The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 3)
The following abbreviations are used in the text: AP - artillery regiment, BAT - military attaché, Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces) - airborne corps (brigade), Armed Forces - Armed Forces, GSD - Mountain Rifle Division, General Staff, KA - Red Army, ZAD - anti-aircraft artillery battalion, cd (kbr or kp) - cavalry division (brigade or regiment), mk - mechanized (motorized) corps, motorized armored brigade - mbbr, mp - motorized regiment, MMC - motorized units, RGK - reserve of the Main Command, pp) - infantry division (regiment), td (tbr, tp or tb) tank division (brigade, regiment or battalion), anti-tank unit, anti-tank division, fortified area.
Tank and motorized troops and experience in their use. It is well known that motorized and tank formations of Germany played an important role in the events of the 1941 summer war, which gained combat experience in the war with Poland, France and England.
And how did the analogous troops develop and the experience of their use in the USSR?
In 1931 was created first in the world MK. The MK consisted of more than 500 tanks and 200 vehicles. In 1934, the spacecraft already had four MKs.
During the war in Spain, the Soviet Union put the Republicans 297 T-26 and 50 BT-5. In the battles, tanks were used by single vehicles, platoon or porotno, often without infantry cover. In some cases, tanks were used in groups of up to several companies (45-48 machines). For example, during the assault on Fuentes de Ebro, 48 BT-5 participated in the attack, breaking through three fortified lines and losing 16 tanks (30% of the composition of the TP). Initially, the tanks had infantry cover, but for various reasons they were left without him in the final phase of the battle ... The combat experience of using tanks was collected "bit by bit" and, it turned out, it was not always correctly evaluated the tactics of their use. At that time, no one in the world knew how to fight using tank and mechanized troops. We were the first ... Tbr in Spain was commanded by D.Pavlov (shot by 22.07.41). In 1957, D.Pavlov was posthumously rehabilitated and restored to the rank of general-army.
Based on the experience of military operations in Spain, Pavlov insisted on the creation of tanks with diesel engines, anti-bullet armor and cannons capable of penetrating anti-bullet armor of enemy tanks. According to D.Pavlov's proposals, a heavy breakthrough tank was developed, which later turned into a heavy tank “Klim Voroshilov” known to us.
In March, 1938 addressed to V.Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, from the People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov (according to a note from Pavlov) received a “Report Note” with a proposal to revise the resolution of the NKO No. 94 “On Types of Tanks ...” in which in particular, it was said: “A tank, intended for operations together with infantry (cavalry) and as part of independent tank formations, must be one. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop two types of tanks: one is purely tracked and the other is wheeled and tracked. ”There were problems with the coordination of the project and its implementation, including from the ABTU, which was headed by Pavlov. But, the difficult road to the T-34 tank (bypassing a number of projects) began with the above-mentioned note. At that time, no one in the world understood how the new tanks should look like. At the beginning of the road to create new tanks, D.Pavlov stood with everyone.
In July, 1938, the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict takes place at Lake Hassan. To defeat the Japanese grouping, the Soviet command attracted the 2 th mbr, 32 th and 40 th ot.tb (total 361 tank and SAU). According to the state of tbr had: 6 battalions (3 tank, infantry and machine gun, combat support, repair and recovery) and 3 companies: motor, communications and reconnaissance.
During the storming of the Pogomolny and Zaozernaya hills, our tankmen came upon a well-organized PT defense. X-NUMX T-85 tanks were lost (26 was burned out of them). The reconnaissance battalion was instructed to “at high speeds to slip through the zone of shelling, to break into the front line of the Japanese defense and strike the north-western slopes of the hills ... to destroy their firing points and rear areas”. BT-9 at high speed without loss slipped through the zone of artillery fire and got into the swamp, in which 5 machines were stuck. They could not get out without help. Crews had to occupy all-round defense in order to prevent the Japanese from destroying tanks.
We see that tanks are used without reconnaissance of the terrain and reconnaissance of the enemy’s defense, almost without the support of infantry. Losses tanks made up 24% of their total. The attack was made in the "forehead", a detour maneuver failed, it did not stop the attack.
12.06.39 G.Zhukov replaced Feklenko as commander of the Special Corps of the 57 (later renamed the 1 Army Group). The enclosures included: 7-I, 8-I, 9-i MBR, 11-I TBR, 36-I MD, 6-I KBR. Later the 1-i tbr was entered into the 6-th army group. Has anything changed in the tactics of using tanks after the battles at Lake Hassan?
First, a fairly massive use of tanks in the conflict at Hanhin-Gol occurred on July 3-5 1939 at Mount Bain-Tsagan. Nothing has changed ... 11 tbr and 7 mbbr again thrown into the battle without intelligence, separately from each other, without the support of infantry and artillery. They attacked from different directions with companies or battalions without infantry cover.
The main PT of the Japanese army was the 37-mm PT gun, which pierced 500-mm armor at a distance of up to 40-mm. The units contained small quantities of 20-mm automatic PT guns (anti-tank guns). In addition, during the battles, 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and 13,2-mm machine guns proved to be quite effective PT weapons. The infantry used PT mines, bundles of hand grenades and gasoline bottles as hand-held PTs. As divisional artillery, 75-mm guns and howitzers, which lacked armor-piercing shells, were used. Therefore, they could not successfully hit the Soviet tanks.
The first 11 tbr attacks began on 8-15 and on 8-30. Around 12 watches, Japanese units from the south attacked the armored division 8-th cd of the MNR, which destroyed several firing points, losing the 3 armored vehicles which had been destroyed and burned down. In 13-00, the 24 th MP took part in the fighting (from 36 md, the regiment was commanded by N. Feklenko, well-known in 2 part), followed by the regiment 6 cd MHP, which operated along Khalkhin-Gol, deployed . In 14-00 again attacked 11 tbr. All attacks were inconsistent, the parts acted without communication between them. In the 19 hours organized the general attack, which involves 24-th MP with support 5 BT-5 and 6 HT-26 11-th Tank Brigade, part of 7-th IBRD, with the support thrown in the area of battle on the machines dismounted squadrons 8-th cd MPR and armored division of the same division. The Japanese repulsed the attack.
A brief description of the attack of one battalion: "The battalion, having an 44 tank BT-5, turned into battle formation along the front and went on the attack. No preliminary reconnaissance was done, no information about the enemy was received from the higher authorities. Going at high speeds (45 – 50 km / h), the battalion ran into the front edge of the Japanese and entered the battle, destroying the enemy with fire and tracks. Not supported by their infantry and artillery, the 16.00 battalion went into the assembly area, leaving the destroyed tanks on the 20 battlefield, which were then burned by the Japanese P and assistance bottles with gasoline. " The tanks passed the Japanese positions several times, but could not crush the enemy without the support of the infantry.
11 Tbr Battle Log
During the 3.7.39 battle, the brigade lost 152's BT-5 45 tanks destroyed [I mean failed irrevocably], padded with 37. Total 82 tank or 53,9% out of operation ... Killed ... 135 people. Wounded ... 57 people. Missing ... 11 people. Total out of order 203 man.
Losses for 4.7.39. Killed - 1, ... injured - 7, there was no loss of combat vehicles.
Losses for 5.7.39 g. 12 injured ... no loss of combat vehicles.
From the evening of July 3 the brigade did not take part in the battles.
Fighting 7 mbbr (the battalions included: armored combat, machine-gun, reconnaissance and artillery division. Total 1888 people, 57 medium and 25 light armored vehicles, 10 76-mm guns and other equipment).
247 Automotive Combat Battalion Fighting Log: “The part had the task - joint actions with ... 11 tbr to destroy the enemy group in the area of three lakes ... There was no reconnaissance before the attack, the battalion went on the attack [on 15-00] directly from the march in 150 km. As a result of the attack, 20 armored vehicles were destroyed (burned down), 13 was killed, 57 people were killed, 26 was wounded, 2 was missing. In total, 50 BA-6 and BA-10 participated in the attack.
The 66% battalion armored vehicles (40% brigade armored vehicles) burned down or were disabled - the combat mission was not completed. Both brigades lost their combat capability, did not dislodge the enemy from Mount Bain-Tsagan, and retreated to their initial positions. The loss of the MNR's armored division was 8 armored vehicles.
In the evening of July 3 at the headquarters of 23 of the Japanese traffic police, they came to the conclusion that "the operation does not develop as expected." Therefore, on July 20-20, 3 was ordered to withdraw units from the west coast of Khalkhin Gol. The departure was to start on the morning of July 4. Cover the crossing remained PP, reinforced with artillery. The Japanese retreat to the crossing began around 12-15. The motor-armor-tank units of the spacecraft, which suffered great losses, could not pursue the retreating enemy. Fighting led only 24-th MP, which throughout the day attacked the defenses of the Japanese regiment.
According to official Japanese data, the losses amounted to 800 people killed and wounded (from 8000 located on the west bank of Hanhin Gol). The Japanese reported that they were able to evacuate all heavy equipment and to endure all those killed and wounded. The greatest losses of one of the regiments occurred during the withdrawal through the bridge (the bridge was not destroyed) under the fire of Soviet artillery.
According to the author - the above is an example of the inept practical application of motorcycle-tank units. Pay attention, close enough to the described event, used MK tanks in counterstrokes in the summer of 1941 of the year.
With further hostilities at Khankhin Gol, the Soviet military learned something. It should be noted that tanks did not rarely return to their initial positions from the battlefield with 2-5 holes. There have been cases of returning from the battle of burning tanks. The tables show material on tbr losses in August 1939. A large number of wrecked tanks were restored during the battles.
The material is described in more detail in the article “Tanks on Hanhin-gol” by M. Kolomiets.
Upon investigation of large losses in 11 tbr and 7 mbbr, a commission arrived under the leadership of Deputy Defense Commissar G.Kulik. G.Zhukov had a conflict with the chairman of the commission ... G.Kulik was recalled ...
From the report of D.Pavlov: “During the liberation of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine in 1939, we participated in sixteen TBRs and two mbrs, which acted independently in isolation from the rifle troops, having in some cases to an infantry battalion planted on tanks. Average daily crossings were from 50 to 100 km. The advance forward paralyzed any organized resistance from the Poles and enabled our army to complete the task in the shortest possible time. ”Again, tanks are used with a small amount of infantry per peak. There was a problem of controllability TC. This was probably due to insufficient experience of commanders at all levels of the Labor Code.
In November, 1939, following the results of the use of the TK in Poland, D.Pavlov spoke in favor of disbanding the corps as inefficient. He was supported by some other military leaders. The corps were disbanded and created 15 md (each md: 4 regiment (tank, artillery, motorized rifle 2), three battalions (reconnaissance, communications, light engineering), PT division and ass. In total, there were 258 tanks, 49 armored vehicles, XNUMND, in the MD. In total, there were 90 tanks, 50 armored vehicles, XNUMNAM) in the MD. and mortars (without 8-mm), 37 980-mm anti-aircraft guns and 2 vehicles. In the MD, the number of tanks decreased a little more than 560 times compared to TK (TK had 12710 tanks and XNUMX manpower), but received two times more motorized riflemen and fewer support units.
War in finland. The whole territory from the Soviet-Finnish border to Vyborg is covered with large forests, which allowed tanks to move only along roads and separate glades. A large number of rivers and lakes with swampy or steep banks, an abundance of deep ravines, non-freezing peat bogs and boulders - all this was a natural impassable PT obstacles. A small number of roads made the maneuver of tank units even more difficult, and the movement along passable forest areas required the high skill of the driver when driving between trees and boulders. In addition, it was necessary to fight in the harsh winter conditions with deep snow cover ...
All of the above and the presence of heavily fortified defense zones did not allow the tank and motorized troops to be widely used for breaking through into enemy rear areas and for subsequent operations in the operational area. Thus, the practical combat experience of the use of large MMT in the enemy rear could not be obtained. Losses: destroyed to 650 tanks, destroyed around 1800, about 1500 failed. Again, the combined-arms commanders did not know how to correctly use tanks ...
07.06.40 G.Pavlov was appointed to command BOVO. It is difficult to say whether he was pleased with such a change of posts. He had no experience in controlling a huge mass of combined-arms troops, and he loved tanks ...
In early June, 1940 of the year, based on information on the use of German MKs in France, a plan was formed for the formation of Soviet corps, which was transmitted to the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B). By December 1940, the 8 micron was formed.
In July, 1940, the specialists of the General Staff of the spacecraft developed two variants of the German attack on the USSR.
According to the scenario "Northern" option at the turn north of the mouth of the San River was deployed 130 German divisions, and 50 divisions were deployed against KOVO (total 180 of the German divisions for the war with the USSR).
The strikes were delivered from East Prussia in the direction of Riga, Kaunas, Vilnius and further to Minsk. At the same time in Belarus strikes are delivered on Baranovichi and Minsk, as well as on Dubno and Brody. From Riga and Kaunas you can strike in the direction of Leningrad, and from Minsk - to Moscow. Military experts simply did not dare to consider such variants of events.
We see that during the evaluation a more difficult situation was considered than the attack on the USSR, given in 1941 in intelligence reports (on the attack of army groups on Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev.) For the evaluation, several blows were considered in each of the indicated directions. According to intelligence reports of RU GSh KA before 20, June 1941, against PribOVO and ZAPOV, there were 59 divisions (excluding divisions in the depth of the territory) against 130 divisions are considered during the evaluation.
How did the Soviet side manage not to lose - this is not a question of this topic - "Unexpected attack on the USSR." Perhaps there was a strategic error here, due to which the Commissar of Defense and the General Staff did not fear Germany’s attack on the night from 21 to June 22 of 1941. According to the staff officers, the Germans did not have enough troops on the border for a full-scale war with the SC. The existing German divisions would be enough only for individual provocative actions ...
"Southern" option envisaged unfolding against the same KOVO 130 German divisions, and against ZOVOVO and PribOVO - 50.
According to specialists, the “Northern” option was the main and most politically beneficial for Germany. As of 18.09 40, the “Northern” option remained the main one. According to the estimates of the RU GSH on the 11.09.40, the total number of divisions of the German army was 208-228 (of which up to 8 md and 15-17 etc.) (No.103 / 252361ss).
In December, 1940, in Moscow, a meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft took place, at which G. Zhukov delivered a presentation: “The nature of the modern offensive operation”: “What is particularly instructive of actions in the West?
1. This is a bold and resolute application [Germanic] TD and MK in close cooperation with the Air Force throughout the depth of the enemy’s operational defense.
2. Decisive strikes by the MK in the oncoming battle and their desire to bravely and independently break through to the rear of the operational grouping of the enemy.
3. The massive use of parachute units and air divisions to capture the most important objects in the near and deep rear of the enemy, with frequent use of these troops in the form of the enemy.
4. When breaking through UR, the Germans paid special attention to the close interaction of infantry, artillery, tanks, sappers and aviation.
5. High rates of offensive operations. Poland ... the average daily advance of the Germans ... 30km. Holland, Belgium and Northern France - 20 km per day. Defeat of France - 16 km per day. At the same time, the effect of the ММЧ reached 100 — 120 km [Guderian's group reached the depth of 100 km - this stage lasted for 3-4 of the day - from the report of D.Pavlov].
6. The offensive operation was usually preceded advance development of a powerful network of spy agents and sabotage groups. This agents, as a rule, sat down closer to airfields, URs, the most important warehouses, railway bridges and other important objects.
7. This is the ability of the Germans to organize the continuity of operations. The continuity of operations in all cases was ensured by: preliminary thorough preparation of the operation and the presence of a plan for the subsequent operation, powerful automobile transport and a well-developed network of railways providing extensive regroupings, troops and rear equipment, and the presence of layered reserves.
Modern conditions are characterized by the presence of powerful technical means of struggle, allowing the upcoming:
1. In close cooperation of aviation, tank units, artillery and rifle troops, destroy not only the field defense, but also break through the modern fortified strip.
2. Having broken through the tactical defense, having entered a powerful mobile group, defeat operational reserves decisively and develop operational success into strategic success.
3. With a powerful and sudden blow, crush the enemy's air force to the full depth of the operational-strategic strike and win air supremacy ... ”
G. Zhukov noted the main points that the spacecraft will face with the start of the 1941 summer war. Having no practical experience in front-line operations with the use of large MMPs, he, as we see, is well acquainted with the topic. Understands the place of parachute assault forces and enemy agents. It is strange that after the war he wrote in his memoirs: “A major gap in Soviet military science was that we did not draw practical conclusions from the experience of the battles of the initial period of the Second World War in the West ... First of all, about the operational-strategic surprise with which Hitler's troops invaded the countries of Europe. Striking powerful blows with armored troops, they quickly cut through the defenses to reach the enemy’s rear. The actions of the armored forces the Germans supported the Air Force ... "
We will continue consideration of the report of G.K. Zhukov at the meeting: “... In the conditions of the Western theater of military operations, a major offensive operation with a strategic goal should be carried out on a wide front of the 400-450 km scale ... cases are much deeper. For such an operation, an SD of order 200-300, 85-100 MK is required ... Based on medium pace development operation 10-15 kmtotal duration of operation to the depth of 200 km be 12-20 daysin particularly favorable conditions it can be completed before ... "
The stated concept could be used by specialists of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, both for evaluating their troops and evaluating the actions of the Wehrmacht. Please note that operational depth is present in the development of an offensive operation. 200 km and pace of advancement 10-15 km / day. The speed of advancement of the SMP is practically "nullified". The direction of impact focuses more than 100 divisions. It should be noted that when the military specialists of the “Northern” variant were being worked out, the German troops went deeper into our territory on the same 200-240km. Probably, there was a concept about this that was substantiated by one of the theoretical specialists.
“... To cover the anti-aircraft artillery of the strike and mobile groups with fire, you need to cover the area along the front in 30 km and in depth of 30 km - 900 sq. Km. One JOB can cover 160 sq.km with fire, and to cover 900 sq.km you need 6 JOB ... "
Since at that time the spacecraft did not encounter a massive use of aircraft against its parts, we see an underestimation of the ground defense of the air forces in the massive use of enemy aircraft.
“... Concentrated divisions are marched at night to the line of deployment and are located in sheltered places in 10-15 km from the front line. In the initial position to attack the main forces are displayed on the night before the attack. Avant-garde units can be thrown for a day. Tank reinforcement units attached to rifle formations occupy their waiting areas in sheltered places out of artillery fire. Artillery takes firing positions no later than one day before the start of the attack. The occupation of firing positions by artillery is made at night. Deploying artillery may require several nights. On the site of the main attack breadth 25-30 km deployed to 3 SC, 3-5 MAF, 7-9 AP RGC ... Total area 30h30 km will be focused around 200000 people, 1500-2000 guns, tanks mass, an enormous amount of vehicles and other means . "
The report refers to the shock grouping up to 8-10 divisions in the area 30 x30 km. For a front-line operation, this is probably correct. On the night of June 22, 1941 of the specified area was no more than 4-5 of the German divisions. The Germans struck with smaller forces than the forces in question in the report. G. Zhukov understands how parts can be put forward before a front-line operation. Means he had to understandhow enemy troops can advance to our border before attacking the USSR ...
In the reports another question was voiced regarding the use of the MK after entering the breakthrough to the operational depth. It was understood that against the corps of an enemy thrown into a breakthrough, it could expose 1-2 front doors and 1-2 etc. from front reserves. Therefore, the MK was required to break them (destroy) and then 10 days to somehow fight in enemy territory. Issues of the action of mobile groups, which should bypass defense strongholds, capture key positions and objects, as did the MMF teams in Germany, were not considered. The task of the MK was to fight with suitable reserves. And without having practice and theoretical developments - the parts would again be thrown in the forehead without communication and interaction between the parts. It seems to the author that this was due to a failure to understand the structure and tactics of the use of the Soviet MMC by the higher personnel of the spacecraft. Therefore, it turned out MK bulky and difficult to control ...
After the meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft in January 1941, two operational and strategic games were held on the maps.
From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “The military-strategic game basically was aimed at checking the reality and feasibility of the basic provisions of the cover plan and the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war. We must pay tribute to the General Staff: all materials prepared for the game reflected the latest actions of the German fascist troops in Europe. In the western strategic direction, the game covered the front from East Prussia to Polesie. The composition of the fronts: the western ("blue") side - over the 60 divisions, the eastern ("red") - over the 50 divisions. Actions ground forces were supported by powerful air forces. The game was full of dramatic moments for the east side. They turned out to be in many ways similar to those that arose after 22 June 1941 of the year when fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union ... "
The first game in the top management of the spacecraft passed 2-6 January 1941 year.
According to the scenario, the “Western” (Germans) in alliance with the “North-Western” (Finns), the “Southern” (Romanians) and the “South-Western” (Hungarians) 15.07.41 attacked the “Eastern” (KA), delivering the main blow to the south from Brest in the direction of Vladimir Volyn, Ternopil. To the north of Brest, the “Westerners” launched an offensive with two fronts, Eastern and North-Eastern, with the aim of destroying the border groups of the Eastern ones and by the end of 15 August reach the line Baranavichy, Dvinsk, Riga. Again, we see that in one month the enemy can invade only the depth of 150-250 km.
Such is the background to the events that were to unfold during the game. The game began with the conditional date 1 Augustwhen the troops of the "eastern" reached the state border line and were about to invade East Prussia and Poland. As a “Western” task, it was set: to hold the enemy offensive until the reserves approach.
The commander of the “Eastern” North-Western Front, General D.Pavlov, decided to destroy the enemy's bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Neman River, force the river and break into the depths of East Prussia. Then the troops of the front had to break through the second defensive zone, break up the enemy’s suitable reserves and reach the Vistula. Two armies of the "eastern" advanced 15-30 kilometers deep into East Prussia. There were maneuverable battles. However, attempts to overcome the first defensive zone of the “Western” were unsuccessful. A horse-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough. She advanced into the depths of the enemy's defense, where she met a strong PT defense and entered into battle with the mobile group of the enemy from the TD, Tbr, and light TD. At this time, the front of the "Western", which was headed by the commander of KOVO G.Zhukov, struck the junction of the two armies of the "Eastern". The strike force of the "Western" managed to break into the depths of the location of the "Eastern". At the same time, the other army of the "Western" also defeated the "Eastern" and advanced significantly to the east ...
Second game where the actions of the parties in the south-west direction were practiced, 8 — 11 January 1941 of the year passed. The introductory game was as follows. Once again, the “game” was launched by the “Westerners” together with their allies. They were the first to go on the offensive and were again thrown back. From this moment the game began.
By this time, the troops of the “Western” had already been thrown a distance of 90 — 180 kilometers west of the border line. At this stage, the Western front of the "eastern" was to go on the offensive to defeat the Warsaw group of "Western". In turn, the South-Western Front had, hiding from the west of the Vistula, to destroy the main forces of the "south-western" and "southern" on their territory and take positions along the lines of Krakow, Budapest, Timisoara, Craiova.
Zhukov was again the enemy of the “Eastern” ... In the course of the unfolding hostilities, maneuvering actions again began with private successes of the “Eastern” and “Western” in certain sectors of the front. In the course of the game, the superiority of the “oriental” ones was increasingly manifested. They successfully eliminated the serious threats of the enemy on their southern flank and resolutely advanced westward in the center of the front and on the north wing. They broke into Transcarpathia, the Hungarian valley and the southern regions of Poland.
We see that now the "Northern" and "Southern" versions of the war with Germany are being played on the games of the higher squadron of the spacecraft.
From G. Zhukov's memoirs: "... Analysis [game] I.Stalin proposed to spend in the Kremlin, where they invited the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff, the commanders of the district troops and their chiefs of staff ... The course of the game was reported by the Chief of the General Staff ... K. Meretskov. After 2-3 sharp replicas of Stalin, he began to repeat and stray ...
Then Colonel-General D.Pavlov spoke. He began with an assessment of the last meeting, but Stalin stopped him: "What are the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the red side troops?" Pavlov tried to get rid of the joke, saying that it happens in war games. Stalin clearly did not like this joke, and he remarked:
"The commander of the district must master the art of war, be able to find the right solutions in any conditions, which you did not succeed in the game."
Next was G.Zhukov. Noting the great value of such games for the growth of the operational-strategic level of the high command, he suggested that they should be held more often, despite the complexity of the organization. In order to increase the military training of commanders and staffs of district headquarters and armies, it was necessary to begin the practice of large command-field field exercises with communication facilities under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff. According to the results of the games and their analysis, G.K. Zhukov was noticed and promoted to the post of chief of the General Staff. With 14.01.41, he holds the position of Chief of General Staff.
Similar games were played in the spring of 1941. On the website "Military Review" there is an article on this topic: https://topwar.ru/21830-igry-41-go-goda.html
Almost always, German troops move slowly and thoroughly, managing to advance to a rather small depth. When changing the leadership of the General Staff in the scenario of games, nothing has changed ...
In mid-December, the spacecraft management receives information about the formation of new divisions in the German Armed Forces.
Special message No. 252742ss from 14.12.40: “... New 22-24 PD are being formed ... From the second half of November, the Germans began to form new 3-5 etc., 3-5 aviation divisions and a significant number of anti-aircraft artillery, using trophies for the formation of new connections, mainly ...” Thus, it is estimated that the RP GSH in the spring German Armed Forces 251-279 divisions.
On 15.01.41 The KA had a total of 228 divisions against potential aggressor countries: Germany, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Japan. 12.02.41 is served Note by NKO and GSH KA in SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), outlining the new mobilization plan. The previous plan was agreed upon by 29.11.37. Under the new plan, during mobilization in the composition of the spacecraft, including the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian territorial corps, 300 divisions will be deployed. After the approval of the plan by the People's Commissar of Defense, an order was issued to form new formations and associations from March 1 to July 1 1941.
From G. Zhukov's memoirs: “In 1940, the formation of the 8 micron begins ... In February, the 1941 GSH developed an even broader plan for the creation of armored formations ... I.Stalin, apparently, while had no definite opinion on this matter and hesitated. As time went on, it was only in March 1941 that the decision was made to form 20 MK requested by us. However, we did not calculate the objective possibilities of our tank industry. To fully equip new MKs, 16,6 thousand of new types of tanks were required, and only about 32 thousand of new types. Practically there was nowhere to take such a number of cars for one year, there was a shortage of technical, command personnel ... ”Agree - this is a military mistake: it’s not knowing how many tanks the industry will master. Maybe it was necessary to form a smaller number of full-fledged MK? Of course, there is also a wine of intelligence, which overestimated the actual number of TD and MD Armed Forces of Germany.
But the situation with the MK incomprehensible. The fact is that GSH didn't plan By the end of 1941, deploy the full-scale MK. Below is a note with the number of tanks for February 1941 and 01.01.42.
The increase in tanks is relatively modest. Maybe the military wanted to increase substantially the production of tanks in the second quarter of 1941? For the whole 1941 year, it was planned to issue 1200 tanks KV (Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) No. 848-232ss from 15.03.1941) and 2800 T-34 (Resolution SNK USSR The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) No. 1216-502ss from 05.05.1941). It is not clear why the numbers 16600 and 32000 tanks are called ...
But the error of the General Staff was not only in the formation of a large number of MKs for which there were no tanks. One MK each was included in each army located near the western border, spraying front-line attack groups from the MK. The spacecraft management did not have practical experience in using large mobile groups from 1-2-3 - if there was only one theoretical study ... The chief of the General Staff considered the average rate of advance of enemy troops to 15 km / day, breaking up the enemy's reserve divisions that appeared, then the commanders armies were even less understood in the tactics of using the new forces given to them.
The same mistake was made in the part of the Air Force - giving each army a mixed aviation division. None of the commanders of armies had the idea of covering airfields with anti-aircraft weapons. [what often complain about research]: the pilots were to cover themselves and still have to cover the entire army, winning air superiority. But how to do it and whether the 2-3 Fighter Regiment of the Army can do it - no one thought about it. Therefore, the airfields are located closer to the border - in order to help the army troops more quickly ...
After receiving information in March 1941 on the presence of paratrooper divisions in the German Armed Forces before 10 and on the formation of the 75-88 mm caliber 1112-459 mm as part of the AP AP with 23.04.41ss 5 caliber from the Formation 16 VDK (three crews, total 10 VDBr) and 5 PT brigades (3 - KOVO, 2 - ZAPOVO, 11 - PribOVO). The formation of new compounds was carried out due to the dissolution of 10 cd and the transfer of XNUMX cd to reduced gsd states.
We already know that, in accordance with the plans of Hitler, extensive misinformation was carried out to show that the main offensive of the German troops was possible in the direction of Ukraine. German disinformation has already begun to work - most of all PT teams formed in KOVO.
From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “Some authors of military memoirs claim that before the war we did not have mobilization plans for the Armed Forces and plans for operational-strategic deployment. In fact, the operational and mobilization plans of the Armed Forces in the General Staff, of course, were. Development and adjustment of their never stopped. After processing, they were immediately reported to the leadership of the country and, upon approval, were immediately brought to the military districts ...
The most dangerous strategic direction was considered the south-western direction - Ukraine, and not western - Belarus, in which Hitler's high command in June 1941 of the year concentrated and put into operation the most powerful land and air forces.
When processing the operational plan in February-April of 1941, we did not completely correct this miscalculation and did not plan more forces for the western direction. Stalin was convinced that the Nazis in the war with the Soviet Union would strive to seize Ukraine in the first place. Stalin for all of us was the greatest authority ... he made a mistake.
The latest version of the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces was approved in February 1941 of the year and received the name MP-41. He was handed over to the districts with instructions to make adjustments to the old mob plans for 1 in May 1941 of the year ... Before 10 in May, the alteration of the plans was to be completed. Fortunately, these were the last serious additions, otherwise the plans would have remained unfinished by the beginning of the invasion of the fascist hordes. ”
There are two inaccuracies in the memoirs. The first is about Stalin choosing the wrong direction of the main strike. We already know that it is not. The direction of the main attack was chosen on the basis of incoming intelligence reports, incl. and from RU GSH, which brought misinformation about the direction of the main attack. And here, the opinion of the General Staff was not complete ... The second is about the completion of the development of mobile plans before May 10. Work on new mobilization plans began only after 20 June 1941 of the year.
Consider excerpts from the Plan of the GSA spacecraft prepared by 11.03.1941 of the year.
More details can be viewed: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1011512
From the plan of the General Staff KA about strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces ... 11.03.1941
"In connection with the large-scale organizational activities carried out in the spacecraft in 1941, I report for your consideration a revised plan for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the west and in the east ...
The Soviet Union needs to be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the west against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the east against Japan as an open opponent or adversary who is in an armed neutrality, always able to go into an open clash. ..
Germany ... to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 DD, 20 TD and 15 MD, will be directed against our borders.
Finland will be able to put up against the Soviet Union to 18 front.
Romania... against the USSR will be used at least 30 PD and 3 cd...
Hungary will be able to put up against the USSR before 20 PD, 2 MBR...
Japan for war can put up against the USSR until 60 front...
In addition to the Japanese troops, you must consider the possibility of using against the USSR Manchu-Guo troops as part of 27 Mixed Brigade, 1 cd, 6 KBR.
So, in a war on two fronts, the USSR must reckon with the possibility of concentrating on its borders near 293 front, 12000 tanks, 21000 field guns of medium and heavy calibers, 15000 aircraft.
In the West
Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces in the southeast - from Sedlec to Hungary, in order to take a blow to Berdichev, Kiev to seize Ukraine.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow in the north - from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.
With Finland speaking on the side of Germany, support for its army by the German divisions 8 – 10 is not excluded ...
With the above presumable variant of Germany’s actions, the following deployment and grouping of its forces can be expected:
north of the lower reaches of the river. Western Bug to the Baltic Sea - 30-40 pd, 3 – 5 td, 2 – 4 md ...;
south of the river. Western Bug to the border with Hungary - to 110, xnumx etc., 14 md
The possibility is not excluded that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction, so that through the Lithuanian SSR they can inflict and develop the main attack in the direction of Riga or Kovno, Dvinsk. At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary concentric strikes from Lomzhi and Brest with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk ...
In this variant of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans would allocate most of their artillery, tanks and aircraft for operations in the north before the 130 divisions, leaving the infantry divisions for the 30 – 40 divisions in the south, some tanks and aircraft. The approximate deployment time of the German armies on our western borders is 10 – 15 day from the beginning of concentration. The end of the deployment of 30 Romanian traffic police on our border ... can be expected on 15 – 20 days ... The final deployment of the Finnish army should be expected on 20 – 25 days ...
4. Basics of our strategic deployment
If necessary, the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces on two fronts, our main forces must be deployed in the west ... 245 divisions: 158 sd, 27 md, 53 td, 7 cd. On the Finnish front are appointed 13 cd and 1 etc ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.Timoshenko
Head of General Staff, General of the Army G.Zhukov»
As we can see against the expected on the western border 254 divisions of Germany, Hungary and Romania the USSR getting ready to deploy everything 245 divisionsmany of which were in the initial stage of formation.
In three months.
Information about the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West 13.06.1941
"In total, the USSR has 303 divisions: sd - 198, td - 61, md - 31, cd - 13 ...
For deployment at western borders. As part of the fronts (without connections, located in the Crimea) - 186 divisions [including the Northern Front 22 divisions], of which: cd - 120, td - 40, md - 20, cd - 6 ...
Army RGC 22A ..., 16A ..., 19A ... [With RGK armies] total on the western border of the 218 divisions...
Central armies RGK 28A ..., 24A ... Total in the West with the central armies of the RGK 237 divisions, of them: sd - 155, td - 51, md - 25, cd - 6 ...
On the rest (secondary) parts of the state border. Total 66 divisions... With such a distribution of forces is necessary [if necessary] additionally plan transport by rail ... Total 33 Divisions... What will be about ... 1700 Echelons... »
Deputy Chief of General Staff KV N.Vatutin
More details can be found at the link: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1011957
An intelligence report from 15.06.41 stated: “... the total number of the German army in june year 1941 estimated in 286-296 divisions»[Sun increased by 23-33 division compared to 01.03.41 g.]. The General Staff of the Spacecraft is already considering the option according to which Germany can use for war with the USSR 220 divisions.
According to the estimates of the General Staff, taking into account all the allies of Germany on the western border and in Finland, the total number of enemy divisions being deployed against the USSR, could reach up to xnumx.
.
Trying to “catch up” with Germany and its allies in the number of divisions against the USSR, the General Staff of the Spacecraft considered all its possible reserves: from where else can it be transferred to the divivism on the western border.
From the above-mentioned number of enemy divisions by Soviet intelligence before 20 June 1941, only 55% was detected at the border (or 43% of the total number of German divisions). It was believed that the remaining divisions had not yet been "transported" by the enemy. It should be noted that a huge number of divisions were concentrated against the British on various fronts (to the same 43% divisions of the total). Therefore, we can say that one of the main reasons for the unexpected start of the war for the USSR (the leadership of the spacecraft) there was an error in evaluating the necessary grouping of German troops for a full-scale war.
On the western border with the USSR was not found none Germanic paratroop division (from 10 available in the opinion of the Republic of Uzbekistan), which were assigned major tasks when operating in the rear. The use of such divisions was mentioned in a report in 1940 year G.Zhukov. About sabotage regiment "Brandenburg" Soviet intelligence has not brought information.
From G. Zhukov's memoirs: “... Our troops did not always learn what they had to meet in the first days of the war. As for other methods and forms of warfare, they were simply neglected, especially on an operational-strategic scale. Just as little attention, as well as defense, was given to questions of reciprocal battles, apostates and battles in the conditions of the environment. Meanwhile, it was these kinds of military operations that, in the initial period of the war, turned around very widely and took on the most fiercest character ...
... In the pre-war period, military strategy was based on the statement that only offensive actions could crush the aggressor and that defense would play a purely supporting role, ensuring the offensive groups achieve their goals ...
... Of course, we studied the combat practice of Hitler's troops in Poland, France and other European countries and even discussed methods and methods of their actions. But truly all felt it only when the enemy attacked our country, throwing against the troops of the border military districts their own compact armored and air groups...
... I want to touch some errorsadmitted guidance of NGOs and General Staff. During the processing of operational plans in the spring of 1941, the features of waging a modern war in its initial period were not fully taken into account. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff considered that a war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles. With respect to the timing of concentration and deployment, Fascist Germany was put in the same conditions with us. In fact, both forces and conditions were far from equal ...
... Sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not provided for ...
... The command staff of the General Staff did not expect that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the first day by compact groups in all strategic areas ...
This was not taken into account by ... the commanders of the ... border military districts ... " And how could district commanders take this into account if the direction of enemy strikes and the deployment of troops to counter these strikes, as well as the time for engaging the defense with covering units, planned the General Staff?
What else can I add? Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov quite self-critically described his mistakes and the mistakes of other higher ranks of the SC. Could not write. It’s hard to write. We only understand the causes of the event in question, and we have no right to condemn.
Now we know about the main mistakes in the strategy of the SC, which led to the fact that the war was unexpected for the army ...
In the middle of May, the General Staff suddenly “sees the light” or “gets a good kick from someone” and immediately starts preparing to change the cover plans. How could this happen?
In mid-April, the 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft, prepared a note on their views on the strategic deployment plan, which included the attack of the German troops before the end of their deployment.
Note by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin with thoughts on the strategic deployment plan in the event of a war with Germany and its allies 16.04.1941 b / n
I report on your consideration considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the Soviet Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and its allies.
I. At present, Germany, according to the data of the Spacecraft Directorate, has deployed ... around 284 divisions ...
It is assumed that in the current political situation, Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to put up against us ... before the 180 divisions ...
Most likely the main forces of the German army as part of 76 PD, 11 etc., 8 md, 2 cd and 5 air [we are talking about parachute divisions], but only up to 100 divisions will be deployed south of Deblin for an attack in the direction of - Kovel , Exactly, Kiev.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by a blow in the north from East Prussia to Vilna and Riga, as well as short, concentric blows from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranavichy ...
Probable allies of Germany can put up against the USSR: Finland - up to 20 front, Hungary - 15 front, Romania - up to 25 front. Total Germany with the Allies can deploy against the USSR before 240 divisions.
Given that Germany is currently holding its army mobilized, with deployed rears, it has the opportunity to warn us in deployment and deliver a sudden blow. To prevent this [and defeat the German army], I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative to the German command, preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be at the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and interaction of the arms of service.
II. The first strategic goal of the actions of the SC space forces is to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Demblin and access the 30 operation day at the front of Ostroleka, the River Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The next strategic goal is to have: an offensive from the Katowice region in the north or north-west direction to defeat the large forces of the Center and the North wing of the German front and seize the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia.
Thus, the spacecraft will begin offensive operations from the front of Chizhov, Motovisko forces 152 divisions against the German 100 divisions. On the remaining sections of the state border provides active defense.
III. Based on the stated strategic deployment plan, the following grouping of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union is envisaged:
1. The ground forces of the Red Army in the composition - 198 SD, 61 td, 31 md, 13 cd (total 303 divisions and 74 artillery regiment RGC) are as follows:
a) The main forces in the composition ... 258 divisions and xnump have in the West...
b) The remaining forces ... 45 divisions and 21 ap RGCs are assigned to defend the Far Eastern, Southern and Northern borders of the USSR ...
Iv. The composition and tasks of the fronts deployed in the West:
Northern FRONT (LVO) - 3 armies ... a total of 21 divisions ... The main tasks are the defense of the city of Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railway and, together with the Baltic Naval fleet to ensure our complete domination in the waters of the Gulf of Finland ...
The North-Western Front (PribOVO) - three armies ... of the entire 23 division ... with tasks: - firmly defend the Riga and Vilna areas with stubborn defense, preventing the enemy from invading from East Prussia; the defense of the west coast and the islands of Ezel and Dago to prevent the landing of naval landings of the enemy ...
Western Front (Zapovo) - four armies ... total 45 divisions ...
Objectives: - stubborn defense on the front of Druskiniki, Ostroleka, firmly cover the Lida and Belostok directions;
- with the transition of the armies of the South-Western Front to the offensive, by hitting the front left wing in the directions of Warsaw, Sedlec, Radom, smash the Warsaw group and seize Warsaw. In cooperation with the South-Western Front, smash the Lublin-Radom grouping of the enemy, go out on the Vistula River and take moving parts to take Radom ...
The South-Western Front - eight armies ... total 122 divisions ... with immediate objectives:
a) with a concentric strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, surround and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the r. Wisla in the Lublin area;
b) at the same time smashing the enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz-Kielce areas and seizing the Krakow, Katowice and Kielce districts at the same time from the front of Sieniaw, Przemysl, Lyutowiska, having in view further to advance from this area in the northern or north-western direction the forces of the northern wing of the enemy front and the seizure of the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia;
c) to firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and to be prepared to deliver concentric attacks against Romania from the regions of Chernivtsi and Chisinau, with the immediate goal of defeating the northern wing of the Romanian army and reach the line of the r. Moldova, Iasi ...
V. Grouping RGC.
In the RGK to have 5 armies and concentrate them:
- two armies ... total 15 divisions, in the area of Vyazma, Sychevka, Yelnya, Bryansk, Sukhinichi;
- one army ... all 8 divisions, in the area of Vileyka, Novogrudok, Minsk;
- one army ... total 12 divisions, in the area of Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berdichev;
- one army ... all 12 divisions, in areas of White Church, Zvenyhorodka, Cherkasy.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army G. Zhukov
It can be assumed that the leadership of the spacecraft convinced Stalin in the further elaboration of this plan (or were confident that he would approve), because Below is the Directive in one of the military districts, indicating the offensive actions of the AC.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces Command Military Department Colonel-General D. G. Pavlov 25.04.1941 b / n
I order you to start developing a plan for the rapid deployment of armies ZOVOVO ...
... 2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its existing 225 radar, 20 td and 15 md, will be able to dispatch up to our 200 divisions, of which up to 165 rd, 20 td and 15 md.
The deployment of the main forces of the German army is most likely in the South-East, so that a strike on Berdichev, Kiev will take over Ukraine.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric blows from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.
In this case, against the troops of the North-Western and Western fronts, we should expect the Germans to deploy to 40, ... etc and ... md [in the amount of td and md typos].
It is possible that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw area in order to deliver and develop a strike at Riga or at Kovno, Dvinsk through the Lithuanian SSR. At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary, strong blows from Lomza and Brest, with the subsequent desire to develop them in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk.
With this variant of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans will deploy against our North-Western and Western fronts to the 130 divisions and most of their aircraft ...
2. With the transition of the armies of the South-Western Front to the offensive by hitting the left wing of the front in the general direction of Sedliec, Radom assisted the South-Western Front to smash the enemy's Lublin-Radom grouping. The immediate task of the front is to capture the area of Sedliec, Lukov and seize the crossings across the r. Wisla; in the future, keep in mind the actions on Radom with the aim of completely surrounding the Lublin enemy grouping, in cooperation with the South-Western Front.
3. To ensure the main strike of the front, deliver an auxiliary strike in the direction of Warsaw, with the task of seizing Warsaw and putting up a defense on the r. Narev ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union (S. Timoshenko)
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army (G. Zhukov)
Border districts are beginning to rapidly develop cover plans for the district, armies, and formations.
In early May, the situation is suddenly changing. S.Timoshenko and G.Zhukov meet with I.Stalin 10, 12 and 14 in May 1941 of the year. 14.05.41. Directives for developing cover plans go to border districts with consideration of activities on defense (special attention is paid to the PT defense), setting up the army and frontline defense defensive lines to the old border, developing a plan for the case of forced withdrawal: creating PT barriers to the full depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway hubs and points of possible concentration of the enemy. Offensive actions on the adjacent territory are completely excluded.
Whether new intelligence reports arrived (nothing much appears in published messages), whether Stalin "got his hands" to figure out the most military plans (military experts played too much), or there were other circumstances. But the strategy of spacecraft in the cover plans has changed dramatically. The political leadership (I.V. Stalin) appeared fear regarding the capabilities of the German army. It is a pity that the military leadership of the spacecraft did not like the fear of I.Stalin ...
24 May at a meeting with Stalin present leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, the commanders of the border districts, members of military councils and commanders of the District Air Force.
May 25 begins the nomination of the 16 Army, the furthest from the western border. In early June, begins the nomination of 19-I army. In June, other armies of the internal districts are being advanced. We now know that, even with these divisions, advancing armies, according to the RUG, the number of Soviet divisions was inferior to that of Germany and its allies in the Western theater of operations.
From the new Directives it is clear that the General Staff is trying to plan defensive operations in the border districts, even plans to evacuate from areas that may be occupied by the enemy are being considered. Previously, it could be shot for ...
The figure shows the threatened directions in the assessment of the General Staff for Zapov and the actual directions of strikes of the German troops.
It turns out that the grouping of spacecraft on the Belostok projection, according to specialists of the General Staff, should have parried the three blows of the German troops to Belostok. And historians were guessing: “Where should this grouping have gone?”
In the West, it has become fashionable to talk about "preparing the invasion of spacecraft troops in 1941, the countries of Eastern Europe ..."
But it was Hitler's Reich with its allies ...
An interstate explanation of the situation with ZOVOVO was offered by A.V. Shubin: “Document developers [I mean the cover plan] completely excluded the option of the main strike of the Wehrmacht on Belarus, because assumed that Germany is preparing for a protracted war with the USSR. At the first stage, Germany will seek to seize the Baltic states and Ukraine, and then strike at Moscow. ” Such a hypothesis explains a lot, if we consider that the German intelligence services were misinforming just such a position of the German military command ...
For those interested in the information that was in the "Red Package" KOVO [/ b] I provide a link:
http://www.rkka.ru/docs/plans/kovo.htm
From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “... Divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery at the beginning of 1941 had not yet been fired and was not prepared for combat missions. Therefore, the district commanders decided to send part of the artillery to the test sites. As a result, some during the attack of fascist Germany, the corps and divisions of the covering troops were left without a significant part of their artillery, which played an important role in the unsuccessful actions of our troops in the first days of the war ... District commanders ... made a big mistake will grow up, and we are not promptly corrected Commissar of the district ... "
The plans for the exercise were agreed with the General Staff.
A little about General D.Pavlov. From AE Golovanov’s memoirs: “... Pavlov greeted me, asked why he hadn’t been in Minsk for so long, asked what I needed, and said that he had given orders for a long time to be provided to all of us, because of this requested Stalin. As soon as I began to answer his questions, he interrupted me and made a proposal to subordinate the regiment directly to him. I reported that I did not resolve such issues.
- And now we call Comrade Stalin. - He picked up the phone and ordered Moscow.
A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. He didn’t have time to say that he was calling about the submission of Golovanov, who is now with him, as from his answers I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.
- No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border ... "
The number of divisions of the Army Group Center, centered on ZOVOVO, on 4.04.41, on 15 of May, on 15 of June, on 20 of June, according to Soviet intelligence, was respectively: 29, 30 (20), 30 (35), 30 * (to 51,5 ), including Td and MD 5, 5 (2), 6 (2), 6 (16,5). The actual number of enemy divisions is shown in parentheses.
* - Zapovo intelligence department “opened” the exit of the German units to the original areas on the night of 21 and 22, June 1941, but the intelligence came to command only in 15-20 22.06.1941.
As we can see, the number of divisions for more than two months was considered unchanged by the RP and General D.Pavlov told Stalin the absolute truth. The divisions of the SC in ZOVOVO were up to 45,8 (of which 18, etc. and md).
There are eyewitness recollections that Pavlov turned to the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress. GSH did not give permission. As a result of the outbreak of war, the grouping of Soviet troops was blocked in the area of the fortress. One of the main directions of the German troops on the way to Minsk was “half-closed”. The second unexpected blow in the direction of Minsk came from the territory of PribOVO, from where it was not expected. The author would assume that there was not a single military commander in the SC who could stop the German troops in June when they hit Zapov. General DGPavlov is just one of many generals who didn’t know how to fight in a new way in June 1941 ... In confirmation of this, consider the similar tragic page of KOVO (YUZF).
We are already familiar with General V.I. Tupikov (BAT in Berlin) from the 1 part of the message. In 1926 he graduated from the courses “Shot”, in 1933 the Frunze Military Academy. With 1937, the Chief of Staff of the SC, with 1939 - Chief of Staff of the HVO. With 12.1940 BAT in Germany. Best of all imagined how well German troops can fight. Late in the evening, 21.06.41 flew to Aeroflot on a plane to Moscow. One of the squadrons of the German Air Force, based in Poland, was assigned to intercept and shoot down the aircraft. Apparently someone "stepped on a corn" Vasily Ivanovich.
With 29.07.41, the chief of staff of the South-Western Front, whose troops fought hard defensive battles with superior enemy forces on Right Bank Ukraine. The commander of the South-Caucasian Front was M. Kirponos (with the 04.1940 — the commander of the SK, with 06.1940 — the commander of the LVO, and with 14.01.41 — the KOVO. Rapid career and lack of experience in managing large masses of troops).
IN AND. Tupikov failed to find a common understanding with the commander, who was poorly aware of the capabilities of the German Armed Forces. According to the memoirs of General I. Glebov, in early September, Tupikov insisted on an immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, as reported by I. Stalin (Stalin received Tupikov in the summer). During the subsequent telephone conversation between Stalin and Kirponos, he said that Dupes were alarmist and that Kiev would be separated.
14.09.41 in 3-25 V.I. Tupikov, on his own initiative, addressed the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov and the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction with a telegram in which, describing the plight of the troops of the front (who were under the threat of the environment), he completed his view with the following phrase : “The beginning of a catastrophe you understand is a matter of a couple of days.” Before the German compound, there remained about 50 km ...
In response, a telegram came: “To the commander of the South-Western Front, a copy of Glavku UZN. Major General Tupikov presented a panic report in the General Staff. The situation, on the contrary, requires preservation, exceptional composure and endurance. commanders of all degrees ... b. Shaposhnikov "
15.09.41 closed encirclement around 5, 21, 26, 37 armies and part of the 38 forces. 20.09.41 killed M. Kirponos and V.Tupikov during a battle surrounded. After the war, the remains of Major-General V.I. Tupikov were found and buried in Kiev near the Monument of Eternal Glory.
As we can see, the actions of Kirpanos and Shaposhnikov led to a catastrophe similar to ZOVOVO (if not larger). Why are they better than D.Pavlov? The author does not urge to respect DG Pavlov, but only asks not to insult ...
To be continued
ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander ZOVOVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No. 503859 / SS / s
In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops, by 20 in May 1941, you personally, with the chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the district headquarters, develop:
a) a detailed plan for the defense of the state border from Kanchiaiestis to Lake Svitez (claim);
b) a detailed air defense plan.
I. Defense tasks:
1. Prevent the invasion of both land and air enemy into the district.
2. The stubborn defense of fortifications along the state border should firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops.
3. Air defense and aviation operations ensure the normal operation of railways and the concentration of troops.
4. By all types of intelligence of the district, it is timely to determine the nature of the concentration and grouping of the enemy troops.
5. Active actions of aviation to gain air supremacy and powerful blows to the main railway junctions, bridges, crossings and groups of troops to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops.
6. Prevent the airborne troops and enemy sabotage groups from dropping and disembarking on the territory of the district.
Ii. To organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following guidelines:
1. The basis of the defense is to put a stubborn defense of the SD and field fortifications created along the state border with the use of all the forces and possibilities for their further development. Defense give the character of active action. Any attempts by the enemy to break through the defense immediately eliminate counterattacks corps and army reserves.
2. Pay special attention to PT defense. In the event of a breakthrough of the front of defense by large enemy MMCs, the fight against them and the elimination of the breakthrough should be carried out by direct order of the District Command, for which it is massively used most of the PT artillery brigades, combat crews and aviation. The task of the PT brigades is to meet tanks on the prepared lines with powerful artillery fire and, together with the aircraft, to delay their advancement until the approach and counterattack of our MK. The task of the MK is to deploy under cover of the PT, with powerful flank and concentric strikes, together with aviation, to inflict a final defeat on the enemy's MFM and eliminate the breakthrough.
3. Particularly responsible areas to consider:
a) Suwalki, Lida;
b) Suwalki, Bialystok;
c) from the front of Ostroleka, Malkin to Bialystok;
d) Siedlce, Volkovysk;
e) Brest-Litovsk, Baranovichi.
4. Under favorable conditions, all defending forces and reserves of armies and districts should be ready, on the instructions of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes.
III. More to the right is the Baltic Military District. Headquarters with 3 mobilization day in Ponevezh. His left-flank 11 army organizes defense at the front of Yurburg, a lawsuit. Kanchiamyestis. Starm - Kaunas.
The border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskiniki, Margerabovo, Lettsen, all items with the exception of Margerabov for ZOVOVO, incl.
To the left is the Kiev Special Military District. Headquarters with 3 mobilization day Tarnopol. His right-flank 5 army organizes defense at the front incl. oz Svitez, Krystynopol. Starm - Kovel.
The border with KOVO is Pinsk, Wlodawa, Demblin, all except for Demblin for CEPOV inclusive.
Iv. To perform the tasks have four areas of cover.
Cover Area No. 1 - 3 army. Composition: Army 3 control; 4 ck control; 56, 27, 85 and 24 sd; 11 control mic; 29 and 33 TD; 204 md; 6 PT art.br; garrison of the Grodno SD; 11 mixed aviation division; border units.
The first mob echelon 24 sd to withdraw to the Grodno region no later than 5 mobilization day.
The district commander is the commander of the 3 army. Starm - Grodno. Border on the left - Art. Novoselnya, claim. Sokolka, claim. Shchuchin, claim. Frederick
The task is a solid defense of the Grodno SD and field fortifications on the front of Kanchiamiestis, Shchuchin’s lawsuit. cover the Lida, Grodno and Belostok directions.
Cover Area No. 2 - 10 army. Composition: 10 army control; 1 and 5 control; 8, 13, 86 and 2 sd; 6 QC control; 6 and 36 cd; 6 control mic; 4 and 7 TD; 29 md; the garrisons of Osovetsky and Zambrovsky SD; 9 mixed aviation division; border units.
The district commander is the commander of the 10 army. Starm - Bialystok. The border on the left is a lawsuit. Fold., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the river. Bug 6 kk to have in the area of Tykocin, Falcons, Menlyanin.
The task of the area is to defend Osovetsky and Zambrovsky SD and field fortifications within the borders, to cover the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.
Cover Area No. 3 - 13 army. Composition: control 2 ck; 113 and 49 sd; 13 control mic; 25 and 31 TD; 208 md; 43 mixed aviation division; border units.
The district commander is the commander of 13 army, and before his arrival in Belsk - the commander of 2 sk. Storm 13 with the mobilization day 3 - Belsk. The border on the left is a lawsuit. Kossovo, Gajnówka, Drogichin, Gura-Kalvaria.
The task of the region is to firmly cover the direction of Belsk from Kossovo and Sokoluv by defense of field fortifications.
Cover Area No. 4 - 4 army. Composition: Army 4 control; 28SK management; 6, 42, 75 and 100 sd; 14 control mic; 22 and 30 TD; 205 md; garrison of Brest UR; 10 mixed aviation division; border units.
The first mob echelon 100 sd to bring to the area Cheremha no later than 4 mobilization day. District Head -
4 Army Commander. Border on the left - border with. KOVO.
The task is to defend the concentration and deployment of the army with a solid defense of the Brest SD and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River.
V. At the immediate disposal of the district command are:
1. 21 ck, consisting of 17 and 50 cd, no later than 15 mobilization day in the area of art. Druskiniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Debrovo.
2. 47 ck, as part of 55, 121 and 155 sd, no later than 15 of the day of mobilization in the area of Pruzhany, Dam, Kartuzbhereza, Bluden.
3. 44 ck, as part of 108, 64, 161, 37 and 143 cd - all at points of permanent dislocation, with their further transfer to the army according to the deployment plan.
4. PT Brigade - 7-I in the area of Art. Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8-I - in the area of Lida.
5. MK:
17 mk, consisting of 27 and 36 td and 209 md in the area of Volkovysk;
20 MK - in the composition of 26 and 38 td and 210 md in the region of Oshmyany.
6. 4 Vdk in the area Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
7. Aviation - 59 and 60 Fighter Divisions; 12 and 13 bomber divisions.
The 3 Aviation Corps is part of the 42 and 52 Long Range Bomber Divisions and the 61 Fighter Division. The corps is used according to the tasks of the Main Command.
Vi. Aviation tasks:
1. By successive strikes of combat aviation on the established bases and airfields, as well as by combat operations in the air, destroy enemy aircraft and from the first days of the war gain air supremacy.
2. Fighter aircraft, in close cooperation with the entire air defense system of the district, firmly cover the mobilization and concentration of district troops, the normal operation of railways and prevent enemy aircraft from overflying the territory into the country.
3. In cooperation with ground forces, destroy the attacking enemy and prevent its major MMCs from breaking through the frontline of the district.
4. Powerful, systematic strikes on major railway bridges and junctions Königsberg, Marienburg, Allenstein, Thorn, Kalisz, Lodz and Warsaw, as well as on enemy force groupings, disrupt and delay the concentration of enemy troops.
VII. By order of the Command SOVO:
1. Prepare the rear lines:
21 ck - on the front of Merech, Rotnitsa, Lakes, Lunno.
47 sk - on the front Murava, Pruzhany, Dneprovsko-Bugsky channel to Gorodets.
2. Provide for the application of counterattacks MK and aviation in cooperation with the SC and PT teams.
3. Dope and prepare the rear lines for the entire depth of the defense to the river. Berezina incl.
For the case of forced withdrawal, develop a plan for creating PT barriers for the entire depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway junctions and points of possible concentration of the enemy (troops, headquarters, hospitals, etc.).
4. Develop a plan for bringing the UR into full combat readiness on the former state border within the county.
5. To develop: a) a plan for raising the troops in alarm and separating detachments of support for the border troops; b) plan for the protection and defense of the most important industrial enterprises, structures and objects.
6. In case of involuntary waste, develop, according to special instructions, a plan for the evacuation of factories, plants, banks and other business enterprises, government agencies, warehouses, military and state property, military service, means of transport, etc.
7. In terms of air defense to provide air defense troops and air defense of the territory in the Western zone of air defense, especially elaborate:
a) the organization of the service of air-launch facilities and the immediate notification of aviation aerodromes — primarily fighter ones, both from company and line posts of air-defense installations, the notification of air defense points and facilities, brigade control departments and the air defense zone;
b) the use and actions of fighter aviation, to establish areas of destruction of enemy aviation for individual aviation units;
c) careful protection by anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft of permanent air defense points and facilities, unloading areas and areas of troop concentration;
d) issues of communication and control of air defense.
Viii. Guidelines for the rear.
Before the 15 mobilization day is allowed to spend:
a) for ground troops cover: ammunition - 3 Ammunition, for combat vehicles - 5 gas stations, for transport vehicles - 8 gas stations.
b) for the Air Force: fighters - 15 departures; near bombers - 10 departures; long-range bombers - 7 departures; scouts - 10 departures;
c) for all covering troops - 15 daily cottages.
Provision of covering troops with all types of supplies, repair and restoration of equipment should be carried out at the expense of reserves and repair facilities of the district.
Evacuation of sick and wounded people and horses to produce within ZOVOVO, using primarily a stationary network of medical institutions.
Ix. General directions.
1. The first flight or crossing the state border is allowed only with the special permission of the High Command ...
2. The cover plan should consist of the following documents:
a) notes on the plan of action of the troops in cover, with the decision map attached to it and the grouping of troops up to the regiment and a separate part inclusive;
b) statements of military personnel;
c) tables of exit and concentration of parts of the cover to the state border;
d) a plan for the use of the Air Force, with an attached base map and operational use;
e) an air defense plan with maps of the deployment of high-speed air-handling facilities and active air defense systems;
e) engineering plan with calculations and map;
g) the plan of the communication device with calculations and schemes;
h) a plan for the organization of the rear and the material support of the ground forces and the Air Force, with an attachment to them of a map of the structure of the rear of the ground forces and aviation;
i) sanitary and veterinary evacuation plan;
k) instructions for raising parts of the cover for the alarm and the allocation of units to support border units;
k) a list of facilities and structures to be protected by the field and NKVD troops;
m) executive documents (directives, orders, orders).
3. The cover plan is put into effect when an encrypted telegram is received for mine, a member of the Main Military Council, the Chief of the General Staff, with the following signatures: “Proceed to implement the 1941 cover plan.».
4. The development of a cover and defense plan is allowed:
in full - the Commander of the troops, a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff of the district and the chief of the operational department of the staff of the district;
in part of the plan for the Air Force - Commander of the Air Force KOVO;
in part of the plan of the rear device - deputy. District Chief of Staff for the rear;
in the part of the plan of military communications - the chief of military communications of the district;
in terms of communications, the head of communications of the district.
Other chiefs of branches of troops and services are allowed only for the fulfillment of personal tasks in their specialty, for giving them a cover plan.
In the army headquarters - the Army Commander, a member of the Military Council of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Operations of the Army Headquarters.
5. A cover plan to be developed in duplicate, one copy through the Chief of the General Staff to submit to me for approval, the second copy sealed with the seal of the Military Council of the Okrug, to be kept in the personal safe of the Chief of the District headquarters.
6. The covering plans for each of the cover areas, developed by the armies and approved by the District Military Council, sealed with the stamp of the District Military Council, must be kept in the personal safe of the respective head of the cover area.
7. Executive documents developed for military units should be stored in packages sealed with the seal of the Military Council of the Army when ... the units.
8. The folder and bags of documents for the cover are opened by written or telegraphic order - in the armies - the Military Council of the District and in the units - the Military Council of the Army.
9. All documents on the cover plan are written by hand or typed personally by the commanders allowed to develop it.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army G. Zhukov
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Kom.
[not later than 30.05.1941] No.503920 / cc / s
In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops PribOVO, to 30 in May 1941 ...
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the head of the General Staff of the Spacecraft KOM KOVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No.503862 / cc / s
To cover mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops to 25 May 1941 ...
Directive People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Kom.vyskami OdVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No.503874 / cc / s
To cover mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops by May 25, 1941
In the next part we will look at the unknown directive of the General Staff of the SC from 18 of June, the sad phenomenon of PribOVO and the peculiarities of the transmission of Directive No. 1
Information