Military Review

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 10)

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The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 10)

The message used material from the book Mark Corned beef “Another Chronology of the Catastrophe 1941. The fall of the "Stalinist Falcons."


Unlike PribOVO, the neighbors in Zapovo in the evening of 20, June, noted an increased activity of the Germans at the border in the area of ​​the Suvalki lug: «To the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft immediately... To the report of the commander of the 3 Army, the wire barriers along the border along the Augustow, Sejny road, which were still in the afternoon, were removed by evening. In this area of ​​the forest, it is as if the noise of ground motors is heard ... Klimovsky» On the document mark: "Sent 21 June 1941 g. In 2 hours 40 minutes". This message in the morning and afternoon 21.6.41 was not particularly alarmed by the head of the General Staff. It is not known what the Klimovsky or Pavlova responded from Moscow. Probably the same as the night before the war. About 23 21.6.41 watch G. Zhukov on the HF unit warned the NS of Western IN: “Expect special instructions!” General Klimovsky reported on this to General D.Pavlov and ordered the commanders of the 3, 10 and 4 armies to be in their headquarters.

FSD XOVUM 22.6.41 “Around one in the morning [00-45 22.6.41] encryption was received from Moscow [cipher telegram - PC] with an order to immediately bring the troops on alert in case of a German attack expected in the morning. At about 2 hours - 2 hours 30 minutes a similar order was made by ciphering the armies, parts of the SD ... " We already know that this PC was delivered to the cryptographic branch on 01-45 and sent to 02-25. Since the district authorities didn’t take any action before getting the command line, it turns out that they didn’t report anything about the content of Directive No. XXUMX from Moscow on HF. Perhaps, as in the case of the ODVO, they only said: "... A telegram of special importance has been sent to you for immediate execution ..." Next, "wring the tail", so as not to succumb to the provocations of the German troops.

General Klimovsky understood the cryptographic business better than the head of the General Staff. The operational department of Zapovo headquarters included the 3 branch in the number of 100 coders (of whom 61 was a man from the coders' school). NS needed to know the cipher case guidance to work with this lineup. Therefore, on his order, immediately after the decoding of PCs, the Military Council was presented with draft material. It was on this material that the leadership of the district left the resolution, making it out as incoming PC. Printed on a typewriter on a typewriter, later the telegram was turned into outgoing PC of ZOVOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on declassified PCs is crossed out with a red pencil, and the addressing and names of the signers are added later. An incident happened: at that time no one decided to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text. PC went to the army for four signatures, which is not practiced.

According to General D.Pavlov, at one in the morning 22.06.41 called the people's commissar Tymoshenko: “Well, how are you, calmly?” I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank: according to the report of Kuznetsov, the commander of the 3 army, the German motor-mechanics were constantly going to Suwalki over one and a half day. According to his report, barrage wire was removed in many places by the Germans in the Augustow — Sapotskin section. The people's commissioner replied to my report: “You should be calmer and do not panic, but collect headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations - call ". After a conversation with the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the leadership of ZOVOVO still about half an hour decided: what instructions should be given to the troops.

The commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, at about one o'clock in the morning, under his own responsibility, ordered to send sealed “red bags” to all the subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the order of actions for combat alert that were kept in the army headquarters. About two o'clock in the morning 22 of June on HF, the commander of the 3 Army V. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov: “To raise troops in combat alert, parts of the UR immediately take up the bunkers and put them into full combat readiness, put into action a plan to cover the state border” . The management of ZOVOVO assumed the responsibility from which the top management of the spacecraft was discharged. 3 hours the time lost from the delivery of Directive No. 1 to the cryptographic department of the General Staff before sending PCs in the army cover. Encryption reached the addressee by the beginning of the war ...

Something similar happened in PribOVO-SZF. Order commander 16 ck, given to 1-30 22.6.41:

«5, 33 and 188 commanders No.0012 The army commander 11 ordered:

1. Min not to put.

2. For the protection of the subsidiary of the private education institution leave small groups of patrols under the command of the average commander. The rest of the people mouth, providing a band predpole, remove immediately.

3. Work on the main page to continue. Commander 16 sk Major General Ivanov»


A very strange order, which had to go from the headquarters of the NWF through the headquarters of the 11-th army. This order of the headquarters of the NWF is in conflict with the previously given orders and initiatives. This could happen only if this instruction came from Moscow. After the arrest of A.D.Loktionov, with whom PSKlenov served since the summer of 1940, the NSH of the NWF was obliged to follow all instructions from Moscow without showing initiative.

From the 4 part, we already know that in the cryptographic offices of armies and corps, Pribovo PCs were processed using a manual cipher. In order for the PC to be sent from the 16 headquarters in the division in 1-30, it was necessary to prepare it at the NWF headquarters in the 23-30… 00-00 area. It turns out that, having passed the SC with Directive No. 1 to the encryption department, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff organized a “cheat” on the phone to the heads of the border HEs, issuing some “valuable instructions” on possible provocative actions of the enemy troops and how to proceed in this case in the counties. It is about these instructions that little is known in our time. In the 4 part, you were presented with the author’s version that the top management of the spacecraft in the evening 21.6.41 was not ready to send Directive No. 1 to the troops. The spacecraft managers were forced to prepare and send this document to I. Stalin. Therefore, the leadership of the spacecraft probably found it necessary to express their views on the HF leadership of the districts. They didn’t get through to OdVO MV Zakharov, who took responsibility for the rise of district troops somewhere between 23-00 21.6.41 and 00-00 22.6.41. Let us again consider the text of Directive No. XXUMX, prepared by Tymoshenko and Zhukov.



It should be noted that from the draft material of this document at the last time point after the words "All parts to bring on alert" The following text has been deleted: "In the case of any provocations by the Germans, or their allies, not to give in to any provocations, by taking steps to immediately resolve misunderstandings by peaceful means. " What else to add to the crossed out text? For 5-6 hours before the war, the wording on provocations and the peaceful settlement of the issue is specified, and not on the preparation of border district troops for war. Very reminiscent of the instructions of KA Meretskov, Commissar of Defense It is likely that it was a similar order that was brought to VO by the senior management of the spacecraft in a rather sharp form. The “valuable instructions” from Moscow and Directive No. XXUMX itself should have been reflected in the instructions of the headquarters and the Military Council of the NWF. Thus distinguish "Provocation" from "Sudden strike"and solvewhat exactly should be transferred to the troops shifted on the shoulders of the command of the frontier districts, which had previously “intimidated” before making a decision ...

«Military Councils 8 and 11 ARMY 22th of June 1941 2-25

1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden German attack on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.

2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.

At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat

I ORDER:

1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

5. Families of the commanding staff 10, 125, 33 and 128 to be transported to the rear only in case of border crossing by large enemy forces.

6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.

Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov, Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchy, Lieutenant-General Maples»


Note the 9 listing. For 2 hours before, the opposite order was given. So what is different from the one set out in Directive No. XXUMX, ordered the people's commissar of defense on the HF NSH of the NWF, if at first they decide "Do not put mines", And after receiving the encryption with the text of Directive No. XXUMX, the headquarters of the NWF decides on their "Immediate installation"?

PCS from SZF headquarters is not sent to the 27 Army. Units 67-th SD (from the 27 army) have already been alerted, and the army headquarters is not notified of the Directive. Probably, the leadership of the front does not expect the start of a full-scale war. Why inform the army headquarters, located in the rear? This misinformation is contributed by incorrect intelligence data, which we talked about in the 7 and 8 parts. In addition, they were convinced of this, ordered by the highest ranks of the SC. Unfortunately, there is no longer any time left to carry out the activities specified in the NWF Directive from 22.6.41 ... For example, the mines near the roads were left to lie away from the dug holes under them ...

Let us consider how the commanders of 8 and 11 armies answered the question of Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky: “When was the order to bring the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22?”

Former commander of the 8 Army, Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov: "It should be noted that even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the Klenov Front School to withdraw troops from the border at dawn of 22.6.41 g in a very categorical manner, which I categorically refused to do ..."

Former commander of the 11 Army, Lieutenant-General V.I. Morozov: “Such an order was received by telephone around one o'clock in the morning 22.6.41 of the front NSH looking for the front commander made it clear to me that it was necessary to act, withdraw troops to the border, saying that an order was prepared about this and you would receive it. Based on this, I have a conditional code on the phone between the 1-2 hour. 22.6.41 was given orders to the troops ... "

What I would like to note in the answers of two army commanders:

1) both talk about the actions of the NSH completely opposite opinions. It turns out that one of them provides some distorted information.

2) both generals answer the questions of General A.P. Pokrovsky in 1952, in the era of omnipotence of organs. In October, 1941, General PP Sobennikov was arrested in connection with the investigation of the hostilities in the Baltic States, and in February, 1942 was released at the request and sent to the front with a demotion.

In responses to General A.P. Pokrovsky, P.S. Sobennikov expresses an opinion on General Trukhin (in October 1941, he deliberately goes to cooperate with the Nazis).



General PP Sobennikov, when he was under arrest, had to ask questions related to this traitor. It can be seen that PPSobennikov (who miraculously survived in prison), even in 1952, distanced himself from this man, emphasizing that he was "The enemy of the people of Vlasovite". At the same time, he expresses his opinion that this person was the author of the cover plan. Further it is easy to understand: “the plan of the enemy of the people” - “unsuccessful actions of the spacecraft forces in the initial period of the war”. Once in prison it was necessary to somehow cooperate with the investigation. Without cooperation, he would have simply been killed and would not have survived ... General PP Sobennikov should have been asked questions about NS Pribovo. We see that in the list of witnesses Sobennikov is missing. Being under investigation, he did not “sink” PS Klenov - surviving at his expense - this is an act! Not everyone was capable of that. Many of those arrested, to escape from torture, unfortunately, turned in friends ...

What we saw in his answers to General Pokrovsky about Klenov is the smallness that PPSobennikov was forced to say. If he spoke about Klenov only good or neutral - he would have signed a death sentence for himself. Moreover, he did not cheat - he just said not everything ... The author tried to show above that, according to the “telephone right”, “pumping” from Moscow started in order to prevent the Germans from causing a conflict. Since the commander of the troops at the front headquarters was not at this time, the NSH brought the latest "particularly valuable instructions" from Moscow to the army commanders. PP Sobennikov simply did not mention in his testimony whether there was another phone call from NSH after the transfer of the “valuable instructions” ... Besides the “plans of the enemy of the people”, General P.P.Sobennikov was blamed for the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the 8 Army laid on the Air Force using this version as a "lifeline." This will be discussed below.

The events of the first days of the war are studied in sufficient detail in the books. Therefore, the author, in concluding the theme “About PribOVO”, will quite briefly provide publicly available information on participation in battles of the air forces of the North-Western Fleet, the ground forces and the ZhBD North-Western Fleet.

In the 2-55 22 June 1941, the Me-110 fighters attacked the Alytus airfield.

At 3-57, the airfield and port in Libau were bombed. The city, port, naval base, located 50 km from the border with East Prussia, became the object of multiple German attacks aviation. In the report signed on 30.07.41 “On the military work 6 th garden"As a cause of large losses materiel noted “Total absence of VNOS posts at sea” и “The airfield in the open was well known to the Germans”. During 22, June Libava was bombarded 13 times.

In 4-00, German aviation struck air strikes in the Baltic States against airfields, major railway junctions, ports, cities of Riga, Vindava, Šiauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Alytus and others. At the same time, heavy artillery, including the enemy’s railway batteries, began shelling settlements and troops along the border.

Excerpt from 57 Headquarters XOUMX 10 00 "Xnumx garden in 3-25 22.06.41 has declared alarm and to 4-00 was ready for combat missions ... "

Order commander 7 garden 22.6.41 4-15 “Regiment commanders.

1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

Commander 7 garden Colonel Petrov».


At 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4 garden to deliver a three-bap attack on the city and port of Memel. On 4-53, the 7 Garden Commander issues an order to the 9 bap commanders and the bap 46 commanders: “... Destroy the enemy grouping and aviation in the Tilsit, Ragnit, Zhilen area. Departure immediately». At 5, the squadron of 9, bap under the command of Captain M. Krivtsov, took to the air in the morning and headed for Tilsit. The route of the squadron ran in the area of ​​Suvalka ledge. Bombers reached the target at an altitude of 7500 m.

The report of the NWF Commander to the People's Commissar of Defense on 6-10 states: “... Our air force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... Took measures to bomb the enemy without flying the border ... ” NSH VVS NWF commander Krupin in 6-15 orders: “... to the commander of the 7 garden. State borders do not break. Destroy the enemy aircraft in your area. Airplanes take off on the radio to land on airfields ... " Captain Krivtsov received by radio an order to return to the airfield when he was on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed bombs, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. In the 7-10 squadron, without losing a single aircraft, she returned to the airfield. The first combat sortie for two other squadrons of 9-Bap was not so successful - during a bombing attack on a gathering of German troops in the Tilsit area, they were met by German anti-aircraft fire; three aircraft were shot down.

About an hour after receiving the order from the headquarters of the 7 garden, three squadrons of the 46 were lifted into the air. In 5-30, the commander of the 7 garden ordered the commander of the 10 iap: “One nine to cover the departure 46 bap”. None of the fighter escort flew.

Operational summary №1 46 bap: “... In 6-40 / 6-45 22.6.41. 2-I and 3-I squadrons 46 Bap made a bombing in the number of 18 aircraft. 2-th AE destroyed the accumulation of troops in the area of ​​Tilsit, Tauragen ... During the bombing of the 2-th AE did not return 5 SB aircraft with crews ... 3-A A destroyed railway station Zhilin [17 km from Tilsit] ..., 5 crews did not return from the flight ... "

Major Mogilevsky (commander of 40-th bap): “... The raid on Koenigsberg, Touragen and Memel ended successfully. There was a powerful anti-aircraft fire, but the bombs dropped exactly on the objects. We have no losses ... "

The 10-iap was alerted on 4-20: "... the fighting began after 5 in the morning ... It was my [komesk V. Borovoy] the second sortie between the 6 and 7 watches ... A link of V.Loboda was attacked by fighter jets, and we hit from the bottom. From the first attack, V. Loboda shot down Bf-109, and my shock group - two Ju-88. During the second attack, we shot down three more Ju-88. It was here that Vasily Loboda, helping a friend, rammed Bf-109 ... "

Fighters 21-iap met the first raid at the airport: the order for the opening of hostilities have not yet been received. but thanks to disguise losses were avoided. The order was soon received, and the second regiment met in full readiness, shooting down 9 German aircraft.

It is possible that the morning of June 22 the obscure provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the situation of confusion, lack of communication and firm leadership in the troops caused more damage than the actual bombing and shelling by German aircraft.

Often, the fighters, taking off in alarm, were aimlessly circling over the airfield, having received no targets, and after landing landed new strikes. AT special messages The 3 NKO Directorate noted: “... VNOS posts do not work well, they confuse signaling to the command post, which is why 22 June this year. the flight personnel of the regiment deployed at the Rende airfield six times flew into false air, and with the actual attack of the enemy, our fighters, being not warned, took to the air when the enemy bombarded the outskirts of the city ... ”

When planning a war in the air, the leadership of the spacecraft assumed that tens to hundreds of aircraft would participate in the battles at the same time. The command of all levels of spacecraft faced a new tactic for conducting military operations on the ground and in the air. New experience they will have to continue to receive at the cost of many lives and material resources.

In 8-10 “Commander 7 garden. Hand in immediately. The commander ordered fighter aircraft to be protected to repel powerful air raid of the enemy. Spend carefully. A large group raid is expected... »

Around 12 of the day 22.06.41. Investigation number 03 headquarters SZF: "... The enemy has not yet brought into operation significant air forces, limited to the action of individual groups and single planes ...". In the second half of the day 22 of June, the estimate of the number of enemy aircraft introduced into the battle became more specific: “An adversary with 4-15 to 13-00 groups up to 40 aircraft and single planes totaling more than 150 aircraft attacked airfields ...”

By 12-00, small parachute assault forces were thrown from Alyutus, Rossiena, south-west of Vilnius and other places from transport planes of the 106 th special-purpose air group to other places, which broke communications, created panic and confusion. At that time, the “fifth column” was operating on the territory of the Baltic states. Enemy airplanes attacked nine airfields in the county, and in the evening - to 11. The raids were carried out in echelon, mostly by small subunits of the aircraft throughout the day. As an example, consider the raids on the Orana airfield 57-th garden in the morning: 4-25 - 1 Me-109 and 3 To-17; 6-25 - 2 Me-109; 9-00 - 5 Me-109; 9-30 - 2 Me-109; 11-10 - 10 Me-109. Methodical raids to block the airfield. Many advanced airfields have been bombed and attacked 6-7 times.

Failures in the actions of the Air Force KA, of course, affected the ground situation. An interesting fact is that the German aviation avoided the places where the anti-aircraft artillery units of the SC were deployed, did not bomb the strategic bridges, keeping them for themselves. And these bridges covered anti-aircraft guns, which were needed in other places. At the same time, the fighter regiments could not provide a full-fledged defense of their airfields from enemy air raids.

According to special report 3 Management of NKO No. 35134 from 25.6.41 at SZF: “Our aviation suffers heavy losses: there were 880 aircraft, from June 24 remained in service around 500. The planes were out of action mainly at the airfields, due to their crowded placement, lack of the required number of alternate aerodromes, sites ”. In fact, the remaining 500 aircraft after two days of fighting, when the Germans advanced to great depth, capturing part of the airfields with damaged aircraft - this is a good result. The losses of the SZF Air Force aircraft on the first day were about 96 ... 98 (of which around 20 was shot down during raids on objects located in Germany). For comparison, ZOVOVO Air Force lost more than 600 aircraft during the same period, and KOVO Air Force lost up to 500 aircraft.

Special message from 25.06.41: “... As of June 24 this year. from each aviation regiment of PribOVO, on average, 10 – 20 aircraft remained. In the entire 7 garden there are about 60 planes ..., aviation combat supplies will be enough for 1 – 2 days ... According to the promised alongside transport of aviation ammunition from Estonia is not ensured due to the lack of transport. In connection with the withdrawal of units, there is a shortage of airfields, since airfields are mainly built in the southwestern parts of the Lithuanian and Latvian republics with the calculation of the offensive. The present leadership of the air force units of the air force by the deputy commander of the air force, Major General Aviation Andreev and the Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Rasskazov is not provided due to the lack of communication with some units and the front command post ... "

From the ReportOn the combat activities of the Air Force ...": "... On the second day of the war, the situation created dictated the need to relocate the IAP into the second and third airfield-based zones ... The second and third zones were not developed, which is why the depth maneuver was extremely difficult ..." Thus, the rapid advance of the German troops led to the fact that a lot of damaged aircraft were thrown or destroyed on the airfields, and some of the aircraft were destroyed at the airfields in the absence of flight personnel. Given the above, the number of lost aircraft of the NWF air force has increased dramatically ...

On June 25, the leadership of the NWF Air Force was removed: commander General A.P. Ionov, his deputy for the political affairs of the regimental commissioner I.V. Mashin, NSH of the brigade commander S.S. Krupin were sent to the personnel department of the Air Force. 26.6.41 A.P.Ionov arrested. Shot 23.02.42. Rehabilitated in 1955.

Of course, in special reports of the 3 NKO Directorate, the NKO issues were to be noted, noting the guilt of the Air Force commander. And a mess when planning combat work, and large losses of aircraft, and abandoned (often abandoned) aircraft on airfields. Therefore, the position of the 3 Office should have been taken into account when compiling the Report “On the combat activity of the air forces of the North-Western Front for the period from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42.": “... 19.6.41, in connection with the unfavorable situation, the units were ordered to go on combat readiness and disperse the materiel from base airfields to operational ones, and no Pribevezhis command headquarters to the Panevezys area were issued, no command was given to the command and air units, on the contrary, on the night from 20 to 21 and from 21 to 22.6.41, the aviation units were ordered to conduct night training flights. As a result, most of the bapes were subjected to enemy bomber raids at the time of the postflight inspection of the materiel and refueling it with fuel. The flight crew has just been dismissed to rest after night work ... "

If you look at the material detailed in the books, you can see that the losses during the first raid were quite small. This material in the report came from the message of counterintelligence. At that time, they still did not understand the scope of the Air Force disaster in other districts. It was a false accusation ...

For the last three pre-war months, the average flight time in KOVO was 4 hours, in ZOVOVO - 9, in PribOVO - 15,5 hours. Parts of the District Air Force turned out to be prepared for war, let's say, better than all the other districts. A.P.Ionov associates did everything he could. He, like other commanders, simply did not know how the Germans would fight. I foresee the stormy indignation of some readers and therefore I will clarify: "The charge of incompetent command, criminal negligence and betrayal of A. Ionov was not submitted. "

NKVD data: “Aleksei Pavlovich Ionov 1894 Born, a former member of the CPSU / b / s 1938, from the fists. Before his arrest - Air Force Commander PribOVO, Major General Aviation. 26 / VI-1941 of the year arrested. Condemns the testimony of Smushkevich, Levin and Yusupov as a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. He admitted that since 1939, he was a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy, recruited by Smushkevich. He was connected by conspiracy with Levin and Yusupov. Conducted sabotage in aerodrome construction. "

A.I.Ionov was forced to admit under torture the mutual accusations of the previously arrested air force generals. He, like PS Klenov, did not drag anyone along. He "confessed" only to sabotage in the airfield construction. In terms of position, he could not influence the construction sites of airfields, the sequence of their construction, he did not have the resources to speed up their construction, he was not given instructions about the necessity of basing aircraft at field airfields. In the period of the growth of the “Case of Aviators”, based on increased accident rate, AP Ionov contributed to improving the composition of his flight training, unlike other VOs. 22.6.41 NWF pilots were the first to strike at enemy territory.

The information contained in the responses to General A.Pokrovsky, for various reasons, may be incorrect. For example, P.P.Sobennikov writes:





It is clear from the CCD that 7-th garden 22.6.41 was part of the 8-th army, and did not support it. Battle Order of the Air Force Commander SZF No. 01 / OP 22.6.41 "... the rest of the 7 and 8 garden units operate according to the plan of the army commanders ..." Among the regiments to which tasks are assigned by the command of the Air Force of the front, there are no 7 th garden regiments. Consequently, the combat missions of this division must be set by the headquarters of the 8 Army.

For reference. The 7 garden on 22.6.41 included: 9 sbap (good 51 SAT), 46 th sapap (good 51 Sat and Ap-2), 241 cap (good 27 I-15 bis), 10 ip (23 MY) 3 (not completed mastering) and 26 serviceable and 16 "type 5" - 1935 year of release), 238 ip (30 and 153, had in combat about 11 pilots). 22.6.41 9-th bap made 43 of the departure plane, while 5 bombers were shot down or badly damaged. 46-th bap made 18 sorties, having lost up to 20 airplanes (of which 10 was on the ground). Thus, by the end of 22.6.41, more than 60 SB and Ap-2 bombers should have remained in the shelves. It turns out that the 15-00 22.6.41 as part of the 7 garden could not remain 5-6 SB aircraft. In 241, by the end of 22.6.41, the 3 of the aircraft was shot down and destroyed at the 5 airfield (including 3 burned during the retreat). In the 10 IAP, by the end of 22.6.41 there were about 12 serviceable aircraft. 238-iap on 21.7.41 had 5 and-153 (the vast majority of the aircraft was left at the airport in the absence of flight personnel).

In 5-30 ... 6-00, the enemy infantry went on the offensive after a repeated air raid. In 8-30 ... 9-00, the Germans threw large forces of the moto-armored troops into battle. 125 SD, deployed at the front in 40 km, was attacked by parts of three TD and two PD, followed by another three MD in the second echelon. Against the five regiments of 188, 126 and 128 sd 11 th army, deployed on the 100-km front, there were six and three TD, followed by one, three MD and one TD.

It is well known that the divisions of the cover with their units did not occupy long-term structures and did not proceed to the construction of debris on the roads that could be viewed from German territory. The units had about one BC and did not have an order to open fire on the enemy. Despite instructions to increase ammunition in defensive positions, this did not happen. Despite the instructions of the PribOVO headquarters to the commanders of the armies and corps to withdraw from the NZ and to issue helmets to the troops, this did not happen in full. The commander of the 533 JV P.A.Bochkov: “... only the 1 th battalion was wearing metal helmets when it went out to the area of ​​staff exercises in alarm, and that was only because it was allowed by the army commander in his order. All other units began the war in the caps ... "

Colonel-General MSShumilov (former commander of 11 sk): “... The war began in 4-00 22.6.41. I was immediately reported to the commander of the 8 army ... Received no fire order. Not to give in to provocation. But the troops without an order opened fire... "

125-Rifle Division withdrew to defensive positions almost all the artillery (136 ... 137 guns and mortars 76-mm caliber or more of the provisions of 148 state. Three artillery regiment (414 light up, 459 howitzer up and 51-th cabinet up), covering division , they opened fire only after 8 hours of the morning. Before 11-00 ... 11-30 they shot their own ammunition, a significant part of the artillery was left in position. A similar situation was in all covering divisions.

The preemptive operational deployment of powerful forces with extensive war experience, the massive use of aviation and mechanized troops ensured the Germans success on the first day of the war.

The loss of the 1 td (XXXXI MK) 22.6.41 amounted to 313 people killed and wounded and 34 people missing. 6-I TD (XXXXI MK) moved to the border on the night of June 22 and went on the offensive from the march. According to the memoirs of Colonel Ritgen: “The enemy’s resistance in our sector turned out to be much stronger than expected. We were blocked by six anti-tank ditches, covered by infantrymen and snipers entrenched in trees. Fortunately for us, they did not have anti-tank guns and mines. Since no one gave up, there were no prisoners. However soon Tanks were left without ammunition, which had never happened before during the campaigns in Poland and France ... ” В RCB XXXXI MK On the day of June 22, it was noted: “Losses exceed normal level”.

RCB 8 th TD (XXXXXVI) 7-55: “Parts are moving east quickly. The division had the impression that it had not yet come in contact with the enemy’s regular troops. ”. Soon the situation has changed. Scheller's battle group got bogged down in battles for Soviet pillboxes and lost pace.

The headquarters of the NWF, the 8 and 11 armies due to the systematic disruption of communication by saboteurs and as a result of the bombings could not properly assess the situation, quickly take the necessary decision and organize the management of subordinate units. Retractable reserves were commonly used to launch hasty counterattacks. The troops were brought into battle on the move, not having enough ammunition, without the support of artillery and aircraft. German aviation detected convoys of our troops and struck them. This did not allow to significantly slow down the advancement of the enemy moto-armored groups.

Consider two Reports. «To the Commander of the North-Western Front, Colonel General Comrade Kuznetsov

From the very first days of the operation, daily operational orders or combat orders contradicting each other began to arrive on 2-3 times. As a result, the troops twitched in vain, and this provision made it impossible to expediently use the forces and means to carry out the order ...

Combat material in the compounds remained old, worn ... After the first day of the march, and especially after the first day of the battle, the cars began to quickly fail out of dozens. Due to the lack of spare parts, both on the routes and in the fighting, they were not restored, and if they were restored ... only on the battlefield, since the absence of tractors did not allow them to be towed to the collection points of emergency vehicles. For the same reason, a lot of the material part was left in the territory of the enemy ...

Troop control was weak due to the lack of radio communications. There were no permanent wires. Regular wire communications due to the excessive dispersion of the divisions was not enough. Radio almost did not work at all. The only means of communication for the entire operation was the delegates of communication.

The commander of 12 mk Major General Shestopalov 27.6.41 12-00 »


Report on the combat activities of the 8 Army artillery in battles with 22.6. by xnumx. "... The artillery of the army went to the front and entered the fighting with a large shortage in peacetime states ... Parts not only were not ordered to take property to wartime states, but they were not informed about the possibility of fighting, therefore, the property supposed to be replaced, transport , means of observation, means of observation were not taken to wartime states ... Due to the lack of an adequate amount of transport, the existing transport was overloaded and was out of service ahead of time, as a result of which it was not always ensured odvoz ammunition and evacuation during the withdrawal ...

From the first days of the fighting the disguise was good, the digging was bad. In the last battles, self-digging measures improved, artillery, as a rule, began to go deeper into the ground, stamina and survivability increased ... Divisional artillery mostly remained with infantry retreat one... reflecting the enemy with his fire, taking the material part in the echelon of his infantry, with great losses ...

Colonel Ivin, Chief of the 8 Army Artillery, 8 Army Artillery Colonel Colonel Ivanov


The deficiencies in the organization of combat activities indicated in the reports are well known and discussed many times. Of course, it is clear that the scattered connections of the PribOVO satellites would not have been able to hold back the German strike forces due to a huge number of reasons. With proper deployment, they could only slightly damage the enemy and sell their lives at a higher price (whoever would want to). There was no fierce hatred for the German invaders at that time ...

JBD SZF. This refers to the so-called "JBD SZF”, Which was to lead an operational staff of the front headquarters.



The document consists of two conditional parts: the 1-part I is the restored part of the journal from 22 June to 12 July 1941 of the year, the 2-I part - entries from 12.7.41 to 18.08.41. The feature of this declassified document is that original source. Information before 12.7.41 was restored by an unknown person.



Another feature of the OBB SZF is that it is reprinted (perhaps not once). The order to reprint the reinforced concrete bollard cannot even be given by the front commander if he is sent to the archive of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown. The log filed in the archive does not have a witness signature, which is a violation of the secrecy regime.



Why did the author decide that the cbd was reprinted? Let's see a piece of text: “... The skillful organization of the concentration of groups and the conduct of operations, the supply of reserves from the depth, the rapid regrouping of troops, perseverance in carrying out the goals set and the tasks assigned to the troops draw attention to themselves. All these positive qualities of the German troops played a role. in the first months of the warBut as soon as the Red Army learned reflect the notorious "wedges", such repeatedly repeated patterns of conducting operations could not lead to success ... " At a reprint of the document even one conclusion was left, with which the person connected with the reprint of the OBD probably does not agree.



It turns out that during the reprint they tried to preserve as much as possible all the existing text. Perhaps the CIA prepared for work some high-ranking person after February 1942, and at the same time, the magazine was generously supplemented with generalizations and conclusions. Why after February 1942? Because in February all this could be clarified with the former NSh SZF ...

Without having a primary source, it is inappropriate to evaluate the actions of the PribOVO-SZF management on the published document. Within the framework of the topic under consideration, I would like to mention only one place in the OBD, referring to the period 18-22.6.41. The assessment was conducted by a person much later than the specified time period. The man who is quite well owned events of the prewar period.

"... Thus, the war became a fact events demanded urgent action on both sides and primarily in the area operational deployment of military units of all the armed forces and their concentration on the mobplan for conducting operations. The command of the NWF in the last days before the war it was possible to relocate immediately a number of parts closer to the border. However, the pace of concentration and deployment was extremely slow. It was necessary to take into account the weak throughput of the Baltic railways, the dispersion of troops over a large territory and their remoteness from the state border.

At the same time the opportunity presented itself under the guise of withdrawing parts to camps, to make a hidden concentration of the main forces at the state border, to occupy and improve field defenses, subject to the correct assessment and prediction of impending events at the SPF. Only 90, 188, 5 sd were withdrawn in due time, but most of them were also engaged in the equipment of the camps, less in combat training. 3 and 12 MK occupied the concentration areas according to the plan ... "


What is unusual about this piece of text? There is not a single word in it about instructions or directives of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. The point is that the command of the NWF opportunity presented relocate a number of parts to the border. All redeployment of troops agree with the General Staff ?! How could the district command redeploy parts, ignoring the attention of the high command of the spacecraft? Who has the right to make such a conclusion in a closed document? This refers to a complete and sealed secret document. It is already a big problem to solve it - not every multi-star general can allow it ...

The same phrase "the opportunity presented itself"Is used when discussing the withdrawal of parts" under the guise of output to the camps, "and in fact concentrate them near the border. And again, does this seem to be a personal initiative of the PribOVO command, which would be unused to the end?

Who could have expected something unexpected from the PribOVO management? Who could give a carte blanche to the district command? If we were talking about a book about alternative stories about the "hitches", then everything is clear. “The Hitchers” immediately send a memo to the leader. The leader would, perhaps, give carte blanche, and the shooting of the protagonist is a failure to justify the hopes of a great man. But we are not in the book ...

There is not a single word about the NSH SZF PS Klenov. Neither bad (he was already arrested as an enemy, but no one “threw a stone”), nor good (fraught, however). Regarding commander F.I. Kuznetsov, there are two references.

“The 3-00 24.6. Decision of the NWF Command: The meeting was attended by: Gen. Col. Kuznetsov, corps Commissar DIBROV, Army Commissar 2 of the rank of Borisov and a number of other responsible commanders. Colonel-General KUZNETSOV ordered Captain NAZAROV and a group of commanders of the headquarters to immediately go and restore the position under KAUNAS. The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS ... "

The order for an attack on Kaunas was signed by Kuznetsov and Dibrova. Army commissar 2 rank Borisov arrived in PribOVO on a business trip just before the war. 24 of June, at his insistence, which was supported by DWI's FWS, it was decided to go over to the 16 sk offensive in order to fight off Kaunas occupied by the enemy. The offensive ended with encirclement. With the help of 46 tp, the encirclement was broken at the turn of the river Viliya and the remnants of the hull (along with 46 tp), having lost almost all heavy weapons, began to retreat in the direction of Polotsk. Borisov voluntarily departed to Moscow, where he was convicted. It seems that it was not in vain that an eyewitness to those events who filled the ZhBD NWF mentioned only two high-ranking political workers who could convince Kuznetsov to carry out this operation.

How does the person who participates in the reprint of the RCB evaluate this event: “... The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS. However, the situation for 16 ck was created extremely hard, parts were not put in order, there were no tanks, aircraft, the connection with the army was lost, the enemy had pulled up to two fresh traffic police stations and put himself in order. The right decision would be to take up defense with parts of 11 A along the river Vilia and put them in order. 8 A to take over the river VENTA, the edge of the forest southern SHULYAY. The operation was not prepared. NWF handed an order around 12.00 24.6, therefore, the troops had too little time to organize an offensive. The absence of aviation and the poor organization of ground reconnaissance did not allow opening the approach of two fresh enemy forces, which decided the fate of the operation. The troops were not put in order, there was no command ... Only not knowing the operational situation and not imagining the whole destructiveness of this business, pushed Colonel General Kuznetsov to give an order to attack KAUNAS... » As we know, the front commander was not shot ...

In the topic devoted to PribOVO, the author mentioned A.D.Loktionov, I.F. Kuznetsov, P.S.Klenov and A.P.Ionov. The bright memory of people who tried to prepare their troops for a meeting with the Nazi invaders. Not everything worked out for them. No one at that time could have kept the Germans ...



PS Quite a lot of readers left asterisks under parts of the cycle. Thank. Many people disagree with the proposed version - this is their right. The main thing for the people left is memory. The author appeals to people who put stars (if it is not contrary to their conviction) to put candles in a church, temple, or to remember these people. Below when discussing this part, the author will post a comment. Please put asterisks under this comment only people who were able to fulfill (personally or through relatives, friends) the request of the author. Thank. Perhaps another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.
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  1. aszzz888
    aszzz888 29 November 2017 06: 14 New
    36
    ... for many decades historians will rethink facts, materials, documents, eyewitness accounts, etc. of that time - the time of the beginning of the Second World War and its first days ... thanks to the author for the material ... an interesting feature: in the "Military Journal 8A" the word LENINGradsky was later attributed to another composition of the writing medium, possibly with a simple pencil ... most likely this was for the sake of secrecy ...
  2. Same lech
    Same lech 29 November 2017 06: 22 New
    55
    Thanks aKtoR for the article hi ... as always, I read your article with great interest.
    Add to it about the confusion ...
    I think many middle and senior commanders were completely devoid of any initiative in a difficult environment ... did not know what to do if they lost contact with the higher command ... did not know how to behave in the environment in the absence of an order to withdraw from their positions .. .a fear of being arrested in case of violation of data orders before the outbreak of war fettered any initiative of the commanders ... rarely did anyone decide to conduct a maneuver war on their own initiative.

    The Germans took advantage of this fully inflicting very large losses on our troops.
    1. Mu Dialer
      Mu Dialer 29 November 2017 07: 25 New
      15
      Yeah, I agree.
      Anti-aircraft gunners sometimes didn’t even open fire when the Germans were already bombing. I even read that the commander of some anti-aircraft gunner was Shot for the fact that he gave the order to shoot at German planes.
      This is some kind of horror.
      1. Mu Dialer
        Mu Dialer 29 November 2017 07: 29 New
        10
        Plus, not everyone wanted to fight, some Germans were waiting, not only in the Baltic states and Ukraine, but even in Russia.
        I remember reading in the memoirs of a veteran that in the rear of the Germans they encountered a column of our prisoners who went into German captivity without a German convoy, that is, without security. Somewhere in August 1941, east of Novgorod somewhere.
        1. ammunition
          ammunition 1 December 2017 05: 05 New
          +4
          Here about Chernyakhovsky at the beginning of the war .-
          https://topwar.ru/32525-genialnyy-voenachalnik-iv
          an-chernyahovskiy.html
          In the same places. Near Šiauliai. So at Chernyakhovsky everything is not so at all.
          -------------
          Kind of weird. From the first minutes of the war, Chernyakhovsky fought very effectively with his division. Even if every other division would do the same, there would be no disaster for the 41 year.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 29 November 2017 08: 06 New
    52
    It is read with great interest, thanks again to the author ....
    1. aKtoR
      29 November 2017 09: 11 New
      27
      Thank you Parusnik, Mu Dialer, The same Lech and the rest who put the likes.
      I also apologize to those whom this message annoyed ...
      Subject, in principle, completed. Perhaps for the New Year holidays I decide to add.
      thanks everyone !!!
      1. aKtoR
        30 November 2017 11: 06 New
        59


        Thanks to whoever responded
        1. 8Schlaf
          8Schlaf 9 December 2017 15: 36 New
          +8
          Fulfilled your request
        2. cavl
          cavl 14 December 2017 05: 35 New
          +1
          Was put a candle for each
          1. aKtoR
            24 December 2017 20: 23 New
            +5
            Thanks again to thirty-eight readers who responded and remembered the departed generals!
            1. VS
              VS 25 December 2017 12: 31 New
              -5
              These are those by whose grace hundreds of thousands died in vain?
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 7 December 2017 12: 50 New
        -6
        PS Quite a lot of readers left asterisks under parts of the cycle. Thank. Many people disagree with the proposed version - this is their right. The main thing for the people left is memory. The author appeals to people who put stars (if it is not contrary to their conviction) to put candles in a church, temple, or to remember these people. Below when discussing this part, the author will post a comment. Please put asterisks under this comment only people who were able to fulfill (personally or through relatives, friends) the request of the author. Thank. Perhaps another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.

        It is better to listen to the opinion of professionals about such "revelations", especially since V.V. gave an exhaustive description to such authors. Slavin:

        “But, unfortunately, the trouble with almost all domestic historians (even military historians) is that when they receive a document of operational or strategic planning, they cannot understand it in principle. Our researchers of the past, as a rule, are so professionally distant from the process of planning the use of troops that attempts to confirm their premises on the basis of a full analysis of the sources do not lead to anything worthwhile.This fully applies to the last book of Mark Solonin, and to other publications devoted to the same time.

        But letting our scientists and publicists fail is not only unprofessionalism. "

        http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2007-10-12/5_theories.ht
        ml
  4. The comment was deleted.
  5. creak
    creak 29 November 2017 09: 30 New
    46
    It remains only to regret that articles prepared at such a high, professional level in VO are rare. Success to the author in his necessary and useful work where there is still an unplowed field ...
    As for the suddenness, in our country winter comes suddenly and snow falls in the winter unexpectedly ... It was just that the Great Patriotic War of the Red Army met in a “semi-dismantled” state - the war with Finland brightly highlighted all this. The state of affairs was reflected in the corresponding ACT, on the transfer of cases to Voroshilov (with a bang removed from his post) to the new new Drug Tymoshenko in 1940.
    This ACT sets out all the reasons for the tragic outcome of the initial period of the Second World War, familiarization with it removes many questions. Objectively, he could not be different, despite the news of heroism and fidelity to the duty of soldiers and commanders ... General Gorbatov, one of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, clearly and unequivocally said this in his own words - it was a complete spoonful of victories and defeats in its time ... .
    1. Mu Dialer
      Mu Dialer 29 November 2017 10: 18 New
      13
      It could have been different if Stalin had reached a real state of affairs at least on June 19-20. Even those troops that were already at the border could have created serious difficulties for the Germans. Stalin personally is guilty - for all this surprise, the 22nd. All one troops our people would retreat - if there were no surprise attacks, but would retreat more slowly, plus the Germans would pay a higher price for their advancement. And so surrender Brest in 4 hours ...
      1. VS
        VS 29 November 2017 15: 07 New
        0
        “After a conversation with the people's commissar of defense, which did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. 1, the ZAPOVO leadership decided for about half an hour: what instructions should be given to the troops”

        - Do not invent - EVERYTHING IS UNDERSTANDED from the text of the adopted directive - Cho must do it - TRANSFER ALL the troops, Air Force, Air Defense and Navy to FULL BG)))
        Another thing is that Pavlov then lied during the investigation that he gave the command at 1.30 - verbally by phone - “puts the troops in combat”, which seems to be brought back to the base station, but in reality - he only gave the staffs the command to assemble on alarm. .))
        MADAM - yes, you read the answers of the finally commanders for this night - in Chekunov's collection - he published these answers especially for the ignorant)))

        "The commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, at about one in the morning, on his own responsibility, ordered the sealed" red packets "to be sent to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the combat alert procedures stored at the army headquarters"

        - Madame - THESE PACKAGES - STORED in safes at comcor ALWAYS !!))) if they are fully approved as valid)))
        Korobkov, he gave the packages under the NEW Cover Plans - in May)) that did not work out in the armies of the ZAPOVO in general !!)) But the old ones were there anyway - or the old ones have not been approved by the NPO and the General Staff but they have not been approved yet ))))

        “At about two o’clock on the night of June 22nd on HF, the commander of the 3rd Army V.I. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov:“ Raise the troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately to take the bunkers and bring them into full combat readiness, put into effect a plan for covering the state border ". The management of ZAPOVO assumed the responsibility from which the senior management of the spacecraft was removed. "

        - yes, enough already to carry the blizzard about the innocent generals that they opened packages on "personal initiative")) - if you don’t know HOW IT ALL WAS REALLY)))
        This was done ONLY by Zakharov in OdVO - about 1 o'clock in the morning already - without waiting for the arrival of and decoding of the text of the directive about full bg. , he received a call at 22 o’clock on the telephone from the General Staff - “Wait for an important encryption” and took the initiative, thinking that an unambiguous order would come - “Proceed to the 1941 RP — and gave the alarm command at midnight already, and at 1 o'clock in the OdVO and open packages - read the answers of the commanders - HOW IT WAS - to Pokrovsky’s question No. 3)))
        SO. This “b / n” directive of 22.20 on June 21 informs the districts of the date of a possible attack, warns that the attack can begin suddenly (in the sense - without declaring war) and with provocations that cannot be succumbed so as not to cause problems of an international nature. And she orders - to bring-transfer all the troops of the border districts, the Air Force, air defense of these districts and the fleet - in full combat readiness! And also - to occupy firing points on the border.
        And the fact that it seems to be indicated in it - "indefinitely" - "an attack is possible on June 22-23," does not play ANY role. Troops are required to IMMEDIATELY, upon receipt of this directive, raise them according to combat alert, withdraw to a minimum at the gathering area and wait for further instructions already there: - either open the red packet and pull in to occupy the trenches at the border, - or fill up the lights out and into the barracks ... And that is how they understood it where they wanted to understand it.
        Considering the fact that the Air Force, Air Defense, Fleet and troops have already been on high alert since June 18 (should have been brought up), this directive precisely puts all troops on full alert and does not bring them from scratch !!!
        1. VS
          VS 29 November 2017 15: 08 New
          -1
          “3 hours of lost time from the delivery of Directive No. 1 to the encryption department of the General Staff before sending the PT to the cover army. Encryption reached the addressee by the beginning of the war ... "

          - no need to write about what you don’t know))))

          Zhukov at 22.00 p.m. from Stalin’s office gives the command to the operational duty officer for the General Staff - to ring the okrug and warn him - to wait for the important encryption of the General Staff!
          At 22.20, Tymoshenko and Zhukov are leaving Stalin’s office for Tymoshenko’s office in the People’s Commissariat of Defense. There, they rewrite within a hour the draft text of the directive b / n on letterhead forms.
          At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko’s People’s Commissar, Admiral Kuznetsov, arrives at the office, who is given a read-out directive, according to which he should raise the fleet on alert and put them on alert No. 1. To clarifying questions of the admiral - is it possible to open fire in the event of an attack by Germany, Tymoshenko confirms - it is possible.
          At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko phoned the districts and said that "provocation is possible from Germany and Romania ... There may not be a war, but the troops must be ready." Which means - with all the ambiguities of the people's commissar's instructions - to be ready for war as well.
          At 23.30, combat missions are already being set at the border: “An order was given by telephone to Colonel Zheleznyak on 9 and 10 bulbats to raise their battles on alarm, to occupy and load bunkers” ...
          At 23.45, the text of the b / n directive is transmitted to the encryption department of the General Directorate of Operations. The typist makes copies of this directive - for the NKVMF, Kuznetsov, and for the headquarters of the Reserve Front, Budyonny. It takes half an hour to encrypt the text of the directive, and at 0.20 the transmission of this directive, encryption to the districts begins.
          At 24.00 - already Zhukov phoned the district and orders: faster to send the directive on combat readiness to the troops! At this time, the text itself is only encrypted in GS. At least he called KOVO ...
          At about 1 am, all districts received this directive "b / n" and even decrypted by 1.20. True, they didn’t do this at KOVO - there wasn’t an operating department yet at the field CP. But they were completely told by telephone from the General Staff what was required of them.

          AND FURTHER - ON ARMY TELEPHONES they lifted - EVERYWHERE !! Except GOOD !! Where is the future innocent victim and the good man Klenov remaining for the commander DO NOT RAISE his armies - AT ALL - right up to the time of the German attack !!! The army of this district - the Germans woke up.
          In the ZAPOVO - Korobkov did NOT raise his army to him, although he received Pavlov’s order completely and the connection with him was OK.
          As it was in KOVO - read Purkaev’s answer))

          “I hurried to TERNOPIL, where I arrived at about 3 o’clock in the morning on 22.6.41.
          By my arrival, the commander of the district’s troops, General KIRPANOS, had already received orders from the General Staff to put the troops on alert, but he didn’t give any orders to anyone.
          Having received instructions from General KIRPANOS about the orders of the General Staff in connection with the expected German attack, I immediately called all army commanders personally to the BODO apparatus. And in the period from 3 to 4 hours he personally transmitted an order to everyone to bring the troops into full combat readiness, to take up defense according to the plan. When crossing the Germans, the state borders should be reflected by all means and means, and the borders themselves should not be crossed. Our planes do not fly over to special instructions.
          All army commanders accepted these instructions for execution. ”

          If it hadn’t for Purkayev, Kirpanos would have been spanked - as yet another “good man”))) for sabotage in the execution of the orders of the General Staff transferred to him via RF communications personally by the same Malandinny or even Zhukov))

          ... At 2 a.m. shelling on the border began - in the same OdVO. Zhukov and Tymoshenko reported this to Stalin.
          At 2 o’clock, the German ambassador began to search for Molotov (Minister of InDel of the USSR) - to poke a note on the attack (perhaps at the same time a telegram from Berlin from our embassy came to Moscow with the signal "Thunderstorm" from the military attache, GRU resident, General Tupikov) ...
          Well, at 2.30 on June 22, Tymoshenko or Zhukov, via HF communications, personally gave an instruction - on the introduction of the software. And now this "directive" should have a "number" - Directive "No. 1" of the outbreak of war ...
          1. The comment was deleted.
            1. VS
              VS 29 November 2017 15: 10 New
              -1
              “You were presented with the author’s version that the top leadership of the spacecraft on the evening of 21.6.41 was not ready to send Directive No. 1 to the troops. The leaders of the spacecraft were forced to prepare and forward this document by I. Stalin. Therefore, the leadership of the AC probably considered it necessary to express their point of view on the HF leadership of the districts. They did not get through only to the OdVO NSh M.V. Zakharov, who assumed responsibility for raising the district troops somewhere from 23-00 21.6.41 to 00-00 22.6.41. "

              - fucking again))
              Zhukov carried to Stalin in general - the order “Proceed to the 1941 implementation of the PP”))) Stalin slowed him down as premature - he suddenly succeeded in settling the situation peacefully))) And he allowed - TRANSFER to full bg. ALL the troops, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy - which by the evening of the 21st SHOULD be on the orders of NCOs and the General Staff from June 8-11-15 and June 18 - should be in the increased battalion))) and the directive was withdrawn to the okrugs - about full bg )))
              At 23 o’clock, Tymoshenko phoned the districts and said that "provocation is possible from Germany and Romania ... There may not be a war, but the troops must be ready." Which means - with all the ambiguities of the people's commissar's instructions - to be ready for war as well.


              “Let's look at the text of Directive No. 1 prepared by Tymoshenko and Zhukov again.


              »

              - Madame - this is not a directive without a number that was sent from the General Staff at 1 a.m. in the district))) YOU are a lie or - you stupidly do not know Whose thing this directive is)))

              Let me tell you - this is a directive - Pavlova)) which different people consider the GSh directive)))
              The EXACT text of the directive b / n - ZHUKOVA - has in the order part of the provision on bringing in b .. g air defense))

              “It was a similar order that was brought to VO by the top leadership of the spacecraft in a rather harsh form. The “valuable instructions” from Moscow and Directive No. 1 itself should have been reflected in the instructions of the headquarters and the Military Council of the NWF. Thus, to distinguish “provocation” from “surprise attack”, and also to decide what exactly to transfer to the troops the top leadership of the spacecraft in Directive No. 1 shifted to the shoulders of the command of the okrug fronts, which had been “frightened” before the decision ... ”

              - STOP CARRYING Nonsense - doing falsification of a question)))

              See HOW they understood the order in the Districts - and what do you invent there again - YOUR problems are ignoramus)))
              1. VS
                VS 29 November 2017 15: 10 New
                -3
                “It was precisely to transfer to the troops the top leadership of the KA in Directive No. 1 that passed on to the shoulders of the command of the okrug fronts, which had been“ frightened ”before making a decision ...

                “To the Military Councils of the 8th and 11th Armies June 22, 1941 2-25

                1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden German attack on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.

                2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.

                At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat

                I ORDER:

                1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

                3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

                4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

                5. The families of commanding personnel of the 10th, 125th, 33rd and 128th should be transported to the rear only in case of crossing the border by large enemy forces.

                6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

                a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

                b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

                7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

                8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

                9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

                10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.

                Colonel General F. Kuznetsov, Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchiy, Lieutenant General Klenov »»

                - Madame - yes, READ YOU ORDERING part - SO the military does when they send orders))
                THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT !!!

                “I ORDER:

                1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                2. In the event of a major enemy offensive, defeat him. ”!!!

                THIS IS FULL MILITARY READINESS SO declared !!!

                And now - see HOW Klenov raised the army - NO !!!

                According to Morozov, he called him and supposedly Morozov then began to raise his army - at 2 o’clock already - but this is a lie)))
                1. VS
                  VS 29 November 2017 15: 11 New
                  -2
                  “What is so different from what is stated in the Directive No. 1 that the People’s Commissar of Defense for High-Frequency NSh NWF ordered the NKF if they first decide not to put mines, and after receiving the encryption with the text of Directive No. 1 at the NWF headquarters, a decision is made on their“ immediate installation "?"

                  - read the ANSWER of the chief of engineer of troops of the 11th Army of Firsov - what everyone was doing there with these mines. And - on mines there was a separate order in PribOVO - from June 189 - to put)))

                  "4. Establish minefields according to the plan of the army commander where they should stand according to the plan of defensive construction. <...>. Blockages and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles to create according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.
                  5. Shtarm, corps and divisions - in touch with the KP, which will provide the VET by decision of the appropriate commander.
                  6. Our retreating units must go to their shelter areas. <...>
                  7. Continue to aggressively replenish the parts with fire supplies and other supplies .... " (TsAMO, f.344, op. 5564, d.1, l. 34-36)
                  The instruction - "Establish minefields according to the plan of the army commander" - WITHOUT indicating the date - means - INSTALL IMMEDIATELY !!!

                  Kuznetsov then departed for Sobennikov’s army and Klenov, the “good man”, remaining for him - and began to think with these mines littering the brains of the commanders (((

                  “Sht from the headquarters of the NWF is not sent to the 27th army. Units of the 67th SD (from the 27th Army) have already been raised by alarm, and the army headquarters is not notified of the Directive. The front leadership probably does not expect a full-scale war to begin. Why inform the army headquarters located in the rear? Incorrect intelligence data contributes to this error. ”

                  Maples NOT ONE army on alert e did not raise at all !!! While the text was not deciphered in the armies, they did NOT know ANYTHING and then began to call to Riga - to clarify - what this means !!

                  “They were convinced of this, ordered by the higher ranks of the spacecraft. Unfortunately, the time for carrying out the activities indicated in the NWF Directive dated 22.6.41 is already gone ... For example, landmines by the roads have remained lying away from the dug holes under them ... "


                  - nonsense. Mines remained SO lying thanks to Klenov personally !!!

                  Escho once - on June 19, "Minefields were set according to the plan of the army commander" was ordered .... and THIS was NOT CANCELED by a written order as requested by Firsov from Klenovy received ORAL commands for the removal of mines.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                    1. VS
                      VS 29 November 2017 15: 12 New
                      -3
                      “If he talked about Klenov only good or neutral, he would have signed a death sentence for himself. "

                      - with what sorry - horseradish vegetable ??)))

                      “The author tried to show that, by“ telephone law ”,“ pumping ”went from Moscow with the aim of not giving the Germans a reason for the conflict. Since there was no commander of the troops at the front headquarters at that time, the NSh communicated to the army commanders the latest “especially valuable instructions” from Moscow. "

                      - Oh, how)) You ALREADY YOUR pardon “babi” fantasies gave out a reliable FACT - what did anyone point out to someone on the phone - and personally to Klenov ??)))

                      “Order of the commander of the 7th garden 22.6.41 4-15“ To the commanders of regiments.

                      1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

                      2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

                      Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

                      The commander of the 7th garden is Colonel Petrov. "

                      - This division commander, Air Force Political Secretary PribOVO brought back June 19 - and the date and time of the attack - 3.0 June 22)))

                      “About 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4th Garden to strike with force of three bap in the city and port of Memel.”

                      Maybe you’ll bring this order ??)) and if you know your strange lady’s tendency to think up something — who thought there, there are doubts — but was this order or stupidly divisive of this GARDEN having opened the package after the attack? It’s so SO POSED to do - and there, after reading the task, he began to carry it out - WITHOUT an order for this additional from Ionov - also shot after -)))

                      "" ... Our Air Force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... I took measures to bomb the enemy without flying over the border ... "

                      - because TAKA ordered Moscow and TAK is written in the PP - the border until the special order of NGOs and General Staff - Moscow - do not cross.)))

                      "" ... The commander of the 7th garden. Do not violate the state borders. Destroy enemy aircraft in your area. Landing planes on the radio to land on the airfields ... "Captain Krivtsov received a radio order to return to the airfield at the time of being on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed the bomb bay, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. At 7-10, the squadron, without losing a single plane, returned to the airfield. "

                      - because the pilots rushed to the other side)))) WITHOUT ORDER on this))
                      Permission came in deere. 2))) at 8 a.m. only))

                      "Iap was raised by alarm at 4-20:"

                      - HERE FOR THIS Klenov was shot - “for manifestation of inaction in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT” !!!
                      1. VS
                        VS 29 November 2017 15: 13 New
                        -2
                        “On the morning of June 22, the slurred provisions of Directive No. 1, the confusion situation, the lack of communication and firm leadership in the troops did more damage than the direct bombardment and shelling of German aircraft.”

                        - this is for you - LADIES they are slurred and for the military - they are quite understandable .. but to you - it is excusable to you)))

                        Klenov, of course, is a bastard, but in the text of his directives - on the basis of the GSh directive on completely b .. g - prepared in advance unambiguously and not invented in those hours - everything was clearly spelled out)))
                        READ THE ORDERING part)) everything is completely clear and intelligible there))

                        “I ORDER:

                        1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.

                        2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.

                        3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.

                        4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.

                        5. The families of the commanding personnel of the 10th, 125th, 33rd and 128th SD should be transported to the rear only if the border is crossed by large enemy forces.

                        6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:

                        a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;

                        b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.

                        7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.

                        8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.

                        9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.

                        10. The execution of this and the violation of the border to report immediately "

                        This directive was thrown off in the army at 2.30 and at 3 o'clock EVERYWHERE it was completely decrypted in the armies 0 because we don’t have any special cryptographic files)))
                        AND THE SAME IONS HER READ IT ONE-BIT - at 2.25! BUT IONS DO NOT RAISE their Air Force on alert !!! Anxiety in the PribOV Air Force begins at 4 a.m. - “good” is another person)))
  6. polpot
    polpot 29 November 2017 13: 35 New
    11
    A complex decision-making system, not a desire to take the initiative, laziness, perhaps betrayal, these are just a few bricks at the base of the 1941 drama, it took a whole range of measures to improve the command qualitatively, starting with the creation of the headquarters and ending with defensive squads and a wreck.
  7. VS
    VS 29 November 2017 15: 05 New
    -2
    Quote: aKtoR
    I apologize to those who were annoyed by this message ...

    so it wasn’t necessary to start lying - to listen to what those in the subject would say and take into account - - THERE WAS THERE BEING OFFERED TO YOU right away - so that you would not show yourself ignorant - and everything would be fine. Nova was itching so much to please everyone with sensations that in the end, they got into a puddle again. By the way, why are you hiding your name then? How rezun what)))

    Well, now according to the text of your nonsense)))))

    ““ To hand the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft immediately ... The report of the Commander of the 3rd Army wire fences along the border near the road Augustow, Sejny, who were still in the afternoon, removed in the evening. In this area of ​​the forest, it is as if the noise of ground-based motors ... Klimovsky’s is heard. ”The document has a note:“ Sent on June 21, 1941 at 2 hours and 40 minutes. ” This message on the morning and afternoon of 21.6.41/XNUMX/XNUMX did not particularly alert the chief of the General Staff. It is not known what Klimovsky or Pavlova answered from Moscow. Probably the same as the night before the war. "

    - Well, what a restless damavrushka))))
    But - our lady finally got to the most interesting - and started inventing again - on ignorance of the topic))))
    But it’s enough just to read DIFFERENT sources - to restore the picture on June 21, but Madame is easier to think up - who is there “Thought”)))
    There is a note on this telegram - Vatutin’s resolution: “To urgently prepare a report to the Government and separately to Vyshinsky.” ...)))
    Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 informs the party leadership of Moscow - there will be an attack. It gives instructions to bring Moscow air defense to high alert ...
    ABOUT THIS wrote - Chadayev, Admiral Kuznetsov)))
    At 19 hours on June 21, a group of the country's top leaders, who were all members of the Commission on Military and Naval Affairs, began to confer with Stalin (which, just a few weeks earlier, was called the KO - Defense Committee). At which Stalin informs Tymoshenko and other members of the Commission of information about a possible German attack on the USSR in the coming days. At this meeting, the issue (according to intelligence reports) about a possible German attack in the coming hours was discussed, and mobilization issues were also discussed. Zhukov, who will visit Stalin only at 20.50, at this time just calls the district and warns the commanders about a possible attack that night.
    (As Y. E. Chadayev, SNK business manager later told the historian G. A. Kumanev, already at this meeting, Stalin informed those present that the attack would be that night (Kumanev, “Stalin's People’s Commissars Say,” M. 2005.). Chadayev told Kumanev that on the afternoon of June 21, Stalin had indeed notified the leaders of the CPSU (b) of Moscow that they had attacked and ordered the commander of the Moscow District, General Tyulenev, to bring the air defense of the capital to high alert. This is also shown in the memoirs and Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov ... .)


    “At about 23 p.m. on 21.6.41/3/10 G. Zhukov on the high-frequency apparatus warned the NS of western military units:“ Expect special instructions! ” General Klimovskikh reported this to General D. Pavlov and ordered the commanders and NSh of the 4rd, XNUMXth and XNUMXth armies to be at their headquarters. ”
    - and type - ANYTHING until 23 o'clock Zhukov did not - associated with the expected attack ??)))
    On June 21, Zhukov calls around the okrugs around 18-19 pm and warns them of the attack. About which intelligence reports to him ... At the same time, on the evening of the 21st and the people's commissar Tymoshenko, sending Meretskov to the LenVO informs him:
    “- Perhaps the war will begin tomorrow!” You need to be as a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.
    - What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.
    - Excerpt first of all. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do ... ”(Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Politizdat, 1968, p.209)

    The districts warned - “Wait for an important encryption” - at 22 hours and not at 23 hours))) Read Marshal Zakharov - how it was and who called him - at whose team the caller did it and from where the person who gave the command set the task)))
    And at 21 o’clock Zhukov arrived at Stalin, who brought with him a directive - on the beginning of the implementation of Cover Plans - “Proceed to the implementation of the 1941 PP”. Which he dragged to Stalin on June 11!
    Some historians continue to repeat stories from Zhukov - that it was he who persuaded the tyrant to be brought to B.G. at this meeting, supposedly, the defectors prompted the date and time of the attack, but actually Zhukov arrived at the meeting already assembled - the Commission on Military and Naval Affairs. At which he himself was invited - as chief of the General Staff. Listen to the proposal of the People's Commissar and the beginning. General Staff, and give the necessary order in the district ...

    Stalin again slows down the Zhukovsky proposal-directive on the “Entry of the 1941 PP” - all of a sudden it will be possible to settle the peacefully brewing situation with the German attack. But it gives permission - to bring (transfer) the troops of the districts to full combat readiness - the directive "w / o from 22.20 on June 21" is signed. In which the districts are warned - “During June 22-23, a sudden attack by Germany and its allies is possible”! It is reported that the attack may begin with provocations that cannot be answered and a command is given to occupy the firing points at the border.
    How did the districts understand this Moscow directive? Approximately, as Purkaev understood it, NSW KOV was “to bring the troops into full combat readiness, in case of the Germans crossing the state border, by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until further notice”.
    1. VS
      VS 29 November 2017 15: 05 New
      -3
      “This PC was handed over to the encryption department at 01-45 and sent at 02-25. Since the district leadership did not take any action before receiving the ShT, it turns out that from Moscow on the HF they did not report anything about the contents of Directive No. 1. "

      - Madame - yes, DO NOT INVENT YOU any shit))
      In Minsk, the con b.n. - for FULL combat readiness - received about 1 hour and decrypted it - by 1.20 !!
      The text was adopted in this form))
      “Military councils of districts.
      1. During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Pribovo, Zapovo, KOVO, ODOVO is possible. The German attack may begin with provocative actions.
      2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the troops of the LVO, Pri.BOVO, Zap.OVO, Kiev and Odessa military districts will be in full combat readiness to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans, or their allies.
      I ORDER:
      a) During the night of June 22, 1941 secretly occupy the firing points of the Fortress. Areas of state border;
      b) Before dawn, September 22.9.41, XNUMX. disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
      c) All units must be put on alert. Troops keep dispersed and disguised;
      d) Put the air defense in combat readiness without additional measures. Prepare all activities to darken cities and objects;
      e) Do not carry out any other events without special order.
      TIMOSHENKO, BEETLES. ”
      On the directive there are notes: “notes -“ Filed 22.6 01.00 adopted 22.6 01.10. ”.

      It took about 20 minutes to decrypt, and at 1.30 Pavlov had already brought it to the headquarters - to get together and wait for the order. And at 3 o’clock he began to dyvyat team to open the package)))
      At 1.45 a NEW text, from PAVLOVA - and sent to SHO ZAPOVO - for sending to the army and sending and occurred - at 2.25 - in the army of ZAPOVO))
      This text of PAVLOV was also published - Pavlov in it removed the provision on air defense - because at the same time he gave a separate order for air defense - about full bg)))
      The text of Pavlov’s order for his armies is published in the “robin”, but they give him out there as an NGO directive and the General Staff Directive (b / n))))

      “Perhaps, as in the case of the OdVO, they only said:“ ... A telegram of special importance has been sent to you for immediate execution ... ”Then they“ twisted the tail ”so that they would not succumb to the provocations of the German troops.”

      - do not invent Madame)) TEXT EVERYWHERE was deciphered by 1.30 - in ALL districts))) except for KOVO - because there were no cryptographers in Ternopol - they arrived only at 7 o’clock - with Baghramyan))) AND EVERYWHERE the essence of the directive was KNOW EXACTLY .)) See what NSh KOVO showed - where the text was not decrypted upon receipt (decrypted ONLY at 12.45) Purkayev - as they understood the essence of this directive -
      “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the district commander received an order from the General Staff, which demanded that the troops be put on full alert, in case the Germans crossed the state border by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until special order "!!

      It’s NOT IMPORTANT that you are inventing it out there - who turned it to someone — it is important HOW THE COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND THESE ORDERS))) Your “opinion” on this subject should be passed under that very tail)))

      “An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. "Sht left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced."

      - Yes, stop making it up - restless)) Zakharov in OdVO - stupidly threw him into the army - TEXT - an exact copy of this directive - with the signatures of NPOs and General Staff)))
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. The comment was deleted.
    1. VS
      VS 29 November 2017 15: 14 New
      -2
      Combat order of the commander of the Air Force of the NWF NW / OP 01, “... the remaining parts 22.6.41 and 7 of the garden operate according to the plan of the army commanders ...” ”

      - throwing the Air Force also to the commanders - this is so positively characterizing the "good" people .. Kopets also gave the same thing to the REQUEST - having thrown off the GARDEN on the army. Breaking the centralized air force control in those hours ..

      “The covering divisions did not occupy long-term structures in their units and did not proceed to the construction of blockages on roads that could be viewed from German territory. "

      -- Stop lying!! See how it was in the 125th SD)))

      Look at the orders in those days - there are also about the rubble)))

      “The units had about one BK and had no order to open fire on the enemy.”

      - until he crossed the border - definitely)))

      “Commander of the 11th ck):“ ... The war began at 4-00 on 22.6.41. I was immediately reported to the commander of the 8th army ... I received an order not to open fire. Do not succumb to provocation. But the troops opened fire without orders ... "

      And what - it was necessary - on the orders of Klenov go ??))) a good man .. God forbid the earth is glassy to him)))

      “Three artillery regiments (414 light ap, 459 howitzer ap and 51st corps ap), covering the division, opened fire only after 8 o’clock in the morning. Until 11-00 "

      - read the answers - WHO FORBIDDEN on fire in the morning in the districts ...


      “The units were not only not ordered to take the property before the wartime states, but they were not informed of the possibility of hostilities, therefore, the property required for replacement, transport, communications, and surveillance equipment were not taken e”

      - and now Madame read what ORDERED in the General Staff Directives of June 11-12, the same KOVO and Pribovo - “TAKE TOTALLY CONTAINABLE STORES OF FIREPROOF AND FUELS” !!
      And this means - pick up and export to the area according to the Cover Plan - ALL warehouses with military equipment !!!

      And good people like Klenov did this - "it was not ordered to take property to the wartime states," !!

      “Even the front commander cannot issue an order to reprint the railway traffic police if he is sent to the archive of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown ”

      - who told you this ??? ZBB ZF was written - following the results of June - in AUGUST - by Malandin))))




      “It does not contain a single word about directions or about the General Directives of the General Staff. The point is that the NWF command was given the opportunity to redeploy a number of units to the border. "

      - actually - this is - according to the instructions of the General Staff))) which "provided" this opportunity to PribOVO)))

      “Good memory to people who were trying to prepare their troops for a meeting with the Nazi invaders. Not all of them succeeded. "

      - shit from the heart in the end ...

      “Another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.”

      Why are you so drawn to showing your nonsense then ??)))
  10. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. cavl
      cavl 29 November 2017 18: 59 New
      18
      Boorish statements and insults
  11. iouris
    iouris 29 November 2017 15: 24 New
    14
    The facts show that historical research should be carried out in the opposite direction: "The real political reasons for the relatively easy victories of the German troops in the initial period of the German war against the USSR." The war proceeded exactly as conceived by the external forces that organize world wars.
  12. RuSFr
    RuSFr 30 November 2017 02: 55 New
    28
    Thanks author
  13. ccsr
    ccsr 30 November 2017 16: 26 New
    -2
    aKtoR
    The document consists of two conditional parts: the 1-part I is the restored part of the journal from 22 June to 12 July 1941 of the year, the 2-I part - entries from 12.7.41 to 18.08.41. The feature of this declassified document is that original source. Information before 12.7.41 was restored by an unknown person.

    Well, why an unknown person - open the last sheet of typewritten text on the reverse side and there is the name of the artist, who had all the documents until 12.7.41, with which he worked.
    aKtoR
    Another feature of the OBB SZF is that it is reprinted (perhaps not once). The order to reprint the reinforced concrete bollard cannot even be given by the front commander if he is sent to the archive of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown. The log filed in the archive does not have a witness signature, which is a violation of the secrecy regime.

    Well, do not fantasize like this - it would be easier to destroy a magazine in the course of the next work of the commission for checking office work after five years, than to create it according to a new one, especially since it would have to be registered by a new numbering. And it would be because all the old verification and registration stamps are difficult to recreate so that later questions do not arise - they will be easy to compare with real ones that are in other documents.
    aKtoR
    Why did the author decide that the JBBs were reprinted?

    From ignorance of the organization of office work in the General Staff.
  14. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 1 December 2017 17: 30 New
    10
    That is, these “commanders” in the middle of a short summer night wake everyone up, as if it will be possible to sleep off tomorrow, and claim that an attack is possible, but the task is not to repel it, but to “not succumb to provocations” (ie “major complications” "are obtained precisely from this, and not from defeats in the war?). Further, they order to occupy the "firing points", and not defense, not just, not to mine roads and bridges. They order to bring the troops into combat readiness, but suddenly "disperse" (according to the alternative text of this directive) the troops. They command in the middle of the night to distill somewhere ALL planes (not even prepared for night flights and to field airfields probably not prepared for receiving planes at night), and not to conduct any "other" events. And each soldier familiar with this order will have to reflect on whether he can order something to his subordinates and whether he himself must fulfill the order of a higher headquarters, or is this already a “different” event, which is prohibited by the general staff. It would be better to sleep off - to her god! laughing
    And the text of this directive given in the article differs from that on many Internet sites:
    Military Councils LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdOVO.
    People's Commissar of the Navy
    1. During the period of June 22–23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Prib. OVO, Zap. OVO, KOVO, Od. OVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
    2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
    At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts to be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.
    I order:
    a) during the night of June 22, 1941 secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
    b) before the dawn of June 22 of June 1941 of the year, disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully mask it;
    c) bring all units into combat readiness.
    Keep troops dispersed and disguised;
    d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
    e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
    Tymoshenko, Zhukov.
    June 21, 1941. "
    (Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections: - M .: APN, 1969, p. 243)

    That is, there are two additional points, although essentially the same thing. I wonder how the author will comment on this difference.
    1. VS
      VS 4 December 2017 08: 27 New
      -2
      “That is, these“ commanders ”wake everyone up in the middle of a short summer night, as if it would be possible to sleep off tomorrow, and claim that an attack is possible, but the task is not to repel it, but“ not to succumb to provocations ”(ie,“ large complications "are obtained precisely from this, and not from defeats in the war?)."

      --- And you there too))))
      In this directive "b / n" a specific task is set - and it is - written in the ORDERING part - Bring ALL troops, air force, air defense and navy to FULL combat readiness)))
      And since we know that from BEFORE this directive there were directives on casting to higher bg. - readiness No. 2 - then this directive w / o from 22.20 on June 21 - on the TRANSFER of troops, air forces, air defense and fleets - in full bg)))
      The instruction about “not succumbing to provocations” is quite reasonable and correctly put up. - It is POSSIBLE to attack, and the Germans will start it as usual - with provocations after which they will yell like victims that Stalin attacked them and therefore they respond defensively !!))

      And it was precisely this in the Note that Hitler attacked and notified.
      After all, the question was - WHO WILL be called the aggressor in this case - we or Germany !! And it depended on who the USA would OFFICIALLY help. Which clearly defined their position - if the USSR is an aggressor - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case)))

      “Then they order to occupy the“ firing points ”, and not to defend, not to see, not to mine roads and bridges.”

      --- And what bothers you ??))

      Defense - the so-called foreground - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" is clearly marked - these trenches could NOT be occupied. ))) Moreover, according to the standards, there was time for trenches — a few hours for border divisions. And if the border division is withdrawn into the defense zone, then time was all the more reduced))) That is - at the command to open packages - the divisions would have managed to occupy their trenches before the Germans crossed the border with their troops. Moreover, the reinforcement border guard battalions have been on the border since May 5 already - with artillery divisions from EACH border division))) under the guise of work at the border)))
      And this command - to open packages - went to the districts at 3 o’clock already))))

      “They are ordering the troops to be ready for battle, but suddenly“ disperse ”(according to the alternative text of this directive) the troops.”


      --- What else is the “alternative text”?))) Zhukov and Zkharov have the text - you brought it)) There is a draft of this directive - and there the unnecessary one was deleted even in Stalin’s office)))

      As a result, everything is clearly spelled out:

      “C) put all units on alert. “Keep troops dispersed and disguised;”

      --- And in your opinion - bring in BG what does this mean?))) Type - occupy trenches on the border or something ??)))
      Trenches are occupied - at the opening of the red packet - when entering the Cover Plan)) But there is no order yet)))
      Bring in B.G. - this is to raise the alarm and giving ammunition in the hands of the soldiers - get out of the barracks - to the gathering area))
      Learn activities when entering degrees b..g - they are today exactly the same as they were in principle ..)) The only difference from those modern years is that when the water was full b..g - the mobilization did not start))
      Then - the mobilization began with SEPARATE orders for this ..)) For example - by entering the PP))) But the beginning of the mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of the mobilization automatically meant entering the war)))
      Therefore, Stalin did not allow the military to introduce the PP - to begin mobilization - BEFORE the attack,)) Or - only at his command))) At the same time, he did NOT PROHIBIT the military, of course, to increase the degrees of the military base. in the army, in the air force, air defense and navy))) What they did quite - starting in early June and even more so - from mid-June)))
      Keep the troops dispersed and disguised - but what do you understand and not logical?)))
      This applies to ALL troops of districts - and sticking out on the border and those who walked at night to the border - the second echelons of districts)))
      Well, yes - we give SPECIALLY the right of the first shot to the Germans - so - we need our own troops to reduce losses - to keep both dispersed and masked))) alas)))

      “They command in the middle of the night to distill ALL planes somewhere (not even prepared for night flights and to field airfields probably not prepared for receiving planes at night), and not to conduct any“ other ”events.”

      --- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to ALL to fly in those hours. This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order. Order - must be completed EXACTLY and on time))
      And the directive is an INSTRUCTION to execution and it allows a "creative approach" in the field)))
      It’s important to disperse the planes - if you haven’t done so yet according to the directives of the non-profit organizations of June 19–20 — across field airfields and even stationary ones, especially)))

      Paragraph "d" - "e) do not carry out any other activities without special order." means - LIMITATIONS for the military))

      The fact is that if there is a reduction to FULL and if there are no SUCH restrictions, then the military will rush into the trenches at the border - SO is supposed to be done. After all, IF there are no restrictions in the order on the full BG))) - the military will start to fight quite foolishly)))

      And so that this did not happen - someone did not overdo it - then they gave a directive at the end of the directive)))
      Read what Zakharov did in OdVO - he opened the package BEFORE it was necessary - without waiting for him to receive this directive, which he was warned at 22 p.m. yet - at 1 o’clock he had already opened the OdVO package))) And this is a matter of jurisdiction))

      “And each soldier familiar with this order will have to reflect on whether he can order something to his subordinates and whether he himself must fulfill the order of a higher headquarters, or is this already a“ different ”event, which is forbidden by the general staff.”


      For the military in THIS there were NO problems with understanding - this directive))

      I have repeatedly shown the author and I will repeat to you - yes, it’s NOT IMPORTANT, in principle, WHAT YOU PERSONALLY think of - about the "meanings" of those directives !!))) that according to YOUR IMHO, who there thought was all the more important because you are nobody and to call you in any way and in the army you did not serve and did not receive TE directives in those days)))))))
      IMPORTANT - as UNDERSTANDING THOSE COMMANDERS !! ))) and how THEY then ordered their subordinates))
      And for this - study the answers of commanders to questions of Pokrvosky)))
      And the same KOVO chief of staff, Purkayev, showed how THEY understood the directive w / o -

      “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the District Commander received an order from the General Staff, which required the troops to be fully operational, in case the Germans crossed the state border by all means and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over, until special order "!!!)))



      "I Dali would be better off to sleep off - to her god! "

      And in Pribovo SO they did - “good people” Klenova .... and in KOVO - as Kirpanos tried to do so ... - they didn’t raise the army on alert that night ... putting it on this directive ...

      “And the text of this directive given in the article differs from that on many Internet sites:

      c) bring all units into combat readiness.
      Keep troops dispersed and disguised;
      d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
      e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
      Tymoshenko, Zhukov.
      June 21, 1941. "
      (Zhukov GK. Memoirs and Reflections: - M .: APN, 1969, p. 243) "


      That is, there are two additional points, although essentially the same thing. I wonder how the author will comment on this difference. ”

      --- You brought - the text that went into the district and which was published by Zakharov and Zhukov was a dash when. And the author, Madame, brought Pavlov’s text to the ZAPOVO))) sure that it was Zhukov’s text — their general staff who came to the okrug))) And as it should be for stubborn individuals, Madame does not want to listen to anyone — those who know her topic better) )

      Pavlov combine the points by removing the anti-aircraft defense provision - because he gave anti-aircraft defense for those minutes and gave a separate order - about full BG)))))
      And here is the same Zakharov — he simply transmitted the same text to the army — without changing anything in it)) Because he had already taken the next step — which would be followed by bringing it to full bg. - opened packages)))
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. VS
          VS 4 December 2017 08: 29 New
          -3
          “If he talked about Klenov only good or neutral, he would have signed a death sentence for himself. "

          - with what sorry - horseradish vegetable ??)))

          “The author tried to show that, by“ telephone law ”,“ pumping ”went from Moscow with the aim of not giving the Germans a reason for the conflict. Since there was no commander of the troops at the front headquarters at that time, the NSh communicated to the army commanders the latest “especially valuable instructions” from Moscow. "

          - Oh, how)) You ALREADY YOUR pardon fantasies gave out for a reliable FACT - what did anyone point out to someone on the phone - and personally to Klenov ??)))

          “Order of the commander of the 7th garden 22.6.41 4-15“ To the commanders of regiments.

          1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.

          2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.

          Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.

          The commander of the 7th garden is Colonel Petrov. "

          - This division commander, Air Force Political Secretary PribOVO brought back June 19 - and the date and time of the attack - 3.0 June 22)))

          “About 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4th Garden to strike with force of three bap in the city and port of Memel.”

          Maybe you’ll bring this order ??)) and if you know your strange lady’s tendency to think up something — who thought there, there are doubts — but was this order or stupidly divisive of this GARDEN having opened the package after the attack? It’s so SO POSED to do - and there, after reading the task, he began to carry it out - WITHOUT an order for this additional from Ionov - also shot after -)))

          "" ... Our Air Force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... I took measures to bomb the enemy without flying over the border ... "

          - because TAKA ordered Moscow and TAK is written in the PP - the border until the special order of NGOs and General Staff - Moscow - do not cross.)))

          "" ... The commander of the 7th garden. Do not violate the state borders. Destroy enemy aircraft in your area. Landing planes on the radio to land on the airfields ... "Captain Krivtsov received a radio order to return to the airfield at the time of being on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed the bomb bay, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. At 7-10, the squadron, without losing a single plane, returned to the airfield. "

          - because the pilots rushed to the other side)))) WITHOUT ORDER on this))
          Permission came in deere. 2))) at 8 a.m. only))

          "Iap was raised by alarm at 4-20:"

          - HERE FOR THIS Klenov was shot - “for manifestation of inaction in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT” !!!
          1. VS
            VS 4 December 2017 08: 30 New
            -3
            “Former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov:“ It should be noted that even on the night of June 22 I personally received an order from the NS of the Klenov Front in a very categorical form to withdraw troops from the border by dawn on 22.6.41, what I categorically refused to do ... ""

            - because Klenov the bastard and the traitor of the Motherland - the face of the White Guard)))

            “By my code on the phone between 1-2 hours. 22.6.41 orders were given to the troops ... ""

            - the facts speak of something else - did not raise the Army of Morozov at THIS time)))

            “About General Trukhin (in October 1941, he consciously goes for cooperation with the Nazis).”

            --- Trukhin fled to the Germans with the STAFF documents on June 27 !!! With codes, etc. - He’s the head of the OPERATOR DEPARTMENT in general of the front district))) And he began the Germans on the ROA - the White Guard face - to campaign immediately !!!

            “Both speak of completely opposite opinions about the actions of NS. It turns out that one of them cites somewhat distorted information. ”

            - Do not guess, but look - how did Morozov’s army actually rise)))

            Sobennikov’s army - practically slept to the last ...

            “He expresses his opinion that this person was the author of the cover plan. Then it’s easy to understand: “the plan of the enemy of the people” - “unsuccessful actions of the space forces in the initial period of the war”. Once in prison, it was necessary to somehow cooperate with the investigation. Without cooperation, he would have been simply clogged and would not have survived ... "


            - stop BEARING Nonsense ignoramus !!)) PP and write in the Operations Department including - NSh of the district and his FIRST DEPUTY Trukhin together and wrote - SO POSED !!!

            And of course - well - the bloody gebnya never killed good people))))

            “The Sobennikov’s witness list is missing.”

            - because ENOUGH and other testimonies and the new May BCPs that were NOT approved by anyone at all - did not interest ANYONE in July of the 41st))) And NOTHING OTHER Sobennikov could show to Klenov as a person under investigation)))

            “While under investigation, he did not“ stoke ”P. S. Klenov - surviving at his expense is an act! "

            - BECAUSE Sobenikov was tried FOR ANOTHER GENERAL - for the fact that HERE himself commanded the troops in September)))) and Klenov HERE is generally stupid NOT at all)))
            Madame - do not go into it what you do not understand at all))) otherwise they will call you not smart - and you will be offended)))
            1. VS
              VS 4 December 2017 08: 30 New
              -3
              “Something similar happened in Pribovo-NWF. The order of the commander 16 sk, given in 1-30 22.6.41:

              “To the commanders of 5, 33 and 188 sd No. 0012, the commander of the 11th army ordered:

              1. Min not to put.

              2. For the protection of the subsidiary of the private education institution leave small groups of patrols under the command of the average commander. The rest of the people mouth, providing a band predpole, remove immediately.

              3. Work on the main strip to continue. The commander of the 16th SC Major General Ivanov

              A very strange order, which was to go from the headquarters of the NWF through the headquarters of the 11th Army. This order of the headquarters of the NWF is contrary to previously issued orders and initiatives. This could only happen if this instruction came from Moscow. After the arrest of A.D. Loktionov, with whom P.S.Klenov served since the summer of 1940, the NSH NWF was obliged to fulfill all instructions from Moscow without any initiative. ”

              - SO it happened because the good man Klenov just ruined the rubbish by his “inaction in managing the affairs of the okrug” - sherry put on Zhukov’s directive - about complete bg - he threw off its analogue in the army at 2.25 and until it was decrypted there - NOBODY had any idea - that it was time to run on alarm !!! And thus, hundreds and thousands of soldiers and commanders perished through the PERSONAL fault of this bastard ...

              “In order for the Sht to be sent from the headquarters of the 16th sk to the division at 1-30, it had to be prepared at the headquarters of the North-West Fleet in the region of 23-30 ... 00-00. It turns out that, having passed the ST with Directive No. 1 to the encryption department, the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff by phone organized a “cheat” to the leaders of the border military forces, issuing some “valuable instructions” about possible provocative actions of the enemy troops and what to do in this case in districts "

              - yes, do you finally read the answers of the commanders on THIS night and how they complied with the b / n directive !!! In the buildings where they were told by PHONES from the armies at 2 o’clock what should they do !!!
              You got Madame with these "provocations")) NOBODY mentioned THAT EVER that night - bringing them to the troops - THERE where they brought them up - about idiotic "provocations")))

              REMEMBER at last - the directive b / n is a directive BEFORE EVERYTHING about FULL gg. - SO UNDERSTAND IT ANYWHERE !!!! In addition to Klenov .. or Pavlov, who ordered the headquarters to be raised first on alarm - “I misunderstood the directives of the people's commissar” - he carried in court))
              And why do you PERSONALLY understand the essence of this directive - YOUR problems are ignoramus))) IMPORTANT - HOW THE PURKAYEVS UNDERSTAND IT))) Well, as they understood it - READ their answers to Pokrovsky on this question)))
              1. VS
                VS 4 December 2017 08: 31 New
                -3
                “After a conversation with the people's commissar of defense, which did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. 1, the ZAPOVO leadership decided for about half an hour: what instructions should be given to the troops”

                - Do not invent - EVERYTHING IS UNDERSTANDED from the text of the adopted directive - Cho must do it - TRANSFER ALL the troops, Air Force, Air Defense and Navy to FULL BG)))
                Another thing is that Pavlov then lied during the investigation that he gave the command at 1.30 - verbally by phone - “puts the troops in combat”, which seems to be brought back to the base station, but in reality - he only gave the staffs the command to assemble on alarm. .))
                MADAM - yes, you read the answers of the finally commanders for this night - in Chekunov's collection - he published these answers especially for the ignorant)))

                "The commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, at about one in the morning, on his own responsibility, ordered the sealed" red packets "to be sent to all subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the combat alert procedures stored at the army headquarters"

                - Madame - THESE PACKAGES - STORED in safes at comcor ALWAYS !!))) if they are fully approved as valid)))
                Korobkov, he gave the packages under the NEW Cover Plans - in May)) which did not work out in the armies of the ZAPOVO at all !!)) But the old ones were there anyway - for the old ones have not been approved by the NPO and the General Staff but they have not been approved yet ))))

                “At about two o’clock on the night of June 22nd on HF, the commander of the 3rd Army V.I. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov:“ Raise the troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately to take the bunkers and bring them into full combat readiness, put into effect a plan for covering the state border ". The management of ZAPOVO assumed the responsibility from which the senior management of the spacecraft was removed. "

                - yes, enough already to carry the blizzard about the innocent generals that they opened packages on "personal initiative")) - if you don’t know HOW IT ALL WAS REALLY)))
                This was done ONLY by Zakharov in OdVO - about 1 o'clock in the morning already - without waiting for the arrival of and decoding of the text of the directive about full bg. , he received a call at 22 o’clock on the telephone from the General Staff - “Wait for an important encryption” and took the initiative, thinking that an unambiguous order would come - “Proceed to the 1941 RP — and gave the alarm command at midnight already, and at 1 o'clock in the OdVO and open packages - read the answers of the commanders - HOW IT WAS - to Pokrovsky’s question No. 3)))
                SO. This “b / n” directive of 22.20 on June 21 informs the districts of the date of a possible attack, warns that the attack can begin suddenly (in the sense - without declaring war) and with provocations that cannot be succumbed so as not to cause problems of an international nature. And she orders - to bring-transfer all the troops of the border districts, the Air Force, air defense of these districts and the fleet - in full combat readiness! And also - to occupy firing points on the border.
                And the fact that it seems to be indicated in it - "indefinitely" - "an attack is possible on June 22-23," does not play ANY role. Troops are required to IMMEDIATELY, upon receipt of this directive, raise them according to combat alert, withdraw to a minimum at the gathering area and wait for further instructions already there: - either open the red packet and pull in to occupy the trenches at the border, - or fill up the lights out and into the barracks ... And that is how they understood it where they wanted to understand it.
                Considering the fact that the Air Force, Air Defense, Fleet and troops have already been on high alert since June 18 (should have been brought up), this directive precisely puts all troops on full alert and does not bring them from scratch !!!
      2. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 4 December 2017 16: 04 New
        19
        Quote: V.S.
        In this directive "b / n" a specific task is set - and it is - written in the ORDERING part - Bring ALL troops, air force, air defense and navy to FULL combat readiness)))

        It says in black and white - the task is not to succumb to provocations.
        Quote: V.S.
        The attack is POSSIBLE, and the Germans will start it as usual - with provocations after which they will yell like victims
        Well, if you decide, then they will attack. If they decide to arrange provocations, then they will. Nothing will essentially depend on this. Everything was clear to everyone (except for Stalin and Co.). What exactly is going to happen in the border forest - what, in essence, is the difference? Hitler’s propaganda could scream anything, just like the Soviet one. By the way, history has confirmed that the Nazis did not even bother to arrange any "provocations" that Stalin and Zhukov were so afraid of.
        Quote: V.S.
        "Then they order to occupy the" firing points ", and not the defense, not the field, not to mine roads and bridges." --- And what bothers you ??)) Defense - the so-called so-called “pre-lands” - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" was clearly marked - these Trenches could NOT be occupied ... But the beginning of mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of mobilization automatically meant entering the war ... Keeping troops dispersed and disguised - But what don’t you understand and it is not logical?))) ...--- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to fly ALL at those hours ... This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order ... etc. , etc.

        Stop grinding nonsense!
        1. RuSFr
          RuSFr 5 December 2017 01: 43 New
          +4
          You're right. As usual, VO says that he is a former military man and treatise orders how he thinks and how he needs to
  15. antivirus
    antivirus 2 December 2017 15: 36 New
    +5
    like a jacket --- I read articles especially late-- + all comments
    NO RESPONSE AND WILL NOT BE AFTER 20 OR 50 YEARS
    IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY AND COMMANDERS BEFORE MO AND NGSH and Stalin + dr.
    THIS IS AN ERA DR. CONVENIENCES IN THE STREET, RAYS, "THE MOBILE IS NOT SHOULDERED AND SO WILL NOT GO"
    There was no single state and people. AFTER THE WARS, PROPAGANDA BECAME STARTED - “THE SOVIET PEOPLE ARE”, AND THEN ??? - SIMPLE DISCONTINUATION (WITH ONE DIRECTIVE)
    the experience of minor wars Spain, Mongolia, Hassan --- zilch before 150 against 190
    million people
    LEARN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ON DIFFERENT TEXTBOOKS - ALREADY DIFFERENT PEOPLE GROW, and then what and how did you understand?

    they could not then, and they all cannot now precisely answer the question of the failure in 41g!
    How did the REV start? also a "sudden treacherous attack" arrogant "pros.r.a ... and
  16. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 08: 34 New
    -3
    Quote: antivirus
    like a jacket --- I read articles especially late-- + all comments
    NO RESPONSE AND WILL NOT BE AFTER 20 OR 50 YEARS

    and what books did you read on the topic at all?))) In SUCH articles and comments even from knowledgeable people - of course you won’t understand anything - if you don’t read smart research books)))
  17. The comment was deleted.
  18. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 08: 45 New
    -3
    Quote: cavl
    Boorish statements and insults

    it is rather the author’s problem))) not wanting to perceive something different from her "understanding" of the topic)))
    But I understand that you are also a lady?))) Judging by the fact that you do not see information from someone who criticized the author, but only - "boorish insults")))
    This is a sign of women - when you tell them something, in fact they don’t hear the essence, but - the volume of sound in the words of the opponent and - right there "boorish insults")) alas)))

    To the author of these articles she doesn’t want to call her name, which she definitely gives to some inadequacy - SO fans of Rezun are online and constantly popping up - anonymously ALWAYS)) - the author was immediately offered - let's help on the topic - I’ll throw off materials that you definitely don’t know and some you definitely don’t understand the moments) But Madame immediately showed her ambitions - yes, I’m a great cryptographer !!!))) Like - you won’t tell me how dumb it is and what signs the machine encrypts - then I won’t listen to you))) TOTAL - the author makes complete nonsense on the topic - ignoring the information that refutes her stupidity)))
    1. cavl
      cavl 4 December 2017 16: 51 New
      13
      I’m a man, but, something, you are not manly verbally abundant
      The behavior is inadequately boorish and thirteen people agreed besides me, until they removed the offensive comment.
      And you were not supported by more than one person in this matter. Maybe you should think about your behavior?
      Personally, I like the author and another 211 people agreed with this. I don’t want to take it, but I’m sure all of your likes will be less than for the last topic of the author. Nobody seems to be reading your great comments.
      The fact that 12 people got to the temple (including myself) is an indicator. Look at fulfilling your request.
      Will lead inadequately - I will file a complaint again
      1. RuSFr
        RuSFr 5 December 2017 01: 50 New
        +7
        You're right. I filed a complaint
        The man here speaks by itself - a sick man
        1. 8Schlaf
          8Schlaf 9 December 2017 15: 34 New
          +6
          I agree with the opinion - Rudeness MUST BE PUNISHED.
          WRITER WRITER _ DOUBLE
          1. cavl
            cavl 9 December 2017 23: 12 New
            +2
            But you yourself are rude to the user
            1. 8Schlaf
              8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 05 New
              +2
              You're right. I was restrained. pardon me
              1. aKtoR
                24 December 2017 20: 27 New
                +1
                Thanks for the support! You cannot pass by rudeness, even when a person is sick)))
  19. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 12: 24 New
    -2
    Quote: V.S.
    depended on it - to whom the USA will OFFICIALLY help. Which clearly defined their position - if the USSR is an aggressor - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case)))

    made a reservation - MUST be like that))

    "" depended on it - to whom the USA will OFFICIALLY help. Who clearly indicated their position - if the USSR is the VICTIM of aggression - we will help him. But they did not indicate - if the Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to attack - would they help us in this case))
  20. ccsr
    ccsr 4 December 2017 12: 40 New
    -3
    Posted by: aKtoR
    General Klimovskikh understood cryptographic matters better than the chief of the General Staff.

    On the basis of what was such a "bold" conclusion made, given that these generals were not "eights"?
    1. VS
      VS 4 December 2017 16: 45 New
      -2
      Alas, like many anonymous authors and even more ladies - our author will not answer)))
      So she wants it SO way - so it should be so. It looks like the Ukrainians are behaving)))
    2. The comment was deleted.
  21. ccsr
    ccsr 4 December 2017 12: 48 New
    -2
    Posted by: aKtoR
    Printed on a typewriter letterhead, the telegram was later turned into an outgoing headquarters of ZAPOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on the declassified text is crossed out in red pencil, and the addresses and surnames of the signatories are printed later. An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. PT left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced.

    Well, if you have the courage to comment on declassified encryption, then you probably need to present at least its scan so that readers can understand what document you are talking about. If you have an encryption scan, post it here.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 06 New
      +6
      You do not require the user for some reason VS present a scan of Directive No. 1 (from the General Staff), about which he repeatedly wrote. Or is it incorrect to ask oneself?
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 10 December 2017 11: 38 New
        -2
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        For some reason, you do not require the user V.S. present a scan of Directive No. 1 (from the General Staff), about which he repeatedly wrote.

        In fact, the Directive did not have a number - it was without a number, in addition, for which it was registered in the 8th department, to be precise. As for its text, only the draft directive is declassified, and the scan of the original text "by hand" is most likely, if it has not been destroyed, stored in the archives of the 8th Department of the General Staff and hardly anyone will see it.
        It is strange that you don’t even understand this, but persistently demand something to be presented to you.
        Or is it incorrect to ask oneself?

        I don’t know what caused your bold conclusion, but you have shown yourself to be inadequate in this phrase. Maybe the voices in your head prevent you from analyzing other people's texts?
  22. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 16: 39 New
    -1
    Quote: Falcon5555
    It says in black and white - the task is not to succumb to provocations.

    for the military - the task is in the directive - it is prescribed in the ORDERING part)) For batans - wherever they like - there they see it)))
  23. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 16: 42 New
    -1
    Quote: Falcon5555
    if you decide, then they will attack. If they decide to arrange provocations, then they will. Nothing will essentially depend on this. Everything was clear to everyone (except for Stalin and Co.). What exactly is going to happen in the border forest - what, in essence, is the difference? Hitler’s propaganda could scream anything, just like the Soviet one. By the way, history has confirmed that the Nazis did not even bother to arrange any "provocations" that Stalin and Zhukov were so afraid of.

    It will not depend on you)) For politics - it was important who would be called the aggressor)) If this were not so, Stalin would completely crash the FIRST - as Zhukov suggested in May)))

    The German attack began quite precisely with provocations - the first shooting at the border began at 2 a.m., as already reported to Moscow ..
  24. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 16: 43 New
    -1
    Quote: Falcon5555
    Defense - the so-called foreground - start to take in the case of opening red packets! And in that situation - until the "aggressor" is clearly marked - these Trenches could NOT be occupied ... But the beginning of mobilization - immediately puts you in the category of aggressor - then the beginning of mobilization automatically meant entering the war ... Keeping troops dispersed and disguised - but what don’t you understand and logical?))) ...--- Pilots flied quite at night in those days)) but - it was not at all necessary to fly ALL at those hours ... This is a DIRECTIVE and not an order ... etc. , etc.
    Stop grinding nonsense!

    as I understand it - in the army you did not serve from the word sapsem)))
  25. VS
    VS 4 December 2017 16: 52 New
    -2
    Quote: ccsr
    Printed on a typewriter letterhead, the telegram was later turned into an outgoing headquarters of ZAPOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on the declassified text is crossed out in red pencil, and the addresses and surnames of the signatories are printed later. An incident happened: no one dared to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text at such a time. PT left the army for four signatures, which was not practiced.
    Well, if you have the courage to comment on declassified encryption, then you probably need to present at least its scan so that readers can understand what document you are talking about. If you have an encryption scan, post it here.

    This is our lady suffered nonsense - about Pavlov’s directive posted on the TsAMO website)))
    She wants to think that having accepted the GSh Pavlov directive DON'T CHANGE her - she gave the decrypted text to the encryptors for encryption))))

    horror))))

    But it’s so simple - there is a text of the so-called deer 1 from Zakharov and Zhukov or from Chekunov — the one who left the General Staff in the okrug — about which, as far back as 2009, disassemblies have been going on at the milleter yet))) Or I have cited this text more than once in books)))
    Chekunov cited the text of the text that was accepted in Minsk - I brought it here as well - THEY are identical !!))
    You take this text and compare it with what Pavlov sent at 2.25 in the army - the one that TsAMO posted in 2014 more - at https://topwar.ru/123513-povtorenie-proydennogo.h
    tml)))) as a scan photo of this directive .. And you will see that Pavlov has no point about air defense)))
  26. The comment was deleted.
    1. cavl
      cavl 5 December 2017 04: 39 New
      12
      In your messages and in books of rezunizm more than the author.
      Rezunism is the fakes that British intelligence scouts ahead of the Soviet attack on Germany.
      The author has not a word about this.
      You have everything connected with the complete preparation of the Red Army for the German attack and traitors by the generals. A very convenient version for Pindovskoye in their fight with Putin in the elections.
      You even had a message deleted by the administrator that Putin is the same traitor and we will also find out about this in decades. And in the same vein, a couple more sentences. And the epic ended with the question: Will you vote for Putin?
      Rezun for arrogance, you are for overseas partners (in any case, pour water on their mill) - both options are bad
  27. The comment was deleted.
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  29. shuravi
    shuravi 5 December 2017 13: 03 New
    +7
    1. Reason to believe, do not respect yourself.
    2. The funniest and most common thread in most of the articles "knowing how to do it retroactively" is that they take the actions of the German army as a constant. And on the basis of this they build their victorious plans. It doesn’t even occur to couch strategists that the enemy could also adjust his plans and drive the situation into even greater catastrophe for all their “ingenious” creeps.
    Alas, it is not unfortunate, but the balance of power, combat experience, a strategic initiative did not leave the Red Army a chance to keep the enemy on the border.
  30. ccsr
    ccsr 7 December 2017 20: 37 New
    -2
    Due to the fact that the author of ten articles does not quite correctly understand what he is writing about, I will try to comment on what, in my opinion, is not true.
    aKtoR writes
    https://topwar.ru/121933-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitl
    erovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-4.html
    Now we will consider some technical details of the transfer of Directive No. 1 of 21.06.41.
    A large number of Directives on the redeployment of troops has the signature stamp "ss / s". Therefore, Directive No. 1 was supposed to have a stamp of "special importance." Documents with such a signature stamp can be transmitted over communication lines only after they are processed using ciphers. Below we will consider the different options of Directive No. 1. The strange thing is that when it was written in the General Staff, they did not put a security stamp at all, and in VO, according to their own understanding, they put "ss". This once again testifies to the confusion when writing this Directive.

    Apparently, the author did not understand that the scan of the b / n directive with the signatures of Tymoshenko and Zhukov, which she cited, was just a DRAFT of the directive itself. Based on this draft, the original encryption text was written on the letterhead of the cipherorgan or on the sheet of the cipher block (not necessarily owned by Tymoshenko or Zhukov) and it was transferred to the eights, which printed the text from it, and the document itself ended up in archive 8 of the General Administration, and there is still since And no one will ever transfer it to the TsAMO archive, if only because of the special marks that are on it. So there was no sense in putting a “top secret” when writing a draft - it’s enough that the forms themselves or the counted sheets had this stamp. And already at registration of the final text it could be registered. Therefore, talking about the "confusion" is only a figment of the author’s imagination. On the contrary, in my opinion, Zhukov unreasonably delayed the execution of the directive upon arrival at the People's Commissariat, and this subsequently had grave consequences for all the armed forces. This is not even surprising, but the fact that Zhukov himself, arriving from the okrug, had a poor idea of ​​how much time it would take to bring their directive to the troops, and moreover, for the entire time he was at the post, the NSS did not carry out a comprehensive check of the rise of the district units by alarm - at least nowhere else do the authors of the memoir remember such a training.
  31. ccsr
    ccsr 7 December 2017 22: 16 New
    -2
    aKtoR writes:
    People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov (1963): “... The naval attache Vorontsov arrived in Moscow at about 18 p.m. on June 21, 1941. At 21 p.m. his report was appointed to me. For 40-45 minutes he presented his thoughts to me in detail. “So is this a war?” I asked him. “Yes, this is war,” Vorontsov replied ...

    In this case, a reference to Kuznetsov’s memoirs is not entirely appropriate, since now there is a completely different opinion about the arrival of a resident of the Navy’s intelligence in Moscow - he reported not only to the Navy’s drug commissar, but most likely to Stalin. This practice existed then:
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 15: 31 New
      13
      Again, Nonsense - this is not the naval attache of Vorontsov. It is known that Stalin met with General Tupikov, a military attaché in Germany, but this name is not in the magazine. If Stalin met with the naval attache, then his last name will be absent from the journal.
      In Fitin's memoirs, he was called to Stalin on June 16. He is not in the lists of those present at Stalin either on the 16th, or on other numbers around the indicated date.
  32. ccsr
    ccsr 8 December 2017 16: 56 New
    -2
    aKtoR writes:
    Consider the basics of encryption communication for that period. Each new military commander (from the commander and the NS division, and above), the head of the SHO was obliged to inform about the basics of a cryptographic link. The head of the General Staff, which is subordinate to the General Staff, was the supervisor of the SC's cryptographic communication. He was obliged to have an idea about encryption and temporary standards, including the equipment of SHO equipment of Western HE.

    This set of slogans has nothing to do with reality. The head of the cipher organ is forbidden to give any information about the work of the cipher organ in terms of cryptography and the characteristics of the systems used, and the rules for working with cipher notebooks are no different from working with other stamped documents.
    The head of the General Staff is not the curator of cipher communications, but is the DIRECT head of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, which is why the word "curator" is more suitable for the 8th Directorate of the NKVD (KGB) of the USSR, which is the main body for cipher communication in accordance with a government decree. This service was created on May 5, 1921, by order of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.
    As regards specifically the standards, the author apparently vaguely imagines that the decryption standards have less effect on the passage of information than the quality of telegraph (radio channels) lines, because of which they cannot transmit the encryption for hours and correctly decrypt it. Moreover, compliance with standards by cryptographers is monitored by the senior cipher agency, or in the worst case, the military prosecutor, if it comes to it. Therefore, you should not believe that the author paints it so famously, who hardly has a correct idea of ​​the work of military cryptographers.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 15: 01 New
      20
      Where did you get the information? Judging from what you wrote - this is a personal fabrication of not having anything with reality. in other words, complete nonsense!
      As of June 22, 1941, there was no 8 department of the General Staff - there was only the encryption department, which also included a special service. It was to the Chief of the General Staff that the encryption department was subordinate. The immediate boss, in other words, is the CURATOR of the service. 8 management of the NKVD was not the controlling body of the RKKA encryption service. Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!
      If, as you write, the author "has a vague idea of ​​encryption" - you do not have it at all - a complete amateur and a layman !!!
      The military prosecutor did not have and does not have ANYTHING to do with the monitoring of encryption communications standards. As the saying goes, "Hi Shishkin with a motor" - a man who carries a blizzard! By the way, how was control over the transfer of Directive No. 1 in question. Group confirmation is not for special encryption.
      The rules for working with cipherblocks are fundamentally different from working with secret documents (you use slang grooves that are not used by employees of cipher communication and security agencies). I’ll note it not for you, but for those who read my answer: a cipher-notepad is a notepad with ciphers. Each cipher sheet removed is ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. Work with information ОВ is carried out according to completely different documents than documents of the neck are classified or top secret. There are still rules for working with notepads of cipher telegrams, but these norms again do not seem to work with ordinary secret information. This fact was noted during the verification of cipher departments by the 3rd management of NPOs.
      So that user CCSR deliberately trying to put knowingly false information! Such people are called: a dreamer or an inventor-liar !!!
      For other people who read my answer (except for the liar) I note: aKtoR described the operation of cryptographic services close enough to what I know. I didn’t have to discuss issues specifically of the 1941 cipher communication, but on discussion with some other persons we came to a common opinion - you can believe it. In any case, I can note a fact that is not available on the Internet: confirmation of the receipt of the Directive in the five military districts was carried out by sending the text back and the GS cipher department. in other words, the decrypted text was encrypted again with new ciphers and sent to the General Staff. In the cipher department of the General Staff, a telegram was decrypted and a complete reconciliation of both texts was made. This method of rechecking and control was introduced after the discovery of the fact of distortion of information of spies in the cipher departments of the embassy in Sweden.
      1. 8Schlaf
        8Schlaf 9 December 2017 15: 22 New
        17
        I forgot to clarify that the head of the cipher department or department is obliged to conduct a briefing with the three new chiefs at each headquarters (I do not want to specify the positions of these persons). After the briefing, these persons are admitted to all guidance documents on ciphering, ciphering and ciphers. The fact is that the knowledge possessed by these individuals cannot lead to compromises ciphers and encryption correspondence.

        I recommend especially not trusting CCSR user messages
        1. cavl
          cavl 10 December 2017 06: 37 New
          +6
          I agree in principle
  33. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 15: 41 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    As of June 22, 1941, there was no 8 department of the General Staff - there was only the encryption department, which also included a special service. It was to the Chief of the General Staff that the encryption department was subordinate.

    You don’t even know the story of 8 management:
    19 July 1939 year 8th Division of the General Staff of the Red Army It was renamed the Encryption Service Division and included as an independent structural unit in the Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army.

    This was a big mistake, which is why in August 1941 the 8th department was withdrawn from the OS and raised its status:
    On August 18, 1941, the Encryption Service of the General Staff of the Red Army was created a total of 197 troops and 50 employees.

    So your remark about June 22 is only partially correct, because until 1939 the cryptographers were not part of the operational management.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 16: 14 New
      +6
      I did not claim to be a verbatim reference to the facts. I just noted that the 8th administration did not exist.
  34. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 15: 49 New
    -1
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The immediate boss, in other words, is the CURATOR of the service.

    There is no word “curator” in the military vocabulary, or it is rarely used — it was closer to the NKVD.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    8 management of the NKVD was not the controlling body of the RKKA encryption service. Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!

    In the POST-SOVIET time, the KGB was disbanded, and its functions were transferred to various structures, including the FAPSI. So for a start learn how to correctly operate with terms. By the way, in Soviet times, no development of cryptographic equipment for the Soviet Army without coordination with the 8th KGB department was carried out. Well, the question of who controlled the release of encryption documents will tear the template for you — you probably don’t know who it was entrusted to in the USSR.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 16: 17 New
      +9
      We use the word Curator - no need to draw unfounded conclusions. People who served earlier also noted that they used. Your word is against mine - I trust my own more

      If you have already started talking about the development of technology, you were obliged to note that without coordination with 8 GU GS, this also did not happen - obviously you do not know this. About ciphers - this is certainly true, but this is public information - I did not say a word about it
  35. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 15: 56 New
    -1
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Even in the post-Soviet years, specialists of the 8th KGB Directorate tried only to determine the possible ways of information leakage from military cipher bodies and ONLY!

    This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times.

    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The military prosecutor did not have and does not have ANYTHING to do with the monitoring of encryption communications standards. As the saying goes, "Hi Shishkin with a motor" - a man who carries a blizzard! By the way, how was control over the transfer of Directive No. 1 in question. Group confirmation is not for special encryption.

    As part of the investigation, the military prosecutor, if a combat order was not executed due to a delay, and which was handed over by technical means of communication and uses encryption, will necessarily require all temporary standards and specific dates for finding a document along the entire chain of executors. However, you are apparently so “cool” that you have not encountered this. But because Powers flew to Sverdlovsk, an officer was sent to prison - precisely because the norm for passing the order was violated. This is a historical fact.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 16: 22 New
      12
      no need for a military prosecutor - this is your speculation. They do not participate in controlling the passage of information - the mechanism already exists. No "historical examples" are needed that are not relevant to the topic under discussion.

      "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion? Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details
  36. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 16: 50 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion?

    This is relevant to your knowledge of the subject.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details

    You’re demonstrating your ignorance because there was a body in the GS structure that had the right to create ciphers and cryptographic equipment without 8 GB controls, but not without the approval of 8 KGB controls. Fine swimming, "comrade-h ..."
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 10 New
      +8
      By ciphers - yes, by cipher technology - no - only by agreement, and this is true only in the post-war period. This was not the case before the war. Submit evidence to your words and I will agree with you
  37. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 16: 53 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I did not claim to be a verbatim reference to the facts. I just noted that the 8th administration did not exist.

    No need to make jumps to the side - it’s you who accused me of something I don’t know, that you know. As it turned out, you yourself do not know a damn thing, but already started to teach others ..
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 17: 33 New
      +8
      I do not blame - I ascertain the fact that for the period you indicated there was no 8th General Staff Directorate. And I already saw your incompetence
  38. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 17: 03 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The rules for working with cipherblocks are fundamentally different from working with secret documents (you use slang grooves that are not used by employees of cipher communication and security agencies). I’ll note it not for you, but for those who read my answer: a cipher-notepad is a notepad with ciphers. Each cipher sheet removed is ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. Work with information ОВ is carried out according to completely different documents than documents of the neck are classified or top secret.

    As I understand it, you are already confusing a notebook with key documents with a cipher telegram notebook, which many officers have in large headquarters, and which was discussed in this topic, because The text of the b / n directive, signed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, was discussed. So why did you stick the key documentation to the stamped cipher block, STORED IN A SAFE OR IN THE SUITCAS OF THE EXECUTORS, I do not know, but this impression did not make me, because unlike you, I know how they differ.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    So that the CCSR user is deliberately trying to put knowingly false information! Such people are called: a dreamer or an inventor-liar !!!

    In this case, you look like verbiage, if only because you don’t know that you couldn’t use key documentation in general to work with correspondents in RU GS illegal immigrants used a completely different method of creating key tables and ciphers. Learn a little before you begin to ride on the ears of a gullible public ...
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 12 New
      +8
      We are discussing the cipher service of the General Staff of the Red Army. The term "did not use the term"key tables or ciphers "
  39. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 17: 09 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    For other people who read my answer (with the exception of liars), I note: aKtoR described the work of the cryptographic service quite close to what I know. I didn’t have to discuss issues specifically of the 1941 cipher communication, but on discussion with some other persons we came to a common opinion - you can believe it.

    Judging by your knowledge, you can’t even imagine how encryption in a strategic link differs from encryption in an operational-tactical link, where they use not coding books, but coding tables with variable numbering of coordinates. So I understand your circle of "specialists" - you can continue to tell your speculations.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 15 New
      +6
      I participated in the creation of coding and negotiation tables. These elements are not used in the operational-tactical link. The specified link does not include negotiations within the framework of: "battalion-regiment", "regiment-division".
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 10 December 2017 12: 28 New
        -2
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        I participated in the creation of coding and negotiation tables. These elements are not used in the operational-tactical link.

        And again you sat down in a puddle - coding tables are widely used in parts of SPN. Moreover, the communications troops have their own tables.
  40. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 17: 15 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    In any case, I can note a fact that is not available on the Internet: confirmation of the receipt of the Directive in the five military districts was carried out by sending the text back and the GS cipher department. in other words, the decrypted text was encrypted again with new ciphers and sent to the General Staff.

    But you are lying - for this there is a reverse check of the transmitted cipher telegram, and on the communication node by comparing the transmitted and received telegrams, they confirm that everything went smoothly, or the broken or incorrectly received five-digit groups are repeated in a new way. Why are you lying about what you don’t know? What your “friends” lied to you about the monkey work - re-encrypting the accepted text, if the encryptors are so overwhelmed with work?
    Everything is clear with you - lie further on "specialist."
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 24 New
      +8
      Reverse verification of the cipher telegram at least existed in the late forties. For a long time, the first head of the SHO Semipalatinsk test site spoke about this. A hotel was built near the headquarters of the landfill, in which L.P. Beria once lived. A cipher telegram came to his name with a demand at the end for a reverse check. The head of the SHO went to the hotel. He should not have given the encryption form to any hands other than the addressee. In the waiting room, he was met by a general on duty (maybe an adjutant) who wanted a telegram request. As a result, the chief insisted that he hands the folder with the cipher telegram to the general, and he does not close the door to the room of L.P. Beria in order to visually control the document folder. They never wrote about this. What further was told by the person whom I certainly believe. The general went into the room without closing the door. Beria sat on the couch and glanced at the cryptographer. After that, the general approached Beria, took out a telegram form and held it until Beria read the text. Then Beria moved somehow with his hand, the general put the form on the folder and Beria signed without addressing and put down the date and time. When sending the telegram back, in addition to the text, the times of receipt at the communication center, in the SHO and the report to the addressee were also put down. So I'm really a former specialist
  41. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 17: 20 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    This method of rechecking and control was introduced after the discovery of the fact of distortion of information of spies in the cipher departments of the embassy in Sweden.

    Yes, you don’t confuse the amount of daily information exchange even in the district’s intelligence department (department) and the amount of telegrams of the crypto radio operator at the embassy - these are two big differences.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 18: 37 New
      +4
      I repeat for NEVER, this is a way of checking especially important encryptions, to which Directive 1 was assigned
  42. 8Schlaf
    8Schlaf 9 December 2017 17: 32 New
    +9
    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    "This is a lie - all documents on the development of cryptographic equipment for CAs were necessarily coordinated with the KGB in Soviet times." - What does this have to do with the topic under discussion?

    This is relevant to your knowledge of the subject.
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Documents were coordinated with 8 GU GSH? You hide your ignorance and lies behind small details

    You’re demonstrating your ignorance because there was a body in the structure of the GS that had the right to create ciphers and cryptographic equipment without the 8 management of the GS, but not without the approval of the 8th KGB department. Fine swimming, "comrade-h ..."


    I swim as required. No need to flaunt semi-truth and semi-secret information, indicating its importance. You do not have one.
    The highlighted text is nonsense again. No service could develop ciphers and cryptotechnologies without the sanction of the GS cipher department or in the future management. No need to escalate the secrecy you have invented. Yes, in the pre-war years and during the war years, the cipher department service created ciphers for its structures - ciphers and cipher blocks without the permission of the NKVD.

    Yes, the RU Red Army created its own ciphers and methods of encrypting information. Only these elements are called CODES. For generally accepted information, they are called Ciphers for DISTINCTION.

    Initially, military specialists developed the cipher equipment, but I did not discuss this period.
  43. 8Schlaf
    8Schlaf 9 December 2017 18: 36 New
    17
    CCSR "As I understand it, you are already confusing a notebook with key documents with a cipher telegram notebook, which many officers have at large headquarters, which was discussed in this topic, because the text of the directive signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov was discussed.
    So why did you stick the key documentation to the stamped cipher block, STORED IN A SAFE OR IN THE SUITCAS OF THE EXECUTORS, I don’t know, but this impression didn’t make me, because unlike you, I know how they differ "


    What nonsense !!! Performers are people who write cipher telegrams in a notebook (execute text). They may not have a “cribbed” (this is the term of a dilentant - that is, yours) cipher block. A cipher notepad is a notepad with ciphers or cipher tables. It could only be stored in a safe on duty at the cipher department (department). It is not issued even to encryptors - only individual ciphers are issued from it. This is known to all experts. NO and there was no such thing as a “notebook with key documents” in the cipher service. The signalmen - yes there are - but we are not talking about them

    As we started talking about the Directive filed in peacetime. then, therefore, we are talking about the connection of peacetime.

    They are not stored in the safes of many officers, and "many officers in large headquarters do not have cipher telegram notebooks." This is a fiction of the inhabitants and yours. The overwhelming majority of the Red Army commanders of staffs of the cipher telegram notepad were given out on a WORKING DAY with a MANDATORY DELIVERY to the cipherorgan at the end of the working day (the working day often went into the night) even in the case of an unsigned document! Cipher telegram notepads could be issued to a limited number of commanders who worked with high ranks. For example, the commander who executed personal orders of G.K. Zhukov. Notebook cipher telegrams could not be in peacetime even at Zhukov, because Zhukov himself rarely performed encryption, and he HAD NO RIGHTS to transfer the notebook to another executor (subordinate commander)! They could be, for example, for individual performers who, for example, prepared a daily document (But this is not for many, as you write) Other performers performed encryption less frequently. The number of notepads of cipher telegrams, which are strict reporting documents, is quite small. They are an order of magnitude or less than officers at headquarters of any level. Therefore, the presence of a constant notebook of cipher telegrams for the commander is an exception, and not an accepted procedure for paperwork. In addition, when leaving home, this commander is obliged to hand over his working folder (briefcase, bag) to the cipher department!

    Consider Directive No. 1, which is sent to FIVE districts and has the numbers of outgoing cipher telegrams from 19942 to 19946. If we take as initial data that the intensity of cipher telegrams runs from 1.1.41 to 21.6.41 on weekdays, and on Sundays on 3 times lower (although not many soldiers in the General Staff were resting at that time). In this case, we have 147 days of high intensity and 24,6 days off. In this case, 24,6 days off correspond to another 8 days of high intensity. Only 155 days. We divide 19942 into 155 - there are 129 numbers of outgoing ciphers per day. Quite often, encryption goes to several addresses (this number can be more than ten). It happens that they are sent to the same address. If we assume that, on average, encryption is sent to three addresses per day, then the General Staff’s cipher department sends about 42 ciphers to all military districts, to the Navy’s People’s Commissariats and civilian organizations, to state organizations, etc. The number of ciphers is much less than the number of commanders in the operational management of the General Staff. Encryption sent and other services of the General Staff.

    With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days). For such intensity of correspondence, most commanders do not need to have personal notepads of cipher telegrams in peacetime. Do not listen to friends who tell you a secret nonsense
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 11 December 2017 19: 43 New
      -2
      Quote: 8Schlaf
      With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days). For such intensity of correspondence, most commanders do not need to have personal notepads of cipher telegrams in peacetime. Do not listen to friends who tell you a secret nonsense

      Especially for amateurs who have no idea about the work of the headquarters at least at the district level - for the vast majority of officers, notebooks are filled in advance with written orders, fully executed, and on which the chiefs only sign in the first minutes of the war. After that, they immediately go. These are the documents of combat command and control of troops, about which such as you have no idea.
  44. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 18: 50 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    The highlighted text is nonsense again. No service could develop ciphers and cryptotechnologies without the sanction of the GS cipher department or in the future management.

    Again, you're lying - RU GSh has the right to independently develop ciphers, and subsequently GRU GSh had the right to develop equipment, without the approval of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, but only with the approval of the KGB of the USSR.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 28 New
      +7
      "RU GSh has the right to independently develop ciphers, and subsequently GRU GSh had the right to develop equipment, without the approval of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff, but only with the approval of the KGB of the USSR."

      This is not true, without coordination with the 8th Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR, the GRU could not develop equipment, because the SHO of the GRU worked, including on regulatory documents, approved by the head of the 8th Main Directorate. In post-Soviet times, there may have been such a thing - I don’t know - but the KGB no longer existed.
  45. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 18: 53 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    Yes, the RU Red Army created its own ciphers and methods of encrypting information. Only these elements are called CODES. For generally accepted information, they are called Ciphers for DISTINCTION.

    Again they lied - in those times and later, each agent could have a coding table and ciphers, using a key phrase and some open statistical tables to compile them. So there is no generally accepted concept - there are code tables, but there are ciphers. You are not here in the subject.
  46. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 21: 37 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    We use the word Curator - no need to draw unfounded conclusions. People who served earlier also noted that they used. Your word is against mine - I trust my own more

    Stop bending - this is a slang word adopted by the special services, but officers do not use this word in any district headquarters or in the General Staff, and you will never find it in official documents or in correspondence. Now a lot of documents are open - give an example of the use of these words, for example, in terms of cover or mobplane of the district.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 29 New
      +9
      Is everything all right with your head? What does the “Curator” slang have to do with the cover plan or the district’s mobplan?
      Hi Shishkin with a motor !!
  47. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 21: 43 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    I repeat for NEVER, this is a way of checking especially important encryptions, to which Directive 1 was assigned

    But figs to you - nobody sent this directive back after processing and re-encryption, because it is enough for cryptographers to get what they brought from the communication center after comparing the groups of the telegram sent and returned for verification. You lied because you don’t know how it all worked.
    1. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 9 December 2017 22: 57 New
      14
      Lord, how can you bring something to your readers if you cannot understand basic things. A special communications officer cannot even help with this, since he does not know why this is necessary. I’m refining this information not for you, blue-liar, but for other users who will read it. Nowadays, there are two reasons for this verification.
      The first reason is the hidden enemies of the people. An enemy of the people can distort the text of a particularly important document. The experience of Sweden showed this - information about French spies has been distorted for a long time. It was possible to reveal this by accident when the contractor saw his document in Moscow. This is an impossible event, as familiarization is carried out by addressing.
      Therefore, verification measures to carry out other cryptographers. At that time, it was believed that hidden enemies exist everywhere. Even among trusted comrade and senior officials.
      The second reason. Human factor. The cryptographer could accidentally distort the time or date or another numerical value. He could also take, for example, a triple for a nine in mind of the artist’s careless handwriting. To exclude such an event, post-war cryptographic equipment existed for a long time in which numbers were excluded. Numbers typed in text. In the names of cities, months and other letters that could distort the meaning, doubles. For example, July. In the post-war period, there was an interdepartmental cryptographic communication in which numbers are replaced by letters. For example, A is a unit, B is a deuce. When typing numbers, the letters tripled. For example, the number 121 was written as AAABBBAAA.
      Therefore, checks at the communication center by groups could not reveal the distortions, voluntary or involuntary. The writer cannot know these things, but when he proves things that he does not understand, the question arises: how correctly does he describe events in his works ?!
      1. cavl
        cavl 10 December 2017 06: 41 New
        +1
        I also complained about this message, but the administrator was kind and did not delete it. Probably because of the unusual information .....
      2. cavl
        cavl 10 December 2017 07: 08 New
        +9
        I’ll only clarify that the equipment for the MVS was used by the Navy at all levels (more encrypted equipment was used for encrypting the fleet headquarters with the main headquarters of the Navy and the General Staff), in the Strategic Missile Forces associations.
        1. 8Schlaf
          8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 30 New
          +2
          Thanks for clarifying
      3. ccsr
        ccsr 11 December 2017 19: 53 New
        -2
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        The first reason is the hidden enemies of the people. An enemy of the people can distort the text of a particularly important document. The experience of Sweden showed this - information about French spies has been distorted for a long time. It was possible to reveal this by accident when the contractor saw his document in Moscow.

        Enough to fantasize - there was a radio station in the embassy in Stockholm, so no “spies” could influence the text of the radiogram. They could intercept, they could interfere with reception, but as a rule no one interferes with the embassy stations because They know that they will create something like that. There are situations when they use the telegraph of the host country, but this is an exception related to special situations, and not the rule.
      4. ccsr
        ccsr 11 December 2017 20: 08 New
        -1
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        Therefore, checks at the communication center by groups could not reveal the distortions, voluntary or involuntary.

        But figs to you - the main distortions in the transmission of cipher telegrams just arose due to transmissions, atmospheric interference, errors of telegraph devices, etc. that is why before setting the time for encryption transmission, any telegraph operator, after receiving the cipher telegram back, will surely check the transmitted and received tape. Moreover, he compares all the numbers in all groups, which is why there are problems with the time for the transfer of one order, if it is forcibly divided into several. those. upon transmission of SEVERAL cipher telegrams.
        The writer cannot know these things, but when he proves things that he does not understand, the question arises: how correctly does he describe events in his works ?!

        Stop wagging - I don’t write anything at all, and what you attribute to me does not hold water. However, I already understood what you are like as a “specialist”, and therefore I can recommend you write to O. Kozinkin yourself or ask the administration, they will tell you something that I don’t speak in two persons. I recommend going to the For Truth forum if something is unclear to you.
  48. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 21: 50 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    What nonsense !!! Performers are people who write cipher telegrams in a notebook (execute text). They may not have a “cribbed” (this is the term of a dilentant - that is, yours) cipher block.

    You are definitely an amateur in this matter - just the performers in one suitcase can store a notebook for ZAS telegrams and a notebook for cipher telegrams (this is a later time when the ZAS technique was created). The word "notepad" is a generally accepted term because there is perforation for tearing sheets from it. But accounting for these notebooks goes through different books - and here you are not in the subject, which is why you, like the author, cannot be trusted.
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    2. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 34 New
      +7
      Since the cipher blocks were made centrally, the "Cipher block" was printed on it. Notebooks for cipher telegrams were printed in various printing houses and on them in 1941 there was no inscription "Notebook for cipher telegrams". There was only an account number. Naturally, printing houses could not do perforation and the sheets were torn off according to the ruler.
      Mentioning the WAS notebook, in my opinion, is to raise your profile and try to get away from sensitive issues
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 10 December 2017 12: 21 New
        -2
        Quote: 8Schlaf
        Since the cipher blocks were made centrally, the "Cipher block" was printed on it. Notebooks for cipher telegrams were printed in various printing houses and on them in 1941 there was no inscription "Notebook for cipher telegrams". There was only an account number. Naturally, printing houses could not do perforation and the sheets were torn off according to the ruler.

        Goofy, come - you just considered my texts nonsense about notebooks for cipher telegrams, which are commonly used among staff officers as "cipher blocks", and now you suddenly found out that they were before 1941, and were used in the spacecraft. A good sign means a quick change of shoes in the air, and now you can pretend to be an "expert". I could tell you why and when perforation appeared on modern notebooks, and why they changed the tear line, but you are such a “connoisseur” that you yourself will find this information if you do not know it. By the way, precisely because of the fact that in the field it is difficult to tear off the sheet precisely along the line “on the knee”, and perforation was introduced.
  49. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 21: 54 New
    -2
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    NO and there was no such thing as a “notebook with key documents” in the cipher service. The signalmen - yes there are - but we are not talking about them

    Have you heard anything about GRU radio cryptographers who work with their ciphers and which notebooks they use, especially when it is the only one at the entire embassy? Your concepts are too narrow for you to indicate what is right and what is not.
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    2. cavl
      cavl 10 December 2017 06: 59 New
      11
      So to speak
      You use the slang name, not the designation of a military specialty. So the cryptographers, whom you call eights, are called specialists of the SPS (special communication units). And in the regular structure too. It’s just that experts know who the encryptor is in fact, and who is the special communications specialist. In Soviet times, the cipher divisions of the motorized rifle divisions included groups of coders. Everyone called the employees of the cipher service to the cryptographers, but only the commander, chief of staff, chief of political department and deputy commander knew how these people differed from each other. The encoder is one level lower in all respects.
      In the divisions of the Airborne Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces, specialists also working at Violet were considered specialists of the SPS by the staffing table. It was believed that they transmit rapidly aging information.
      Perhaps you have other information and can present the facts. Sorry, I’m not a jeltman and I don’t take my word for it.
      1. 8Schlaf
        8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 36 New
        +6
        Violets were still included in special air defense communications units and in separate regiments (air, tank, in some GRU units - I won’t say anything
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 10 December 2017 13: 09 New
        -2
        Quote: cavl
        So to speak
        You use the slang name, not the designation of a military specialty.

        This is the usual post of special radio communications officers in embassies and missions. By the way, very "low", judging by the rank corresponding to this position.
        Quote: cavl
        So the cryptographers, whom you call eights, are called specialists of the SPS (special communication units).

        "Eights" are usually called all those who are regularly included in the 8 departments (or departments). But those who are on the states of other structures, and engaged in ciphers and coding, are usually called differently.
  50. ccsr
    ccsr 9 December 2017 22: 22 New
    -3
    Quote: 8Schlaf
    With this calculation, the headquarters of the western military district on average had no more than 12 ciphers daily, and the headquarters of the Baltic district had less than 0,2 (for smart people, an average of 172 days).

    Especially for pseudo-experts - learn how it was in real conditions, and what cipher-notepads are:
    1. cavl
      cavl 9 December 2017 23: 21 New
      +5
      These are code tables that are simply called ciphers in the book.
      1. 8Schlaf
        8Schlaf 10 December 2017 09: 38 New
        +6
        I agree. when the first article about cryptographers appeared in the 70s, it talked about a communications girl tortured by the Nazis. The teacher then emphasized that although the article dealt with ciphers, in fact they were encoding tables