The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 7)

Once again about intelligence. In order to understand the decisions made by the leadership of PribOVO, one should understand what the Soviet intelligence reported about the situation on the border on the eve of the war with Germany. It is necessary to disconnect from our After-Knowledge and try to draw conclusions only from the submitted intelligence reports and special messages. For this purpose it is necessary to repeat separate fragments of the previously described material.

The following abbreviations will be used in the text of this and subsequent parts: AK - army corps, ap (hell) - artillery regiment (division), BAP - bomber regiment, BAT - military attache, VO - military district, GSB - mountain rifle battalion, General Staff - General headquarters, ZhBD - combat magazine, IAP - fighter aviation regiment, KA - Red Army, cd (KBR, KP) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), mk - mechanized or motorized corps, md (mp, mb) - motorized division ( regiment, battalion), NS - chief of staff, od - security (escort) division, infantry (pp, pb) - infantry division (regiment, battalion), RO - reconnaissance department of the Military Forces, RU - Intelligence Directorate of General Staff, garden - mixed air division , Sat - combat engineer battalion, NWF - North-Western Front, SD (joint venture) - Infantry Division (regiment), TD (tp, tb) - tank division (regiment, battalion), cap - assault air regiment, PMC - member of the Military Council.

In the 1 and 2 parts, special messages were presented to you, from which it can be seen that many of them contained contradictory and even fantastic information about the plans of the German leadership regarding the USSR. This misinformation was "thrust" by the first persons of Germany, the German intelligence services and the numerous officials, military and other specialists who were attracted by them. More or less accurate dates of the German attack on the USSR began to appear in messages closer to the 20 of June 1941. In addition to messages with more precise terms of attack, reports were also received with information about postponing the attack to the end of June or even August, as well as refusing to attack when certain conditions were met by the Soviet leadership. An example is a special message from "Ramsay" 17.06.41: “... The German courier told BAT ... that the war against the USSR is probably delayed until the end of June. BAT does not know whether there will be a war or not ... "

Even in the Soviet embassy in Berlin, not everyone expected the start of the June 22 war. Post German agent 21.6.41 about the opinion of the Soviet employee: “... The situation is very serious ... We firmly believe that Hitler started a giant bluff. We do not believe that war can begin tomorrow. The process is likely to continue. It is clear that the Germans intend to put pressure on us in the hope of obtaining the benefits that Hitler needs to continue the war ... ”

In order for the country's leadership and the spacecraft to believe the date of the attack, it was necessary to additionally provide information on the concentration of German troops. This concentration of troops should be sufficient to start a full-scale war with the USSR. Intelligence also had to report on the directions of the main attacks of the German troops.

From March to June 1941, the specialists of the General Staff estimated the number of German troops that only one Germany could put up for a full-scale war with the USSR, in 180 ... 200 ... 220 divisions.

Consider an excerpt from Information about the concentration of German troops: “In April - May of this year. continued concentration of German troops near the Soviet-German border. During this period, in the territory of East Prussia and the Polish Government-General established the concentration: up to 3 army groups (Headquarters: Warsaw, Ulanów, Usmezh), 10 AK, 68-70 PD, 6-8 ppm, 10 cd and 5 etc., 65 up , 2-3 aviation divisions, engineer-sapper and other special parts, including pontoon ones.

The largest grouping of troops was observed in the following areas:

1. In the Klaipeda region: up to 2 AK, 10-12 pd, 2 md, 2 cd and 2 td, 19 an and 2 air squadron.

2. Ostrow Mazowiecki: up to 1 AK, 7-8 PD, 2 cd and 5 ap.

3. Biala Podlaska: up to 1 AK, 9-10 pd and 2 etc. and up to 13 ap ...

At the same time, large military engineering works were recorded, mainly on the construction of trenches, long-term and tree-ground firing points and anti-tank obstacles ... "

The Help refers to the grouping in 68-70 German divisions in East Prussia and in the Polish Governor-General. We are talking about a territory that borders on three Soviet HE. At the same time, the Germans mention the construction of a defensive line by the Germans, saturated with bunkers and bunkers. Are the Germans going to defend themselves when attacking the spacecraft?

At the time period indicated in the certificate, the RP considered that along the entire Soviet-German border there were concentrated before 119 German divisions, of which 25 td and md. In fact, along the border stationed 71 Division, of them 4 TD and MD. Therefore, the mention in the 68-70 reference of divisions in East Prussia and in Poland is not correct information. This information is essentially misinformation.

It should not be taken literally that all the above divisions camped on the border. Not a small part of the specified number of connections was located at a considerable distance (even at a distance over 100 ... 150 km) from the border. The table below shows the number of German divisions at the border according to the RU.

The table shows that, according to the RU, from 1940 to June 1941, the number of German divisions near the border was greatly overestimated. Only by June 20 did the RP determine the exact number of divisions. Unfortunately, even this coincidence is accidental. Why? According to the RU, out of thirty-one German TD and MD twenty were concentrated against KOVO and OdVO. In fact, in this area there were only 8,5, etc. and md. RU believed that 64 front was concentrated against KOVO and OdVO, and in fact there were about 43,5 divisions. Thus, according to the information of the RU, it turned out that against the troops KOVO and OdVO concentrated on the 32 division more than they were there. Taking into account the overestimation of the grouping of German troops in Finland on the 3 divisions, the total number of "lost" units near the Soviet-German border will be 35. Subsequently, these divisions "surfaced" in other areas. It turns out that on the eve of the war, the RU provided the military and political leadership of the USSR with an incorrect assessment of the distribution of German troops in the expected theaters of military operations.

At different times, in accordance with the estimates of the RU, it was believed that German divisions were concentrated against the PribOVO troops, the number of which is given in the table.

Below is one of special messages of the NKVD: “... During the period from April 20 to May 19, an increase in German troops near the border with the USSR was expressed: In the Klaipeda region: six kp, two td and two md, nine ap, one kbr and six sat. In the district of Suwalki: one PD, one CD and one MD, two AP and one sapper regiment ... " In accordance with this announcement, 13 divisions arrived in the territory bordering the Baltic States, which is also misinformation.

In the evening of 22, June 1941, the first wartime RU was published. Intelligence No.1 / 660724 RU GSH KA on 20-00 22.6.1941 g. “... In the north [in Finland], the main grouping is made up of units of the German army, which in the Rovaniemi sector has up to 3-4's divisions, and ... in the Kirkenes area, up to three more divisions ...

The total number of enemy groups is determined by:

a) on SZF - 29 divisions, of which 4-5 td and 5 md

b) on the Western front, in the Warsaw district - 31 division, of which 21 pd, 1 md, 4 td and 1 cd

c) on the South-Western Front (before Slovakia) - 48 divisions, of which 5 md and 6 etc.

In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania, 33-35 divisions, of which 4 td, 11 md and 1 mountain infantry ... Front-line enemy reserves in the area of ​​Częstochowa, Breslau, Moravian Ostrava to 7 divisions. The reserves of the High Command on 20.6 consist of 17-20 divisions located in the central regions of Germany ...

CONCLUSION: Opponent for 22.6. brought significant forces into battle, namely: 37-39 infantry, 5 motorized, 8 tank, and the total 50-52 division ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»

A fairly calm and optimistic report, which again speaks of the 29 German divisions against the North-West Front. True, part of the individual tank battalions and regiments, which were previously brought in intelligence reconnaissance, turned into full-fledged ones. In fact, against the PribOVO troops as part of two tank groups, 4 MK (13 td and md) were put up. On the first day of the war, he crossed the Soviet-German border or already took part in hostilities of more than 70 German divisions. 40 divisions are set against PribOVO; 26 of them have entered into clashes or crossed the border (six more divisions have no information).

On the Internet, there is a publicly available information form for the RU of 22 June 1941. We see that 9 and 18 armies, 13 rd, 4 md and 4 td are marked against the NWF troops. The document again does not mention tank groups - they were not found. It is spoken only about separate td and md. Suddenly, the Td that appeared did not even have numbers - these are the consequences of a carefully thought-out and elaborated plan by the German military command to disguise and concentrate troops.

Intelligence No.2 / 660731 RU GSH KA on 23-00 23.6.1941 “... The composition of the enemy forces against the NWF, as indicated in Intelligence No. XXUMX, remains unchanged. With the corresponding grouping of forces in the Tilzitsky and Kaunas-Vilna directions, the enemy has provided a three-fold superiority on 1 against our covering divisions ...

CONCLUSION: 1. The total number of forces entered by the enemy towards the end of 23.6 is the division's 62-64 ...

3. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the enemy forces compared to our covering divisions in the directions of its main attacks, it is necessary to evaluate the actions of our troops for June 22 and 23 as a whole as very positive, and recognize the rate of advance of the enemy as low ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»

The number of divisions in the bulletin increases from 50-52 to 62-64, but again, the estimate of the RU is delayed. Crossed the border or joined the battle for about 90 divisions. The situation on the NWF and the Western Front began to get out of control of the command.

Intelligence No.4 / 660751 RU GSH KA on 22-00 25.6.1941 "... On the offensive front from the Baltic Sea to Romania, the enemy launched 88-90 divisions, of which 72-73 were directly in combat, distributed as follows:

a) against SZF - 22 divisions, of which 4 td and 4 md

b) against the Western Front - 25 divisions, of which 4 td and 4 md

c) against the South-Western Front (without Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) 25-26 divisions, of which 6 td and 3 md ... Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov»

On this day, the 3-I tank group turned in the direction of the Western Front. Our scouts are trying to work, but, unfortunately, they are in tight time pressure. The information coming from intelligence at all levels, to put it mildly, is incomplete ... In conditions of total misinformation and the strictest secrecy from Germany, Soviet intelligence could not reveal the exact number of German troops near the border. Very much the Germans made lightning for war. In addition, the top managers of the spacecraft lived in their own categories ... Let's understand what kind of intelligence information the agency brought to the country's leadership, to the leadership of the spacecraft and military education before the war.

From July 1940, the head of the Regional Office Pribovo was Colonel A.I. Safronov (died at the end of June), and his deputies were Colonels K.N. Derevianko (from 07.40 to 06.41) and K.V. Kashnikov (from 09.40 to 06.41 g.).

In 1953, Lieutenant-General K.N. Derevianko, in reply to Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky, wrote: “... The grouping of the German fascist troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region, especially in the border areas, in the last days before the war was known to headquarters in full enough and in large parts and detail. To be convinced of this, it is enough to get acquainted with the last prewar final reconnaissance of the RO ... The data of this reconnaissance was fully confirmed by the subsequent data obtained after the start of hostilities ... I had a strong opinion that the VO command underestimated the looming threat and treated some of the distrust ...

The opened group of German fascist troops on the eve of the hostilities was regarded by the RO as an offensive grouping with considerable saturation with tanks and motorized units. The RO considered possible directions of the expected strikes of the Germans: Eidkunen-Kaunas and Turogen-Šiauliai ... "

KN Derevyanko writes that the command of the VO was completely aware of the grouping of German troops located on the border of PribOVO and the probable directions of strikes. To some readers it may seem that everything is very clear.

Here is the layout of the grouping of German troops, which was discovered by the intelligence service, and the “generals-traitors-enemies” are to blame for the lack of preparedness of the military forces! The figure also shows the especially important areas that are indicated in the project “Cover Plans ...”, as well as the expected directions of strikes, according to K. Derevianko.

Below is a link to a RO report in which district intelligence officers estimated the number of German troops and military equipment on the border with PribOVO. Data on the number of military equipment was not obtained from agents abroad and their sources of information, but were calculated by specialists of the RO.

Pribovo headquarters information from 21.6.41. «On the grouping of forces and equipment of the German troops in East Prussia to 18 watches 21.6.41 g...
Link to intelligence report http://makeyev.msk.ru/pub/NeProhodiMimo/sbd_34
Deputy Chief of the RO of the PribOVO headquarters, Colonel Kashnikov, Head of the 3 branch of the RO Major Major Korenevsky»

The figure below shows only the summary information of this intelligence.

In accordance with this document in the East Prussia (to the city of Suwalki), Pribovo is opposed to the troops: 19 pd, 5 md, one td, 5 tp, to 9 tb and 6-7 kp. It should be noted that from this number of divisions 16 were in the area of ​​responsibility of PribOVO (at points of permanent deployment) from November 1940 of the year. The document is intended that these troops have 193 Battalion (distribution density 0,5 Battalion 1 km front), 660 heavy and 1505 light guns, 2312 anti-tank guns, 764 anti-aircraft guns, 764 mortar, 2473 tank (6,5 tank on 1 km front) 1743 armored vehicles (4,9 on 1 km front), 465 aircraft. It seems to be all right, there are significant forces and especially the number of tanks - 2473. In the 18 Army, in the 3 and 4 tank groups there were actually about 1735 tanks. Of course, estimated estimates should be different from the real ones. Please note that the summary does not indicate the direction of possible enemy strikes, and in the RO calculations all German forces are "smeared" on the fronti.e. are given on 1 km front. Among other things, "spread" on the front and the main military equipment of the shock groups: tanks and armored vehicles.

Interestingly, the VO leadership also distributed the 3 and 12 mic divisions along the front. When analyzing the use of guidance of the district of mechanized corps indicated: "... There is no pronounced grouping of troops, moreover, the striking force, mk, is taken apart in divisions in a number of areas ...". It turns out that the VO leadership did not know the directions of the main strikes of the German troops and, therefore, deployed the MK divisions scattered along the front. Below we consider other declassified documents in order to find an indication of the directions of the expected attacks of the German troops voiced by K. Derevianko.

Why, then, did the leadership of PribOVO concentrate somehow not hastily at the border only 6 incomplete sd and two microns (incomplete to full staff)? You can, of course, understand the anger of the scouts after the German attack: “We warned you ...”

Let me remind you that, in accordance with the unapproved "Cover Plan ...", the district leadership was assessing the grouping of troops that the German command was supposed to set aside to attack PribOVO in 48-49 divisions (of which up to 8-9 td and md). In accordance with the above intelligence data (for 10 hours before the start of the war) before the specified number is not enough twenty divisions. In fact, against the troops PribOVO was exposed 40 divisions (24 DD, 13, etc. and MD, 3 od).

It turns out that the leadership of PribOVO made a mistake only on the 8-9 divisions in its preliminary assessment of the German grouping allocated for the attack on the district troops. And intelligence (divisional, district, RU, NKGB, border guards of the NKVD, etc.) could not fully reveal the number of this group. Some readers may argue that the German 29 divisions were enough to split the PribOVO troops in parts. But we know that now! No one at that time could have imagined such a thing. In addition, we have not yet considered the deployment of these compounds before the war.

Specialists of the General Staff, who incorrectly predicted the possible attacks of the German troops, also contributed to the disinformation of the leadership of the VO. In particular, the offensive from the Suwalki bulge was expected in the following directions: Suwalki-Belostok, Suwalki-Lida and Suwalki-Olita. In other words, it can be said that only around the 1 / 3 groups concentrated on this ledge could come out against the PribOVO troops. For strikes in three directions on the ledge should have been concentrated a significant grouping of German troops.

Let's see what the scouts found. It should be remembered that there is a continuous exchange of intelligence information about German troops between the RU, RO PribOV and ZapOVO, the NKGB intelligence, the NKVD border troops, the border is flown daily by border aircraft aviationwhich, among other tasks, observe the adjacent territory.

Below is the reconnaissance of RO PribOVO. It is quite large and can be skipped because Below in the pictures you will be shown the location of the German troops in accordance with the above report. To simplify the presentation of the material in the figures, anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments (divisions) are designated as artillery. This simplification is not essential for subsequent conclusions.

Intelligence staff PribOVO from 18.6.41. "On 17.6.41 against PribOVO in the band: on the left - Suwalki, Lykk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein found: army headquarters - 2, AK headquarters - 6, front - 12, md - 5, td - 1, tp - 5 and up to 9 individual TB - only at least td, kn - 6-7, Sat - 17, airplanes - over 500.

Grouping and dislocation of parts:

in the region of Memel - the headquarters of the 291-th PD, 401-i and 610-th PP, two battalions of the 337-th PP, training battalion of the 213, PP, 33, 61, 63 hell, up to two TB, a battalion of heavy machine guns, 48, 541 th Sat, 7 th Marine Regiment, School of scuba diving;

in Melnerggen - anti-aircraft artillery division;

in Bachmann - to hell;

in Shveppeln - TB;

in Rooken - battalion 660-th PP;

in Silute - the headquarters of the 5 th PD, the headquarters of the 161 th MD, the headquarters of the 660 th, 22 th nn, one nn, division of anti-tank guns, 208 th building battalion;

in Mattsiken - hell 206-th;

Laugen - 520 st;

in Rus - battalion 14-th PP, sapper company;

in Viljayken - battalion 660 th nn;

Uzhleknen - battalion 660-th PP;

in Kloken - battalion 14-th PP, sapper company;

in Kaukemen - headquarters and battalion of 14-th PP, demining company;

in Tilsit - the headquarters of the 7-st AK, 1-th PD, 290-th PD, 8-th MD, 1-th KB; 43, 45, 216, 213, 94, 501, 502, 503; 469 headquarters, PP, GSB, 202, 204,227, 206 and 210, MP, battalion of 272, MP, 1 and 2, CP, 22, heavy, AP, 21, AP, 290, AP , 61 th ap, hell 1 th CBR, 212 th tb, 101 th tb, communication battalion of 7 st AK, 610 th separate communications battalion, 52 th pontoon battalion, 552 th and 557 th motorized carriage battalions;

in Pogogen - 291-th MP, battalion of 350-th MP, 116-th TB;

Pictupenen - headquarters 350-th MP, PB, 511-th division of anti-tank guns;

in Grezhpelken - to a company of medium tanks;

in Laugzhargen - battalion 214-th nn, to an, headquarters of the construction site;

in Wellkishken - pb;

in Heinrichswald - 44-th MP;

in Lompenen - 31 th hell of anti-tank guns;

in Eristal - headquarters and hell 67 up;

in Ragnit - 3 and 414, sat, artillery battery, motorcycle company, 41 spare battalion;

in Kursen - 405-th PP;

in Schmalleningken, PB, sapper company;

in Neukirch, headquarters 217; in addition, according to the RU, three TPs, three heavy ans and two MPs arrived from Tilzit. By
According to the RO, parts of 205 and DD and 20 are specified, two paragraphs of unknown numbering, the last in the 1 forest, km to the north-west.

In the district of Lazdenen, Insterburg, Goldap, Stallupen:

Lazdenen - battalion 41-th PP;

in Pilkallen - headquarters and two battalions of the 41-th PP, anti-aircraft artillery regiment, military hospital, cav squadron;

in Stallupenen - 214-th pp (without battalion), the headquarters of the construction site;

in Eidtkunen - two pp, battalion of 214-th pp;

in Shirvindt - pp;

in Gumbinen - the headquarters of the 12-th and 22-th AK (require verification), 16-rd; convoy Division, 27-rd and 29-th paragraphs, 6-th Mortar Regiment, 206, 570, 113 and 32-th up, 4-th regiment of anti-tank guns, 25-th m, 206-th kp, 217-I intelligence unit, 337 guard battalion, 46, 10, 501 pb, 43 th reserve battalion, 16-I aviation group (70-100 aircraft);

in Suwalki, Sejny:

in Suwalki - the headquarters of the 34-th DD, 17-th and 37-md; 254, 70, 103, 104, 134, 135 and 136-second paragraphs, and the battalion headquarters 115-th paragraphs, 70-th Mortar Regiment, 241-th up, anti-aircraft artillery regiment (given initially), 31 ..., 18- th communications battalion, 608-th reserve battalion, to the air squadron, three sat, headquarters for the construction site;

in Sejny - the headquarters of the 26 th brigade, the 12 th pp, the battalion of the 103 th pp, up to one tp, the 420 th mortar regiment, to the division of anti-tank guns, the 110 th CP, scooter battalion.

In Margrobovo - headquarters, pp, sat;

in Rachki - Sat;

in the forest southwest of Plocicno - to nn;

in Novelty - battalion 176-th pp;

in Krasnopol - to the division of anti-tank guns, Sat;

in Postovela - kp;

in Shiplishki - pb, division of anti-tank guns;

in Punsk - 412-th MP, pb;

in Filipów - pb, sat;

Visiones - 422-th MP, 408-th Sat;

in Bakalazhevo - Sat;

In the Gibs - PB, to TB.

In the area of ​​Königsberg, Velau, Pillau:

in Koenigsberg - the headquarters of the 18 Army, 8 AK, 4 and 43, and 1 air district; 201, 217, 110, 21, and 623; 1, 4 and 19-th an, 47, 511 and 536-th an (the last 3 require verification), TP;

in Plau, the 231 and 215 regiments of naval anti-aircraft artillery (data require verification), nn, 150 aircraft.

Near Letzen, Allenstein, Johannisburg (data from the ZOVOVO Intelligence Division):

in Letzen - AK headquarters, 21-th TP, 115-th PP, an, CP;

in Likk - the headquarters of the 14-th PD, 215-th PP, 37-th up (according to 14-th PD data PO PribOVO);

Aris - headquarters, 143 and 151, and 14;

in Rustenburg - 56 and 665;

in Bischofsburg - nn;

in Allenstein - the headquarters of the 9 Army, AK and 7 traffic police headquarters; 301 th and 413 th pp, regiment of anti-tank guns, 206 th ap.

Chief of the RO Colonel Safronov»

The following summary marks the 18 of the German divisions. Given the individual battalions and regiments, the total number of divisions can be estimated to 20. In accordance with the intelligence unit of the RU, the number of German divisions against PribOVO is 29. Missing divisions are located outside the PribOVO RO area of ​​responsibility, which in depth was limited to the Koenigsberg-Allenstein line. The territory of East Prussia is also to the west of the indicated line. It turns out that around 1 / 3 groups of German troops, planned for military operations with PribOVO (according to the estimates of the SC command), 17 June are deployed at a depth of more than 100-120 km. What kind of war can we talk about in the near future? Moving these troops to the border should reveal intelligence!

From the pictures you can see:

- Directly close to the border of PribOVO, only a small part of the troops are concentrated in the form of a certain number of PB and four regiments in the zone of the Suvalki lug. The bulk of the troops is located at a sufficiently large distance from the border;

- the city of Suwalki has three divisional headquarters and a total of up to 8 regiments at a distance of 20-25 km from the border. These forces should "in theory" be divided into three shock groups. And for this force, in fact, is not enough. Consequently, additional forces must still come;

- one more grouping of troops is concentrated near the city of Gumbinnen (the distance to the border is about 30 km);

- a large group of troops stationed in Tilcite (distance to the border 20-25 km);

- the reinforced divisional group is deployed in Memele;

- from the 40 divisions, which will be put up against the troops of PribOVO, intelligence has established the correct designations of only eight (in the name of 9, the error is one).

In order to concentrate troops remote from the border on the initial lines, an attack takes up to two days for infantry units and, theoretically, a day for TD and MD, located in the area of ​​responsibility of PO PribOVO. Considering the huge amount of equipment in md and td and a limited number of roads - one day will not be enough ... According to the available access to the railway traffic police of German motorcycle and armored formations, it is clear that their separate parts began to focus several days before the attack, but this concentration was not reconnaissance opened up. It should be noted that only one intelligence unit was opened up by intelligence, although by June 22 only the intelligence battalions, etc., and the MD should have been more than 10. In addition, you need to tighten the connections for 100 km.

What fears the leadership of PribOVO with such good intelligence work? At least a day or two (up to a maximum of 4-5), the VO leadership is there until the German troops move to the border on the initial lines for an attack. At the same time it will be possible to determine the locations of concentration of troops and the direction of the main attacks. The leadership of the district thinks so ... The Germans discovered by the intelligence services are still less than what is required for the attack on PribOVO according to the assessment of the leadership of the district.

It should be noted that the reconnaissance detected only one full-fledged tank division and not a single MK headquarters, tank groups and the headquarters of Army Group North were found. The absence of the headquarters of the motorcycle and armored associations does not allow developing an offensive to a greater depth and surround large groups of Soviet troops. Separate tank units (regiments and battalions) can only be used to support infantry formations and AK, for carrying out private offensive operations within individual AKs. To lead the mobile shock groups need the appropriate headquarters. Without them, the rate of advance can decrease to the already familiar to us 10-15 km / day.

Since May, in East Prussia, in addition to 20, there were at least three more TDs, which intelligence has not found. Discovered by separate tank regiments and battalions could relate to these divisions. But the undercover capabilities of the Soviet intelligence service in the theater in question did not allow us to link separate motorcycle and armored units and battalions into mobile strike groups.

Among those indicated in the reconnaissance of five md, the 161-md is noted - there was no such division in the Wehrmacht. Perhaps this 161 PD? The report again did not indicate the direction of possible strikes by the German troops. In the future, we will try to understand the issue of coverage of the situation of RO PribOVO. And now let's see what the neighbors from RO ZOVOVO reported 1,5 days before the outbreak of war.

Intelligence RO ZOVOVO: “In recent days, the German command has been making reinforced transfers of troops - infantry, artillery and tanks to the borders of the USSR.

1. At the end of May, 3 and 9 ap from Biala Podlaska and 27 kp from Mezhirechye departed to the borders of the USSR.

On May 17 five armored trains arrived in Biala Podlaska. During 1-8.6.41 through Warsaw in the direction of Terespol marked movement 18 td, followed in the vanguard 11 TP.

4-10.6. to the Warsaw district, Prague concentrated 38 td. On the river Vistula marked parts flotilla with №№ 60, 300, 500, 600. The numbers are not decrypted.

From 4 to 6 June, through Rembertov station eastward (the end point was not installed) proceeded to 10 military echelons with infantry, artillery and rear units. According to unverified data, the headquarters of the eastern group at the end of April relocated to Otwock. In the area Kodeni marked up to 100 tanks.

May 18 on the airfield Belyany installed to 125 fighters. At the airport of Pulawy - 50 bombers. In late May, from Pulawy to Lublin proceeded to the infantry division. In Rozhanka arrived 475 nn.

From 6 to 12 June through Minsk Mazowiecki to Sedlec proceeded:
280 vehicles with infantry (20 — 22 people per vehicle); 900 vehicles with infantry, some of them proceeded to Lublin; 15 guns over 150 mm, 12 guns - 150 mm and 12 guns 105 mm; 75 PTO guns - 37 mm; anti-aircraft guns: 17 - 37 mm and 60 - 105 mm; Xnumx tanks. In the region of Janów Podlaski delivered to 100 aircraft, allegedly disassembled. According to unverified data, General von Klyuk came to Sokolov to recruit an army from units arriving from Yugoslavia and France.

2. According to human and radio data, the corps headquarters are installed in the following points: Radin, Lukov, Mezirechie. According to radio intelligence, in the Warsaw area, two large radio stations have been established that independently maintain contact with the headquarters of the main command, Berlin. Perhaps one of the radio stations belongs to the headquarters of the eastern group, relocated to Otwock, the second to the headquarters of the 8 army. During the period from 8 to 14 June, the most intensive flights of airplanes were noted in points: Königsberg - 41; Danzig - 35; Warsaw - 51; Breslau - 99.

3. According to RO PribOVO on 16.6, 291 PD is deployed in Klaipeda, Silute - 161 MD, Nejrich - 217 DD, Tilsit - 158 and 290 PD and 8 MD.

With 11.6. The evacuation of the families of officers from Klaipeda and Šilutė began. At the end of May, Seyny arrived - headquarters 26 PD, 12 PP, 110 CP, tank.bat and scooter battalion ...

Conclusion: 1. Previously received data on the intensive redeployment of German troops to the borders of the USSR are confirmed, mainly in the districts of Suwalki and Sedlets.

2. The data on the redeployment of the Eastern Group headquarters to Otwock and about 18 and 38 etc require additional verification.

3. In recent days, there have been numerous cases of desertion and non-execution of orders in the army, but the army as a whole is a powerful bulwark of German fascism. Chief of the RO Headquarters Zapovo Colonel Blokhin, Head of the 3 Branch of the RO Major SAMOYLOVICH 21.6.41. ”

It can be seen that in the above intelligence, there is practically no information from which it can be concluded that the war began in 1,5 days. In accordance with the reconnaissance of the air command and control unit, the number of German divisions in the Army Group Center (against ZOVOVO) was invariably: 15 divisions (of which 30 etc. md) were on May 5, 1 (30) on June 6, on 15-20 June –30 (6). The author did not manage to find reconnaissance information of RO ZOVOVO with the deployment of German units during the period 15-20 of June 1941 of the year, but with high probability it can be said that they were also located far from the border ...

Therefore, when we are told that any one reconnaissance flight of 17.6.41 on behalf of Stalin personally, allegedly, in the online mode, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and other gag, you would suggest that you do not believe in this nonsense ...

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aKtoR

... thanks for the article ... detailed and informative ... more often it would be so in VO.

[aKtoR]

Thank you and forum users who left comments below.
Tomorrow should be part of 2 on intelligence (continued).
And next week about Pribovo two parts, but the material is well known.
Thanks again to everyone!

[stas]

Mr. author, Pavlov, it appears, misled Stalin and Zhukov (beginning of the General Staff).
Mr. author, you want Rezun (the traitor) to outperform the accuracy of the information.
And what are you better than Rezun, he is Suvorov, he is a traitor to the motherland.
It’s just like you who are Rezuns (who are now scampering in Ukraine), or maybe you are hiding under a new nickname.

[ccsr]

It turns out that about 1/3 of the group of German troops planned for military operations with PribOVO (according to the command of the spacecraft) are deployed on June 17 at a depth of more than 100-120 km. What kind of war can we talk about in the near future? Intelligence must reveal the movement of these troops to the border!

The author seems to have a poor idea of ​​what the mobility of the German army is and the throughput of German railways, but I only remind those who are interested that even during the war the German division was transferred from France to the Eastern Front in two days. And in peacetime, from the regions of Germany themselves, they could send several divisions to the USSR border in a couple of days, and given the secrecy of such a transfer, it is simply impossible to open the arrival of divisions instantly. By the way, the author of the article points to this, citing the text of the intelligence report:

Reconnaissance RO ZAPOVO: “The German Command in recent days has been making reinforced troop transfers - infantry, artillery and tanks to the borders of the USSR.

Indirectly, the fact of the rapid transfer of troops from other theater of operations on the eve of the war confirms the arrival of a German general coordinating the re-equipment of troops on the eve of the war:

According to unverified data, General von Klyuk came to Sokolov to recruit an army from units arriving from Yugoslavia and France.

That is why the author’s statement looks completely naive, because any intelligence information should not only be checked, but also checked:

It can be seen that the reconnaissance report contains practically no information from which it can be concluded that the war began in 1,5 days.

It is interesting how this author imagines that the head of the RO came to a report to the General Staff of the General Staff with unverified information - this is not accepted in intelligence.

Therefore, when we are told that any one reconnaissance flight of 17.6.41 on behalf of Stalin personally, allegedly, in the online mode, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and other gag, you would suggest that you do not believe in this nonsense ...

With the same success, any discussion of why the district’s intelligence could not calculate the start of the war in 1,5 days, given the fact that our flights into the depths of German territory were prohibited by the spacecraft command, can be considered as nonsense. Well, so that the author would think a little, I remind him that the intelligence revealed the Dortmund signal, but after that, an emergency meeting took place near Stalin in the evening of June 21. So the author’s conclusions about intelligence are too superficial and do not correspond to the realities of those years.

[parusnik]

A good article ... bookmarked ... once again I read in conjunction with the others .. It is a pity, this series of articles comes out with big breaks ...

[BAI]

Yes, you must at least provide links to the previous parts. The integrity of the material is violated.

[aKtoR]

Fair to say sorriii ...
You can go to my page and see the publication there.
I apologize again))

[stas]

Just like you, EBN in 91 in the words of truth and justice from the tank contributed to the bourgeois coup and the collapse of the USSR, and then, like you said litter, and squinted forever.
And his dirty deeds live now.

At the ECHO, one Jew in the program “The Price of Victory” seemed to culturally enfold our Victory of 1945 of the year with the right words.
Liberals also applauded him with shouts.

[antivirus]

Therefore, when we are told that a single reconnaissance flight of 17.6.41, on behalf of Stalin personally, supposedly, on-line, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and the other “gag”, the author would suggest you not to believe in this balcony

- apparently it will be correct to admit the words of GKZhukov (he was still thinking and suffered such a conclusion) "we were not ready. We lagged behind. (not verbatim)
THIS IS A POLITICAL CONCLUSION AND SENTENCE TO THE STATE OF CASES IN THE USSR ON 22.06.41.
it is necessary to see in comparison (USSR-Germany) the number of people with the formation of "technical school", "university", grade 4, "competent", "I can sign in the statements."
from this and the number and quality of “scouts” - how much a country can allocate to this section of “society’s life” (military building)

[Bakht]

Articles are useful and necessary. But they are heavily overloaded with details that the mass reader is unlikely to read and even more analyze.
In my opinion, intelligence reports after June 20th could not change anything in decision-making. The troops needed time to enter the specified areas of defense. Considering that the mass of Soviet troops began moving after June 16th, only intelligence data from June 1 to June 14 is of interest.
The concentration of German troops began after June 1st (according to Gader’s diary). By June 14th, apparently, this became noticeable to the Soviet leadership. Hence the TASS statement of June 14th. After the German side ignored this message, the advance of Soviet troops began.
Of course, I don’t have such data as the author cites. But, it seems convincing to me that the intelligence revealed the concentration of German troops near the border by mid-June and the Soviet leadership immediately responded to this threat. Intelligence from abroad had little influence on the decision-making mechanism. Much more significant was information about the concentration of German troops and their numbers. Was the data overpriced? Maybe. But this all the more made the leadership of the USSR react immediately.

[VS]

"" The concentration of German troops began after June 1 (according to Gader’s diary), By June 14, apparently, this became noticeable to the Soviet leadership. Hence the TASS statement of June 14th. After the German side ignored this message, the advance of the Soviet troops began. ""

- nonsense - the conclusion of howling to began long before June 14)))

[Bakht]

Which troops? German or Soviet? For many documents and for all the Border Districts, troops began to raise and push to the border after June 16.

[VS]

In OdVO - from June 8, they began to withdraw by software, in ZAPOVO - from June 11 ....

[Bakht]

Please link. I just don’t believe a word.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: V.S.

- nonsense - the conclusion of howling to began long before June 14)))

The Kolomiyets in the "Prelude to Barbarossa" was given a schedule for the transfer of German compounds. The bulk of the troops were transferred precisely in June 1941. Moreover, part of the forces was transferred after 22.06.41.

[Michael HORNET]

Monstrous mistakes were made by the Soviet leadership much earlier
Alas, the extremely low intellectual level of Stalin and his inner circle did not allow to draw lessons even from the 1939-1940 campaign.
Unfortunately, Stalin was afraid of arming the people, he saw enemies everywhere, made gross mistakes (including the actual destruction of both large defensive lines (they didn’t have time to create the old one), he organized the army and control in a completely moronic way, destroyed (!) The already created “partisan underground” , including its supply bases, organization, etc. Everywhere he imagined enemies. Plus he was afraid to allow the people to own rifled weapons and generally rely on the people as such ... Well, what is said in this series of articles - they lost outright a level of intelligence and analysis
Almost lost the war because of such a "wise" leadership, miraculously survived. We need to learn from the past

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Michael HORNET

Unfortunately, Stalin was afraid of arming the people

And how will the armed people help against the army? With a rifle on the tank?

Quote: Michael HORNET

(including the actual destruction of both large defensive lines (they didn’t create the old, they didn’t create a new one),

The “hidden” KaUR was actually able to stop the Finns offensive on Leningrad.
The reasons for the rapid breakthrough of drugs are not that. that she was allegedly "torn down." And the fact that they built it with the expectation of a completely different army - Polish, Romanian, Finnish, moreover, a sample of the early to mid-30s.

Quote: Michael HORNET

in a completely moronic way he organized the army and control

Yes, yes, yes ... Stalin personally wrote all the Statutes and painted organizational structures.

Quote: Michael HORNET

Plus, he was afraid to allow the people possession of rifled weapons and generally lean on the people as such ...

Once again: how can a crowd of brutal muschschyn with rifles help against at least the Wehrmacht battalion? The fact that he gets into a banzai attack under machine-gun and mortar fire?

The problem of the Red Army and the USSR as a whole is the general low literacy rate of all l / s - from marshals of the country to ordinary soldiers. The largest fifth point was at the lower level, where illiterate recruits were trained by the same illiterate sergeants. In BTV KOVO in 1941 2/3 of privates had only primary education - and the junior command staff had 1/3 of such.

[Bakht]

You definitely noticed the weakness of the Red Army in the low educational level. I often ask a question and get no answer. Why were the MechKorpus created and the tanks were withdrawn from the rifle divisions? The answer is on the surface and you voiced it. But most do not understand.
For comparison. The BT and T 26 series began to be created in the early to mid 30s. So at the beginning of the war the vast majority (almost all) of Soviet tanks were less than 10 years old. Where does such wear and tear come from? Let's say the T-72 and T-80 tanks of the ten-year-old production are not combat-ready? But most armored vehicles were lost by the Red Army due to technical unavailability.

[VS]

At the beginning of the 41st, old tanks were discontinued and the troops stopped replenishing with spare parts ... Here are the losses - the slightest damage and the old types of tanks are thrown on the road ..

[Bakht]

And before the beginning of the 41st?
The reason is simple. Maintenance of tanks in rifle divisions was difficult. Low qualification of staff, weak repair services. When marching to Poland in September 1939, military losses amounted to 40-50 tanks. Losses for technical reasons of the order of 500 tanks. The addition of tanks to the mechanized corps, in addition to purely military purposes, also had the task of facilitating their maintenance.
Well, you correctly noticed that the pursuit of the number of tanks resulted in the absence of spare parts for their repair.

[Bakht]

This is interesting but wrong. Stalin was so afraid to arm the people that the army increased from 3 to 5 million in two years. And then they called for more than 30 million in the Red Army. Can you confirm with documents that Stalin was afraid to arm the people?
So he destroyed the defensive lines that he began the construction of a third line of fortified areas in areas near Moscow. The decision was made in 1940. Apparently he was preparing to advance, as some here claim.
Now in the Russian Federation can freely own rifled weapons? Maybe every house has a machine gun under a bed and an automatic machine? You want to learn lessons. Well, let the State Duma allow the free possession of weapons to the population ...

[VS]

the question is - when did the withdrawal of OUR troops actually begin))) Armies from the internal districts - began in May already - after the 13th)) The second echelon and reserves of the districts - began to withdraw at the request of the Military Councils of the districts - from 6-8- June 9 - from June 8–11 and June 15 .. The Mehkorpus - “1st Line”)) - began to withdraw from June 14–16))) At the same time, some border divisions began to withdraw from the airborne division - from June 11–15 - according to the directives of NCOs and the General Staff .. Well, from June 18th, they began to withdraw to the defense zone — and the border divisions of the districts. And by June 21 they brought it out - with a lead in increased B.G. accordingly - 17 divisions - out of 39. Also - from June 18, are given in increased B.G. - Air Force, Air Defense and Navy)))

[Bakht]

The pumping of the western direction began in the month of May. It's right. But the army was withdrawn to the second line of defense. Only in the region of Minsk was the 13th army formed. All the rest were withdrawn to the border of the Dnieper. I am talking about cover troops according to the border cover plan. These are the troops of the Counties. And they all started moving to cover areas after June 16th.

[VS]

And the districts were - their first and second echelons))) And the second echelons of the districts began to be withdrawn from June 8-11-15. And the first echelon - the border divisions of the districts - began to be withdrawn from June 17))) The time until June 22 - TOTALY had enough for them to withdraw from the BCP))) And they removed 17 border border divisions from the BCP))) out of 39 .. .

[Bakht]

Again. You give figures and dates without reference to the sources. Literary memories interest me little. Facts and documents are more important.
What are the second echelons of counties? Say by ZAPOV it is the 13th army (at the formation stage) It seems the 17th mechanized corps (at the formation stage). On the border itself, only cover forces for one or two battalions from the division. The order to withdraw the 22nd TD from Brest was received on June 18. And until June 22 was not completed. Moreover, the 22nd division was to be withdrawn from the border east to the area of ​​Zhabinka.
The 17th mechanized corps is generally a complete tragedy. 30 thousand people without control (headquarters not formed) without weapons (total 10 thousand rifles). Nobody even set a military task for him, since the corps was not combat-ready. This is the second tier of the District.
-----
The General Staff and the command of the Red Army believed that they have 2-3 days for the nomination of troops (report of Kirponos at the All-Army Conference). In reality, the poor road network and the underdevelopment of the rear services slowed the advance of troops into the cover areas. Chernyakhovsky report on the march of his TD in PribOVO. During the march from June 18 to 20 (the war has not yet begun) up to 30% of equipment was lost, the troops broke away from the depots and had 0,5-1,0 ammunition and refueling. On June 23, the division stood still without fuel.
The same is true for other Counties.
----
I can repeat the words of Clausewitz "In principle, military affairs are simple and understandable to any person. But it’s difficult to fight"

[VS]

"" You give numbers and dates without reference to the sources. Literary memories interest me little. Facts and documents are more important. "

- Did I refer to memoirs or other “lit memories” - when did you name the dates and echelons?))) See the checkpoints of the okrugs - what parts of which “echelons” were written down are there. On June 8-11-12, the directives went to the okrugs - to withdraw to the areas envisaged by the BCP, to the areas of concentration by the BCP, the "deep" divisions - the second echelons and reserves. From June 14, the directives went to the MK to conclude that the MK was the "first line", that is, the most really combat-ready, but from June 18, the 1st echelon — the border divisions — that held the defense on the border — the first blow - from June 17-18, they had to start the withdrawal of PP in their defense lines))) This conclusion automatically obligated leads the troops to be withdrawn - to increased b.g. - i.e. cancel the planned studies of exercises and other works))) And - from June 18 to the increased b .. g. led the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy - separate directives)))
Well, at 1 o’clock in the morning on June 22, the okrugs accepted an order for complete bg. - according to the directive b / n)))

"" On the border itself, only cover forces for one or two battalions from the division. ""

- before the opening of the red packets - this could not be done - withdraw to the trenches of the entire border division)) The command for the packet - went to 2.30 on the 22nd)))

"" The order to withdraw the 22nd TD from Brest was received on June 18. And until June 22 was not completed. Moreover, the 22nd division was to be withdrawn from the border east to the area of ​​Zhabinka. ""

- so MK and them, etc., are not the first to fight and accept))) And - for the foiled withdrawal from Brest of these THREE divisions in the PP - they shot Korobkov)))

"" The 17th mechanized corps is generally a complete tragedy. 30 thousand people without control (headquarters not formed) without weapons (total 10 thousand rifles). Nobody even set a military task for him, since the corps was not combat-ready. This is the second tier of the District. ""

- this MK - yes ...

"" The General Staff and the command of the Red Army believed that they have 2-3 days for the nomination of troops (report of Kirponos at the All-Army Conference). In reality, the poor road network and the underdevelopment of the rear services slowed the advance of troops into the cover areas. ""

- the battle will be the first to be taken - border divisions - 1st echelon of districts)) And for them a couple of days - it’s quite normal time ... And already they will have to give time restraining the attacking enemy - THE REMAINING parts to end the withdrawal to their areas according to the BCP )))

"" Report of Chernyakhovsky on his march in PribOV. During the march from June 18 to 20 (the war has not yet begun) up to 30% of equipment was lost, the troops broke away from the depots and had 0,5-1,0 ammunition and refueling. ""

- or a mess or sabotage .. There were orders - with fully transported stockpiles of fire stocks and fuels and lubricants to withdraw troops from June 8-11-12. MK is also concerned)))
It was a disruption to the withdrawal of troops. Kagda instead of stocks of b / p dragged the training property of the regiment)))

[Bakht]

This is not the first time you mention the dates of June 8-11-12. I have not yet seen such orders anywhere, and therefore I ask for a document. Parish Coverage Plans were prepared in early June. But in the Western and Pribatsky it is precisely the plans of the Districts. Signatures of the People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff are not there. In Kiev, I have not yet found cover plans. There was no mess or sabotage. Just motor transport could not raise the necessary ammunition. There was no motor vehicle. Even with the outbreak of war, the MechKorpus had to leave part of their weapons and ammunition in the areas of deployment. Many orders and reports said that part of the artillery and troops remained in the towns due to lack of transport. In the Kiev District (it is necessary to look for which particular mechanized corps), the mechanized division makes a march on foot due to the lack of vehicles.
Unavailability of the Red Army and the country as a whole. Well, Stalin could not, at the height of the harvest, remove thousands of trucks and tractors from the national economy. Could not. Before the TASS statement, the start of the war was not clear.

[VS]

"" This is not the first time you have mentioned the dates of June 8-11-12. I have not yet seen such orders anywhere, and therefore I ask for a document. ""

- the directives of NCOs and the General Staff from June 11-12 - on the withdrawal of second echelons and reserves - have been published completely)) in the robin - in 1998))) These are directives for ZAPOVO and KOVO)) For PribOVO, the directive has not been published yet but I hope it, like the directive for OdLO of June 8, will be published soon by S. Chekunov))) Which, in a two-volume book on the full answers of the commanders, Pokrovsky quite gives the details of this directive - for OdVO)))

"" County Coverage Plans were prepared in early June. But in the Western and Pribatsky it is precisely the plans of the Districts. Signatures of the People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff are not there. In Kiev, I have not yet found cover plans. ""

- these PPs of districts are quite LAST published too)) they are on the network))) But - these PPs were illegal and therefore were not signed - in NPOs and the General Staff))) I show more exact information about this in my books - 7 years so already)))

"" There was no mess or sabotage. Just motor transport could not raise the necessary ammunition. There was no motor vehicle. ""

- they directly wrote in reports later - INSTEAD of bp - dragged on TECH machines what is - training property)))
I agree - this is not a mess, but sabotage.

"" Even with the outbreak of war, the MechKorpus were forced to leave part of their weapons and ammunition in the areas of deployment. ""

- but because the cars have already left with training rubbish - to the places of concentration - on June 17 and they didn’t have time to return already for military equipment)))

"" Unavailability of the Red Army and the country as a whole. Well, Stalin could not, at the height of the harvest, remove thousands of trucks and tractors from the national economy. Could not. ""

- this is only one of the nuances)))
Available transport in divisions - filled with training property INSTEAD of b..p. - about which they wrote reports later - in the 41st)))

"" Before the TASS statement, the start of the war was not clear. ""

- measures - directives on the withdrawal of second echelons - were before June 13th)))

[Bakht]

Again. No links to documents. Give the order number of the NGO if you can. Also, please indicate the document that the transport was carrying educational property. So far, there has not been a single link to the document from you.
Well, at least so

13 June the leadership of the Kiev Special Military District received a directive from the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to nominate "deep" rifle corps closer to the border. The nomination of the "deep" formations of the district began June 17-18. The nomination dates and destinations of the buildings were determined as follows:
“By the morning of June 31, the 28st Rifle Corps from the Korosten region was to approach the border near Kovel. The corps headquarters was to remain in place until June 22; The 36th Rifle Corps was to occupy the border region of Dubno, Kozin, Kremenets by the morning of June 27; By the morning of June 37, the 25th Rifle Corps needed to concentrate in the area of ​​Peremyshlyany, Brezhzhan, and Danubev; The 55th Rifle Corps (without one division remaining in place) was ordered to go to the border on June 26, the 49th - by June 30. "
-----
From mid-June, vacations were canceled for personnel. The night of 16 on 17 June came from the Kivertsy camp of the 62nd Infantry Division. Having made two night transitions, by the morning of June 18, they reached positions near the border. However, the line of defense was not occupied, and the division was dispersed in settlements and forests. From 17 June the commander of the 41st Infantry Division G.N. assembled the division’s units in the summer camp Mikushev. 18 June Commander of the 5th Army M.I. Potapov ordered the 45th Infantry Division to withdraw from the firing range. June 18 The 135th Infantry Division, which constituted the second echelon of the 27th Infantry Corps of the 5th Army, received an order to advance to the border.
-----
19 June from the General Staff, an order was received to create a front-line command and relocate it to Tarnopol.

As you can see, there is no question of June 8-11. The redeployment of troops began on the 16th. The decision was made on June 13 or a day earlier.
What you write is retelling of Kozinkin or Solonin. I don’t know what you read. But the fact is that this directive is NOT SIGNED. And first appeared on the site of Yakovlev. Does not convince. Well, does not convince.
http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/
1012036

[Bakht]

Why do you need a "Prelude ..."? An official German deployment document for Barbarossa. Tier 4c Starts deployment from June 1 to June 22, 1941. Includes 14 tank divisions and 12 motorized divisions. Considering that the invasion was carried out by 20 German tank divisions, the bulk of the German troops began their advance on June 1, 1941. All that intelligence has obtained before is interesting, but unproductive.
I don’t remember only who signed the document: Keitel and I. Brauhich.

[creak]

Thanks to the author for the work done and the balanced approach to those long-standing and tragic events, without hackneyed ideological cliches and a textbook gloss .... The only thing that could be advised to the author is to reduce the number of small details that are a bit overloaded with the article. Successes.

[aKtoR]

Fair remark. Unfortunately, the rest of the material is also too bulky. I do not have time to fix it.
Thanks for the positive feedback))

[Chaos]

Author, well done! So much information was analyzed, reduced to an article. The article is not overloaded. Historical facts cannot be cumbersome. Well you did such a job. Thank!

[stas]

Do you understand why such articles are written. When you understand, you will not thank such muslim authors.

This we have already passed a long time, read the “Winner” of Rezun, he is Suvorov, he is a traitor and you will see the similarity in the presentation of information and the meaning for which this is presented.

[Chaos]

According to your editorial board VO narrow-minded or traitors. )))

[stas]

I'm talking about the author of the article!

[RuSFr]

I Thank you Author

[Flying Dutchman]

1941, June 22. But what if we return to the end of 1939? Finland is an ally of Hitler and dreams of a "Great Finland" up to the Urals. Stalin decides to knock Finland out of the general dump before the war with Germany. But what happened? Hitler was silent that his ally was battered. But France and England, already at war with Germany, and with them the United States, were brutalized in the USSR and proclaimed an action of military retaliation against the USSR, because the USSR had beaten Hitler's ally. And this is during the war with Hitler! Fantasy? Why was Stalin so afraid? If in a "conversation" with Hitler the USSR would be recognized as an aggressor? Just as in the case of Finland, would the whole west unite against the USSR? So there was something to think about ...
Still. In general, the NKVD of the USSR on June 22, 1941 fairly correctly revealed the grouping of Hitler's troops and the directions of the main strikes, but what is the mistake? The mistake is that Stalin confided, nevertheless, to the military. Stalin proposed a few years before the war that all the most significant supply and production depots should be moved beyond the Volga, and the groupings would be located farther from the border. The military, however, convinced that this was unnecessary and the groups of Soviet troops were concentrated in the OFFENSIVE OPTION.
By the way, recall: it was thanks to Stalin before the war that many promising weapons were able to get to production — the military were against them. And already under Moscow itself, Stalin understood that the military were not those whom you could trust, and they completely and irrevocably took control of the Army into their own tough hands. As G.K. Zhukov himself wrote (even to the anti-Stalin orgy of the 60s) already near Moscow, Stalin disposed of every battalion, every tank, and Zhukov himself did not know that at the most terrible time for the defenders, Stalin had accumulated reserves for a counter-offensive for Moscow.
But the main "mistake" of the Red Army and the leadership was the lack of combat experience. Those troops who had experience in the Finnish conflict, from the first hours of the war, fought well ...

[Glory1974]

The military, however, convinced that this was unnecessary and the groups of Soviet troops were concentrated in the OFFENSIVE OPTION.

Something smacks of "rezunovschinoy"

And already under Moscow itself, Stalin understood that the military were not those whom you could trust, and they completely and irrevocably took control of the Army into their own tough hands.

Stalin did not take everything into his own hands. Decisions were worked out collectively at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander.

near Moscow, Stalin disposed of every battalion, each tank

There was a difficult situation, there were not enough forces and means, therefore, in fact, tactical issues were resolved at a strategic level.

[VS]

The "ruptures of Soviet troops were concentrated in the OFFENSIVE OPTION.
Something smacks of "rezunovschinoy" ""

- no))) Rezun-0)) But - they were trying to attack. Not FIRST but in response))

[Bakht]

You don’t even know what to object to ....
Let's start with the warehouses and the location of the troops. Where is "away from the border"? Specifically, the line ... So, you agree to give up the territory on which several million (well, even hundreds of thousands) reservists reside? Ready to give up the territory? At that time no one went to it. In no country in the world. Warehouses beyond the Volga? Are the troops there too? Warehouses should be near the troops. Nobody doubts Rokossovsky’s talent? Summer 1943, Kursk. Rokossovsky orders the warehouses in Kursk to be printed out and moved closer to the troops in case of encirclement. The district squads should be as close as possible to the troops in order to reduce the supply shoulder. 25-30 km for army depots and 100 km for district. And then you need a lot of motor vehicles.
Theory ..... and her mother practice

[qQQQ]

I want to add that the Germans are the only ones who at that time applied the Blitzkrieg theory in practice. The clash of the Armed Forces of the USSR and Germany in the initial period, it is like a crowd and a phalanx - the result is known. German TDs and MDs were balanced formations with infantry, artillery, and aviation; in the USSR only at the end of 1943 were they able to create such and even better - TA. The main blame for the defeat in the initial period lies entirely with the command staff, from marshals to lieutenants. It was the illiterate use, primarily of tanks, that led to terrifying defeats at the beginning of the Second World War. I don’t remember who, cited the example that the use of tanks by Zhukov on Khalkhin Gol played a cruel joke, when the tanks broke through the Japanese defense on the move without infantry support, they won, although with heavy losses, no one counted them, they looked at the result. As a result, our entire initial period we tried to repeat this experience, it didn’t work with the Germans like that. In support I want to say that they did not give up, did not lose heart (this was probably the worst thing at that time) they fought as they could and studied, studied, as a result, as a result of the Red Flag over the Reichstag.

[Glory1974]

Thank you for the article. Very interesting. I would like to express a couple of considerations.

For the time period indicated in the certificate, RU believed that up to 119 German divisions were concentrated along the entire Soviet-German border, of which 25 and so on. In fact, the 71 division was stationed along the border, of which 4 and so on. Therefore, reference to the 68-70 divisions in East Prussia and Poland is not accurate information. This information, in fact, is misinformation.

I would not consider this misinformation. The main task of the intelligence chief, as the scouts themselves joke, is to frighten the commander. Better let it be more than less. But in fact, it turned out that the command of the military district believed that there were fewer troops than it actually was.

As subsequent events prove:

The number of divisions in the bulletin increases from 50-52 to 62-64, but again, the estimate of the RU is delayed. Crossed the border or joined the battle for about 90 divisions. The situation on the NWF and the Western Front began to get out of control of the command.

Interesting data.

It takes up to two days for infantry units and theoretically a day for military units and so on to concentrate the troops distant from the border at the starting lines for the attack, ....... ... According to the widely available Russian railways of German motorized armored formations, it is clear that focus their individual parts began a few days before the attack, but this concentration was not discovered by intelligence.

Information is confirmed that the rear units and units of the Germans were concentrated near the border, and the combat units were located at a distance. A few days before the war, a transfer of forces began, the divisions seemed to “turn around” in the other direction: to the east. I recall fiction: "for several days in a row, motors were buzzing on the adjacent side."

Specialists of the General Staff also contributed to the misinformation of the VO leadership, who incorrectly predicted possible attacks by German troops.

Here the fault and the General Staff and intelligence. The main task has not been completed: opening the directions of the main attacks. The General Staff generally believed that the main blow would be in the south.
And of course, the great work of the Fritz on disinformation of the Red Army. They probably knew the intelligence zone that the district was leading. But formations and units, in fact, could not conduct reconnaissance; in peacetime, you can’t send a reconnaissance group. Now called a zone of detailed and surveillance intelligence, before it was probably about the same.

[Doliva63]

Quote: glory1974

formations and units, in fact, could not conduct reconnaissance; in peacetime, you can’t send a reconnaissance group.

Nothing comes to the memory of the pre-war state of affairs in military intelligence, but after the war, border border formations were fought on adjacent territory, including and intelligence intelligence. A “reconnaissance group” may also be “tourists” from among the “vacationers”, for example, yes, as you like, if you need to clarify the intelligence reports. There would be a task and there would be a desire to fulfill it. I remember that in the corps intelligence of ZabVO, he said to all the movements of the head intelligence that you need it? Read the summary, everything is there. So, if you wanted, reconnaissance could be carried out as BUSS was written - in any situation, purposefully and continuously.

[Glory1974]

So, if you wanted, reconnaissance could be carried out as BUSS was written - in any situation, purposefully and continuously.

I agree. But these lines in the charter most likely appeared after this experiment. And before the war, what kind of situation was, God forbid, you provoke. Even shooting towards the border is prohibited.
Therefore, they conducted reconnaissance, for their part, using methods of eavesdropping, interviewing local residents and observing (I almost wrote "spying" ).

[DimerVladimer]

Therefore, when we are told that any one reconnaissance flight of 17.6.41 on behalf of Stalin personally, allegedly, in the online mode, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and other gag, you would suggest that you do not believe in this nonsense ...

Intelligence, and intelligence, in order to receive information from many sources.

[Operator]

The table at the beginning of the article completely contradicts the conclusions given at the end of the article - according to the data of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army as of May 15.05.1941, XNUMX, the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border was quite enough to attack the USSR, but, according to the author, there was no intelligence information from which it can be concluded that the war will begin soon.

[VS]

“About intelligence. To understand the decisions made by the leadership of PribOVO, one should understand what the Soviet intelligence informed about the situation on the border on the eve of the war with Germany. You should disconnect from our Afterglow and try to draw conclusions only from the presented intelligence reports and special communications. This requires repeating individual fragments of the previously stated material. ”

- Here is a restless dyvchina))))
I read “robins” and believes that there were NO OTHER reports for STALIN in those days))) And to understand that published reports can be rigged or not fully published, the more I can’t understand it)))
“More or less accurate dates of the German attack on the USSR began to appear in messages closer to the 20th of June 1941.”

- Lies. Fairly accurate data began to appear not “closer” to June 20, but from June 11 already.
“In addition to reports with more precise terms of the attack, there were also reports with information about the postponement of the attack to the end of June or even August, as well as about the refusal of the attack when certain conditions were met by the leadership of the USSR. An example is the special message from "Ramsay" 17.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX: "... The German courier told BAT ... that the war against the USSR was delayed, probably until the end of June. BAT does not know whether there will be a war or not ... ""

- Yes, leave Ramzai alone at last already))) IN addition to TENS there were messages in the same days - about the attack on June 22))) AND - SEE YOU FINALLY at the chronology of events - what happened on those days in June On the 41st. From these events it is clear - what and to whom Stalin believed and to whom not very)))
“Even in the Soviet embassy in Berlin, not everyone expected the war to begin on June 22. The message of the German agent on 21.6.41 about the opinion of the Soviet employee: "

- And what about Stalin? Stalin decided what parts of what date of June should be withdrawn and where - according to the PLAN of cover, but who there "thought" what clerks in the embassy - but do not care)))
SEE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PRE-WAR DAYS IN THE DISTRICTS - WHICH THE TERMS OF THE NCO AND GSH WERE FULFILLED - STALIN))))

“In order for the leadership of the country and the AC to believe in the deadline for the attack, it was necessary to provide additional information on the concentration of German troops. This concentration of troops should be sufficient to start a full-scale war with the USSR. "

- And who said that the General Staff believed that since the Germans had not withdrawn 200 divisions, that means they are not going to attack yet ??)))

The Germans attacked KSHI in MAY in forces of 130 divisions in total)))) So - to take the liberty of deciding who is there "THINKING" in the General Staff - you must first know some sort of Veschi yourself)))

“Intelligence also had to report on the directions of the main attacks of the German troops.”
- Relax - reported))) German intelligence reported to Berlin - the Russians in their GSh are waiting for THREE blows and the main one is waiting north of the woodlands)))
Zhukov wrote in his memoirs - back in JANUARY, he showed Stalin - the Germans would strike three hits and the main one would be - north of woodland)))

“GS specialists estimated the number of German troops that only Germany could put up for a full-scale war with the USSR, at 180 ... 200 ... 220 divisions.”

- To expose so many troops - according to the country's capabilities and - ATTACK SUCH then the number of troops - MISCELLANEOUS concepts)))

[VS]

“The certificate refers to the grouping of 68-70 German divisions in East Prussia and the Polish governor general. "
- And cho ??)) There is a CONCLUSION in this certificate - ATTACKS MAY NOT BE WAITED ?????))))
No))) So what the fuck ... the author is climbing with her conclusions - an attack in the General Staff and all the more in the Kremlin - they did not wait ??)))
“It is mentioned that the Germans were building a defensive line saturated with bunkers and bunkers. Are the Germans going to defend themselves when the space forces attack? ”

- They built a new border)) no more ...)) But - there was no such construction of fortifications as ours - there was))
“The RU believed that up to 119 German divisions were concentrated along the entire Soviet-German border, of which 25 were md and md. In fact, 71 divisions were deployed along the border, of which 4 were md and md. Therefore, the reference in the certificate to 68-70 divisions in East Prussia and in Poland is not true information. This information is essentially misinformation. ”
- Madame does not know - but only border guards track the side for 400 km THAT !!))) And if they and even more intelligence have shown so many troops in the TERRITORY of the entire governorship - this means the whole territory of Poland or Prussia)))) and not directly on the border)))

“The table shows the number of German divisions at the border according to RU.”
- That is, intelligence provided EXCELLENT data - the actual number of German divisions on the border by June 21 and according to its data - MATCHED EXACTLY)))

“According to RU, it turned out that there were more than 32 divisions concentrated against the KOVO and OdVO troops than there were. "

- Nonsense))
READ THE RESPONSES of the commanders in the Chekunov collection - they show - THEIR TALES IN THE DISTRICTS ARE EXACT - the data is so much against the KOVO so much is in the other districts)))) And they brought it to the neighboring districts - against the Soviet Socialist Republic put up 21 divisions on June 120)))
“A) in the NWF — 29 divisions, of which 4-5 TD and 5 MD

b) on the Western front, in the Warsaw district - 31 division, of which 21 pd, 1 md, 4 td and 1 cd

c) on the South-Western Front (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions, of which 5 md and 6 td. ”

- and now consider a miracle - everything is expected = revealed against the SSR - UNDER 130 GERMAN divisions)) We consider - 29 against PribOVO, 48 against KOVO - total = 77 divisions. It remains - AGAINST the STOCK - 130-77 = 53 divisions))))

T..e - published summary - distorted upon publication))))

[VS]

“40 divisions are set up against PribOVO,”
- NONSENSE)))) NOBODY has written yet that Pribovo has been flooded with 40 !! divisions .. author - gave out SENSATION and made a discovery !!! Hooray!!!!

“The number of divisions in the report increases from 50-52 to 62-64, but again the estimates of RU are late. About 90 divisions crossed the border or entered the battle. The situation on the NWF and the Western Front began to get out of control of the command. ”

- and how it will help the author to invent - who was there who “thought” in the General Staff BEFORE June 22 ??))
Inaccurate information AFTER the attack NEVER can serve as a criterion for the actions of the RCU BEFORE the attack)))

"Intelligence was unable to reveal the exact number of German troops at the border."

- Nonsense and lies)))) the author himself showed - by June 21 how many Germans had withdrawn their troops to the BORDER - so much was revealed by us)))

And BEFORE this - the intelligence of DIFFERENT departments, and not just the NKVD or anyone else - was completely tracking that side for 400 km !!!)))
“The data on the quantity of military equipment was not obtained from agents abroad and their sources of information, but was calculated by RO specialists.”

-- do not lie. RO does not calculate from the ceiling, taking data on the enemy, namely, according to agents))))

"Please note that the summary does not indicate the direction of possible enemy attacks, and in the calculations of the RO all German forces are" spread "along the front,"
- and the RO is not obliged to think about this as well)))))

"There is no pronounced grouping of troops, moreover, the striking force - mk - is spread out over divisions in a number of directions ..." It turns out that the VO leadership did not know the directions of the main strikes of the German troops and therefore deployed mk divisions scattered along the front. ”
- this suggests that the head of the district’s headquarters who was shot "for displaying inaction in the administration of the okrug’s affairs" was corrected CORRECTLY))) as a traitor. And his deputy, TRUKHIN, ran away to the Germans rightly)))

[VS]

“Why, then, did the leadership of PribOVO concentrate somehow slowly at the border only 6 incomplete SDs and two mk (not staffed to full staff)?”

--- for which Klenova and spanked in the end)))

“In fact, 40 divisions were put up against the forces of PribOVO (24 pd, 13 td and md, 3 od).”

- no need to lie))) Waited and received - 29 divisions against Pribovo!

“It turns out that the leadership of PribOVO was mistaken only for 8-9 divisions during its preliminary assessment of the German group allocated for the attack on the troops of the district. And intelligence (divisional, district, RU, NKGB, NKVD border troops, etc.) could not fully reveal the size of this group. "

- And where does the DISCONTINUED BY NIKEM PP okrug ???)))
These PPs are Zhukov’s self-will and therefore they were not approved because they were unauthorized)) i.e. crap Zhukov and Vasilevsky)))

“The total number of divisions can be estimated as 20. According to RU intelligence, the number of German divisions against PribOVO is 29. The missing divisions are located outside the RO PribOVO zone of responsibility, which was limited in depth by the Königsberg-Allenstein line. The territory of East Prussia is also located west of this line. It turns out that about 1/3 of the group of German troops planned for military operations with PribOVO (according to the command of the spacecraft) are deployed on June 17 at a depth of more than 100-120 km. What kind of war can we talk about in the near future? "
- the author again invents - who is there THOUGHT in the General Staff - was waiting or not waiting for the attack))
Or maybe the author will still show everyone the CONCLUSIONS in these reports - the attack is not expected ??))) Or maybe he will show such conclusions in the reports of GSh-Zhukov on these reports - the attack is not waiting?)))

“Intelligence must reveal the movement of these troops to the border!”

- and opened - on June 21, ALL that was on the border - WATCH and showed. And according to the events known to us, it is quite obvious - WAITING or did not wait for the attack))))

“In order to concentrate the troops distant from the border at the starting lines, an attack requires up to two days for infantry units and, theoretically, a day for military units and units located in the area of ​​responsibility of the RO Pribovo. Given the huge amount of equipment in MD and so on and a limited number of roads - one day will not be enough ... "

- therefore, from June 18, they brought them to the base station. 17 out of 39 BORDER divisions ai brought them to the defense zone at the BCP !! And the fact that only 17 out of 39 was brought out - so for that they then put them to the wall of freaks like Pavlov and Korobkov with Klenovs)))

“Their individual parts began to focus a few days before the attack, but this concentration was not revealed by intelligence.”

- hello)) THEY EXITED by June 21 and on June 21 RU knows about them completely))))

[VS]

“The VO leadership has a day or two (maximum - up to 4-5) until the German troops move to the border at the starting lines for attack.”

- the okrugs began to withdraw their border divisions according to the BCP - which FIRST and will meet the Germans - from June 18 .. And MK - from June 16)))
They didn’t decide the district there with that withdrawal of troops in principle) DO NOT have to invent dope - that these districts decided))

"The German troops discovered by intelligence are still fewer than required for the attack on PribOVO according to the district leadership." -
- Yes, not the district is thinking about these things - what is there and to whom it is necessary to do and evaluate))) NGOs and the General Staff decides and gives orders - when to whom and where to withdraw and where to look - WHAT troops in JUNE were withdrawn to)))

“The lack of headquarters of motorized armored associations does not allow us to develop the offensive to a greater depth and surround large groups of Soviet troops.”

- against PribOVO - the Germans withdrew their headquarters at the last moment and in the ZAPOVO on June 5th !! they gave data to the 4th Army - it was revealed against Brest - under 16 front and 7 rear)))

“The report again does not indicate the direction of possible attacks by German troops. "

- RO district and is not required to engage in sim))

“The reconnaissance report contains practically no information from which we can conclude that the war began in 1,5 days” -

- actually - this summary on the ZAPOVO - ON JUNE 11 !!!))))

“The author was not able to find the intelligence of RO Zapovo with the deployment of German units in the period June 15-20, 1941, but with a high degree of probability we can say that they were also located far from the border”

- I didn’t find it - well, there’s nothing to invent)))) TOTAL on June 21 it was revealed that it happened - under 130 German divisions alone - for an attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic. And judging by the answers of the divisors in the same LenVO - they brought this figure completely ,,))
Against KOVO 45-48, against PribOVO - 29 and the remaining under 50 divisions - and were against ZAPOVO !!!))))
Not 30 but - 50 divisions; the minimum was detected in the ZAPOV)))

“Therefore, when we are told that a single reconnaissance flight on 17.6.41, on behalf of Stalin personally, supposedly, on-line, immediately opened his eyes to Stalin and the other“ gag ”, the author would suggest you not to believe in this balcony ... "

- alas - this is our author’s bestowal and showed how it can carry nonsense)))) I read a couple of "sources - in the" robin "lying just - and on this and rushed to compose her nonsense)))

STUDY THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION BY DIFFERENT SOURCES)))))

[Flying Dutchman]

You see, it’s not so important to talk about what Stalin knew. It is important to know the theory of the beginning of the war as it was considered by the Soviet military. And it was considered as gradually unfolding, why the troops were concentrated with the anticipation of the offensive. And the Nazis? They spat on the flanks, the main thing ahead and the hope was that the "Western Ukrainians and Belarusians" would not fight and surrender, which was partially justified. True, Hitler was mistaken in the Russian peasants: the information that the Russian peasants hate Stalin's collective farms was exaggerated. So, the beginning of the war was seen somewhat in a softer light.
Further. What could Stalin do? Preventive strike? This is precisely what he is accused of as the instigator of the 10nd Mv. Although there was no preemptive strike. But, it was necessary to blame Stalin. Alright with these demagogues ... Stalin could not deliver a preemptive strike — this would allow Roosevelt and Churchill to prove to his people that the USSR was an aggressor. But at that time the USSR could not fight against the whole world because of economic weakness — only 50 years of industrial development, in contrast to 100-1914 years of industrial development of Western countries. Suffice it to recall that in the 75st MV 3 France produced about XNUMX% of Russian Mosin’s rifles of the XNUMXrd line and everything related to large-caliber artillery. Cars, planes - all Western technology. Stalin could not go on a preventive war. No way.
There was hope for the stamina of the troops. Therefore, Stalin did not even freak out on his retreat to Moscow. Pavlov? Well, here was the conclusion of the commission, signed by the "bison" Shaposhnikov and Zhukov ...
Everything else is a lie of Khrushchev's and anti-Stalin’s injury.

[Oilpartizan]

"Western Ukrainians and Belarusians" will not fight and will surrender, which was partially justified.

You can’t be cured if you think that 5 captive soldiers of the Red Army were all Ukrainians and Belarusians, all the more so “Western”.
It smacks of another Russophile maxim that Russians won WWII exclusively on their own, though under the leadership of a Georgian.

[Flying Dutchman]

I wonder where did anyone get the "5000000 prisoners" if in the entire Red Army in June there were 2,9 million? According to Halder, Hitler in July asked in surprise, saying how many are fighting, and where are the prisoners? Well, the paper will endure ... if only the authorities did not cry. In addition, you don’t know the orders for the Nazi army, which clearly shows that the one whom the Wehrmacht soldiers wish is considered to be a Russian prisoner: civilians (?) - a deal. According to Hitler’s orders, anyone who made an attempt to resist the Russian (protests against the “requisition” of the pig) was shot, anyone who looked askance would be taken as a prisoner of war. It was enough for a man to have a short haircut. See orders for the Nazi army. Naturally, in the western districts by June 1941 there were a lot of western Ukraine and Belarus. As noted in the memoirs by commanders of all degrees of that time, desertion was rampant. As my father said, at the beginning of the war, after counterattacks, Soviet commanders with a bullet (7,62 mm unlike Hitler's bullet 7,69) were often found in the back - "their" shot. And there you are something ...

[Oilpartizan]

at that time the USSR could not fight against the whole world because of economic weakness

But is it nothing that from September 17, 1939 to July 22, 1941 the USSR occupied Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, half of Poland along with Germany, Bessarabia and Bukovina?
Not only that, a month after the outbreak of war with Germany, despite monstrous losses and retreats, in August 1941 the Red Army carried out a brilliant offensive operation against Iran, showing excellent combat training of the troops, their technical readiness and “tearing the country into pairs, but already with a new ally - Great Britain.
A vivid example is when no factors influence the implementation of the strategic plan if you attack first and not sit “on the defensive” in a clean field BEFORE the Dnieper.

[VS]

the implementation of the strategic plan is not affected by any factors, if you attack first, ""

- do not compare the joint operation on Iran - with England in August, and our attack was the first on the Germans on June 22))) We could not attack Germany first .. Although Zhukov or Meretskov dreamed about it)))

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Oilpartizan

Not only that, a month after the outbreak of war with Germany, despite monstrous losses and retreats, in August 1941 the Red Army carried out a brilliant offensive operation against Iran, showing excellent combat training of the troops, their technical readiness and “tearing the country into pairs, but already with a new ally - Great Britain.

Do you seriously think that the Iranian armed forces are approximately equal to the German?
And what to collide with the forces of two districts and an army group on Iran - is it about the same as attacking the Reich?

Quote: Oilpartizan

A vivid example is when no factors influence the implementation of the strategic plan if you attack first and not sit “on the defensive” in a clean field BEFORE the Dnieper.

There was another striking example of an attack first - Finland. After the war with which Voroshilov himself flew from his post. Because brilliant offensive operation turned into motti boilers north of Ladoga and bare-chest machine gun attacks on the Karelian Isthmus.

[Alexey RA]

I apologize - we are talking about the same GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army, which reported that the Wehrmacht had heavy tank divisions armed with heavy tanks. produced in factories in France and Czechoslovakia? Which scared GABTU with German tanks with 105-mm guns (used to break through the Maginot Line), German tank divisions with 500 tanks each, and tens of thousands of German motorcyclists?

[iouris]

It is impossible to hide preparations for war, since war requires the maximum exertion of spiritual forces and the state’s economy. The last example is Georgia: as soon as the military budget and the saturation of armaments exceeded the reasonable level and capabilities of the state, it was necessary to take preventive measures. A fresh example to give?

[Seal]

Quote: Flying Dutchman

Finland is an ally of Hitler and dreams of a "Great Finland" up to the Urals.

Is dreaming forbidden?
We, for example, at the same time dreamed of the victory of communism on a global scale.

Take one of the most famous writers and political propagandists K. Simonov
(New Year's Toast, 1937)

"Someday, getting together with friends,
We will remember after many years,
That the edges were cut into the ground
Cruel tracked track
That crumpled bread soldier’s boots,
That a war was coming towards us
What west of us once
Was a fascist country. "

Or from (“The Battle of the Ice”, also 1937)

The day will come when freedom
Conquered in battle
Fascism shaken people
We will give our hand.
That day with joyful clicks
We will praise the whole country
Liberated and great
The people of Germany are native.
We believe in this, it will be so,
Not now, tomorrow the battle will break out ...

And the final scene of another pre-war work of Konstantin Simonov - the play “The Guy from Our City” (1941), in which the protagonist, a Soviet tank officer, utters the following monologue, very bold for a brief pre-war era of diplomatic maneuvering in relations with Hitler Germany:
“Maybe many years will pass and (...) in the last fascist city this last fascist will raise his hands in front of the tank on which there will be a red, namely a red banner.”

And how many more such simons, only on a smaller scale, did we have? So, that, and we had just as you think we are Finns in 1939 ... for our thoughts of crime?

[Seal]

Quote: qqqq

I don’t remember who, gave an example that the use of tanks by Zhukov at Khalkhin Gol played a cruel joke when breaking through the Japanese defense with tanks

Well, all the same, it was not a breakthrough in defense, but the destruction (discharge into the river) of the Japanese landing that had just crossed over and had not yet had time to gain a foothold, which captured a small bridgehead on our side of the river.

[RuSFr]

You are mistaken, there were huge losses of tanks and armored vehicles of the Soviet troops and the planned retreat of Japanese soldiers. After this attack, tank brigades were not operational the very next day. Girl author watched this case 4 part

[RuSFr]

I apologize - 3 part

[VS]

Quote: RuSFr

You are mistaken, there were huge losses of tanks and armored vehicles of the Soviet troops and the planned retreat of Japanese soldiers. After this attack, tank brigades were not operational the very next day.

everything was rightly done here - if you don’t immediately throw the enemy off the bridgehead - then you swallow the dust))) That is - Zhukov did everything right then)))

[RuSFr]

Russians have a saying
Speed ​​is needed with a strip.
How can I write? Everything was done right.
If no reconnaissance was carried out, did the units enter the battle in parts and without artillery?
Do you consider yourself a military man?
These are elementary actions.
And the Japanese military simply left the next day, retaining manpower and equipment.

[VS]

Zhukov won in Mongolia or not?)))

[RuSFr]

You distort the answers, so they argue with you a little and don’t like the answers
The topic of attack by tanks and armored cars on Tsagan Mountain was discussed. The troops were abandoned without reconnaissance, full concentration, without artillery support and air, too. All parts are not void. Fighting with Japanese soldiers a motorized rifle regiment and a rushed cavalry. Japanese troops retreated in perfect order. He won this Zhukov - no lost. He won in Mongolia - won the Red Army of the USSR.
Also in the forehead Zhukov attacked the spruce. The huge losses of the Russians, the Germans took their units. Zhukov defeated - no, he satisfied his ambitions.
Beat Zhukov in the Great Patriotic War? No, the Soviet army and the entire Soviet people won.
You are a historical writer, you can’t write incorrectly and distort words

[RuSFr]

Quote: RuSFr

Russians have a saying
Speed ​​is needed for diarrhea.
How to write: Everything was done right.
If no reconnaissance was carried out, were the troops brought into battle in parts and without artillery?
Do you consider yourself a military man? I am also a former non-Russian military, but I understand that. These are elementary actions. How not to understand this you?
And the Japanese military simply left the next day, retaining manpower and equipment.

[VS]

Quote: Bakht

No links to documents. Give the order number of the NGO if you can.

What do I need - to shovel 9 books to find these "links"?)) The OdVO began its conclusion - on June 8. First, he gave them permission by telephone to Zhukov on the 6th on this phone — and then a telegram came with a directive)) ZAPOVO — at 7 o’clock in the morning he began to conclude his “deep-seated” ones, and the directive of NCOs and the General Staff arrived by the evening of the 11th)) ) For KOVO and PribOVO, they signed on the 12th, but they came to the okrugs on the 14th in the evening))) For KOVO and ZAPOVO, these directives are published in a robin. But there the dates are indicated nevertheless))) According to the OdVO - Zakharov wrote about this)))

[VS]

Quote: Bakht

from you there was not a single link to the document.
Well, at least so

in my books I show more - there are also links to details of pre-war directives and additional information))))

[VS]

Quote: Bakht

about June 8-11 there is no question. The redeployment of troops began on the 16th. The decision was made on June 13 or a day earlier.
What you write is retelling of Kozinkin or Solonin. I don’t know what you read.

why should I retell or read Kozinkin if I do - I write this))))

Did you read Zakharov — on OdVO?))) Baghramyan — on KOVO?))) Bagramyan — of course, memoirs, but Zakharov — wrote work with all the links needed to the docks))) And if you look at the “notes” to Chekunov’s commanders’s answers, then there all the more - solid links to my words - the numbers of these directives and the dates and details of their storage in TsAMO)))

The withdrawal of the second echelons - began with the requests of the Military Councils of the districts in NPOs - was it time to begin the withdrawal of troops by the BCP)) - and that was June 8-9. As it was, both Zakharov and Bagramyan described it just))) The OdVO requested this conclusion as early as June 6th. According to the KOVO, this request was posted in the robin))) But Chekunov also shows these requests in a two-volume book on answers)))
Having received these requests, Zhukov in which districts indicated that they expect an attack in the coming days - June 11 goes to Stalin and brings with him a directive - "Proceed with the 1941 implementation of the PP")) Stalin slows down this)) Zhukov suggests contacting Hitler create a joint Commission - to monitor the border strip - to remove questions about the alleged Germans withdrawing troops to the border and rumored by England to attack the USSR)))
Stalin and this offer is crap. BUT - He gives a TASS message dated June 13th which turned out to be more effective))) And also - he gives instructions - to begin the withdrawal of second echelons - deep divisions))) Minsk began to withdraw to OdVO already on the 8th - started at 7 a.m. 11- go))) and only KOVO and PribOVO - started on the 15th)))
YOU have read what books of mine?)) After all, I show in detail - which directives went and I show all the necessary source and details on them)))

[VS]

Quote: Bakht

This directive is NOT SIGNED. And first appeared on the site of Yakovlev. Does not convince. Well, does not convince.

it was published - a directive for the KOVO about second echelons - in the "robin" - the collection of "1941. Documents" is called among historians)) But the robin is in general a collection of fakes including))) More precisely - the data on the documents are often distorted there and even the documents themselves - for example, the text of the so-called. deer 1))) For example, on KOVO this deer. it is shown as from "June 13th" and for the ZAPOVO - there is no date at all - "no later than June 20th"))) But - for Minsk it is dated June 11th, and for Kiev - June 12th)) You do not believe me - see the two-volume Chekunova - he shows their exact data too))))

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Nothing comes to mind the pre-war state of affairs in military intelligence,

You can study a rather interesting and reliable book about this - V.V. Kondrashov "History of Russian Military Intelligence", Ch. 3 p. 318