The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 3)

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The following abbreviations are used in the text: AP - artillery regiment, BAT - military attaché, Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces) - airborne corps (brigade), Armed Forces - Armed Forces, GSD - Mountain Rifle Division, General Staff, KA - Red Army, ZAD - anti-aircraft artillery battalion, cd (kbr or kp) - cavalry division (brigade or regiment), mk - mechanized (motorized) corps, motorized armored brigade - mbbr, mp - motorized regiment, MMC - motorized units, RGK - reserve of the Main Command, pp) - infantry division (regiment), td (tbr, tp or tb) tank division (brigade, regiment or battalion), anti-tank unit, anti-tank division, fortified area.



Tank and motorized troops and experience in their use. It is well known that motorized and tank formations of Germany played an important role in the events of the 1941 summer war, which gained combat experience in the war with Poland, France and England.

And how did the analogous troops develop and the experience of their use in the USSR?
In 1931 was created first in the world MK. The MK consisted of more than 500 tanks and 200 vehicles. In 1934, the spacecraft already had four MKs.

During the war in Spain, the Soviet Union put the Republicans 297 T-26 and 50 BT-5. In the battles, tanks were used by single vehicles, platoon or porotno, often without infantry cover. In some cases, tanks were used in groups of up to several companies (45-48 machines). For example, during the assault on Fuentes de Ebro, 48 BT-5 participated in the attack, breaking through three fortified lines and losing 16 tanks (30% of the composition of the TP). Initially, the tanks had infantry cover, but for various reasons they were left without him in the final phase of the battle ... The combat experience of using tanks was collected "bit by bit" and, it turned out, it was not always correctly evaluated the tactics of their use. At that time, no one in the world knew how to fight using tank and mechanized troops. We were the first ... Tbr in Spain was commanded by D.Pavlov (shot by 22.07.41). In 1957, D.Pavlov was posthumously rehabilitated and restored to the rank of general-army.

Based on the experience of military operations in Spain, Pavlov insisted on the creation of tanks with diesel engines, anti-bullet armor and cannons capable of penetrating anti-bullet armor of enemy tanks. According to D.Pavlov's proposals, a heavy breakthrough tank was developed, which later turned into a heavy tank “Klim Voroshilov” known to us.

In March, 1938 addressed to V.Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, from the People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov (according to a note from Pavlov) received a “Report Note” with a proposal to revise the resolution of the NKO No. 94 “On Types of Tanks ...” in which in particular, it was said: “A tank, intended for operations together with infantry (cavalry) and as part of independent tank formations, must be one. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop two types of tanks: one is purely tracked and the other is wheeled and tracked. ”There were problems with the coordination of the project and its implementation, including from the ABTU, which was headed by Pavlov. But, the difficult road to the T-34 tank (bypassing a number of projects) began with the above-mentioned note. At that time, no one in the world understood how the new tanks should look like. At the beginning of the road to create new tanks, D.Pavlov stood with everyone.

In July, 1938, the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict takes place at Lake Hassan. To defeat the Japanese grouping, the Soviet command attracted the 2 th mbr, 32 th and 40 th ot.tb (total 361 tank and SAU). According to the state of tbr had: 6 battalions (3 tank, infantry and machine gun, combat support, repair and recovery) and 3 companies: motor, communications and reconnaissance.

During the storming of the Pogomolny and Zaozernaya hills, our tankmen came upon a well-organized PT defense. X-NUMX T-85 tanks were lost (26 was burned out of them). The reconnaissance battalion was instructed to “at high speeds to slip through the zone of shelling, to break into the front line of the Japanese defense and strike the north-western slopes of the hills ... to destroy their firing points and rear areas”. BT-9 at high speed without loss slipped through the zone of artillery fire and got into the swamp, in which 5 machines were stuck. They could not get out without help. Crews had to occupy all-round defense in order to prevent the Japanese from destroying tanks.
We see that tanks are used without reconnaissance of the terrain and reconnaissance of the enemy’s defense, almost without the support of infantry. Losses tanks made up 24% of their total. The attack was made in the "forehead", a detour maneuver failed, it did not stop the attack.

12.06.39 G.Zhukov replaced Feklenko as commander of the Special Corps of the 57 (later renamed the 1 Army Group). The enclosures included: 7-I, 8-I, 9-i MBR, 11-I TBR, 36-I MD, 6-I KBR. Later the 1-i tbr was entered into the 6-th army group. Has anything changed in the tactics of using tanks after the battles at Lake Hassan?

First, a fairly massive use of tanks in the conflict at Hanhin-Gol occurred on July 3-5 1939 at Mount Bain-Tsagan. Nothing has changed ... 11 tbr and 7 mbbr again thrown into the battle without intelligence, separately from each other, without the support of infantry and artillery. They attacked from different directions with companies or battalions without infantry cover.

The main PT of the Japanese army was the 37-mm PT gun, which pierced 500-mm armor at a distance of up to 40-mm. The units contained small quantities of 20-mm automatic PT guns (anti-tank guns). In addition, during the battles, 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and 13,2-mm machine guns proved to be quite effective PT weapons. The infantry used PT mines, bundles of hand grenades and gasoline bottles as hand-held PTs. As divisional artillery, 75-mm guns and howitzers, which lacked armor-piercing shells, were used. Therefore, they could not successfully hit the Soviet tanks.

The first 11 tbr attacks began on 8-15 and on 8-30. Around 12 watches, Japanese units from the south attacked the armored division 8-th cd of the MNR, which destroyed several firing points, losing the 3 armored vehicles which had been destroyed and burned down. In 13-00, the 24 th MP took part in the fighting (from 36 md, the regiment was commanded by N. Feklenko, well-known in 2 part), followed by the regiment 6 cd MHP, which operated along Khalkhin-Gol, deployed . In 14-00 again attacked 11 tbr. All attacks were inconsistent, the parts acted without communication between them. In the 19 hours organized the general attack, which involves 24-th MP with support 5 BT-5 and 6 HT-26 11-th Tank Brigade, part of 7-th IBRD, with the support thrown in the area of ​​battle on the machines dismounted squadrons 8-th cd MPR and armored division of the same division. The Japanese repulsed the attack.

A brief description of the attack of one battalion: "The battalion, having an 44 tank BT-5, turned into battle formation along the front and went on the attack. No preliminary reconnaissance was done, no information about the enemy was received from the higher authorities. Going at high speeds (45 – 50 km / h), the battalion ran into the front edge of the Japanese and entered the battle, destroying the enemy with fire and tracks. Not supported by their infantry and artillery, the 16.00 battalion went into the assembly area, leaving the destroyed tanks on the 20 battlefield, which were then burned by the Japanese P and assistance bottles with gasoline. " The tanks passed the Japanese positions several times, but could not crush the enemy without the support of the infantry.

11 Tbr Battle Log
During the 3.7.39 battle, the brigade lost 152's BT-5 45 tanks destroyed [I mean failed irrevocably], padded with 37. Total 82 tank or 53,9% out of operation ... Killed ... 135 people. Wounded ... 57 people. Missing ... 11 people. Total out of order 203 man.
Losses for 4.7.39. Killed - 1, ... injured - 7, there was no loss of combat vehicles.
Losses for 5.7.39 g. 12 injured ... no loss of combat vehicles.
From the evening of July 3 the brigade did not take part in the battles.

Fighting 7 mbbr (the battalions included: armored combat, machine-gun, reconnaissance and artillery division. Total 1888 people, 57 medium and 25 light armored vehicles, 10 76-mm guns and other equipment).
247 Automotive Combat Battalion Fighting Log: “The part had the task - joint actions with ... 11 tbr to destroy the enemy group in the area of ​​three lakes ... There was no reconnaissance before the attack, the battalion went on the attack [on 15-00] directly from the march in 150 km. As a result of the attack, 20 armored vehicles were destroyed (burned down), 13 was killed, 57 people were killed, 26 was wounded, 2 was missing. In total, 50 BA-6 and BA-10 participated in the attack.
The 66% battalion armored vehicles (40% brigade armored vehicles) burned down or were disabled - the combat mission was not completed. Both brigades lost their combat capability, did not dislodge the enemy from Mount Bain-Tsagan, and retreated to their initial positions. The loss of the MNR's armored division was 8 armored vehicles.

In the evening of July 3 at the headquarters of 23 of the Japanese traffic police, they came to the conclusion that "the operation does not develop as expected." Therefore, on July 20-20, 3 was ordered to withdraw units from the west coast of Khalkhin Gol. The departure was to start on the morning of July 4. Cover the crossing remained PP, reinforced with artillery. The Japanese retreat to the crossing began around 12-15. The motor-armor-tank units of the spacecraft, which suffered great losses, could not pursue the retreating enemy. Fighting led only 24-th MP, which throughout the day attacked the defenses of the Japanese regiment.

According to official Japanese data, the losses amounted to 800 people killed and wounded (from 8000 located on the west bank of Hanhin Gol). The Japanese reported that they were able to evacuate all heavy equipment and to endure all those killed and wounded. The greatest losses of one of the regiments occurred during the withdrawal through the bridge (the bridge was not destroyed) under the fire of Soviet artillery.

According to the author - the above is an example of the inept practical application of motorcycle-tank units. Pay attention, close enough to the described event, used MK tanks in counterstrokes in the summer of 1941 of the year.

With further hostilities at Khankhin Gol, the Soviet military learned something. It should be noted that tanks did not rarely return to their initial positions from the battlefield with 2-5 holes. There have been cases of returning from the battle of burning tanks. The tables show material on tbr losses in August 1939. A large number of wrecked tanks were restored during the battles.

The material is described in more detail in the article “Tanks on Hanhin-gol” by M. Kolomiets.

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 3)



Upon investigation of large losses in 11 tbr and 7 mbbr, a commission arrived under the leadership of Deputy Defense Commissar G.Kulik. G.Zhukov had a conflict with the chairman of the commission ... G.Kulik was recalled ...

From the report of D.Pavlov: “During the liberation of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine in 1939, we participated in sixteen TBRs and two mbrs, which acted independently in isolation from the rifle troops, having in some cases to an infantry battalion planted on tanks. Average daily crossings were from 50 to 100 km. The advance forward paralyzed any organized resistance from the Poles and enabled our army to complete the task in the shortest possible time. ”Again, tanks are used with a small amount of infantry per peak. There was a problem of controllability TC. This was probably due to insufficient experience of commanders at all levels of the Labor Code.

In November, 1939, following the results of the use of the TK in Poland, D.Pavlov spoke in favor of disbanding the corps as inefficient. He was supported by some other military leaders. The corps were disbanded and created 15 md (each md: 4 regiment (tank, artillery, motorized rifle 2), three battalions (reconnaissance, communications, light engineering), PT division and ass. In total, there were 258 tanks, 49 armored vehicles, XNUMND, in the MD. In total, there were 90 tanks, 50 armored vehicles, XNUMNAM) in the MD. and mortars (without 8-mm), 37 980-mm anti-aircraft guns and 2 vehicles. In the MD, the number of tanks decreased a little more than 560 times compared to TK (TK had 12710 tanks and XNUMX manpower), but received two times more motorized riflemen and fewer support units.

War in finland. The whole territory from the Soviet-Finnish border to Vyborg is covered with large forests, which allowed tanks to move only along roads and separate glades. A large number of rivers and lakes with swampy or steep banks, an abundance of deep ravines, non-freezing peat bogs and boulders - all this was a natural impassable PT obstacles. A small number of roads made the maneuver of tank units even more difficult, and the movement along passable forest areas required the high skill of the driver when driving between trees and boulders. In addition, it was necessary to fight in the harsh winter conditions with deep snow cover ...
All of the above and the presence of heavily fortified defense zones did not allow the tank and motorized troops to be widely used for breaking through into enemy rear areas and for subsequent operations in the operational area. Thus, the practical combat experience of the use of large MMT in the enemy rear could not be obtained. Losses: destroyed to 650 tanks, destroyed around 1800, about 1500 failed. Again, the combined-arms commanders did not know how to correctly use tanks ...

07.06.40 G.Pavlov was appointed to command BOVO. It is difficult to say whether he was pleased with such a change of posts. He had no experience in controlling a huge mass of combined-arms troops, and he loved tanks ...

In early June, 1940 of the year, based on information on the use of German MKs in France, a plan was formed for the formation of Soviet corps, which was transmitted to the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B). By December 1940, the 8 micron was formed.

In July, 1940, the specialists of the General Staff of the spacecraft developed two variants of the German attack on the USSR.
According to the scenario "Northern" option at the turn north of the mouth of the San River was deployed 130 German divisions, and 50 divisions were deployed against KOVO (total 180 of the German divisions for the war with the USSR).

The strikes were delivered from East Prussia in the direction of Riga, Kaunas, Vilnius and further to Minsk. At the same time in Belarus strikes are delivered on Baranovichi and Minsk, as well as on Dubno and Brody. From Riga and Kaunas you can strike in the direction of Leningrad, and from Minsk - to Moscow. Military experts simply did not dare to consider such variants of events.

We see that during the evaluation a more difficult situation was considered than the attack on the USSR, given in 1941 in intelligence reports (on the attack of army groups on Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev.) For the evaluation, several blows were considered in each of the indicated directions. According to intelligence reports of RU GSh KA before 20, June 1941, against PribOVO and ZAPOV, there were 59 divisions (excluding divisions in the depth of the territory) against 130 divisions are considered during the evaluation.

How did the Soviet side manage not to lose - this is not a question of this topic - "Unexpected attack on the USSR." Perhaps there was a strategic error here, due to which the Commissar of Defense and the General Staff did not fear Germany’s attack on the night from 21 to June 22 of 1941. According to the staff officers, the Germans did not have enough troops on the border for a full-scale war with the SC. The existing German divisions would be enough only for individual provocative actions ...

"Southern" option envisaged unfolding against the same KOVO 130 German divisions, and against ZOVOVO and PribOVO - 50.

According to specialists, the “Northern” option was the main and most politically beneficial for Germany. As of 18.09 40, the “Northern” option remained the main one. According to the estimates of the RU GSH on the 11.09.40, the total number of divisions of the German army was 208-228 (of which up to 8 md and 15-17 etc.) (No.103 / 252361ss).

In December, 1940, in Moscow, a meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft took place, at which G. Zhukov delivered a presentation: “The nature of the modern offensive operation”: “What is particularly instructive of actions in the West?
1. This is a bold and resolute application [Germanic] TD and MK in close cooperation with the Air Force throughout the depth of the enemy’s operational defense.
2. Decisive strikes by the MK in the oncoming battle and their desire to bravely and independently break through to the rear of the operational grouping of the enemy.
3. The massive use of parachute units and air divisions to capture the most important objects in the near and deep rear of the enemy, with frequent use of these troops in the form of the enemy.
4. When breaking through UR, the Germans paid special attention to the close interaction of infantry, artillery, tanks, sappers and aviation.
5. High rates of offensive operations. Poland ... the average daily advance of the Germans ... 30km. Holland, Belgium and Northern France - 20 km per day. Defeat of France - 16 km per day. At the same time, the effect of the ММЧ reached 100 — 120 km [Guderian's group reached the depth of 100 km - this stage lasted for 3-4 of the day - from the report of D.Pavlov].
6. The offensive operation was usually preceded advance development of a powerful network of spy agents and sabotage groups. This agents, as a rule, sat down closer to airfields, URs, the most important warehouses, railway bridges and other important objects.
7. This is the ability of the Germans to organize the continuity of operations. The continuity of operations in all cases was ensured by: preliminary thorough preparation of the operation and the presence of a plan for the subsequent operation, powerful automobile transport and a well-developed network of railways providing extensive regroupings, troops and rear equipment, and the presence of layered reserves.

Modern conditions are characterized by the presence of powerful technical means of struggle, allowing the upcoming:
1. In close cooperation of aviation, tank units, artillery and rifle troops, destroy not only the field defense, but also break through the modern fortified strip.
2. Having broken through the tactical defense, having entered a powerful mobile group, defeat operational reserves decisively and develop operational success into strategic success.
3. With a powerful and sudden blow, crush the enemy's air force to the full depth of the operational-strategic strike and win air supremacy ... ”

G. Zhukov noted the main points that the spacecraft will face with the start of the 1941 summer war. Having no practical experience in front-line operations with the use of large MMPs, he, as we see, is well acquainted with the topic. Understands the place of parachute assault forces and enemy agents. It is strange that after the war he wrote in his memoirs: “A major gap in Soviet military science was that we did not draw practical conclusions from the experience of the battles of the initial period of the Second World War in the West ... First of all, about the operational-strategic surprise with which Hitler's troops invaded the countries of Europe. Striking powerful blows with armored troops, they quickly cut through the defenses to reach the enemy’s rear. The actions of the armored forces the Germans supported the Air Force ... "

We will continue consideration of the report of G.K. Zhukov at the meeting: “... In the conditions of the Western theater of military operations, a major offensive operation with a strategic goal should be carried out on a wide front of the 400-450 km scale ... cases are much deeper. For such an operation, an SD of order 200-300, 85-100 MK is required ... Based on medium pace development operation 10-15 kmtotal duration of operation to the depth of 200 km be 12-20 daysin particularly favorable conditions it can be completed before ... "

The stated concept could be used by specialists of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, both for evaluating their troops and evaluating the actions of the Wehrmacht. Please note that operational depth is present in the development of an offensive operation. 200 km and pace of advancement 10-15 km / day. The speed of advancement of the SMP is practically "nullified". The direction of impact focuses more than 100 divisions. It should be noted that when the military specialists of the “Northern” variant were being worked out, the German troops went deeper into our territory on the same 200-240km. Probably, there was a concept about this that was substantiated by one of the theoretical specialists.

“... To cover the anti-aircraft artillery of the strike and mobile groups with fire, you need to cover the area along the front in 30 km and in depth of 30 km - 900 sq. Km. One JOB can cover 160 sq.km with fire, and to cover 900 sq.km you need 6 JOB ... "
Since at that time the spacecraft did not encounter a massive use of aircraft against its parts, we see an underestimation of the ground defense of the air forces in the massive use of enemy aircraft.

“... Concentrated divisions are marched at night to the line of deployment and are located in sheltered places in 10-15 km from the front line. In the initial position to attack the main forces are displayed on the night before the attack. Avant-garde units can be thrown for a day. Tank reinforcement units attached to rifle formations occupy their waiting areas in sheltered places out of artillery fire. Artillery takes firing positions no later than one day before the start of the attack. The occupation of firing positions by artillery is made at night. Deploying artillery may require several nights. On the site of the main attack breadth 25-30 km deployed to 3 SC, 3-5 MAF, 7-9 AP RGC ... Total area 30h30 km will be focused around 200000 people, 1500-2000 guns, tanks mass, an enormous amount of vehicles and other means . "

The report refers to the shock grouping up to 8-10 divisions in the area 30 x30 km. For a front-line operation, this is probably correct. On the night of June 22, 1941 of the specified area was no more than 4-5 of the German divisions. The Germans struck with smaller forces than the forces in question in the report. G. Zhukov understands how parts can be put forward before a front-line operation. Means he had to understandhow enemy troops can advance to our border before attacking the USSR ...

In the reports another question was voiced regarding the use of the MK after entering the breakthrough to the operational depth. It was understood that against the corps of an enemy thrown into a breakthrough, it could expose 1-2 front doors and 1-2 etc. from front reserves. Therefore, the MK was required to break them (destroy) and then 10 days to somehow fight in enemy territory. Issues of the action of mobile groups, which should bypass defense strongholds, capture key positions and objects, as did the MMF teams in Germany, were not considered. The task of the MK was to fight with suitable reserves. And without having practice and theoretical developments - the parts would again be thrown in the forehead without communication and interaction between the parts. It seems to the author that this was due to a failure to understand the structure and tactics of the use of the Soviet MMC by the higher personnel of the spacecraft. Therefore, it turned out MK bulky and difficult to control ...

After the meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft in January 1941, two operational and strategic games were held on the maps.

From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “The military-strategic game basically was aimed at checking the reality and feasibility of the basic provisions of the cover plan and the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war. We must pay tribute to the General Staff: all materials prepared for the game reflected the latest actions of the German fascist troops in Europe. In the western strategic direction, the game covered the front from East Prussia to Polesie. The composition of the fronts: the western ("blue") side - over the 60 divisions, the eastern ("red") - over the 50 divisions. Actions ground forces were supported by powerful air forces. The game was full of dramatic moments for the east side. They turned out to be in many ways similar to those that arose after 22 June 1941 of the year when fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union ... "

The first game in the top management of the spacecraft passed 2-6 January 1941 year.

According to the scenario, the “Western” (Germans) in alliance with the “North-Western” (Finns), the “Southern” (Romanians) and the “South-Western” (Hungarians) 15.07.41 attacked the “Eastern” (KA), delivering the main blow to the south from Brest in the direction of Vladimir Volyn, Ternopil. To the north of Brest, the “Westerners” launched an offensive with two fronts, Eastern and North-Eastern, with the aim of destroying the border groups of the Eastern ones and by the end of 15 August reach the line Baranavichy, Dvinsk, Riga. Again, we see that in one month the enemy can invade only the depth of 150-250 km.

Such is the background to the events that were to unfold during the game. The game began with the conditional date 1 Augustwhen the troops of the "eastern" reached the state border line and were about to invade East Prussia and Poland. As a “Western” task, it was set: to hold the enemy offensive until the reserves approach.

The commander of the “Eastern” North-Western Front, General D.Pavlov, decided to destroy the enemy's bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Neman River, force the river and break into the depths of East Prussia. Then the troops of the front had to break through the second defensive zone, break up the enemy’s suitable reserves and reach the Vistula. Two armies of the "eastern" advanced 15-30 kilometers deep into East Prussia. There were maneuverable battles. However, attempts to overcome the first defensive zone of the “Western” were unsuccessful. A horse-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough. She advanced into the depths of the enemy's defense, where she met a strong PT defense and entered into battle with the mobile group of the enemy from the TD, Tbr, and light TD. At this time, the front of the "Western", which was headed by the commander of KOVO G.Zhukov, struck the junction of the two armies of the "Eastern". The strike force of the "Western" managed to break into the depths of the location of the "Eastern". At the same time, the other army of the "Western" also defeated the "Eastern" and advanced significantly to the east ...

Second game where the actions of the parties in the south-west direction were practiced, 8 — 11 January 1941 of the year passed. The introductory game was as follows. Once again, the “game” was launched by the “Westerners” together with their allies. They were the first to go on the offensive and were again thrown back. From this moment the game began.
By this time, the troops of the “Western” had already been thrown a distance of 90 — 180 kilometers west of the border line. At this stage, the Western front of the "eastern" was to go on the offensive to defeat the Warsaw group of "Western". In turn, the South-Western Front had, hiding from the west of the Vistula, to destroy the main forces of the "south-western" and "southern" on their territory and take positions along the lines of Krakow, Budapest, Timisoara, Craiova.

Zhukov was again the enemy of the “Eastern” ... In the course of the unfolding hostilities, maneuvering actions again began with private successes of the “Eastern” and “Western” in certain sectors of the front. In the course of the game, the superiority of the “oriental” ones was increasingly manifested. They successfully eliminated the serious threats of the enemy on their southern flank and resolutely advanced westward in the center of the front and on the north wing. They broke into Transcarpathia, the Hungarian valley and the southern regions of Poland.

We see that now the "Northern" and "Southern" versions of the war with Germany are being played on the games of the higher squadron of the spacecraft.

From G. Zhukov's memoirs: "... Analysis [game] I.Stalin proposed to spend in the Kremlin, where they invited the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff, the commanders of the district troops and their chiefs of staff ... The course of the game was reported by the Chief of the General Staff ... K. Meretskov. After 2-3 sharp replicas of Stalin, he began to repeat and stray ...

Then Colonel-General D.Pavlov spoke. He began with an assessment of the last meeting, but Stalin stopped him: "What are the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the red side troops?" Pavlov tried to get rid of the joke, saying that it happens in war games. Stalin clearly did not like this joke, and he remarked:
"The commander of the district must master the art of war, be able to find the right solutions in any conditions, which you did not succeed in the game."

Next was G.Zhukov. Noting the great value of such games for the growth of the operational-strategic level of the high command, he suggested that they should be held more often, despite the complexity of the organization. In order to increase the military training of commanders and staffs of district headquarters and armies, it was necessary to begin the practice of large command-field field exercises with communication facilities under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff. According to the results of the games and their analysis, G.K. Zhukov was noticed and promoted to the post of chief of the General Staff. With 14.01.41, he holds the position of Chief of General Staff.

Similar games were played in the spring of 1941. On the website "Military Review" there is an article on this topic: https://topwar.ru/21830-igry-41-go-goda.html

Almost always, German troops move slowly and thoroughly, managing to advance to a rather small depth. When changing the leadership of the General Staff in the scenario of games, nothing has changed ...

In mid-December, the spacecraft management receives information about the formation of new divisions in the German Armed Forces.
Special message No. 252742ss from 14.12.40: “... New 22-24 PD are being formed ... From the second half of November, the Germans began to form new 3-5 etc., 3-5 aviation divisions and a significant number of anti-aircraft artillery, using trophies for the formation of new connections, mainly ...” Thus, it is estimated that the RP GSH in the spring German Armed Forces 251-279 divisions.

On 15.01.41 The KA had a total of 228 divisions against potential aggressor countries: Germany, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Japan. 12.02.41 is served Note by NKO and GSH KA in SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), outlining the new mobilization plan. The previous plan was agreed upon by 29.11.37. Under the new plan, during mobilization in the composition of the spacecraft, including the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian territorial corps, 300 divisions will be deployed. After the approval of the plan by the People's Commissar of Defense, an order was issued to form new formations and associations from March 1 to July 1 1941.

From G. Zhukov's memoirs: “In 1940, the formation of the 8 micron begins ... In February, the 1941 GSH developed an even broader plan for the creation of armored formations ... I.Stalin, apparently, while had no definite opinion on this matter and hesitated. As time went on, it was only in March 1941 that the decision was made to form 20 MK requested by us. However, we did not calculate the objective possibilities of our tank industry. To fully equip new MKs, 16,6 thousand of new types of tanks were required, and only about 32 thousand of new types. Practically there was nowhere to take such a number of cars for one year, there was a shortage of technical, command personnel ... ”Agree - this is a military mistake: it’s not knowing how many tanks the industry will master. Maybe it was necessary to form a smaller number of full-fledged MK? Of course, there is also a wine of intelligence, which overestimated the actual number of TD and MD Armed Forces of Germany.

But the situation with the MK incomprehensible. The fact is that GSH didn't plan By the end of 1941, deploy the full-scale MK. Below is a note with the number of tanks for February 1941 and 01.01.42.



The increase in tanks is relatively modest. Maybe the military wanted to increase substantially the production of tanks in the second quarter of 1941? For the whole 1941 year, it was planned to issue 1200 tanks KV (Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) No. 848-232ss from 15.03.1941) and 2800 T-34 (Resolution SNK USSR The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) No. 1216-502ss from 05.05.1941). It is not clear why the numbers 16600 and 32000 tanks are called ...

But the error of the General Staff was not only in the formation of a large number of MKs for which there were no tanks. One MK each was included in each army located near the western border, spraying front-line attack groups from the MK. The spacecraft management did not have practical experience in using large mobile groups from 1-2-3 - if there was only one theoretical study ... The chief of the General Staff considered the average rate of advance of enemy troops to 15 km / day, breaking up the enemy's reserve divisions that appeared, then the commanders armies were even less understood in the tactics of using the new forces given to them.

The same mistake was made in the part of the Air Force - giving each army a mixed aviation division. None of the commanders of armies had the idea of ​​covering airfields with anti-aircraft weapons. [what often complain about research]: the pilots were to cover themselves and still have to cover the entire army, winning air superiority. But how to do it and whether the 2-3 Fighter Regiment of the Army can do it - no one thought about it. Therefore, the airfields are located closer to the border - in order to help the army troops more quickly ...

After receiving information in March 1941 on the presence of paratrooper divisions in the German Armed Forces before 10 and on the formation of the 75-88 mm caliber 1112-459 mm as part of the AP AP with 23.04.41ss 5 caliber from the Formation 16 VDK (three crews, total 10 VDBr) and 5 PT brigades (3 - KOVO, 2 - ZAPOVO, 11 - PribOVO). The formation of new compounds was carried out due to the dissolution of 10 cd and the transfer of XNUMX cd to reduced gsd states.

We already know that, in accordance with the plans of Hitler, extensive misinformation was carried out to show that the main offensive of the German troops was possible in the direction of Ukraine. German disinformation has already begun to work - most of all PT teams formed in KOVO.

From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “Some authors of military memoirs claim that before the war we did not have mobilization plans for the Armed Forces and plans for operational-strategic deployment. In fact, the operational and mobilization plans of the Armed Forces in the General Staff, of course, were. Development and adjustment of their never stopped. After processing, they were immediately reported to the leadership of the country and, upon approval, were immediately brought to the military districts ...

The most dangerous strategic direction was considered the south-western direction - Ukraine, and not western - Belarus, in which Hitler's high command in June 1941 of the year concentrated and put into operation the most powerful land and air forces.

When processing the operational plan in February-April of 1941, we did not completely correct this miscalculation and did not plan more forces for the western direction. Stalin was convinced that the Nazis in the war with the Soviet Union would strive to seize Ukraine in the first place. Stalin for all of us was the greatest authority ... he made a mistake.

The latest version of the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces was approved in February 1941 of the year and received the name MP-41. He was handed over to the districts with instructions to make adjustments to the old mob plans for 1 in May 1941 of the year ... Before 10 in May, the alteration of the plans was to be completed. Fortunately, these were the last serious additions, otherwise the plans would have remained unfinished by the beginning of the invasion of the fascist hordes. ”

There are two inaccuracies in the memoirs. The first is about Stalin choosing the wrong direction of the main strike. We already know that it is not. The direction of the main attack was chosen on the basis of incoming intelligence reports, incl. and from RU GSH, which brought misinformation about the direction of the main attack. And here, the opinion of the General Staff was not complete ... The second is about the completion of the development of mobile plans before May 10. Work on new mobilization plans began only after 20 June 1941 of the year.

Consider excerpts from the Plan of the GSA spacecraft prepared by 11.03.1941 of the year.
More details can be viewed: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1011512

From the plan of the General Staff KA about strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces ... 11.03.1941
"In connection with the large-scale organizational activities carried out in the spacecraft in 1941, I report for your consideration a revised plan for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the west and in the east ...
The Soviet Union needs to be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the west against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the east against Japan as an open opponent or adversary who is in an armed neutrality, always able to go into an open clash. ..

Germany ... to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 DD, 20 TD and 15 MD, will be directed against our borders.
Finland will be able to put up against the Soviet Union to 18 front.
Romania... against the USSR will be used at least 30 PD and 3 cd...
Hungary will be able to put up against the USSR before 20 PD, 2 MBR...
Japan for war can put up against the USSR until 60 front...
In addition to the Japanese troops, you must consider the possibility of using against the USSR Manchu-Guo troops as part of 27 Mixed Brigade, 1 cd, 6 KBR.

So, in a war on two fronts, the USSR must reckon with the possibility of concentrating on its borders near 293 front, 12000 tanks, 21000 field guns of medium and heavy calibers, 15000 aircraft.

In the West
Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces in the southeast - from Sedlec to Hungary, in order to take a blow to Berdichev, Kiev to seize Ukraine.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow in the north - from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.
With Finland speaking on the side of Germany, support for its army by the German divisions 8 – 10 is not excluded ...
With the above presumable variant of Germany’s actions, the following deployment and grouping of its forces can be expected:
north of the lower reaches of the river. Western Bug to the Baltic Sea - 30-40 pd, 3 – 5 td, 2 – 4 md ...;
south of the river. Western Bug to the border with Hungary - to 110, xnumx etc., 14 md

The possibility is not excluded that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction, so that through the Lithuanian SSR they can inflict and develop the main attack in the direction of Riga or Kovno, Dvinsk. At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary concentric strikes from Lomzhi and Brest with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk ...

In this variant of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans would allocate most of their artillery, tanks and aircraft for operations in the north before the 130 divisions, leaving the infantry divisions for the 30 – 40 divisions in the south, some tanks and aircraft. The approximate deployment time of the German armies on our western borders is 10 – 15 day from the beginning of concentration. The end of the deployment of 30 Romanian traffic police on our border ... can be expected on 15 – 20 days ... The final deployment of the Finnish army should be expected on 20 – 25 days ...

4. Basics of our strategic deployment

If necessary, the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces on two fronts, our main forces must be deployed in the west ... 245 divisions: 158 sd, 27 md, 53 td, 7 cd. On the Finnish front are appointed 13 cd and 1 etc ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.Timoshenko
Head of General Staff, General of the Army G.Zhukov
»

As we can see against the expected on the western border 254 divisions of Germany, Hungary and Romania the USSR getting ready to deploy everything 245 divisionsmany of which were in the initial stage of formation.

In three months.

Information about the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West 13.06.1941
"In total, the USSR has 303 divisions: sd - 198, td - 61, md - 31, cd - 13 ...

For deployment at western borders. As part of the fronts (without connections, located in the Crimea) - 186 divisions [including the Northern Front 22 divisions], of which: cd - 120, td - 40, md - 20, cd - 6 ...

Army RGC 22A ..., 16A ..., 19A ... [With RGK armies] total on the western border of the 218 divisions...

Central armies RGK 28A ..., 24A ... Total in the West with the central armies of the RGK 237 divisions, of them: sd - 155, td - 51, md - 25, cd - 6 ...

On the rest (secondary) parts of the state border. Total 66 divisions... With such a distribution of forces is necessary [if necessary] additionally plan transport by rail ... Total 33 Divisions... What will be about ... 1700 Echelons... »
Deputy Chief of General Staff KV N.Vatutin

More details can be found at the link: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1011957

An intelligence report from 15.06.41 stated: “... the total number of the German army in june year 1941 estimated in 286-296 divisions»[Sun increased by 23-33 division compared to 01.03.41 g.]. The General Staff of the Spacecraft is already considering the option according to which Germany can use for war with the USSR 220 divisions.
According to the estimates of the General Staff, taking into account all the allies of Germany on the western border and in Finland, the total number of enemy divisions being deployed against the USSR, could reach up to xnumx.
.
Trying to “catch up” with Germany and its allies in the number of divisions against the USSR, the General Staff of the Spacecraft considered all its possible reserves: from where else can it be transferred to the divivism on the western border.

From the above-mentioned number of enemy divisions by Soviet intelligence before 20 June 1941, only 55% was detected at the border (or 43% of the total number of German divisions). It was believed that the remaining divisions had not yet been "transported" by the enemy. It should be noted that a huge number of divisions were concentrated against the British on various fronts (to the same 43% divisions of the total). Therefore, we can say that one of the main reasons for the unexpected start of the war for the USSR (the leadership of the spacecraft) there was an error in evaluating the necessary grouping of German troops for a full-scale war.

On the western border with the USSR was not found none Germanic paratroop division (from 10 available in the opinion of the Republic of Uzbekistan), which were assigned major tasks when operating in the rear. The use of such divisions was mentioned in a report in 1940 year G.Zhukov. About sabotage regiment "Brandenburg" Soviet intelligence has not brought information.

From G. Zhukov's memoirs: “... Our troops did not always learn what they had to meet in the first days of the war. As for other methods and forms of warfare, they were simply neglected, especially on an operational-strategic scale. Just as little attention, as well as defense, was given to questions of reciprocal battles, apostates and battles in the conditions of the environment. Meanwhile, it was these kinds of military operations that, in the initial period of the war, turned around very widely and took on the most fiercest character ...

... In the pre-war period, military strategy was based on the statement that only offensive actions could crush the aggressor and that defense would play a purely supporting role, ensuring the offensive groups achieve their goals ...

... Of course, we studied the combat practice of Hitler's troops in Poland, France and other European countries and even discussed methods and methods of their actions. But truly all felt it only when the enemy attacked our country, throwing against the troops of the border military districts their own compact armored and air groups...

... I want to touch some errorsadmitted guidance of NGOs and General Staff. During the processing of operational plans in the spring of 1941, the features of waging a modern war in its initial period were not fully taken into account. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff considered that a war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles. With respect to the timing of concentration and deployment, Fascist Germany was put in the same conditions with us. In fact, both forces and conditions were far from equal ...

... Sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not provided for ...

... The command staff of the General Staff did not expect that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the first day by compact groups in all strategic areas ...

This was not taken into account by ... the commanders of the ... border military districts ... " And how could district commanders take this into account if the direction of enemy strikes and the deployment of troops to counter these strikes, as well as the time for engaging the defense with covering units, planned the General Staff?

What else can I add? Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov quite self-critically described his mistakes and the mistakes of other higher ranks of the SC. Could not write. It’s hard to write. We only understand the causes of the event in question, and we have no right to condemn.

Now we know about the main mistakes in the strategy of the SC, which led to the fact that the war was unexpected for the army ...

In the middle of May, the General Staff suddenly “sees the light” or “gets a good kick from someone” and immediately starts preparing to change the cover plans. How could this happen?

In mid-April, the 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of the Spacecraft, prepared a note on their views on the strategic deployment plan, which included the attack of the German troops before the end of their deployment.

Note by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin with thoughts on the strategic deployment plan in the event of a war with Germany and its allies 16.04.1941 b / n

I report on your consideration considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the Soviet Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and its allies.

I. At present, Germany, according to the data of the Spacecraft Directorate, has deployed ... around 284 divisions ...
It is assumed that in the current political situation, Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to put up against us ... before the 180 divisions ...
Most likely the main forces of the German army as part of 76 PD, 11 etc., 8 md, 2 cd and 5 air [we are talking about parachute divisions], but only up to 100 divisions will be deployed south of Deblin for an attack in the direction of - Kovel , Exactly, Kiev.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by a blow in the north from East Prussia to Vilna and Riga, as well as short, concentric blows from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranavichy ...
Probable allies of Germany can put up against the USSR: Finland - up to 20 front, Hungary - 15 front, Romania - up to 25 front. Total Germany with the Allies can deploy against the USSR before 240 divisions.

Given that Germany is currently holding its army mobilized, with deployed rears, it has the opportunity to warn us in deployment and deliver a sudden blow. To prevent this [and defeat the German army], I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative to the German command, preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be at the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and interaction of the arms of service.

II. The first strategic goal of the actions of the SC space forces is to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Demblin and access the 30 operation day at the front of Ostroleka, the River Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The next strategic goal is to have: an offensive from the Katowice region in the north or north-west direction to defeat the large forces of the Center and the North wing of the German front and seize the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia.
Thus, the spacecraft will begin offensive operations from the front of Chizhov, Motovisko forces 152 divisions against the German 100 divisions. On the remaining sections of the state border provides active defense.

III. Based on the stated strategic deployment plan, the following grouping of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union is envisaged:

1. The ground forces of the Red Army in the composition - 198 SD, 61 td, 31 md, 13 cd (total 303 divisions and 74 artillery regiment RGC) are as follows:
a) The main forces in the composition ... 258 divisions and xnump have in the West...
b) The remaining forces ... 45 divisions and 21 ap RGCs are assigned to defend the Far Eastern, Southern and Northern borders of the USSR ...

Iv. The composition and tasks of the fronts deployed in the West:

Northern FRONT (LVO) - 3 armies ... a total of 21 divisions ... The main tasks are the defense of the city of Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railway and, together with the Baltic Naval fleet to ensure our complete domination in the waters of the Gulf of Finland ...

The North-Western Front (PribOVO) - three armies ... of the entire 23 division ... with tasks: - firmly defend the Riga and Vilna areas with stubborn defense, preventing the enemy from invading from East Prussia; the defense of the west coast and the islands of Ezel and Dago to prevent the landing of naval landings of the enemy ...

Western Front (Zapovo) - four armies ... total 45 divisions ...
Objectives: - stubborn defense on the front of Druskiniki, Ostroleka, firmly cover the Lida and Belostok directions;
- with the transition of the armies of the South-Western Front to the offensive, by hitting the front left wing in the directions of Warsaw, Sedlec, Radom, smash the Warsaw group and seize Warsaw. In cooperation with the South-Western Front, smash the Lublin-Radom grouping of the enemy, go out on the Vistula River and take moving parts to take Radom ...

The South-Western Front - eight armies ... total 122 divisions ... with immediate objectives:
a) with a concentric strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, surround and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the r. Wisla in the Lublin area;
b) at the same time smashing the enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz-Kielce areas and seizing the Krakow, Katowice and Kielce districts at the same time from the front of Sieniaw, Przemysl, Lyutowiska, having in view further to advance from this area in the northern or north-western direction the forces of the northern wing of the enemy front and the seizure of the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia;
c) to firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and to be prepared to deliver concentric attacks against Romania from the regions of Chernivtsi and Chisinau, with the immediate goal of defeating the northern wing of the Romanian army and reach the line of the r. Moldova, Iasi ...

V. Grouping RGC.

In the RGK to have 5 armies and concentrate them:
- two armies ... total 15 divisions, in the area of ​​Vyazma, Sychevka, Yelnya, Bryansk, Sukhinichi;
- one army ... all 8 divisions, in the area of ​​Vileyka, Novogrudok, Minsk;
- one army ... total 12 divisions, in the area of ​​Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berdichev;
- one army ... all 12 divisions, in areas of White Church, Zvenyhorodka, Cherkasy.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army G. Zhukov


It can be assumed that the leadership of the spacecraft convinced Stalin in the further elaboration of this plan (or were confident that he would approve), because Below is the Directive in one of the military districts, indicating the offensive actions of the AC.

Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces Command Military Department Colonel-General D. G. Pavlov 25.04.1941 b / n

I order you to start developing a plan for the rapid deployment of armies ZOVOVO ...

... 2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its existing 225 radar, 20 td and 15 md, will be able to dispatch up to our 200 divisions, of which up to 165 rd, 20 td and 15 md.

The deployment of the main forces of the German army is most likely in the South-East, so that a strike on Berdichev, Kiev will take over Ukraine.

This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric blows from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.
In this case, against the troops of the North-Western and Western fronts, we should expect the Germans to deploy to 40, ... etc and ... md [in the amount of td and md typos].

It is possible that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw area in order to deliver and develop a strike at Riga or at Kovno, Dvinsk through the Lithuanian SSR. At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary, strong blows from Lomza and Brest, with the subsequent desire to develop them in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk.

With this variant of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans will deploy against our North-Western and Western fronts to the 130 divisions and most of their aircraft ...

2. With the transition of the armies of the South-Western Front to the offensive by hitting the left wing of the front in the general direction of Sedliec, Radom assisted the South-Western Front to smash the enemy's Lublin-Radom grouping. The immediate task of the front is to capture the area of ​​Sedliec, Lukov and seize the crossings across the r. Wisla; in the future, keep in mind the actions on Radom with the aim of completely surrounding the Lublin enemy grouping, in cooperation with the South-Western Front.

3. To ensure the main strike of the front, deliver an auxiliary strike in the direction of Warsaw, with the task of seizing Warsaw and putting up a defense on the r. Narev ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union (S. Timoshenko)
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army (G. Zhukov)


Border districts are beginning to rapidly develop cover plans for the district, armies, and formations.

In early May, the situation is suddenly changing. S.Timoshenko and G.Zhukov meet with I.Stalin 10, 12 and 14 in May 1941 of the year. 14.05.41. Directives for developing cover plans go to border districts with consideration of activities on defense (special attention is paid to the PT defense), setting up the army and frontline defense defensive lines to the old border, developing a plan for the case of forced withdrawal: creating PT barriers to the full depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway hubs and points of possible concentration of the enemy. Offensive actions on the adjacent territory are completely excluded.
Whether new intelligence reports arrived (nothing much appears in published messages), whether Stalin "got his hands" to figure out the most military plans (military experts played too much), or there were other circumstances. But the strategy of spacecraft in the cover plans has changed dramatically. The political leadership (I.V. Stalin) appeared fear regarding the capabilities of the German army. It is a pity that the military leadership of the spacecraft did not like the fear of I.Stalin ...

24 May at a meeting with Stalin present leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, the commanders of the border districts, members of military councils and commanders of the District Air Force.

May 25 begins the nomination of the 16 Army, the furthest from the western border. In early June, begins the nomination of 19-I army. In June, other armies of the internal districts are being advanced. We now know that, even with these divisions, advancing armies, according to the RUG, the number of Soviet divisions was inferior to that of Germany and its allies in the Western theater of operations.

From the new Directives it is clear that the General Staff is trying to plan defensive operations in the border districts, even plans to evacuate from areas that may be occupied by the enemy are being considered. Previously, it could be shot for ...

The figure shows the threatened directions in the assessment of the General Staff for Zapov and the actual directions of strikes of the German troops.



It turns out that the grouping of spacecraft on the Belostok projection, according to specialists of the General Staff, should have parried the three blows of the German troops to Belostok. And historians were guessing: “Where should this grouping have gone?”
In the West, it has become fashionable to talk about "preparing the invasion of spacecraft troops in 1941, the countries of Eastern Europe ..."
But it was Hitler's Reich with its allies ...

An interstate explanation of the situation with ZOVOVO was offered by A.V. Shubin: “Document developers [I mean the cover plan] completely excluded the option of the main strike of the Wehrmacht on Belarus, because assumed that Germany is preparing for a protracted war with the USSR. At the first stage, Germany will seek to seize the Baltic states and Ukraine, and then strike at Moscow. ” Such a hypothesis explains a lot, if we consider that the German intelligence services were misinforming just such a position of the German military command ...

For those interested in the information that was in the "Red Package" KOVO [/ b] I provide a link:
http://www.rkka.ru/docs/plans/kovo.htm

From G. Zhukov’s memoirs: “... Divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery at the beginning of 1941 had not yet been fired and was not prepared for combat missions. Therefore, the district commanders decided to send part of the artillery to the test sites. As a result, some during the attack of fascist Germany, the corps and divisions of the covering troops were left without a significant part of their artillery, which played an important role in the unsuccessful actions of our troops in the first days of the war ... District commanders ... made a big mistake will grow up, and we are not promptly corrected Commissar of the district ... "
The plans for the exercise were agreed with the General Staff.
A little about General D.Pavlov. From AE Golovanov’s memoirs: “... Pavlov greeted me, asked why he hadn’t been in Minsk for so long, asked what I needed, and said that he had given orders for a long time to be provided to all of us, because of this requested Stalin. As soon as I began to answer his questions, he interrupted me and made a proposal to subordinate the regiment directly to him. I reported that I did not resolve such issues.
- And now we call Comrade Stalin. - He picked up the phone and ordered Moscow.

A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. He didn’t have time to say that he was calling about the submission of Golovanov, who is now with him, as from his answers I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.
- No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border ... "

The number of divisions of the Army Group Center, centered on ZOVOVO, on 4.04.41, on 15 of May, on 15 of June, on 20 of June, according to Soviet intelligence, was respectively: 29, 30 (20), 30 (35), 30 * (to 51,5 ), including Td and MD 5, 5 (2), 6 (2), 6 (16,5). The actual number of enemy divisions is shown in parentheses.
* - Zapovo intelligence department “opened” the exit of the German units to the original areas on the night of 21 and 22, June 1941, but the intelligence came to command only in 15-20 22.06.1941.
As we can see, the number of divisions for more than two months was considered unchanged by the RP and General D.Pavlov told Stalin the absolute truth. The divisions of the SC in ZOVOVO were up to 45,8 (of which 18, etc. and md).

There are eyewitness recollections that Pavlov turned to the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress. GSH did not give permission. As a result of the outbreak of war, the grouping of Soviet troops was blocked in the area of ​​the fortress. One of the main directions of the German troops on the way to Minsk was “half-closed”. The second unexpected blow in the direction of Minsk came from the territory of PribOVO, from where it was not expected. The author would assume that there was not a single military commander in the SC who could stop the German troops in June when they hit Zapov. General DGPavlov is just one of many generals who didn’t know how to fight in a new way in June 1941 ... In confirmation of this, consider the similar tragic page of KOVO (YUZF).

We are already familiar with General V.I. Tupikov (BAT in Berlin) from the 1 part of the message. In 1926 he graduated from the courses “Shot”, in 1933 the Frunze Military Academy. With 1937, the Chief of Staff of the SC, with 1939 - Chief of Staff of the HVO. With 12.1940 BAT in Germany. Best of all imagined how well German troops can fight. Late in the evening, 21.06.41 flew to Aeroflot on a plane to Moscow. One of the squadrons of the German Air Force, based in Poland, was assigned to intercept and shoot down the aircraft. Apparently someone "stepped on a corn" Vasily Ivanovich.

With 29.07.41, the chief of staff of the South-Western Front, whose troops fought hard defensive battles with superior enemy forces on Right Bank Ukraine. The commander of the South-Caucasian Front was M. Kirponos (with the 04.1940 — the commander of the SK, with 06.1940 — the commander of the LVO, and with 14.01.41 — the KOVO. Rapid career and lack of experience in managing large masses of troops).

IN AND. Tupikov failed to find a common understanding with the commander, who was poorly aware of the capabilities of the German Armed Forces. According to the memoirs of General I. Glebov, in early September, Tupikov insisted on an immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, as reported by I. Stalin (Stalin received Tupikov in the summer). During the subsequent telephone conversation between Stalin and Kirponos, he said that Dupes were alarmist and that Kiev would be separated.

14.09.41 in 3-25 V.I. Tupikov, on his own initiative, addressed the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov and the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction with a telegram in which, describing the plight of the troops of the front (who were under the threat of the environment), he completed his view with the following phrase : “The beginning of a catastrophe you understand is a matter of a couple of days.” Before the German compound, there remained about 50 km ...

In response, a telegram came: “To the commander of the South-Western Front, a copy of Glavku UZN. Major General Tupikov presented a panic report in the General Staff. The situation, on the contrary, requires preservation, exceptional composure and endurance. commanders of all degrees ... b. Shaposhnikov "

15.09.41 closed encirclement around 5, 21, 26, 37 armies and part of the 38 forces. 20.09.41 killed M. Kirponos and V.Tupikov during a battle surrounded. After the war, the remains of Major-General V.I. Tupikov were found and buried in Kiev near the Monument of Eternal Glory.

As we can see, the actions of Kirpanos and Shaposhnikov led to a catastrophe similar to ZOVOVO (if not larger). Why are they better than D.Pavlov? The author does not urge to respect DG Pavlov, but only asks not to insult ...



To be continued

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander ZOVOVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No. 503859 / SS / s

In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops, by 20 in May 1941, you personally, with the chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the district headquarters, develop:
a) a detailed plan for the defense of the state border from Kanchiaiestis to Lake Svitez (claim);
b) a detailed air defense plan.

I. Defense tasks:
1. Prevent the invasion of both land and air enemy into the district.
2. The stubborn defense of fortifications along the state border should firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops.
3. Air defense and aviation operations ensure the normal operation of railways and the concentration of troops.
4. By all types of intelligence of the district, it is timely to determine the nature of the concentration and grouping of the enemy troops.
5. Active actions of aviation to gain air supremacy and powerful blows to the main railway junctions, bridges, crossings and groups of troops to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops.
6. Prevent the airborne troops and enemy sabotage groups from dropping and disembarking on the territory of the district.

Ii. To organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following guidelines:

1. The basis of the defense is to put a stubborn defense of the SD and field fortifications created along the state border with the use of all the forces and possibilities for their further development. Defense give the character of active action. Any attempts by the enemy to break through the defense immediately eliminate counterattacks corps and army reserves.

2. Pay special attention to PT defense. In the event of a breakthrough of the front of defense by large enemy MMCs, the fight against them and the elimination of the breakthrough should be carried out by direct order of the District Command, for which it is massively used most of the PT artillery brigades, combat crews and aviation. The task of the PT brigades is to meet tanks on the prepared lines with powerful artillery fire and, together with the aircraft, to delay their advancement until the approach and counterattack of our MK. The task of the MK is to deploy under cover of the PT, with powerful flank and concentric strikes, together with aviation, to inflict a final defeat on the enemy's MFM and eliminate the breakthrough.

3. Particularly responsible areas to consider:
a) Suwalki, Lida;
b) Suwalki, Bialystok;
c) from the front of Ostroleka, Malkin to Bialystok;
d) Siedlce, Volkovysk;
e) Brest-Litovsk, Baranovichi.

4. Under favorable conditions, all defending forces and reserves of armies and districts should be ready, on the instructions of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes.

III. More to the right is the Baltic Military District. Headquarters with 3 mobilization day in Ponevezh. His left-flank 11 army organizes defense at the front of Yurburg, a lawsuit. Kanchiamyestis. Starm - Kaunas.
The border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskiniki, Margerabovo, Lettsen, all items with the exception of Margerabov for ZOVOVO, incl.
To the left is the Kiev Special Military District. Headquarters with 3 mobilization day Tarnopol. His right-flank 5 army organizes defense at the front incl. oz Svitez, Krystynopol. Starm - Kovel.
The border with KOVO is Pinsk, Wlodawa, Demblin, all except for Demblin for CEPOV inclusive.

Iv. To perform the tasks have four areas of cover.

Cover Area No. 1 - 3 army. Composition: Army 3 control; 4 ck control; 56, 27, 85 and 24 sd; 11 control mic; 29 and 33 TD; 204 md; 6 PT art.br; garrison of the Grodno SD; 11 mixed aviation division; border units.
The first mob echelon 24 sd to withdraw to the Grodno region no later than 5 mobilization day.
The district commander is the commander of the 3 army. Starm - Grodno. Border on the left - Art. Novoselnya, claim. Sokolka, claim. Shchuchin, claim. Frederick
The task is a solid defense of the Grodno SD and field fortifications on the front of Kanchiamiestis, Shchuchin’s lawsuit. cover the Lida, Grodno and Belostok directions.

Cover Area No. 2 - 10 army. Composition: 10 army control; 1 and 5 control; 8, 13, 86 and 2 sd; 6 QC control; 6 and 36 cd; 6 control mic; 4 and 7 TD; 29 md; the garrisons of Osovetsky and Zambrovsky SD; 9 mixed aviation division; border units.
The district commander is the commander of the 10 army. Starm - Bialystok. The border on the left is a lawsuit. Fold., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the river. Bug 6 kk to have in the area of ​​Tykocin, Falcons, Menlyanin.
The task of the area is to defend Osovetsky and Zambrovsky SD and field fortifications within the borders, to cover the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.

Cover Area No. 3 - 13 army. Composition: control 2 ck; 113 and 49 sd; 13 control mic; 25 and 31 TD; 208 md; 43 mixed aviation division; border units.
The district commander is the commander of 13 army, and before his arrival in Belsk - the commander of 2 sk. Storm 13 with the mobilization day 3 - Belsk. The border on the left is a lawsuit. Kossovo, Gajnówka, Drogichin, Gura-Kalvaria.
The task of the region is to firmly cover the direction of Belsk from Kossovo and Sokoluv by defense of field fortifications.

Cover Area No. 4 - 4 army. Composition: Army 4 control; 28SK management; 6, 42, 75 and 100 sd; 14 control mic; 22 and 30 TD; 205 md; garrison of Brest UR; 10 mixed aviation division; border units.
The first mob echelon 100 sd to bring to the area Cheremha no later than 4 mobilization day. District Head -
4 Army Commander. Border on the left - border with. KOVO.
The task is to defend the concentration and deployment of the army with a solid defense of the Brest SD and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River.

V. At the immediate disposal of the district command are:

1. 21 ck, consisting of 17 and 50 cd, no later than 15 mobilization day in the area of ​​art. Druskiniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Debrovo.
2. 47 ck, as part of 55, 121 and 155 sd, no later than 15 of the day of mobilization in the area of ​​Pruzhany, Dam, Kartuzbhereza, Bluden.
3. 44 ck, as part of 108, 64, 161, 37 and 143 cd - all at points of permanent dislocation, with their further transfer to the army according to the deployment plan.
4. PT Brigade - 7-I in the area of ​​Art. Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8-I - in the area of ​​Lida.
5. MK:
17 mk, consisting of 27 and 36 td and 209 md in the area of ​​Volkovysk;
20 MK - in the composition of 26 and 38 td and 210 md in the region of Oshmyany.
6. 4 Vdk in the area Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
7. Aviation - 59 and 60 Fighter Divisions; 12 and 13 bomber divisions.
The 3 Aviation Corps is part of the 42 and 52 Long Range Bomber Divisions and the 61 Fighter Division. The corps is used according to the tasks of the Main Command.

Vi. Aviation tasks:
1. By successive strikes of combat aviation on the established bases and airfields, as well as by combat operations in the air, destroy enemy aircraft and from the first days of the war gain air supremacy.
2. Fighter aircraft, in close cooperation with the entire air defense system of the district, firmly cover the mobilization and concentration of district troops, the normal operation of railways and prevent enemy aircraft from overflying the territory into the country.
3. In cooperation with ground forces, destroy the attacking enemy and prevent its major MMCs from breaking through the frontline of the district.
4. Powerful, systematic strikes on major railway bridges and junctions Königsberg, Marienburg, Allenstein, Thorn, Kalisz, Lodz and Warsaw, as well as on enemy force groupings, disrupt and delay the concentration of enemy troops.

VII. By order of the Command SOVO:
1. Prepare the rear lines:
21 ck - on the front of Merech, Rotnitsa, Lakes, Lunno.
47 sk - on the front Murava, Pruzhany, Dneprovsko-Bugsky channel to Gorodets.

2. Provide for the application of counterattacks MK and aviation in cooperation with the SC and PT teams.

3. Dope and prepare the rear lines for the entire depth of the defense to the river. Berezina incl.
For the case of forced withdrawal, develop a plan for creating PT barriers for the entire depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway junctions and points of possible concentration of the enemy (troops, headquarters, hospitals, etc.).

4. Develop a plan for bringing the UR into full combat readiness on the former state border within the county.

5. To develop: a) a plan for raising the troops in alarm and separating detachments of support for the border troops; b) plan for the protection and defense of the most important industrial enterprises, structures and objects.

6. In case of involuntary waste, develop, according to special instructions, a plan for the evacuation of factories, plants, banks and other business enterprises, government agencies, warehouses, military and state property, military service, means of transport, etc.

7. In terms of air defense to provide air defense troops and air defense of the territory in the Western zone of air defense, especially elaborate:
a) the organization of the service of air-launch facilities and the immediate notification of aviation aerodromes — primarily fighter ones, both from company and line posts of air-defense installations, the notification of air defense points and facilities, brigade control departments and the air defense zone;
b) the use and actions of fighter aviation, to establish areas of destruction of enemy aviation for individual aviation units;
c) careful protection by anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft of permanent air defense points and facilities, unloading areas and areas of troop concentration;
d) issues of communication and control of air defense.

Viii. Guidelines for the rear.

Before the 15 mobilization day is allowed to spend:
a) for ground troops cover: ammunition - 3 Ammunition, for combat vehicles - 5 gas stations, for transport vehicles - 8 gas stations.
b) for the Air Force: fighters - 15 departures; near bombers - 10 departures; long-range bombers - 7 departures; scouts - 10 departures;
c) for all covering troops - 15 daily cottages.

Provision of covering troops with all types of supplies, repair and restoration of equipment should be carried out at the expense of reserves and repair facilities of the district.
Evacuation of sick and wounded people and horses to produce within ZOVOVO, using primarily a stationary network of medical institutions.

Ix. General directions.

1. The first flight or crossing the state border is allowed only with the special permission of the High Command ...

2. The cover plan should consist of the following documents:
a) notes on the plan of action of the troops in cover, with the decision map attached to it and the grouping of troops up to the regiment and a separate part inclusive;
b) statements of military personnel;
c) tables of exit and concentration of parts of the cover to the state border;
d) a plan for the use of the Air Force, with an attached base map and operational use;
e) an air defense plan with maps of the deployment of high-speed air-handling facilities and active air defense systems;
e) engineering plan with calculations and map;
g) the plan of the communication device with calculations and schemes;
h) a plan for the organization of the rear and the material support of the ground forces and the Air Force, with an attachment to them of a map of the structure of the rear of the ground forces and aviation;
i) sanitary and veterinary evacuation plan;
k) instructions for raising parts of the cover for the alarm and the allocation of units to support border units;
k) a list of facilities and structures to be protected by the field and NKVD troops;
m) executive documents (directives, orders, orders).

3. The cover plan is put into effect when an encrypted telegram is received for mine, a member of the Main Military Council, the Chief of the General Staff, with the following signatures: “Proceed to implement the 1941 cover plan.».

4. The development of a cover and defense plan is allowed:

in full - the Commander of the troops, a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff of the district and the chief of the operational department of the staff of the district;
in part of the plan for the Air Force - Commander of the Air Force KOVO;
in part of the plan of the rear device - deputy. District Chief of Staff for the rear;
in the part of the plan of military communications - the chief of military communications of the district;
in terms of communications, the head of communications of the district.
Other chiefs of branches of troops and services are allowed only for the fulfillment of personal tasks in their specialty, for giving them a cover plan.
In the army headquarters - the Army Commander, a member of the Military Council of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Operations of the Army Headquarters.

5. A cover plan to be developed in duplicate, one copy through the Chief of the General Staff to submit to me for approval, the second copy sealed with the seal of the Military Council of the Okrug, to be kept in the personal safe of the Chief of the District headquarters.

6. The covering plans for each of the cover areas, developed by the armies and approved by the District Military Council, sealed with the stamp of the District Military Council, must be kept in the personal safe of the respective head of the cover area.

7. Executive documents developed for military units should be stored in packages sealed with the seal of the Military Council of the Army when ... the units.

8. The folder and bags of documents for the cover are opened by written or telegraphic order - in the armies - the Military Council of the District and in the units - the Military Council of the Army.

9. All documents on the cover plan are written by hand or typed personally by the commanders allowed to develop it.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army G. Zhukov


Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Kom.
[not later than 30.05.1941] No.503920 / cc / s
In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops PribOVO, to 30 in May 1941 ...

Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the head of the General Staff of the Spacecraft KOM KOVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No.503862 / cc / s
To cover mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops to 25 May 1941 ...

Directive People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Kom.vyskami OdVO
[not later than 20.05.1941] No.503874 / cc / s
To cover mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops by May 25, 1941

In the next part we will look at the unknown directive of the General Staff of the SC from 18 of June, the sad phenomenon of PribOVO and the peculiarities of the transmission of Directive No. 1
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  1. +2
    July 25 2017
    .... dear
    Posted by: aKtoR
    ... to know the story is good and necessary ... but sorry, in your material, there will already be a good book ...
    ... I may be mistaken, but I think there are few forum users re-reading all the numbers, facts, data, etc. .... in this article ... this is more likely already, for amateur historians ... hi
    1. +3
      July 25 2017
      and to involve Zhukov’s memoirs as documents — generally bad manners!
      1. jjj
        +21
        July 25 2017
        When the words of the memoirs are confirmed by documents, then this suggests that they are true. And what can shed additional light, if not a living word, of course, with an understanding of all the features of memoirs.
        As for the published work, I consider it extremely necessary. It gives additional insight into the current situation. But this work personally strengthened me personally in the thought that not all members of the conspiratorial circle of Tukhachevsky were cleansed
        1. +11
          July 25 2017
          as rightly noted above: not everyone will master to the end, although I also liked it. Zhukov’s memoirs are bad in that it is necessary to set the year of publication, for the general line in them rushes from year to year like a fragile boat in a storm, even in posthumous ones he changed something from the grave
          1. 0
            October 5 2017
            In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

            Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

            It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

            Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
        2. +4
          July 25 2017
          Actually, after the fact, all the works on this topic strengthen understanding in the following things:
          - the thesis about the “surprise” of an attack for the Soviet command may not even be taken seriously.
          - from some times, bashfully removed the definition of "treacherous attack." And rightly, in general, they did it, because it’s absolutely a disgrace.
          - The Stalinist personnel red army, model 39-40, was destroyed in 41 during the months of the war.
          - Since, comrade Stalin possessed all power, was called the "leader" and "father of peoples", and in the disaster of 41 years he had to be fully accountable to his people. At least with him, for a bag of grain they could shoot a man ... And then whole armies died ...
          - And finally, Zhukov. He is the last person to blame for anything. After the accident of the 41st, it was already too late to fight in white gloves, with small losses. He did everything he could, and coped with his task.
          1. 0
            October 5 2017
            In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

            Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

            It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

            Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
        3. +4
          July 27 2017
          It seems that it was this (unfinished conspiracy) that determined the terrible summer and fall of the 41st.
      2. +11
        July 27 2017
        Novel, if you turn on the mind, you can understand in the memoirs FOREIGN ERRORS do not take over. He took only one person - Christ.
        Usually try to shove them to others, and take the merit of yourself.
        GKZhukov in the above 5 excerpts took errors as the head of the General Staff. They DON'T LIE
        1. +1
          October 1 2017
          Author! I give a link to a really SCARY Klenov encryption dated 16.06.41. - This is essentially a receipt of the combat incapacity of the troops! Wild junior staff shortage: TsAMO Archive, Fund 833, Inventory 1, Case 13, Document U / 452
        2. +1
          October 1 2017
          TsAMO Archive, 221 Foundation, 1351 Inventory, 163 Case
    2. +5
      August 7 2017
      Judging by the number of likes - you are mistaken)))
    3. +2
      30 September 2017
      Author! You forget that military operations 22.06.41/4.00/22.06. ONLY Germany began. That is, only from Brest and north to the Baltic Sea, our borders and troops were from 21.06.41 to 21.06.41. under fire. This is ONLY the edge of the right flank of KOVO, and the whole ZAPOVO and Pribovo (two districts converted to fronts already on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX., WITH TRANSFORMATION AND FORMATION OF DISTRICT DEPARTMENTS. This is important! The status of the district headquarters differs from the status of the headquarters of the front, the usual rights to emergency rights change, The communication systems were supposed to change, and even the encryption systems (I don’t know anything at all), but the main thing is that it automatically transferred ALL THE MILITARY WARS AND SERVICES of these districts to martial law with full barracks and guard duty, the rights and duties of command personnel and military personnel in general, with full front-line readiness and responsibility, therefore Pavlov and his headquarters (as well as even the headquarters of some commanders of armies and corps, divisions, etc.), who went on vacation and sightseeing in the evening of June XNUMX, XNUMX, already stood in line for investigation and trial with well-known methods and sentences. Pavlov could not know about it!
  2. +3
    July 25 2017
    The article tries to blur the question of who is to blame for the disorganization of the defense of the Red Army in June 1941 in a simple way - allegedly the fact is that in January-May of the 1941, Soviet intelligence was able to open the deployment directly on the border (in the area of ​​East Prussia and the Polish governor general) in total only 60 enemy divisions against 130, which were relied upon by the calculations of the General Staff of the Red Army for organizing an attack on the USSR.

    The author of the article ignores the fact that during the command-staff game in January 1941 of the year, the Western forces (for which Zhukov played) had enough 60 divisions to defeat the eastern forces.

    Moreover, the notorious 60 of German divisions on the border is what Soviet military intelligence of the district level was able to open. She could not open anymore by definition - her area of ​​responsibility was limited to the border regions of Germany and former Poland.

    The General Staff of the Red Army fundamentally did not need district intelligence data - it was more than provided with the intelligence intelligence of RU NCO and PSU NKGB, which absolutely correctly determined in January-June 1941 of the year the total number of divisions of Germany, Romania, Hungary and Finland (up to 300 units by June 1941 of the year), as well as their deployment in the first and second echelon (with the possibility of advancing to the first echelon in a few days).

    So all the allegations that I. Stalin and the General Staff of the Red Army were guided only by the data of the district intelligence and hammered a bolt on the information of undercover intelligence are deso.

    Stalin and Zhukov elementarily messed around - having all the information about preparing the enemy for an invasion of the USSR and his deep operation strategy, they chose the most disadvantageous defense plan, namely the location of the bulk of the troops in the first line directly on the border.
    Moreover, Stalin and Zhukov persisted in their choice: having learned from the district intelligence in the middle of June 1941 about the beginning of the advance to the border of the second echelon of the Germans, they did not find anything better than to take a symmetrical step - to advance several more armies from the first echelon of cover troops depths of the Western and Baltic military districts.

    In addition, Stalin and Zhukov severely blocked any initiatives of the districts commanders to withdraw cover troops directly from the border, such as Pavlov’s proposal to withdraw the division from the Brest Fortress, which became a trap with the outbreak of war.

    In this regard, Stalin and Zhukov, who had all the information and made gross errors in the organization of defense, are the only ones to blame for the defeat of the Red Army in the 1941 year.
    1. +13
      July 27 2017
      Especially for meticulous readers, it is given in 1 and 2 parts over 80% of published intelligence reports and reports, most of which are included in the documents "List ..." and "Calendar ...", which were prepared for Stalin. Although it may be for the unfaithful researchers (they were engaged in fraud for posterity)))
      But seriously, in the 2-th part are shown the THREE intelligence reports of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, indicating the number of Hitler's divisions.
      If you read CAREFULLY there is not a single word about district intelligence))) There are only 3 intelligence reports of the districts on 20 and 21 of June, that the reader understood what the district intelligence had seen and what the strategic intelligence had seen.
      Intelligence services of the GS GS spacecraft were prepared on the basis of the intelligence reports of the spacecraft of the spacecraft, the NKGB, reports
      "route guides", BAT observations, district intelligence and analysis of specialists of the Republic of Uzbekistan. If you have other data - give excerpts from the documents, not speculation.
      It “zamylivaet” is, in fact, an incorrect remark — the author tries to base himself on documents — that is why he is being scolded for longer than articles.
      1. 0
        July 27 2017
        I am not a meticulous reader, I am a reader who knows the four operations of arithmetic.

        aKtoR: "According to reconnaissance reports of the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration up to 20 of June 1941 against PribOVO and ZAPOVO, there were 59 divisions (excluding divisions inland) against 130 divisions considered during the assessment.
        The "southern" option provided for the deployment of the same 130 German divisions against KOVO, and 50 against ZAPOVO and PribOVO. "

        59> 50, isn't it (despite the fact that the General Staff of the Red Army was expecting the main blow in the south)?

        aKtoR: “The 15.06.41 intelligence report said:“ ... the total size of the German army in June 1941 is estimated in 286-296 divisions. ”Of the above number of enemy divisions by Soviet intelligence, until 20 on June 1941, only 55% (or 43%) was found on the border of the total number of German divisions). "

        43% of 296 is 127 divisions - it seems to be less than your declared 190 settlement divisions of the enemy (130 + 60). But where is the estimate of the General Staff of the Red Army for the speed of transfer to the border of the missing 60 German divisions (week)? And where are the appropriate countermeasures on our part, such as the withdrawal of Soviet cover troops from at least enemy artillery fire zone (at 20-30 km from the border), or even better beyond the combat radius of German dive aircraft (200-300 km), which is clearly will require a period of more than a week?

        Analyze the numbers and you will be happy laughing
        1. +4
          July 28 2017
          Quote: Operator
          Analyze the numbers and you will be happy


          The numbers can fool. German tank units had the experience of long marches and deep breakthroughs. Our tank troops not only consisted mainly of obsolete tanks, but also could not drive 100 km to break, not to lose fuel, shells, communications.
          1. 0
            July 28 2017
            It is only about what Stalin was guided by in the readiness of Germany for war - in the opinion of the author of the article: the presence of German divisions on the 190 border (according to Soviet intelligence). This value was determined by calculation in the General Staff of the Red Army.

            15.06.1941 divisions (127% of the total number in 43 units) located directly at the border appear in the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the Red Army of the 296 of the year.

            But the author of the article is silent about the assessment of the General Staff of the Red Army by the time of redeployment by rail of additional 63 divisions out of the total availability - for example, in 1914, two weeks were spent on the delivery of one German army of three-corps (9-10 divisions).

            Those. even without taking into account technical progress in transport over the past 27 years, Germany on June 15 of the year 1941 was on the verge of an attack on the USSR.

            Stalin and Zhukov, instead of putting them on full alert and pulling cover troops from the border, transferred parts of the second echelon to the border and forbade any measures aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the troops in the first echelon (such as not provoking the enemy).

            On June 22, a logical result occurred - the cover forces not withdrawn into the field, located in the same line, were hit by German motorized groups, which were completely brought into offensive battle formations.

            In addition, Stalin and Zhukov did not come up with the simple idea that the enemy’s estimate of the number of German divisions needed to defeat the Red Army cover forces could differ from the calculation of the General Staff of the Red Army.

            As a result of the nearness of these two representatives of the military-political leadership of our country, we have what we have.
        2. +8
          July 30 2017
          Sorry, I did not understand everything. 59 is of course more 50
          In accordance with the data of intelligence (German misinformation), the General Staff expects the main attack in the south. But 11 March also played a version with 130 German divisions against ZOVOVO and PribOVO. When the Nazis on the considered direction 50 (or 59) divisions and 130 - military scenarios are different. Different and the number of involved spacecraft forces. Therefore, one army concentrated on the territory of Zapovo (without subordination to the district - it could also be used in a more threatened direction - PribOVO). ZOVOVO KA leadership as a "non-standard, provincial" district, where, apart from strikes against Bialystok and Baranavichy (when enemy forces of the 130 divisions), nothing was expected

          43% are the 129 divisions discovered by Soviet intelligence (including 9 located somewhat remotely). Only there is not 130 + 60, and until March it was 130 +50but it is not so important. Already in March, the total amount of divisions put up against the USSR (as estimated by the General Staff), only Germanic, was 200, and by June it had increased to 220 divisions.
          Let's compare: for a full-scale war, according to the General Staff, 220 German divisions are required, and all their 120 is near the border. At the same time, the Soviet troops outnumber the German ones. Therefore, no one thought that there would be a war (and not a provocation) and, naturally, no one thought over the countermeasures. In their opinion, it was still too early to act ... If Zhukov were at the border, where the whole war was felt stronger, then maybe he would have thought differently. He and Tymoshenko, even on the night from 21 to 22, did not realize that a WAR was coming.
          Well, and then "cleaned up" the tails. Someone had to answer for the disaster. In the memoirs it is written that Stalin ordered to call Pavlov, but Stalin did not accept Pavlova. Why called? It was possible to arrest on the way to Moscow. He took and spoke at length with Pavlov Zhukov. Then the former commander barely got to Molotov (he took many offended people — a gentle man, maybe ...)
          In the protocols of the interrogation of D.Pavlov there is not a single mention of Zhukov. Perhaps he promised him a "soft" punishment. And then, according to unverified information, Zhukov’s voice was decisive when deciding on the execution of D.Pavlov. At the same time, it is strange that the leadership of the spacecraft did not suffer serious punishment for the complete defeat of the spacecraft forces entrusted to them. Removed only from posts. A member of the military council Zapovo, who was supposed to watch and report to the political department, was only scolded.
          1. +1
            July 30 2017
            190 (then 220) of German divisions intended to attack the USSR is a red light, an unconditional signal for the General Staff of the Red Army to activate the defense plan in the western direction.

            Moreover, the systematic increase in the total number of German divisions (almost until 300 by June 1941) in Europe from French Brest to Soviet Brest was even more an unconditional signal regardless of their location (given the development of the railway network and relatively small European distances )

            It doesn’t matter what the enemy says (war with England), it doesn’t matter what he does (builds up the Wehrmacht).

            The Soviet leadership had all the information on hand in a timely manner, but disposed of it stupidly - by pulling parts of the Red Army to the border.
            At the same time, the Soviet leadership was well aware of the Wehrmacht's strategy - conducting a deep operation with the help of motorized troops.

            So the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 was entirely on the conscience of Stalin (who sold his vision of warfare) and Zhukov (who did not dare to contradict the master). "The surprise of 22 on June 1941 of the year" is a childish excuse that they came up with in order to maintain their reputation.
          2. 0
            30 September 2017
            The republican Central Command and the Bolsheviks of the BSSR rolled several carts on Pavlov, and in the case, their war was completely taken aback by surprise. In Brest, Obkomovs barely managed to escape, leaving documents and archives in Grodno and Bialystok reg. glavnyuki - too. Many families could not be saved. The civilian connection was cut from 1.00 on 22.06.41. The party activist escaped from the districts along with the refugees with random cars or carts with the wounded. Banks threw money! For this alone, Pavlova had to be shot.
          3. +1
            30 September 2017
            By the way - the failure in Brest also has a lot of disinformation. Only 8 battalions were left from the division in the city, and 10 were withdrawn, including on the evening of June 21.06.41, 22.06.41. stealthily across the river, bypassing bridges - as they say, gardens. Mostly defective armored vehicles were left in the tank fleet. All officers in the city slept that night in the barracks, in the fortress. Under shelling, they also managed to withdraw part of the troops from the fortress. In an disorganized manner, but on orders and with fire cover, however, weak people were brought out. But the bridges were not mined in advance, and could not be blown up - and so along the entire border. Mine and blow up bridges until XNUMX. there was no order. This was supposed to be done by the NKVD special teams, it is necessary to watch their encryption, otherwise the situation at the border
    2. +1
      30 September 2017
      Instead of Tymoshenko, you are stubbornly placing him against the wall of Stalin, but you don’t even mention this hidden ukronatsik from Bessarabia. Tymoshenko’s troops moved, not Stalin and Zhukov! Zhukov could offer options, Stalin approve options, and only Tymoshenko could order the troops. Zhukov's signature on orders is a signature on acquaintance and on complicity in responsibility. He could object and report to Stalin, but in this case too, before the cancellation, the order of the NPO was an order for the troops. Zhukov's signature ONE was not a directive or an order! The commander of the troops was not the General Staff, but the NPO.
    3. +1
      25 2018 June
      Tymoshenko is not at the answer? Mehlis? Malenkov? Who forbade families of officers to be sent on vacation on 18.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.? He ordered the NKVD patrols to take them off the trains and drop them off the buses, send them by force back to the garrisons at the border? This despite the fact that the NKVD had already sent their families to the rear, and with junk.
  3. BAI
    +6
    July 25 2017
    Yes, no one offends either Pavlov or Kirponos. Just Kirponos managed to die in the war, but Pavlov is not. Therefore, he was appointed extreme and shot. If Kirponos would have left the encirclement, he would have been shot too.
  4. +9
    July 25 2017
    Quote: Operator
    In this regard, Stalin and Zhukov, who had all the information and made gross errors in the organization of defense, are the only ones to blame for the defeat of the Red Army in the 1941 year.

    --------------------------
    Do not sprinkle ash on your head. Stalin never removed this guilt. Everyone may have errors.
    1. 0
      July 25 2017
      On the account of "sprinkle [his] head with ashes" here is clearly superfluous.
  5. +10
    July 25 2017
    in articles the main events of the pre-war period are collected. I would like to highlight the essence of the described.
    1 Military doctrines. between the wars there was a question of the optimal use of new weapons of tanks and aircraft. In the USSR, there was very little such experience. With a poorly trained military and a very large demagogue led by the Red Army Tukhachevsky, the doctrines of using tanks developed by Triandafillov were adopted. Tanks were made into 2 types. Tanks of direct infantry support. These are the T-26 tanks. They were used in infantry support teams. In addition, each infantry corps had a small tank unit. These tanks, as it should be, were sewn in front of the infantry, covering it from fire and supporting it with fire. Everything is clear here except that the tanks were scattered between a large number of infantry units. But the use of BT tanks was planned with the greatest stupidity. Tanks were supposed to operate in infantry brigade long-range support teams. These tanks without infantry were supposed to break into speed at the position of enemy defense. The goal of these breakthroughs was to destroy the enemy artillery in closed positions and create other problems behind enemy lines. It was an absolutely idiotic idea. The attack in the Spanish Fuentes was just an attempt to test this theory. The stupid theory gave a negative result. Tanks could not operate without the support of artillery and infantry. The Germans took another more rational path. They primarily created large mechanized highly mobile units. Their base was truck-mounted infantry. Armored personnel carriers were but there were very few. The mechanized infantry was given artillery towed by high-speed tractors. Almost all Wehrmacht tanks were attached to this infantry. The Wehrmacht immediately abandoned the slow-moving infantry support tanks. But the Germans used the speed of their tanks only on the march to accompany the infantry landed on the trucks. At the beginning of the attack, the infantry dismounted and on foot accompanied the tanks. This attack was actively supported by artillery. That is, the fur corps could quickly focus on a narrow section of the front that was unexpected for the enemy. Break through the front and then the infantry got on their trucks and the connection went into the rear of the enemy. The goal was precisely the enemy’s environment. After the Polish company in the Red Army, they realized the fallacy of their concepts of using tanks. Tank divisions and corps began to be created. But the USSR did not have the necessary number of trucks for this. Without trucks, it was not possible to create real mechanized units. There were no high-speed artillery tractors in the USSR. Since, according to the previous military concept, they were not needed.
  6. +8
    July 25 2017
    One of the main reasons for Stalin's desire to avoid war in 1941 was the beginning of the active rearmament of the army. On the one hand, the USSR began to actively arm itself earlier than Germany. The USSR had a huge fleet of obsolete equipment. On the other hand, the USSR at the beginning of Stalin's rule was a backward country. Tanks and aircraft engines were made exclusively under license. The USSR began rearmament late. The T 26 was originally an English vehicle for third world export. He was spanked at the factories of the USSR almost before the start of the Patriotic War, although in reality he could be somehow useful only against the Papuans with spears. The USSR was late with transitions to tanks with bulletproof armor. Tank fighting vehicle created for certain functions on the battlefield. A machine with bulletproof armor, having the Wehrmacht as an enemy, could no longer act from open positions as it should be for a tank. It is useless to talk about tens of thousands of tanks in the Red Army in 1941. Neither T 26 nor BT tanks were anymore. Also in the leadership of the Red Army did not set the correct requirements for fighters. As a result, when the war was already on the very nose, biplanes continued to be fired. Aircraft engines manufactured under Western licenses have already allowed to build a really high-quality fighter. In any case, new planes have just begun to enter the troops, but under them there was neither high octane gas nor airfields with the necessary coverage and long strips. Aircraft began to arrive in the winter and their development was postponed until the summer with more summer weather. It was the desire to delay the war at all costs until the end of the rearmament of the army, and determined the behavior of the USSR in relation to Germany. The Germans had only one, no less modern T 4 tank. But all the tactics of the Wehrmacht were modernized and the armor, at least the frontal one, was anti-shell on them. Often they write about the low quality of 45 mm anti-tank shells in the Red Army. But the magpie gun itself was a cannon of the past generation for fighting tanks with bulletproof armor. She's just out of date. The Germans also had the main outdated 37 mm gun. But firstly, it perfectly hit our BT and T 36. Secondly, the Germans were already faced with modern tanks in France and had at their disposal sub-caliber and cumulative shells.
    1. BAI
      +6
      July 25 2017
      The Germans also had the main outdated 37 mm gun. But firstly, it perfectly hit our BT and T 36.

      "Perfectly hit" - not the right word. The Germans specially adapted for newsreels, let the tank get closer under the camera and beat so that the detonation of the ammunition occurred. Very spectacular shots were obtained.
      Yes, and not the T-36, but the T-26.
      1. +2
        July 25 2017
        wrote in a hurry a typo
  7. +5
    July 25 2017
    By the way, the author still needs to consider, in addition to military issues, economic and political issues.
    For example, the answer to why everyone so stubbornly waited for an attack on Ukraine, and not in Belarus, is quite simple: In the 40th year, Ukraine was one of the main components of the economy of the USSR.
    Here are some dry numbers:
    Cast Iron Steel Rolled Iron ore coke
    USSR 14,9 18,3 13,1 29,86 21,1
    BSSR 0 0 0 0 0
    RSFSR 5,26 9,3 6,55 9,6 5,4
    USSR 9,64 8,94 6,52 20,19 15,7

    And this is only by raw materials. If you look at industry, then Ukraine also occupies a significant place there. This is not to mention agriculture.

    Therefore, increased attention to the southern direction from the military and political leadership of the country was justified. Moreover, it was the southern flank that most successfully resisted (here we must be fair and say that this happened also because it was also the strongest) and to neutralize it we had to distract Army Group Center (Kiev boiler)

    Therefore, not everything is so simple.
    1. +5
      July 26 2017
      In fact, there was no blow to Belarus or a blow to Ukraine. The leadership of the Wehrmacht set out to surround and destroy the Red Army at the border. That is, the planning did not take into account what is in the interior of the country. The placement of the Wehrmacht and the direction of the blows took into account the configuration of the border and the convenience for the offensive. Group North delivered a chilling auxiliary strike, as it was not possible to surround the enemy. Bialystok ledge begs for 2 oncoming wedges. Already from Belarus it was planned to exit to the rear of the Red Army troops stationed in the north. The Lviv ledge from the south is protected by mountains and it was possible to advance only from the Sokalsky ledge. Further, the place suitable for the offensive was in Romania. The Germans did not send a tank group there. Logistics in Romania was more complex and the Red Army intelligence could notice this group much earlier. The only thing that raises the question is that the 1 tank group acting alone was weaker than the 2 tank group. This despite the fact that she acted in Ukraine alone and she needed to go more to encircle the enemy. It seems to me that the authority of Guderian played in this not very rational decision. He chose for himself the most convenient direction for attacking on a good road and knocked out more tanks to the detriment of the whole operation. Hitler believed that after the complete destruction of the Red Army troops on the border, the rest of the USSR would easily fall at his feet. On the whole, the Wehrmacht managed to destroy the troops located on the Bialystok ledge and with delay the troops of the Lviv ledge. He did not find the expected void in the depths of the USSR.
      1. +2
        July 27 2017
        Interesting comment, but unfortunately at odds with the facts. Army Group North delivered a "chilling blow"? This is where such a conclusion? According to the main document of German planning, Gr.Armiy Sever dealt by no means a constraining blow. I would even call it basic. Read the original
        The southern of these groups, which is the center of the common front, has the task of attacking with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw region and to the north of it and crushing the enemy forces in Belarus. Thus, the prerequisites for turning powerful mobile units northso that, in cooperation with the northern army group, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction to Leningrad, to destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic. Only after ensuring the fulfillment of this urgent task, which should be followed by the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, one should proceed with operations to capture Moscow as an important center of communications and military industry

        And what was the main direction?
        By the way, here are the Intersens of Guderian’s memoirs. He himself destroyed the German war plan. For such things in the USSR put to the wall. We are fortunate that Guderian has commanded for so long. He managed to do so many tricks that three executions were provided to him
        1. 0
          January 19 2018
          Army Group North certainly attacked but it did not act on the environment. The environment was to be achieved by turning the Center group.
          1. 0
            25 2018 June
            My father, from the encirclement near Alytus, went to Kaunas on the second day of the war. The headquarters of the 11th Army of the NWF, where he served, from 26.06.41. was surrounded, and in the headquarters of the front and in Moscow it was believed that the headquarters of the 11th army was either destroyed or captured, and it was ordered to stop even fragmentary radio communications with him that still occurred in episodes. By that time, by June 26.06. - the garrison of the Navy and Air Force bases in Liepaja was already surrounded, from there they already broke through in separate groups by sea to Riga and by land to Venstpils.
    2. +5
      July 27 2017
      Hitler had one logic; Zhukov had another. Because of this, Zhukov could not correctly evaluate the intention of the Wehrmacht leadership.
  8. +6
    July 25 2017
    Quote: Operator
    On the account of "sprinkle [his] head with ashes" here is clearly superfluous.

    ------------------------
    Of course, Stalin, as head of state, is guilty of everything that happens, but his performers were also not always ideal people. It's about that. You will assume the role of head of staff, technical director of several projects, the role of chief intelligence analyst, the role of chief diplomat, plus the role of writer, art critic, and theorist of Marxism. In general, it does not seem enough. But Stalin coped, of course, and had to learn on the go, read a lot, talk with experts.
    1. +1
      July 25 2017
      Yes, for God's sake, you can at least study art, but not lose your sense of smell: in January-June of 1941, the main thing was to monitor Germany and take retaliatory measures. The main thing was that Stalin failed and his assistants had nothing to do with it, with the exception of a direct subordinate responsible for preparing proposals on this issue - Zhukov.
      1. +4
        July 27 2017
        the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east began at the end of April 1941. It was not possible to prepare for war for the Red Army. Already in 1940 it was necessary to prepare for the war of 1941 and not for the war in 1942. Unfortunately, they could not correctly predict the events. It is difficult but possible.
  9. +6
    July 25 2017
    Now about the unexpected start of the war. I think the Molotov Ribentrop Pact was absolutely the right decision. Otherwise, the Red Army would have had to wait for the defeat of Poland so that it would have no right to enter its territory of the Red Army, and then the Germans would have hit the USSR. How France and England fulfill their obligation history has shown. In the West, everyone hiss and can not calm down as Russia did not sacrifice itself in the name of the enlightened west. But the USSR also had a second front with Japan. She had to take this into account. This is what prompted Belgium and Holland to abandon their alliance with France and England. How they could believe Hitler’s promises. It’s just that France and England have so much discredited themselves in the eyes of all that they were not going to agree on anything with them. It was the position of Belgium that led to such a rapid collapse of France. No one talks about it. The pact fulfilled its function and the next victim of Hitler was not the USSR but France. But it turned out that France was not at all capable of serious defense. There is no technical ability or even a desire to fight. The terms of the war with Germany for the USSR moved very far. Then the question arose when to expect a war. The USSR defense plans depended on this. It was necessary to solve this not so much in 1941 as in 1940. The question was who would be the next USSR or England. It is important here to correctly understand Hitler's logic. It was necessary to put himself in his position and look at her with his eyes. Intelligence is a very necessary thing, but only if you yourself correctly understand the logic of the enemy. Our leadership decided that since the air battle for England had already begun, it means that Hitler will continue it in the spring and the USSR has at least time until the spring of 1942. At the same time, they did not take into account the facts that Hitler had a trained fired army that did not need to be mobilized. The Wehrmacht has already proved its highest efficiency. Having such an instrument, it was better to solve all of their affairs on land before fighting at sea. Secondly, the USSR, in case of any problems, could very quickly go on the offensive. England especially could not threaten Germany for two years .. Third, the victory over the USSR gave Germany enormous resources. The victory over England gave few resources. Germany was not ready for the war for the English colonies.
    If the leadership decided that the next victim in 1941 would be the USSR, then apparently it was not worth relocating the military infrastructure to new territories. For active offensive operations, the Red Army was not ready. It was not possible to prepare the infrastructure for 1941. It was easier to destroy the transport infrastructure in the new territories and retreat.
    In early 1941, a plan for the reorganization of mechanized units was adopted. It was designed for 1941-42. Accordingly, the compounds were divided into compounds of the 1st stage, with readiness for the spring of 1942 and 2 stages. Zero line readiness for the spring of 1941 there were no connections. Cover plans issued at Zhukov’s direction at about the same time were closely linked to plans for the reorganization of mechanized units. They suggested the use of forces which the leadership of the Red Army by 1941 could not have. The plan also assumed the presence of serious fortifications that were just under construction. The plan was grandiose. He assumed that the Wehrmacht was surrounded between the Bialystok and Sokalsky ledges. There was nothing to implement such a plan in 1941.
    In late April, the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east began. In May, the leadership of the Red Army has already seen this deployment. By May, new cover plans were urgently written. They already had a more passive defensive character. The mechanized formations of this plan are no longer assembled in several shock armies, but distributed to all armies to counter possible breakthroughs.
    Unfortunately, in conditions of complete unpreparedness for the war of 1941, the leadership in many respects took an ostrich position. This exacerbated the situation. The cover plan was not put into effect. Vehicles were not mobilized. The fortifications were not busy. From this, the introduction of a cover plan should generally begin. Almost all modern tanks at the time the war began were assembled in 4 buildings. At the same time, even these buildings were not completely ready and equipped with vehicles. In some of these valuable parts, even rifles were missing.
    Zhukov, having given the order to occupy the fortifications on the last night, considered that the instructions had been fulfilled. He thought that there were only blanket wedges of breakthroughs. He wanted to eliminate these breakthroughs by cutting off the Sokalsky and Suvalkovsky ledges from which these breakthroughs were carried out. He did not own the full picture of what was happening. But he had 2 options. Or retreat leaving the fortifications without a fight, or urgently cut off the breakthrough wedges. He chose the second option. In fact, the front of the defense was completely crushed, the fortifications often left even not occupied by troops.
    1. +1
      July 25 2017
      Behind the three pines there is no way to make out swamps ....
      The more I get acquainted with the materials published now ... the conclusion suggests itself ... "The best friend of athletes" was preparing to slap the Fuhrer at once and forever with little blood and on its territory .... Defense? ... It would not have been enough no forces ... 5 VDK, Danube Flotilla, mountain armies on the southwestern border .... artillery ammunition "on the ground" - well, yes, yes - .... chyut-chyut was not enough for high-quality defense. ... Already more than 70 years have passed .... it's time to collect the pebbles and shards, calmly and soberly evaluate, tie them in a rag and throw them into the abyss .... with the invariable Russian prikazskoy
      1. +15
        July 27 2017
        Hello! About artillery reserve "to the ground" - can you submit an excerpt from the document (as the author) or only excerpts from your favorite "historians"?))
        Danube Flotilla - that's cool! Agree. AT SHIPS caliber 16-inch? All the ships of the flotilla cost less than a tank regiment. Intelligence expected heavy German tanks with guns up to 105-mm. What-is there old 102-mm monitors and 76-mm armored troopers?))) But in Suvorov’s book, this is serious ...
        Mountain armies on the southwest border - a weighty argument, if not to look at the map, which we know from actual data.
        For example. 8sk (includes 173 sd, 99 cd and 72 gss). Against him, 52 AK (454 od, 444 od, 101 lpd) and on the flank are in reserve 4 from the 34 AK.
        13 sc (192 gsd, 44 gsd). Against them, the Hungarian 8-i pbr, 4-i mbr, 2-i mbr. According to intelligence information, they could be located before the 20 divisions.
        17 sc (80 gsd, 96 gsd, 164 cd) and 58 gss.
        Against them, the Hungarian Romanian 1-I, 2-I, 4-I gsbr, 8-I br, 7-I PD and 1-I Hungarian brigade.
        According to estimates, the GS GSA somewhere there was even before Romania’s 10 PD, which could not be found at the border.
        Collect shards and further, but look, though occasionally cards
        1. 0
          30 September 2017
          Author! I give a link to an interesting document - the Combat Journal of 12 microns of the North-West Federal District from 16.06.41. on 12.07.41., 36 pages !!! Through Wikipedia and then follow the links in it to a large selection from the Archive! I read it myself! See TsAMO Archive, Fund 3447, Inventory 1, Case 29
  10. +6
    July 25 2017
    I want to add what seems to Zhukov as the main danger was a direct Germans strike on Kiev. The first level of defense is fortification. the second cutting blows aimed at cutting the Sokalsky ledge from where the main blow was expected. Right before the war, forces were deployed under Kiev. They were supposed to be the last level to stop this threat.
  11. +4
    July 25 2017
    The beginning of the construction of fortifications on the Bialystok ledge was begun even before Zhukov. At that time, it was apparently believed that the Bialystok ledge was a convenient position for an attack on Prussia. For Zhukov, the priority was the Sokalsky ledge. In terms of covering the beginning of 1941, the offensive from the Bialystok ledge should lag behind the actions of the KOVO in time. Under these conditions, it was dangerous to keep troops on the entire Bialystoks ledge. But fortifications were already under construction and they determined the deployment of troops. The presence of fortifications required the deployment of troops close to the border. The first echelons of the border corps were not of sufficient density for stable front retention. For this, according to the field charter, a density of 8-12 km per division was required. There was no such density in the first echelon. Lower density was allowed only during the defense of long-term fortifications. Outside of the use of fortifications, the pre-war disposition of troops lost all its meaning. Unfortunately, the fortifications could be no less ready only in the spring of 1942. The hull mechs were to compensate for the weakness of the first echelon. They had to insure the frontier corps from a breakthrough. Second tier. The so-called deep divisions did not manage to take up combat positions 100 km from the border at all and often entered combat in marching formations. their density as well as the first echelon was not sufficient for sustainable defense
  12. +5
    July 25 2017
    I would like to know more about the Brest Fortress. Brest fortified area. One of the most-most world .... What was there who was there as it was (the film "I am a Russian soldier" watched ... A hard feat ... I respect) .... but ... how it happened .. Well, it’s not at the village of Klyuevka that a platoon dies .... In fact, the Russians themselves built, created, strengthened ...... and during WW II they stormed, defended, surrendered and again stormed ... With clay Tour -Bore was more interesting
  13. +8
    July 26 2017
    By the way, in December1945, a game similar to the game of January 1941 was held in Wündsdorf - for the Germans Marshal Zhukov (chief of staff Marshal Sokolovsky) for ours Marshal Konev (chief of staff general regiment Antonov) ---...... iiiii after 6 weeks of fighting, Konev managed to stop \ stabilize the front along the Narva-Pskov-Smolensk-Kiev-Uman-Zaporozhye-Perekop line, and then a powerful counterattack began, but this was another game.
  14. +5
    July 26 2017
    Quote from the article:
    There are eyewitnesses that Pavlov turned to the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress. GSh did not give permission.

    All "exactly"just the opposite.
    According to Sandalov’s memoirs, the commander of the 4th Army, General Chuykov repeatedly appealed to Pavlova district and the People’s Commissar with a request to withdraw troops from the Brest Fortress. He also repeatedly refused Pavlov, probably managed to convince the chief of the General Staff. A few days later we received an official written order confirming that Pavlov was in the district and the people's commissariat. However, at the end of 1940 they gave the green light to partially unload the fortress. The 55th division was withdrawn, the 6th remained in the fortress.
    However, in February-March 1941, four months before the war, on the initiative and order of the commander of the district Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Pavlov, the 42nd Infantry Division was introduced into the fortress, instead of the withdrawn 55th Infantry Division.
    From the memories of Sandalov:
    Pavlov probably managed to convince the chief of the General Staff (Zhukov) A few days later we received formal written order, confirming everything that Pavlov expressed verbally. We were allowed to leave one rifle regiment of the 42nd division outside the fortress and place it in the area of ​​Zhabinka.

    The commander of the ZAPOVO, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Pavlov tried to fill the fortress with troops as much as possible, so that the Wehrmacht could block, lock them in the fortress and destroy them.
    This opportunity provided by the commander of the ZAPOVO Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Pavlov, the Wehrmacht fully used.
    1. +7
      July 27 2017
      Thank you for your restraint!
      I respect the opinion of the front-line soldiers, but ... The opinion of this comrade should be checked, but there are no documents from that period. The command of the 4 Army - and not only the commander, but also the 2 face in the army - Sandals should have been guilty for the situation in Brest. He had to try very hard to stay alive and "wash" after the war in order to remain among the "clean ones". You want to believe him about the events of the beginning of the war - your right. But the document on the prohibition of the withdrawal of border units from the PPD. The same directive exists according to ZOVOVO - I don’t have time to find it)))
      Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the KOVO Military Council
      13.06.1941 No. 504205cc / s

      To increase the combat readiness of the district troops to 1 in July 1941, transfer all subdivision divisions and corps control units with corps closer to the state border to new camps: 1) 31 SC - by march;
      2) 36 ck - hike; 3) 55 ck - hike; 4) 49 ck - by rail and trekking; 5) 37 ck - hike.
      Border divisions should be left in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be made only on my special order.
      People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
      Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov
      1. +3
        July 27 2017
        Quote: aKtoR
        I respect the opinion of the war veterans, but..


        You write that you respect the opinion of the war veterans, but besides Sandalov, former chief of staff of the 4th Army.
        At the same time, you write that “there are memories eyewitnessesthat Pavlov turned to the General Staff (i.e. to army generals, Heroes of the Soviet Union, future marshals of victory to Meretskov and Zhukov) with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress. The General Staff (ie, to the Marshals of victory, Meretskov and Zhukov) did not give permission. "
        Sandalov as an eyewitness, does not deserve your trust, this Your right is to believe him or not to believe.
        So could you name these eyewitnesses that you namelessly mentioned in the article and who deserve your trust, and also indicate their works, memoirs, other documents where they wrote that Pavlov turned to the General Staff (i.e., army generals, Heroes of the Soviet Union, future marshals of victory Meretskov and Zhukov) with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from Brest fortresses.
        1. +6
          July 30 2017
          I wrote that the source deserves my trust ("... who deserve your trust"). Sorry, you are distorting. Yes, on a couple of sites there is a mention of such negotiations. Since there is no reliable source of information - it is mentioned in passing. The source you cited is the person concerned — that is what I wrote.
          The right of the commander of the 4 Army and his chief of staff was to raise and withdraw at least half of the troops. So did 15 ck in Potapov's 5 Army. Your source avoided such an accusation - they are equivalent to the accusation of Pavlov (I mean during the discussion on our forum).
          There are no documented data on Pavlov’s talk - you yourself know this very well.
          There are only indirect. When any subordinate molesters to the chief, he will, not by volition, the same question asks his superior. And then the opinion of the superior superior is voiced to his subordinates as his own. You have not met with this?
          Here is an indirect mention in the directive of the General Staff: "... Border divisions should be left in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be made only on my special order...
          People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
          Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov ".

          The CA leadership "got out" with requests for the redeployment of border divisions - the leadership responded.
          What does Meretskov do with it? You have already read that until May of the German divisions (from October 1940) our intelligence counted only 82-84 against more than 160 Soviet (including internal districts up to the meridian of the Moscow Military District). Why was Germany afraid in the period before May?
          1. +1
            August 2 2017
            Quote: aKtoR
            There are no documented data on Pavlov’s talk - you yourself know this very well.

            The fact of the matter is that I do not know these eyewitnesses and who would recall that Pavlov turned to the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress, but the General Staff did not give permission.
            Therefore, I turned to you with the hope to find out the names of these eyewitnesses, but it turns out even to you they are unknown. It is a pity that you do not know who these eyewitnesses are, but whose opinion you already trust, and even without documented evidence of Pavlov’s conversations? It is a pity that you do not know where they left their recollections that Pavlov contacted the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress and that the General Staff did not give permission, but you are sure that there are precisely such memories somewhere. Therefore, in their article, they mentioned the recollections of eyewitnesses about that. that Pavlov applied to the General Staff with a proposal to withdraw parts of the SD from the Brest Fortress and that the General Staff did not give permission. Your right.
      2. 0
        30 September 2017
        I give a link to the top-level encryption of PribOVO dated 22.06.41.: TsAMO Archive, Fund 858, Listing 1, Case 34, Document 74
  15. +3
    July 26 2017
    Quote from the article:
    General D.G. Pavlov is just one of many generals who in June 1941 did not know how to fight in a new way...


    Commander of the ZAPOVO Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Pavlov is a well-trained professional military man.
    He began serving in the army at the age of 18. In tsarist Russia, he rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer. Then he served in the Red Army. He went through the Civil War, in command positions, fought in Spain, on the Halkin Gol, participated in the Soviet-Finnish conflict (Winter War).
    He completed the full course of study at the Omsk Infantry School named after the Comintern, was awarded a valuable gift - binoculars for his academic excellence. In those days, tsarist Russia did not have its own optical-mechanical production, and in the early years of Soviet power optical devices were not yet produced and binoculars were a very valuable gift. Then three years he studied at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, also studied for a year at academic courses at the Military Technical Academy.
    On the eve of the war he participated in a large military strategic game.
    Army General Pavlov had more than enough combat experience and knowledge.
    Just in June 1941, the commander of the ZapOVO, then the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Pavlov, member of the CPSU (b) since 1919 fought against the red army and this one achieved very significant successes.
    1. +2
      July 26 2017
      WO commander had the right to independently announce mobilization?
      1. +10
        July 27 2017
        No, it was strictly forbidden. VO commanders could not even change the location of the formations and units without the permission of the General Staff. Here is an example of relocating connections.
        Note by the Military Council of KOVO to the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR Marshal Tymoshenko
        11.06.1941 No. 01 / 00210cc / s

        In order to enhance the combat readiness of the KOVO troops, I ask you to allow to carry out this July from 1. following activities:
        1. The 62 st division [fir-tree] division should be transferred from Lutsk to a camp site in the Radzihuv area (40 km s [th] -z [western] Kovel), Oletsk, Dolsk, Tuzhisk.
        2. The 135 st division [fir-tree] division shall be transferred to the camp site from the region of Ostrug to the camp of the 62 st division [fir-tree] division - Lutsk.
        3. The 193 th rifle division should be transferred by rail or by trek from Korosten to Povursky camp ...
        Commander-in-Chief of KOVO, Colonel-General Kirponos
        Member of the Military Council of KOVO Corps Commissar Vashugin
        Chief of Staff KOVO, Lieutenant-General Purkaev
        1. 0
          30 September 2017
          Found traces of the GSh directive dated 18.06.41/833/1. See the encryption from PribOVO (I give the link) TsAMO Archive, Fund 13, Listing 3872, Case XNUMX, Document XNUMX / sh
      2. +5
        July 27 2017
        Mobilization can be announced only by the country's leadership. This is an axiom. One of the accusations against Blucher was that he arbitrarily declared mobilization in the Far East. This is beyond reason.
        BUT the question must be posed differently. What could the commanders in the field do. Read
        IX. Raise parts on combat alert

        1. The raising of units for combat alert shall have the right to produce:

        a) people's commissar of defense;
        b) the military council of the district;
        c) military councils of armies;
        d) persons having instructions signed only by the people's commissar of defense or the military council of the district;

        e) commanders of formations and units in the part [relating to] units subordinate to them.
        1. +5
          July 28 2017
          Exact remark! He could not even raise his registration
          1. +3
            July 29 2017
            The enlisted staff is already the replenishment of divisions to wartime states. Nobody can do this. But they could raise troops and withdraw them from the towns. Theoretically, of course. What it looked like at that time, we don’t understand.
            Pavlov’s problem was not that he was a traitor. No need to look for any underlying reasons. It’s just that a person did not correspond to his position. A mess reigned at headquarters. They praised Pavlov as a tankman. But we must not forget that it was Pavlov who opposed the creation of the T-34. That is, and as a specialist, his knowledge left much to be desired. And the "backward" Voroshilov restored the production of the T-34.
            Truth is multifaceted, like a glass. Not so simple
            1. +6
              July 30 2017
              Not always up to the regular number, 2-3 could lift hundreds of people. Different options were.
              In the initial period, the T-34 had many opponents - no one knew what a mass tank should have been to replace the T-26, T-28 and BT. The tank had quite a few negative qualities, we know that the tank was flawed, its working out (experimental) did not go as it should have been. The head of all tanks, of course, could not be happy. The resource was, unfortunately, too small. It is difficult to judge until you figure out the documents of that time - I do not aspire to this. Instead of T-34, some BT-20, BT-IS or other variants could appear (do not be Pavlova).
              But I agree with your opinion
              1. +2
                July 30 2017
                Let's start with the tank
                Yes, the T-34 was a crude tank. But the professional tanker Pavlov did not see its potential. And he proposed to produce the T-50. Light tank. Has anyone heard of this tank? And for some reason, the horse-drawn Voroshilov stepped on precisely the production of the T-34. It tells me something.
                As far as I know, the enlisted personnel are people assigned to Vlinsky units, which during the WAR are sent to specific units. That is, they must leave the national economy. Without declaring war, this is simply impossible. So no one could raise any membership. It’s another matter to raise the Aoysk on alarm and deliver it to the defensive areas according to plan
                But we have a poor idea of ​​the real situation. For such a decision, it is necessary to have not just a will, but an unbroken will and confidence. This decision will be able to make units
                So the decision was made by the commander of the Surroundings, individual commanders. But in the mass of swine it is unrealistic. And not only in the Red Army. Both the Urantians and the Americans have very few such examples.
    2. +7
      July 27 2017
      The conspiracy of the generals ... Everyone remains his opinion
      1. +4
        20 September 2017
        Take a look at the study on "The actions of the troops of the fronts in the directions of the main attack of the German troops in June-July 1941" (name from memory). So it shows that the North-Western Front used more than 50% of its troops in the main strike zone of the North group, and the Western and South-Western ones - from 10 to 15%. This suggests that in the Baltic countries they fought, and to the south - maneuvered, engaged in “relocations”, from Brest to Minsk, then to Smolensk, or from Lvov to Odessa, then to Kiev, Crimea and Rostov. The striking difference is impressive. In the Baltic states, the least tanks were at our front, the 11th Army of the NWF from 26.06.41/30.06.41/28.06. until 11/360/XNUMX. It was considered surrounded and defeated, with a captive headquarters, and she fought, retreating in an environment from which she came out with headquarters and a combat banner! Commander Morozov XNUMX/XNUMX. he asked for help near Dvinsk, for which the Lelyushenko’s corps then fought - and the XNUMXth army would have escaped from the encirclement there (with wounded XNUMX wagons), but the headquarters of the NWF considered this a German trap and did not render assistance. There was no coordination of actions with the encirclement on all fronts!
  16. +9
    July 26 2017
    I read all 3 articles - thanks, it was very interesting.
    According to Pavlov - he is a tanker and appoint him com. County / Front is a blatant mistake. Blame Pavlov for the defeat of 1941. not properly. Having discovered a breakthrough of the 2nd of this year Gudarian, he immediately ordered the retreat. The defeat occurred due to the blow of the 3rd of this year. Gotha. She broke the front of the NWF and after the capture of Vilnius turned to Minsk. This is the failure of the General Staff, not Pavlov.
    And even if the USSR did not prepare for filling, and did not expect a flood, therefore:
    1. Headquarters of Prib.OVO - 20.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX - front headquarters.
    2. Why sk and uk were pulled up to the border itself, and 22td 14mk was in the area of ​​Brest.
    3. Why in the spring of 1941 urgently reorganized the SD into the State Duma.
    1. +15
      July 27 2017
      Thank!! According to PribOVO = the next part - you can not even imagine how interesting and sad it is.
      Spring 1941 re-formation of diabetes in the GDM. This was in the 3 part.
      Special post RU №660279cc 11.03.1941. This report is the first time that 5 parachute divisions and 5 German airborne divisions are mentioned (10 in total). It also mentions the formation of artillery regiments (two-divisional personnel) in heavy tank divisions (which the Germans did not have) with the use of eight-eight anti-aircraft guns.
      In response to this, 5 airborne corps are formed (8040 people in each + one more VD brigade) and 10 PT brigades. Since the strength of the Armed Forces has exceeded the maximum agreed by the government, 11 cd and 10 cd are simultaneously disbanded into mountain rifle states. This meant that their staff size was less than SD and in peacetime they are kept in smaller states than SD even on the 2 line.
      According to Brest, I will express only my personal opinion - there is no other information that is documented.
      Unfortunately, the command of the NCO and the GSH are stuck between the 1 and 2 world wars. Probably, therefore, they thought that it was possible (if necessary) to defend themselves in a fortress. By indirect data, this is confirmed by the fact that the memoirs speak of the error of disarming the old SD. According to the author, this is not such a mistake. DOTS built 20-30-ies were practically not intended for war with the trained and maneuverable army 1941 of the year. In the old SD there were almost no artillery bunkers (for example, in the Kiev SD there was not one, only 12 open concreted trenches). And even if they were, the 76-mm mountain (or regimental) gun from the bunker could not hit the German tank with enhanced armor. At the same time, the huge embrasures, closed with relatively thin armor, made the artillery casemates an easy-hit target with armored self-propelled guns.
      A similar problem with machine gun pillboxes - they all had frontal embrasures (which could also hit artillery fire, but due to their much smaller dimensions, much more difficult. But it was possible to cover the ground with explosions. After the Finnish war, it changed a little and the construction of pillboxes (of course, not all). Thank you, if you have read it)))
      1. +4
        July 27 2017
        I read it, thanks. But the skron had to break through the front. And the GDF of the 2nd echelon had to run to the passes and gain a foothold on them. And in this they are better sd and so on. But here is the contradiction if they wanted to defend themselves:
        1. We withdraw troops from the Bialystok ledge - this is a trap during defense.
        2. We take MK 100 km east of the Brest - Grodno - Suwalki line.
        3. Warehouses there too. And in our region of Brest, a fuel and lubricant warehouse of district / frontline value and about a dozen more such fuel and lubricant warehouses, art. And clothing supplies at a distance of less than 100km from the border.
        The contradiction is that they say about defense and the location of troops, warehouses, airfields and the hospital suggests the opposite.
        1. +7
          July 28 2017
          Hi! The mistake of many researchers is that they think in terms of the present tense.
          Bialystok ledge. Look in the message there is a map. It shows in green the three directions of strikes against Bialystok, as the General Staff imagined. At the base of these blows are located on one MK - all for science. Only science, unfortunately, turned out to be different ...
          Therefore, no one departed from the ledge: they thought that to constrain the forces of the enemy and systematically retreating at a speed of 15 km / day would go to Volkovysk-Baranovichi.
          About gsd. On the map of the location of the troops there are no rifle corps about which you wrote. As the new Cover Plans were developed, the old ones were destroyed. New was not in the army. And 40 days have passed since the sending of the directive for the development of plans. To prepare me for the offensive ka (as the rezunist say) it was necessary at least 20-30 days to plan this offensive since 22 June
          1. +5
            20 September 2017
            From Bialystok, the 6th mechanized corps of the 10th army was to be beaten to Suwalki (abroad) according to Zhukov's plan. But 22.06/100. they began to form the KMG of General Boldin, and wait for the mechanized corps and cavcopus for a “concentric strike” (under bombardment). The corps approached. Pavlov gave the fatal command for everyone to strike not at Suwalki, but at Grodno (up to 6 km), which the Germans had already occupied and had already mined the approaches, where necessary, had deployed artillery. Their tanks went further to Minsk. 23.06-micron, the most powerful on the theater, 30/24.06. moved to Grodno, losing tanks under the bombs, then on mines, lost 25.06%, before reaching the Germans. He did not find German tanks. Disorganization was added by Marshal Kulik, who crushed everyone there. They are already 6. were surrounded from which Marshal Kulik got out in peasant clothes on a cart along the road with advancing German columns. 10/28. The 90th mechanized corps from above was moved back to Bialystok, again through minefields and bombing. The headquarters bombed especially precisely, because Germans took direction on all walkie-talkies. The Chief of Staff of the 22.06th Army, General Pyotr Lyapin, gathered the survivors and led a large group with horse carts (several thousand gathered from all sides) from the encirclement. Minsk was taken on the 15th, by this time all our first-line mechanized corps had lost XNUMX% of their armored vehicles, not so much for military reasons as for technical reasons. Basically she was abandoned (not everyone knew how to blow up). Lyapin with the group (and the banner of the army) left the encirclement already beyond Minsk. Several of our divisions got into the environment west of Bialystok - already with spent BC. Until XNUMX/XNUMX. it was strictly forbidden to give out ammunition to their depots; they had XNUMX rounds per barrel (guard ammunition). Their artillery did not return to them from the proving ground outside Minsk (even in the territory of the KOVO neighbor), or returned without shells. On the Brest direction was almost the same as on Bialystok.
        2. +6
          July 28 2017
          Dear Kord, I wonder how you think))
          Move away from stereotypes and try to formulate the idea that the USSR was saved by an undeployed army from the complete enslavement of Germany.
          Try to justify)))
          1. +3
            20 September 2017
            The number of armed forces of the USSR in 1988 amounted to 5 million 266 thousand people, including:
            ground forces - 2 million people
            air force - 454 thousand people
            navy - 477 thousand people
            (Strategic Missile Forces) strategic missile forces - 298 thousand people
            air defense troops - 520 thousand people
            construction and auxiliary troops - 1 million 477 thousand people
            border troops - 230 thousand people
            internal troops - 340 thousand people.
            It was the largest army in the world.
      2. +5
        20 September 2017
        Hundreds of ready-made pillboxes along the old border is a myth. Almost all of them were of low-quality unfinished, although adopted by acts of acceptance. And about 10000 people worked there. some years. Some underground structures have already flooded groundwater. The 1939 NGO commission recognized the entire strip of SD as unfinished and unfinished even according to a bad project, declassified and unprotected by anyone, without a foreground strip at all. Armament for her (the junk from the civil war) peacefully rusted in warehouses. It was decided to build SDs on the new border. They were built, built, but again by 22.06.41. unfinished, no more than 10-20% of the structures were accepted according to acts. But it was possible to fight in unfinished, and began to fight, in some places heroically held to the last bullet. However, there was no general fire system, there was no foreland, the Germans partly circumvented them, and partly shot or detonated. Near Brest, for example, or Alytus in Lithuania. For a day or two, the Germans crushed them and defeated them as URs. All the enormous labors and money of the country went to dust. But in the end everyone, even the super-powerful German and French, URs in Europe, built for decades, ended up in this.
    2. +5
      20 September 2017
      If only sd, but cavalry divisions began to be reorganized into tank! And they started with the fact that the horse and veterinary service were taken out of the staff and removed from the feed allowance. Horses, a harness and carts (sleds) were handed over to collective farms before they received armored vehicles and motor vehicles (most of them used, 2nd category, many without rubber, spare parts, tools, etc.). And most importantly - without specialist technicians for the operation and repair. "Horse" marshals were removed from the game, but beaten by the total power of the Red Army. The equestrian staff in the SD was also up to 3000 goals in the state, all the logistical support of the division was 90% horse-drawn - and the horses were suddenly taken away ... A blow to the rear services, to the medical service, and to the battalion artillery - it was left without a horse reserve!
  17. 0
    July 27 2017
    Afterword
    1. Bitterly.
    2. It is annoying that in this world there are still apologists for the villain and ghoul of the Russian people.
    Let the FSB ban me, but I can not help but say that the same kgb-fsb -2 (!) Times led the country to the abyss:
    - first time in 41
    - the second time in 91.
    And these individuals teach us how to live. Contempt is only one emotion.
    Actually, everything.
    1. +3
      July 27 2017
      in more detail pzhlst b ghoul and villain
      1. +1
        July 27 2017
        you are welcome. The All-Union Army of the Russian Federation has a little less than a million personnel officers and 2-3 million mobility reserves.
        Now the question is: what will happen to the leader of the country (even the African one) if he "suddenly" loses the whole personnel army, and in addition a mobile reserve? Will they get fired? ... Hmm ... to say the least.
        In general, I do not consider it necessary to comment on fetishism, which is frenzied worship of the mustachioed Georgian half a century ago. This is a matter of psychiatry, not politics.
        1. +3
          20 September 2017
          The number of armed forces of the USSR in 1988 amounted to 5 million 266 thousand people, including:
          ground forces - 2 million people
          air force - 454 thousand people
          navy - 477 thousand people
          (Strategic Missile Forces) strategic missile forces - 298 thousand people
          air defense troops - 520 thousand people
          construction and auxiliary troops - 1 million 477 thousand people
          border troops - 230 thousand people
          internal troops - 340 thousand people.
          It was the largest army in the world.
    2. +5
      July 27 2017
      Quote: Klaus
      - first time in 41


      If possible in more detail, at least in general terms, as "kgb-fsb" led the country for the first time in 1941 to the abyss. After all, this is the topic of the article.
      Also join Rey_ka about ghoul and villain.
      1. +1
        July 27 2017
        As for 41, it is precisely known that intelligence reported on the movements of the Germans at the border. Ordinary employees worked as they should. But the apparatus, as a whole, was imprisoned for licking the boots of higher authorities and mutual responsibility. Hence all the troubles. From here the USSR fell apart, and Felix was demolished from the square. A disgrace.
        Roughly speaking, they sold a handful of the country from above, and the whole chain didn’t care. The author and ideological inspirer of such a system of state administration is a mustachioed Georgian, so beloved by many.
        1. +7
          July 28 2017
          About exactly knew, give two any excerpts from intelligence reports and see if she knew or not exactly. A mud watered do not understand a lot of lovers. Come on, bring, I'll wait
          1. 0
            July 28 2017
            And since when have secret intelligence and intelligence information been available to us? I do not want to operate on any journalism about Sorge and the like. I reason in terms of logic and common sense. Not to know about the impending war - it was necessary to sit with your ears closed and blindfolded, since the concentration of so many divisions on the border would not notice only the deaf-mute. Yes, and military intelligence at all levels, I think, did not doze off, and was aware that something was up in June. And I’m sure that many commanders understood the situation, but. But here I am leading to the fact that the state security system (if I am not mistaken, at that time still under the jurisdiction of the NKVD, the NKGB later, will appear in 43-44) was so ideological and focused on a cry from above that any initiative to take urgent measures to bring troops into full combat readiness - was regarded as alarmism and provocation.
            I do not want to go further into lengthy thoughts about politics and ideology in the army, for this is a topic of a separate big topic.
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. +5
              July 30 2017
              Secret information is already quite a while in the public domain. You throw comments, and the first two parts did not even read. Or do you just have a job like this: post such messages?
  18. +3
    July 27 2017
    Interesting article. In my opinion, it once again shows that the surprise attack was essentially not. But it is not worth it to water the Soviet generals with slops for a lost border battle. After all, they were outplayed by the Germans, who managed to hone their tactics in 2 years of battles, train troops against such opponents as the French and British. In addition, they had the opportunity to conduct several wars against frankly weak opponents (the Kingdom of Serbs and Croats, Greece, Holland, Norway and of course Poland). There they more or less didn’t strain, they managed to hone their skills with minimal losses. And the USSR had one war with Finland and a showdown with Japan at the level of a microscopic conflict.
    So strictly Pavlov and the rest should not be judged for their decisions. None of us were in their place. And not the fact that there was an opportunity to make other decisions. All are strong and smart in hindsight.
    Of course, we can say that they were appointed extreme, but to be a commander is not only the tzatsks sparkle at the parade, but also be responsible for following orders and for the lives of their soldiers. They certainly didn’t fulfill this.
    1. +3
      July 29 2017
      Quote: Mac Sim
      After all, the Germans outplayed them,


      You know that hours before the war, hours before the start of hostilities the generals in the main border districts, namely ZAPOVO and KOVO, massively went to join the beautiful, i.e. to theaters, concerts, festivities and other recreational activities.
      So, for example, the commander of the ZAPOVO Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Pavlov with the district headquarters, with their families, went to the district Officer’s House in Minsk on the evening of June 21, 1941 to watch "The Wedding in the Robin". His subordinate commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, also a few hours before the war, a few hours before the outbreak of hostilities and also as a higher command with the army headquarters, went with their families to watch the "Gypsy Baron" in Kobrin. You know that the 4th Army was to hold the defense in the direction of the main attack of the Army Group Center Wehrmacht. Similarly, in Brest, directly on the border, the 4th Army’s PMC General Shlykov, with corps command, with division commanders, and also several hours before the war, several hours before the outbreak of hostilities, literally at the border and also with his subordinates, and with their families went to watch a concert of the Moscow stage.
      While Wehrmacht troops fully prepared for the strike, i.e. mortar guns were put into combat positions, delivered ammunition, dug trenches-slots, refueled fuel and ammunition tank planes and other equipment, especially not lurking, in front of our generals, and in the Red Army at the same time a few hours before the war the bulk of the Soviet generals and command staff enjoyed wonderful at performances and concerts. After performances, concerts, generals and the average command We also went to banquets with artists, to take on the chest for high art. The personnel, privates and junior command personnel also go on June 21, 1941, a few hours before the hostilities, to watch performances, movies, concerts, themselves participate in amateur performances and concerts, festivities in city parks and gardens.
      So what result can be expected from such a service, from such performance of official duties by the generals and senior command staff of the Red Army?
      Of course, the Wehrmacht generals will replay the "poor" generals of the Red Army, they are not yet trained to fight.
      1. 0
        August 2 2017
        Actually, not everyone went to join. In the KVO, for example, some units were alerted several hours before the attack. And the fleet did not sleep.
        In addition, even after the "sudden" attack, the Red Army troops lost the battle one by one until Moscow. So let's be objective - the Wehrmacht in 1941 fought better. This, of course, does not diminish the merits of the Red Army generals.
    2. 0
      July 31 2018
      What do you mean by a surprise attack ??
  19. +4
    July 28 2017
    No preliminary reconnaissance was carried out, no information about the enemy was received from higher authorities.
    Again, combined arms commanders were not able to use tanks wisely ...

    - peasants - on haymaking.?!
  20. +5
    20 September 2017
    As a former tanker (in the 60s), I advise the author to visit at least one tank fleet, a tank training ground and a divisional ARVB - a separate repair and restoration battalion of a tank division. After this, the author herself will understand that for statements about the incapacity of the tank and mechanized corps in 1939, General Pavlov had to be imprisoned, not promoted. A tank is not an armored unit, but a system of weapons and its operation, with the CORRECT system for training, guarding, accounting and storing all iron and lubricating fuel, with repair and disposal, with many training and operational specialties, with personnel trained in science up to the psychology of crews, not to mention the tactics of the combat use of this entire volumetric system. One adjustment, even in the simplest tank of the 30s (without a radio station) is enough for a textbook with pictures. One electrical circuit on a 40s tank was already setting the table, and on a 50s tank and beyond, it was already a wall. Without trained technicians - and there were 15-25% of the staff in 1939, as well as repairmen - the 1941 tank could have traveled an average of 100-150 km of "overhaul mileage". And Zhukov planned for him "operational" counterattacks of 200-300 km and counterattacks of up to 500 km. He fell from the moon? He came from the cavalry and from the machine gun school in St. Petersburg. With all his commanding, even commander, talent for armored vehicles and artillery, he did not know in real life. He believed that a gunner or a Cossack could be made a tanker in a year - without classes, teachers, teaching aids, cutaway layouts, tank dodges, training grounds, etc. But the tank drove (if wound up at all) its 150 - and stood up for repairs, which was not there. Then the Germans took it - or blew their own, the Germans for spare parts. It's simple - all of our armored vehicles in 1941 objectively had to stand up ALL during the week of movement. Which is what happened.
    1. 0
      28 September 2017
      As a former submariner .... Completely for ... Isho history does not know what happened with 671, 670, 675 .... I went to the reserve by order ... escorted the darling ... paw to the ear .... Next our cat was sitting "Basmach" - he was crying, have you seen cats cry?
  21. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    GKZhukov in the above 5 excerpts took errors as the head of the General Staff. They DON'T LIE

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  22. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aszzz888
    it’s rather already, for amateur historians ...

    The cost of certain types of Soviet tanks by years
    ATTENTION! When using the materials in this table, a link to it is required!
    Wartime tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
    T-34 (Plant No. 183*) 596 373 429 256 249 256 165 810 141 822 140 996 136 380
    T-34 (Plant No. 183**) - 510 - 000 166 300 136
    T-34 (Plant No. 112) - - - 209 700 179 300
    T-34 (Plant No. 174) - - - 3 127 000 2
    T-34 (UZTM) - - - 273800 190800 179400 -
    KV-1s (ChKZ) - - - 300 200 246 000 - -
    IS-2 (ChKZ) - - - - 347 900 264
    IS-3 (CHKZ) - - - - - - 267200
    Notes:
    * - figures from the plant report
    ** - figures from the report of the People’s Commissariat
    Self-propelled artillery mounts
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1942 1943 1944 1945
    2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y
    SU-122 203 900 175 - - - -
    SU-85 - - 201 000 175 - -
    SU-100 - - - - 176 500 176
    Pre-war tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
    BT-2 (KhPZ) 93 313 - - - - - - -
    BT-5 (KhPZ) - - 66 830 - - - - - -
    BT-7 (KhPZ) - - - 91 309 96 453 95 326 104 168 101 094 -
    BT-7M (KhPZ) - - - - - - - 168 196 177 609
    The tables are compiled according to the NKTP reports in 1940-1945. (RGAE)
    1. +7
      October 6 2017
      Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
      When using materials of this tables reference to it is required!

      Sorry, but what you post over and over is probably very interesting ... but, unfortunately, completely unreadable ...
      Maybe, all the same, take the labor of "material" into order?

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