The message used material from the book Mark Corned beef “Another Chronology of the Catastrophe 1941. The fall of the "Stalinist Falcons."
Unlike PribOVO, the neighbors in Zapovo in the evening of 20, June, noted an increased activity of the Germans at the border in the area of the Suvalki lug: «To the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft immediately... To the report of the commander of the 3 Army, the wire barriers along the border along the Augustow, Sejny road, which were still in the afternoon, were removed by evening. In this area of the forest, it is as if the noise of ground motors is heard ... Klimovsky» On the document mark: "Sent 21 June 1941 g. In 2 hours 40 minutes". This message in the morning and afternoon 21.6.41 was not particularly alarmed by the head of the General Staff. It is not known what the Klimovsky or Pavlova responded from Moscow. Probably the same as the night before the war. About 23 21.6.41 watch G. Zhukov on the HF unit warned the NS of Western IN: “Expect special instructions!” General Klimovsky reported on this to General D.Pavlov and ordered the commanders of the 3, 10 and 4 armies to be in their headquarters.
FSD XOVUM 22.6.41 “Around one in the morning [00-45 22.6.41] encryption was received from Moscow [cipher telegram - PC] with an order to immediately bring the troops on alert in case of a German attack expected in the morning. At about 2 hours - 2 hours 30 minutes a similar order was made by ciphering the armies, parts of the SD ... " We already know that this PC was delivered to the cryptographic branch on 01-45 and sent to 02-25. Since the district authorities didn’t take any action before getting the command line, it turns out that they didn’t report anything about the content of Directive No. XXUMX from Moscow on HF. Perhaps, as in the case of the ODVO, they only said: "... A telegram of special importance has been sent to you for immediate execution ..." Next, "wring the tail", so as not to succumb to the provocations of the German troops.
General Klimovsky understood the cryptographic business better than the head of the General Staff. The operational department of Zapovo headquarters included the 3 branch in the number of 100 coders (of whom 61 was a man from the coders' school). NS needed to know the cipher case guidance to work with this lineup. Therefore, on his order, immediately after the decoding of PCs, the Military Council was presented with draft material. It was on this material that the leadership of the district left the resolution, making it out as incoming PC. Printed on a typewriter on a typewriter, later the telegram was turned into outgoing PC of ZOVOVO headquarters. Therefore, part of the text on declassified PCs is crossed out with a red pencil, and the addressing and names of the signers are added later. An incident happened: at that time no one decided to delete the names of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the text. PC went to the army for four signatures, which is not practiced.
According to General D.Pavlov, at one in the morning 22.06.41 called the people's commissar Tymoshenko: “Well, how are you, calmly?” I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank: according to the report of Kuznetsov, the commander of the 3 army, the German motor-mechanics were constantly going to Suwalki over one and a half day. According to his report, barrage wire was removed in many places by the Germans in the Augustow — Sapotskin section. The people's commissioner replied to my report: “You should be calmer and do not panic, but collect headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations - call ". After a conversation with the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not clarify the main provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the leadership of ZOVOVO still about half an hour decided: what instructions should be given to the troops.
The commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, at about one o'clock in the morning, under his own responsibility, ordered to send sealed “red bags” to all the subordinate units and separate units with instructions on the order of actions for combat alert that were kept in the army headquarters. About two o'clock in the morning 22 of June on HF, the commander of the 3 Army V. Kuznetsov received the order of General Pavlov: “To raise troops in combat alert, parts of the UR immediately take up the bunkers and put them into full combat readiness, put into action a plan to cover the state border” . The management of ZOVOVO assumed the responsibility from which the top management of the spacecraft was discharged. 3 hours the time lost from the delivery of Directive No. 1 to the cryptographic department of the General Staff before sending PCs in the army cover. Encryption reached the addressee by the beginning of the war ...
Something similar happened in PribOVO-SZF. Order commander 16 ck, given to 1-30 22.6.41:
«5, 33 and 188 commanders No.0012 The army commander 11 ordered:
1. Min not to put.
2. For the protection of the subsidiary of the private education institution leave small groups of patrols under the command of the average commander. The rest of the people mouth, providing a band predpole, remove immediately.
3. Work on the main page to continue. Commander 16 sk Major General Ivanov»
A very strange order, which had to go from the headquarters of the NWF through the headquarters of the 11-th army. This order of the headquarters of the NWF is in conflict with the previously given orders and initiatives. This could happen only if this instruction came from Moscow. After the arrest of A.D.Loktionov, with whom PSKlenov served since the summer of 1940, the NSH of the NWF was obliged to follow all instructions from Moscow without showing initiative.
From the 4 part, we already know that in the cryptographic offices of armies and corps, Pribovo PCs were processed using a manual cipher. In order for the PC to be sent from the 16 headquarters in the division in 1-30, it was necessary to prepare it at the NWF headquarters in the 23-30… 00-00 area. It turns out that, having passed the SC with Directive No. 1 to the encryption department, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff organized a “cheat” on the phone to the heads of the border HEs, issuing some “valuable instructions” on possible provocative actions of the enemy troops and how to proceed in this case in the counties. It is about these instructions that little is known in our time. In the 4 part, you were presented with the author’s version that the top management of the spacecraft in the evening 21.6.41 was not ready to send Directive No. 1 to the troops. The spacecraft managers were forced to prepare and send this document to I. Stalin. Therefore, the leadership of the spacecraft probably found it necessary to express their views on the HF leadership of the districts. They didn’t get through to OdVO MV Zakharov, who took responsibility for the rise of district troops somewhere between 23-00 21.6.41 and 00-00 22.6.41. Let us again consider the text of Directive No. XXUMX, prepared by Tymoshenko and Zhukov.
It should be noted that from the draft material of this document at the last time point after the words "All parts to bring on alert" The following text has been deleted: "In the case of any provocations by the Germans, or their allies, not to give in to any provocations, by taking steps to immediately resolve misunderstandings by peaceful means. " What else to add to the crossed out text? For 5-6 hours before the war, the wording on provocations and the peaceful settlement of the issue is specified, and not on the preparation of border district troops for war. Very reminiscent of the instructions of KA Meretskov, Commissar of Defense It is likely that it was a similar order that was brought to VO by the senior management of the spacecraft in a rather sharp form. The “valuable instructions” from Moscow and Directive No. XXUMX itself should have been reflected in the instructions of the headquarters and the Military Council of the NWF. Thus distinguish "Provocation" from "Sudden strike"and solvewhat exactly should be transferred to the troops shifted on the shoulders of the command of the frontier districts, which had previously “intimidated” before making a decision ...
«Military Councils 8 and 11 ARMY 22th of June 1941 2-25
1. Perhaps during the 22-23.6.41, the sudden German attack on our location. The attack can begin suddenly provocative actions.
2. The task of our units is not to succumb to any provocative actions of the Germans that could cause major complications.
At the same time, our units must be in full combat readiness to meet the sudden blow of the Germans and defeat
1. During the night on 22.06.41, secretly occupy the defense of the main line. In the assumption, put forward field guards to protect the bunkers, and the units assigned to occupy the assumption should be behind. Live ammunition and shells. In the case of provocative actions of the Germans, the fire does not open. When flying over our territory, German planes do not show up and until enemy planes start fighting, do not open fire.
2. In the case of the transition to the offensive of large enemy forces defeat him.
3. Hold tight control of troops in the hands of commanders.
4. The situation is explained to the commanding composition and the Red Army.
5. Families of the commanding staff 10, 125, 33 and 128 to be transported to the rear only in case of border crossing by large enemy forces.
6. In the event of the transfer of large enemy forces to the offensive:
a) the engineer battalions of the directorate of the chief of construction should be handed over to the commanders of the divisions in the areas where they are located and used to strengthen the troops;
b) construction battalions, motor vehicles, and mechanisms of the directorates of the chief of construction should be taken to the rear lines according to the plans of the armies.
7. The commander of the 11 Army should immediately deploy the headquarters of the 126 division and the possible amount of infantry and artillery to Kalwaria, where all units of the 126 division will be advanced.
8. The means and forces of the air defense should be put on alert number one by preparing a complete blackout of cities and objects.
9. Anti-tank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately.
10. Execution of this and the violation of the border to inform immediately.
Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov, Brigadier Commissioner Ryabchy, Lieutenant-General Maples»
Note the 9 listing. For 2 hours before, the opposite order was given. So what is different from the one set out in Directive No. XXUMX, ordered the people's commissar of defense on the HF NSH of the NWF, if at first they decide "Do not put mines", And after receiving the encryption with the text of Directive No. XXUMX, the headquarters of the NWF decides on their "Immediate installation"?
PCS from SZF headquarters is not sent to the 27 Army. Units 67-th SD (from the 27 army) have already been alerted, and the army headquarters is not notified of the Directive. Probably, the leadership of the front does not expect the start of a full-scale war. Why inform the army headquarters, located in the rear? This misinformation is contributed by incorrect intelligence data, which we talked about in the 7 and 8 parts. In addition, they were convinced of this, ordered by the highest ranks of the SC. Unfortunately, there is no longer any time left to carry out the activities specified in the NWF Directive from 22.6.41 ... For example, the mines near the roads were left to lie away from the dug holes under them ...
Let us consider how the commanders of 8 and 11 armies answered the question of Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky: “When was the order to bring the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22?”
Former commander of the 8 Army, Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov: "It should be noted that even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the Klenov Front School to withdraw troops from the border at dawn of 22.6.41 g in a very categorical manner, which I categorically refused to do ..."
Former commander of the 11 Army, Lieutenant-General V.I. Morozov: “Such an order was received by telephone around one o'clock in the morning 22.6.41 of the front NSH looking for the front commander made it clear to me that it was necessary to act, withdraw troops to the border, saying that an order was prepared about this and you would receive it. Based on this, I have a conditional code on the phone between the 1-2 hour. 22.6.41 was given orders to the troops ... "
What I would like to note in the answers of two army commanders:
1) both talk about the actions of the NSH completely opposite opinions. It turns out that one of them provides some distorted information.
2) both generals answer the questions of General A.P. Pokrovsky in 1952, in the era of omnipotence of organs. In October, 1941, General PP Sobennikov was arrested in connection with the investigation of the hostilities in the Baltic States, and in February, 1942 was released at the request and sent to the front with a demotion.
In responses to General A.P. Pokrovsky, P.S. Sobennikov expresses an opinion on General Trukhin (in October 1941, he deliberately goes to cooperate with the Nazis).
General PP Sobennikov, when he was under arrest, had to ask questions related to this traitor. It can be seen that PPSobennikov (who miraculously survived in prison), even in 1952, distanced himself from this man, emphasizing that he was "The enemy of the people of Vlasovite". At the same time, he expresses his opinion that this person was the author of the cover plan. Further it is easy to understand: “the plan of the enemy of the people” - “unsuccessful actions of the spacecraft forces in the initial period of the war”. Once in prison it was necessary to somehow cooperate with the investigation. Without cooperation, he would have simply been killed and would not have survived ... General PP Sobennikov should have been asked questions about NS Pribovo. We see that in the list of witnesses Sobennikov is missing. Being under investigation, he did not “sink” PS Klenov - surviving at his expense - this is an act! Not everyone was capable of that. Many of those arrested, to escape from torture, unfortunately, turned in friends ...
What we saw in his answers to General Pokrovsky about Klenov is the smallness that PPSobennikov was forced to say. If he spoke about Klenov only good or neutral - he would have signed a death sentence for himself. Moreover, he did not cheat - he just said not everything ... The author tried to show above that, according to the “telephone right”, “pumping” from Moscow started in order to prevent the Germans from causing a conflict. Since the commander of the troops at the front headquarters was not at this time, the NSH brought the latest "particularly valuable instructions" from Moscow to the army commanders. PP Sobennikov simply did not mention in his testimony whether there was another phone call from NSH after the transfer of the “valuable instructions” ... Besides the “plans of the enemy of the people”, General P.P.Sobennikov was blamed for the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the 8 Army laid on the Air Force using this version as a "lifeline." This will be discussed below.
The events of the first days of the war are studied in sufficient detail in the books. Therefore, the author, in concluding the theme “About PribOVO”, will quite briefly provide publicly available information on participation in battles of the air forces of the North-Western Fleet, the ground forces and the ZhBD North-Western Fleet.
In the 2-55 22 June 1941, the Me-110 fighters attacked the Alytus airfield.
At 3-57, the airfield and port in Libau were bombed. The city, port, naval base, located 50 km from the border with East Prussia, became the object of multiple German attacks aviation. In the report signed on 30.07.41 “On the military work 6 th garden"As a cause of large losses materiel noted “Total absence of VNOS posts at sea” и “The airfield in the open was well known to the Germans”. During 22, June Libava was bombarded 13 times.
In 4-00, German aviation struck air strikes in the Baltic States against airfields, major railway junctions, ports, cities of Riga, Vindava, Šiauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Alytus and others. At the same time, heavy artillery, including the enemy’s railway batteries, began shelling settlements and troops along the border.
Excerpt from 57 Headquarters XOUMX 10 00 "Xnumx garden in 3-25 22.06.41 has declared alarm and to 4-00 was ready for combat missions ... "
Order commander 7 garden 22.6.41 4-15 “Regiment commanders.
1. Have dispersed aircraft with the ability to immediately take off on a signal.
2. Have in readiness ... to destroy the ground forces of the enemy and the enemy aircraft ... to our territory.
Do not violate the border. To be prepared for the destruction of enemy ground forces in the area ... - Taurogen.
Commander 7 garden Colonel Petrov».
At 4-40, the commander of the NWF Air Force, General Ionov, orders the commander of the 4 garden to deliver a three-bap attack on the city and port of Memel. On 4-53, the 7 Garden Commander issues an order to the 9 bap commanders and the bap 46 commanders: “... Destroy the enemy grouping and aviation in the Tilsit, Ragnit, Zhilen area. Departure immediately». At 5, the squadron of 9, bap under the command of Captain M. Krivtsov, took to the air in the morning and headed for Tilsit. The route of the squadron ran in the area of Suvalka ledge. Bombers reached the target at an altitude of 7500 m.
The report of the NWF Commander to the People's Commissar of Defense on 6-10 states: “... Our air force is in the air. Until you receive your order, do not fly over the border ... Took measures to bomb the enemy without flying the border ... ” NSH VVS NWF commander Krupin in 6-15 orders: “... to the commander of the 7 garden. State borders do not break. Destroy the enemy aircraft in your area. Airplanes take off on the radio to land on airfields ... " Captain Krivtsov received by radio an order to return to the airfield when he was on a combat course with open bombs. Komesk first closed bombs, but after a few seconds he decided to bomb. In the 7-10 squadron, without losing a single aircraft, she returned to the airfield. The first combat sortie for two other squadrons of 9-Bap was not so successful - during a bombing attack on a gathering of German troops in the Tilsit area, they were met by German anti-aircraft fire; three aircraft were shot down.
About an hour after receiving the order from the headquarters of the 7 garden, three squadrons of the 46 were lifted into the air. In 5-30, the commander of the 7 garden ordered the commander of the 10 iap: “One nine to cover the departure 46 bap”. None of the fighter escort flew.
Operational summary №1 46 bap: “... In 6-40 / 6-45 22.6.41. 2-I and 3-I squadrons 46 Bap made a bombing in the number of 18 aircraft. 2-th AE destroyed the accumulation of troops in the area of Tilsit, Tauragen ... During the bombing of the 2-th AE did not return 5 SB aircraft with crews ... 3-A A destroyed railway station Zhilin [17 km from Tilsit] ..., 5 crews did not return from the flight ... "
Major Mogilevsky (commander of 40-th bap): “... The raid on Koenigsberg, Touragen and Memel ended successfully. There was a powerful anti-aircraft fire, but the bombs dropped exactly on the objects. We have no losses ... "
The 10-iap was alerted on 4-20: "... the fighting began after 5 in the morning ... It was my [komesk V. Borovoy] the second sortie between the 6 and 7 watches ... A link of V.Loboda was attacked by fighter jets, and we hit from the bottom. From the first attack, V. Loboda shot down Bf-109, and my shock group - two Ju-88. During the second attack, we shot down three more Ju-88. It was here that Vasily Loboda, helping a friend, rammed Bf-109 ... "
Fighters 21-iap met the first raid at the airport: the order for the opening of hostilities have not yet been received. but thanks to disguise losses were avoided. The order was soon received, and the second regiment met in full readiness, shooting down 9 German aircraft.
It is possible that the morning of June 22 the obscure provisions of Directive No. XXUMX, the situation of confusion, lack of communication and firm leadership in the troops caused more damage than the actual bombing and shelling by German aircraft.
Often, the fighters, taking off in alarm, were aimlessly circling over the airfield, having received no targets, and after landing landed new strikes. AT special messages The 3 NKO Directorate noted: “... VNOS posts do not work well, they confuse signaling to the command post, which is why 22 June this year. the flight personnel of the regiment deployed at the Rende airfield six times flew into false air, and with the actual attack of the enemy, our fighters, being not warned, took to the air when the enemy bombarded the outskirts of the city ... ”
When planning a war in the air, the leadership of the spacecraft assumed that tens to hundreds of aircraft would participate in the battles at the same time. The command of all levels of spacecraft faced a new tactic for conducting military operations on the ground and in the air. New experience they will have to continue to receive at the cost of many lives and material resources.
In 8-10 “Commander 7 garden. Hand in immediately. The commander ordered fighter aircraft to be protected to repel powerful air raid of the enemy. Spend carefully. A large group raid is expected... »
Around 12 of the day 22.06.41. Investigation number 03 headquarters SZF: "... The enemy has not yet brought into operation significant air forces, limited to the action of individual groups and single planes ...". In the second half of the day 22 of June, the estimate of the number of enemy aircraft introduced into the battle became more specific: “An adversary with 4-15 to 13-00 groups up to 40 aircraft and single planes totaling more than 150 aircraft attacked airfields ...”
By 12-00, small parachute assault forces were thrown from Alyutus, Rossiena, south-west of Vilnius and other places from transport planes of the 106 th special-purpose air group to other places, which broke communications, created panic and confusion. At that time, the “fifth column” was operating on the territory of the Baltic states. Enemy airplanes attacked nine airfields in the county, and in the evening - to 11. The raids were carried out in echelon, mostly by small subunits of the aircraft throughout the day. As an example, consider the raids on the Orana airfield 57-th garden in the morning: 4-25 - 1 Me-109 and 3 To-17; 6-25 - 2 Me-109; 9-00 - 5 Me-109; 9-30 - 2 Me-109; 11-10 - 10 Me-109. Methodical raids to block the airfield. Many advanced airfields have been bombed and attacked 6-7 times.
Failures in the actions of the Air Force KA, of course, affected the ground situation. An interesting fact is that the German aviation avoided the places where the anti-aircraft artillery units of the SC were deployed, did not bomb the strategic bridges, keeping them for themselves. And these bridges covered anti-aircraft guns, which were needed in other places. At the same time, the fighter regiments could not provide a full-fledged defense of their airfields from enemy air raids.
According to special report 3 Management of NKO No. 35134 from 25.6.41 at SZF: “Our aviation suffers heavy losses: there were 880 aircraft, from June 24 remained in service around 500. The planes were out of action mainly at the airfields, due to their crowded placement, lack of the required number of alternate aerodromes, sites ”. In fact, the remaining 500 aircraft after two days of fighting, when the Germans advanced to great depth, capturing part of the airfields with damaged aircraft - this is a good result. The losses of the SZF Air Force aircraft on the first day were about 96 ... 98 (of which around 20 was shot down during raids on objects located in Germany). For comparison, ZOVOVO Air Force lost more than 600 aircraft during the same period, and KOVO Air Force lost up to 500 aircraft.
Special message from 25.06.41: “... As of June 24 this year. from each aviation regiment of PribOVO, on average, 10 – 20 aircraft remained. In the entire 7 garden there are about 60 planes ..., aviation combat supplies will be enough for 1 – 2 days ... According to the promised alongside transport of aviation ammunition from Estonia is not ensured due to the lack of transport. In connection with the withdrawal of units, there is a shortage of airfields, since airfields are mainly built in the southwestern parts of the Lithuanian and Latvian republics with the calculation of the offensive. The present leadership of the air force units of the air force by the deputy commander of the air force, Major General Aviation Andreev and the Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Rasskazov is not provided due to the lack of communication with some units and the front command post ... "
From the ReportOn the combat activities of the Air Force ...": "... On the second day of the war, the situation created dictated the need to relocate the IAP into the second and third airfield-based zones ... The second and third zones were not developed, which is why the depth maneuver was extremely difficult ..." Thus, the rapid advance of the German troops led to the fact that a lot of damaged aircraft were thrown or destroyed on the airfields, and some of the aircraft were destroyed at the airfields in the absence of flight personnel. Given the above, the number of lost aircraft of the NWF air force has increased dramatically ...
On June 25, the leadership of the NWF Air Force was removed: commander General A.P. Ionov, his deputy for the political affairs of the regimental commissioner I.V. Mashin, NSH of the brigade commander S.S. Krupin were sent to the personnel department of the Air Force. 26.6.41 A.P.Ionov arrested. Shot 23.02.42. Rehabilitated in 1955.
Of course, in special reports of the 3 NKO Directorate, the NKO issues were to be noted, noting the guilt of the Air Force commander. And a mess when planning combat work, and large losses of aircraft, and abandoned (often abandoned) aircraft on airfields. Therefore, the position of the 3 Office should have been taken into account when compiling the Report “On the combat activity of the air forces of the North-Western Front for the period from 22.6.41 to 1.7.42.": “... 19.6.41, in connection with the unfavorable situation, the units were ordered to go on combat readiness and disperse the materiel from base airfields to operational ones, and no Pribevezhis command headquarters to the Panevezys area were issued, no command was given to the command and air units, on the contrary, on the night from 20 to 21 and from 21 to 22.6.41, the aviation units were ordered to conduct night training flights. As a result, most of the bapes were subjected to enemy bomber raids at the time of the postflight inspection of the materiel and refueling it with fuel. The flight crew has just been dismissed to rest after night work ... "
If you look at the material detailed in the books, you can see that the losses during the first raid were quite small. This material in the report came from the message of counterintelligence. At that time, they still did not understand the scope of the Air Force disaster in other districts. It was a false accusation ...
For the last three pre-war months, the average flight time in KOVO was 4 hours, in ZOVOVO - 9, in PribOVO - 15,5 hours. Parts of the District Air Force turned out to be prepared for war, let's say, better than all the other districts. A.P.Ionov associates did everything he could. He, like other commanders, simply did not know how the Germans would fight. I foresee the stormy indignation of some readers and therefore I will clarify: "The charge of incompetent command, criminal negligence and betrayal of A. Ionov was not submitted. "
NKVD data: “Aleksei Pavlovich Ionov 1894 Born, a former member of the CPSU / b / s 1938, from the fists. Before his arrest - Air Force Commander PribOVO, Major General Aviation. 26 / VI-1941 of the year arrested. Condemns the testimony of Smushkevich, Levin and Yusupov as a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. He admitted that since 1939, he was a member of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy, recruited by Smushkevich. He was connected by conspiracy with Levin and Yusupov. Conducted sabotage in aerodrome construction. "
A.I.Ionov was forced to admit under torture the mutual accusations of the previously arrested air force generals. He, like PS Klenov, did not drag anyone along. He "confessed" only to sabotage in the airfield construction. In terms of position, he could not influence the construction sites of airfields, the sequence of their construction, he did not have the resources to speed up their construction, he was not given instructions about the necessity of basing aircraft at field airfields. In the period of the growth of the “Case of Aviators”, based on increased accident rate, AP Ionov contributed to improving the composition of his flight training, unlike other VOs. 22.6.41 NWF pilots were the first to strike at enemy territory.
The information contained in the responses to General A.Pokrovsky, for various reasons, may be incorrect. For example, P.P.Sobennikov writes:
It is clear from the CCD that 7-th garden 22.6.41 was part of the 8-th army, and did not support it. Battle Order of the Air Force Commander SZF No. 01 / OP 22.6.41 "... the rest of the 7 and 8 garden units operate according to the plan of the army commanders ..." Among the regiments to which tasks are assigned by the command of the Air Force of the front, there are no 7 th garden regiments. Consequently, the combat missions of this division must be set by the headquarters of the 8 Army.
For reference. The 7 garden on 22.6.41 included: 9 sbap (good 51 SAT), 46 th sapap (good 51 Sat and Ap-2), 241 cap (good 27 I-15 bis), 10 ip (23 MY) 3 (not completed mastering) and 26 serviceable and 16 "type 5" - 1935 year of release), 238 ip (30 and 153, had in combat about 11 pilots). 22.6.41 9-th bap made 43 of the departure plane, while 5 bombers were shot down or badly damaged. 46-th bap made 18 sorties, having lost up to 20 airplanes (of which 10 was on the ground). Thus, by the end of 22.6.41, more than 60 SB and Ap-2 bombers should have remained in the shelves. It turns out that the 15-00 22.6.41 as part of the 7 garden could not remain 5-6 SB aircraft. In 241, by the end of 22.6.41, the 3 of the aircraft was shot down and destroyed at the 5 airfield (including 3 burned during the retreat). In the 10 IAP, by the end of 22.6.41 there were about 12 serviceable aircraft. 238-iap on 21.7.41 had 5 and-153 (the vast majority of the aircraft was left at the airport in the absence of flight personnel).
In 5-30 ... 6-00, the enemy infantry went on the offensive after a repeated air raid. In 8-30 ... 9-00, the Germans threw large forces of the moto-armored troops into battle. 125 SD, deployed at the front in 40 km, was attacked by parts of three TD and two PD, followed by another three MD in the second echelon. Against the five regiments of 188, 126 and 128 sd 11 th army, deployed on the 100-km front, there were six and three TD, followed by one, three MD and one TD.
It is well known that the divisions of the cover with their units did not occupy long-term structures and did not proceed to the construction of debris on the roads that could be viewed from German territory. The units had about one BC and did not have an order to open fire on the enemy. Despite instructions to increase ammunition in defensive positions, this did not happen. Despite the instructions of the PribOVO headquarters to the commanders of the armies and corps to withdraw from the NZ and to issue helmets to the troops, this did not happen in full. The commander of the 533 JV P.A.Bochkov: “... only the 1 th battalion was wearing metal helmets when it went out to the area of staff exercises in alarm, and that was only because it was allowed by the army commander in his order. All other units began the war in the caps ... "
Colonel-General MSShumilov (former commander of 11 sk): “... The war began in 4-00 22.6.41. I was immediately reported to the commander of the 8 army ... Received no fire order. Not to give in to provocation. But the troops without an order opened fire... "
125-Rifle Division withdrew to defensive positions almost all the artillery (136 ... 137 guns and mortars 76-mm caliber or more of the provisions of 148 state. Three artillery regiment (414 light up, 459 howitzer up and 51-th cabinet up), covering division , they opened fire only after 8 hours of the morning. Before 11-00 ... 11-30 they shot their own ammunition, a significant part of the artillery was left in position. A similar situation was in all covering divisions.
The preemptive operational deployment of powerful forces with extensive war experience, the massive use of aviation and mechanized troops ensured the Germans success on the first day of the war.
The loss of the 1 td (XXXXI MK) 22.6.41 amounted to 313 people killed and wounded and 34 people missing. 6-I TD (XXXXI MK) moved to the border on the night of June 22 and went on the offensive from the march. According to the memoirs of Colonel Ritgen: “The enemy’s resistance in our sector turned out to be much stronger than expected. We were blocked by six anti-tank ditches, covered by infantrymen and snipers entrenched in trees. Fortunately for us, they did not have anti-tank guns and mines. Since no one gave up, there were no prisoners. However soon Tanks were left without ammunition, which had never happened before during the campaigns in Poland and France ... ” В RCB XXXXI MK On the day of June 22, it was noted: “Losses exceed normal level”.
RCB 8 th TD (XXXXXVI) 7-55: “Parts are moving east quickly. The division had the impression that it had not yet come in contact with the enemy’s regular troops. ”. Soon the situation has changed. Scheller's battle group got bogged down in battles for Soviet pillboxes and lost pace.
The headquarters of the NWF, the 8 and 11 armies due to the systematic disruption of communication by saboteurs and as a result of the bombings could not properly assess the situation, quickly take the necessary decision and organize the management of subordinate units. Retractable reserves were commonly used to launch hasty counterattacks. The troops were brought into battle on the move, not having enough ammunition, without the support of artillery and aircraft. German aviation detected convoys of our troops and struck them. This did not allow to significantly slow down the advancement of the enemy moto-armored groups.
Consider two Reports. «To the Commander of the North-Western Front, Colonel General Comrade Kuznetsov
From the very first days of the operation, daily operational orders or combat orders contradicting each other began to arrive on 2-3 times. As a result, the troops twitched in vain, and this provision made it impossible to expediently use the forces and means to carry out the order ...
Combat material in the compounds remained old, worn ... After the first day of the march, and especially after the first day of the battle, the cars began to quickly fail out of dozens. Due to the lack of spare parts, both on the routes and in the fighting, they were not restored, and if they were restored ... only on the battlefield, since the absence of tractors did not allow them to be towed to the collection points of emergency vehicles. For the same reason, a lot of the material part was left in the territory of the enemy ...
Troop control was weak due to the lack of radio communications. There were no permanent wires. Regular wire communications due to the excessive dispersion of the divisions was not enough. Radio almost did not work at all. The only means of communication for the entire operation was the delegates of communication.
The commander of 12 mk Major General Shestopalov 27.6.41 12-00 »
Report on the combat activities of the 8 Army artillery in battles with 22.6. by xnumx. "... The artillery of the army went to the front and entered the fighting with a large shortage in peacetime states ... Parts not only were not ordered to take property to wartime states, but they were not informed about the possibility of fighting, therefore, the property supposed to be replaced, transport , means of observation, means of observation were not taken to wartime states ... Due to the lack of an adequate amount of transport, the existing transport was overloaded and was out of service ahead of time, as a result of which it was not always ensured odvoz ammunition and evacuation during the withdrawal ...
From the first days of the fighting the disguise was good, the digging was bad. In the last battles, self-digging measures improved, artillery, as a rule, began to go deeper into the ground, stamina and survivability increased ... Divisional artillery mostly remained with infantry retreat one... reflecting the enemy with his fire, taking the material part in the echelon of his infantry, with great losses ...
Colonel Ivin, Chief of the 8 Army Artillery, 8 Army Artillery Colonel Colonel Ivanov
The deficiencies in the organization of combat activities indicated in the reports are well known and discussed many times. Of course, it is clear that the scattered connections of the PribOVO satellites would not have been able to hold back the German strike forces due to a huge number of reasons. With proper deployment, they could only slightly damage the enemy and sell their lives at a higher price (whoever would want to). There was no fierce hatred for the German invaders at that time ...
JBD SZF. This refers to the so-called "JBD SZF”, Which was to lead an operational staff of the front headquarters.
The document consists of two conditional parts: the 1-part I is the restored part of the journal from 22 June to 12 July 1941 of the year, the 2-I part - entries from 12.7.41 to 18.08.41. The feature of this declassified document is that original source. Information before 12.7.41 was restored by an unknown person.
Another feature of the OBB SZF is that it is reprinted (perhaps not once). The order to reprint the reinforced concrete bollard cannot even be given by the front commander if he is sent to the archive of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Such an order could be given by someone from the top management of the spacecraft. But who and when is unknown. The log filed in the archive does not have a witness signature, which is a violation of the secrecy regime.
Why did the author decide that the cbd was reprinted? Let's see a piece of text: “... The skillful organization of the concentration of groups and the conduct of operations, the supply of reserves from the depth, the rapid regrouping of troops, perseverance in carrying out the goals set and the tasks assigned to the troops draw attention to themselves. All these positive qualities of the German troops played a role. in the first months of the warBut as soon as the Red Army learned reflect the notorious "wedges", such repeatedly repeated patterns of conducting operations could not lead to success ... " At a reprint of the document even one conclusion was left, with which the person connected with the reprint of the OBD probably does not agree.
It turns out that during the reprint they tried to preserve as much as possible all the existing text. Perhaps the CIA prepared for work some high-ranking person after February 1942, and at the same time, the magazine was generously supplemented with generalizations and conclusions. Why after February 1942? Because in February all this could be clarified with the former NSh SZF ...
Without having a primary source, it is inappropriate to evaluate the actions of the PribOVO-SZF management on the published document. Within the framework of the topic under consideration, I would like to mention only one place in the OBD, referring to the period 18-22.6.41. The assessment was conducted by a person much later than the specified time period. The man who is quite well owned events of the prewar period.
"... Thus, the war became a fact events demanded urgent action on both sides and primarily in the area operational deployment of military units of all the armed forces and their concentration on the mobplan for conducting operations. The command of the NWF in the last days before the war it was possible to relocate immediately a number of parts closer to the border. However, the pace of concentration and deployment was extremely slow. It was necessary to take into account the weak throughput of the Baltic railways, the dispersion of troops over a large territory and their remoteness from the state border.
At the same time the opportunity presented itself under the guise of withdrawing parts to camps, to make a hidden concentration of the main forces at the state border, to occupy and improve field defenses, subject to the correct assessment and prediction of impending events at the SPF. Only 90, 188, 5 sd were withdrawn in due time, but most of them were also engaged in the equipment of the camps, less in combat training. 3 and 12 MK occupied the concentration areas according to the plan ... "
What is unusual about this piece of text? There is not a single word in it about instructions or directives of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. The point is that the command of the NWF opportunity presented relocate a number of parts to the border. All redeployment of troops agree with the General Staff ?! How could the district command redeploy parts, ignoring the attention of the high command of the spacecraft? Who has the right to make such a conclusion in a closed document? This refers to a complete and sealed secret document. It is already a big problem to solve it - not every multi-star general can allow it ...
The same phrase "the opportunity presented itself"Is used when discussing the withdrawal of parts" under the guise of output to the camps, "and in fact concentrate them near the border. And again, does this seem to be a personal initiative of the PribOVO command, which would be unused to the end?
Who could have expected something unexpected from the PribOVO management? Who could give a carte blanche to the district command? If we were talking about a book about alternative stories about the "hitches", then everything is clear. “The Hitchers” immediately send a memo to the leader. The leader would, perhaps, give carte blanche, and the shooting of the protagonist is a failure to justify the hopes of a great man. But we are not in the book ...
There is not a single word about the NSH SZF PS Klenov. Neither bad (he was already arrested as an enemy, but no one “threw a stone”), nor good (fraught, however). Regarding commander F.I. Kuznetsov, there are two references.
“The 3-00 24.6. Decision of the NWF Command: The meeting was attended by: Gen. Col. Kuznetsov, corps Commissar DIBROV, Army Commissar 2 of the rank of Borisov and a number of other responsible commanders. Colonel-General KUZNETSOV ordered Captain NAZAROV and a group of commanders of the headquarters to immediately go and restore the position under KAUNAS. The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS ... "
The order for an attack on Kaunas was signed by Kuznetsov and Dibrova. Army commissar 2 rank Borisov arrived in PribOVO on a business trip just before the war. 24 of June, at his insistence, which was supported by DWI's FWS, it was decided to go over to the 16 sk offensive in order to fight off Kaunas occupied by the enemy. The offensive ended with encirclement. With the help of 46 tp, the encirclement was broken at the turn of the river Viliya and the remnants of the hull (along with 46 tp), having lost almost all heavy weapons, began to retreat in the direction of Polotsk. Borisov voluntarily departed to Moscow, where he was convicted. It seems that it was not in vain that an eyewitness to those events who filled the ZhBD NWF mentioned only two high-ranking political workers who could convince Kuznetsov to carry out this operation.
How does the person who participates in the reprint of the RCB evaluate this event: “... The commander of 16 ck Major General IVANOV was ordered to take KAUNAS. However, the situation for 16 ck was created extremely hard, parts were not put in order, there were no tanks, aircraft, the connection with the army was lost, the enemy had pulled up to two fresh traffic police stations and put himself in order. The right decision would be to take up defense with parts of 11 A along the river Vilia and put them in order. 8 A to take over the river VENTA, the edge of the forest southern SHULYAY. The operation was not prepared. NWF handed an order around 12.00 24.6, therefore, the troops had too little time to organize an offensive. The absence of aviation and the poor organization of ground reconnaissance did not allow opening the approach of two fresh enemy forces, which decided the fate of the operation. The troops were not put in order, there was no command ... Only not knowing the operational situation and not imagining the whole destructiveness of this business, pushed Colonel General Kuznetsov to give an order to attack KAUNAS... » As we know, the front commander was not shot ...
In the topic devoted to PribOVO, the author mentioned A.D.Loktionov, I.F. Kuznetsov, P.S.Klenov and A.P.Ionov. The bright memory of people who tried to prepare their troops for a meeting with the Nazi invaders. Not everything worked out for them. No one at that time could have kept the Germans ...
PS Quite a lot of readers left asterisks under parts of the cycle. Thank. Many people disagree with the proposed version - this is their right. The main thing for the people left is memory. The author appeals to people who put stars (if it is not contrary to their conviction) to put candles in a church, temple, or to remember these people. Below when discussing this part, the author will post a comment. Please put asterisks under this comment only people who were able to fulfill (personally or through relatives, friends) the request of the author. Thank. Perhaps another part will be prepared for the New Year holidays.