be succumbed so as not to cause problems of an international nature. And she orders - to bring-transfer all the troops of the border districts, the Air Force, air defense of these districts and the fleet - in full combat readiness! And also - to occupy firing points on the border.
        And the fact that it seems to be indicated in it - "indefinitely" - "an attack is possible on June 22-23," does not play ANY role. Troops are required to IMMEDIATELY, upon receipt of this directive, raise them according to combat alert, withdraw to a minimum at the gathering area and wait for further instructions already there: - either open the red packet and pull in to occupy the trenches at the border, - or fill up the lights out and into the barracks ... And that is how they understood it where they wanted to understand it.
        Considering the fact that the Air Force, Air Defense, Fleet and troops have already been on high alert since June 18 (should have been brought up), this directive precisely puts all troops on full alert and does not bring them from scratch !!!
        1. VS
          -1
          November 29, 2017
          “3 hours of lost time from the delivery of Directive No. 1 to the encryption department of the General Staff before sending the PT to the cover army. Encryption reached the addressee by the beginning of the war ... "

          - no need to write about what you don’t know))))

          Zhukov at 22.00 p.m. from Stalin’s office gives the command to the operational duty officer for the General Staff - to ring the okrug and warn him - to wait for the important encryption of the General Staff!
          At 22.20, Tymoshenko and Zhukov are leaving Stalin’s office for Tymoshenko’s office in the People’s Commissariat of Defense. There, they rewrite within a hour the draft text of the directive b / n on letterhead forms.
          At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko’s People’s Commissar, Admiral Kuznetsov, arrives at the office, who is given a read-out directive, according to which he should raise the fleet on alert and put them on alert No. 1. To clarifying questions of the admiral - is it possible to open fire in the event of an attack by Germany, Tymoshenko confirms - it is possible.
          At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko phoned the districts and said that "provocation is possible from Germany and Romania ... There may not be a war, but the troops must be ready." Which means - with all the ambiguities of the people's commissar's instructions - to be ready for war as well.
          At 23.30, combat missions are already being set at the border: “An order was given by telephone to Colonel Zheleznyak on 9 and 10 bulbats to raise their battles on alarm, to occupy and load bunkers” ...
          At 23.45, the text of the b / n directive is transmitted to the encryption department of the General Directorate of Operations. The typist makes copies of this directive - for the NKVMF, Kuznetsov, and for the headquarters of the Reserve Front, Budyonny. It takes half an hour to encrypt the text of the directive, and at 0.20 the transmission of this directive, encryption to the districts begins.
          At 24.00 - already Zhukov phoned the district and orders: faster to send the directive on combat readiness to the troops! At this time, the text itself is only encrypted in GS. At least he called KOVO ...
          At about 1 am, all districts received this directive "b / n" and even decrypted by 1.20. True, they didn’t do this at KOVO - there wasn’t an operating department yet at the field CP. But they were completely told by telephone from the General Staff what was required of them.

          AND FURTHER - ON ARMY TELEPHONES they lifted - EVERYWHERE !! Except GOOD !! Where is the future innocent victim and the good man Klenov remaining for the commander DO NOT RAISE his armies - AT ALL - right up to the time of the German attack !!! The army of this district - the Germans woke up.
          In the ZAPOVO - Korobkov did NOT raise his army to him, although he received Pavlov’s order completely and the connection with him was OK.
          As it was in KOVO - read Purkaev’s answer))

          “I hurried to TERNOPIL, where I arrived at about 3 o’clock in the morning on 22.6.41.
          By my arrival, the commander of the district’s troops, General KIRPANOS, had already received orders from the General Staff to put the troops on alert, but he didn’t give any orders to anyone.
          Having received instructions from General KIRPANOS about the orders of the General Staff in connection with the expected German attack, I immediately called all army commanders personally to the BODO apparatus. And in the period from 3 to 4 hours he personally transmitted an order to everyone to bring the troops into full combat readiness, to take up defense according to the plan. When crossing the Germans, the state borders should be reflected by all means and means, and the borders themselves should not be crossed. Our planes do not fly over to special instructions.
          All army commanders accepted these instructions for execution. ”

          If it hadn’t for Purkayev, Kirpanos would have been spanked - as yet another “good man”))) for sabotage in the execution of the orders of the General Staff transferred to him via RF communications personally by the same Malandinny or even Zhukov))

          ... At 2 a.m. shelling on the border began - in the same OdVO. Zhukov and Tymoshenko reported this to Stalin.
          At 2 o’clock, the German ambassador began to search for Molotov (Minister of InDel of the USSR) - to poke a note on the attack (perhaps at the same time a telegram from Berlin from our embassy came to Moscow with the signal "Thunderstorm" from the military attache, GRU resident, General Tupikov) ...
          Well, at 2.30 on June 22, Tymoshenko or Zhukov, via HF communications, personally gave an instruction - on the introduction of the software. And now this "directive" should have a "number" - Directive "No. 1" of the outbreak of war ...
          1. The comment was deleted.
            1. VS
              -1
              November 29, 2017
              “You were presented with the author’s version that the top leadership of the spacecraft on the evening of 21.6.41 was not ready to send Directive No. 1 to the troops. The leaders of the spacecraft were forced to prepare and forward this document by I. Stalin. Therefore, the leadership of the AC probably considered it necessary to express their point of view on the HF leadership of the districts. They did not get through only to the OdVO NSh M.V. Zakharov, who assumed responsibility for raising the district troops somewhere from 23-00 21.6.41 to 00-00 22.6.41. "

              - fucking again))
              Zhukov carried to Stalin in general - the order “Proceed to the 1941 implementation of the PP”))) Stalin slowed him down as premature - he suddenly succeeded in settling the situation peacefully))) And he allowed - TRANSFER to full bg. ALL the troops, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy - which by the evening of the 21st SHOULD be on the orders of NCOs and the General Staff from June 8-11-15 and June 18 - should be in the increased battalion))) and the directive was withdrawn to the okrugs - about full bg )))
              At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko phoned the districts and said that "provocation is possible from Germany and Romania ... There may not be a war, but the troops must be ready." Which means - with all the ambiguities of the people's commissar's instructions - to be ready for war as well.


              “Let's look at the text of Directive No. 1 prepared by Tymoshenko and Zhukov again.


              »

              - Madame - this is not a directive without a number that was sent from the General Staff at 1 a.m. in the district))) YOU are a lie or - you stupidly do not know Whose thing this directive is)))

              Let me tell you - this is a directive - Pavlova)) which different people consider the GSh directive)))
              The EXACT text of the directive b / n - ZHUKOVA - has in the order part of the provision on bringing in b .. g air defense))

              “It was a similar order that was brought to VO by the top leadership of the spacecraft in a rather harsh form. The “valuable instructions” from Moscow and Directive No. 1 itself should have been reflected in the instructions of the headquarters and the Military Council of the NWF. Thus, to distinguish “provocation” from “surprise attack”, and also to decide what exactly to transfer to the troops the top leadership of the spacecraft in Directive No. 1 shifted to the shoulders of the command of the okrug fronts, which had been “frightened” before the decision ... ”

              - STOP CARRYING Nonsense - doing falsification of a question)))

              See HOW they understood the order in the Districts - and what do you invent there again - YOUR problems are ignoramus)))
              1. VS
                -3
                November 29, 2017
                “It was precisely to transfer to the troops the top leadership of the KA in Directive No. 1 that passed on to the shoulders of the command of the okrug fronts, which had been“ frightened ”before making a decision ...

                “To the Military Councils of the 8th and 11th Armies June 22, 1941 2-25

                1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden German attack on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.

                2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.

                At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat

                I ORDER:

                1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

                3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

                4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

                5. The families of commanding personnel of the 10th, 125th, 33rd and 128th should be transported to the rear only in case of crossing the border by large enemy forces.

                6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

                a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

                b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

                7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

                8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

                9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

                10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.

                Colonel General F. Kuznetsov, Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchiy, Lieutenant General Klenov »»

                - Madame - yes, READ YOU ORDERING part - SO the military does when they send orders))
                THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT !!!

                “I ORDER:

                1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                2. In the event of a major enemy offensive, defeat him. ”!!!

                THIS IS FULL MILITARY READINESS SO declared !!!

                And now - see HOW Klenov raised the army - NO !!!

                According to Morozov, he called him and supposedly Morozov then began to raise his army - at 2 o’clock already - but this is a lie)))
                1. VS
                  -2
                  November 29, 2017
                  “What is so different from what is stated in the Directive No. 1 that the People’s Commissar of Defense for High-Frequency NSh NWF ordered the NKF if they first decide not to put mines, and after receiving the encryption with the text of Directive No. 1 at the NWF headquarters, a decision is made on their“ immediate installation "?"

                  - read the ANSWER of the chief of engineer of troops of the 11th Army of Firsov - what everyone was doing there with these mines. And - on mines there was a separate order in PribOVO - from June 189 - to put)))

                  "4. Minefields should be installed according to the plan of the army commander where they should be according to the plan of defensive construction. <…>. Blockages and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles should be created according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.
                  5. Shtarm, corps and divisions - in touch with the KP, which will provide the VET by decision of the appropriate commander.
                  6. Our retractable units must go to their areas of shelter. <…>
                  7. Continue to aggressively replenish the parts with fire supplies and other supplies .... " (TsAMO, f.344, op. 5564, d.1, l. 34-36)
                  The instruction - "Establish minefields according to the plan of the army commander" - WITHOUT indicating the date - means - INSTALL IMMEDIATELY !!!

                  Kuznetsov then departed for Sobennikov’s army and Klenov, the “good man”, remaining for him - and began to think with these mines littering the brains of the commanders (((

                  “Sht from the headquarters of the NWF is not sent to the 27th army. Units of the 67th SD (from the 27th Army) have already been raised by alarm, and the army headquarters is not notified of the Directive. The front leadership probably does not expect a full-scale war to begin. Why inform the army headquarters located in the rear? Incorrect intelligence data contributes to this error. ”

                  Maples NOT ONE army on alert e did not raise at all !!! While the text was not deciphered in the armies, they did NOT know ANYTHING and then began to call to Riga - to clarify - what this means !!

                  “They were convinced of this, ordered by the higher ranks of the spacecraft. Unfortunately, the time for carrying out the activities indicated in the NWF Directive dated 22.6.41 is already gone ... For example, landmines by the roads have remained lying away from the dug holes under them ... "


                  - nonsense. Mines remained SO lying thanks to Klenov personally !!!

                  Escho once - on June 19, "Minefields were set according to the plan of the army commander" was ordered .... and THIS was NOT CANCELED by a written order as requested by Firsov from Klenovy received ORAL commands for the removal of mines.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                    1. VS
                      -3
                      November 29, 2017
                      “If he talked about Klenov only good or neutral, he would have signed a death sentence for himself. "

                      - with what sorry - horseradish vegetable ??)))

                      “The author tried to show that, by“ telephone law ”,“ pumping ”went from Moscow with the aim of not giving the Germans a reason for the conflict. Since there was no commander of the troops at the front headquarters at that time, the NSh communicated to the army commanders the latest “especially valuable instructions” from Moscow. "

                      - Oh, how)) You ALREADY YOUR pardon “babi” fantasies gave out a reliable FACT - what did anyone point out to someone on the phone - and personally to Klenov ??)))

                      “Order of the commander of the 7th garden 22.6.41 4-15“ To the commanders of regiments.

                      1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

                      2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

                      Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

                      The commander of the 7th garden is Colonel Petrov. "

                      - This division commander, Air Force Political Secretary PribOVO brought back June 19 - and the date and time of the attack - 3.0 June 22)))

                      “About 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4th Garden to strike with force of three bap in the city and port of Memel.”

                      Maybe you’ll bring this order ??)) and if you know your strange lady’s tendency to think up something — who thought there, there are doubts — but was this order or stupidly divisive of this GARDEN having opened the package after the attack? It’s so SO POSED to do - and there, after reading the task, he began to carry it out - WITHOUT an order for this additional from Ionov - also shot after -)))

                      "" ... Our Air Force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... I took measures to bomb the enemy without flying over the border ... "

                      - because TAKA ordered Moscow and TAK is written in the PP - the border until the special order of NGOs and General Staff - Moscow - do not cross.)))

                      "" ... The commander of the 7th garden. Do not violate the state borders. Destroy enemy aircraft in your area. Landing planes on the radio to land on the airfields ... "Captain Krivtsov received a radio order to return to the airfield at the time of being on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed the bomb bay, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. At 7-10, the squadron, without losing a single plane, returned to the airfield. "

                      - because the pilots rushed to the other side)))) WITHOUT ORDER on this))
                      Permission came in deere. 2))) at 8 a.m. only))

                      "Iap was raised by alarm at 4-20:"

                      - HERE FOR THIS Klenov was shot - “for manifestation of inaction in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT” !!!
                      1. VS
                        -2
                        November 29, 2017
                        “On the morning of June 22, the slurred provisions of Directive No. 1, the confusion situation, the lack of communication and firm leadership in the troops did more damage than the direct bombardment and shelling of German aircraft.”

                        - this is for you - LADIES they are slurred and for the military - they are quite understandable .. but to you - it is excusable to you)))

                        Klenov, of course, is a bastard, but in the text of his directives - on the basis of the GSh directive on completely b .. g - prepared in advance unambiguously and not invented in those hours - everything was clearly spelled out)))
                        READ THE ORDERING part)) everything is completely clear and intelligible there))

                        “I ORDER:

                        1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                        2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

                        3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

                        4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

                        5. The families of the commanding personnel of the 10th, 125th, 33rd and 128th SD should be transported to the rear only if the border is crossed by large enemy forces.

                        6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

                        a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

                        b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

                        7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

                        8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

                        9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

                        10. The execution of this and the violation of the border to report immediately "

                        This directive was thrown off in the army at 2.30 and at 3 o'clock EVERYWHERE it was completely decrypted in the armies 0 because we don’t have any special cryptographic files)))
                        AND THE SAME IONS HER READ IT ONE-BIT - at 2.25! BUT IONS DO NOT RAISE their Air Force on alert !!! Anxiety in the PribOV Air Force begins at 4 a.m. - “good” is another person)))
  6. +11
    November 29, 2017
    A complex decision-making system, not a desire to take the initiative, laziness, perhaps betrayal, these are just a few bricks at the base of the 1941 drama, it took a whole range of measures to improve the command qualitatively, starting with the creation of the headquarters and ending with defensive squads and a wreck.
  7. VS
    -2
    November 29, 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    I apologize to those who were annoyed by this message ...

    so it wasn’t necessary to start lying - to listen to what those in the subject would say and take into account - - THERE WAS THERE BEING OFFERED TO YOU right away - so that you would not show yourself ignorant - and everything would be fine. Nova was itching so much to please everyone with sensations that in the end, they got into a puddle again. By the way, why are you hiding your name then? How rezun what)))

    Well, now according to the text of your nonsense)))))

    ““ To hand the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft immediately ... The report of the Commander of the 3rd Army wire fences along the border near the road Augustow, Sejny, who were still in the afternoon, removed in the evening. In this area of ​​the forest, it is as if the noise of ground-based motors ... Klimovsky’s is heard. ”The document has a note:“ Sent on June 21, 1941 at 2 hours and 40 minutes. ” This message on the morning and afternoon of 21.6.41/XNUMX/XNUMX did not particularly alert the chief of the General Staff. It is not known what Klimovsky or Pavlova answered from Moscow. Probably the same as the night before the war. "

    - Well, what a restless damavrushka))))
    But - our lady finally got to the most interesting - and started inventing again - on ignorance of the topic))))
    But it’s enough just to read DIFFERENT sources - to restore the picture on June 21, but Madame is easier to think up - who is there “Thought”)))
    There is a note on this telegram - Vatutin’s resolution: “To urgently prepare a report to the Government and separately to Vyshinsky.” ...)))
    Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 informs the party leadership of Moscow - there will be an attack. It gives instructions to bring Moscow air defense to high alert ...
    ABOUT THIS wrote - Chadayev, Admiral Kuznetsov)))
    At 19 hours on June 21, a group of the country's top leaders, who were all members of the Commission on Military and Naval Affairs, began to confer with Stalin (which, just a few weeks earlier, was called the KO - Defense Committee). At which Stalin informs Tymoshenko and other members of the Commission of information about a possible German attack on the USSR in the coming days. At this meeting, the issue (according to intelligence reports) about a possible German attack in the coming hours was discussed, and mobilization issues were also discussed. Zhukov, who will visit Stalin only at 20.50, at this time just calls the district and warns the commanders about a possible attack that night.
    (As Y. E. Chadayev, SNK business manager later told the historian G. A. Kumanev, already at this meeting, Stalin informed those present that the attack would be that night (Kumanev, “Stalin's People’s Commissars Say,” M. 2005.). Chadayev told Kumanev that on the afternoon of June 21, Stalin had indeed notified the leaders of the CPSU (b) of Moscow that they had attacked and ordered the commander of the Moscow District, General Tyulenev, to bring the air defense of the capital to high alert. This is also shown in the memoirs and Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov ... .)


    “At about 23 p.m. on 21.6.41/3/10 G. Zhukov on the high-frequency apparatus warned the NS of western military units:“ Expect special instructions! ” General Klimovskikh reported this to General D. Pavlov and ordered the commanders and NSh of the 4rd, XNUMXth and XNUMXth armies to be at their headquarters. ”
    - and type - ANYTHING until 23 o'clock Zhukov did not - associated with the expected attack ??)))
    On June 21, Zhukov calls around the okrugs around 18-19 pm and warns them of the attack. About which intelligence reports to him ... At the same time, on the evening of the 21st and the people's commissar Tymoshenko, sending Meretskov to the LenVO informs him:
    “- Perhaps the war will begin tomorrow!” You need to be as a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.
    - What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.
    - Excerpt first of all. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do ... ”(Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Politizdat, 1968, p.209)

    The districts warned - “Wait for an important encryption” - at 22 hours and not at 23 hours))) Read Marshal Zakharov - how it was and who called him - at whose team the caller did it and from where the person who gave the command set the task)))
    And at 21 o’clock Zhukov arrived at Stalin, who brought with him a directive - on the beginning of the implementation of Cover Plans - “Proceed to the implementation of the 1941 PP”. Which he dragged to Stalin on June 11!
    Some historians continue to repeat stories from Zhukov - that it was he who persuaded the tyrant to be brought to B.G. at this meeting, supposedly, the defectors prompted the date and time of the attack, but actually Zhukov arrived at the meeting already assembled - the Commission on Military and Naval Affairs. At which he himself was invited - as chief of the General Staff. Listen to the proposal of the People's Commissar and the beginning. General Staff, and give the necessary order in the district ...

    Stalin again slows down the Zhukovsky proposal-directive on the “Entry of the 1941 PP” - all of a sudden it will be possible to settle the peacefully brewing situation with the German attack. But it gives permission - to bring (transfer) the troops of the districts to full combat readiness - the directive "w / o from 22.20 on June 21" is signed. In which the districts are warned - “During June 22-23, a sudden attack by Germany and its allies is possible”! It is reported that the attack may begin with provocations that cannot be answered and a command is given to occupy the firing points at the border.
    How did the districts understand this Moscow directive? Approximately, as Purkaev understood it, NSW KOV was “to bring the troops into full combat readiness, in case of the Germans crossing the state border, by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until further notice”.
    1. VS
      -3
      November 29, 2017
      “This PC was handed over to the encryption department at 01-45 and sent at 02-25. Since the district leadership did not take any action before receiving the ShT, it turns out that from Moscow on the HF they did not report anything about the contents of Directive No. 1. "

      - Madame - yes, DO NOT INVENT YOU any shit))
      In Minsk, the con b.n. - for FULL combat readiness - received about 1 hour and decrypted it - by 1.20 !!
      The text was adopted in this form))
      “Military councils of districts.
      1. During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Pribovo, Zapovo, KOVO, ODOVO is possible. The German attack may begin with provocative actions.
      2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the troops of the LVO, Pri.BOVO, Zap.OVO, Kiev and Odessa military districts will be in full combat readiness to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans, or their allies.
      I ORDER:
      a) During the night of June 22, 1941 secretly occupy the firing points of the Fortress. Areas of state border;
      b) Before dawn, September 22.9.41, XNUMX. disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
      c) All units must be put on alert. Troops keep dispersed and disguised;
      d) Put the air defense in combat readiness without additional measures. Prepare all activities to darken cities and objects;
      e) Do not carry out any other events without special order.
      TIMOSHENKO, BEETLES. ”
      On the directive there are notes: “notes -“ Filed 22.6 01.00 adopted 22.6 01.10. ”.

      It took about 20 minutes to decrypt, and at 1.30 Pavlov had already brought it to the headquarters - to get together and wait for the order. And at 3 o’clock he began to dyvyat team to open the package)))
      At 1.45 a NEW text, from PAVLOVA - and sent to SHO ZAPOVO - for sending to the army and sending and occurred - at 2.25 - in the army of ZAPOVO))
      This text of PAVLOV was also published - Pavlov in it removed the provision on air defense - because at the same time he gave a separate order for air defense - about full bg)))
      The text of Pavlov’s order for his armies is published in the “robin”, but they give him out there as an NGO directive and the General Staff Directive (b / n))))

      “Perhaps, as in the case of the OdVO, they only said:“ ... A telegram of special importance has been sent to you for immediate execution ... ”Then they“ twisted the tail ”so that they would not succumb to the provocations of the German troops.”

      - do not invent Madame)) TEXT EVERYWHERE was deciphered by 1.30 - in ALL districts))) except for KOVO - because there were no cryptographers in Ternopol - they arrived only at 7 o’clock - with Baghramyan))) AND EVERYWHERE the essence of the directive was KNOW EXACTLY .)) See what NSh KOVO showed - where the text was not decrypted upon receipt (decrypted ONLY at 12.45) Purkayev - as they understood the essence of this directive -
      “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the district commander received an order from the General Staff, which demanded that the troops be put on full alert, in case the Germans crossed the state border by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until special order "!!

      It’s NOT IMPORTANT that you are inventing it out there - who turned it to someone — it is important HOW THE COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND THESE ORDERS))) Your “opinion” on this subject should be passed under that very tail)))

      “An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. "Sht left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced."

      - Yes, stop making it up - restless)) Zakharov in OdVO - stupidly threw him into the army - TEXT - an exact copy of this directive - with the signatures of NPOs and General Staff)))
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. The comment was deleted.
    1. VS
      -2
      November 29, 2017
      Combat order of the commander of the Air Force of the NWF NW / OP 01, “... the remaining parts 22.6.41 and 7 of the garden operate according to the plan of the army commanders ...” ”

      - throwing the Air Force also to the commanders - this is so positively characterizing the "good" people .. Kopets also gave the same thing to the REQUEST - having thrown off the GARDEN on the army. Breaking the centralized air force control in those hours ..

      “The covering divisions did not occupy long-term structures in their units and did not proceed to the construction of blockages on roads that could be viewed from German territory. "

      -- Stop lying!! See how it was in the 125th SD)))

      Look at the orders in those days - there are also about the rubble)))

      “The units had about one BK and had no order to open fire on the enemy.”

      - until he crossed the border - definitely)))

      “Commander of the 11th ck):“ ... The war began at 4-00 on 22.6.41. I was immediately reported to the commander of the 8th army ... I received an order not to open fire. Do not succumb to provocation. But the troops opened fire without orders ... "

      And what - it was necessary - on the orders of Klenov go ??))) a good man .. God forbid the earth is glassy to him)))

      “Three artillery regiments (414 light ap, 459 howitzer ap and 51st corps ap), covering the division, opened fire only after 8 o’clock in the morning. Until 11-00 "

      - read the answers - WHO FORBIDDEN on fire in the morning in the districts ...


      “The units were not only not ordered to take the property before the wartime states, but they were not informed of the possibility of hostilities, therefore, the property required for replacement, transport, communications, and surveillance equipment were not taken e”

      - and now Madame read what ORDERED in the General Staff Directives of June 11-12, the same KOVO and Pribovo - “TAKE TOTALLY CONTAINABLE STORES OF FIREPROOF AND FUELS” !!
      And this means - pick up and export to the area according to the Cover Plan - ALL warehouses with military equipment !!!

      And good people like Klenov did this - "it was not ordered to take property to the wartime states," !!

      “Even the front commander cannot issue an order to reprint the railway traffic police if he is sent to the archive of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown ”

      - who told you this ??? ZBB ZF was written - following the results of June - in AUGUST - by Malandin))))




      “It does not contain a single word about directions or about the General Directives of the General Staff. The point is that the NWF command was given the opportunity to redeploy a number of units to the border. "

      - actually - this is - according to the instructions of the General Staff))) which "provided" this opportunity to PribOVO)))

      “Good memory to people who were trying to prepare their troops for a meeting with the Nazi invaders. Not all of them succeeded. "

      - shit from the heart in the end ...

      “Another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.”

      Why are you so drawn to showing your nonsense then ??)))
  10. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +18
      November 29, 2017
      Boorish statements and insults
  11. +14
    November 29, 2017
    The facts show that historical research should be carried out in the opposite direction: "The real political reasons for the relatively easy victories of the German troops in the initial period of the German war against the USSR." The war proceeded exactly as conceived by the external forces that organize world wars.
  12. +28
    November 30, 2017
    Thanks author
  13. -2
    November 30, 2017
    aKtoR
    The document consists of two conditional parts: the 1-part I is the restored part of the journal from 22 June to 12 July 1941 of the year, the 2-I part - entries from 12.7.41 to 18.08.41. The feature of this declassified document is that original source. Information before 12.7.41 was restored by an unknown person.

    Well, why an unknown person - open the last sheet of typewritten text on the reverse side and there is the name of the artist, who had all the documents until 12.7.41, with which he worked.
    aKtoR
    Another feature of the OBB SZF is that it is reprinted (perhaps not once). The order to reprint the reinforced concrete bollard cannot even be given by the front commander if he is sent to the archive of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown. The log filed in the archive does not have a witness signature, which is a violation of the secrecy regime.

    Well, do not fantasize like this - it would be easier to destroy a magazine in the course of the next work of the commission for checking office work after five years, than to create it according to a new one, especially since it would have to be registered by a new numbering. And it would be because all the old verification and registration stamps are difficult to recreate so that later questions do not arise - they will be easy to compare with real ones that are in other documents.
    aKtoR
    Why did the author decide that the JBBs were reprinted?

    From ignorance of the organization of office work in the General Staff.
  14. +10
    December 1 2017
    That is, these “commanders” in the middle of a short summer night wake everyone up, as if it will be possible to sleep off tomorrow, and claim that an attack is possible, but the task is not to repel it, but to “not succumb to provocations” (ie “major complications” "are obtained precisely from this, and not from defeats in the war?). Further, they order to occupy the "firing points", and not defense, not just, not to mine roads and bridges. They order to bring the troops into combat readiness, but suddenly "disperse" (according to the alternative text of this directive) the troops. They command in the middle of the night to distill somewhere ALL planes (not even prepared for night flights and to field airfields probably not prepared for receiving planes at night), and not to conduct any "other" events. And each soldier familiar with this order will have to reflect on whether he can order something to his subordinates and whether he himself must fulfill the order of a higher headquarters, or is this already a “different” event, which is prohibited by the general staff. It would be better to sleep off - to her god! laughing
    And the text of this directive given in the article differs from that on many Internet sites:
    Military Councils LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdOVO.
    People's Commissar of the Navy
    1. During the period of June 22–23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Prib. OVO, Zap. OVO, KOVO, Od. OVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
    2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
    At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts to be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.
    I order:
    a) during the night of June 22, 1941 secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
    b) before the dawn of June 22 of June 1941 of the year, disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully mask it;
    c) bring all units into combat readiness.
    Keep troops dispersed and disguised;
    d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
    e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
    Tymoshenko, Zhukov.
    June 21, 1941. "
    (Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections: - M .: APN, 1969, p. 243)

    That is, there are two additional points, although essentially the same thing. I wonder how the author will comment on this difference.
    1. VS
      -2
      December 4 2017
      “That is, these“ commanders ”wake everyone up in the middle of a short summer night, as if it would be possible to sleep off tomorrow, and claim that an attack is possible, but the task is not to repel it, but“ not to succumb to provocations ”(ie,“ large complications "are obtained precisely from this, and not from defeats in the war?)."

      --- And you there too))))
      In this directive "b / n" a specific task is set - and it is - written in the ORDERING part - Bring ALL troops, air force, air defense and navy to FULL combat readiness)))
      And since we know that from BEFORE this directive there were directives on casting to higher bg. - readiness No. 2 - then this directive w / o from 22.20 on June 21 - on the TRANSFER of troops, air forces, air defense and fleets - in full bg)))
      The instruction about “not succumbing to provocations” is quite reasonable and correctly put up. - It is POSSIBLE to attack, and the Germans will start it as usual - with provocations after which they will yell like victims that Stalin attacked them and therefore they respond defensively !!))

      And it was precisely this in the Note that Hitler attacked and notified.
      After all, the question was - WHO WILL be called the aggressor in this case - we or Germany !! And it depended on who the USA would OFFICIALLY help. Which clearly defined their position - if the USSR is an aggressor - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case)))

      “Then they order to occupy the“ firing points ”, and not to defend, not to see, not to mine roads and bridges.”

      --- And what bothers you ??))

      Defense - the so-called foreground - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" is clearly marked - these trenches could NOT be occupied. ))) Moreover, according to the standards, there was time for trenches — a few hours for border divisions. And if the border division is withdrawn into the defense zone, then time was all the more reduced))) That is - at the command to open packages - the divisions would have managed to occupy their trenches before the Germans crossed the border with their troops. Moreover, the reinforcement border guard battalions have been on the border since May 5 already - with artillery divisions from EACH border division))) under the guise of work at the border)))
      And this command - to open packages - went to the districts at 3 o’clock already))))

      “They are ordering the troops to be ready for battle, but suddenly“ disperse ”(according to the alternative text of this directive) the troops.”


      --- What else is the “alternative text”?))) Zhukov and Zkharov have the text - you brought it)) There is a draft of this directive - and there the unnecessary one was deleted even in Stalin’s office)))

      As a result, everything is clearly spelled out:

      “C) put all units on alert. “Keep troops dispersed and disguised;”

      --- And in your opinion - bring in BG what does this mean?))) Type - occupy trenches on the border or something ??)))
      Trenches are occupied - at the opening of the red packet - when entering the Cover Plan)) But there is no order yet)))
      Bring in B.G. - this is to raise the alarm and giving ammunition in the hands of the soldiers - get out of the barracks - to the gathering area))
      Learn activities when entering degrees b..g - they are today exactly the same as they were in principle ..)) The only difference from those modern years is that when the water was full b..g - the mobilization did not start))
      Then - the mobilization began with SEPARATE orders for this ..)) For example - by entering the PP))) But the beginning of the mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of the mobilization automatically meant entering the war)))
      Therefore, Stalin did not allow the military to introduce the PP - to begin mobilization - BEFORE the attack,)) Or - only at his command))) At the same time, he did NOT PROHIBIT the military, of course, to increase the degrees of the military base. in the army, in the air force, air defense and navy))) What they did quite - starting in early June and even more so - from mid-June)))
      Keep the troops dispersed and disguised - but what do you understand and not logical?)))
      This applies to ALL troops of districts - and sticking out on the border and those who walked at night to the border - the second echelons of districts)))
      Well, yes - we give SPECIALLY the right of the first shot to the Germans - so - we need our own troops to reduce losses - to keep both dispersed and masked))) alas)))

      “They command in the middle of the night to distill ALL planes somewhere (not even prepared for night flights and to field airfields probably not prepared for receiving planes at night), and not to conduct any“ other ”events.”

      --- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to ALL to fly in those hours. This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order. Order - must be completed EXACTLY and on time))
      And the directive is an INSTRUCTION to execution and it allows a "creative approach" in the field)))
      It’s important to disperse the planes - if you haven’t done so yet according to the directives of the non-profit organizations of June 19–20 — across field airfields and even stationary ones, especially)))

      Paragraph "d" - "e) do not carry out any other activities without special order." means - LIMITATIONS for the military))

      The fact is that if there is a reduction to FULL and if there are no SUCH restrictions, then the military will rush into the trenches at the border - SO is supposed to be done. After all, IF there are no restrictions in the order on the full BG))) - the military will start to fight quite foolishly)))

      And so that this did not happen - someone did not overdo it - then they gave a directive at the end of the directive)))
      Read what Zakharov did in OdVO - he opened the package BEFORE it was necessary - without waiting for him to receive this directive, which he was warned at 22 p.m. yet - at 1 o’clock he had already opened the OdVO package))) And this is a matter of jurisdiction))

      “And each soldier familiar with this order will have to reflect on whether he can order something to his subordinates and whether he himself must fulfill the order of a higher headquarters, or is this already a“ different ”event, which is forbidden by the general staff.”


      For the military in THIS there were NO problems with understanding - this directive))

      I have repeatedly shown the author and I will repeat to you - yes, it’s NOT IMPORTANT, in principle, WHAT YOU PERSONALLY think of - about the "meanings" of those directives !!))) that according to YOUR IMHO, who there thought was all the more important because you are nobody and to call you in any way and in the army you did not serve and did not receive TE directives in those days)))))))
      IMPORTANT - as UNDERSTANDING THOSE COMMANDERS !! ))) and how THEY then ordered their subordinates))
      And for this - study the answers of commanders to questions of Pokrvosky)))
      And the same KOVO chief of staff, Purkayev, showed how THEY understood the directive w / o -

      “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the District Commander received an order from the General Staff, which required the troops to be fully operational, in case the Germans crossed the state border by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until special order "!!!)))



      "I Dali would be better off to sleep off - to her god! "

      And in Pribovo SO they did - “good people” Klenova .... and in KOVO - as Kirpanos tried to do so ... - they didn’t raise the army on alert that night ... putting it on this directive ...

      “And the text of this directive given in the article differs from that on many Internet sites:

      c) bring all units into combat readiness.
      Keep troops dispersed and disguised;
      d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
      e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
      Tymoshenko, Zhukov.
      June 21, 1941. "
      (Zhukov GK. Memoirs and Reflections: - M .: APN, 1969, p. 243) "


      That is, there are two additional points, although essentially the same thing. I wonder how the author will comment on this difference. ”

      --- You brought - the text that went into the district and which was published by Zakharov and Zhukov was a dash when. And the author, Madame, brought Pavlov’s text to the ZAPOVO))) sure that it was Zhukov’s text — their general staff who came to the okrug))) And as it should be for stubborn individuals, Madame does not want to listen to anyone — those who know her topic better) )

      Pavlov combine the points by removing the anti-aircraft defense provision - because he gave anti-aircraft defense for those minutes and gave a separate order - about full BG)))))
      And here is the same Zakharov — he simply transmitted the same text to the army — without changing anything in it)) Because he had already taken the next step — which would be followed by bringing it to full bg. - opened packages)))
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. VS
          -3
          December 4 2017
          “If he talked about Klenov only good or neutral, he would have signed a death sentence for himself. "

          - with what sorry - horseradish vegetable ??)))

          “The author tried to show that, by“ telephone law ”,“ pumping ”went from Moscow with the aim of not giving the Germans a reason for the conflict. Since there was no commander of the troops at the front headquarters at that time, the NSh communicated to the army commanders the latest “especially valuable instructions” from Moscow. "

          - Oh, how)) You ALREADY YOUR pardon fantasies gave out for a reliable FACT - what did anyone point out to someone on the phone - and personally to Klenov ??)))

          “Order of the commander of the 7th garden 22.6.41 4-15“ To the commanders of regiments.

          1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

          2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

          Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

          The commander of the 7th garden is Colonel Petrov. "

          - This division commander, Air Force Political Secretary PribOVO brought back June 19 - and the date and time of the attack - 3.0 June 22)))

          “About 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4th Garden to strike with force of three bap in the city and port of Memel.”

          Maybe you’ll bring this order ??)) and if you know your strange lady’s tendency to think up something — who thought there, there are doubts — but was this order or stupidly divisive of this GARDEN having opened the package after the attack? It’s so SO POSED to do - and there, after reading the task, he began to carry it out - WITHOUT an order for this additional from Ionov - also shot after -)))

          "" ... Our Air Force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... I took measures to bomb the enemy without flying over the border ... "

          - because TAKA ordered Moscow and TAK is written in the PP - the border until the special order of NGOs and General Staff - Moscow - do not cross.)))

          "" ... The commander of the 7th garden. Do not violate the state borders. Destroy enemy aircraft in your area. Landing planes on the radio to land on the airfields ... "Captain Krivtsov received a radio order to return to the airfield at the time of being on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed the bomb bay, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. At 7-10, the squadron, without losing a single plane, returned to the airfield. "

          - because the pilots rushed to the other side)))) WITHOUT ORDER on this))
          Permission came in deere. 2))) at 8 a.m. only))

          "Iap was raised by alarm at 4-20:"

          - HERE FOR THIS Klenov was shot - “for manifestation of inaction in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT” !!!
          1. VS
            -3
            December 4 2017
            “Former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov:“ It should be noted that even on the night of June 22 I personally received an order from the NS of the Klenov Front in a very categorical form to withdraw troops from the border by dawn on 22.6.41, what I categorically refused to do ... ""

            - because Klenov the bastard and the traitor of the Motherland - the face of the White Guard)))

            “By my code on the phone between 1-2 hours. 22.6.41 orders were given to the troops ... ""

            - the facts speak of something else - did not raise the Army of Morozov at THIS time)))

            “About General Trukhin (in October 1941, he consciously goes for cooperation with the Nazis).”

            --- Trukhin fled to the Germans with the STAFF documents on June 27 !!! With codes, etc. - He’s the head of the OPERATOR DEPARTMENT in general of the front district))) And he began the Germans on the ROA - the White Guard face - to campaign immediately !!!

            “Both speak of completely opposite opinions about the actions of NS. It turns out that one of them cites somewhat distorted information. ”

            - Do not guess, but look - how did Morozov’s army actually rise)))

            Sobennikov’s army - practically slept to the last ...

            “He expresses his opinion that this person was the author of the cover plan. Then it’s easy to understand: “the plan of the enemy of the people” - “unsuccessful actions of the space forces in the initial period of the war”. Once in prison, it was necessary to somehow cooperate with the investigation. Without cooperation, he would have been simply clogged and would not have survived ... "


            - stop BEARING Nonsense ignoramus !!)) PP and write in the Operations Department including - NSh of the district and his FIRST DEPUTY Trukhin together and wrote - SO POSED !!!

            And of course - well - the bloody gebnya never killed good people))))

            “The Sobennikov’s witness list is missing.”

            - because ENOUGH and other testimonies and the new May BCPs that were NOT approved by anyone at all - did not interest ANYONE in July of the 41st))) And NOTHING OTHER Sobennikov could show to Klenov as a person under investigation)))

            “While under investigation, he did not“ stoke ”P. S. Klenov - surviving at his expense is an act! "

            - BECAUSE Sobenikov was tried FOR ANOTHER GENERAL - for the fact that HERE himself commanded the troops in September)))) and Klenov HERE is generally stupid NOT at all)))
            Madame - do not go into it what you do not understand at all))) otherwise they will call you not smart - and you will be offended)))
            1. VS
              -3
              December 4 2017
              “Something similar happened in Pribovo-NWF. The order of the commander 16 sk, given in 1-30 22.6.41:

              “To the commanders of 5, 33 and 188 sd No. 0012, the commander of the 11th army ordered:

              1. Min not to put.

              2. For the protection of the subsidiary of the private education institution leave small groups of patrols under the command of the average commander. The rest of the people mouth, providing a band predpole, remove immediately.

              3. Work on the main strip to continue. The commander of the 16th SC Major General Ivanov

              A very strange order, which was to go from the headquarters of the NWF through the headquarters of the 11th Army. This order of the headquarters of the NWF is contrary to previously issued orders and initiatives. This could only happen if this instruction came from Moscow. After the arrest of A.D. Loktionov, with whom P.S.Klenov served since the summer of 1940, the NSH NWF was obliged to fulfill all instructions from Moscow without any initiative. ”

              - SO it happened because the good man Klenov just ruined the rubbish by his “inaction in managing the affairs of the okrug” - sherry put on Zhukov’s directive - about complete bg - he threw off its analogue in the army at 2.25 and until it was decrypted there - NOBODY had any idea - that it was time to run on alarm !!! And thus, hundreds and thousands of soldiers and commanders perished through the PERSONAL fault of this bastard ...

              “In order for the Sht to be sent from the headquarters of the 16th sk to the division at 1-30, it had to be prepared at the headquarters of the North-West Fleet in the region of 23-30 ... 00-00. It turns out that, having passed the ST with Directive No. 1 to the encryption department, the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff by phone organized a “cheat” to the leaders of the border military forces, issuing some “valuable instructions” about possible provocative actions of the enemy troops and what to do in this case in districts "

              - yes, do you finally read the answers of the commanders on THIS night and how they complied with the b / n directive !!! In the buildings where they were told by PHONES from the armies at 2 o’clock what should they do !!!
              You got Madame with these "provocations")) NOBODY mentioned THAT EVER that night - bringing them to the troops - THERE where they brought them up - about idiotic "provocations")))

              REMEMBER at last - the directive b / n is a directive BEFORE EVERYTHING about FULL gg. - SO UNDERSTAND IT ANYWHERE !!!! In addition to Klenov .. or Pavlov, who ordered the headquarters to be raised first on alarm - “I misunderstood the directives of the people's commissar” - he carried in court))
              And why do you PERSONALLY understand the essence of this directive - YOUR problems are ignoramus))) IMPORTANT - HOW THE PURKAYEVS UNDERSTAND IT))) Well, as they understood it - READ their answers to Pokrovsky on this question)))
              1. VS
                -3
                December 4 2017
                “After a conversation with the people's commissar of defense, which did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. 1, the ZAPOVO leadership decided for about half an hour: what instructions should be given to the troops”

                - Do not invent - EVERYTHING IS UNDERSTANDED from the text of the adopted directive - Cho must do it - TRANSFER ALL the troops, Air Force, Air Defense and Navy to FULL BG)))
                Another thing is that Pavlov then lied during the investigation that he gave the command at 1.30 - verbally by phone - “puts the troops in combat”, which seems to be brought back to the base station, but in reality - he only gave the staffs the command to assemble on alarm. .))
                MADAM - yes, you read the answers of the finally commanders for this night - in Chekunov's collection - he published these answers especially for the ignorant)))

                "The commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, at about one in the morning, on his own responsibility, ordered the sealed" red packets "to be sent to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the combat alert procedures stored at the army headquarters"

                - Madame - THESE PACKAGES - STORED in safes at comcor ALWAYS !!))) if they are fully approved as valid)))
                Korobkov, he gave the packages under the NEW Cover Plans - in May)) which did not work out in the armies of the ZAPOVO at all !!)) But the old ones were there anyway - for the old ones have not been approved by the NPO and the General Staff but they have not been approved yet ))))

                “At about two o’clock on the night of June 22nd on HF, the commander of the 3rd Army V.I. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov:“ Raise the troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately to take the bunkers and bring them into full combat readiness, put into effect a plan for covering the state border ". The management of ZAPOVO assumed the responsibility from which the senior management of the spacecraft was removed. "

                - yes, enough already to carry the blizzard about the innocent generals that they opened packages on "personal initiative")) - if you don’t know HOW IT ALL WAS REALLY)))
                This was done ONLY by Zakharov in OdVO - about 1 o'clock in the morning already - without waiting for the arrival of and decoding of the text of the directive about full bg. , he received a call at 22 o’clock on the telephone from the General Staff - “Wait for an important encryption” and took the initiative, thinking that an unambiguous order would come - “Proceed to the 1941 RP — and gave the alarm command at midnight already, and at 1 o'clock in the OdVO and open packages - read the answers of the commanders - HOW IT WAS - to Pokrovsky’s question No. 3)))
                SO. This “b / n” directive of 22.20 on June 21 informs the districts of the date of a possible attack, warns that the attack can begin suddenly (in the sense - without declaring war) and with provocations that cannot be succumbed so as not to cause problems of an international nature. And she orders - to bring-transfer all the troops of the border districts, the Air Force, air defense of these districts and the fleet - in full combat readiness! And also - to occupy firing points on the border.
                And the fact that it seems to be indicated in it - "indefinitely" - "an attack is possible on June 22-23," does not play ANY role. Troops are required to IMMEDIATELY, upon receipt of this directive, raise them according to combat alert, withdraw to a minimum at the gathering area and wait for further instructions already there: - either open the red packet and pull in to occupy the trenches at the border, - or fill up the lights out and into the barracks ... And that is how they understood it where they wanted to understand it.
                Considering the fact that the Air Force, Air Defense, Fleet and troops have already been on high alert since June 18 (should have been brought up), this directive precisely puts all troops on full alert and does not bring them from scratch !!!
      2. +19
        December 4 2017
        Quote: V.S.
        In this directive "b / n" a specific task is set - and it is - written in the ORDERING part - Bring ALL troops, air force, air defense and navy to FULL combat readiness)))

        It says in black and white - the task is not to succumb to provocations.
        Quote: V.S.
        The attack is POSSIBLE, and the Germans will start it as usual - with provocations after which they will yell like victims
        Well, if you decide, then they will attack. If they decide to arrange provocations, then they will. Nothing will essentially depend on this. Everything was clear to everyone (except for Stalin and Co.). What exactly is going to happen in the border forest - what, in essence, is the difference? Hitler’s propaganda could scream anything, just like the Soviet one. By the way, history has confirmed that the Nazis did not even bother to arrange any "provocations" that Stalin and Zhukov were so afraid of.
        Quote: V.S.
        "Then they order to occupy the" firing points ", and not the defense, not the field, not to mine roads and bridges." --- And what bothers you ??)) Defense - the so-called so-called “pre-lands” - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" was clearly marked - these Trenches could NOT be occupied ... But the beginning of mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of mobilization automatically meant entering the war ... Keeping troops dispersed and disguised - But what don’t you understand and it is not logical?))) ...--- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to fly ALL at those hours ... This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order ... etc. , etc.

        Stop grinding nonsense!
        1. +4
          December 5 2017
          You're right. As usual, VO says that he is a former military man and treatise orders how he thinks and how he needs to
  15. +5
    December 2 2017
    like a jacket --- I read articles especially late-- + all comments
    NO RESPONSE AND WILL NOT BE AFTER 20 OR 50 YEARS
    IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY AND COMMANDERS BEFORE MO AND NGSH and Stalin + dr.
    THIS IS AN ERA DR. CONVENIENCES IN THE STREET, RAYS, "THE MOBILE IS NOT SHOULDERED AND SO WILL NOT GO"
    There was no single state and people. AFTER THE WARS, PROPAGANDA BECAME STARTED - “THE SOVIET PEOPLE ARE”, AND THEN ??? - SIMPLE DISCONTINUATION (WITH ONE DIRECTIVE)
    the experience of minor wars Spain, Mongolia, Hassan --- zilch before 150 against 190
    million people
    LEARN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ON DIFFERENT TEXTBOOKS - ALREADY DIFFERENT PEOPLE GROW, and then what and how did you understand?

    they could not then, and they all cannot now precisely answer the question of the failure in 41g!
    How did the REV start? also a "sudden treacherous attack" arrogant "pros.r.a ... and
  16. VS
    -3
    December 4 2017
    Quote: antivirus
    like a jacket --- I read articles especially late-- + all comments
    NO RESPONSE AND WILL NOT BE AFTER 20 OR 50 YEARS

    and what books did you read on the topic at all?))) In SUCH articles and comments even from knowledgeable people - of course you won’t understand anything - if you don’t read smart research books)))
  17. The comment was deleted.
  18. VS
    -3
    December 4 2017
    Quote: cavl
    Boorish statements and insults

    it is rather the author’s problem))) not wanting to perceive something different from her "understanding" of the topic)))
    But I understand that you are also a lady?))) Judging by the fact that you do not see information from someone who criticized the author, but only - "boorish insults")))
    This is a sign of women - when you tell them something, in fact they don’t hear the essence, but - the volume of sound in the words of the opponent and - right there "boorish insults")) alas)))

    To the author of these articles she doesn’t want to call her name, which she definitely gives to some inadequacy - SO fans of Rezun are online and constantly popping up - anonymously ALWAYS)) - the author was immediately offered - let's help on the topic - I’ll throw off materials that you definitely don’t know and some you definitely don’t understand the moments) But Madame immediately showed her ambitions - yes, I’m a great cryptographer !!!))) Like - you won’t tell me how dumb it is and what signs the machine encrypts - then I won’t listen to you))) TOTAL - the author makes complete nonsense on the topic - ignoring the information that refutes her stupidity)))
    1. +13
      December 4 2017
      I’m a man, but, something, you are not manly verbally abundant
      The behavior is inadequately boorish and thirteen people agreed besides me, until they removed the offensive comment.
      And you were not supported by more than one person in this matter. Maybe you should think about your behavior?
      Personally, I like the author and another 211 people agreed with this. I don’t want to take it, but I’m sure all of your likes will be less than for the last topic of the author. Nobody seems to be reading your great comments.
      The fact that 12 people got to the temple (including myself) is an indicator. Look at fulfilling your request.
      Will lead inadequately - I will file a complaint again
      1. +7
        December 5 2017
        You're right. I filed a complaint
        The man here speaks by itself - a sick man
        1. +6
          December 9 2017
          I agree with the opinion - Rudeness MUST BE PUNISHED.
          WRITER WRITER _ DOUBLE
          1. +2
            December 9 2017
            But you yourself are rude to the user
            1. +2
              December 10 2017
              You're right. I was restrained. pardon me
              1. +1
                December 24 2017
                Thanks for the support! You cannot pass by rudeness, even when a person is sick)))
  19. VS
    -2
    December 4 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    depended on it - to whom the USA will OFFICIALLY help. Which clearly defined their position - if the USSR is an aggressor - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case)))

    made a reservation - MUST be like that))

    "" depended on it - to whom the USA will OFFICIALLY help. Who clearly indicated their position - if the USSR is the VICTIM of aggression - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case))
  20. -3
    December 4 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR
    General Klimovskikh understood cryptographic matters better than the chief of the General Staff.

    On the basis of what was such a "bold" conclusion made, given that these generals were not "eights"?
    1. VS
      -2
      December 4 2017
      Alas, like many anonymous authors and even more ladies - our author will not answer)))
      So she wants it SO way - so it should be so. It looks like the Ukrainians are behaving)))
    2. The comment was deleted.
  21. -2
    December 4 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR
    Printed on a typewriter letterhead, the telegram was later turned into an outgoing headquarters of ZAPOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on the declassified text is crossed out in red pencil, and the addresses and surnames of the signatories are printed later. An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. PT left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced.

    Well, if you have the courage to comment on declassified encryption, then you probably need to present at least its scan so that readers can understand what document you are talking about. If you have an encryption scan, post it here.
    1. +6
      December 10 2017
      You do not require the user for some reason VS present a scan of Directive No. 1 (from the General Staff), about which he repeatedly wrote. Or is it incorrect to ask oneself?
      1. -2
        December 10 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        For some reason, you do not require the user V.S. present a scan of Directive No. 1 (from the General Staff), about which he repeatedly wrote.

        In fact, the Directive did not have a number - it was without a number, in addition, for which it was registered in the 8th department, to be precise. As for its text, only the draft directive is declassified, and the scan of the original text "by hand" is most likely, if it has not been destroyed, stored in the archives of the 8th Department of the General Staff and hardly anyone will see it.
        It is strange that you don’t even understand this, but persistently demand something to be presented to you.
        Or is it incorrect to ask oneself?

        I don’t know what caused your bold conclusion, but you have shown yourself to be inadequate in this phrase. Maybe the voices in your head prevent you from analyzing other people's texts?
  22. VS
    -1
    December 4 2017
    Quote: Falcon5555
    It says in black and white - the task is not to succumb to provocations.

    for the military - the task is in the directive - it is prescribed in the ORDERING part)) For batans - wherever they like - there they see it)))
  23. VS
    -1
    December 4 2017
    Quote: Falcon5555
    if you decide, then they will attack. If they decide to arrange provocations, then they will. Nothing will essentially depend on this. Everything was clear to everyone (except for Stalin and Co.). What exactly is going to happen in the border forest - what, in essence, is the difference? Hitler’s propaganda could scream anything, just like the Soviet one. By the way, history has confirmed that the Nazis did not even bother to arrange any "provocations" that Stalin and Zhukov were so afraid of.

    It will not depend on you)) For politics - it was important who would be called the aggressor)) If this were not so, Stalin would completely crash the FIRST - as Zhukov suggested in May)))

    The German attack began quite precisely with provocations - the first shooting at the border began at 2 a.m., as already reported to Moscow ..
  24. VS
    -1
    December 4 2017
    Quote: Falcon5555
    Defense - the so-called foreground - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" is clearly marked - these Trenches could NOT be occupied ... But the beginning of mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of mobilization automatically meant entering the war ... Keeping troops dispersed and disguised - but what don’t you understand and logical?))) ...--- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to fly ALL at those hours ... This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order ... etc. , etc.
    Stop grinding nonsense!

    as I understand it - in the army you did not serve from the word sapsem)))
  25. VS
    -2
    December 4 2017
    Quote: ccsr
    Printed on a typewriter letterhead, the telegram was later turned into an outgoing headquarters of ZAPOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on the declassified text is crossed out in red pencil, and the addresses and surnames of the signatories are printed later. An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. PT left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced.
    Well, if you have the courage to comment on declassified encryption, then you probably need to present at least its scan so that readers can understand what document you are talking about. If you have an encryption scan, post it here.

    This is our lady suffered nonsense - about Pavlov’s directive posted on the TsAMO website)))
    She wants to think that having accepted the GSh Pavlov directive DON'T CHANGE her - she gave the decrypted text to the encryptors for encryption))))

    horror))))

    But it’s so simple - there is a text of the so-called deer 1 from Zakharov and Zhukov or from Chekunov — the one who left the General Staff in the okrug — about which, as far back as 2009, disassemblies have been going on at the milleter yet))) Or I have cited this text more than once in books)))
    Chekunov cited the text of the text that was accepted in Minsk - I brought it here as well - THEY are identical !!))
    You take this text and compare it with what Pavlov sent at 2.25 in the army - the one that TsAMO posted in 2014 more - at https://topwar.ru/123513-povtorenie-proydennogo.h
    tml)))) as a scan photo of this directive .. And you will see that Pavlov has no point about air defense)))
  26. The comment was deleted.
    1. +12
      December 5 2017
      In your messages and in books of rezunizm more than the author.
      Rezunism is the fakes that British intelligence scouts ahead of the Soviet attack on Germany.
      The author has not a word about this.
      You have everything connected with the complete preparation of the Red Army for the German attack and traitors by the generals. A very convenient version for Pindovskoye in their fight with Putin in the elections.
      You even had a message deleted by the administrator that Putin is the same traitor and we will also find out about this in decades. And in the same vein, a couple more sentences. And the epic ended with the question: Will you vote for Putin?
      Rezun for arrogance, you are for overseas partners (in any case, pour water on their mill) - both options are bad
  27. The comment was deleted.
  28. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
  29. +7
    December 5 2017
    1. Reason to believe, do not respect yourself.
    2. The funniest and most common thread in most of the articles "knowing how to do it retroactively" is that they take the actions of the German army as a constant. And on the basis of this they build their victorious plans. It doesn’t even occur to couch strategists that the enemy could also adjust his plans and drive the situation into even greater catastrophe for all their “ingenious” creeps.
    Alas, it is not unfortunate, but the balance of power, combat experience, a strategic initiative did not leave the Red Army a chance to keep the enemy on the border.
  30. -2
    December 7 2017
    Due to the fact that the author of ten articles does not quite correctly understand what he is writing about, I will try to comment on what, in my opinion, is not true.
    aKtoR writes
    https://topwar.ru/121933-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitl
    erovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-4.html
    Now we will consider some technical details of the transfer of Directive No. 1 of 21.06.41.
    A large number of Directives on the redeployment of troops has the signature stamp "ss / s". Therefore, Directive No. 1 was supposed to have a stamp of "special importance." Documents with such a signature stamp can be transmitted over communication lines only after they are processed using ciphers. Below we will consider the different options of Directive No. 1. The strange thing is that when it was written in the General Staff, they did not put a security stamp at all, and in VO, according to their own understanding, they put "ss". This once again testifies to the confusion when writing this Directive.

    Apparently, the author did not understand that the scan of the b / n directive with the signatures of Tymoshenko and Zhukov, which she cited, was just a DRAFT of the directive itself. Based on this draft, the original encryption text was written on the letterhead of the cipherorgan or on the sheet of the cipher block (not necessarily owned by Tymoshenko or Zhukov) and it was transferred to the eights, which printed the text from it, and the document itself ended up in archive 8 of the General Administration, and there is still since And no one will ever transfer it to the TsAMO archive, if only because of the special marks that are on it. So there was no sense in putting a “top secret” when writing a draft - it’s enough that the forms themselves or the counted sheets had this stamp. And already at registration of the final text it could be registered. Therefore, talking about the "confusion" is only a figment of the author’s imagination. On the contrary, in my opinion, Zhukov unreasonably delayed the execution of the directive upon arrival at the People's Commissariat, and this subsequently had grave consequences for all the armed forces. This is not even surprising, but the fact that Zhukov himself, arriving from the okrug, had a poor idea of ​​how much time it would take to bring their directive to the troops, and moreover, for the entire time he was at the post, the NSS did not carry out a comprehensive check of the rise of the district units by alarm - at least nowhere else do the authors of the memoir remember such a training.
  31. -2
    December 7 2017
    aKtoR writes:
    People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov (1963): “... The naval attache Vorontsov arrived in Moscow at about 18 p.m. on June 21, 1941. At 21 p.m. his report was appointed to me. For 40-45 minutes he presented his thoughts to me in detail. “So is this a war?” I asked him. “Yes, this is war,” Vorontsov replied ...

    In this case, a reference to Kuznetsov’s memoirs is not entirely appropriate, since now there is a completely different opinion about the arrival of a resident of the Navy’s intelligence in Moscow - he reported not only to the Navy’s drug commissar, but most likely to Stalin. This practice existed then:
    1. +13
      December 9 2017
      Again, Nonsense - this is not the naval attache of Vorontsov. It is known that Stalin met with General Tupikov, a military attaché in Germany, but this name is not in the magazine. If Stalin met with the naval attache, then his last name will be absent from the journal.
      In Fitin's memoirs, he was called to Stalin on June 16. He is not in the lists of those present at Stalin either on the 16th, or on other numbers around the indicated date.
  32. -2
    December 8 2017
    aKtoR writes:
    Consider the basics of encryption communication for that period. Each new military commander (from the commander and the NS division, and above), the head of the SHO was obliged to inform about the basics of a cryptographic link. The head of the General Staff, which is subordinate to the General Staff, was the supervisor of the SC's cryptographic communication. He was obliged to have an idea about encryption and temporary standards, including the equipment of SHO equipment of Western HE.

    This set of slogans has nothing to do with reality. The head of the cipher organ is forbidden to give any information about the work of the cipher organ in terms of cryptography and the characteristics of the systems used, and the rules for working with cipher notebooks are no different from working with other stamped documents.
    The head of the General Staff is not the curator of cipher communications, but is the DIRECT head of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, which is why the word "curator" is more suitable for the 8th Directorate of the NKVD (KGB) of the USSR, which is the main body for cipher communication in accordance with a government decree. This service was created on May 5, 1921, by order of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.
    As regards specifically the standards, the author apparently vaguely imagines that the decryption standards have less effect on the passage of information than the quality of telegraph (radio channels) lines, because of which they cannot transmit the encryption for hours and correctly decrypt it. Moreover, compliance with standards by cryptographers is monitored by the senior cipher agency, or in the worst case, the military prosecutor, if it comes to it. Therefore, you should not believe that the author paints it so famously, who hardly has a correct idea of ​​the work of military cryptographers.
    1. +20
      December 9 2017
      Where did you get the information? Judging from what you wrote - this is a personal fabrication of not having anything with reality. in other words, complete nonsense!
      As of June 22, 1941, there was no 8 department of the General Staff - there was only the encryption department, which also included a special service. It was to the Chief of the General Staff that the encryption department was subordinate. The immediate boss, in other words, is the CURATOR of the service. 8 management of the NKVD was not the controlling body of the RKKA encryption service. Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!
      If, as you write, the author "has a vague idea of ​​encryption" - you do not have it at all - a complete amateur and a layman !!!
      The military prosecutor did not have and does not have ANYTHING to do with the monitoring of encryption communications standards. As the saying goes, "Hi Shishkin with a motor" - a man who carries a blizzard! By the way, how was control over the transfer of Directive No. 1 in question. Group confirmation is not for special encryption.
      The rules for working with cipherblocks are fundamentally different from working with secret documents (you use slang grooves that are not used by employees of cipher communication and security agencies). I’ll note it not for you, but for those who read my answer: a cipher-notepad is a notepad with ciphers. Each cipher sheet removed is ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. Work with information ОВ is carried out according to completely different documents than documents of the neck are classified or top secret. There are still rules for working with notepads of cipher telegrams, but these norms again do not seem to work with ordinary secret information. This fact was noted during the verification of cipher departments by the 3rd management of NPOs.
      So that user CCSR deliberately trying to put knowingly false information! Such people are called: a dreamer or an inventor-liar !!!
      For other people who read my answer (except for the liar) I note: aKtoR described the operation of cryptographic services close enough to what I know. I didn’t have to discuss issues specifically of the 1941 cipher communication, but on discussion with some other persons we came to a common opinion - you can believe it. In any case, I can note a fact that is not available on the Internet: confirmation of the receipt of the Directive in the five military districts was carried out by sending the text back and the GS cipher department. in other words, the decrypted text was encrypted again with new ciphers and sent to the General Staff. In the cipher department of the General Staff, a telegram was decrypted and a complete reconciliation of both texts was made. This method of rechecking and control was introduced after the discovery of the fact of distortion of information of spies in the cipher departments of the embassy in Sweden.
      1. +17
        December 9 2017
        I forgot to clarify that the head of the cipher department or department is obliged to conduct a briefing with the three new chiefs at each headquarters (I do not want to specify the positions of these persons). After the briefing, these persons are admitted to all guidance documents on ciphering, ciphering and ciphers. The fact is that the knowledge possessed by these individuals cannot lead to compromises ciphers and encryption correspondence.

        I recommend especially not trusting CCSR user messages
        1. +6
          December 10 2017
          I agree in principle
  33. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    As of June 22, 1941, there was no 8 department of the General Staff - there was only the encryption department, which also included a special service. It was to the Chief of the General Staff that the encryption department was subordinate.

    You don’t even know the story of 8 management:
    July 19, 1939 8th Division of the General Staff of the Red Army It was renamed the Encryption Service Division and included as an independent structural unit in the Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army.

    This was a big mistake, which is why in August 1941 the 8th department was withdrawn from the OS and raised its status:
    On August 18, 1941, the Encryption Service of the General Staff of the Red Army was created a total of 197 troops and 50 employees.

    So your remark about June 22 is only partially correct, because until 1939 the cryptographers were not part of the operational management.
    1. +6
      December 9 2017
      I did not claim to be a verbatim reference to the facts. I just noted that the 8th administration did not exist.
  34. -1
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The immediate boss, in other words, is the CURATOR of the service.

    There is no word “curator” in the military vocabulary, or it is rarely used — it was closer to the NKVD.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    8 management of the NKVD was not the controlling body of the RKKA encryption service. Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!

    In the POST-SOVIET time, the KGB was disbanded, and its functions were transferred to various structures, including the FAPSI. So for a start learn how to correctly operate with terms. By the way, in Soviet times, no development of cryptographic equipment for the Soviet Army without coordination with the 8th KGB department was carried out. Well, the question of who controlled the release of encryption documents will tear the template for you — you probably don’t know who it was entrusted to in the USSR.
    1. +9
      December 9 2017
      We use the word Curator - no need to draw unfounded conclusions. People who served earlier also noted that they used. Your word is against mine - I trust my own more

      If you have already started talking about the development of technology, you were obliged to note that without coordination with 8 GU GS, this also did not happen - obviously you do not know this. About ciphers - this is certainly true, but this is public information - I did not say a word about it
  35. -1
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!

    This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times.

    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The military prosecutor did not have and does not have ANYTHING to do with the monitoring of encryption communications standards. As the saying goes, "Hi Shishkin with a motor" - a man who carries a blizzard! By the way, how was control over the transfer of Directive No. 1 in question. Group confirmation is not for special encryption.

    As part of the investigation, the military prosecutor, if a combat order was not executed due to a delay, and which was handed over by technical means of communication and uses encryption, will necessarily require all temporary standards and specific dates for finding a document along the entire chain of executors. However, you are apparently so “cool” that you have not encountered this. But because Powers flew to Sverdlovsk, an officer was sent to prison - precisely because the norm for passing the order was violated. This is a historical fact.
    1. +12
      December 9 2017
      no need for a military prosecutor - this is your speculation. They do not participate in controlling the passage of information - the mechanism already exists. No "historical examples" are needed that are not relevant to the topic under discussion.

      "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion? Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details
  36. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion?

    This is relevant to your knowledge of the subject.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details

    You’re demonstrating your ignorance because there was a body in the GS structure that had the right to create ciphers and cryptographic equipment without 8 GB controls, but not without the approval of 8 KGB controls. Fine swimming, "comrade-h ..."
    1. +8
      December 10 2017
      By ciphers - yes, by cipher technology - no - only by agreement, and this is true only in the post-war period. This was not the case before the war. Submit evidence to your words and I will agree with you
  37. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I did not claim to be a verbatim reference to the facts. I just noted that the 8th administration did not exist.

    No need to make jumps to the side - it’s you who accused me of something I don’t know, that you know. As it turned out, you yourself do not know a damn thing, but already started to teach others ..
    1. +8
      December 9 2017
      I do not blame - I ascertain the fact that for the period you indicated there was no 8th General Staff Directorate. And I already saw your incompetence
  38. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The rules for working with cipherblocks are fundamentally different from working with secret documents (you use slang grooves that are not used by employees of cipher communication and security agencies). I’ll note it not for you, but for those who read my answer: a cipher-notepad is a notepad with ciphers. Each cipher sheet removed is ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. Work with information ОВ is carried out according to completely different documents than documents of the neck are classified or top secret.

    As I understand it, you are already confusing a notebook with key documents with a cipher telegram notebook, which many officers have in large headquarters, and which was discussed in this topic, because The text of the b / n directive, signed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, was discussed. So why did you stick the key documentation to the stamped cipher block, STORED IN A SAFE OR IN THE SUITCAS OF THE EXECUTORS, I do not know, but this impression did not make me, because unlike you, I know how they differ.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    So that the CCSR user is deliberately trying to put knowingly false information! Such people are called: a dreamer or an inventor-liar !!!

    In this case, you look like verbiage, if only because you don’t know that you couldn’t use key documentation in general to work with correspondents in RU GS illegal immigrants used a completely different method of creating key tables and ciphers. Learn a little before you begin to ride on the ears of a gullible public ...
    1. +8
      December 10 2017
      We are discussing the cipher service of the General Staff of the Red Army. The term "did not use the term"key tables or ciphers "
  39. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    For other people who read my answer (with the exception of liars), I note: aKtoR described the work of the cryptographic service quite close to what I know. I didn’t have to discuss issues specifically of the 1941 cipher communication, but on discussion with some other persons we came to a common opinion - you can believe it.

    Judging by your knowledge, you can’t even imagine how encryption in a strategic link differs from encryption in an operational-tactical link, where they use not coding books, but coding tables with variable numbering of coordinates. So I understand your circle of "specialists" - you can continue to tell your speculations.
    1. +6
      December 10 2017
      I participated in the creation of coding and negotiation tables. These elements are not used in the operational-tactical link. The specified link does not include negotiations within the framework of: "battalion-regiment", "regiment-division".
      1. -2
        December 10 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        I participated in the creation of coding and negotiation tables. These elements are not used in the operational-tactical link.

        And again you sat down in a puddle - coding tables are widely used in parts of SPN. Moreover, the communications troops have their own tables.
  40. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    In any case, I can note a fact that is not available on the Internet: confirmation of the receipt of the Directive in the five military districts was carried out by sending the text back and the GS cipher department. in other words, the decrypted text was encrypted again with new ciphers and sent to the General Staff.

    But you are lying - for this there is a reverse check of the transmitted cipher telegram, and on the communication node by comparing the transmitted and received telegrams, they confirm that everything went smoothly, or the broken or incorrectly received five-digit groups are repeated in a new way. Why are you lying about what you don’t know? What your “friends” lied to you about the monkey work - re-encrypting the accepted text, if the encryptors are so overwhelmed with work?
    Everything is clear with you - lie further on "specialist."
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +8
      December 10 2017
      Reverse verification of the cipher telegram at least existed in the late forties. For a long time, the first head of the SHO Semipalatinsk test site spoke about this. A hotel was built near the headquarters of the landfill, in which L.P. Beria once lived. A cipher telegram came to his name with a demand at the end for a reverse check. The head of the SHO went to the hotel. He should not have given the encryption form to any hands other than the addressee. In the waiting room, he was met by a general on duty (maybe an adjutant) who wanted a telegram request. As a result, the chief insisted that he hands the folder with the cipher telegram to the general, and he does not close the door to the room of L.P. Beria in order to visually control the document folder. They never wrote about this. What further was told by the person whom I certainly believe. The general went into the room without closing the door. Beria sat on the couch and glanced at the cryptographer. After that, the general approached Beria, took out a telegram form and held it until Beria read the text. Then Beria moved somehow with his hand, the general put the form on the folder and Beria signed without addressing and put down the date and time. When sending the telegram back, in addition to the text, the times of receipt at the communication center, in the SHO and the report to the addressee were also put down. So I'm really a former specialist
  41. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    This method of rechecking and control was introduced after the discovery of the fact of distortion of information of spies in the cipher departments of the embassy in Sweden.

    Yes, you don’t confuse the amount of daily information exchange even in the district’s intelligence department (department) and the amount of telegrams of the crypto radio operator at the embassy - these are two big differences.
    1. +4
      December 9 2017
      I repeat for NEVER, this is a way of checking especially important encryptions, to which Directive 1 was assigned
  42. +9
    December 9 2017
    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion?

    This is relevant to your knowledge of the subject.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details

    You’re demonstrating your ignorance because there was a body in the structure of the GS that had the right to create ciphers and cryptographic equipment without the 8 management of the GS, but not without the approval of the 8th KGB department. Fine swimming, "comrade-h ..."


    I swim as required. No need to flaunt semi-truth and semi-secret information, indicating its importance. You do not have one.
    The highlighted text is nonsense again. No service could develop ciphers and cryptotechnologies without the sanction of the GS cipher department or in the future management. No need to escalate the secrecy you have invented. Yes, in the pre-war years and during the war years, the cipher department service created ciphers for its structures - ciphers and cipher blocks without the permission of the NKVD.

    Yes, the RU Red Army created its own ciphers and methods of encrypting information. Only these elements are called CODES. For generally accepted information, they are called Ciphers for DISTINCTION.

    Initially, military specialists developed the cipher equipment, but I did not discuss this period.
  43. +17
    December 9 2017
    CCSR "As I understand it, you are already confusing a notebook with key documents with a cipher telegram notebook, which many officers have at large headquarters, which was discussed in this topic, because the text of the directive signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov was discussed.
    So why did you stick the key documentation to the stamped cipher block, STORED IN A SAFE OR IN THE SUITCAS OF THE EXECUTORS, I don’t know, but this impression didn’t make me, because unlike you, I know how they differ "


    What nonsense !!! Performers are people who write cipher telegrams in a notebook (execute text). They may not have a “cribbed” (this is the term of a dilentant - that is, yours) cipher block. A cipher notepad is a notepad with ciphers or cipher tables. It could only be stored in a safe on duty at the cipher department (department). It is not issued even to encryptors - only individual ciphers are issued from it. This is known to all experts. NO and there was no such thing as a “notebook with key documents” in the cipher service. The signalmen - yes there are - but we are not talking about them

    As we started talking about the Directive filed in peacetime. then, therefore, we are talking about the connection of peacetime.

    They are not stored in the safes of many officers, and "many officers in large headquarters do not have cipher telegram notebooks." This is a fiction of the inhabitants and yours. The overwhelming majority of the Red Army commanders of staffs of the cipher telegram notepad were given out on a WORKING DAY with a MANDATORY DELIVERY to the cipherorgan at the end of the working day (the working day often went into the night) even in the case of an unsigned document! Cipher telegram notepads could be issued to a limited number of commanders who worked with high ranks. For example, the commander who executed personal orders of G.K. Zhukov. Notebook cipher telegrams could not be in peacetime even at Zhukov, because Zhukov himself rarely performed encryption, and he HAD NO RIGHTS to transfer the notebook to another executor (subordinate commander)! They could be, for example, for individual performers who, for example, prepared a daily document (But this is not for many, as you write) Other performers performed encryption less frequently. The number of notepads of cipher telegrams, which are strict reporting documents, is quite small. They are an order of magnitude or less than officers at headquarters of any level. Therefore, the presence of a constant notebook of cipher telegrams for the commander is an exception, and not an accepted procedure for paperwork. In addition, when leaving home, this commander is obliged to hand over his working folder (briefcase, bag) to the cipher department!

    Consider Directive No. 1, which is sent to FIVE districts and has the numbers of outgoing cipher telegrams from 19942 to 19946. If we take as initial data that the intensity of cipher telegrams runs from 1.1.41 to 21.6.41 on weekdays, and on Sundays on 3 times lower (although not many soldiers in the General Staff were resting at that time). In this case, we have 147 days of high intensity and 24,6 days off. In this case, 24,6 days off correspond to another 8 days of high intensity. Only 155 days. We divide 19942 into 155 - there are 129 numbers of outgoing ciphers per day. Quite often, encryption goes to several addresses (this number can be more than ten). It happens that they are sent to the same address. If we assume that, on average, encryption is sent to three addresses per day, then the General Staff’s cipher department sends about 42 ciphers to all military districts, to the Navy’s People’s Commissariats and civilian organizations, to state organizations, etc. The number of ciphers is much less than the number of commanders in the operational management of the General Staff. Encryption sent and other services of the General Staff.

    With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days). For such intensity of correspondence, most commanders do not need to have personal notepads of cipher telegrams in peacetime. Do not listen to friends who tell you a secret nonsense
    1. -2
      December 11 2017
      Quote: 8Schlaf
      With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days). For such intensity of correspondence, most commanders do not need to have personal notepads of cipher telegrams in peacetime. Do not listen to friends who tell you a secret nonsense

      Especially for amateurs who have no idea about the work of the headquarters at least at the district level - for the vast majority of officers, notebooks are filled in advance with written orders, fully executed, and on which the chiefs only sign in the first minutes of the war. After that, they immediately go. These are the documents of combat command and control of troops, about which such as you have no idea.
  44. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The highlighted text is nonsense again. No service could develop ciphers and cryptotechnologies without the sanction of the GS cipher department or in the future management.

    Again, you're lying - RU GSh has the right to independently develop ciphers, and subsequently GRU GSh had the right to develop equipment, without the approval of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, but only with the approval of the KGB of the USSR.
    1. +7
      December 10 2017
      "RU GSh has the right to independently develop ciphers, and subsequently GRU GSh had the right to develop equipment, without the approval of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, but only with the approval of the KGB of the USSR."

      This is not true, without coordination with the 8th Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR, the GRU could not develop equipment, because the SHO of the GRU worked, including on regulatory documents, approved by the head of the 8th Main Directorate. In post-Soviet times, there may have been such a thing - I don’t know - but the KGB no longer existed.
  45. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Yes, the RU Red Army created its own ciphers and methods of encrypting information. Only these elements are called CODES. For generally accepted information, they are called Ciphers for DISTINCTION.

    Again they lied - in those times and later, each agent could have a coding table and ciphers, using a key phrase and some open statistical tables to compile them. So there is no generally accepted concept - there are code tables, but there are ciphers. You are not here in the subject.
  46. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    We use the word Curator - no need to draw unfounded conclusions. People who served earlier also noted that they used. Your word is against mine - I trust my own more

    Stop bending - this is a slang word adopted by the special services, but officers do not use this word in any district headquarters or in the General Staff, and you will never find it in official documents or in correspondence. Now a lot of documents are open - give an example of the use of these words, for example, in terms of cover or mobplane of the district.
    1. +9
      December 10 2017
      Is everything all right with your head? What does the “Curator” slang have to do with the cover plan or the district’s mobplan?
      Hi Shishkin with a motor !!
  47. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I repeat for NEVER, this is a way of checking especially important encryptions, to which Directive 1 was assigned

    But figs to you - nobody sent this directive back after processing and re-encryption, because it is enough for cryptographers to get what they brought from the communication center after comparing the groups of the telegram sent and returned for verification. You lied because you don’t know how it all worked.
    1. +14
      December 9 2017
      Lord, how can you bring something to your readers if you cannot understand basic things. A special communications officer cannot even help with this, since he does not know why this is necessary. I’m refining this information not for you, blue-liar, but for other users who will read it. Nowadays, there are two reasons for this verification.
      The first reason is the hidden enemies of the people. An enemy of the people can distort the text of a particularly important document. The experience of Sweden showed this - information about French spies has been distorted for a long time. It was possible to reveal this by accident when the contractor saw his document in Moscow. This is an impossible event, as familiarization is carried out by addressing.
      Therefore, verification measures to carry out other cryptographers. At that time, it was believed that hidden enemies exist everywhere. Even among trusted comrade and senior officials.
      The second reason. Human factor. The cryptographer could accidentally distort the time or date or another numerical value. He could also take, for example, a triple for a nine in mind of the artist’s careless handwriting. To exclude such an event, post-war cryptographic equipment existed for a long time in which numbers were excluded. Numbers typed in text. In the names of cities, months and other letters that could distort the meaning, doubles. For example, July. In the post-war period, there was an interdepartmental cryptographic communication in which numbers are replaced by letters. For example, A is a unit, B is a deuce. When typing numbers, the letters tripled. For example, the number 121 was written as AAABBBAAA.
      Therefore, checks at the communication center by groups could not reveal the distortions, voluntary or involuntary. The writer cannot know these things, but when he proves things that he does not understand, the question arises: how correctly does he describe events in his works ?!
      1. +1
        December 10 2017
        I also complained about this message, but the administrator was kind and did not delete it. Probably because of the unusual information .....
      2. +9
        December 10 2017
        I’ll only clarify that the equipment for the MVS was used by the Navy at all levels (more encrypted equipment was used for encrypting the fleet headquarters with the main headquarters of the Navy and the General Staff), in the Strategic Missile Forces associations.
        1. +2
          December 10 2017
          Thanks for clarifying
      3. -2
        December 11 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        The first reason is the hidden enemies of the people. An enemy of the people can distort the text of a particularly important document. The experience of Sweden showed this - information about French spies has been distorted for a long time. It was possible to reveal this by accident when the contractor saw his document in Moscow.

        Enough to fantasize - there was a radio station in the embassy in Stockholm, so no “spies” could influence the text of the radiogram. They could intercept, they could interfere with reception, but as a rule no one interferes with the embassy stations because They know that they will create something like that. There are situations when they use the telegraph of the host country, but this is an exception related to special situations, and not the rule.
      4. -1
        December 11 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        Therefore, checks at the communication center by groups could not reveal the distortions, voluntary or involuntary.

        But figs to you - the main distortions in the transmission of cipher telegrams just arose due to transmissions, atmospheric interference, errors of telegraph devices, etc. that is why before setting the time for encryption transmission, any telegraph operator, after receiving the cipher telegram back, will surely check the transmitted and received tape. Moreover, he compares all the numbers in all groups, which is why there are problems with the time for the transfer of one order, if it is forcibly divided into several. those. upon transmission of SEVERAL cipher telegrams.
        The writer cannot know these things, but when he proves things that he does not understand, the question arises: how correctly does he describe events in his works ?!

        Stop wagging - I don’t write anything at all, and what you attribute to me does not hold water. However, I already understood what you are like as a “specialist”, and therefore I can recommend you write to O. Kozinkin yourself or ask the administration, they will tell you something that I don’t speak in two persons. I recommend going to the For Truth forum if something is unclear to you.
  48. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    What nonsense !!! Performers are people who write cipher telegrams in a notebook (execute text). They may not have a “cribbed” (this is the term of a dilentant - that is, yours) cipher block.

    You are definitely an amateur in this matter - just the performers in one suitcase can store a notebook for ZAS telegrams and a notebook for cipher telegrams (this is a later time when the ZAS technique was created). The word "notepad" is a generally accepted term because there is perforation for tearing sheets from it. But accounting for these notebooks goes through different books - and here you are not in the subject, which is why you, like the author, cannot be trusted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +7
      December 10 2017
      Since the cipher blocks were made centrally, the "Cipher block" was printed on it. Notebooks for cipher telegrams were printed in various printing houses and on them in 1941 there was no inscription "Notebook for cipher telegrams". There was only an account number. Naturally, printing houses could not do perforation and the sheets were torn off according to the ruler.
      Mentioning the WAS notebook, in my opinion, is to raise your profile and try to get away from sensitive issues
      1. -2
        December 10 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        Since the cipher blocks were made centrally, the "Cipher block" was printed on it. Notebooks for cipher telegrams were printed in various printing houses and on them in 1941 there was no inscription "Notebook for cipher telegrams". There was only an account number. Naturally, printing houses could not do perforation and the sheets were torn off according to the ruler.

        Goofy, come - you just considered my texts nonsense about notebooks for cipher telegrams, which are commonly used among staff officers as "cipher blocks", and now you suddenly found out that they were before 1941, and were used in the spacecraft. A good sign means a quick change of shoes in the air, and now you can pretend to be an "expert". I could tell you why and when perforation appeared on modern notebooks, and why they changed the tear line, but you are such a “connoisseur” that you yourself will find this information if you do not know it. By the way, precisely because of the fact that in the field it is difficult to tear off the sheet precisely along the line “on the knee”, and perforation was introduced.
  49. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    NO and there was no such thing as a “notebook with key documents” in the cipher service. The signalmen - yes there are - but we are not talking about them

    Have you heard anything about GRU radio cryptographers who work with their ciphers and which notebooks they use, especially when it is the only one at the entire embassy? Your concepts are too narrow for you to indicate what is right and what is not.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +11
      December 10 2017
      So to speak
      You use the slang name, not the designation of a military specialty. So the cryptographers, whom you call eights, are called specialists of the SPS (special communication units). And in the regular structure too. It’s just that experts know who the encryptor is in fact, and who is the special communications specialist. In Soviet times, the cipher divisions of the motorized rifle divisions included groups of coders. Everyone called the employees of the cipher service to the cryptographers, but only the commander, chief of staff, chief of political department and deputy commander knew how these people differed from each other. The encoder is one level lower in all respects.
      In the divisions of the Airborne Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces, specialists also working at Violet were considered specialists of the SPS by the staffing table. It was believed that they transmit rapidly aging information.
      Perhaps you have other information and can present the facts. Sorry, I’m not a jeltman and I don’t take my word for it.
      1. +6
        December 10 2017
        Violets were still included in special air defense communications units and in separate regiments (air, tank, in some GRU units - I won’t say anything
      2. -2
        December 10 2017
        Quote: cavl
        So to speak
        You use the slang name, not the designation of a military specialty.

        This is the usual post of special radio communications officers in embassies and missions. By the way, very "low", judging by the rank corresponding to this position.
        Quote: cavl
        So the cryptographers, whom you call eights, are called specialists of the SPS (special communication units).

        "Eights" are usually called all those who are regularly included in the 8 departments (or departments). But those who are on the states of other structures, and engaged in ciphers and coding, are usually called differently.
  50. -3
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days).

    Especially for pseudo-experts - learn how it was in real conditions, and what cipher-notepads are:
    1. +5
      December 9 2017
      These are code tables that are simply called ciphers in the book.
      1. +6
        December 10 2017
        I agree. when the first article about cryptographers appeared in the 70s, it talked about a communications girl tortured by the Nazis. The teacher then emphasized that although the article dealt with ciphers, in fact they were encoding tables
  51. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Let's consider Directive No. 1, which is sent to FIVE districts and has numbers of outgoing cipher telegrams from 19942 to 19946. If we take as initial data that the intensity of cipher telegrams during the period from 1.1.41 to 21.6.41 on weekdays occurs evenly, and on Sundays 3 times lower (although not many military personnel at the General Staff rested at that time). In this case, we have 147 days of high intensity and 24,6 days off. In this case, 24,6 days off corresponds to another 8 days of high intensity. Only 155 days. Divide 19942 by 155 - that’s 129 outgoing encryption numbers per day.

    All these fantasies are easily shattered by the fact that when the FCS starts, a huge number of training codes are sent to all structures of the district, and the load on the code agency does not lend itself to any “average” statistics.
    1. +5
      December 10 2017
      It is not clear why we are talking about exercises. I spoke about the average workload of the headquarters with cipher correspondence and estimated the number of notebooks required for cipher telegrams. You distorted as usual
  52. -2
    December 9 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The vast majority of Red Army headquarters commanders were given cipher telegram notebooks for the working day with MANDATORY DELIVERY to the cipher authority at the end of the working day

    You're lying - nowhere was it indicated that at headquarters the notebooks with cipher telegrams were handed over to the cipher authority, because they were kept either in a safe or in a suitcase in secret, but not in the 8th department. All the suitcases will not fit in the room of eights - yes, you are a complete ignoramus in the question of how all this is organized in the districts and in the General Staff. Even work with a written encryption code is given a deadline, and it is not necessary to immediately submit it to the encryption authority if it is received at the end of the day.
    1. +6
      December 10 2017
      In principle, everything is correct. The delivery of the encryption unfinished depends on the classification of secrecy that the stated information has
    2. +8
      December 10 2017
      Perhaps your knowledge is valid in modern times. But the knowledge of the war and post-war times differs from the current state of affairs. In fact, the text set out in the cipher telegram project is a text that can be accessed by a limited number of people. Secret department workers did not belong to this category. Therefore, storing the encryption project in a sealed folder in a secret department in 1941 is unlikely.
      I think I originally wrote the wrong information. The performer had to hand over the unsigned encrypted telegram to the SHO. There is practically no information about that period. It is unlikely that you will be able to present facts that refute my words. My word against yours is worthless without facts. There is only one fact: who will users trust more?
      When checking the SHO of the General Staff of the Red Army, it was discovered that encryption in the interests of operational management was not stored under the supervision of the SHO. In other words, they were accessed by more people than they were intended for.
      1. -2
        December 11 2017
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        I think I originally wrote the wrong information. The performer had to hand over the unsigned encrypted telegram to the SHO.

        Yes, you don’t know this question at all because in the code pads of the district headquarters officers all unsigned codes are stored permanently, and are only periodically corrected if the situation changes. These are documents from the combat command, it’s even strange that you consider yourself a military pensioner, but don’t know the basic questions.
        There is practically no information about that period. It is unlikely that you will be able to present facts that refute my words. My word against yours is worthless without facts. There is only one fact: who will users trust more?

        I can imagine . At that time there was no ZAS equipment and therefore all classified information was transmitted only through a coded organ. There was no other way to hide information transmitted via technical means - or maybe you know about it and are hiding it from us? Of course, in later Soviet times, the 8th branches in parts already began to become obsolete, although they did not completely disappear.
  53. The comment was deleted.
  54. The comment was deleted.
  55. The comment was deleted.
  56. -3
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Again, Nonsense - this is not the naval attache of Vorontsov. It is known that Stalin met with General Tupikov, a military attaché in Germany, but this name is not in the magazine. If Stalin met with the naval attache, then his last name will be absent from the journal.

    Indeed, the question of whether Vorontsov’s name was included in the list of those visited in Stalin’s office has not yet been clarified, and according to established practice, the names of current residents could not be entered in the visit log. Tupikov was not in Stalin’s office on June 21 - you screwed that up. But the fact that Vorontsov was specially called from Berlin as a resident on the eve of the war is confirmed in the publication of the GRU General Staff:
  57. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    By ciphers - yes, by cipher technology - no - only by agreement, and this is true only in the post-war period. This was not the case before the war. Submit evidence to your words and I will agree with you

    Before the war, this could not have happened - the RU General Staff used manual encryption to work with agents and representative offices, because the dimensions of the encryption equipment were such that they could not be stored in hiding places. And not only because of this - you apparently have no idea how many copies of encryption technology were produced for the spacecraft.
  58. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    We are discussing the cipher service of the General Staff of the Red Army. The term "did not use the term"key tables or ciphers "

    You apparently are not aware that the RU General Staff used more advanced encryption methods than what was used in the 8th Department of the General Staff, but nevertheless, you did not come up with a fairy tale about how the accepted encryption was decrypted and encrypted again. If this happened, it was most likely in isolated cases when the information contained in it was called into question.
  59. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    This is not true, without coordination with the 8th Main Directorate of the USSR General Staff, the GRU could not develop equipment, because the GRU SHO worked, including according to regulatory documents, approved by the head of the 8th Main Directorate.

    No, you are not in the know, and you don’t know what undercover work is, and what and with whom the developers of special equipment were obliged to coordinate. By the way, Directorate 8 was not “Chief” in the General Staff, as you write.”approved by the head of the 8th Main Directorate"- and after that you are still trying to prove that you know the essence of relationships in the General Staff?
  60. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Reverse verification of a cipher telegram at least existed in the late forties. The first head of the Semipalatinsk test site talked about this quite a long time ago. A hotel was built next to the training ground headquarters, where L.P. Beria once lived. A code telegram was sent to him with a request at the end for a reverse check. The head of the SHO went to the hotel.

    You apparently did not understand that Beria was the head of another department, and it was from there that they asked for a reverse check, and not because it was an obligatory element of the work of the SHO of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Moreover, the SHO could have belonged to another People's Commissariat, so this check does not mean anything.
  61. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Yes, the RU Red Army created its own ciphers and methods of encrypting information. Only these elements are called CODES. For generally accepted information, they are called Ciphers for DISTINCTION.

    And again you demonstrate complete ignorance of the essence of the issue. It was in the Republic of Uzbekistan, without any 8th department of the General Staff, that coding tables were created, and then a coded message was superimposed on the encoded message, taken from those printed materials that were in free circulation in the host country. This is the ABC of intelligence work of those years, and it is connected with the fact that it was not necessary to use one-time keys and deliver them to the agent.
  62. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I think I originally wrote the wrong information. The performer had to hand over the unsigned encrypted telegram to the SHO.

    Whoops, we've arrived... And where do you think the unused training materials after the exercises that were not sent were handed over? Or the rejected ones, which were used as drafts for drawing up new ones, were they kept in a notebook until the second coming? It's strange that you even began to admit your stupidity.
  63. -2
    December 10 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:

    To process it, all SHOs use the same set of ciphers.
    If the same item has several numbers, then there are two options. Option 1 - Sht is sent to different addresses, with which there is only an individual communication scheme. Option 2 - to speed up the passage of the CT, they split it into several parts and encrypt each part separately using a manual cipher, which can be sent to recipients circularly.

    Splitting the CT into several does not in any way speed up the passage of encrypted information, but rather slows down the overall time for the information to reach the recipient. This method is used because there are restrictions on the maximum number of five-digit groups in telegrams received at the communication center.
  64. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Perhaps your knowledge is valid in modern times. But the knowledge of the war and post-war times differs from the current state of affairs.

    The fact of the matter is that when you look at scans of encryption codes from those years, and compare what you yourself had to deal with, you immediately see that the rules for their execution have not changed in any way, even the order of imposing resolutions is not at all different from the pre-war one.
  65. +8
    December 10 2017
    I'm surprised how you can distort the text and words of your interlocutor.

    1) CCSR “Whoa, here we come - you just thought my texts were nonsense about notebooks for cipher telegrams, which are commonly called “cipher notebooks” among staff officers, and now you suddenly found out that they existed before 1941, and were used in spacecraft. That’s a good sign - that means quickly changed your shoes in the air, and now you can pretend to be an “expert.” I could tell you why and when perforation appeared on modern notebooks, and why they changed the tear line, but you are such an “expert” that you will find this information yourself, if not you know. By the way, precisely because in the field it is difficult to tear off a sheet exactly along a ruler “on the knee”, perforation was introduced." The name “cipher pad” was not in common use among officers (who at that time were commanders - in case you get it wrong again) at headquarters, meaning a pad for coded telegrams This is your invention. Give facts. I just wrote that a cipher pad is a cipher pad - that’s what it says on it. But the notepad for “cipher telegrams” does not have this inscription. In general, there is only a number and there is not even a name “for encrypted telegrams”.
    There is no need to burden me with secondary information showing your importance.
    2) Before the war (in 1941), there was no such position as “GRU radio operators-cipher operators” - special radio communications officers in embassies and representative offices. You have again gone off topic behind a veil of supposed knowledge.
    3) “Eighters” are usually called all those who are part of 8 departments (or departments). But those who are on the staff of other structures and are engaged in ciphers and coding are usually called differently.
    Not true, they also call employees of the GRU encryption department. Again, this did not relate to the original topic about the messages of the author aKtoR. For those who read our messages, I will tell you the following. Initially, code departments (departments) were to wear the number six, but legitimate fears that they would be called "six-mi" led to the number eight.
    4) CCSR Indeed, the question of whether Vorontsov’s name was included in the list of those visited in Stalin’s office has not yet been clarified, and according to established practice, the names of current residents could not be entered in the visit log. Tupikov was not in Stalin’s office on June 21 - you screwed that up. But the fact that Vorontsov was specially called from Berlin as a resident on the eve of the war is confirmed in the publication of the GRU General Staff:
    There is no text in my message that General Tupikov visited Stalin on June 21 - again this is your fiction and distortion of facts.
    5) CCSR Before the war, this could not have happened - the RU General Staff used manual encryption to work with agents and representative offices, because the dimensions of the encryption equipment were such that they could not be stored in hiding places. And not only because of this - you apparently have no idea how many copies of encryption technology were produced for the spacecraft.
    If you read your exchange with aKtoR, you only learned from him about the presence of encryption technology in the General Staff. Of course, I am a military pensioner and I know much more about this, both about the dimensions of old equipment and about its quantity. maybe you can show your knowledge and write what the ciphers for this technique were. Not in general, but specifically with certain numbers? Your special communications specialist friend cannot know this, and you need to be able to find information on the Internet. For example, how many holes were there in the encryption tape?
    1. +9
      December 10 2017
      6) CCSR You apparently are not aware that the RU General Staff used more advanced encryption methods than what was used in the 8th Department of the General Staff, but nevertheless, you did not come up with a fairy tale about how the accepted encryption was decrypted and encrypted again. If this happened, it was most likely in isolated cases when the information contained in it was called into question.
      The methods are not advanced, but less crypto-resistant and less convenient for transmitting information at the troop level.
      Regarding double-checking, this is your personal opinion as an amateur. At that time, the cipher service was just getting started. As the author correctly noted, there were no degrees of urgency, there was not enough equipment, it was believed that there were plenty of enemies hidden around. Therefore, instead of the degree of urgency, the phrase “Transmit in code” or “Decrypt immediately” was used. During the war, when it was necessary to figure out at the communication center which encryption messages to send, the specified term was first introduced. In the same way, when the process of reverse checking due to the flow of information became impossible to carry out - the war unexpectedly turned out to be fleeting, requiring quick decisions and numerous instructions - they introduced checking directly in the encryption department equipped with encryption equipment. Simply after encrypting the telegram, a second specialist deciphered it and checked the text. Only after this the encryption was handed over to the communication center. It took time to get to this point, to understand the fallacy of some of the guidelines.
      7) CCSRNo, you are not in the know, and you don’t know what undercover work is, and what and with whom the developers of special equipment were obliged to coordinate. By the way, the 8th Directorate was not “Chief” in the General Staff, as you write, “approved by the head of the 8th Main Staff” - and after that you are still trying to prove that you know the essence of relationships in the General Staff?
      Yes, management was not the main thing, you are right. Regarding the encryption technology for the group, which was not agreed upon with the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, please provide a link. If it is not there, then your words against mine are zero.
      8) CCSR And again you demonstrate complete ignorance of the essence of the issue. It was in the Republic of Uzbekistan, without any 8th department of the General Staff, that coding tables were created, and then a coded message was superimposed on the encoded message, taken from those printed materials that were in free circulation in the host country. This is the ABC of intelligence work of those years, and it is connected with the fact that it was not necessary to use one-time keys and deliver them to the agent.
      To credit this remark of yours, I ask for a link; if not, again with zeros - failure
      9) CCSR Whoops, we've arrived... And where do you think the unused training materials after the exercises that were not sent were handed over? Or the rejected ones, which were used as drafts for drawing up new ones, were they kept in a notebook until the second coming? It's strange that you even began to admit your stupidity.
      Why did you even include training codes in the 1941 topic? In our time, it is generally unknown how cryptographer training was conducted. If you have facts, please provide them.
      It is only known that there were training cipher pads - they are characterized by the fact that they were made in one copy and encrypted and decrypted telegrams both manually and on a typewriter in only one school. May be different specialists.
      The process of destroying damaged sheets of a notebook of cipher telegrams, the training ciphers themselves and ciphers for working with them is regulated - destruction with two signatures - one of them is the duty officer at the SHO who kept these documents.
      10) CCSR Splitting the CT into several does not in any way speed up the passage of encrypted information, but rather slows down the overall time for the information to reach the recipient. This method is used because there are restrictions on the maximum number of five-digit groups in telegrams received at the communication center.
      Let's just say you're confusing the chicken and the eggs. The limitation on the length of the encryption became a limitation at the communication node, and not vice versa. Acceleration certainly occurs. The SHO employs several people. When breaking down the encryption, 2-4 specialists can work with it at once, depending on the length (number of sheets) and the number of recipients. If we take Directive No. 1 as an example (you’re already tired of nitpicking that it doesn’t have a number - this is clear to everyone and won’t add points to your omniscience), which is written on three sheets. When working with it using a manual code, each sheet can be given to one specialist. Telegram processing speed will increase three times. And it doesn’t matter how many ciphers are required for this. Each part will be less than the maximum length. By the way, how much is it? There is no requirement that the set of ciphers be used in full. Partial use of tapes or tables is allowed.
      When working with encryption technology, sheets are simply transferred from one performer to another - here the number of people is no longer important. The speed of work on the equipment is significantly higher and amounts to minutes, not tens of minutes. I wonder why some people don't get it the first time?
      11) CCSR The fact of the matter is that when you look at scans of encryption codes from those years, and compare what you yourself had to deal with, you immediately see that the rules for their execution have not changed in any way, even the order of imposing resolutions is not at all different from the pre-war one.
      I’m not ready to answer anything on this question - I haven’t thought about it
      1. +7
        December 10 2017
        Let’s just say, I apologize for the incontinence, but I don’t want to discuss with you anymore - it requires a lot of nerves. The messages contain a wealth of information that you will not find on the Internet. Somehow it is not customary to write something that is outdated.
        There was also your remark about the tables for Special Forces, but those groups and detachments that existed on 21.6.41/1/XNUMX could not relate (their connection) to the operational-tactical level. And we talked about the transfer of Directive No. XNUMX from the General Staff - you should not provide data that is not related to the topic under consideration. Tomorrow or the day after tomorrow your second profile will open and you will be happy
        1. 0
          December 11 2017
          Quote: 8Schlaf
          Tomorrow or the day after tomorrow your second profile will open and you will be happy

          I have one profile - keep your fantasies to yourself.
        2. -2
          December 11 2017
          Quote: 8Schlaf
          The methods are not advanced, but less crypto-resistant and less convenient for transmitting information at the troop level.

          Yes, you can’t drag something like this with you across the fields: "M-100" (total weight of a set of 3 main and 7 auxiliary devices - 141 kg)
          By the way, regarding stability - the Germans were able to read our agent encryption only after capturing the radio operator during work. So take it easy on the “less crypto-resistant” part.
          . Simply after encrypting the telegram, a second specialist deciphered it and checked the text. Only after this the encryption was handed over to the communication center. It took time to get to this point, to understand the fallacy of some of the guidelines.

          In this case, you just demonstrated the verification of encryption technology “on yourself”, so as not to get stuck later during the investigation. This has virtually no effect on the total time it takes for encryption to reach the performer, since such a check is carried out very quickly, and the only thing you can find here is an incorrect key entry or a technical failure of the equipment itself.
          Let's just say you're confusing the chicken and the eggs. The limitation on the length of the encryption became a limitation at the communication node, and not vice versa.

          This is what you think, but in fact, these restrictions were most likely introduced due to the length of the key - it looks like you taught the theory poorly, or completely forgot. When developing communication rules, signalmen could take into account the recommendations given by NKVD cryptographers when developing ciphers for spacecraft.
  66. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Why did you even include training codes in the 1941 topic? In our time, it is generally unknown how cryptographer training was conducted. If you have facts, please provide them.

    Study at your leisure, “expert”; by the way, it says about the prosecutor:
    ORDER ON IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES ON COMMAND
    AON-2 FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE WAR GAME DIRECTIVE
    IN VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED ORDER
    No. 0044 August 26, 1939

    ...As a result, the directive developed by brigade commander Comrade Kotelnikov in the assignment and handed over to the command staff of the army headquarters without reservations and labeled “training” acquired a clearly provocative character.
    The provocative significance of the directive was further aggravated after the head of the 1st headquarters department, Major Avdonin, who received the directive from the chief of staff for final implementation, supplemented it at his own discretion with specific instructions to the units and signed the Army Military Council.
    The head of the encryption service of the army headquarters, Major Khozevich, allegedly for the purpose of training the encryption departments subordinate to him, without the knowledge or permission of the command and without warning the recipients about the training nature of the directive, sent it to the headquarters of army military formations not participating in the game, thanks to which the directive acquired the character of a valid operational document.
    Major Khozevich, wanting to hide his crime, during the investigation process, marked the copies of the directive remaining at army headquarters with the stamp “training”, while the copy delivered to the brigade did not have the indicated stamp.
    This criminal attitude to the matter on the part of the above-mentioned responsible staff commanders led to the fact that the headquarters of one of the air brigades, having received this document, began to carry out the task of the provocative document, and only a simple accident helped the brigade commander to establish the true purpose of the directive he received.
    ... 4. The head of the encryption service of the army headquarters, Major Comrade Khozevich, who on his own initiative sent out a document to military formations that did not take part in the game and is trying to hide his crime through forgery, is removed from his post and the case about him is transferred to the investigative authorities.

    https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Приказ_НКО_СССР_от
    _26.08.1939_№_0044
  67. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    There is no text in my message that General Tupikov visited Stalin on June 21 - again this is your fiction and distortion of the facts.

    Well, why did you drag him in if we were talking about a resident of the NKVMF intelligence service who arrived in Moscow on June 21? so, to raise your rating?
  68. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    If you read your exchange with aKtoR, you only learned from him about the presence of encryption technology in the General Staff. Of course, I am a military pensioner and I know much more about this, both about the dimensions of old equipment and about its quantity.

    Don’t talk nonsense - several years ago I argued about this at a meeting with a figure who recently published a book on his answers to Pokrovsky. The funny thing is that you don’t even know the total number of vehicles produced and their weight, which, by the way, was unacceptable where there were no vehicles. That's why RU didn't use this technique at that time.
  69. -1
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    There was also your remark about the tables for Special Forces, but those groups and detachments that existed on 21.6.41/XNUMX/XNUMX could not relate (their connection) to the operational-tactical level.

    Radio-enabled reconnaissance and sabotage groups received coding tables and codes - I gave you an example with a radio operator from a partisan detachment. Read Starov, then you will find out when they curtailed the program for training agents to work in the territories left behind by the enemy - this was before the war.
  70. -2
    December 10 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Regarding double-checking, this is your personal opinion as an amateur. At that time, the cipher service was just getting started.

    In fact, it began to develop twenty years earlier, and if we take into account the experience of the army of the Russian Empire, then even more.
  71. -2
    December 11 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    In addition, the leader could leave the Kremlin after 23 pm. It turns out that I. Stalin trusted the military so much and “did not interfere in their affairs” that he did not look at the Directive?

    Why should he look at this internal directive of the People's Commissariat of Defense if he gave instructions to Tymoshenko as the head of the country? The author apparently does not quite understand that any verbal instruction from the head of government automatically becomes an order for any people's commissar (minister). That is why Stalin, having heard Tymoshenko, limited himself to only giving instructions on its essence - it is not the tsar’s business to bother checking the final text of such a directive.

    Who could edit the text of the draft ST after it was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff? Only the person who expressed his proposals in Stalin’s office is Semyon Budyonny. He was sent a copy that was not in the ShT mailing list.

    This is enchanting stupidity - after the People's Commissar signs any document, no one can edit it at all, except the People's Commissar himself, or the person to whom he gave the ORDER to make changes to the already signed document. But in any case, this will require resubmitting the corrected document to the People's Commissar. These are the basics of military service, and Budyonny, no matter what rank he had, would not have done this, i.e. what is commonly called official forgery.
  72. +11
    December 12 2017
    I liked the article. As a former employee of the cunning department, I will say once again that the events described in the fourth part of encryption communications may be close to the truth. 8Schlas user's comments are true. Comments from user CCSR, aka V.O. correspond to the knowledge of a person who does not know the true state of affairs. He has certain information from people standing next to the workers of 8 departments, but not from the workers themselves. Personally, his outpourings do not inspire confidence in me. Since his messages are not marked by practically other users, he writes them for himself. I suggest that you no longer correspond with him.
    He's in the tank guys
  73. -1
    December 12 2017
    Quote: cavl
    As a former employee of the cunning department, I will say once again that the events described in the fourth part of encryption communications may be close to the truth.

    Why is it that “may be” not definitely, since you are such a specialist? There are no two types of truth - you have to decide, at least for yourself, where is truth and where is fantasy.
    8Schlas user's comments are true.

    Please clarify what. Is it that the passage of an order transmitted from the General Staff to the district on the eve of the war in the form of an encrypted telegram will happen faster if the encryptors split it into three separate encrypted telegrams, or that this will reduce the work time of the encryptors, but increase the total time of passage through communication channels?

    Comments from user CCSR, aka V.O. correspond to the knowledge of a person who does not know the true state of affairs.

    Wake up - ccsr is not V.O., no matter how much you might like it. It is amazing that this nonsense is being uttered here by those who consider themselves experts on military topics.
    He has certain information from people standing next to the workers of 8 departments, but not from the workers themselves.

    You are too self-confident - I just had to work with them at a level to which you were definitely not allowed.
    Personally, his outpourings do not inspire confidence in me. Since his messages are not marked by practically other users, he writes them for himself. I suggest that you no longer correspond with him.
    He's in the tank guys

    You didn’t see anything further than your “kibitka”, that’s why you don’t know what encryption systems were used besides the “octagons” of the General Staff. And they imagine themselves to be a major theorist...
  74. -2
    December 12 2017
    Author: aKtoR writes

    In 23-45 a draft got to the SHO. The typist to 23-50 printed copies. One copy was taken away by S. Budyonny, and the draft Directive went to the cryptographers.

    This is complete stupidity, because the typist reproduced an already signed directive, which was ACCEPTED by the cipher authority for sending, and it was not a draft, which she would not have been able to understand without the performer (just look at the scan), but a final corrected text rewritten and rewritten by hand directives b/n. This signed original directive has not yet appeared anywhere, because it is stored in the archives of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff (if it was not destroyed earlier).
  75. -2
    December 12 2017
    Due to the fact that some “historians” here began to spread rumors that supposedly there was a small volume of transmitted encrypted messages, and officers of large headquarters did not have notebooks of encrypted telegrams with pre-prepared unsigned orders, I offer a scan of the KOVO encrypted telegram so that you can see what is going on speech and how it really happened.
    1. The cipher telegram was written in advance, this is obvious at least from the edits and from the fact that Purkaev’s last name is included, but his signature is not there.
    2. The pre-written text exactly corresponds to the instructions of the General Staff directive, which provides instructions for drawing up cover plans, and how army cover plans should be introduced.
    3. A draft of this encryption, created in advance, could be kept by the performer - this is evidenced by the vertical inscription, which indicates that it is submitted at the same time, i.e. the performer could have kept an unsigned encryption and its draft in his suitcase.
    4. The attached receipt from the communication node confirms that the encryption has reached the recipient nodes.
    5. In addition to this encryption, there were many more encryption with directive instructions in case of war, which were prepared in advance and stored in the suitcases of officers of the district headquarters.
    6. Circulation of forms - 5000 pieces per ONE order in one district in peacetime. Hello to those who talked here about the small volume of encrypted telegrams at the General Staff.
  76. -2
    December 12 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    It is not noted in N. Kuznetsov’s memoirs that the People’s Commissar of Defense dictated the text of the Directive from a sheet of paper and, therefore, the Directive was born in this office. Below it will be shown that the version of Directive No. 1, shown to N. Kuznetsov, consisted of two sheets. Why then did Admiral N. Kuznetsov write: “Several sheets of a large notebook lay to the left of him [Zhukov]”? These may have been drafts of previous versions of this document. This suggests that before the trip to the Kremlin, the leaders of the spacecraft did not have a draft Directive and it was not ruled by I. Stalin. After returning from the Kremlin, they also did not have a complete understanding of what should be reflected in the Directive for troops. How could this even happen?

    The author of the article apparently does not remember what she wrote about earlier, because, referring to Zhukov’s memoirs, she claims that her project was brought to Stalin for a report:
    I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I. Stalin...
    “Come with the People's Commissar for minutes in 45 to the Kremlin,” said Stalin.
    Taking with him the draft directive to the troops, together with the People's Commissar and Lieutenant General N. Vatutin, we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed at all costs to achieve a decision to put the troops on combat readiness...

    I will only note that the author of the article has no idea how this happened in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, taking into account the fact that there is a procedure when someone going to report to the boss prepares in ADVANCE a draft solution to the issue, or even a backup option, if suddenly the situation is not so clear-cut. So the author’s conclusion that Zhukov did not have a draft directive before his trip to the Kremlin is absurd - this is refuted by Zhukov’s memoirs and the established practice of reporting to senior commanders, which still exists.
  77. +13
    December 12 2017
    For some reason I meet quite reasonable people. You always think about a person that all is not lost. Even if a person is in a tank or an armored train, you think that he was not hit several times by the armored cover. I'll try to answer the comments one last time.
    1) CCSR Why is it that “may be” not definitely, since you are such a specialist? There are no two types of truth - you have to decide, at least for yourself, where is truth and where is fantasy.
    There is very little complete information left about the work of the encryption service specialists of that time (1941). The workers left almost no memories. In Soviet times, only excerpts from the memoirs of veterans of that period were published. Even in the museum of the encryption service, all the questions that we discussed in this topic will not be answered. That's why I used the term "can be"We discussed it with colleagues and came to the conclusion that this could be the case. Regarding your comments, we came to the opposite conclusion.

    2) CCSR "8Schlas user's comments are true."
    Please clarify what. Is it that the passage of an order transmitted from the General Staff to the district on the eve of the war in the form of an encrypted telegram will happen faster if the encryptors split it into three separate encrypted telegrams, or that this will reduce the work time of the encryptors, but increase the total time of passage through communication channels?
    I'll try to explain in detail. User 8Schlas first considered the option of transferring the so-called manual cipher. Directives No. 1. According to my estimate, when transmitted by hand cipher, this directive covers more than 600 groups. This encryption method was a backup method during Soviet times. Therefore, I agree that it takes about one hour to encrypt such a text. With the work of three specialists, the encryption time will be reduced to approximately 21-22 minutes (you will need to enter a small piece of official information), but you will get three encryptions. The transmission time via telegraph is incomparably shorter than manual encryption. The increase in transmitted information will increase by no more than 20-30 groups - about two minutes. The total time for information transmission, if you do not take into account the time for official correspondence between telegraph operators, will be reduced by 26 minutes. Almost half.
    The second option, which was considered by the user 8Schlas, is encryption using a cipher machine. I also heard about the lack of circular communication between the SHOs equipped with encryption machines in 1941. The author of aKtoR rated the same directive at 205 groups. According to his estimates, the time for one encryption during encryption should be 6,2 minutes. When encrypting text for five counties, the total time is 31 minutes. If two encryptors work, they will need 18,6 and 12,4 minutes for 3 and 2 encryptions. The gain of time is obvious. The transmission time at the communication center will remain unchanged.
    Therefore, I wrote that the comments of the user 8Schlas are true. The standards are true. In 1941, they worked on cipher tapes of shorter length than in Soviet times. Therefore, it took more time just to change the ciphers. I had to work on equipment when the speed of work was limited by the technical capabilities of the equipment. Therefore, I cannot challenge the above standards from the author of aKtoR, but I wonder how the girl knows this.
    1. +13
      December 12 2017
      3) CCSR Wake up - ccsr is not V.O.
      No one has yet canceled phraseological units. This is especially noticeable in your long texts and the way you end comments with evil irony.

      4) CCSR You too self-confident - I just had to work with them at a level to which you were definitely not allowed.
      It is not true. All your knowledge is about special communications. You can't prove otherwise. Many people on forums try to pass themselves off as great specialists. In general, I don’t believe it (my colleagues neither)

      5) CCSR aKtoR: At 23:45 the draft got into the SHO. The typist had printed the copies by 23:50 p.m. One copy was taken to S. Budyonny, and the draft Directive was sent to the cryptographers.
      CCSR: This is complete stupidity, because the typist reproduced an already signed directive, which was ACCEPTED by the cipher authority for sending, and it was not a draft, which she would not have been able to understand without the performer (just look at the scan), but it was finally worked out and rewritten by hand corrected text of the directive b/n. This signed original directive has not yet appeared anywhere, because it is stored in the archives of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff (if it was not destroyed earlier).

      What is your evidence? That's what the hero said in the movie "Red Heat". In your message you are trying to explain in your own words why there is no original encryption. Why should I believe you? Are you psychic? Can you talk to spirits? At the same time, send a message to the author: “If you have the courage to comment on declassified encryption, then you probably need to present at least a scan of it so that readers can understand what document you are talking about. If you have a scan of the encryption, please post it here." Do you have the courage to post a scan of Directive No. 1, which you wrote about? Your comment means nothing.
      Further. User 8Schlas posted a message that the General Staff, during an inspection on June 30, 1941, discovered an encryption “the department sometimes accepts texts of encrypted telegrams that are not handwritten by the performers, but typed in several copies in a typewriting bureau”. Have you ever wondered what document the typist typed the text from (with the indicated violations) and how they understood the authors’ marks? You might think that the performer dictates the text to the typists from a blank sheet of paper. Believe me, this is impossible to do in a machine bureau. It is obvious that there was a violation when the performer prepared the text on unaccounted sheets in the school or did not want to rewrite the corrected text again (he was a big boss). You don’t have to believe me, because neither I nor you will know for sure. I also may not believe your assumptions. What you wrote has not been proven
      The fact that the typist couldn’t figure out what to type from the draft is not entirely true. I can read the entire text of the third sheet, and so can you (if you couldn’t read it, that’s actually your problem). Experienced typists were able to decipher such difficult-to-read handwriting with blots that it was simply amazing. I believe that this remark of yours is also not proven.
      1. +13
        December 12 2017
        6) CCSR Due to the fact that some “historians” here began to spread rumors that supposedly there was a small volume of transmitted encrypted messages, and officers of large headquarters did not have notebooks of encrypted telegrams with pre-prepared unsigned orders, I offer a scan of the KOVO encrypted telegram so that you can see what is going on speech and how it really happened.
        1. The cipher telegram was written in advance, this is obvious at least from the edits and from the fact that Purkaev’s last name is included, but his signature is not there.

        The fact that it was written in advance is not at all obvious, but this is your assumption. For example, on some combat reports from PRIBOVO, which date from June 22 to 24, there is no signature of Chief of Staff Klenov, but there are signatures of Kuznetsov and Dibrova. The problem is that KOVO cryptographers passed an order with Purkaev’s name (without his signature), and this is a violation.

        I can say something different from a lantern, and without facts you won’t be able to prove that it’s a lie: For example, after receiving information about the rise of troops on June 22, the executor was given the command to write the text of the encryption. The text is short, there are not many recipients (the 24th reserve MK - only encryption number 9 was sent to him). Corrections were made in pencil by someone from the management of the operations department or the deputy chief of staff. For some reason, Purkaev was unable to sign the document. The document was sent at 9:33. Your proof has been made out of thin air. Not proven.
        Small amount of encryption. For example, PRIBOVO when sending directive No. 1 is one of number 70!
        V ZAPOVO 5203. This is a small amount of encryption. In Soviet times, in peacetime, over 60000 encryption messages passed through the General Staff per year. The numbers of Directive No. 1 from the General Staff are over 19000 - this is a large volume of encryption compared to the districts. Everything is so clear that your nitpicking is obvious.
        1. +13
          December 12 2017
          CCSR 2. The pre-written text exactly corresponds to the instructions of the General Staff directive, which provides instructions for drawing up cover plans, and how army cover plans should be introduced.
          From the encryption we can only say that the wording corresponds to the wording from the General Staff documents on drawing up cover plans. And that’s all, no conclusion can be drawn about any pre-written text. The encryption text and number are made in similar ink. Writing draft codes and registering them with the SHO without submitting them for dispatch is a gross violation. There are no facts to prove your words - not proven
          3. A draft of this encryption, created in advance, could be kept by the performer - this is evidenced by the vertical inscription, which indicates that it is submitted at the same time, i.e. the performer could have kept an unsigned encryption and its draft in his suitcase.
          It might not have been stored if the text was written on the morning of June 22. Without facts, it's just your speculation.
          The vertical inscription only says that if the performer first prepared a draft on one sheet of the encryption notebook, and then copied it onto another sheet where he collected the signatures, then he must submit both sheets to the SHO. It happened that Unicoms wrote a draft encryption in one notebook, and then, in order to go to the commander for a signature, they copied it into another notebook, so that the commander knew how easily, quickly and correctly the officer wrote telegrams. It was easier to destroy the draft sheets and then go for a signature. You say one thing, I will say that on the form there is a reminder for fools. Your conclusion is not proven.
          In addition to this encryption, there were many more encryption with directive instructions in case of war, which were prepared in advance and stored in the suitcases of officers of the district headquarters.
          This is how our writers draw unexpected conclusions without evidence.

          6. Circulation of forms - 5000 pieces per ONE order in one district in peacetime. Hello to those who talked here about the small volume of encrypted telegrams at the General Staff.
          This once again shows your lack of knowledge of the work of not only the encryption service, but also the communication centers of the Soviet period.
          5000 forms are 100 notepads for cipher telegrams. Please note that there is no order date anywhere on the form. We can assume that 1104 is an order dated April 11 (we don’t know what year). But this number may have nothing to do with the date at all. For example, at our army headquarters, bound notebooks for outgoing CTs and forms for incoming CTs came from the district headquarters. About a third of the double-door safe was filled with forms and notepads. Personally, can you provide information about when this order was printed? Where else was he going besides the district headquarters?? How many months or years of SHO operation is it designed for? For example, at the headquarters of ZAPOVO there was a school of cryptographers. Was there a similar school at the KOVO headquarters? How many forms did they need for training? How many pages on average were required per encryption during that period? This data is currently unknown to us. How can you draw conclusions based on such information? It's simple manipulation of certain information to suit one’s interests
          1. +14
            December 12 2017
            7) CCSR The author of the article apparently does not remember what she wrote about earlier, because referring to Zhukov’s memoirs, she (aKtoR) claims that her project was brought to Stalin for a report
            aKtoR: I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I. Stalin...
            “Come with the People's Commissar for minutes in 45 to the Kremlin,” said Stalin.
            Taking with them the draft directive to the troops, together with the people's commissar and lieutenant-general N. Vatutin we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed to at any cost achieve a decision on bringing the troops on alert ...
            CCSR I will only note that the author of the article has no idea how this happened in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, taking into account the fact that there is a procedure when someone going to report to the boss prepares in ADVANCE a draft solution to the issue, or even a backup option, if suddenly the situation is not so clear-cut. So the author’s conclusion that Zhukov did not have a draft directive before his trip to the Kremlin is absurd - this is refuted by Zhukov’s memoirs and the established practice of reporting to senior commanders, which still exists.


            Once again you are distorting and distorting the facts.. The author's version is interesting and there are moments that are difficult to explain with the generally accepted version of those events.
            The author of aKtoR initially gives G.K. Zhukov’s version of events according to his memoirs, and then considers his own alternative version. According to the author, the directive was written after a reception with Stalin in the Kremlin. In this case, G.K. Zhukov and Tymoshenko simply did not have a draft directive upon arrival in the Kremlin. It's strange that everyone figured it out, but you didn't. I repeat once again - your text is a deception of users. In vain. Almost no one looks at this page anymore, except for extremely interested people. It's already outdated. This is noticeable by the sharp decrease in the number of likes. Those who have recently read the comments of the discussion DO NOT SUPPORT you.
            You write that this is refuted by the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov. Is there any documentary evidence of your words?

            For example, text from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov:
            The enemy managed to concentrate more than ten thousand bayonets on Mount Bain-Tsagan; Soviet troops were able to concentrate more than a thousand bayonets; Japanese forces had about 100 guns and up to 60 anti-tank guns. We have a little more than 50 guns, including those supporting from the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.
            However, the 11th heroic tank brigade, which had up to 150 tanks, the 7th motorized armored brigade, which had 154 armored vehicles, and the 8th Mongolian armored division, armed with 45-mm cannons, fought in our ranks.
            Thus, our main trump card was armored formations, and we decided to immediately take advantage of this in order to immediately defeat the Japanese troops that had just crossed, preventing them from burying themselves in the ground and organizing anti-tank defense. It was impossible to delay the counterattack, since the enemy, having discovered the approach of our tank units, began to quickly take measures for defense and began to bomb the columns of our tanks. And they had nowhere to hide - for hundreds of kilometers around there was absolutely open terrain, devoid of even bushes.
            At 9:15 a.m. we met with the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, M.P. Yakovlev, who was with the main forces of the vanguard battalion and led its actions. After discussing the situation, they decided to call in all aviation, speed up the movement of tanks and artillery, and attack the enemy no later than 10 hours and 45 minutes. At 10:45 the main forces of the 11th Tank Brigade turned around and attacked the Japanese troops on the move.
            Here is what Japanese soldier Nakamura wrote about these events in his diary on July 3: [166]
            “Several dozen tanks suddenly attacked our units. We were in terrible confusion, the horses neighed and ran away, dragging the limbers of the guns behind them; cars rushed in all directions. 2 of our planes were shot down in the air. The entire personnel lost heart. In the vocabulary of Japanese soldiers, the words “scary”, “sad”, “lost in spirit”, “became creepy” are used more and more often.
            The battle continued day and night on July 4th. Only by 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5 was enemy resistance finally broken, and Japanese troops began to hastily retreat to the crossing. But the crossing was blown up by their own sappers, who feared a breakthrough by our tanks. Japanese officers threw themselves in full gear straight into the water and immediately drowned, literally in front of our tank crews.
            The remnants of the Japanese troops that captured Mount Bain-Tsagan were completely destroyed on the eastern slopes of the mountain in the area of ​​the decline of the Khalkhin Gol River. Thousands of corpses, a mass of dead horses, many crushed and broken guns, mortars, machine guns and vehicles covered Mount Bayin-Tsagan.


            In fact, everything was not as good as described in the book. I discovered this after reading the third part and surfing the net. Therefore, how can you confirm Zhukov’s words? What if he wrote a lie again? There is currently no documentary evidence of the writing of Directive No. 1 in the Kremlin.

            There is also no explanation for the presence on one of the sheets of the draft (or non-draft) of the mention of two cryptographers. It was correctly written above: one signature means acceptance of the encryption by the duty officer or his deputy in the encryption department of the General Staff, and the second – the person encrypting the text. I cannot exclude the fact that the text could have been received not by the duty officer or his deputy, but by a cipher clerk who was given such authority. There were contenders, and such a development of events was allowed by the instructions for the cipher service in the post-war period. Once again, we can only speculate about those events. So your statement is not proven. This is just your guess. You can assume what comes into your head, and you attack aKtoR for similar assumptions. You may be a genius, but we don’t take your word for it.
            The question can be posed this way: who should we trust, G.K. Zhukov or S.M. Budyonny? Personally, I would like to believe S.M. Budyonny.
            What else did I pay attention to? Kutsnetsov:
            The chief of the General Staff, G. Zhukov, was sitting at the table and, without stopping, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notepad lay to his left
            Did Zhukov write the encryption on plain sheets of paper? This is the same violation, the sheets are not numbered - another violation. Nothing prevented him, as the curator of the encryption service, from further violating the requirements of the manual as part of the delivery of the text of this directive................................... .........
            .......
            1. -2
              December 13 2017
              Quote: cavl
              Did Zhukov write the encryption on plain sheets of paper? This is the same violation, the sheets are not numbered - another violation.

              Where did you get the idea that Zhukov did not have blank sheets recorded in the code organ for preparing drafts? At a later time, cipher telegram notepads located in the suitcases of the performers were used for this.

              Nothing prevented him, as the curator of the encryption service, from further violating the requirements of the manual as part of the delivery of the text of this directive

              With this approach, he himself could have been handed over to the NKVD - they oversaw the work rules of army cryptographers, an extract from the report of the counterintelligence bodies temporarily transferred to the NGO was already given here. And Zhukov was the direct boss of all cryptographers in the NPO, and not a curator.
          2. -2
            December 13 2017
            Quote: cavl
            It happened that Unicoms wrote a draft encryption in one notebook, and then, in order to go to the commander for a signature, they copied it into another notebook, so that the commander knew how easily, quickly and correctly the officer wrote telegrams.

            I don’t know why you are fantasizing, but it’s immediately clear that you yourself have never prepared encryption for your boss’s signature. Firstly, the performer is usually given one pad of encrypted telegrams, and if it runs out you immediately receive a new one.
            Secondly, the executor can destroy all drafts from the notebook even before he submits the executed order for signature.
            Why then does the performer need a second notebook of encrypted telegrams, especially if the suitcase is already full?
            In addition to this encryption, there were many more encryption with directive instructions in case of war, which were prepared in advance and stored in the suitcases of officers of the district headquarters.
            This is how our writers draw unexpected conclusions without evidence.

            I don’t even want to prove anything to you, but it will be better if you yourself find some senior officer from the departments of the border district (Soviet groups of troops) and ask how it was in Soviet times. The answer will refute your speculations. Let me remind you that officers are on vacation, sick or on business trips, and for example, someone assigned to one army may receive a command to take over another army. That’s when preparations will be needed to instantly send the necessary orders to the two armies. You were taught bad things during commander training at the headquarters of your army - apparently it was “paper”, having at best one fully deployed division, and everything else was castrated.
        2. -2
          December 12 2017
          Quote: cavl
          The fact that it was written in advance is not at all obvious, but this is your assumption. For example, on some combat reports from PRIBOVO, which date from June 22 to 24, there is no signature of Chief of Staff Klenov, but there are signatures of Kuznetsov and Dibrova.

          This is not obvious to you, because you yourself have never prepared orders in peacetime. By the way, combat reports could be signed by one person, even an acting commander, if there were no corresponding commanders at the time the report was submitted - this is not important during the war. But the procedure and text for sending encryption for entering a cover plan was approved by the People's Commissar of Defense - see the district cover plans, where the officials who sign these encryptions are indicated.
        3. -2
          December 12 2017
          Quote: cavl
          For example, after receiving information about the rise of troops on June 22, the executor was given the command to write the text of the encryption. The text is short, there are not many recipients (the 24th reserve MK - only encryption number 9 was sent to him). Corrections were made in pencil by someone from the management of the operations department or the deputy chief of staff. For some reason, Purkaev was unable to sign the document.

          Well, if you yourself had ever executed such documents after your boss assigned you a task, then I assure you that he would have given you a hard time if, after his instructions, you had to change the text of the order in such a way. Are you familiar with staff culture at all? This is not a collective farm, but a high-level headquarters.
          If you knew who kept the documents on the cover-up plan, then you would know why Purkaev’s signature is not there - they were in his safe, and he signed it, having previously made signatures of other persons on it. Eh, you, an expert on staff affairs, are trying to prove something else to me...
      2. -2
        December 13 2017
        Quote: cavl
        No one has yet canceled phraseological units. This is especially noticeable in your long texts and the way you end comments with evil irony.

        And yet, you have shown yourself to be a complete amateur in phraseological units, because once again I tell you that I am not who you take me for.
        In general, I don’t believe it (my colleagues neither)

        I don’t know who you are and who your colleagues are, but I can say with a 95% probability that you were not even a senior officer of any department of the district headquarters, and you have not studied the theory of signal transmission at all, otherwise you would have immediately understood what mistakes some people are making here "specialists".
        Why should I believe you? Are you psychic? Can you talk to spirits?

        I did not ask you to believe me - I simply stated what was obvious to me, looking at the cipher telegrams of those years. You cannot understand them, and as V.V. Slavin correctly noted, this is not given to you.
      3. -2
        December 13 2017
        Quote: cavl
        Further. User 8Schlas posted a message that during an inspection at the General Staff on June 30, 1941, it was discovered that the encryption department “sometimes accepts texts of cipher telegrams that are not handwritten by the performers, but typed in several copies in a typewritten bureau.” Have you ever wondered what document the typist typed the text from (with the indicated violations) and how they understood the authors’ marks?

        I thought about it and I can definitely say that this mess was a consequence of the fact that the “eights” were included in the operational command shortly before the Second World War, which could not have been done, and which was corrected after the start of the war.
        Experienced typists were able to decipher such difficult-to-read handwriting with blots that it was simply amazing. I believe that this remark of yours is also not proven.

        You will be tortured in the machine bureau by running around to call a typist if you write like a chicken with its paw in the workbook for the machine bureau. And the eldest one will complain. secret part, and he will pour out his soul to your boss, after which you will first be given a mild punishment, but if you cannot correct yourself, you will end up in the annual order after checking the office work. Or they will print the documents themselves - this also happens.
        1. +4
          December 14 2017
          I will say this: you are right! What kind of staff culture can a retired senior commanding officer have who has served on staff for almost 22 years?! Complete bureaucrat!!
          Judging by what you say about staff work, you are either a former officer of the political department, or served in small headquarters - up to a regiment, or you know everything well from books and publications.
          Here are three trick questions:
          1) Your text: “You will be tortured in the machine bureau by running around to call the typist if you write in the workbook for the machine bureau like a chicken with its paw. And the older one will complain to the head of the secret part, and he will pour out his soul to your boss, after which you will first be given a mild punishment, but you will not be able to correct yourself, so you will end up in the annual order after checking the paperwork. Or they will print the documents themselves - this also happens.“Let me remind you that previously we were talking about typing outgoing encryption text at headquarters by high-ranking officials with the consent of the cryptographers. Will your words be correct in the post-war period?
          2) why in the post-war period (somewhere until the 80s) they practically did not issue notepads for encrypted telegrams in work briefcases? You write the opposite - in your opinion, almost all officers carried these notebooks. For example, at our army headquarters we constantly had only 4 such notebooks on hand - 2 of them in the intelligence department.
          3) Did you post the text from the encryption form about submitting the encryption and draft to the SHO? Why do you need to submit a draft? Why, in the post-war period, were not (almost all) performers allowed to keep draft codes in their work briefcase in a secret part of the headquarters? What kind of beast is the term "Cipher Compromise"

          There are a lot of clues; it’s easy for a person close to special communications who worked in the 70s to figure it out and answer correctly. A person who knows this after the mid-80s will not be able to answer correctly. You just need to think
          1. -2
            December 14 2017
            Quote: cavl
            Judging by what you say about staff work, you are either a former officer of the political department, or served in small headquarters - up to a regiment, or you know everything well from books and publications.

            Past the cash register - you can’t even understand my texts correctly, otherwise you would immediately understand what stupidity you have hidden in this conclusion.
            Let me remind you that previously we were talking about typing outgoing encryption text at headquarters by high-ranking officials with the consent of the cryptographers. Will your words be correct in the post-war period?

            The text of the outgoing encryption was not typed by the performers on typewriters, but was written by hand. The inboxes that I came across were all printed. This was the case in the 70-80s in SA and later in the early nineties.
            You write the opposite - in your opinion, almost all officers carried these notebooks. For example, at our army headquarters we constantly had only 4 such notebooks on hand - 2 of them in the intelligence department.

            I served at the group headquarters for almost five years, and sometimes I had to check those to whom you gave two notebooks. So relax, since you still don’t understand why it was in the suitcases of my colleagues at the group headquarters.
            3) Did you post the text from the encryption form about submitting the encryption and draft to the SHO? Why do you need to submit a draft?

            Have you decided to test me? In vain, I know the theory much better than you. It was impossible to store the draft for a simple reason - if it fell into the hands of the enemy, and taking into account the fact that it is believed that the enemy knows the design of encryption technology and code tables, it will not be difficult for him to restore the cipher if he intercepts an encrypted message transmitted over communication channels. And you decided to amaze me with this alphabet? Funny....
            There are a lot of clues; it’s easy for a person close to special communications who worked in the 70s to figure it out and answer correctly.

            I don’t need any hints - moreover, you hardly know, for example, where Kaspersky studied and where he later served, and what he did before he became world famous. Search on the Internet and you will find it - maybe then you will understand that not everything you know was the most important for our armed forces, especially when creating an automated control system.
    2. -1
      December 12 2017
      Quote: cavl
      The transmission time via telegraph is incomparably shorter than manual encryption. The increase in transmitted information will increase by no more than 20-30 groups - about two minutes. The total time for information transmission, if you do not take into account the time for official correspondence between telegraph operators, will be reduced by 26 minutes. Almost half.

      You really shouldn’t be involved in assessing pre-war events, because you don’t know the basic issues of transmitting telegraph information at that time. That's why your conclusions make me smile. To begin with, let me remind you that in OdVO and PribOVO since 1941 there was no direct telegraph connection with the General Staff, and it was carried out on a schedule through Kyiv and Minsk, respectively. This was due to the fact that huge amounts of money were spent on renting telegraph channels, so a decision was made to use telegraph channels hourly for these four border districts. Because of this, it was not possible to simultaneously transmit the non-refundable directive to all four districts - this is just for your information, since you are not in the subject.
      I could continue to point out to you your fantasies about the general timing of the passage of telegraph information to the districts, but first, study what was taught after the war:
      The experience of the Patriotic War confirmed that telegraph communication is one of the main types of long-distance wire communications. Large capacity and range (communications over thousands of kilometers), documentation, stability of action - all this puts telegraph communications in one of the first places among other means of command and control, especially in the system of large headquarters.

      To service headquarters with telegraph communications, military telegraph stations (MTS) are organized in a system of wired nodes, which, with all personnel and material and technical means, are part of the communications unit serving this headquarters.
      1947 year
      You can estimate how many relay nodes there were before Odessa, for example, if “The transmission speed on the ST-35 apparatus is 1100 words per hour, i.e., greater than the transmission speed on the keyboard of a multiple telegraph apparatus. The range of direct telegraphy (i.e., without broadcast devices) is 200–300 kilometers."

      https://nag.ru/upload/images/20130710-0001.png
      https://nag.ru/upload/images/20130710-0035.png
      https://nag.ru/upload/images/20130710-0036.png

      I recommend paying attention to the timing of telegrams, especially taking into account the fact that first the encryption from the General Staff had to be transmitted to one district, and then to another, while registering their passage through relay stations.
  78. -3
    December 14 2017
    Author: aKtoR writes:
    . It was allowed to paint over the official information contained in the ShT with black paint, but beauty requires sacrifice... and the encryption was reprinted on the PM.

    Firstly, it was not allowed, but there was a direct obligation not to include official (corrected) information of the cipher authority in the encryption text for the purposes of secrecy and so that this information did not lead to misunderstanding of the entire text.
    Secondly, in order to avoid mistakes and other disputes, due to incorrect reading of the accepted encryption codes, they were obliged to encrypt the texts or approved typists to type the texts. There is no smell of beauty here - this is an element of the staff culture.
  79. -3
    December 14 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    In the Directive, text that is not in the ShT adopted by ZAPOVO is underlined in blue. At the same time, he is present in the draft SHT. This indicates that amendments were made to the text of the ShT a second time. And this should have been done by a person who did not like the text of the Directive - it could have been Budyonny after receiving a copy. He could make changes with the consent of the signatories (or they were all in the SHO reception room). The edit concerns the removal of the text “keep troops dispersed and camouflaged” and “bring air defense to combat readiness.” The indicated measures are already carried out when bringing the defense troops into combat readiness (go to the reserve area, camouflage and deploy air defense systems; raise all units, including air defense units, both of district subordination and those included in divisions, corps, etc.). d.). Of course, there is a version on the sites that the cryptographers were tired and missed the text. It doesn't happen like that...


    The version that Budyonny made changes to the encrypted telegram after Tymoshenko signed it is simply absurd and does not correspond to reality. In fact, a scan of the draft is presented, which was reported to the Kremlin and was corrected by Zhukov himself on Stalin’s instructions. After this, the handwritten text of the directive was rewritten from the corrected draft, which is why certain points were not included in it. This explains the difference in what was adopted in the district with what we see in the scan of the draft. Budyonny has nothing to do with editing the directive - these are speculations of people who do not know well the work of high-level headquarters.
    The version about tired cryptographers in the General Staff looks simply ridiculous, especially considering the fact that the war has not yet begun.
  80. -3
    December 14 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:

    But there is another unaccounted factor: the SHO officer on duty had to find out where the VO command was and where to send the command post: to the VO headquarters or to the front command post. For each recipient had their own codes. PCs for HE headquarters will not be able to decipher at the front-line control point. Sending PCs to both addresses is to double the work that is under the control of the Chief of the General Staff.

    This is complete nonsense, indicating that the author has no idea how the passage of orders and instructions is organized in the army. The head of the General Staff does not care where the district headquarters is located and whether there is a coder there, because the communication officers on duty are responsible for passing encryption from the General Staff to the district code agency. And it is they who decide how to quickly and accurately deliver the encrypted telegram to the encrypted authority of the boss who is indicated in the address line. And it is they who know from the communication order where and who to find, or those persons who replace them. And it is they who decide what type of communication to use to reduce the time it takes for orders to arrive, and the officials of the encryption authorities have nothing to do with this.
    It is because of such absurd statements about Budyonny’s edits, about cipher organs that decide for signalmen where to transmit encrypted telegrams, the number of myths about the war is growing, and it is a pity that even those who served in the army for more than one year buy into these fantasies.
  81. -1
    December 14 2017
    Quote: cavl
    These are code tables that are simply called ciphers in the book.

    It’s even funny to condemn with you something about which you and your “colleague” have a vague idea - you confuse encoding tables with ciphers:
    And the cipher of Richard Sorge (the head of the Japanese station of the GRU “Ramsay”), which will be discussed here, should be considered as a typical example of the existing encryption systems of all Soviet intelligence services, and not unfairly attribute its invention to Sorge himself or look for some uniqueness in it. For the sake of secrecy, Sorge composed his telegrams to Moscow mainly in English. Therefore, the word “SUBWAY” was chosen as the key to construct the square cipher, which translates as “underground passage.” Isn't it quite symbolic for a scout?

    The key was written on the top line of a square tablet. And the remaining cells were filled in order with the letters of the English alphabet that were not included in the word SUBWAY. This way we will get the following mesh:

    This was the basis for the coding table for converting letters into numbers. But after this, a ciphergram was superimposed on the encrypted message:
    Here we come to Ramsay's main secret. The initial encryption of the text was then recoded by applying an infinite one-time digital scale modulo 10 to it. The method of obtaining it could be completely different: from the use of so-called one-time encryption pads to converting the letters of a certain book text into numbers. Both methods were widely used in intelligence, and we will see this again. But for Sorge the task was greatly simplified. The thick “German Statistical Yearbook for 1935” was chosen as a code book, consisting of hundreds of numerical tables, from which the required scales were selected at random.

    It’s strange that you don’t understand that coding tables can be easily opened without using ciphers, and to think that intelligence didn’t know this is the height of naivety.
  82. -3
    December 15 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    Question: should the head of the General Staff, the curator of the encryption service, have known that in the encryption communication links “VO-Army” and “Army-Corps” (not to mention the link “Corps-Division”) there is no encryption technology and transmission time for CT (taking into account the report command) from the General Staff to the army will be at least 1,5 hours, and “General Staff-Corps” up to 3,5 hours? In the best case, the buildings would have received the Directive around 4:00. In the divisions, the staff of encryptors is even smaller - they would have received and deciphered the Directive around 6-00.

    Before discussing the timing of the passage of the text of the directive to the division, point out the words in the directive itself that this was required to be carried out by order right up to the division. Otherwise, all your arguments are just empty words, because... this is not indicated in the text of the directive itself.
  83. -2
    December 16 2017
    Quote: cavl
    This once again shows your lack of knowledge of the work of not only the encryption service, but also the communication centers of the Soviet period.
    5000 forms are 100 notepads for cipher telegrams. Please note that there is no order date anywhere on the form. We can assume that 1104 is an order dated April 11 (we don’t know what year). But this number may have nothing to do with the date at all.

    If you know how printing houses work on orders, then you would have guessed that the number and circulation were placed on separate sheets, but on bound editions it was placed only on one of the last sheets or on the cover.
    Regarding the number - in one day the printing house can produce several orders, especially simple and small in quantity.
  84. -2
    December 16 2017
    Quote: cavl
    The author of aKtoR initially gives G.K. Zhukov’s version of events according to his memoirs, and then considers his own alternative version. According to the author, the directive was written after a reception with Stalin in the Kremlin. In this case, G.K. Zhukov and Tymoshenko simply did not have a draft directive upon arrival in the Kremlin. It's strange that everyone figured it out, but you didn't. I repeat once again - your text is a deception of users. In vain.

    The author cited a delusional version that does not fit with Zhukov’s memoirs and contradicts the established practice when bosses arrive at a report with a ready-made draft decision. I'm not even talking about the fact that three military leaders came to Stalin, and one of them (or other commanders) would have refuted Zhukov's words if he had lied in his memoirs.
    It’s strange that people who consider themselves experts do not know basic questions, and still believe that they have figured out something. So the term “deceiver” applies more to you than to me.
  85. -2
    December 16 2017
    Quote: cavl
    I can say something different from the lantern, and without facts you cannot prove that it is a lie: For example, after receiving information about the rise of troops on June 22, the executor was given the command to write the text of the encryption. The text is short, there are not many recipients (the 24th reserve MK - only encryption number 9 was sent to him).

    It’s really interesting, how is it possible to get a weapon, a suitcase, go to the loading place during an alarm, and still write a code? By the way, cryptographers are also loading up with their equipment - how will they manage to receive an encrypted telegram from the contractor at this time and send it again?
    Do you have any idea how all this happened in dynamics?
  86. -3
    December 18 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    Also, none of the senior leadership of the spacecraft (including the leadership of the Military District and the armies) thought about possible disruptions in communications by enemy sabotage groups. This was simply not intended. You can’t blame them for this - they’ve never encountered anything like this before...

    This statement is absurd in essence, because in addition to wired communications in the districts, there is necessarily a radio warning network through which combat control signals are transmitted in the form of certain commands. In addition, there are district radio networks and radio directions for armies and within armies the same system for communication with formations. So to say that after saboteurs disable air communication lines, command and control of troops using radio means stops is simply stupid.
    Here is an example of how, due to the carelessness of some signalmen, combat signals were not received on time:
    "At midnight on June 22, a radio operator from the 293rd air base of the 12th RAB A.K. Lyashenko took duty at his radio station 11-AK, mounted on
    automobile chassis, at the field airfield of the 129th Fighter Aviation Regiment in Tarnovo, 12 km from the border. At approximately 00:30 he was called by the division headquarters radio center and given a break until 6 am. The diligent fighter decided to use this time to clean the equipment; the driver of the special vehicle, M. Pantelepen, was outside guarding the “point”. When the radio operator finished his work and opened the door of the radio station, the driver reported that women, old people and children were traveling from Tarnovo along the highway in carts towards Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The Red Army soldiers were animatedly discussing this event when they heard three artillery shots from the side of the border.
    A.K. Lyashenko immediately turned on the radio station and heard that the division was calling him. A combat alarm signal was transmitted from headquarters,
    coded with three digits, and the message in clear text: “Bialystok is being bombed, war.” The operational department was immediately notified by phone
    zhurny on the regiment. On the air, the divisional radio operator could be heard unsuccessfully trying to call the 124th Regiment. Lyashenko duplicated the call at maximum power, but also did not receive an answer. At this time, a duty officer came running from the 129th with a pistol in his hand and the intention of arresting
    alarmist. But the air raid that began a few minutes later put everything in its place [76, letter].
    This evidence is completely inconsistent with what is written in the literature, but, as it seems to me, it has every right to exist. "(134)
    D. Egorov
  87. -2
    December 20 2017
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I forgot to clarify that the head of the encryption department or department is required to brief the newly appointed three chiefs at each headquarters (I don’t want to clarify the positions of these persons). After instruction, these persons are admitted to all governing documents on encryption communications, encryption technology and ciphers. The fact is that the knowledge that these individuals possess cannot lead to compromise of ciphers and encrypted correspondence.

    The funny thing is that you have no idea that there are separate units where there may be only a few officers without any headquarters, and they have their own cryptographer, who does not have the right to acquaint anyone with his work and documentation, except for the commander. Precisely because this can lead to too many people knowing about the operation of the cipher organ. So there is no need to mislead people about three officials, if there are no more of them in the unit than fingers on one hand, and one of them was a political officer.
  88. -3
    December 20 2017
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    The author does not know how long it takes to send the PC by telegraph. Transmission of a PC text by telegraph is likely to be the same 8 minutes that are required for "P". Given the exchange of service information and preparation for reception (when a telegram is expected), this time may not exceed 10 minutes.

    This calculation shows that the author has no idea what the transmission time of a cipher telegram consists of, and therefore hit the mark, indicating that the time will not exceed 10 minutes.
    Firstly, even on the fastest ST-35 devices, only the transmission time for encryption from 200 groups will be more than 10 minutes. Secondly, according to current standards, processing an encrypted telegram on one node is 10-15 minutes.
    Thirdly, such cipher telegrams are usually transmitted with a reverse check so that they can be decrypted, and this further increases the overall transit time of information.
    So, if we sum everything up, then the transmission of the directive could not have been carried out faster than 30 minutes, and this despite the fact that the telegraph channels and telegraph devices were in excellent condition, and the personnel had good training.
    From Baghromian's memoirs: “... At 00-25 22 in June, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving a telegram from Moscow ... Only at half past two in the night did the reception of this lengthy Directive end ...”
    Comment on this event and the time of "about half past two" is quite difficult - not enough information.

    There is nothing to comment on here, you just need to know that the district communications center connected to the local network of the People's Commissariat of Communications, and it had outdated equipment, and therefore the transmission speed and reverse check took so much time. It is possible that a radio channel was used to communicate with the stationary communications center of the district headquarters, where the encrypted telegram was received on the ST-35, and then it was broadcast to the field communications center.
  89. -2
    December 23 2017
    Author: aKtoR writes
    Also, none of the senior leadership of the spacecraft (including the leadership of the Military District and the armies) thought about possible disruptions in communications by enemy sabotage groups. This was simply not intended. You cannot blame them for this - they have never encountered anything like this before... Loss of communication at all levels is the “scourge” of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war. The author does not know who is to blame for this - but not the leader - that’s for sure.

    No one denies the fact that there was a loss of communication, as well as the blame for this on NGO officials, and not Stalin.
    But was everything as bad as the author claims? It is sometimes useful to read what the war participants themselves wrote on this issue:
    25 years ago
    (To the anniversary of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union)
    Marshal of the Soviet Union A. GRECHKO
    Until the time of the enemy attack, no instructions or orders to raise troops and bring them in to occupy defensive lines were received either from the headquarters of the 4th Army, which included the 28th Rifle Corps, or from the district headquarters, although the telephone connection worked fine up to this point (!!!!). Therefore, the defensive line along the state border by troops was not busy on time.


    Moreover, Marshal Grechko states:
    The defensive line along the state border consisted of a system of trenches, communication passages and wood-earth structures, the construction of which had not yet been completed at the beginning of the war. With the advance occupation of this line by troops, with the subsequent development of work to improve it, it could ensure the repulsion of attacks by fascist German units in the Brest direction.

    So it turns out that not everything depended on the state of communication, which, in addition to wired communication, also included radio communication, and which was in effect even after the attack. That is why the question of the responsibility of the command of the border districts for the outcome of the first days of the war still causes heated debate, although military professionals are well aware that responsibility in this matter lay precisely with the district authorities, and not with the General Staff and Stalin.
    1. VS
      -1
      December 24 2017
      You cited the words not Grechko but nsh 28 sk in Brest))

      But I still don’t understand - so what did the author want to say with a series of her articles?))) Is Stalin to blame for everything?)))
      1. -2
        December 24 2017
        This is from an article by A. Grechko:
        http://zhistory.org.ua/images/25YE1.jpg
        And whose words he referred to in his article are not particularly important - the article was published in VIZH, 1966, 6
        By the way, Zakoretsky has laid out it in full.
        1. VS
          -1
          December 25 2017
          This is from the response from the beginning of the headquarters of the 28th IC in Brest..
  90. -2
    December 24 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    But I still don’t understand - so what should the author say?

    Perhaps the author of the article will explain his position in his other articles.
    1. VS
      -2
      December 25 2017
      I just hope that the author will no longer please anyone with his nonsense)) and will remain anonymous)))
  91. -3
    January 3 2018
    Quote: aKtoR
    Subject, in principle, completed. Perhaps for the New Year holidays I decide to add.
    thanks everyone !!!

    The New Year holidays are over, the holidays are coming, it seems like we can add something. True, I would like to know the author’s opinion regarding the claims made to the material presented, but apparently this is “above his dignity” ....
    1. +4
      January 4 2018
      I understand that you are not one of the two hundred and fifty users who marked the 10th part.
      The material is being prepared for like-minded people. Therefore, your complaints about the subsequent release of materials do not matter to me.
      Regarding responses to the claims made against the author, see the previous sentence.
      I watched how you argue - God forbid I get involved with you)))
      1. VS
        -3
        January 4 2018
        And you generally do not accept ANY criticism of YOUR nonsense - according to your texts)) I suggested to you - at the very beginning - let me help you, give you some advice on the pre-war events?? You obviously don’t know all the facts - having picked up something from the top, you rushed to please the people with sensations???)) And what did you answer - since I don’t know what’s on some encryption machines, that means talking to me about nothing???)))
        Madam - as befits a lady, you DO NOT LISTEN TO THE ESSENCE of the complaints - you see and hear ONLY “rudeness”)) But these rudenesses appeared only because you are stubborn .... the same - YOU DO NOT WANT TO perceive ANYTHING different from your fantasies, on the topic where did you go, and nonsense))) And in the end you are engaged in FALSIFICATING the topic on June 22))
        YOU grabbed some data - a couple of intelligence reports that were published in the generally deceitful robin of Yakovlev's anti-advisers - and from this you began to invent - who "THOUGHT" what in the General Staff - instead of looking at the EVENTS of the pre-war days)) which took place in reality) )) In general - remain anonymous... ))
        And - DO NOT write ANYTHING ELSE ON THE TOPIC on June 22 - you will always be ridiculed by those who understand the topic and KNOWS what happened there, understanding what is happening))). But if you are flattered by the “opinion” of online ignoramuses who know NOTHING on the topic and really don’t want to know anything, then you can only feel sorry for you))) amuse yourself with idiotic “likes” - after all, ladies (as they should be) only react to such garbage with pleasure)))
      2. -2
        January 4 2018
        Quote: aKtoR
        I understand that you are not one of the two hundred and fifty users who marked the 10th part.

        Historical issues are not decided by voting - do you even understand that?
        Quote: aKtoR
        I watched how you argue - God forbid I get involved with you)))

        Admit honestly that you have been caught in ignorance on some issues that you have inflated with pomp, and now you want to keep a good face on a bad game. As for all the material, it is mostly compiled from well-known sources. and no more. There is practically nothing of yours there, so there is no point in referring to the number of voters.
        1. +4
          January 5 2018
          I leave my comment in this topic only for those site users who someday get to this forgotten page and decide to look at the messages on the forums listed below. Perhaps they will even get to the “Military” forum and understand a lot about the “sweet couple” of the below-mentioned users...

          User VS (allegedly the universally recognized writer-historian Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin): “...And - don’t write ANYTHING ELSE ON THE TOPIC of June 22 - you will always be ridiculed by those who understand the topic and KNOWS what happened there, understanding what is happening...”

          Website "Historical Club Sokol" ( http://sokol.zbord.ru/viewtopic.php?t=748 )

          “...The writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin was banned again for rudeness, non-academic style of discussion and for... grammatical errors. Everything is clear with him. Another thing is interesting: the publication of his books in Russia is an indicator of Kozinkin’s intelligence... The long-awaited Freedom of Speech has arrived in boundless breadth, and as a result, now everyone is free to exercise (in this case, rather, defecate) in the writing field.
          It’s all kinds of “kozinkins” who produce waste heaps of such crap. Our dear Oleg Yurich, he is far from the only one like this, and not even the first, and not even the largest. So. An average lousy chewer of what he had previously chewed and dumped, for example, A. Martirosyan. By the way, this is why Kozinkin has absolutely no answers in his arsenal to many absolutely logical questions that inevitably arise in readers’ minds after reading his texts. In this situation, he is in the role of a poor student who copied the answers to a test from another poor student, and in principle he cannot explain where such wild results on his piece of paper came from. Not only is it just rubbish, it’s also not his own. He only tried to “sing” from the stage what he had previously heard with his own hands in a false performance by Arsen M. Hence the results. The unfortunate graphomaniac creates in a genre that is something between “a collection of bad jokes” and “notes of a madman.” He creates prolificly, fortunately, pouring from empty to empty does not require much strength and intelligence. He has every right to do so. Freedom of speech, you know...»


          (http://olegzhuk.ru/forum/51-68-1) “...I read Kozinkin’s book “Why didn’t they shoot Zhukov? In defense of Marshal of Victory.” Eh, we didn’t appreciate Kozinkin at the time, we made a mistake. Do you know what he wrote at the end of his book? If you are standing, then sit down: Zhukov and Timoshenko were traitors and German agents, and were preparing the defeat and destruction of the Red Army. Stalin didn’t shoot them only because he was ashamed to admit in front of Roosevelt and Churchill that he himself had appointed traitors to the highest military posts. And in this case, its own army would refuse to fight. That’s why I chose to present them before everyone not as traitors, but as fools... At the beginning of the book there is “Instead of a Preface” with these words: “I’m not a historian, and I’m not going to prove anything.” Requires you to take his word for it..."

          “...Kozinkin is being trashed at the Militera forum. He saw in the book “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions” maps relating to the “Considerations” of September 1940, mistook them for maps of March 1941, and based his “sensational” “revelations” on this...”

          “...By the way, Oleg Yurievich writes in Militer with almost no spelling errors. So, he can, whenever he wants. And Milchakov, whom Hoax mentions there, is this CCSR? Yes, CCSR is Milchakov. So is Kozinkin constantly referring to Milchakov? But What is Milchakov famous for? Milchakov is most famous for the fact that he is consistently banned on all forums for redneck and incompetence. I met with CCSR at Golitsyn, as a “forum fighter” he is a well-known person. Does he write books or just give ideas to Kozinkin? Kulikov2005, if you are so impressed by Kozinkin’s “research,” then you have the opportunity to defend them on the Militera forum, otherwise they have simply smeared him on the wall and wiped their feet on him...”

          Let me clarify that on the above forum CCSR registered since 2013 and visited in December 2017. Total one like)) Another unrecognized genius - they didn’t appreciate him, just like on the Military Review website. That’s why he writes: “Historical issues are not decided by voting - do you even understand that? Admit honestly that you have been caught in ignorance on some issues that you have inflated with pomp, and now you want to keep a good face on a bad game. As for all the material, it is mostly compiled from well-known sources. and no more. There’s practically nothing of yours there, so there’s no point in referring to the number of voters.” This is written by a person with whom two former cryptographers argued (in this thread) and, according to CCSR, in the dispute they turned out to be complete ignoramuses. But, as CCSR fussed about going away from the topic and showing “his knowledge” in matters of encryption communication, this is something. I completely agree with the opinion expressed on the forum "CCSR redneck and incompetence"

          Website "History" (http://zhistory.org.ua/kznksmzv.htm)

          “I have long suspected that with the screams of Kozinkin O.Yu. There’s something wrong about his serious military experience. (Something does not fit with his stories that he graduated from the Penza Higher Artillery Engineering School named after Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov (PVAIU). And then he served in the army for 20 years through the RAV (bases, warehouses, etc. .). That is, he had to pass exams on the materiel of ammunition, shells, fuses) ... The impudent Kozinkin had the audacity to blame others for his lies.”

          ( http://zhistory.org.ua/razlvo41.htm ) “...What kind of forgery did Kozinkin commit in the book? He took and threw out the first sentence from the 2nd page of the document... In particular, on this lie (about the “correct Directive number 1”) Kozinkin piled up a bunch of lies in general on the topic of pre-war Soviet planning. Covering it with a “smokescreen” of cries about “correct understanding”, about traitors who are “cutters” (allegedly not understanding anything about anything) and about the fact that only he understands everything as it was. I hope this simple example will help readers understand how “correct” Kozinkin and his series of crazy multi-volume books are…”

          Website "For the truth!" (http://zapravdu.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3194)

          “About the new book by Kozinkin O.Yu. - “Stalin. Who betrayed the leader on the eve of the war” The author begins his investigations with “gratitude” to V. Suvorov - V. Rezun. After all, it was he who stirred up the historical science of Russia with his books... Why on earth did Oleg Yurich dream that “the main ones for June 1941” were the Considerations of the head of the General Staff before last (?!), remains a mystery... He no longer cares about the fact that PP-41 was clearly in NO WAY designed for a surprise enemy attack, especially an attack BEFORE this plan itself was put into effect. He is already pouring out “discoveries” one more trenchant than the other: According to Kozinkin, this gave our country (attention!) “the authority of the victim.” What, haven’t you heard of this before? I, too, once heard about the AUTHORITY OF THE WINNER from the USSR, but thanks to Kozinkin’s tinkering, now we can laugh at yet another “discovery” of his.

          According to Kozinkin, it turns out that if the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 had sided with the anti-fascist forces not forcedly (where could they have gone after Hitler’s attack), but on its own initiative, then public opinion in the West would never have forgiven us for this. And vice versa, since the USSR (which until recently helped the Reich to fight against the West with resources) did not voluntarily raise the sword against Hitler, but was forced to do so by Hitler himself, his authority on this (to put it bluntly, rotten) soil greatly increased in the eyes of Western citizens . This all works out according to Kozinkin. In a fit of passion, he even agreed to the point that, as a result of the above-described setup: “the communists of France directly told their rulers after the war: If you go to the USSR, you will get partisanship such that the Nazis never dreamed of...” this, it turns out, is why S. de Gaul did not dare to follow in the footsteps of N. Bonoparte...”


          After this and other nonsense, God forbid agreeing to V.S.’s proposals. : “I suggested to you - at the very beginning - let me help you, give you some advice on the pre-war events?” He didn’t even understand anything in the text that was given in the first 10 parts of the topic...
          1. -3
            January 5 2018
            Quote: aKtoR
            This is written by a person with whom two former cryptographers argued (in this thread) and, according to CCSR, in the dispute they turned out to be complete ignoramuses. But, as CCSR fussed about going away from the topic and showing “his knowledge” in matters of encryption communication, this is something.

            Let's start with the fact that the cryptographer was most likely in the rank of major, and did not rise above the army level, and as far as I understand, he had no idea that cryptographers were also involved in the prosecutor's investigation, and this already speaks of his knowledge. The fact that he was talking about the return transfer from the embassies generally put an end to him as a specialist - he was simply not in the subject.
            Well, so that you have no illusions, I will inform you that even on the eve of the war, means of classifying communications from telegraph devices were developed, which in terms of technical development were in no way inferior to encryption technology, but their communication efficiency was higher. By the way, this subsequently became so widely used among the troops that many structures abandoned encryption technology altogether.
            Now, as for Kozinkin, he writes books, publishes them, and, unlike you, does not hide his name. That’s why you decided to throw crap at him, although to be honest, no one knows what you have behind you other than these articles. So come to the For Truth forum, since you link to it, there are military experts there, and you can express your “professional” opinion about Kozinkin and his work there.
            And you have cleverly learned to avoid awkward questions - it’s immediately obvious that you have essentially nothing to say.
          2. -3
            January 5 2018
            Quote: aKtoR
            Website "Historical Club Sokol" ( http://sokol.zbord.ru/viewtopic.php?t=748 )
            (http://olegzhuk.ru/forum/51-68-1)
            Website "History" (http://zhistory.org.ua/kznksmzv.htm)



            By the way, the "Falcon" forum and the Zhuk forum are the same resource, one just appeared after the closure of the other. As for Zakoretsky’s sites, this unique person, well known in certain circles, has nothing except faith in Rezun. Therefore, your link to two little-known Ukrainian resources (the owners are citizens of Ukraine) once again showed that you are an ordinary person, and you cannot present anything serious against Kozinkin’s arguments. Well, the fact that he can be unrestrained, we must thank figures like you, who can make a molehill out of a mountain, and at the same time demand to be treated seriously.
          3. VS
            -3
            January 5 2018
            madam - you are actually on the websites and forums of REZUNOV or where REZUNOV hang out - they sent screams at me)))) Or the screams of Rezunov on the same militar))) \\
            That is - THE OPINION OF THESE IDIOTS and anti-Soviet Russobs is of no interest to ANYONE for a long time))))
            So - I sympathize with you - you have found wonderful supporters - REZUNOV AS ASSISTANTS AND SUPPORTERS)))

            AND TO YOUR STUPIDITY I GIVEN EXACTLY THE FACT OF THE PRE-WAR DAYS AND I HAVE NEVER BEEN DIFFERENT FROM YOU IN MY BOOKS, and especially here - I NEVER WRITE - WHO "THOUGHT" WHAT IN NGOs and the General Staff))
            Continue to amuse yourself with the fact that your supporters are stupid idiots)))
          4. -3
            January 8 2018
            Quote: aKtoR
            After this and other nonsense

            Since you think my words are nonsense, then let’s look specifically at what you stated here earlier.
            So you said:
            According to RU estimates, in 1938 Germany had 7300 tanks and 5160 aircraft. In fact, after 8 months, the German Armed Forces had only 3474 tanks and 4288 aircraft.

            https://topwar.ru/120030-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitl
            erovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-2.html
            Due to the fact that the source is not indicated, and it is impossible to verify its reliability, I provide a scan from the book, which contains GRU materials, in particular the report to the People's Commissar of Defense dated February 10.02.1939, 4500, where the number of aircraft is indicated about 660. That is. you overestimated the estimated data by 4288 aircraft, which did not differ much from those you indicated (5 units - the estimation error is less than XNUMX%):

            And after that you begin to talk about the reliability of intelligence data? Are you taking on too much when using Yakovlev’s sources?
          5. -3
            January 8 2018
            Quote: aKtoR
            He didn’t even understand anything in the text that was given in the first 10 parts of the topic...

            Consider what you wrote earlier:
            Special message RU No. 660279cc 11.03.1941/1940/228 “...The total strength of the German army by September 15 was about 17 divisions, including 8-10 TD and XNUMX-XNUMX MD.

            https://topwar.ru/120030-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitl
            erovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-2.html
            Due to the fact that there is no link, and I again suspect Yakovlev’s source of information, let’s look at what exactly the GRU leadership reported on March 20, 1941 to the country’s leadership:

            If you cannot correctly evaluate paragraph 13 of this message, then what right do you have to write in the affirmative about the 228 divisions that the GRU allegedly reported in 1940? As they say, the facts are in the studio, otherwise you will be perceived as a dreamer, and that’s putting it mildly.
      3. -2
        January 5 2018
        Quote: aKtoR
        I understand that you are not one of the two hundred and fifty users who marked the 10th part.

        On the forum of this site I tried to bring your material up for discussion:

        https://topwar.ru/18261-general-pavlov-kak-otveti
        vshiy-za-vseh.html
        On “VO” this topic was raised by an author under the nickname aKtoR and posted about ten articles, analyzing that tragedy in different directions.


        But no one wanted to discuss it seriously - apparently you failed to impress people with your texts. This is the “voice of the people”, and not hidden likes from someone unknown.
        However, you can try to hold a discussion there yourself - the flag is in your hands.
        1. VS
          -2
          January 9 2018
          Well, what can you do if Madame the author, instead of reading what those who are trying to show her are those who have been digging into the topic longer and can actually show the texture that she does not know and therefore she draws the wrong conclusions - she rushed to look for what about me or about you, stupid people - cutters screaming)))
          1. -3
            January 9 2018
            If you consider what sources she refers to, it becomes clear what can be expected from her:
            The message uses material from Mark Solonin’s book “Another Chronology of the Catastrophe of 1941. The Fall of Stalin’s Falcons.”
            1. VS
              -1
              January 9 2018
              If you take documents or facts, then that’s one thing)) And the same Markushi has a lot of useful INFORMATION - after all, he went into TsAMO, into pre-war documents to prove that the USSR-Stalin was going to attack first - and in the end - he found something completely different and - stopped writing your own books in the end))) But if you write something on them and discard what you don’t like, in the end you yourself will become a cutter)))
  92. -3
    January 25 2018
    Posted by: aKtoR writes:
    Probably, the leadership of the front does not expect the outbreak of a full-scale war. Why inform the army headquarters located in the rear? This misconception is facilitated by incorrect intelligence data, which we discussed in parts 7 and 8. In addition, the highest ranks of the spacecraft convinced them of this and ordered them.

    This erroneous conclusion of the author is easily refuted by a scan of the journal of Shumilov’s corps headquarters:
    [media=http://shot.qip.ru/00UTQf-2169kKaezd/]
    http://shot.qip.ru/00UTQf-2169kKaezd/
  93. -4
    February 12 2018
    Quote: aKtoR
    Your comment on this topic

    Judging by the fact that the author disappeared and no longer appears here, there is only one conclusion left - the hat turned out to be a bad one, and during discussions with military professionals, incompetence and superficiality of knowledge on the topic under discussion surfaced.
  94. +1
    October 13 2018
    When General Trukhin became a traitor, beginning. operational department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, the fate of his immediate superior - the chief of this headquarters, and the commander of this front, and other generals of this headquarters - was sealed. Because this betrayal - which did not happen at the headquarters of other fronts - predetermined the defeat of the NWF in border battles, in addition to other fatal mistakes of its command and the “political vertical” in June 1941. Nevertheless, the front lost irretrievably in the first 10 days of the war “only " OK. 60 thousand people, not approx. 300 thousand, like the Western Front under the leadership of Pavlov. There must be punishment for this, and it falls on the GUILTY (even if not all of them). And rightly so.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"