Once again about intelligence. In order to understand the decisions made by the leadership of PribOVO, one should understand what the Soviet intelligence reported about the situation on the border on the eve of the war with Germany. It is necessary to disconnect from our After-Knowledge and try to draw conclusions only from the submitted intelligence reports and special messages. For this purpose it is necessary to repeat separate fragments of the previously described material.
The following abbreviations will be used in the text of this and subsequent parts: AK - army corps, ap (hell) - artillery regiment (division), BAP - bomber regiment, BAT - military attache, VO - military district, GSB - mountain rifle battalion, General Staff - General headquarters, ZhBD - combat magazine, IAP - fighter aviation regiment, KA - Red Army, cd (KBR, KP) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), mk - mechanized or motorized corps, md (mp, mb) - motorized division ( regiment, battalion), NS - chief of staff, od - security (escort) division, infantry (pp, pb) - infantry division (regiment, battalion), RO - reconnaissance department of the Military Forces, RU - Intelligence Directorate of General Staff, garden - mixed air division , Sat - combat engineer battalion, NWF - North-Western Front, SD (joint venture) - Infantry Division (regiment), TD (tp, tb) - tank division (regiment, battalion), cap - assault air regiment, PMC - member of the Military Council.
In the 1 and 2 parts, special messages were presented to you, from which it can be seen that many of them contained contradictory and even fantastic information about the plans of the German leadership regarding the USSR. This misinformation was "thrust" by the first persons of Germany, the German intelligence services and the numerous officials, military and other specialists who were attracted by them. More or less accurate dates of the German attack on the USSR began to appear in messages closer to the 20 of June 1941. In addition to messages with more precise terms of attack, reports were also received with information about postponing the attack to the end of June or even August, as well as refusing to attack when certain conditions were met by the Soviet leadership. An example is a special message from "Ramsay" 17.06.41: “... The German courier told BAT ... that the war against the USSR is probably delayed until the end of June. BAT does not know whether there will be a war or not ... "
Even in the Soviet embassy in Berlin, not everyone expected the start of the June 22 war. Post German agent 21.6.41 about the opinion of the Soviet employee: “... The situation is very serious ... We firmly believe that Hitler started a giant bluff. We do not believe that war can begin tomorrow. The process is likely to continue. It is clear that the Germans intend to put pressure on us in the hope of obtaining the benefits that Hitler needs to continue the war ... ”
In order for the country's leadership and the spacecraft to believe the date of the attack, it was necessary to additionally provide information on the concentration of German troops. This concentration of troops should be sufficient to start a full-scale war with the USSR. Intelligence also had to report on the directions of the main attacks of the German troops.
From March to June 1941, the specialists of the General Staff estimated the number of German troops that only one Germany could put up for a full-scale war with the USSR, in 180 ... 200 ... 220 divisions.
Consider an excerpt from Information about the concentration of German troops: “In April - May of this year. continued concentration of German troops near the Soviet-German border. During this period, in the territory of East Prussia and the Polish Government-General established the concentration: up to 3 army groups (Headquarters: Warsaw, Ulanów, Usmezh), 10 AK, 68-70 PD, 6-8 ppm, 10 cd and 5 etc., 65 up , 2-3 aviation divisions, engineer-sapper and other special parts, including pontoon ones.
The largest grouping of troops was observed in the following areas:
1. In the Klaipeda region: up to 2 AK, 10-12 pd, 2 md, 2 cd and 2 td, 19 an and 2 air squadron.
2. Ostrow Mazowiecki: up to 1 AK, 7-8 PD, 2 cd and 5 ap.
3. Biala Podlaska: up to 1 AK, 9-10 pd and 2 etc. and up to 13 ap ...
At the same time, large military engineering works were recorded, mainly on the construction of trenches, long-term and tree-ground firing points and anti-tank obstacles ... "
The Help refers to the grouping in 68-70 German divisions in East Prussia and in the Polish Governor-General. We are talking about a territory that borders on three Soviet HE. At the same time, the Germans mention the construction of a defensive line by the Germans, saturated with bunkers and bunkers. Are the Germans going to defend themselves when attacking the spacecraft?
At the time period indicated in the certificate, the RP considered that along the entire Soviet-German border there were concentrated before 119 German divisions, of which 25 td and md. In fact, along the border stationed 71 Division, of them 4 TD and MD. Therefore, the mention in the 68-70 reference of divisions in East Prussia and in Poland is not correct information. This information is essentially misinformation.
It should not be taken literally that all the above divisions camped on the border. Not a small part of the specified number of connections was located at a considerable distance (even at a distance over 100 ... 150 km) from the border. The table below shows the number of German divisions at the border according to the RU.
The table shows that, according to the RU, from 1940 to June 1941, the number of German divisions near the border was greatly overestimated. Only by June 20 did the RP determine the exact number of divisions. Unfortunately, even this coincidence is accidental. Why? According to the RU, out of thirty-one German TD and MD twenty were concentrated against KOVO and OdVO. In fact, in this area there were only 8,5, etc. and md. RU believed that 64 front was concentrated against KOVO and OdVO, and in fact there were about 43,5 divisions. Thus, according to the information of the RU, it turned out that against the troops KOVO and OdVO concentrated on the 32 division more than they were there. Taking into account the overestimation of the grouping of German troops in Finland on the 3 divisions, the total number of "lost" units near the Soviet-German border will be 35. Subsequently, these divisions "surfaced" in other areas. It turns out that on the eve of the war, the RU provided the military and political leadership of the USSR with an incorrect assessment of the distribution of German troops in the expected theaters of military operations.
At different times, in accordance with the estimates of the RU, it was believed that German divisions were concentrated against the PribOVO troops, the number of which is given in the table.
Below is one of special messages of the NKVD: “... During the period from April 20 to May 19, an increase in German troops near the border with the USSR was expressed: In the Klaipeda region: six kp, two td and two md, nine ap, one kbr and six sat. In the district of Suwalki: one PD, one CD and one MD, two AP and one sapper regiment ... " In accordance with this announcement, 13 divisions arrived in the territory bordering the Baltic States, which is also misinformation.
In the evening of 22, June 1941, the first wartime RU was published. Intelligence No.1 / 660724 RU GSH KA on 20-00 22.6.1941 g. “... In the north [in Finland], the main grouping is made up of units of the German army, which in the Rovaniemi sector has up to 3-4's divisions, and ... in the Kirkenes area, up to three more divisions ...
The total number of enemy groups is determined by:
a) on SZF - 29 divisions, of which 4-5 td and 5 md
b) on the Western front, in the Warsaw district - 31 division, of which 21 pd, 1 md, 4 td and 1 cd
c) on the South-Western Front (before Slovakia) - 48 divisions, of which 5 md and 6 etc.
In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania, 33-35 divisions, of which 4 td, 11 md and 1 mountain infantry ... Front-line enemy reserves in the area of Częstochowa, Breslau, Moravian Ostrava to 7 divisions. The reserves of the High Command on 20.6 consist of 17-20 divisions located in the central regions of Germany ...
CONCLUSION: Opponent for 22.6. brought significant forces into battle, namely: 37-39 infantry, 5 motorized, 8 tank, and the total 50-52 division ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»
A fairly calm and optimistic report, which again speaks of the 29 German divisions against the North-West Front. True, part of the individual tank battalions and regiments, which were previously brought in intelligence reconnaissance, turned into full-fledged ones. In fact, against the PribOVO troops as part of two tank groups, 4 MK (13 td and md) were put up. On the first day of the war, he crossed the Soviet-German border or already took part in hostilities of more than 70 German divisions. 40 divisions are set against PribOVO; 26 of them have entered into clashes or crossed the border (six more divisions have no information).
On the Internet, there is a publicly available information form for the RU of 22 June 1941. We see that 9 and 18 armies, 13 rd, 4 md and 4 td are marked against the NWF troops. The document again does not mention tank groups - they were not found. It is spoken only about separate td and md. Suddenly, the Td that appeared did not even have numbers - these are the consequences of a carefully thought-out and elaborated plan by the German military command to disguise and concentrate troops.
Intelligence No.2 / 660731 RU GSH KA on 23-00 23.6.1941 “... The composition of the enemy forces against the NWF, as indicated in Intelligence No. XXUMX, remains unchanged. With the corresponding grouping of forces in the Tilzitsky and Kaunas-Vilna directions, the enemy has provided a three-fold superiority on 1 against our covering divisions ...
CONCLUSION: 1. The total number of forces entered by the enemy towards the end of 23.6 is the division's 62-64 ...
3. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the enemy forces compared to our covering divisions in the directions of its main attacks, it is necessary to evaluate the actions of our troops for June 22 and 23 as a whole as very positive, and recognize the rate of advance of the enemy as low ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»
The number of divisions in the bulletin increases from 50-52 to 62-64, but again, the estimate of the RU is delayed. Crossed the border or joined the battle for about 90 divisions. The situation on the NWF and the Western Front began to get out of control of the command.
Intelligence No.4 / 660751 RU GSH KA on 22-00 25.6.1941 "... On the offensive front from the Baltic Sea to Romania, the enemy launched 88-90 divisions, of which 72-73 were directly in combat, distributed as follows:
a) against SZF - 22 divisions, of which 4 td and 4 md
b) against the Western Front - 25 divisions, of which 4 td and 4 md
c) against the South-Western Front (without Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) 25-26 divisions, of which 6 td and 3 md ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»
On this day, the 3-I tank group turned in the direction of the Western Front. Our scouts are trying to work, but, unfortunately, they are in tight time pressure. The information coming from intelligence at all levels, to put it mildly, is incomplete ... In conditions of total misinformation and the strictest secrecy from Germany, Soviet intelligence could not reveal the exact number of German troops near the border. Very much the Germans made lightning for war. In addition, the top managers of the spacecraft lived in their own categories ... Let's understand what kind of intelligence information the agency brought to the country's leadership, to the leadership of the spacecraft and military education before the war.
From July 1940, the head of the Regional Office Pribovo was Colonel A.I. Safronov (died at the end of June), and his deputies were Colonels K.N. Derevianko (from 07.40 to 06.41) and K.V. Kashnikov (from 09.40 to 06.41 g.).
In 1953, Lieutenant-General K.N. Derevianko, in reply to Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky, wrote: “... The grouping of the German fascist troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region, especially in the border areas, in the last days before the war was known to headquarters in full enough and in large parts and detail. To be convinced of this, it is enough to get acquainted with the last prewar final reconnaissance of the RO ... The data of this reconnaissance was fully confirmed by the subsequent data obtained after the start of hostilities ... I had a strong opinion that the VO command underestimated the looming threat and treated some of the distrust ...
The opened group of German fascist troops on the eve of the hostilities was regarded by the RO as an offensive grouping with considerable saturation with tanks and motorized units. The RO considered possible directions of the expected strikes of the Germans: Eidkunen-Kaunas and Turogen-Šiauliai ... "
KN Derevyanko writes that the command of the VO was completely aware of the grouping of German troops located on the border of PribOVO and the probable directions of strikes. To some readers it may seem that everything is very clear.
Here is the layout of the grouping of German troops, which was discovered by the intelligence service, and the “generals-traitors-enemies” are to blame for the lack of preparedness of the military forces! The figure also shows the especially important areas that are indicated in the project “Cover Plans ...”, as well as the expected directions of strikes, according to K. Derevianko.
Below is a link to a RO report in which district intelligence officers estimated the number of German troops and military equipment on the border with PribOVO. Data on the number of military equipment was not obtained from agents abroad and their sources of information, but were calculated by specialists of the RO.
Pribovo headquarters information from 21.6.41. «On the grouping of forces and equipment of the German troops in East Prussia to 18 watches 21.6.41 g...
Link to intelligence report http://makeyev.msk.ru/pub/NeProhodiMimo/sbd_34
Deputy Chief of the RO of the PribOVO headquarters, Colonel Kashnikov, Head of the 3 branch of the RO Major Major Korenevsky»
The figure below shows only the summary information of this intelligence.
In accordance with this document in the East Prussia (to the city of Suwalki), Pribovo is opposed to the troops: 19 pd, 5 md, one td, 5 tp, to 9 tb and 6-7 kp. It should be noted that from this number of divisions 16 were in the area of responsibility of PribOVO (at points of permanent deployment) from November 1940 of the year. The document is intended that these troops have 193 Battalion (distribution density 0,5 Battalion 1 km front), 660 heavy and 1505 light guns, 2312 anti-tank guns, 764 anti-aircraft guns, 764 mortar, 2473 tank (6,5 tank on 1 km front) 1743 armored vehicles (4,9 on 1 km front), 465 aircraft. It seems to be all right, there are significant forces and especially the number of tanks - 2473. In the 18 Army, in the 3 and 4 tank groups there were actually about 1735 tanks. Of course, estimated estimates should be different from the real ones. Please note that the summary does not indicate the direction of possible enemy strikes, and in the RO calculations all German forces are "smeared" on the fronti.e. are given on 1 km front. Among other things, "spread" on the front and the main military equipment of the shock groups: tanks and armored vehicles.
Interestingly, the VO leadership also distributed the 3 and 12 mic divisions along the front. When analyzing the use of guidance of the district of mechanized corps indicated: "... There is no pronounced grouping of troops, moreover, the striking force, mk, is taken apart in divisions in a number of areas ...". It turns out that the VO leadership did not know the directions of the main strikes of the German troops and, therefore, deployed the MK divisions scattered along the front. Below we consider other declassified documents in order to find an indication of the directions of the expected attacks of the German troops voiced by K. Derevianko.
Why, then, did the leadership of PribOVO concentrate somehow not hastily at the border only 6 incomplete sd and two microns (incomplete to full staff)? You can, of course, understand the anger of the scouts after the German attack: “We warned you ...”
Let me remind you that, in accordance with the unapproved "Cover Plan ...", the district leadership was assessing the grouping of troops that the German command was supposed to set aside to attack PribOVO in 48-49 divisions (of which up to 8-9 td and md). In accordance with the above intelligence data (for 10 hours before the start of the war) before the specified number is not enough twenty divisions. In fact, against the troops PribOVO was exposed 40 divisions (24 DD, 13, etc. and MD, 3 od).
It turns out that the leadership of PribOVO made a mistake only on the 8-9 divisions in its preliminary assessment of the German grouping allocated for the attack on the district troops. And intelligence (divisional, district, RU, NKGB, border guards of the NKVD, etc.) could not fully reveal the number of this group. Some readers may argue that the German 29 divisions were enough to split the PribOVO troops in parts. But we know that now! No one at that time could have imagined such a thing. In addition, we have not yet considered the deployment of these compounds before the war.
Specialists of the General Staff, who incorrectly predicted the possible attacks of the German troops, also contributed to the disinformation of the leadership of the VO. In particular, the offensive from the Suwalki bulge was expected in the following directions: Suwalki-Belostok, Suwalki-Lida and Suwalki-Olita. In other words, it can be said that only around the 1 / 3 groups concentrated on this ledge could come out against the PribOVO troops. For strikes in three directions on the ledge should have been concentrated a significant grouping of German troops.
Let's see what the scouts found. It should be remembered that there is a continuous exchange of intelligence information about German troops between the RU, RO PribOV and ZapOVO, the NKGB intelligence, the NKVD border troops, the border is flown daily by border aircraft aviationwhich, among other tasks, observe the adjacent territory.
Below is the reconnaissance of RO PribOVO. It is quite large and can be skipped because Below in the pictures you will be shown the location of the German troops in accordance with the above report. To simplify the presentation of the material in the figures, anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments (divisions) are designated as artillery. This simplification is not essential for subsequent conclusions.
Intelligence staff PribOVO from 18.6.41. "On 17.6.41 against PribOVO in the band: on the left - Suwalki, Lykk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein found: army headquarters - 2, AK headquarters - 6, front - 12, md - 5, td - 1, tp - 5 and up to 9 individual TB - only at least td, kn - 6-7, Sat - 17, airplanes - over 500.
Grouping and dislocation of parts:
in the region of Memel - the headquarters of the 291-th PD, 401-i and 610-th PP, two battalions of the 337-th PP, training battalion of the 213, PP, 33, 61, 63 hell, up to two TB, a battalion of heavy machine guns, 48, 541 th Sat, 7 th Marine Regiment, School of scuba diving;
in Melnerggen - anti-aircraft artillery division;
in Bachmann - to hell;
in Shveppeln - TB;
in Rooken - battalion 660-th PP;
in Silute - the headquarters of the 5 th PD, the headquarters of the 161 th MD, the headquarters of the 660 th, 22 th nn, one nn, division of anti-tank guns, 208 th building battalion;
in Mattsiken - hell 206-th;
Laugen - 520 st;
in Rus - battalion 14-th PP, sapper company;
in Viljayken - battalion 660 th nn;
Uzhleknen - battalion 660-th PP;
in Kloken - battalion 14-th PP, sapper company;
in Kaukemen - headquarters and battalion of 14-th PP, demining company;
in Tilsit - the headquarters of the 7-st AK, 1-th PD, 290-th PD, 8-th MD, 1-th KB; 43, 45, 216, 213, 94, 501, 502, 503; 469 headquarters, PP, GSB, 202, 204,227, 206 and 210, MP, battalion of 272, MP, 1 and 2, CP, 22, heavy, AP, 21, AP, 290, AP , 61 th ap, hell 1 th CBR, 212 th tb, 101 th tb, communication battalion of 7 st AK, 610 th separate communications battalion, 52 th pontoon battalion, 552 th and 557 th motorized carriage battalions;
in Pogogen - 291-th MP, battalion of 350-th MP, 116-th TB;
Pictupenen - headquarters 350-th MP, PB, 511-th division of anti-tank guns;
in Grezhpelken - to a company of medium tanks;
in Laugzhargen - battalion 214-th nn, to an, headquarters of the construction site;
in Wellkishken - pb;
in Heinrichswald - 44-th MP;
in Lompenen - 31 th hell of anti-tank guns;
in Eristal - headquarters and hell 67 up;
in Ragnit - 3 and 414, sat, artillery battery, motorcycle company, 41 spare battalion;
in Kursen - 405-th PP;
in Schmalleningken, PB, sapper company;
in Neukirch, headquarters 217; in addition, according to the RU, three TPs, three heavy ans and two MPs arrived from Tilzit. By
According to the RO, parts of 205 and DD and 20 are specified, two paragraphs of unknown numbering, the last in the 1 forest, km to the north-west.
In the district of Lazdenen, Insterburg, Goldap, Stallupen:
Lazdenen - battalion 41-th PP;
in Pilkallen - headquarters and two battalions of the 41-th PP, anti-aircraft artillery regiment, military hospital, cav squadron;
in Stallupenen - 214-th pp (without battalion), the headquarters of the construction site;
in Eidtkunen - two pp, battalion of 214-th pp;
in Shirvindt - pp;
in Gumbinen - the headquarters of the 12-th and 22-th AK (require verification), 16-rd; convoy Division, 27-rd and 29-th paragraphs, 6-th Mortar Regiment, 206, 570, 113 and 32-th up, 4-th regiment of anti-tank guns, 25-th m, 206-th kp, 217-I intelligence unit, 337 guard battalion, 46, 10, 501 pb, 43 th reserve battalion, 16-I aviation group (70-100 aircraft);
in Suwalki, Sejny:
in Suwalki - the headquarters of the 34-th DD, 17-th and 37-md; 254, 70, 103, 104, 134, 135 and 136-second paragraphs, and the battalion headquarters 115-th paragraphs, 70-th Mortar Regiment, 241-th up, anti-aircraft artillery regiment (given initially), 31 ..., 18- th communications battalion, 608-th reserve battalion, to the air squadron, three sat, headquarters for the construction site;
in Sejny - the headquarters of the 26 th brigade, the 12 th pp, the battalion of the 103 th pp, up to one tp, the 420 th mortar regiment, to the division of anti-tank guns, the 110 th CP, scooter battalion.
In Margrobovo - headquarters, pp, sat;
in Rachki - Sat;
in the forest southwest of Plocicno - to nn;
in Novelty - battalion 176-th pp;
in Krasnopol - to the division of anti-tank guns, Sat;
in Postovela - kp;
in Shiplishki - pb, division of anti-tank guns;
in Punsk - 412-th MP, pb;
in Filipów - pb, sat;
Visiones - 422-th MP, 408-th Sat;
in Bakalazhevo - Sat;
In the Gibs - PB, to TB.
In the area of Königsberg, Velau, Pillau:
in Koenigsberg - the headquarters of the 18 Army, 8 AK, 4 and 43, and 1 air district; 201, 217, 110, 21, and 623; 1, 4 and 19-th an, 47, 511 and 536-th an (the last 3 require verification), TP;
in Plau, the 231 and 215 regiments of naval anti-aircraft artillery (data require verification), nn, 150 aircraft.
Near Letzen, Allenstein, Johannisburg (data from the ZOVOVO Intelligence Division):
in Letzen - AK headquarters, 21-th TP, 115-th PP, an, CP;
in Likk - the headquarters of the 14-th PD, 215-th PP, 37-th up (according to 14-th PD data PO PribOVO);
Aris - headquarters, 143 and 151, and 14;
in Rustenburg - 56 and 665;
in Bischofsburg - nn;
in Allenstein - the headquarters of the 9 Army, AK and 7 traffic police headquarters; 301 th and 413 th pp, regiment of anti-tank guns, 206 th ap.
Chief of the RO Colonel Safronov»
The following summary marks the 18 of the German divisions. Given the individual battalions and regiments, the total number of divisions can be estimated to 20. In accordance with the intelligence unit of the RU, the number of German divisions against PribOVO is 29. Missing divisions are located outside the PribOVO RO area of responsibility, which in depth was limited to the Koenigsberg-Allenstein line. The territory of East Prussia is also to the west of the indicated line. It turns out that around 1 / 3 groups of German troops, planned for military operations with PribOVO (according to the estimates of the SC command), 17 June are deployed at a depth of more than 100-120 km. What kind of war can we talk about in the near future? Moving these troops to the border should reveal intelligence!
From the pictures you can see:
- Directly close to the border of PribOVO, only a small part of the troops are concentrated in the form of a certain number of PB and four regiments in the zone of the Suvalki lug. The bulk of the troops is located at a sufficiently large distance from the border;
- the city of Suwalki has three divisional headquarters and a total of up to 8 regiments at a distance of 20-25 km from the border. These forces should "in theory" be divided into three shock groups. And for this force, in fact, is not enough. Consequently, additional forces must still come;
- one more grouping of troops is concentrated near the city of Gumbinnen (the distance to the border is about 30 km);
- a large group of troops stationed in Tilcite (distance to the border 20-25 km);
- the reinforced divisional group is deployed in Memele;
- from the 40 divisions, which will be put up against the troops of PribOVO, intelligence has established the correct designations of only eight (in the name of 9, the error is one).
In order to concentrate troops remote from the border on the initial lines, an attack takes up to two days for infantry units and, theoretically, a day for TD and MD, located in the area of responsibility of PO PribOVO. Considering the huge amount of equipment in md and td and a limited number of roads - one day will not be enough ... According to the available access to the railway traffic police of German motorcycle and armored formations, it is clear that their separate parts began to focus several days before the attack, but this concentration was not reconnaissance opened up. It should be noted that only one intelligence unit was opened up by intelligence, although by June 22 only the intelligence battalions, etc., and the MD should have been more than 10. In addition, you need to tighten the connections for 100 km.
What fears the leadership of PribOVO with such good intelligence work? At least a day or two (up to a maximum of 4-5), the VO leadership is there until the German troops move to the border on the initial lines for an attack. At the same time it will be possible to determine the locations of concentration of troops and the direction of the main attacks. The leadership of the district thinks so ... The Germans discovered by the intelligence services are still less than what is required for the attack on PribOVO according to the assessment of the leadership of the district.
It should be noted that the reconnaissance detected only one full-fledged tank division and not a single MK headquarters, tank groups and the headquarters of Army Group North were found. The absence of the headquarters of the motorcycle and armored associations does not allow developing an offensive to a greater depth and surround large groups of Soviet troops. Separate tank units (regiments and battalions) can only be used to support infantry formations and AK, for carrying out private offensive operations within individual AKs. To lead the mobile shock groups need the appropriate headquarters. Without them, the rate of advance can decrease to the already familiar to us 10-15 km / day.
Since May, in East Prussia, in addition to 20, there were at least three more TDs, which intelligence has not found. Discovered by separate tank regiments and battalions could relate to these divisions. But the undercover capabilities of the Soviet intelligence service in the theater in question did not allow us to link separate motorcycle and armored units and battalions into mobile strike groups.
Among those indicated in the reconnaissance of five md, the 161-md is noted - there was no such division in the Wehrmacht. Perhaps this 161 PD? The report again did not indicate the direction of possible strikes by the German troops. In the future, we will try to understand the issue of coverage of the situation of RO PribOVO. And now let's see what the neighbors from RO ZOVOVO reported 1,5 days before the outbreak of war.
Intelligence RO ZOVOVO: “In recent days, the German command has been making reinforced transfers of troops - infantry, artillery and tanks to the borders of the USSR.
1. At the end of May, 3 and 9 ap from Biala Podlaska and 27 kp from Mezhirechye departed to the borders of the USSR.
On May 17 five armored trains arrived in Biala Podlaska. During 1-8.6.41 through Warsaw in the direction of Terespol marked movement 18 td, followed in the vanguard 11 TP.
4-10.6. to the Warsaw district, Prague concentrated 38 td. On the river Vistula marked parts flotilla with №№ 60, 300, 500, 600. The numbers are not decrypted.
From 4 to 6 June, through Rembertov station eastward (the end point was not installed) proceeded to 10 military echelons with infantry, artillery and rear units. According to unverified data, the headquarters of the eastern group at the end of April relocated to Otwock. In the area Kodeni marked up to 100 tanks.
May 18 on the airfield Belyany installed to 125 fighters. At the airport of Pulawy - 50 bombers. In late May, from Pulawy to Lublin proceeded to the infantry division. In Rozhanka arrived 475 nn.
From 6 to 12 June through Minsk Mazowiecki to Sedlec proceeded:
280 vehicles with infantry (20 — 22 people per vehicle); 900 vehicles with infantry, some of them proceeded to Lublin; 15 guns over 150 mm, 12 guns - 150 mm and 12 guns 105 mm; 75 PTO guns - 37 mm; anti-aircraft guns: 17 - 37 mm and 60 - 105 mm; Xnumx tanks. In the region of Janów Podlaski delivered to 100 aircraft, allegedly disassembled. According to unverified data, General von Klyuk came to Sokolov to recruit an army from units arriving from Yugoslavia and France.
2. According to human and radio data, the corps headquarters are installed in the following points: Radin, Lukov, Mezirechie. According to radio intelligence, in the Warsaw area, two large radio stations have been established that independently maintain contact with the headquarters of the main command, Berlin. Perhaps one of the radio stations belongs to the headquarters of the eastern group, relocated to Otwock, the second to the headquarters of the 8 army. During the period from 8 to 14 June, the most intensive flights of airplanes were noted in points: Königsberg - 41; Danzig - 35; Warsaw - 51; Breslau - 99.
3. According to RO PribOVO on 16.6, 291 PD is deployed in Klaipeda, Silute - 161 MD, Nejrich - 217 DD, Tilsit - 158 and 290 PD and 8 MD.
With 11.6. The evacuation of the families of officers from Klaipeda and Šilutė began. At the end of May, Seyny arrived - headquarters 26 PD, 12 PP, 110 CP, tank.bat and scooter battalion ...
Conclusion: 1. Previously received data on the intensive redeployment of German troops to the borders of the USSR are confirmed, mainly in the districts of Suwalki and Sedlets.
2. The data on the redeployment of the Eastern Group headquarters to Otwock and about 18 and 38 etc require additional verification.
3. In recent days, there have been numerous cases of desertion and non-execution of orders in the army, but the army as a whole is a powerful bulwark of German fascism. Chief of the RO Headquarters Zapovo Colonel Blokhin, Head of the 3 Branch of the RO Major SAMOYLOVICH 21.6.41. ”
It can be seen that in the above intelligence, there is practically no information from which it can be concluded that the war began in 1,5 days. In accordance with the reconnaissance of the air command and control unit, the number of German divisions in the Army Group Center (against ZOVOVO) was invariably: 15 divisions (of which 30 etc. md) were on May 5, 1 (30) on June 6, on 15-20 June –30 (6). The author did not manage to find reconnaissance information of RO ZOVOVO with the deployment of German units during the period 15-20 of June 1941 of the year, but with high probability it can be said that they were also located far from the border ...
Therefore, when we are told that any one reconnaissance flight of 17.6.41 on behalf of Stalin personally, allegedly, in the online mode, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and other gag, you would suggest that you do not believe in this nonsense ...