The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 1)

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Dedicated to S.
Preface. Quite a lot of people in our huge country can competently talk about the events of the Great Patriotic War. The last decade, interest in military technology and the events of the Great Patriotic War has increased even more, in contrast to the civilized countries of Europe, in which they try to forget their history and "step on the rake again." The peoples of these countries are forced to "dance to the American tune" ...

In the article “How Europe went to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, the author tried to show the role of the true perpetrators of the tragedy in Europe - England and the USA, who “behind the scenes” ruled other countries. 30's events are reminiscent of current times. As Churchill said then, "Hitler betrayed an anti-communist ... cause." It turns out that for the sake of the “Great” goal - the destruction of Bolshevism - you can “surrender” your allies and the “Great” goal should be set higher than the interests of the peoples of many countries. Now in Russia there is no power of the communist regime, but "Great "target - Anti-Russian - unites Europe. If you look closely, the United States and Britain are still somewhat isolated from other countries and are ready to act against Russia. Perhaps they are still under the control of the backstage Puppeteers ...




Since 22 June 1941, we were told about the unexpected attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR. We read a lot and heard about the Soviet intelligence reports, which revealed the plans of the fascists.
To us, the present generation, everything is clear about preparing Germany for war, and Stalin all "overslept". Once at the time, we would immediately “open the eyes” of the ruling clique! Stalin did not believe intelligence reports, because he believed Hitler and, by virtue of the non-aggression pact, he tried to delay the war, which he feared, without giving Germany a reason to attack. Or, maybe, I.V. Stalin simply trusted the specialists and therefore the Germans "beat" him?


The decision on the war with the USSR and the overall plan of the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the supreme military command of 31.07.40. December 18 1940 years after making clarifications Hitler signed directive №21 Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), which received the name "Barbarossa".
The German Armed Forces (AF) were tasked with defeating Soviet Russia in the course of a short-term campaign. For which it was intended to use all ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupational functions in Europe and the North African coast, as well as about two thirds of the Air Force and part of the Navy. The start of the invasion was scheduled for 15 on May 1941 of the year. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was according to the plan 4 — 5 months.

On the night of 5 on 6 on April (Sunday), German troops launched air strikes and invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. November 30.04.41, XNUMX at a meeting of senior military leadership Hitler called new date of the attack on the USSR22 June 1941 yearwhich he wrote on his copy of the plan.

Preparing Germany for war with the USSR was carried out in the framework of unprecedented measures to ensure secrecy. To conceal the military plans of Germany against the USSR, on the orders of Hitler, at the initial stage, misinformation measures were developed. Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and some other cabinet members closest to the Führer knew about them. The thesis of Hitler that the war against the USSR is possible only after the "reasonable agreement with England" was reached by the German special services was adopted to mislead the USSR leadership regarding the timing of the attack.

In the dissemination of misinformation information participated:
- The top officials of the German leadership (Hitler, the ministers of foreign affairs and foreign trade), German ambassadors, diplomats, and military attaches;
- employees of the political and military intelligence of Germany, who operated in European countries and in the Far East;
- members of the German government and trade and economic delegations who visited Moscow and the capitals of other European states;
- German media.

As an example, I will cite only one indication of the headquarters of the OKV to the Abwehr’s leadership about the disinformation activities of the Soviet military command 6.09.40 of
"... In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the east will increase significantly ... From these our rearrangements in Russia ... there should not be an impression that we are preparing an offensive to the east ... Russia must understand that in the General Government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate there are strong and efficient German troops, and conclude from this that we are ready at any moment and with sufficiently powerful forces to defend our interests in the Balkans against Russian intervention.

For the operation of one’s own intelligence, as well as for possible answers to Russian intelligence requests, one should be guided by the following basic principles.

1. To disguise the total number of German troops in the east as much as possible by spreading rumors and news about the allegedly intensive replacement of military units taking place in the area. Movement of troops to justify their transfer to training camps, re-formation, etc.

2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.

3. To exaggerate the state and level of armament of formations, especially tank divisions.

4. Spread appropriately selected information to create the impression that after the end of the western march anti-aircraft defense in the east seriously increased due to the captured French technology.

5. The work on improving the network of highways, railways and airfields is explained by the need to develop the newly conquered eastern regions, while referring to the fact that they are conducted at a normal pace and serve mainly economic goals.

To what extent are the individual authentic data, for example, the regiment numbering, the number of garrisons, etc.? can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes - decides the General Command of the Army.

Earlier, Soviet intelligence did not meet with such large-scale actions to cover the attack. Read more in the article.
(http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=10646886%40cmsArticle).


Let me draw attention to just one fact hidden in the OKW instruction: from the autumn of 1940, the number of German Armed Forces on the border with the USSR should have been overestimated. The USSR should have concluded that Germany is ready to defend our interests in the Balkans against Russian intervention [invasion] by powerful forces. Prepared "soil" for the "addiction" of the leadership of the USSR to such a concentration of troops.

For example, the Red Army Intelligence Agency (RU) estimated the number of divisions on the western border: 1.10.40 - 89 (in fact, it was 30); 1.11.40 - 88 divisions (32); 4.04.41 - 84 Divisions (47).


In Berlin, the resident foreign intelligence NKGB was Kobulov. Working in Berlin, Kobulov sent to Moscow valuable information obtained by Soviet intelligence officers.

In May 1947 of the year, German intelligence major Muller showed during interrogation: “In August 1940 of the year Kobulov was substituted by Berlinka’s intelligence agent (“ Lyceist ”), who for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials. Information from conversations with Kobulov ... was reported to Hitler and Ribbentrop. At meetings with the "Lyceum" Kobulov informed his "agent" that he sent his information personally to Stalin and Molotov.

14.12.40/XNUMX/XNUMX Mr. Kobulov reported to Moscow: “... According to the Lyceum’s reports, Germany’s foreign policy is based on the following basic principles ... The only enemy of our country [Germany] is England ... They see their tasks in Germany as ... avoiding a two-way war front. At the same time, it is important to ensure good relations between the Germans and Russia ... ”In a note to the report, it was reported that“ Lyceumist ”received information about the upcoming German landing in England from the senior lieutenant. This is indirectly confirmed by the changed nature of German raids. aviation to London. " For "the senior lieutenant", which Kobulov mentioned in the report, Corporal Hitler, who led the work of the "Lyceum", gave himself out.

In June 1991, an article was published by the former head of the GRU, General P.I. Ivashutin. The article, in particular, noted: “The reactionary circles of Western countries waited for the German attack on the USSR, but by that time their own existence depended on the ability of the Soviet Union to stand and win. Data on the reconnaissance channels of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the NKVD and the NKID since the 1938 have been reported on the maturing of military danger for the USSR. They concerned the buildup of the military and economic potential of Germany, the strategic concentration and operational deployment of the troops of the Hitler coalition near the western Soviet border, the creation of strike groups, and the directions of their actions. The main content of the “Barbarossa” plan was known 11 days after its approval by Hitler. During the period from December 27 1940 to June 22, 1941 received more than a dozen reliable sources about the possible dates of an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, which also indicated such dates as the middle of June, 15 – 20 of June and 22 – 25 hours of 3 June 4. However, the country's leadership, the military commander, even having information on the timing of the attack, did not take appropriate measures to repel the aggressor in a timely manner ... ”

The foreign intelligence services of the NKGB and military intelligence were created to obtain the information necessary to ensure the effective protection of the territory, the political and economic interests of the USSR.

There were five categories of information:
1 category - reports from Soviet ambassadors from Germany and other European countries;
2 - reports of residents of foreign intelligence NKGB;
3 - reports of military attaches, residents of military intelligence and intelligence of the Navy;
4 - special communications and intelligence reports prepared by the NKGB and the Space Agency;
5 - reports of intelligence agents.

The 1937 – 39 cleaning struck a severe blow to the spacecraft. Experienced intelligence officers were recalled from overseas business trips, dismissed from work or subjected to repression, the agent network was actually destroyed not only in Germany, but also in other Western European countries. The Soviet political leadership made an unwarranted mistake.

In 1940, the Republic of Uzbekistan began to treat residents' reports as extremely important information about the imminent threat of war. Similarly, the reports of the military intelligence included the leadership of the General Staff (GS), which, from December 1940, began to pay serious attention to the preparation of the military intelligence system for military operations.

14 December 1940, the head of the General Staff, General Meretskov, approved the new significantly increased staff of the RU. At the same time, the new Regulations on Military Intelligence were approved, emphasizing that the GS GSA is the central body of operational-strategic intelligence. The RU’s sphere of responsibility was defined quite widely - it was supposed to direct the work of foreign intelligence apparatus, the intelligence divisions of the headquarters of military districts (VO), radio intelligence units and other structures.

Between January 25 and February 21, the 1941 of the Republic of Uzbekistan organized and carried out the training of the heads of the intelligence departments of the HE staffs. Other measures were also taken related to the organization of the transition of military intelligence to work in emergency conditions. Under extraordinary conditions in the Republic of Uzbekistan was understood only one thing - war. According to General M. Milstein, who after the war was head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Staff Academy, military intelligence, despite the losses suffered during the years of repression, before the war "not only restored its previous connections, but also became one of the most powerful ... military intelligence in the world".

P.Ivashutin noted: "... The texts of almost all documents and radio telegrams relating to German military preparations and the timing of the attack were reported regularly on the following list: Stalin (2 copy), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff."

The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 1)


Sending two copies of the documents to Stalin testifies to the fact that he was rather painstakingly trying to work with these documents.

G. Zhukov: “... The information that emanated from General F. Golikov [head of the Republic of Uzbekistan] was immediately reported to us by I.Stalin. However, I don’t know what the intelligence was reported to Stalin Golikov personally, bypassing the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff ... ”

Why same surprise attack possible?

First, Soviet intelligence was inconclusive.

Secondly, the Soviet leadership was aware of Germany’s preparation for an attack on the USSR, believed that this clash could occur, but hoped to prevent it or move it back in time in order to gain more time to prepare the country to repel the aggression.

Thirdly, the Soviet leadership did not have the necessary experience in analyzing the complex military and political situation that had developed on the eve of the German attack on the USSR. Which of these causes are close to reality?

Let's return to the events in Europe during the conclusion of the Treaty 23.08.39.

First, Stalin was then able to prevent the creation of the Anglo-Franco-German alliance.

Secondly, by concluding an agreement with Germany, Stalin prevented the possibility of a war with Japan, which was already an ally of Germany.

Third, the western borders of the USSR were pushed aside, which created a strategic territorial barrier covering the USSR from the west.

Fourthly, the Soviet leadership won the time needed to strengthen the country's defense and increase the combat capability of the spacecraft.

It turns out that The Soviet leadership had the experience of analyzing a complex military-political situation and at that time trusted information from intelligence..

We do not even know what effort our intelligence was worth in preventing England from uniting with Germany. Why do we think that management did not trust Soviet intelligence in 1941?

29.12.40, the Soviet military attache in Berlin, General V.Tupikov ("Arnold") reported to Moscow that Hitler had ordered to prepare for war with the USSR. The war will be declared in March 1941. Moscow demanded clarification of information.

4.01.41 from Berlin received confirmation of the accuracy of the information based onnot rumored, and on the special order of Hitler, which is highly secret and which is known to very few people ... The preparation of the offensive against the USSR began much earlier, but at one time was somewhat suspended, because the Germans miscalculated with the resistance of England. In the spring the Germans expect England to put on their knees and free their hands in the east. ” Mention was made of the new start of the war - the spring of the year 1941.

Information about the timing of the start of the war after the withdrawal of England from it, as we already know, was disinformation. Intelligence received information about a certain decision about the war of Hitler, but the exact description of it, the scale of the action and the timeframe remained unknown.

7.01.41 G. General V. Tupikov learned that "most of the sources available in Germany do not have significant possibilities for obtaining documentary data on the German Armed Forces».

In the second half of March 1941, V.Tupikov sent to Moscow the “Report on the military and numerical strength of the deployed German army and its grouping as of 15.3.41”. The report contained more than 100 typewritten sheets, 30 layouts of organizational structures of units of the German Armed Forces, a diagram of the grouping of troops, a scheme of organization of the German army corps, summary tables of the combat strength of the Wehrmacht artillery units, etc.

In Moscow, the report of V.Tulikov was immediately processed. On its basis, in April 1941, a “Intelligence report on Germany” was prepared and sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and the commander of the Western military districts.

In the second half of April, another report was received from Tupikov on the “German Army Grouping as of 25.4.41”.

Analyzing the state of Soviet-German political relations against the background of a visit to Moscow by the Japanese Foreign Minister, V. Tupikov reports that question of the collision of Germany and the CCCR [it] "question deadlines and terms not so remote"Because the German leadership, which initiated an open anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, cannot" plan for a long period the stability of German-Soviet relations on an anti-Soviet basis. "

Evaluating the preparation of the Wehrmacht for the war against the USSR, Tupikov drew the attention of the head of the RU to the fact that “the grouping of the German army from the autumn of 1940 has invariably shifted to the east. Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118 – 120 divisions. The qualitative condition of the Armed Forces ... is now at its zenith and it’s not likely that it will hold out at this level for a long time, the Reich leaders have no reason, as it’s already felt that even the slightest complications hinting at a possible delay in the war cause acute nervousness among the general population ” .

Of particular value was the graphic "Scheme of possible options for Germany's actions against the USSR", which Tupikov himself executed and sent to the RU. One of the three options presented by Tupikov of the German forces reflected the plan of the German command to attack the USSR.

On the basis of the information at his disposal, V. Tupikov came to conclusions, which he informed the head of military intelligence:
“1. In the German plans of the USSR appears as another opponent.
2. The start of the collision is as short as possible and, of course, within the current year. ”
9 May 1941, General V.Tupikov reported to the People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko and the Head of the General Staff Zhukov about the plan of possible actions of the German army against the USSR. The report indicated that Germans are planning to defeat the spacecraft in 1 – 1,5 of the month with access to the Moscow meridian. [Naturally, senior military leaders could not even imagine that it was possible to fight like that and considered all this to be disinformation or nonsense.]

From January to March 1941, data on the preparation of a German attack on the USSR, on building up a group of German troops along the Soviet borders were received by the Center from military intelligence officers from Hungary, Romania, Germany, France, Iran and Japan.

20 March 1940 year the head of the RU GS GS prepared Report to the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, to the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) “Sayings ... and options for combat operations of the German army against the USSR”

“Most of the intelligence data relating to the possibilities of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 comes from Anglo-American sources, whose task today ... is the desire to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany. At the same time, ... a brief summary of all the available intelligence data for the period July July 1940 — March 1941 deserve in some part of serious attention ... Of all the statements we received at different times, the following deserve attention:

1. Goring allegedly agreed to make peace with England and oppose the USSR.

2. The Japanese military BAT [military attache] reports that Hitler allegedly stated that after a quick victory in the west he began an offensive against the USSR.

3. In Berlin, they talk about some major disagreement between Germany and the USSR. In this regard, the German embassy said that after England and France will come the turn of the USSR ...

... 14. A clash between Germany and the USSR should be expected in May 1941 g ... No one responds approvingly to these plans. It is believed that the spread of war on the USSR will only bring the end of the national socialist regime closer. This opinion is expressed by the nephew of Brauchitsch ...

Of the most likely options for action against the USSR, the following deserve attention:

1. Option No. 1 according to an anonymous letter received by our plenipotentiary in Berlin from 15.12.40 g.: “... the main direction of the blow: a) from Lublin in Pripyat to Kiev; b) from Romania between Iasi and Bukovina in the direction of Teterev, and c) from East Prussia to Memel, Willing, Berezina and further along the Dnieper to Kiev ”; [very similar to German misinformation];

2. Option No. 2 according to KOVO’s data from December 1940: “... Three main directions of impact: a) from East Prussia in the direction of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia ...; b) through Galicia and Volyn ... A group of troops of the 2 and 3 directions is surrounded by enemy troops in MaloPolshe. In the rest of the area, auxiliary blows are inflicted in the frontal direction in order to clear the rest of the territory ... "

3. Option No. 3, according to our intelligence report for February 1941: “... Three army groups are being set up for an offensive on the USSR: the 1-group under the command of General Marshal Bock strikes in the direction of Petrograd, the 2-group under the command of Field Marshal Runstudt - in the direction of Moscow and the 3-group under the command of General Field Marshal Leeb - in the direction of Kiev. The beginning of the offensive against the USSR is approximately May 20. ”

In addition to these documents, according to other sources, it is known that the plan of an offensive against the USSR will be as follows:

a) after the victory over England, Germany, advancing against the USSR, intends to strike from two flanks: coverage from the north (meaning Finland) and from the Balkan Peninsula;

b) the commercial director of the German company Trencha Mine, the limited said that the attack on the USSR would take place through Romania ...;

e) according to our BAT report from Berlin, according to a quite authoritative source, the beginning of military operations against the USSR should be expected between May 15 and June 15, 1941.

Hack and predictor Aviator:

1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible time limit start action against CCCP will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany.

2. Gossip and documents that speak of the inevitability of this spring in the war against the USSR must be regarded as misinformationcoming from the English and even, perhaps, German intelligence. " For more information visit http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1004944/66/Martirosyan_Arsen_-_Tragediya_1941_goda.html)

Maybe someone would have tried from the Report to choose from several “fantastic” one real version of the war between Germany and the USSR, having improved the available information. But GSH thought in other categories and this information "the price was worthless." In addition, the messages "were illuminated by the sworn friends" of the USSR. Therefore, intelligence did not particularly believe.

As General V.Tupikov correctly noted: “the sources in Germany ... do not have ... the possibilities of obtaining documentary data about the German Armed Forces." Quite right, we do not see in the report materials either the option of encircling the Zapov troops, nor the lightning actions of the moto-armored formations, nor the distribution of German troops in directions with the definition of the main directions of strikes. The attacks on Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev are too abstract.

Calling the approximate time of the German attack “somewhere in May-June”, did the “Great Secret” of Hitler come out, having learned that the USSR would win right away? Unlikely. Maybe in other reports there is more detailed information?


In the second half of June, the 1941 of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence of the NKGB prepared two documents. Their content greatly expands the current understanding of what information the preparation of Germany for the attack on the USSR was possible to obtain by Soviet intelligence on the eve of World War II.

The first document prepared by the NKGB is called “The calendar reports of agents of the Berlin residency NKGB USSR ... for the period from September 1940 to 16 June 1941 of the year. " "Calendar ...", judging by the date available on it, was compiled on June 20, that is, approximately 40 hours before the German attack on the USSR.

The second document is entitled “List military intelligence reports on Germany’s preparation for war against the USSR (January – June 1941). ” On the "List ..." there is no date of its execution, but it can be assumed that it was developed at the end of June.

The form and content of the "Calendar ..." and "List ..." are somewhat similar to each other, and at the same time different. "Calendar ..." is built according to the type of contradictions of intelligence reports and reflects the position of Beria. The “List ...” is built according to the type of the Golikov report from 20.03.41, and contains only those messages that speak of the possibility of a war between Germany and the USSR. Since there are no interim messages, it is difficult to judge whether these messages were the same inconsistency, which is noted in the "Calendar ...". Probably, both documents were prepared for one task, and the customer could be the head to which the NKGB and the RU were subordinate. Such a person was I.Stalin.

«A calendar of messages from agents of the Berlin Rezindentura of the NKGB USSR "Corsican" and "Senior Saints" about preparing Germany for war for the period from September 6 1940 to June 16 and 1941 June»20.06.1941
The article only reports from the beginning of the 1941 year. Removed non-relevant text from intelligence messages. More information about the "Calendar ..." can be found at: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1012019.

07.01.41 G. "Corsican"- In the circles grouped around Herren Club, there is an increasing opinion that Germany will lose the war in this connection you need to negotiate with England and America in order to turn weapon to the East.

[Dangerous enough news - against the three powers of the USSR was not to stand. It was necessary again, as in 1939 of the USSR, to "tack", without making mistakes.]

07.01.41 G. "Foreman"- The headquarters of the German aviation instructed to begin reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory in order to photograph the entire border strip. Leningrad is also included in the field of reconnaissance flights. Goering's position is increasingly inclined to conclude an agreement with America and England...

09.01.41 G. "Corsican"- The Military Economic Department of the Imperial Statistical Office received an order from the OKW to draw up industry maps of the USSR.

04.02.41 G. "Corsican"- A German offensive in the Balkans is ahead, which has already been prepared. In connection with the Balkan campaign, relations between Germany and the Soviet Union will escalate.

06.02.41 G. "Foreman"- Aviation Headquarters decided to launch a Balkan campaign in March. Over the past three weeks, German troops are being transferred to Bulgaria.

From the diary of Gebelss: "22 February 1941 (Sat)" The mood in the United States is developing in the direction of war. Now they talk about it openly, even in the highest circles ... "

01.03.41 G. "Corsican"- The Committee completed the calculation of the economic effect of the anti-Soviet [war] action, with negative conclusions. The order for the development of calculations does not come from the OKW, but from Ribbentrop or even Hitler. All calculations must be completed by May 1.

March 1941Foreman"- German aviation operations on aerial photography of the Soviet territory are in full swing. German aircraft operate from airfields in Bucharest, Königsberg and from Northern Norway - Kirkenes. The shooting is made from a height of 6000 m. In particular, the Germans photographed Kronstadt. Goering is the main driving force in the design and preparation of war against the Soviet Union.
[And Hitler, then for the war or against?]

March 1941Corsican"- The question of a military intervention against the Soviet Union in the spring of this year was resolved with the expectation that the Russians would not be able to set green bread on fire during the retreat and the Germans would take advantage of this harvest ... Speech is scheduled for May 1. Germany’s military intervention against the USSR is already a matter of concern. Urals, according to their calculations, maybe reached within 25 days. [The advancement of German troops in 25 days to the Urals — after such a message has been examined by military specialists of the General Staff — the reports of this source should be checked.].

20.03.41 G. "Corsican"- Work on the calculation of the economic efficiency of the anti-Soviet action continues ... In Belgium, in addition to the occupation troops, there is only one active division, which confirms that military action against the British Isles has been postponed ...

24.03.41 G. "Foreman"- aviation headquarters conducts intensive training against the USSR. Plans are made for the bombing of the most important objects. A plan for the bombing of Leningrad, Vyborg, Kiev. Aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of cities and industrial facilities. The German aviation attache in Moscow finds out the location of the Soviet power stations, personally drives around the areas where the power stations are located. In the general staff of aviation among the officers there is an opinion that the German military action against the USSR is timed to the end of April or the beginning of May ... There is only a 50% chance that this gig will happen, it may all be a bluff..

28.03.41 G. "Foreman"- The German command is preparing a pincer-like strike from the south - from Romania, on the one hand, and through the Baltic states, and possibly through Finland - on the other. This maneuver will be undertaken in order to cut off the Soviet Army, as it was done in its time in France.

02.04.41 G. "Foreman"- The headquarters of the German aviation fully developed and prepared a plan of attack on the Soviet Union. Aviation concentrates its attack on the railway hubs of the central and western parts of the USSR, the power stations of the Donetsk basin, and the aviation industry enterprises of Moscow. Air bases near Krakow are the main starting point for an attack on the USSR. Created two army groups that are scheduled for operations against the USSR. Goering takes a clear course on the war against the USSR, and messages that indicate the riskiness and inexpediency of this adventure are undesirable for him. Goering at the last meeting with Antonescu demanded 20 divisions to participate in the anti-Soviet action. In Romania, German troops are concentrated on the Soviet border. Germans consider weak point Soviet defense ground service of aviation, and therefore hope by intensive bombing of airfields immediately disrupt its actions. The second imperfect defense link consider the communications service of the Red Army Aviation because of its heaviness, excessive radiosity and complexity of keys. The air force is preparing an attack on Yugoslavia, which is to follow shortly. To this end, the aviation headquarters from the Russian question temporarily switched to Yugoslavia, thereby causing the fear that the moment of the action against the USSR might be lost.

02.04.41 G. "Corsican"- ...The question of armed intervention against the USSR resolved. April 10 will be issued a decree on the termination of private deliveries by rail. The anti-Soviet campaign will begin on April 15.

07.04.41 G. "Corsican"- The Germans evacuated Memel. Poznan and the cities of Silesia are declared zones of military danger of the first stage. From the Governor-General ends the evacuation of women and children.

14.04.41 G. "Foreman"- Military training is conducted by Germany deliberately noticeable in order to demonstrate their military power. Hitler is the initiator of the plan of attack on the Soviet Union, believing that a preventive war with the Union is necessary in order not to face a stronger enemy. The outbreak of hostilities must precede ultimatum Soviet Union with the proposal to accede to the Covenant of three. The beginning of the implementation of the plan is tied to the end of the war with Yugoslavia and Greece ... To make England more compliant, it is necessary to reject Ukraine from the Soviet Union. The seizure of Ukraine will force England to make concessions.
If necessary, it is possible to conclude peace with England, even at the cost of sacrificing Nazism, and in case of failure in the war with the USSR, even Hitler himself, in order to “eliminate” the obstacles to the unification of the civilized world against Bolshevism. Japan and Italy are allegedly not devoted to these anti-Soviet plans.

17.04.41 G. "Foreman"- In connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Libya, African victories are at the center of attention. The mood of the circles fighting for the attack on the Soviet Union, somewhat subsided, as they received new hopes to win the war with England. However, GSH with the same intensity conducts preparatory work for operations against the USSR, which are expressed in a detailed definition of the objects of bombardment. In the Army General Staff, some of the generals are the instigators and supporters of the anti-Soviet action. The latter also includes Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch's nephew said that it's time to end the struggle between the peoples of Europe and it is necessary to unite efforts against the Soviet Union. Similar ideas come from Brauchitsch and borrowed from him by his young relative. Main figureth, driving the anti-Soviet plans of the German military and part of the bourgeoisie, is goering. Ribbentrop is opposed to these plans in opposition to him.. The differences between Goering and Ribbentrop went so far as to escalate into personal dislike between them.

[It was misinformation, the dissemination of which is intended to create an opinion among the leadership of the USSR about disagreements among the German leaders on the issue of war with the USSR.]

24.04.41 G. "Foreman"- German intelligence has established that the production of artillery ammunition is mainly concentrated in the Leningrad region. Currently, the aviation headquarters has almost completely ceased the development of Russian facilities and is intensively preparing for an action directed against Turkey, Syria and Iraq, in the first place. The rally against the USSR seems to be pushed to the rearn, the General Staff no longer receives photographs of Soviet territory taken from German aircraft.

30.04.41 G. "Foreman"- The question of Germany’s action against the Soviet Union is finally decidedand the beginning should be expected from day to day.
Ribbentrop, who is still not a supporter of his campaign against the USSR, knowing Hitler’s firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR. Confirms the message "Gregor" that the question of speaking out against the Soviet Union is considered resolved. In the aviation headquarters, increased cooperation between the German and Finnish GS in the development of operational plans against the USSR. The Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian headquarters turned to the Germans with a request for the urgent delivery of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, which they needed in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.

May 1941Corsican"- At the meeting of responsible referents of the Ministry of Economy, press assistant Krol stated in the report:" ...From the USSR will be required to speak out against England on the side of the Axis powers. As a guarantee, Ukraine will be occupied, and possibly the Baltic States. ”

May 1941Foreman"- It is necessary to seriously warn Moscow about all the data indicating that the issue of an attack on the Soviet Union is resolved, the speech is scheduled for the near future, and the Germans want to solve the issue of" fascism or socialism "and, of course, prepare the maximum possible forces and funds. At the headquarters of the German aviation, the preparation of an operation against the USSR is carried out at the highest rate. All data suggests that the performance is scheduled for the near future. In conversations among staff officers, the date is often called 20 May as the start date of the war. Others believe that the speech is scheduled for June. In the beginning, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding wider exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda. As a guarantee of these requirements, German commissioners should be sent to industrial areas and economic centers and enterprises of Ukraine, and some Ukrainian regions should be occupied by the German army. The ultimatum will be preceded by a “war of nerves” in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.. Recently, the preparation of war with the USSR, the Germans are trying to keep completely secret ... Despite the note of the Soviet government, German aircraft continue to fly to the Soviet side for the purpose of aerial photography. Now photography is taking place from a height of 11 thousand m ... Antonescu sent a memorandum to Hitler and Goering, in which he proves the necessity of the German attack on the USSR in the spring of this year.

11.05.41 G. "Foreman"- Fleet number 1 of German aviation is designed to act against the USSR as the main unit. It is still on paper, with the exception of night fighter connections, anti-aircraft artillery and detachments training specifically in “shaving flights”. However, this does not mean that he is not ready to speak, since everything is clear according to the plan - the organization is prepared, planes can be deployed as soon as possible. Until now, the center of the 1st Air fleet was Berlin ...

14.05.41 G. "Foreman"- Plans for the Soviet Union are delayed., German authorities are taking measures to keep their subsequent development in complete secrecy. German military attaches abroad, as well as ambassadors, were instructed to refute rumors of a military confrontation between Germany and the USSR. Reports coming from Sweden and Finland constantly state that Swedish industry circles interested in Soviet orders all the time influence the Swedish and Finnish policies in favor of maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. An aviation order dated May 7 was published at the aviation headquarters. The order states that the strategic plans and preliminary intelligence activities have become known to the enemy.

May 1941Corsican"- In the Ministry of Economy, the OKW order is associated with the anti-Soviet plans of Germany, which became known to the Russians.

May 1941Foreman"- Slowing down the fulfillment of the anti-Soviet plans of Germany at the aviation headquarters is explained by difficulties and losses in the war with the British on the African front and the sea. The circles of authoritative officers believe that simultaneous operations against the British and against the USSR are hardly possible. Along with this, preparatory work against the USSR in the aviation headquarters continues.

From the diary of Gebelss: "31 May." Operation Barbarossa is developing. We are starting a great disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things. I have to send the entire ministry along the wrong path, risking my prestige in case of failure ... 14 divisions heading west.Slowly expand the topic of the invasion [meaning to England]. I ordered to write a song about the invasion, a new motive, strengthen the use of English radio programs, instructing the mouths of propaganda in England, etc. two weeks...
7 June. “We force the invasion theme. Not yet seen a real success. Everyone is silent ... "


09.06.41 G. "Foreman"- Next week the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of war will be finally resolved. Germany will present the USSR with a request to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and to use the Soviet navy against England. All preparatory military activities, mapping the location of Soviet airfields, focusing on the Balkan airfields of German aviation should be completed by mid-June. All the chiefs of the airfields in the Governor-General and East Prussia were assigned to prepare for the take-off of the aircraft. Hastily equipped with a large airfield in Insterburg. Formed the future administrative management of the occupied territory of the USSR, headed by Rosenberg.

11.06.41 G. "Foreman"- In leading circles of the German Ministry of Aviation and at the aviation headquarters, they claim that the issue of an attack on the Soviet Union finally resolved. The main headquarters of Goering is transferred from Berlin, presumably to Romania. 18 Jun Goering should go to a new headquarters.

June 1941Corsican"- The appointment of the heads of the military-economic departments of the future districts of the occupied territory of the USSR was made: for the Caucasus, Ammon, one of the leaders of the NSDAP in Dusseldorf; for Kiev - Burandt, a former employee of the Ministry of Economy; for Moscow - Burger, head of the Chamber of Commerce in Stuttgart. All these persons left for Dresden, which is a rallying point. For the overall management of the economic management of the "occupied territories of the USSR", Schlotterer, the head of the foreign department of the Ministry of Economy, was appointed. The territory to be occupied should be divided into three parts, of which the governor Kaufman should fill one. The Ministry of Economy says that at a meeting of business executives appointed for the “occupied territory of the USSR,” Rosenberg also spoke, who said that “the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from a geographical map.”

Of Gebelss's diary: “A big sensation. British radio stations claim that our action against Russia is just a bluff, for which we are trying to hide our preparations for the invasion of England. That was the purpose of the maneuver ... The Russians, it seems, still do not anticipate anything. In any case, they are deployed in such a way that they completely meet our desires: densely mass forces are easy prey for captivity ... I give Winkelkemper a secret order to transmit English opinion on the invasion [to England] on radio in foreign languages ​​and unexpectedly in the middle to interrupt transfer. It’s as if censorship scissors interfered in the transfer. "On Friday, June 13, Goebbels’s article on the invasion appears in Felkischer Beobachter." Everything is on schedule: at night the newspaper’s number is confiscated.

Of Gebelss's diary 15 June 1941 of the Year: ... The refutation of TASS, according to the Fuhrer, is only the result of fear. Stalin trembles before the upcoming events. His fake game will be over. We use the raw materials of this rich country. Hope of the British to destroy us through the blockade thereby completely failed to materialize, and after that only the real underwater war will begin. Italy and Japan will now receive reports that in the beginning of July we intend to present Russia with certain ultimatum demands. This will be talked about everywhere. Then again at our disposal will be a few days. The duce has not yet been fully informed about the entire breadth of the intended operation. Antonescu knows a little more. Romania and Finland stand together with us ... I must now prepare everything very carefully. It is necessary, in spite of everything, to continue spreading rumors: peace with Moscow, Stalin is going to Berlin, the invasion of England is coming soon, in order to veil the whole situation, what it really is. "

16.06.41 G. "Foreman"- All the military measures of Germany in preparation for an armed uprising against the USSR are completely over, and a strike can be expected at any time. Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on the Hungarian airfields.

Clear enough Stalin's sharp resolution on the message "Senior", after numerous conflicting reports: "T-shu Merkulov. You can send your" source "from the headquarters of German aviation ... This is not a" source ", but a" disinformer "I.St"

P. Fitin [former intelligence chief of the NKGB] talked about a call to Stalin 16.06.41 about this report: "... In the office, Stalin was alone. When we entered [with Merkulov], he immediately turned to me: “Chief of intelligence, there is no need to retell a special message, I read it carefully. Report that the sources report this, where they work, their reliability and what opportunities they have for obtaining such secret information. I spoke in detail about the sources of information. Stalin walked around the office and asked various clarifying questions ... Stalin walked for a long time. Then he said: "Go, clarify everything, double-check this information and report back to me." This episode also shows that Stalin was trying to understand the events mentioned in the intelligence reports. In addition, the description of events does not mention the spacing of Merkulov or Fitin. Probably, Stalin expressed his attitude only in the resolution.

From the diary of Gebelss: “17 June. Disguise against Russia has reached a climax. We filled the world with a flood of rumors, so it’s very difficult to figure it out ... Our newest trick: we schedule a peace conference with the participation of Russia. "

«Military Intelligence Reporting List (January-June 1941 g. "
Different messages have the same date. Probably, the date of receipt of messages to the Center. More details in the article (http://istmat.info/node/11581).

«AG»February 1941 of the year - the USSR will be fully prepared for the war in 1942, and Germany may be exhausted by this time.

«Khlopov»
08.01.41 - Assistant American BAT in Germany, in a conversation with our assistant BAT, said: “We now have information from very reliable sources that Germany is preparing to start a war against the USSR. The exact date is not specified, but it is emphasized that the information is reliable. ”
13.03.41 - Saying BAT Sweden. The danger of a German attack on the USSR is growing: The transfer of German troops to the border of the USSR continues. In Germany, propaganda against the USSR is intensifying. The contradictions between Germany and the USSR on the Balkan issue are intensifying.

«Sawa"(Colonel Yakovlev)
26.02.41 - German troops in Romania are designed to act against the USSR ... The flow of "tourists" to Finland and military transports to Slovakia and Galicia has increased. Basically transferred mechanized parts.
22.03.41 - According to the workers of the Ministry of Commerce, on March 20 the Germans issued a secret order to suspend the execution of orders for the USSR by the Protectorate industry. The attache of the Yugoslav Trade Agency showed the stamps of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. prepared by the Germans. In Krakow, General Wojciechowski forms a Slavic anti-Bolshevik regiment.
24.03.41 - According to unverified information Deadline against the USSR - April 15. The termination of our orders in Protectorate is confirmed.

«Arnold"- 27.03.41 - Romanians conveyed to Yugoslav that Germany would oppose the USSR, if not in May, then in August 1941.

«Maro»
04.03.41 - This year Germany will oppose the USSR.
27.03.41 - The grouping of troops in the Balkans created by the Germans is directed mainly against Ukraine, which should become the food and oil base of Germany in case of a protracted war with England.
21.06.41 - According to reliable data Germany's attack on the USSR is scheduled for 22 June 1941 of the year.
Allegedly, Stalin’s resolution preserved on the report form: “This information is an English provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation, and punish him. ” The resolution is unsigned and executed in red ink. I.Stalin, put the resolution with colored pencils. This is probably Beria’s resolution.

«Mars"(Colonel N. Lyakhterov)
01.03.41 - Speech by the Germans against the USSR at the moment is considered all unthinkable before the defeat of England. The military attaches of America, Turkey and Yugoslavia emphasize that the German army in Romania is intended primarily against the British invasion of the Balkans and as a countermeasure if Turkey and the USSR perform. After the defeat of England, the Germans will oppose the USSR.
04.03.41 - A major Hungarian official heard from German officers that this year Germany will oppose the USSR.
13.03.41 - BAT in Budapest was invited to the Hungarian Defense Ministry, where he was informed that false rumors were spreading among the diplomatic corps about preparations by Germany, Hungary and Romania to attack the USSR, to mobilize in Hungary and send large numbers of troops to the Soviet Hungarian border. The Hungarian representative said that these rumors were being spread by British intelligence, and suggested that the Soviet BAT be personally convinced of the inconsistency of these data and make a trip to the region of the Carpathian Ukraine. BAT sent a report to Moscow in which it outlined the content of the talks ... It notified the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan that he had agreed with the military ministry about going to Carpathian Ukraine from 17 to March 20. On a journey, BAT went along with his assistant. [Since there are no other clarifications in the "List ...", then the information was not confirmed.]

«Dixen"- 02.03.41 - The envoy in Belgrade at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Nazi party and the army agreed on the expediency to launch an offensive against the USSR soon. The envoy assesses German propaganda fabricated for the Balkan governments.
"Sofokl" (Col. A. Samokhin) - 09.03.41 - It is known from the Minister of the Court in Belgrade that the German General Staff refused to attack the British Isles. The immediate task set - the seizure of Ukraine and Baku. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing for this.

«Bart"- 24.03.41 - They openly talk about war with the USSR. Called go to our border. One of these days people are called up to the age of 50. New parts arrive from the West in Königsberg.

«Tomáš»
24.03.41 - Over the past week and a half masters do not give a passage, pursuing brazenly. An order was received to delay the shipment of equipment on orders of the USSR. Before 15 April, the question of the German campaign to the East should be finally decided.
26.03.41 - Termination of all cargoes to Przemysl, with the exception of equipment, food and fodder. They confirmed from another source the preparation of the German campaign to the East.

«Jury"- 25.03.41 - The German offensive against England may fail ... There is a second plan for an attack on the Middle East." With the USSR, Germany will not be considered, since The KA has demonstrated its weakness in Poland and Finland.

«Doge"- 17.01.41 - In military and diplomatic circles, they say that after the defeat of England or the conclusion of peace with her, the USSR will be the closest enemy of Germany. The attack - March 1941 of the year.
The first half of March 1941 of the year - Hitler justifies the plan to seize Ukraine with the following motives: the creation of the 50-million Ukrainian state would solve the problem of providing power to Europe. This plan is supported by supporters of Hitler ... The military does not approve of such a plan.because This will lead to a bloody war, which is not known what will end. Some certainty of the existence of such a plan is confirmed by the support of the Ukrainians in the General Government.

«Yeshchenko"(Colonel G. Eremin)
12.03.41 - It was planned to transfer the Germans to Bulgaria 27-28 in February 1941, but there was an order from Berlin to part of the troops that were scheduled for transfer to Bulgaria, to be sent to Moldova. In Moldova and Bukovina, a large accumulation of Germans. In German circles they say: "We will defend Romania and Bulgaria from England and the USSR."
15.03.41 - Lawyer Sakar said that the Germans allegedly completely change their plan and are going to attack against the USSR. We, the Germans say, will take bread, coal, and oil from the USSR. The headquarters of the Romanian army, together with the Germans, is developing a plan of war against the USSR. Offensive through 2-3 of the month.
24.03.41 - ABC data [scout call]: when Antonescu met with Goering, they discussed the role of Romania in the upcoming war with the USSR. In Berlin, widespread rumors about the inevitability of war. Here it is argued that the SC is weak, that the invasion of Moscow and the Urals will not be difficult for the Germans. If there is a war, England will not help the USSR. At present, an enormous amount of weapons is being transferred from France to the border with the USSR.
24.03.41 - During the meeting of Antonescu with Goring in Vienna, the question of the role of Romania in the forthcoming war of Germany against the USSR was discussed. Goering gave Antonescu a series of instructions for coordinating the plan for the mobilization of the Romanian armies with the plans for the mobilization of the German army, bearing in mind the general plan of the war with the USSR. It is believed that the war should start in May 1941.
24-25 March Antonescu had a meeting at which the latter offered his services to fight against the USSR. German officer Herbert said: “The Reds are dogs. Soon we will have a settlement with them. We will take Ukraine away from them. ”
25.03.41 - "Hoffman said that he had a conversation with Antonescu a few days ago, who said that back in January of this year he was initiated into a war plan for Germany against the USSR."
25.03.41 - USSR is the backstage enemy of Germany. The USSR is trying with all its might to prolong the war, and there is a danger that the advance of the German armies to the south-east will be subjected to a flank attack by the spacecraft. The food crisis makes Ukraine take away. The main reason for the war is a possible transition of the USSR to the side of England.
26.03.41 - The Romanian General Staff has accurate information that 80 divisions are being prepared in the territory of East Prussia and Poland for an offensive against Ukraine. Romanians intend to participate in the war against the USSR together with the Germans in order to get Bessarabia.
26.03.41 - There are rumors of an upcoming conflict between Germany and the USSR. Antonescu when visiting Berlin 1.01.41 was dedicated to the plan of the war of Germany against the USSR. And there was a detailed conversation about this when Antonescu met with Goering in Vienna.
26.03.41 - Germany is expected to speak in Ukraine through 2-3 of the month, at the same time the Baltic countries will perform, where the Germans are expecting an uprising against the USSR.

End of 1 part
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  1. +17
    July 12 2017
    "Our newest trick: we are planning a peace conference involving Russia." ... does this Goebelss phrase remind anyone of the present?
    .... an article detailed by facts ... to whom - everything is again, to whom - it will refresh the memory ... I find it useful to read and know at least the main numbers and dates ... article +
    1. +2
      July 12 2017
      and Stalin overslept everything.
      I do not agree with this. It is enough to listen to Stalin's speech at the congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the 1939 year. He clearly says that there will be a war.
  2. +4
    July 12 2017
    29.08.39/XNUMX/XNUMX. Stalin then managed to prevent the creation of AngloFranco-German union.

    It is easy to prevent something that could not be in principle: firstly, the punishment of France for the disgrace of Germany’s defeat in WWII and the return of lost lands were the cornerstone of Hitler’s revanchist policy. France was the ultimate goal of the invasion and knew and was mortally afraid of it.

    Secondly: a war with Poland was planned spring 1939 Which automatically led to a war with France and England. What a warning could be in August 1939?
    1. +6
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Olgovich
      France was the ultimate goal of the invasion and knew and was mortally afraid of it.

      Not a fact. The military potential of France in 1939 was superior to German. Another thing is how the government ordered them. The case when the democratic way of governing the country became the cause, ultimately, of defeat in the war, is not the only one, of course. If the French and British, declaring war on Germany would be active, then history could go in a completely different direction.
      Quote: Olgovich
      Secondly: the war with Poland was planned in the spring of 1939. Which automatically led to a war with France and England. What prevention could be in August 1939?

      England has repeatedly informally warned Germany that it would not go to war by declaring war. Which was tantamount to approving the start of the Polish campaign. If in August England would confirm its guarantees to Poland and take the French as accomplices, Hitler could cancel the invasion of Poland, which has already happened. So all the conditions and the possibilities of preventing war until 31.08.1939/1/1,5 really were. There was no main thing - political will, i.e. there was a will to commit actions that did not correspond in any way with the official line of Ang. and Fr., the so-called "tactics of indirect actions" in politics, namely, Poland was "divorced" on fake guarantees specifically to run into a conflict with Germany, for Germany to come into direct contact with the USSR. Along the way, I wanted to express my misunderstanding of the author’s phrase - “The report indicated that the Germans planned to defeat the spacecraft in 1941–1 months with access to the Moscow meridian. [Naturally, the top military commanders could not even imagine that it was possible to fight and everyone considered it it's misinformation or delirium.] ". I note that our military leaders could well imagine this, because they themselves (G.K. Zhukov) were supporters of "deep operations". In addition to the headquarters game in January XNUMX, actions were worked out aimed at covering significant operational groups of the "enemy", deep breakthroughs of defense with mechanized formations in cooperation with an airborne landing force. The actions of Germany in the Polish campaign were analyzed. So, do not think that the military thought of the spacecraft was limited to the experience of XNUMXMB.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. +6
          July 12 2017
          Diana, hello star VO love love love You are adorable as always in righteous anger good ! But the fact is that
          When will you burst from the shit that overwhelms you ?!
          unfortunately it does not sink in water and does not burn in fire request .
          And you are right about the Anglo-Franco-German Union. It could well have taken place, but something did not grow together. It is possible they could not agree on areas of influence. Since Germany was responsible for the whole burden of maintaining a database in the East, Hitler apparently requested more, but England and France, because of their greed, apparently did not make concessions, and Hitler decided this question in his own way. I suppose something like this. Although the way it was in fact we are unlikely to know. Perhaps the British in 200 years and open their archives, then something will come up. It is true if humanity survives these 200 years ...
          Let the madam freeze in deep sorry ... hi love
          1. +2
            July 12 2017
            Quote: Alex_1973
            You are adorable as always in righteous anger

            Of course, I apologize for interrupting the conversation, but you are mistaken in determining the righteous anger.
            The words “righteous” and “anger”, their combination, can be applied only to God, a person cannot be righteous in his anger.
            1. +13
              July 12 2017
              bober1982 Today, 10:44 ↑
              The words “righteous” and “anger”, their combination, can be applied only to God, a person cannot be righteous in his anger.
              What are you ?! But what about the postulate that man was created in the image and likeness of God request ?! You can not answer, the question is purely rhetorical, and it is not worth it to breed a flood in the subject. A subject about another. Such theological disputes are transferred to the PM if that ...
              Alex_1973 Today, 10:18
              Diana, hello star in love love love
              Alexey and you mine with a brush! hi love You are wrong about the archives. It is unlikely that the British would declassify at least something that casts a shadow on them or their policies, these are arrogant Saxons ...
              Let the madam freeze in deep sorry ... hi love
              Sir love I mercifully allow ... lol
              1. The comment was deleted.
                1. +4
                  July 12 2017
                  bober1982 Today, 11:05 ↑ New
                  One has switched to the divine language, the other to the petty-bourgeois language, comrades are fading ...
                  And this is actually not your business. We communicate as we like. In this case, the tone of communication is comic.
                  P.S. Stop flood yourself and force others to flood, you have already been pointed out.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
      2. +1
        July 12 2017
        Quote: ARES623
        If in August England would confirm its guarantees to Poland and take in the accomplices of the French, Hitler could cancel the invasion

        And what's that?:
        August 25 1939 year was signed Pact between Poland and Great Britain about general protection. The agreement contained mutual promises in the provision of military assistance in case one of the parties was attacked by a third party. Thanks to this pact, Hitler postponed the attack on Poland from August 26 to September 1.


        And in accordance with the Covenant, England and France declared war on Germany. And they gave guarantees to Poland back in March 1939.
        But, declaring war, they really didn’t want to fight and, therefore, really suffer losses.
        1. +8
          July 12 2017
          Quote: Olgovich
          .. declaring war, to fight for real and, therefore, to bear the loss for real, did not want to. categorically.

          This is someone else to fight with "for real"? With those whom they themselves fed for many years, they gave them the money of Austria, the largest military industry in Europe in Czechoslovakia, exceeding the military-industrial complex of the British Empire. Poland has always been a bargaining chip for them and still remains. They wrote to them (Poles 300 years ago) ) the first constitution in history, and they still haven’t bothered to draw anything of the kind to themselves, but why, why should they limit themselves in anything? Only their slaves and slaves should be tamed and they should be protected from all kinds of restrictions in every possible way, it is more profitable.
      3. +6
        July 12 2017
        Unfortunately you are wrong, the military and Zhukov were shot between the waves (1 and 2) and did not know how to fight as you wrote. I do not want to shoot intrigue, so I will not specify more. But it will only be in the 3 part next week, no time, Soria).
        1. +3
          July 12 2017
          Quote: aKtoR
          Unfortunately you are wrong, the military and Zhukov were shot between the waves (1 and 2) and did not know how to fight as you wrote.

          I understood how "stuck between wars." Right? The ability to fight comes in practice. No staff games will give what real war gives. And, as WWII showed, in the third year of the war with the best army in Europe, the decisions and their implementation by our commanders were worthy of the highest ratings. Although your categorical assessment "did not know how" is acceptable if you yourself have practically "gotten something" at least at the operational level. Kicking dead lions is not a great merit. We must be more restrained ... IMHO
          1. +6
            July 12 2017
            Kicking is when they slander. And when they understand the false story?
            1. +1
              July 12 2017
              Quote: aKtoR
              Kicking is when they slander. And when they understand the false story?

              Do not mislead people. “Slandering” means slandering, and “kicking” means judging people who all VO readers owe their lives to, if the defendants are unable to defend themselves against the attacks of amateurs. And if you want to understand the vicissitudes of history, especially your homeland, treat historical figures with due respect and without arrogance. And remember - you are alive only because they knowingly risked their lives, and many died.
              1. +9
                July 12 2017
                We are alive because we were covered by the bodies of the millions of fighters who fell, and not because the units these millions made us die stupidly because of our lack of unity!
                I owe my two great-grandfathers and the 4 brother, I paid tribute to three search engines.
                And you just talker ??
                1. 0
                  July 12 2017
                  Quote: aKtoR
                  We are alive because we were covered by the bodies of the millions of fighters who fell, and not because the units these millions made us die stupidly because of our lack of unity!
                  I owe my two great-grandfathers and the 4 brother, I paid tribute to three search engines.
                  And you just talker ??

                  I am from "those who commanded companies" and traveled to the southern country not to belly warm, but with other more risky goals. And you, you see, want to represent yourself holier than the Pope? All the rest are less worthy of respect, especially those "these millions made them stupidly die because of their lack of thought!"? Why, you yourself think in a narrow-minded way. You don’t understand that without these "units" millions themselves would not have "covered" anything. Apparently, you are weakly representing the army, although you have ambitions, but obviously not in terms of ability.
                  1. 0
                    January 6 2019
                    33rd artillery combat magazine from 22.6 to 31.8.41 Describes the period from 22.06.1941/31.08.1941/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
                    War logs. Document creation dates: from 31.08.1941/31.08.1941/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
                    Archive: TsAMO, Fund: 325, Inventory: 0004591, Case: 0014, Sheet of the beginning of the document in the file: 1
                    Authors of the document: 33 CD, Captain Bogdanov
                    33 sd 16 ck 11 A PribOV, disl. near Kaunas, state 12000, it was about half brought to the border by 20.6.41. Withstood the German 2-hour artillery preparation and battle from 3.30 to 22.6. on the border until the evening, by order she left the semicircle, blowing up bridges, directing (the remains) to Kaunas, the surviving 2nd echelon partially to Vilnius-Polotsk. K 23.6. almost all artillery of the division was left without mechtyag, because tractor tractors were mostly defeated by German artillery and aircraft. From artillery regiments, including the regiment of corps artillery, which came up during the battle, remained in the evening 22.6. one, two, or three battle-worthy batteries. In the course of battles in the streets of Kaunas and retreat further for the Neman, then for Vilya she left (from 2 divisional artillery regiments, a division of anti-aircraft guns and artillery of infantry regiments) about 10 working barrels with which she covered the crossing of the remains of 7 divisions with headquarters and headquarters 11 A 26-27.06., when the front headquarters already numbered 11 A defeated and captured from 25.6., while having contact with the headquarters 16 sk, which he allegedly reassigned 8 A. For the first day of battle, artillery regiments spent an average of 1 full-time BC, had the remnants of ammunition, the wounded, the remnants of fuel, vehicles, etc. But they were without communication, THE WHOLE ARMY, the garrisons of Kaunas and Alytus, other garrisons and rescued family members. For this alone it was necessary to send not a single chief of staff of the NWF to the tribunal, but a couple of generals for sure.
                  2. 0
                    January 6 2019
                    At 7.00 a.m. 22.6.41. Commander 27 And General Berzarin reported to the headquarters of the North-West Fleet that, according to the data at 6.00:7, Palanga was fired by artillery, it’s burning that there is a battle going on (who is fighting, didn’t indicate), and that 50 air raids have already been made on Libava. These data are not reflected either in the intelligence report or in the combat report of the NWF headquarters in the NPO. The question is why? Why did they hide the blow through the border Palanga to the most important Baltic Fleet forward base and Libavu fortress? 23.6.41 km from the border, along a coastal road covered only by border guards? To the Germans on this road infantry on bicycles calmer to Libava already 22.6. have you arrived? Why was Zhukov not aware of this when writing a report in the morning of 22.6.? Day 11., Before departure to the SWF? Why was Palanga not mentioned at all in the documents of the NWF headquarters in general? Because the daughter of Morozov, the commander of the XNUMXth army, worked there in a shot pioneer camp there as a pioneer leader?
                2. 0
                  October 27 2018
                  Quote: aKtoR
                  I owe my two great-grandfathers

                  I quote you: "There were five categories of information:
                  1 category - reports from Soviet ambassadors from Germany and other European countries;
                  2 - reports of residents of foreign intelligence NKGB;
                  3 - reports of military attaches, residents of military intelligence and intelligence of the Navy;
                  4 - special communications and intelligence reports prepared by the NKGB and the Space Agency;
                  5 - reports of intelligence agents. "I add: there were a number of other sources, including such departments as the NKVT headed by Mikoyan, as well as the Comintern and international party contacts, very well informed. Our merchant ships also did not swim sandals. In the White Guard emigration, too. people worked with connections. Well, Litvinov also had connections, of a well-known informed nationality, with which Mikoyan's Armenians constantly competed in this matter. Stalin had information ten times more than Zhukov, but NEVER shared his information with him, which Zhukov especially notes in his memoirs. In particular, from Mikoyan there were reports on the growth of trade with Germany, very much needed by the USSR The last echelon across the bridge in Brest passed FROM it to our side, loaded with the very necessary MACHINES for our defense industry - two hours before the war. saboteurs infiltrated, removed our guard of the already MINED bridge and prevented its undermining, ensuring the capture of the most important bridge in Brest and Bres in general by the Germans that. USSR very good They needed German machines, and the Germans needed Soviet food, and Stalin's hope for a postponement of the war died only when he and Vatutin drew up Directive No. 2, signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov, 22.6.41. (Zhukov already flew to Kiev at this time). I advise you to dig a little wider sources of information - on Mikoyan and Litvinov, first of all, and on the Comintern.
            2. 0
              January 6 2019
              At 7.00 a.m. 22.6.41. Commander 27 And General Berzarin reported to the headquarters of the North-West Fleet that, according to the data at 6.00:7, Palanga was fired by artillery, it’s burning that there is a battle going on (who is fighting, didn’t indicate), and that 50 air raids have already been made on Libava. These data are not reflected either in the intelligence report or in the combat report of the NWF headquarters in the NPO. The question is why? Why did they hide the blow through the border Palanga to the most important Baltic Fleet forward base and Libavu fortress? 23.6.41 km from the border, along a coastal road covered only by border guards? To the Germans on this road infantry on bicycles calmer to Libava already 22.6. have you arrived? Why was Zhukov not aware of this when writing a report in the morning of 22.6.? Day 11., Before departure to the SWF? Why was Palanga not mentioned at all in the documents of the NWF headquarters in general? Because the daughter of Morozov, the commander of the XNUMXth army, worked there in a shot pioneer camp there as a pioneer leader?
        2. 0
          30 September 2017
          Take a look at Wikipedia's “Białystok-Minsk Operation 1941”. The right column indicates the irretrievable and sanitary losses of the parties. By irrevocable ratio: 340 thousand. Red Army and 6,5 Wehrmacht. In terms of sanitation, the same horror is that we didn’t have ANY HOSPITAL in any ONE BORDER DISTRICT, and even Germans in Warsaw closed Polish schools to equip military hospitals in advance. In conditions when the Wehrmacht is only for the day 22.06.41. passed tank wedges from 60 to 70 km in the main directions (railway and main highways) and the Luftwaffe in one day gained air supremacy to a depth of 250 km already on 23.06.41., and the USSR only on 23.06. declared universal mobilization (neither Romania, nor Hungary, nor Finland had entered the war), what mistakes and fortune-telling of the USSR intelligence could explain the defeat on the border of the Red Army, from 18.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. being on alert? The troops had STRENGTHENED and UNUSUAL military guards from the NKVD frontier guards - and still could not do almost anything with the Wehrmacht. SILEN WAS THE HELL, AND THE DEMONS COMMANDED US, starting with Tymoshenko and Zhukov.
        3. 0
          January 9 2019
          To my amazement - it turned out that the first anti-tank grenade of the Red Army was adopted only on June 12, 1941 !!! See the decision of the Council of People's Commissars. For this alone (!), A couple of Ukromarshals Tymoshenko-Kulik could be brought under investigation and a tribunal. There are still a few recently declassified resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of 1939-41. on military construction, still not explored. For example, on mortars, on PribOVO, on URam, etc. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR solved only the most serious issues, including the deprivation of general ranks. I advise the author to distract from the calculation of divisions, which are very different between us and the Germans, and consider the reasons why the Red Army in 1941 found itself without company-owned anti-tank defense in general. A 45 mm cannon and a 50 mm mortar are not anti-tank guns, although they can damage armored vehicles at distances of the order of 500 or less meters, i.e. at effective fire distances of German machine guns, especially heavy machine guns, which the Red Army almost did not have.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +1
      October 2 2017
      France itself entered the war WITH HIS ETERNAL ENEMY - Germany. The French, as always, had an overestimation of their own power, and an underestimation of the German. Moreover, there was still a union of the Atlantists against the Germans in defense of the Jews and Poles. The Poles were considered strong warriors with a strong army and anti-German society. But the Germans managed to defeat Poland de facto in 15 days, GO TO BREST, while the atlantists formed an allied army in France. Hitler even gave Warsaw to Stalin, but the IVS did not take this "poisoned pawn" and took only his own to the Curzon line recognized in Europe. But Hitler, having strengthened after the occupation of Poland, defeated the allied forces in France, achieved a de facto anti-Soviet alliance with Russophobes throughout Europe, including the Vichy French and Pilsudnik-Poles. In France, it cost the fleet and colonies in North Africa attacked by atlantists.
  3. +7
    July 12 2017
    Well, probably enough to procrastinate the topic of an “unexpected” war and a surprise attack ?! For the USSR there was nothing unexpected in this war. For us, the main adversary was clearly named Stalin in May 1940, Germany. After the western German company in May 1940, there was a period -it's all over for the USSR, or we are a step away from the war. But when Germany not only did not reduce its armed forces, and since June began to form an additional 40 divisions, and one third of them are tank and motorized, all doubts have disappeared-WAR. Germany has no other rival on the continent like the USSR T. Who will believe that for the war with England you need 220-240 divisions?! There will be enough 10-12 for the eyes. And the dates can be roughly calculated, and they were calculated - spring 1941. So where is the surprise and surprise ?! It is so important to know the date ?! A week earlier or later it does not play a special role. But the preparation of NCOs and the General Staff raises a lot of questions. The government gave the Red Army everything that was possible and more to give there was nothing, but how they all disposed of it ........ well, that's another topic.
    1. +8
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Predator
      The government gave the Red Army everythingthat there was strength and in stock and there was nothing more to give, I think, but how they disposed of all this ........ well, that’s another topic.

      I think that this was the main mistake at that time, it was impossible to trust the leadership of the Red Army to such an extent: The war is too serious a thing and should not be trusted to the generals. The main mobilization resources were instantly lost in the very first days of the war. So the government itself is, in principle, guilty, thanks to its unreasonable credulity in military command, primarily in the gene. headquarters.
      1. +5
        July 12 2017
        In this you are right - and it turned out, but it will be only in the 3 part)))
        1. 0
          October 27 2018
          Admiral Canaris, a pro-naval (!) Submarine officer, was appointed Abwehr only in 1935, and was executed in 1944, when the Gestapo found in his diary evidence of his work for the British and complicity in the conspiracy against Hitler. Judging by this fact, the British informed Stalin the Credible information about the impending German attack on the USSR received from Canaris. But all the English with us was always under double suspicion, as you know ... And the second fact - London radio announced the beginning of a German invasion of the USSR and the declaration of war by Germany SIMULTANEOUSLY with Berlin radio in the very first issues of the morning news on 22.06.41. That is, before Molotov left Stalin’s office (at 7.30 a.m.) after a report at a meeting of the country's top leadership at which they discussed this WRITTEN declaration of war handed to Molotov at 4.30 a.m. by the German ambassador Shullenburg! And for air defense at the borders, the ban on firing at German aircraft continued to operate - until 9.00:XNUMX in any case in Białystok bombarded with might and main! What is this insanity to call ?! And this insanity is precisely on the conscience of Pavlov and Klimovsky!
      2. +1
        July 12 2017
        Quote: venaya
        I think that this was the main mistake at that time, it was impossible to trust the leadership of the Red Army to such an extent

        Excuse me, what did you command in the real service? This is in order to understand the level of your view of the operational situation of those years, the structure of the state’s government for mobilization training of the country and the place of NGOs and the General Staff in all this complex “machine”. War is a multifaceted matter, and the military only decides in it the bulk of the issues related to actual military operations. And resource support, human reserves, even the deployment of military groups throughout the country are always decided precisely by the political leadership in cooperation with all interested ministries (people's commissariats). What do you put in the concept of "main mobilization resources", which, in your opinion, were instantly lost in the very first days of the war? And then who won this war? In 41, 3 people were irretrievably lost, according to some sources. During the WWII period, 138 million people were drafted into the army. Judge for yourself what mobilizing resources the country had. With the average population structure, up to 000% of the country's population can be attributed to mobilization resources. For the USSR in 34,5, the number of m \ r will be approximately 20 million people. Regarding the confidence of the General Staff. Well, well, don’t trust the General Staff, but who needs it? KE Voroshilov during the transfer of Tymoshenko NCO transferred a very difficult inheritance. Look at the “act of transferring cases on NPOs ....” (available on the Internet), I think you will have respect for those who took on this overwhelming burden. However, we will wait for the next exposure from 1941 parts .....
        1. 0
          October 29 2018
          Take a look at our sensible film-doc about artillery, Kulik, Grabin, Stalin, etc. on the Tube. I give the link: https://youtu.be/T_k3kmJ
        2. 0
          January 8 2019
          The Institute of Military History summed up the results of "political repressions" in the Armed Forces of the USSR from 1936 to 1940. I give it roundly - 32 thousand were dismissed for political reasons, 12 thousand were returned after an appeal (optional!), Shot according to LEGAL sentences and died during the investigation - approx. 3700. During the same time, more than 270 thousand new officers came to the army and navy - in place of the 20 thousand who left. So this argument should be removed from consideration as having reduced combat effectiveness. On the contrary, had it not been for this purge, betrayal and intrigues would have been an order of magnitude wider, more dangerous and destructive.
    2. +2
      July 12 2017
      Predator, and if the information is somewhat different?)))
    3. +1
      October 1 2017
      As for the fact that "the Red Army was given everything that the country could do" - you are deeply mistaken. First of all, they gave KILLING artillery (guns and mortars, anti-aircraft guns, aviation fire weapons, etc.), but they could give DECENT. Tukhachevsky and Co. interfered with this (until 1937), after him Kulik and Co., and Tymoshenko and Co., too, can be seen in this matter from the late 20s until 1943. Meanwhile, stories with a 76 mm mountain cannon processed with a beautiful 75 mm Skoda Czech cannon (the USSR bought a license for its production), with a 47 mm magnificent VET gun of the same Czech company, the license for which was bought by the German invaders, but why didn’t we buy it. It became the main VET of the Wehrmacht, and the Red Army fought back almost useless as a VET 45 mm gun ... The best of the possible guns for us, even domestic ones (for example, 57 mm VET), mercilessly mowed, and were not taken into service for years with the motivation of NCO COMMISSIONS "for excessive armor penetration "! For a long time to list similar subjects ALMOST FOR ALL MAJOR WEAPONS. As a result, the Wehrmacht’s division (any) was 3-4 times more powerful than ours (any), and Zhukov considered them to be almost equivalent, operating with “counterattacks”.
  4. +1
    July 12 2017
    ... To talk about intelligence ... for thought .....
    "" "" "" "Shortly after the start of the war, I realized that everything we were told about Russia was nonsense." "" "" "Field Marshal Kleist" "" ""

    ..... The evidence does not require evidence that before starting to draw up the Barbarossa plan, the German staff workers had to accurately assess their future adversary ....... Did the German generals know the geography of the USSR? It is doubtful. If they knew, they would not endlessly complain about the vast territory of the Soviet Union, impassable terrain, poor roads and climate. For example, Guderian, in a letter to his wife on December 10, 1941, writes: “... the enemy, the size of the country, the terrible weather - all this was highly underestimated” ........... It turns out in the General Staff Germany, the size of the USSR was evaluated "by eye". Well, a bit wrong. They thought Russia was the size of Sicily. And she is so ... ...
  5. +3
    July 12 2017
    In the 1941 year, the military-political leadership of the USSR possessed all the information about the concentration of the Wehrmacht on the border with the USSR. And intelligence gathering of rumors on the topic will attack / not attack Hitler has absolutely nothing to do with it - the deployment of troops, and not rumors, is a threatening factor.

    Regardless of the intentions of the enemy, countermeasures should have been implemented:
    - withdrawal of cover troops directly from the western border;
    - mobilization and formation of fronts by May 1941 of the year;
    - deployment of a solid line of defense on the old border;
    - Deployment of the second line of defense.

    The blame for ignoring reality lies with Stalin and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
    1. +7
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Operator
      .. The blame for ignoring reality lies with Stalin ..

      Again Stalin, why would it? And what specific position did he have on June 22, 1941? Who held the posts of chief of staff and commander in chief of the Red Army? Maybe we will stop all this shortsighted propaganda in the style of: "the cat left the kittens, someone (from the leaders) is very guilty." I think it’s time to more soberly assess the situation of those days, so as not to fall into the same rake again, it will be more useful
    2. +3
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Operator
      Regardless of the intentions of the enemy, countermeasures should have been implemented:
      - withdrawal of cover troops directly from the western border;
      - mobilization and deployment of fronts by May 1941;
      - deployment of a solid line of defense on the old border;
      - Deployment of the second line of defense.


      I must say that the Germans really were not ready to the war with the USSR, one-for-one.
      So the assessment and intelligence in the subsequent leadership and the country was correct.
      They waited for the war in 1942. And only Hitler's adventurism pushed Germany into the war in 1941. (But what happened in France, they thought it would take a ride in Russia.)

      In that situation, Stalin could not carry out the mobilization and full deployment of the Armed Forces - otherwise 100% war, but we would still be late in deployment. But in the fall (even the end of summer), it would be possible to start full-scale deployment without any particular danger (horseradish with two Germans would climb onto the Winter in the USSR). Our MK would "drive out", they settled the OSH. prepared at the training camp reserve.
      And so all your suggestions based on the afterlife.

      Here is what was not worth doing. so it is to form 30 MK, and put them mainly in the first operational echelon, well, Zhukov’s “merit” here. .
      1. +1
        July 12 2017
        What kind of afterthought - in my assessment of the situation in the first half of the 1941 of the year I proceed only from what was known to the military-political leadership of the USSR (except for rumors, of course) - namely, the constant build-up and total number of Wehrmacht divisions in the Soviet-German the border.

        And the potential adversary’s adventurism / lack of adventurism has absolutely nothing to do with it - for every objective action in peacetime it is necessary to respond in time and in full with counter-action, and not give out right and left personal assessments of the level of competence of his informants, as Stalin did before 22 June 1941 of the year.
        1. 0
          July 12 2017
          Wow how decisive you are, even horror.
          The Germans began to create a group for the offensive at the very last moment, and that was the balance of forces (in the western districts). And to specifically provoke them there was no sense and desire. In March, it was decided to create 30 MK (I hope the level of organizational measures is clear to you), it was possible when the General Staff was completely sure that there would be no war in 1941 (And Zhukov convinced Stalin of the need for this, Meretskov was against)

          .
          Quote: Operator
          withdrawal of cover troops directly from the western border;

          Quote: Operator
          - deployment of a solid line of defense on the old border;

          Quote: Operator
          What, in FIG, afterglow


          I also thought that it would be better to make a provision zone 200-250 km deep., Where small mobile units would operate, with the possibility of uniting into larger units (with pre-established food outlets), well, in some areas there could be units and even connections ..
          But this is taking into account the fact that you know how the war was going.

          And so, where there would be a big boss who suggested renting out such territory. Shaposhnikov only planned to have a second operational echelon more powerful than the first, and that could not resist.

          Quote: Operator
          mobilization and deployment of fronts


          Only the USSR in the years 70-90 could joke like that.
          1. +1
            July 12 2017
            Quote: chenia
            The Germans began to create a group for the offensive at the very last moment, and so it was a balance of power

            The author promises to publish quantitative estimates in the next article, then we'll talk.
            1. 0
              October 1 2017
              Quantitative estimates are just the most misleading - the General Staff of the Red Army burned on them in 1941. What was the use of considering our old tanks as almost balanced German? The 20-mm cannon of the old German Panzer-2 pierced the armor of any of our armored vehicles (except heavy KV, even took the T-34 in the stern and board) from 500-700 m, while our tank guns, including the divisional 76 mm on KV, could penetrate thin but resistant hardened armor of German tanks only from distances of 350-450 m? Their anti-aircraft guns of all calibers from 20 to 47-50 mm also "took" our armor 90% of our armored vehicles from 500-700 m, and ours - from 350. About the level of military communications, reconnaissance and radar, equipment and effectiveness of military defense systems , mine-guarding armament can not even be reminded - it is well known. Any of our headquarters from the regiment and higher became the list of targets of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe WITH GUARANTEE of shelling and bombing, as soon as he turned on his low-power radio station. Continuing this topic of LEVEL OF BATTLE EFFICIENCY OF THE TROOPS is even sadder if you get into the qualitative characteristics of ALL BIRTHS of TROOPS and skills in their combat interaction. And if you look at the staffing quality junior command staff on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. - it’ll become sad at all. It's a shame for the power.
      2. +2
        July 12 2017
        Quote: chenia
        And only Hitler's adventurism pushed Germany into the war in 1941

        I agree with everything you have written, except for Hitler’s adventurism. He was literate enough to realize that the war with Russia was definitely the end. Another thing is more likely that someone was pushing him in one place and rather fearfully in order to begin such an obvious adventure with the USSR. Something painfully famously passed the very beginning of the invasion, but after the country's leadership was rebuilt and Hitler "everything went to dust." His curators apparently did not expect this either, although at first I think they helped everyone with everything possible - both with developed intelligence and opportunities for sabotage work up to the highest echelons of power, otherwise there would be no way to explain such dizzying successes of the Wehrmacht.
        1. +1
          July 12 2017
          Quote: venaya
          His curators apparently did not expect this either, although at first I think they helped everyone as much as possible -


          Yes. but only until 1.09.39 .. Prior to this, the curators hoped for a tandem of Poland, Germany against the USSR. But the appetites of the Poles were not part of Hitler’s plans (I agree until a certain moment that the figure is driven, but still had a certain freedom).
          After Czechoslovakia, Hitler felt more confident, and began to make decisions on his own. (The German general was chilled when they attacked Poland. But Hitler already knew the "courage" of Western curators) ..
    3. +2
      July 12 2017
      Unfortunately, you are mistaken - not possessed. Tomorrow the moderator will release the 2 part. It is devoted to the quantitative assessment of the whole of Germany based on intelligence reports.
      1. 0
        29 September 2017
        Everyone came up against the number of armies, corps, divisions, etc., their deployment and the degree of deployment by 22.06.41. It did, of course, matter, but SECONDARY. The Wehrmacht would defeat our cover troops at any location in 1941, with, of course, greater losses and a slower pace of advancement in the first 3 days, even if the General Staff and Tymoshenko and the entire vertical of headquarters and command personnel acted perfectly. The Wehrmacht excelled the Red Army as a weapon, throughout its recruitment in the troops, both on the ground and in the air, in the training of military personnel to possess it, in the tactics and efficiency of its use, in coherence and coordination of actions, starting with CONTINUOUS, technically armed intelligence. For example, anti-tank artillery weapons of the Wehrmacht made it possible to GUARANTEED to destroy and then destroy 90% of Soviet tanks and anti-tank missiles from a distance of 500-700 m, while ours from distances of no more than 300-400 m, i.e. from the ranges of shooting them with German small arms of the main caliber of 7,92 mm, striking aimly and in heaps. The superiority in military optics was enormous, in the technique of radar and radio direction finding - overwhelming, in aviation and air defense - striking. If our aviation would have avoided 2/3 destruction at airfields, then it would have been destroyed in the air, with enormous losses in flight personnel, 2/3 of which were, however, preserved. German losses, of course, this would increase, but very slightly. The ratio of the losses of planes and pilots in the air battles of the first days of the war was glaring - about one German in our seven or ten. Only in the radar field of Moscow and Leningrad did our aviation somehow manage to even out the accounts, and nowhere else did we have neither radars nor poise for anti-aircraft artillery, which had already been intentionally underdeveloped since the 30s. Tukhachevsky’s plot in the field of armament of the Red Army was proved by the blood of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and millions surrounded and captured. BUT COULD BE WORTER. So, despite the failures of the Red Army in 1941-42, the country and its Armed Forces were not lowered to the very bottom of military senility, they survived, and then won!
  6. The comment was deleted.
  7. +6
    July 12 2017
    .... association to the figure ......
    ...... the truth is a bit old .......
    1. +1
      July 12 2017
      The drawing is a bit old, unfortunately by the contours. The border must be drawn much east. Do you consider Belarus and Ukraine neutral? The modern border resembles the summer of 1943 to the horror.
      Ukraine under the Nazis, fighting in the Donbass, the Baltic states in the hands of the enemy. Belarus is either hostile or partisan. And in the red fallen outskirts. No Transcaucasia, Central Asia. The Caucasus is not paused to the end. Separatists in Tatarstan. And the worst thing in the Kremlin is not Stalin, but Medvedev and the “liberal government”.
      Danger is not at borders. Once again, I can repeat it. This is the summer of 1943 and the enemy agents in the Kremlin. There is no unity of the people. What unity can there be between Gref and the simple worker? Gref will defend the independence of Russia? Or will a simple worker take a rifle and defend Gref’s capital?
      If you do not start cleaning the Kremlin immediately, then the situation is simply disastrous.
    2. 0
      July 27 2017
      and the feeling somewhere deep down that we "on the eve of the big schucher" does not leave me
  8. +2
    July 12 2017
    The article is called "Unexpected war ...". This is far from the case. And the first part is based on intelligence, which is generously scattered throughout the article. I can confidently say that, based only on intelligence, the country is not being prepared for war. And they do not carry out mobilization.
    We should not consider intelligence reports, but those specific decisions that were taken by the Soviet leadership before the outbreak of war. And based on them, one can firmly say that there was no “surprise”.
    Just for objective reasons, there was no chance to withstand the first blow. The shock itself was not the war itself, but the fact that the Red Army could not withstand the first blow. The failure of the defense, especially in the West, was crushing. But this has nothing to do with the question of "surprise."
    1. +3
      July 12 2017
      ......... The Red Army was not ready. Not ready for war. On the contrary, Stalin prepared the Soviet Union in general and the Red Army in particular for the war with Germany very seriously and thoroughly. The conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact in 1939 could not deceive Stalin, he was too smart and pragmatic for that. Stalin never, for a single minute, believed in Hitler’s peacefulness and knew perfectly well that sooner or later a clash between the USSR and Germany would happen. Therefore, the Red Army was arming heavily, replenished with personnel, pulling up divisions to the borders. The main mobilization reserves were also concentrated there. But all these preparations were not associated with a reflection of German aggression. Stalin did not believe in the possibility that Hitler would risk attacking the USSR in 1941 until the very last day of peace. This means that the Red Army was preparing to conduct a completely different war.
      The Red Army was completely unprepared for the fact that the war would begin on June 22, 1941 with the offensive of German troops. The reason for the defeat at the border was completely different. We can say this: the Red Army did not have time to prepare for the border battle. This often happened in world history when two armies entered the battlefield, but one was already lined up in battle formation, and the other was just beginning to build. In such a situation, the side usually ready for battle won. This did not mean that the losers were worse armed, less trained or more cowardly. They just did not have time.
      In 1941, this was exactly what happened, only on an incomparably larger scale. Just another two weeks, and at the borders there would be a completely different situation. If the Germans hit the fully deployed Red Army, the cross-border battle would have been completely different .......
      1. +1
        July 12 2017
        The result would be the same. I categorically do not accept your thesis "these preparations were not related to the repulsion of German aggression." It was with the reflection of aggression that these preparations were connected. And the re-singing of the residentists has long been refuted by all the facts.
      2. +3
        July 12 2017
        Quote: gla172
        The reason for the defeat at the border was completely different. We can say this: the Red Army did not have time to prepare for the border battle. This often happened in world history when two armies entered the battlefield, but one was already lined up in battle formation, and the other was just beginning to build. In such a situation, the side usually ready for battle won. This did not mean that the losers were worse armed, less trained or more cowardly. They just did not have time.
        In 1941, this was exactly what happened, only on an incomparably larger scale. Just another two weeks, and at the borders there would be a completely different situation. If the Germans hit the fully deployed Red Army, the border battle would have been completely different

        And if the Wehrmacht overwhelmed the fully deployed Red Army in a border battle? Is there a guarantee of the contrary? They are not here.
        1. +7
          July 12 2017
          You are right - would crush. When you do not know how to fight - the soldiers and equipment - it is a consumable item. Consumables less sorry for when it is a lot.
          When the machine-gun pillboxes of the Kiev SD were unblocked, after a series of attacks in the forehead on the machine guns, the Red Army climbed over a shaft of corpses ... And the German machine-gunners (sorry not all) went crazy. The USSR saved that the army was not focused ... There was someone to learn from the experience of others who tried to detain the enemy
          1. +3
            July 12 2017
            Quote: aKtoR
            You are right - would crush

            You know, an alternative story is a moot point. On all the last two days the branches have been arguing to hoarseness from "which fighter of the Red Army Air Force was the best" and "whether aircraft designer Yakovlev was a good man" to the topic of the border battle of anti-aircraft guns TTX. How many studies and memoirs have been written on these topics. But the number of commentators and comments does not decrease.
            On the issue of the "games of the mind" of June 41, A. Isaev with his "Great Patriotic Alternative" is a support for me.
            1. +10
              July 12 2017
              I will answer this way. Hero of the Soviet Union VF Golubev until January 1943 fought on the I-16 fighter, covering the “Road of Life”. He managed to get combat experience.
              12 March 1942 alone on the plane And 16 fought against a pair of German fighters Messerschmitt Bf.109. In a short battle both Germans were shot down.

              He was lucky that he collided with fighters when he got experience in dealing with them - let him talk about it on the ground and teach a little in the air.
              The main thing is not the plane that is better, but the one on which the pilot knows how to fight.
              1. +4
                July 12 2017
                Yakovlev - not Pts respect. I will say this, those airline companies that made good planes remained afloat at the present time, those who survived through ties — drowned
                1. 0
                  October 8 2017
                  Quote: aKtoR
                  Yakovlev - not Pts respect. I will say this, those airline companies that made good planes remained afloat at the present time, those who survived through ties — drowned

                  You do not know well both the past and present of our military aviation, and the distribution of its quantity and quality between leading design bureaus and branded factories. Yakovlev not only developed his company, but also raised the general level, not so much with some clamps, but with HEALTHY rivalry between the companies. He started with training aircraft - this is the most important part of aviation - and his company remains the leader in this direction even now (Yak-18, Yak-130). Vertical take-off is also its Yak-141, and so far no one has beaten us. Yak-1, -3, -9 became the best OUR fighters of the Second World War. WOODEN !!! He put a jet engine on wooden wings and a tail ... But he came when Polikarpov’s biplanes ruled the ball out of competition - only in the USSR, of course. If Yakovlev had not had time with the Yak-1 monoplane, they would have drove the I-15 before the war, slowly moving to the I-153, I-16, not reaching the German level of very good. strong. And now his company is not the last even in helicopter engineering; he still holds weight records. He did a lot for our aviation - what they gave him to do as a designer and as a Zai. People’s Commissar of the aviation industry. After it it became sharply worse ...
                  1. 0
                    October 31 2018
                    Disgusting comment. You are absolutely not competent. Yak-141 did not go into production and was not in service. Only a few of them were released. In service was the Yak-38. Yak-3 was not wooden. He received his outstanding characteristics, including due to the simplification of the design due to the use of duralumin instead of wood. Wooden was LaGG-3.
                    Yak-1 and Yak-9 were never our best fighters during the war. They were typical middle peasants. In some ways they were superior to their competitors, in others they were inferior. There was simply nothing more to fly then. However, La-5 and La-7 were no worse than the same Yak-9 and Yak-3. The Yak-1 was far from the first monoplane. The same Polikarpov I-16 appeared much earlier and by the time the Yak-1 appeared, it had already become obsolete. To replace him, Polikarpov was already preparing other aircraft (I-180, I-185) and here the question arises: why did not they go into production, despite the positive feedback from the pilots? Just as almost all Sukhoi's cars did not go into production. Yes, and Lavochkin's cars could have been turned off if the KB workers hadn’t hurried up and “borrowed” a cooling rabiator from the Yakovlevites for an experienced La-5. And at the expense of the admin resource, nobody can take away the palm from Tupolev.
                    1. 0
                      January 9 2019
                      According to I-185, I agree that he was not allowed to go into the series offensively, this is a big question, but no one forbade him to argue and write to Stalin, and he wrote and his complaints were discussed collectively. The decision was made in favor of maintaining a high pace of the deployed and streamlined production of mass aircraft for mass pilots. If you delved into the details of the development of new types of aircraft during the war, then before and a month after June 22, 1941, in PribOVO, for example, none of the 200 aircraft flew into the air, because there was NOT ONE pilot (out of 900) in the district who mastered a new plane and received permission to pilot it. So these 200 on the ground burned out, often in factory packaging, not even collected by factory specialists. And on the ground, our troops massively died under German bombs, with the air supremacy of the Luftwaffe. The risk of a repetition of this disgrace was in the case of serial production of the I-185 of the famous Polikarpov.
          2. +2
            July 12 2017
            ........... Regarding the level of command staff - yes, the Soviet generals at the end of the war were much more experienced than at the beginning. Yes, at the beginning of the war, many of the red commanders of 1941 lost their responsibilities and stepped aside. Yes, many Soviet marshals in their memoirs often wrote that in 1941-1942. they only learned to fight, i.e. before the war they seemed to be unable to fight. But all this does not mean that things were different in the Wehrmacht. Take a look at the commanders of army groups. Not one of them sat at his post even until 1943. Take a look at the commanders of the tank groups. After the battle of Moscow, Guderian and Gepner flew from their posts. After the Kursk Bulge, Goth also flew. Kleist rose higher to the commander of Army Group "A", and he was removed in early 1944 for defeat.
            As for the ability to fight, which supposedly needed to be studied ... Well, how could the Soviet generals explain their failures at the beginning of the war? There are only three options. You can blame everything on the numerical superiority of the enemy, on the poor quality of the Red Army soldier and on your own inability. And then it all depended on the personal moral qualities of the memoirist himself. Unscrupulous wrote about bad soldiers, decent about their inability, and all together - about the numerical superiority of the enemy. In this case, the word "decent" means by no means truthful. Just a decent general blame for the defeat will not be blamed on his dead soldiers. ..........
        2. +2
          July 12 2017
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          And if the Wehrmacht overwhelmed the fully deployed Red Army in a border battle? Is there a guarantee of the contrary? They are not here


          I would not overwhelm, if you correctly understand the word deployment. The Wehrmacht would be immediately bogged down, the pace of the offensive would be low, our surrounded units would be able to go out (this would save experience), there would be much fewer prisoners.
          In short. beyond the Dnieper, they would not have passed.
          Only demagogues (one of the definitions) can argue that standing, worse than lying.

          I must say that the Germans didn’t have a high operational level and the OSh was bad - everything worked for us while we threw new connections and had even weaker trained personnel — after the 1943 (or rather Stalingrad) the Germans were turned off, they only snapped (Kurskaya battle inclusive).
          1. +2
            July 12 2017
            Quote: chenia
            I must say that the Germans didn’t have a high operational level and the OSh was bad - everything worked for us while we threw new connections and had even weaker trained personnel — after the 1943 (or rather Stalingrad) the Germans were turned off, they only snapped (Kurskaya battle inclusive).

            Throughout the war, the Germans and tanks had fewer aircraft and personnel. A deafening victory did not happen either near Kursk, or near Kiev (November-December of the 43-th), nor near Warsaw in August-September of the 44-th, nor in Hungary (December of the 44-th - March of the 45-th). Pomeranian operation remained incomplete. Konev had serious problems during operations in Silesia (Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian, the latter was also abandoned incomplete).
            1. +1
              July 12 2017
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Deafening victory did not happen


              Do you oppose or confirm what I said?

              The Battle of Kursk - ours in 3,5 months - 450 km liberation of Kiev and the Dnieper did not help (but this is a strategic offensive operation of the enemy, more than 3 months of preparation, the result is 40 km south face, they took 2 lines, and they were prepared -9, North is the front page.
              Warsaw, is it after Bagration to fight for London Poland? Well, etc.

              Unlike the Germans, we defeated an experienced and strong opponent, and their deafening victories - mainly over the just mobilized and practically without combat coordination of troops, or after the deafening shoals of our commanders. - South 1942.
              1. +2
                July 12 2017
                Quote: chenia
                Battle of Kursk

                ... entered the offensive phase of 12.07.43 when the Red Army launched Operation Kutuzov. Which once again confirms the idea of ​​the viciousness of "deep defense". The Wehrmacht was forced to transfer mobile units to reinforce the defense in the Oryol direction, because see below
                Quote: stalkerwalker
                Throughout the war, the Germans and tanks had fewer aircraft and personnel

                Quote: chenia
                Warsaw, is it after Bagration to fight for London Poland? Well, etc.

                Do not confuse successful operations with resounding victories. In the entire history of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army only once conducted an operation on complete environment and destruction - Stalingrad boiler.
                1. 0
                  July 13 2017
                  Quote: stalkerwalker
                  complete encirclement and destruction - the Stalingrad boiler.


                  And here is a controversial statement, it’s much better to fuck the retreating enemy in parallel pursuit, the pace is higher and the losses are less. Cut to pieces and smash into pieces, and not when he was in a deaf prepared defense, but hastily occupied. The enemy will only lose combat effectiveness from air strikes and artillery fire. Departure is the most difficult event.
                  Stalingrad, these are two months with a flake of fighting (I mean after being surrounded). And the Germans fettered more than 200 thousand. our grouping. The same is Courland and East Prussia.
                  And so, if the right flank was secured, Zhukov could strike Berlin in February.
                  1. +2
                    July 13 2017
                    Quote: chenia
                    And here is a controversial statement, it’s much better to fuck the retreating enemy in parallel pursuit, the pace is higher and the losses are less.

                    Halb boiler remind? Or those entourage who went to Belarus in 44 at our rear? You have a strange vision.
                    Quote: chenia
                    The same is Courland and East Prussia.

                    The East Prussian operation was finally completed. And Courland, like the remnants of the Wehrmacht in the upper Oder, was called the largest armed prisoner of war camps. The technique was. Human reserves are depleted. If the Vistula-Oder operation began with almost 100% complete set of l / s, then the Berlin began and carried out with an average number of divisions 4-5 tons of people. It came to the fact that the tankers of the 3 Guards had to clean up the quarters of Berlin on their own. Therefore, her losses were higher than others. And only 30.04.45 was given to them by the infantry of the Polish Army.
                    Quote: chenia
                    And so, if the right flank was secured, Zhukov could strike Berlin in February.

                    "If grandmother had ......" The leadership of the Red Army did not take risks, leaving powerful groups both in Pomerania and in Silesia on the flanks of the 1-th Belorussian and 1-th Ukrainian. The Germans were good teachers.
                    1. 0
                      July 13 2017
                      Quote: stalkerwalker
                      "If grandmother had

                      You yourself realized that you wrote a complete confirmation of my statement (pun intended). Oppose for the sake of the process,

                      At the end of the war, our marshals (especially Konev) did not like to arrange boilers for large groups. Fuss a lot, the pace is falling. And nibble the defense when the density in advance does not fall. Another thing to beat on the march, and on the shoulders forward.
                      And Hitler was right in arranging fortified cities. This slowed down our advance.
                      1. +2
                        July 13 2017
                        Quote: chenia
                        Quote: stalkerwalker
                        "If grandmother had

                        You yourself realized that you wrote a complete confirmation of my statement (pun intended). Oppose for the sake of the process.

                        Just do not attribute me masturbation ......
                        lol
    2. +2
      July 12 2017
      Quote: Bakht
      And based on them, one can firmly say that there was no “surprise”.

      If we talk about strategic surprise, then of course it would sound absurd, but for Hitler, surprise was important - tactical. Abwehr knew how to use disinformation, and the initiator of this was Hitler and Goebbels, who, that is, they intimidated disinformation by more powerful opponents in Europe - France, Poland, and they succeeded. The panic behavior of some army commanders confirms that the effect of surprise worked, and most importantly, Hitler managed to seize the strategic initiative - and this is very important in the war. The Soviet troops could not recover for a long time, because the pressure from the Germans was very serious.

      Quote: Bakht
      Just for objective reasons, there was no chance to withstand the first blow.

      All the chances were: it was necessary not to pull troops, tanks and planes to the border, but to put up defense in the rear. The Soviet generals were too arrogant.
      1. 0
        July 12 2017
        Where it was necessary to keep troops was a difficult question. By all laws, troops were held exactly where needed. Not a single country of that time left its borders. Poland did not keep troops inland, France did not leave borders, the States did not keep a fleet in San Diego and advanced to forward bases. This is the norm of that time.
        Just the Red Army occupied the necessary positions. Cover armies, mechanized corps for counterattacks and the main line of defense along the Dnieper.
        1. +2
          July 12 2017
          Quote: Bakht
          By all laws, troops were held exactly where needed.

          What are the laws of the First World War? WWII tactics have changed significantly, especially with regard to the speed of movement of troops. Mannerheim held defensive positions while still only assuming a war with the USSR, and the Soviet generals knew about the inevitability of a war with Germany. In OG 1812 of the year, the troops did not advance to the border, but retreated, retreated and retreated. Kutuzov knew that he would lose the army, there would be no one to fight, and Napoleon’s army was strong - "great." Hitler’s army was “invincible,” don’t you find the resemblance? As long as the army is combat-ready, the enemy will be at war, which means it can be defeated. It was necessary to learn at least something from the Russian field marshal and I think Stalin studied, only then. Keeping an army operational is very important. Delaying the offensive, weakening the onslaught and pushing the enemy back - it seems quite logical, now think that according to the laws of war this is necessary.

          Quote: Bakht
          France left no boundaries

          France built a pretty good defense - the Maginot Line, but Hitler outwitted them.

          Quote: Bakht
          Cover armies, mechanized corps for counterattacks and the main line of defense along the Dnieper.

          Counterattacks were senseless, in them we lost soldiers, equipment, and initiative. But of course there were many divisions, they threw one or the other, they defeated, then another. Theoretical miscalculations and betrayal of the Red Army - these are the causes of cross-border defeats. For Hitler, the primary duty was: the destruction of troops and strategically important facilities - the USSR knew about this, but here for the Germans everything was at a glance: troops at the border, airfields, tanks.
          1. +2
            July 12 2017
            Quote: Brother Fox
            Counterattacks were senseless, in them we lost soldiers, equipment, and initiative.

            Ahhhhh ... We had to dig deeper and meet the enemy with "fire and sword" ...
            Quote: Brother Fox
            Theoretical miscalculations and betrayal of the Red Army - these are the causes of cross-border defeats.

            Yes, you, my friend, are just the genius of the "tactical and strategic sciences." "Which regiment served" (c) lol
            1. +2
              July 12 2017
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Ahhhhh ... We had to dig deeper and meet the enemy with "fire and sword" ...

              Yes, at least disguise objects, and not give them to the enemy on a silver platter.

              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Yes, you, my friend, are just the genius of the "tactical and strategic sciences." "Which regiment served" (c)

              Mockery cannot be remedied. For theoretical calculations, it is just not necessary to serve in the regiment — this is the General Staff’s business, which carries with it: strategic planning, which the Soviet generals completely failed. This is not a stone in the USSR, but reproached the high command. But counterattacks and counterattacks were carried out hastily - the consequences of not timely preparation.
              1. +2
                July 12 2017
                Quote: Brother Fox
                For theoretical calculations, it is just not necessary to serve in the regiment - this is the General Staff’s business, which carries with it: strategic planning, which the Soviet generals completely failed

                So I repeat the question
                Quote: stalkerwalker
                "Which regiment served" (c)
          2. 0
            July 12 2017
            You touch on a huge topic. Just kept according to the canons of World War II, and not the First. You can write a lot about France and Poland. Just about the Maginot line is not talking. It was about the Dill plan.
            But the most interesting is your comparison with the Patriotic War of 1812. This is my favorite question - what is the difference between the two World War II? Why was Kutuzov’s tactics detrimental to the Red Army?
            Pointless counterattacks? This is too bold a statement. It was the counterattacks that became the salvation of the Red Army. And in 1941 and in 1942 and in 1943. This is the only way to stop the enemy. Just due to mobility, which was not in the First World War.
            Just on the border, our troops stood. Or say of the nearly 200 divisions on the border there were 57.
            In general, you can talk a lot, but the troops stood exactly where they should have stood.
            1. +2
              July 12 2017
              Quote: Bakht
              But the most interesting is your comparison with the Patriotic War of 1812 of the year.

              But you will learn at least its fundamentals and understand: weakening the army (the Russian troops maneuvered well, which confused the enemy, and the Soviet divisions launched senseless counterattacks), the destruction of the enemy on the march and defense, the latter significantly weakened the onslaught of the French. This is precisely the strategic calculation: the stretching of communications, the difficulty in delivering provisions, and the weakening of the initiative. Stalin highly appreciated the genius of Kutuzov and indicated this in his Remarks on Military Ideology. As much as the Soviet command did not try, they had to let the Germans inland.

              Quote: Bakht
              It was the counterattacks that became the salvation of the Red Army. And in 1941 and in 1942 and in 1943.

              If they were in the 42, then the 43 for the Red Army would no longer exist. A counterattack was carried out near Stalingrad and near Kursk, not counterattacks — you are a "specialist."

              Quote: Bakht
              In general, you can talk a lot, but the troops stood exactly where they should have stood.

              Now the second article of this author has been published, there is a map on which even a student of a military school will determine: what is worth cutting the ledge from two sides, on which the troops are located, and they will turn out to be a boiler. This arrangement of troops is a gift for the advancing.
              1. +1
                July 12 2017
                Your self-conceit does not allow the discussion of a "specialist".
                So the war of 1812. Why then was it possible to retreat, and in 1941 it was undesirable? Why was it possible to surrender Moscow in 1812 and not in 1941? What is the Root difference and why is it pointless to compare them? Read and maybe understand.
                Near Stalingrad carried out a mass of counterattacks. Read about the mechanized corps in the summer of 1942. Tanaschyshyn brigades melted before our eyes and were immediately restored.
                About the card. In the summer of 1943, near Kursk, Rokossovsky (I hope he is a specialist) ordered that all warehouses be transported closer to the front line. For the simple reason that I was also afraid of cutting the ledge. And where at that time stood 1 Guards. TA Katukova? Or 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrova? Didn’t she counterattack? By the way, why did the Germans stop the offensive on both the North and South faces? If you read, then you will understand that because of the "meaningless" counterattacks.
                In general, read and read. And not just read, but also to comprehend.
                1. +7
                  July 12 2017
                  Well, about counterattacks, you are very optimistic .. Stalingrad - about a million servicemen died. Do you think this is the right decision? Rzhev is the same.
                  Rotmistrov's army is defeated in a blunt attack. The Germans did not go further - they knew that Katukov's army was on the flank of 1. Since the beginning of the war, solid counter. blows and a lot of broken mountain equipment, the kingdom of heaven, our soldiers. The point is not in counter-strike - but how to apply it and what kind of support to cover the troops. This is elementary, but our command is tupilo. As you called there above comrade, ahhh, "Specialist, you are ours"
                  1. +1
                    July 12 2017
                    You are an author. The selection of materials is good, but does not answer the question of whether the war was unexpected. I believe not. Every effort was made. But when the first-class champion and the world champion converge in the ring, the result is predictable.
                    The question of counterattacks is simpler than ever and well studied. The counterattacks of Tanaschyshyn saved Stalingrad in August 1942. Without them, there would not have been a million dead and there would have been no Stalingrad.
                    Counterattack is the only way to stop the enemy. Moreover, the counterattack is not on the edge of the wedge but under the base. Therefore, the mechanized corps were located in protrusions in 40-100 ki from the border. So that you can decide, apply a counterattack.
                    The Germans also launched counterattacks. Without any preparation and without cover. Read the Mellentin. "We must strike immediately. If you have one tank and one platoon, you must advance. In a few hours it will be too late. In a day it is fatally late." Remember once and for all the counterattacks saved the Red Army in 1941, 1942 and 1943.
                    Do you get personal? Does not honor. The “specialist” was used by my opponent. I just returned his word.
                    1. +4
                      July 12 2017
                      Remember time ... - I do not like it. Because of the blunt contra attacks in September, the KA only lost more than 3 million people to the prisoners. Think about it - on 1 January 1942, the Wehrmacht’s irretrievable loss is less than 200tych. Senseless counterstrokes generals justified their inability. Counterstrike had to be thought out. Do not take it as a deliberate Zhukov counterattack who threw two cd, arrived from Central Asia under machine guns and buried tanks. Rummage in the real losses of the Soviet troops and the Germans under Yelnya. The horror that created the former head of the General Staff.
                      1. +1
                        July 12 2017
                        I don’t like much either. If you want a normal discussion, let's get by with the facts.
                        We are talking about the contours of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941. In particular about the mechanized corps. They had to advance. There was simply no other way out. An alternative would be the destruction of the Red Army in parts. This is the only way to save the situation with a lack of strength.
                        Foch in the Battle of Marne "troops cannot defend and therefore we must advance"
                        Denikin in Lutsk operation "our position is peak and we will be defeated. The only way out is to attack"
                        Sweetened in 1920 in Crimea "Sitting in the trenches disastrously. We must withdraw the troops and prepare for counterattacks"
                        Manstein in 1943 "We didn’t have enough strength to defend. And therefore the only way to stabilize the front was the offensive."
                        Dragomirov The advantages of an offensive mode of action in battle are so significant in comparison with its shortcomings and the benefits of a defensive mode of action, and the disadvantages of this latter are so detrimental in moral terms that an offensive mode of action is undeniably the most advantageous. Decisive and talented commanders always preferred the offensive to defense, and thanks to this they achieved combat goals in those cases in which success, for reasons of common sense, seemed impossible
                        The thesis that defense in the form of sitting in trenches and dugouts is good, and an offensive in the form of walking in attacks on machine guns is bad, no more than a myth. Unfortunately, it has circulation not only at the level of housewives and “aunts from French television”, but also among more serious people. In fact, at the army level of a large country, passive actions are fatal.
                      2. +3
                        July 12 2017
                        Quote: aKtoR
                        Delve into the real losses of the Soviet troops and Germans near Yelnya. The horror that the former head of the General Staff did.

                        Do not hang dead dogs on G. Zhukov. Criticism of Zhukov is rooted in the army of the tactical level. The main thesis of this criticism is not declared explicitly, but can be clearly seen: high losses and failures in the battle are always the result of errors of the high command. In the distant future, such criticism aims at issuing indulgence to mid-level commanders. They almost never make mistakes, and their failures are the result of the wrong orders of "fools-bosses." Quite definitely, this thesis was formulated by the chief of intelligence of the 1 Guards who wrote the revealing and revealing memoirs. the cavalry corps of P. A. Belov, Colonel A. K. Kononenko: “Eternal glory to the heroes who died due to the mistakes of their high leaders.” Such logic is vicious in itself. As they often say, "victory has many fathers, defeat is always an orphan."
                        Honestly, I was always tempted to seat the fans of "strategic defense" at the table, put in front of them a packet of leaflets with a stamp in the upper left corner of the "People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR", give a pen, an ink-bottle, and offer to depict my own version of the plan of the first operation of the Red Army.
                        A. Isaev. George Zhukov.
                        Examples of overuse of mechanized units to repel offensives can be cited without much effort. Thus, for example, in July 1943, the Soviet command expended six of its tank corps to repel the strike of three tank grenadier divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of P. Hausser on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. The same examples can be found on the other side of the front. To repulse the Soviet offensive on Mius in July 1943, the German command spent one motorized, one tank division of the Wehrmacht, two tank divisions of the SS troops, and only four mobile units. At the same time, the losses of the SS divisions in the defensive operation on Mius were greater than in the offensive near Kursk. On the Soviet side, two mechanized corps and infantry participated in the attack on Mius. Equally textbook is the infamous Mars. On the Soviet side, in the offensive near Rzhev in November - December 1943, two tank and two mechanized corps took part, i.e. four mobile units of the "tank division" class. The Germans eventually deployed seven armored divisions (9, 1, 2, 5, 9, 12, 19) and two motorized divisions (20 and Greater Germany) to repel the attack on Model’s 14 Army, etc. e. nine movable joints. In all these cases, as we see, the defender successfully repulsed the blow, using about twice as many mobile units than the advancing one.
                        Accordingly, the conclusion suggests itself: do we need this doubtful happiness? Is it necessary to throw valuable mechanized units under the skating rink of an adversary’s counterattack on the move and without reconnaissance? Choosing an offensive, we thereby equalize this imbalance [97] of resource spending and force the enemy to spend their mechanized reserves on our attacks in the same way.
                      3. +1
                        29 September 2017
                        Take a look at the irreparable loss of the Reserve Front near Moscow when Zhukov commanded it in 1941. Over 180 thousand, and sanitary losses of approx. 140 thousand for a couple of months. The beginning front headquarters Pyotr Lyapin, trying to object, he fiercely oppressed, took off and sent to the Volkhov front. Zhukov got into the habit of it with the Far Eastern Front, when he removed 7 people from the front headquarters general and put him on trial, knowing that the court would give VMN. Only one of them was able to escape the verdict and execution. And so he proved his determination for attacks on the forehead. He ruined people and technology countlessly and constantly.
                  2. 0
                    October 1 2017
                    Order on the rear of the headquarters 11 A

                    The period from 22.06.1941/22.06.1941/848 to 1/1/1 TsAMO Archive, Fund XNUMX, Inventory XNUMX, Case XNUMX, Document XNUMX
                2. +3
                  July 12 2017
                  Quote: Bakht
                  Your conceit does not allow discussion

                  And now we are not discussing with you? Do you know what a march is? On the march, the troops are very vulnerable, trample 50-70 km. and I'll see which of you will be a warrior. The Germans were supposed to make the march, and the Red Army did this and for this reason lost half of the military equipment. After the march, the troops must concentrate and strike. Or do you think that after the troops cross the border they will drink tea in the villages, they will attack to destroy the army. This is what the 1812 war of the year says: the French army telepathed for the Russian to Moscow itself and Kutuzov knew this, knew that Napoleon would destroy the army. Napoleon’s army exceeded the Russian by a quarter, but lost, if Kutuzov so scattered the troops and did not maneuver, Napoleon would have no one to fight. And your reasoning is cynical, your soldier is a consumable. I am not saying that counterattacks are meaningless in principle, but then they were not needed - people were dying. And the Germans in counterattacks also lost many soldiers, V. Keitel emphasized their senselessness.
                  You want to say that the Soviet generals were based on the strategies of Poland and France, yes, perhaps that’s why they failed the plan. And to draw conclusions after the "Winter War" was not fate? In which they participated directly.
                  About the surrender of Moscow in 41, I did not say anything, do not overdo it. In order to recapture German troops, the Soviet generals had the opportunity with a probability of 50%, and this is not enough. To calculate the attacks and go on the counterattack, the Soviet military leaders had everything but desire. You don’t have to be smart here either. What will your enemy do? Probably trying to destroy the army and capture important objects - is this not information for calculations, for preparation? It was necessary to learn from the Russian army of 1812, and not from Europe.
                  1. +2
                    July 12 2017
                    These are all common words. No marches, defense will not help to win the war. And no intelligence reports of ten Sorge will help.
                    The middle of the 20th century. No country in the world will give up an inch of its land. And he will meet the enemy at the border. This is an axiom. Poland’s best defense plan is defense on the Vistula-Narew-San rivers. But Poland was preparing for the offensive. France - the best plan is to defend its borders, but the 1st Army Group goes to Belgium according to the Dill plan.
                    THE USSR. The best defense plan on the Dnieper River. So there it was built. Up to a third of the troops were allocated in the army cover, and the bulk stood on the Dnieper. That was a mistake. But it was repeated in 1942 near Stalingrad. The General Staff gave a certificate that this is irrational. And in 1943, near Kursk, they stepped on the same gabli. But not on such a scale. Defense cannot be won. This is an axiom. The largest boilers of 1941 were caused by the fact that the enemy owned the initiative. This is Kiev boiler and Vyazemsky boiler. The only way to seize the initiative is to strike with mobile units. Both we and the Germans did this. This is the basis of military science.
                    I do not want to crucify much. Do not retell me all the memoirs and studies on this topic.
                    -----
                    According to the Occasion of the War of 1812. It was important for Kutuzov to keep the army. At that time, Moscow was just a city. Not even the capital. Stalin had to save industry. Orders for the evacuation of plants in Leningrad, Kharkov, Rostov and Melitopol were issued on June 23, 1941. And printed in Truth on June 24 early in the morning. What does it mean? So, on the evening of the 22nd or the morning of the 23rd, Stalin already knew that the border battle had been lost. He shot the Generals not for the retreat, but for the FAST retreat. The army of the 20th century differed from the army of the 19th century in the saturation of technology. And without industry, war cannot be won. Here is the main difference. What about Moscow? In the 20th century, it is the largest transport hub throughout the central part of the country. The loss of the Moscow transport hub destroyed the connectivity of the entire front. Therefore, Stalin had no alternative. He could not follow the path of Kutuzov. Kutuzov wanted to keep the army, Stalin wanted to keep the industry. This is the main difference. Stalin sacrificed an army to gain time for evacuation. Everything is about Liddell Garth and Indirect Action Strategies. Evacuation was the very model of indirect action.
                    The same thing happened in the summer of 1942 near Stalingrad. I am talking about the evacuation of the population from Stalingrad. Stalin sacrificed the population to take out tractors and cattle. Cruel? I would even say inhumane. But without this, in 1943, the USSR could have surrendered.
                    ---
                    I am not a journalist or a writer. Moreover, everything is already well described in the literature. You just need to read and think a lot, compare and analyze. My opinion is that the war was not unexpected, that the plan for covering the country was based on incorrect premises (but this is a common misfortune of all countries of that time) and that counterattacks saved the country in 1941.
                    Whoever has a different opinion is not going to argue. Whoever wants to let them think so.
                    1. +2
                      July 12 2017
                      Say defensive war does not win? Why then it was created near Moscow, when they felt the onslaught of the Germans? Why was it created near Stalingrad, near Kursk? You want to say: the priority in the war is attack, but neither Kutuzov nor Stalin attacked, but won. Kutuzov did not advance at all, but the French army was defeated. Of course, wars are different from each other, but they have the main law - some attack, others defend. Yes, Kutuzov gave Moscow, Smolensk burned to Moscow, but the losses in the USSR were monstrous. You just rested on your own, especially on counterattacks. But a counterattack is a drop in the bucket, Operation near Stalingrad, near Kursk, Operation Bagration is another.
                      1. +1
                        July 12 2017
                        I said that I’m not going to argue. The conversation was about the meaninglessness of counterattacks. Do you know that the defense near Stalingrad and Kursk was broken through? Moreover, on the southern front, where the direction of the main blow did not guess the defense that the Germans built for three months, they passed in a day.
                        In 1941, the mechanized corps stood from 40 to 100 km from the border in the Bialystok and Lviv ledges. That is, in readiness to inflict flanking counterattacks. In full accordance with military science and the charters of that time. Yes, and according to the current Charters, too.
                        The surprise was the German transition to the offensive immediately with great forces. E. Rzhevskaya in a conversation with Marshal Zhukov "Our mistake was that we did not assume that the Germans would send all troops to the first line with virtually no reserves" Guderian and Manstein say the same. The Germans put all their strength into the first blow and then beat the troops in parts.
                        I didn’t rest. Just shoveled a lot of literature. Read about IPTABs. 10 pieces. In each under 200 barrels of artillery. And only the 1st Moskalenko and one more (I do not remember the number) in the Baltic played their role. The rest burned in defense without any benefit. They were simply mixed with the ground while they were sitting on the defensive.
                        Kiev boiler. The Germans used mobility and struck where they did not wait - from the Kremenchug bridgehead. Vyazemsky boiler. The Germans used mobility and struck where they did not wait for the 4th TGR. The liberation of Kiev in 1943. The Red Army struck using TA mobility. He who sits on the defensive will lose. This applies to the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. There are no exceptions.
                    2. +2
                      July 13 2017
                      Bakht,
                      From the encyclopedia:
                      Counter-strike - a blow delivered by the forces of an operational association (front, army, army corps) in a defensive operation to defeat an enemy force group that has broken into the depths of defense, restore the lost position and create favorable conditions for a counter-offensive.

                      Understand that a counterattack (and not some kind of failed counterattack) is impossible in principle without defense - this is what I am trying to explain to you. After counterattacks, it is necessary to go on the counterattack, otherwise your army, front, corps will be surrounded and defeated. Near Stalingrad, it was an offensive from both sides that surrounded the 6 Army and began the liberation of the USSR, and no counterattacks there would have helped to defeat the enemy. Of course, defense was broken near Kursk, but it also weakened the onslaught of the enemy, because it was effective and allowed to go on the counterattack. For the effectiveness of a counterattack, support is needed, otherwise it will choke, and counterattacks in the Red Army were ineffective, especially in the first months of the war, and this is precisely what this is about. They have already written to you about the operation "Mars", so I won’t repeat it; take an interest in it yourself, about Zhukov’s failure. Operation "Mars" was carried out even when the Red Army gained combat experience.
                      You say that Stalin sacrificed soldiers to transfer strategically important objects, so that too was a mistake, because people own weapons and machine tools. Yes, then they put children and women at the machine tools, but it would be better if there was not a half-hungry specialist standing there. And why did the hungry women and children stand at the machines? Yes, because the Wehrmacht on the move captured most of the grain-growing country, warehouses and cities. Why did he capture them? Yes, because the first echelons of the Red Army were defeated. Factories had to be moved earlier, cities should be defended, and military facilities should be masked - disguise, also part of the defense. And no “your” counterattacks saved either Kiev, Minsk, or many other cities. Moscow saved the defense, winter and fresh forces transferred from the east. Then the German forces were driven back by a counteroffensive. They didn’t plant Moscow, only because they stood to their death — this is from the category of defense, and not counterattacks. And about the counterattacks in the early days of the war, there can be no question, there were scattered counterattacks, and several times a day. They laid down the divisions, because they did not prepare for war properly, that’s all.
                      I think further discussion is pointless.
                      1. 0
                        July 13 2017
                        Of course it’s pointless, because you incorrectly interpret your own quotes. It does not follow from the quote you quoted that a counterattack should follow after a counterattack. On the contrary
                        to defeat the enemy force group that had broken through into the depths of defense, to restore the lost position

                        This is the main goal of counterattack. Creating conditions is the task of the future and only under favorable conditions.
                        You do not want to admit that when breaking through the front, counterattack with mobile units is the only way. The front in Belarus is broken and the Red Army inflicts counterattacks on the mechanized corps. Just by your own link. And you say to me that they did not need to be carried out. You already select links so that they confirm your theses, and not refute them.
                        Regarding the mistakes of Stalin? The famous Liddell Garth wrote that the decision to evacuate buried the German war plan. This was one of the most striking manifestations of the indirect action strategy.
  9. 0
    July 12 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    Predator, and if the information is somewhat different?)))

    Which one ?! There will be, we will discuss! Ordinary logic says that there could be no other and there were people in the government with gigantic experience of “eating near and far” and were not going to trust anyone, but what were they preparing for in the NCO ?!
    1. 0
      October 2 2017
      FROM THE REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE REAR DEPARTMENT OF THE STAFF OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONT
      COLONEL KRESIK IN THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
      ABOUT THE LOSS OF WAREHOUSES AS OF JULY 9, 1941

      [July 10, 1941]
      BODO1
      The unit has Colonel CRESIC. I report:
      First: There is no information about prisoners of war.
      Second :.
      1. Fuel depots destroyed:
      a) N [arkomat] O [harrows]
      No. 885 (Vilno) -
      No. 992 (Kovno) | - The degree of destruction is specified
      No. 692, 695 (Libava) -
      No. 990 (Dvinsk) - 600 t - completely burned when leaving.
      No. 858 (Riga) - up to 525 t - was completely burnt when leaving.
      No. 633 (Pskov) - up to 250 tons - burned. The degree of destruction is specified, because they put it out twice.
      The department of warehouse No. 858 (Cessis) - up to 370 t - was burnt.
      Airbase - up to 3290 tons of fuel and up to 330 tons of oil.
      b) Civil oil depots of Neftesbyt
      Siauliai oil depot - 500 t [natural] t [fuel], up to 300 tons of aviation gasoline.
      Panevezys Oil Depot - 400 tons of gasoline.
      c) Released to the ground and burned
      Oil depot Riga - up to 1600 tons of gasoline, up to 500 tons of [gasoline] B-70.
      Tank farm Riga - 4000 tons of gasoline.
      Pskov - up to 2000 tons of various fuels burned by the enemy.
      d) 4th storage At [board] D [state] R [reserves]
      Art. Tsekuli - up to 350 tons of [gasoline] B-77 burned.
      Total 19 t
      2. Destroyed art warehouses:
      No. 978 (Uskule)
      No. 260 (Riga)
      No. 979 (Linkanchai)
      No. 258 (Kovno)
      No. 259 (Vilno)
      No. 618 (Trishkiai)
      Stocks not established.
      3. Destroyed food warehouses:
      Taurogen branch of the food warehouse № 834
      Plungen branch of food warehouse No. 834
      branch of the warehouse Lidovyany
      food warehouse number 834 (Chovin)
      food warehouse No. 969 (Riga)
      garrison warehouse at art. Cessis
      garrison warehouse at art. Valga
      Besides:
      Warehouse A [WTO] B [rone] T [anchor] B [armament] No. 942 (Dvinsk) - 26 vehicles and 3 wagons of spare parts were removed, the enemy left up to 80-90 wagons of spare parts.
      Chemical warehouse No. 980 (Dvinsk) - partially destroyed, the rest was left to the enemy.
      Inzhsklad No. 988 (Vilno) - burned.
      Vetkladodes No. 573 and 286 are left (Dvinsk) - data is checked.
      Vetsklad in Kovno - fate is unknown.
      <...>
      TsAMO USSR. F. 221. Op. 1372. D. 23. L. 6, 7
  10. +4
    July 12 2017
    The article is slightly overloaded with messages from documents, but useful. Careful work to collect information - thanks to the author!
  11. +2
    July 12 2017
    We were told about the unexpectedness of the war with Germany. They told us and we believed. Comrade Stalin foresaw the war and took measures in the field of economics and industry to win the war. And so it happened. The economy of the USSR not only survived, but also surpassed the German one in the sphere of production of arms and ammunition, and we note, not only the German one. Almost the whole of Europe worked for the Reich. About the timing of the attack and the guilt of Stalin. The question is this. Good. Comrade Stalin, having not received a reply to the TASS message, gives the order to bring the troops of the western districts to full combat readiness. They brought. On June 22, the war begins with the Wehrmacht attack according to the plan of Barbarossa. And what happens next. Maybe Pavlov will be able to stop Guderian, or the Soviet I-16s will win in air battles, or somehow the control of the Red Army will become stable, or our generals will suddenly learn how to defeat the German. Not at all. It all took time paid for by blood and lesions. It was necessary to have experience counteracting the best army in Europe, the best trained, with advanced weapons, motivated and without defeat in previous companies. Therefore, the failure of the red army in the initial battles is understandable. Such an opinion was Marshal Vasilevsky. But the main thing is that our country was, by and large, ready for war, for a big war, but Germany not. This is the main difference. Yes, the frontier battle the red army lost. Yes, you can blame Stalin that he was cautious in making decisions on bringing troops into full combat readiness, but by and large Berlin, not Moscow, fell.
    1. +5
      July 12 2017
      You're right. You named one of the main reasons for the defeat in the border battle and the incorrect assessment of the events before 22.06.41 and the Soviet military planning - this is the EXPERIENCE of the German army from soldier to field marshal
      1. +1
        July 12 2017
        What does the experience of the Wehrmacht and the strategically disastrous plan for building Soviet cover armies as of June 22 1941 of the year have to do with it?
        1. +7
          July 12 2017
          Hello Andrey! The experience of the Wehrmacht and the lack of it in our military of any rank.
          A simple example (I can’t compare the highest ranking military is the topic of the next part) about simple pilots. How long can the three DB-3 bombers live against several pairs of Messers during the 30 June 1941 of the year and in the absence of their fighters?
          1. +12
            July 12 2017
            Many read a book or watched a film by K. Simonov "The Living and the Dead."
            There is an episode in the book that nine TB-3 bombers are shot down by one Me-109 fighter. In fact, K. Simonov observed a battle from the ground in which German fighters shot down eight DB-3 bombers from the 212 regiment. It seemed to the observer on earth that one fighter was attacking. In fact, there were many. The shot down pilots described in the episode: Captain A. Kvasov (navigator, high pilot with the order) and pilot Lieutenant Ischenko (in the future hero of the Soviet Union). The events took place 30 June 1941, when the German motorcycle-tank units seized a bridgehead on the Berezina, and further to Smolensk, the Soviet troops were not. Received an order to detain the enemy and bombed the links.

            Two flights of pilots of another squadron. The same aircraft, the same area, the same clouds of enemy fighters and the absence of their own.
            The pilot of the 212 regiment V.Ponomarenko: “I took the six, there is shooting, black from the gaps. I walk away from the goal to the rear of the Germans, turn around, fly to bomb. The ferry is damaged but not destroyed. I hit one plane. We take it in a circle, fighting off the attacks of the Messers. In Smolensk, a small village sat down ... We were flying to the airfield. The next five is Golovanov. Three returned. The next top five, which Ponomarenko entered, is led by a komesk (the specificity of the regiment was that the komes and castle (with navigators and gunners) were military men — the other pilots were GAF pilots). Our top five was attacked by a group of 18 Me-109 and Me-110. The squadron commander faltered and left the battlefield (returned safely to the airfield, he was written off at the school a few days later). I stepped forward and rocked the wings gave the command to settle down to me. The Messers cut off the plane of my closest friend, Zakhar Pruzhilin. He died with the crew ... Togo "Messer", which brought down Pruzhilina, our arrows destroyed. The Germans at first attacked cheekily, saw in us victims ready to be shot, but after they lost two more, they died of agility. We then applied the method of avoiding fighter fire with an inconspicuous slight slip down. The air gunner gives a command, a small maneuver, and all the power of fire flies past ... After the bombing, we returned to the airfield ... We learned to be cunning and not to go for trouble. We learned to deceive the Germans ... From the first days of the war after the flights, we thought how to deceive the enemy ... June 30 regiment lost 11 aircraft. The pilots flew 2-3 with the full domination of German fighters in the air. ”
            From the second day of the war, the pilots of this group got together every evening and argued: how to fight the enemy's fighters. They have some experience. The same was with the top commanders - experience gradually appeared.
            1. 0
              October 2 2017
              OWL. SECRET
              ORDER
              MILITIES OF THE 43rd ARMY
              № 00442
              December 29, 1941 Forest 1 km southwest. Vasyukino

              I declare the directive of the headquarters of the Western Front No. 0131 / OP:
              “In connection with the onset of cold and heavy snows, the Germans are grouped mainly in settlements and close to roads. The Germans have not yet received warm uniforms, so they are forced to heat in settlements.
              The Military Council ordered from tonight to commit widespread sudden night actions. On the road in the depths of the enemy’s position in the evening, send ambushes of small fighter squads. Prepare all night attacks of settlements before the dawn. In the initial position for the attack, the troops are also brought out before dawn. Make wider use of conductors and machine gunners.
              The general task: to keep Germans with their actions continuously in the cold.
              Execution to convey 29.12.41 g.
              Chief of Staff of the Western Front
              Lieutenant General SOKOLOVSKY »

              Army Commander ORDERED:
              Adopt the directive for immediate execution and leadership in organizing fighter squads and night attacks of settlements.
              To inform about the execution by the end of December 29.12.41, XNUMX.
              Chief of Staff 43 A
              Colonel BOGOLYUBOV
              Military Commissioner of Staff 43 A
              Brigadier Commissioner Druzhinin
              F. 398, op. 19842 ss, d. 2, l. 156.
        2. 0
          October 2 2017
          The number of tanks in the NKVD troops on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX:

          BT-7 - 260 units

          T-38 - 52 units

          Armored vehicles BA-20 - 14
          Armored cars FAI - 26
          Armored vehicles BA-27M - 10
          Armored locomotives - 21
          Motorized armored vehicles MBV-31 - 36
          Armored Platforms - 34
          Armored tires - 2

          On 22.06.41
          8 MSP - 5 BT-7r., 6 BT-7l., 1 T-38r., 2 T-38l.
          13 MSP - 5 BT-7r., 6 BT-7l., 1 T-38r., 2 T-38l.
          14 MSP - 4 BT-7r., 4 BT-7l.
          15 MSP - 5 BT-7r., 5 BT-7l.

          tank squadrons in the Far East.
          Formed by the NKVD Order No. 00276-39.
          There were only two detachments - 58th and 59th.

          summary of the orders of the NKVD tanks.

          1933 - 500 T-27
          1934 - nothing
          1935 - nothing
          1936 - n / a
          1937 - n / a
          1938 - 100 BT
          1939 - 179 BT, 72 T-38 (including 8 T-38 transferred by NPOs)
          1940 - 50 BT
          Although these are figures on orders and there are no data for 2 years, but, nevertheless, these data give a general idea of ​​the amount of equipment in the NKVD. T-27 after rearmament were transferred to NPO.


          Colonel Knyazev, chief of the armored service of the GUVV NKVD of the USSR
        3. 0
          October 2 2017
          Tanks in the fleet

          The Baltic Fleet

          1st Leningrad Tank Regiment of the 1st Marine Division
          310th separate tank company (former separate tank battalion of the Izhora sector of the BO)
          Separate tank company of the 1st Special Marine Brigade of the Baltic Fleet
          Separate tank battalion of the 2nd Separate Marine Corps of the Baltic Fleet
          Separate tank battalion of the 3nd Separate Marine Corps of the Baltic Fleet
          Separate tank battalion of the 4nd Separate Marine Corps of the Baltic Fleet
          Separate tank battalion of the 5nd Separate Marine Corps of the Baltic Fleet
          Black Sea Fleet

          ?
          Northern Fleet

          654th separate tank company BO GB SF (formerly separate tank company)
          Pacific Fleet

          4th separate tank battalion of the Artyomovsky sector
          2nd Tank Company of the 354th Separate Marine Corps Battalion, Island Sector BO
          351st Separate Tank Company of the 13th Marine Brigade ASBO Pacific Fleet
          In the 62nd, 74th and 77th naval rifle brigades there were separate tank companies.

          1st Moscow Separate Order of Sailors. Of interest is the composition of this detachment, which included a battalion for the protection of the People’s Commissariat of Naval Forces, a battalion of the Moscow Naval Crew, a guards naval missile division, a motorcycle battalion, a tank company and an 85-mm gun battery.
      2. 0
        October 2 2017
        The cost of Soviet armored vehicles

        Wartime tanks
        Tank model T-34 KV-1s IS-2 IS-3
        Year/factory Plant No. 183* Plant No. 183** Plant No. 112 Plant No. 174 UZTM ChKZ ChKZ ChKZ
        1939 596 373 - - - - - - -
        1940 429 256 510 000 - - - - - -
        1941 249 256 - - - - - - -
        1942 165 810 166 300 209 700 312 700 273 000 300 200 - -
        1943 141 822 136 500 179 300 210 -
        1944 140 996 142 100 174 - 900 -
        1945 136 380 130 000 - - 173 000
        * - from the report of the plant, ** from the report of the People’s Commissar

        Self-propelled artillery mounts
        Brand SAU SU-122 SU-85 SU-100
        1942 203 900 - -
        1st half of 1943 175 - -
        2nd half of 1943 173 700 -
        1st half of 1944 - 175 -
        2nd half of 1944 - 169 000
        1st half of 1945 - - 176
        2st half of 1945 - - 167
        Pre-war tanks
        BT-2 (KhPZ) BT-5 (KhPZ) BT-7 (KhPZ) BT-7M (KhPZ)
        1932 93 313 - - -
        1933 76 192 - - -
        1934 - 66 - -
        1935 - - 91 -
        1936 - - 96 -
        1937 - - 95 -
        1938 - - 104 -
        1939 - - 101 094 168 196
        1940 - - - 177
        The tables are compiled according to the NKTP reports in 1940-1945. (RGAE).
  12. +9
    July 12 2017
    Bakht,
    What kind of discussion is this? You throw links, and do not even try to think.
    Precisely because in senseless and ill-conceived attacks thousands of tanks, tens of thousands of guns and other equipment disappeared, since July 1941 reduced all the states for combat equipment of the formations. By the way, how much of abandoned weapons did the nazis use against us? Perhaps, our soldiers were very pleased with these strikes, who were forced into the ground by the KV and T-34 caterpillars and the infantry could not oppose anything to this. Do you think they were happy? Maybe our tankers were happy to be killed by our 76 mm divisions? Or were those who were bombarded with our shells from our own howitzers rejoiced? Why repeat truths that are not truths at all. No, not thought out counter blows are evil. Have you heard of the tactics of building a strike from the depths? Notable such tactics costing us huge losses .... Consider - I lost the discussion - I will not answer anymore
  13. +3
    July 12 2017
    Bakht,
    Quote: Bakht
    Counterattack is the only way to stop the enemy. Moreover, the counterattack is not on the edge of the wedge but under the base. Therefore, the mechanized corps were located in protrusions in 40-100 ki from the border. So that you can decide, apply a counterattack.

    The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Red Army in the summer of the 41, with the enumeration of the number of tanks and the lack of artillery and infantry, the shortage of tankers and tractors, were the whip that, if not outweighed the butt of the Wehrmacht, but made it much weaker. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Red Army made the mobile mechanized and tank Wehrmacht stop the development of the attack in the depths of the defense, or even switch to the defense of the attacks of the same mechanized corps.
    1. +1
      July 13 2017
      I completely agree with you. The fact that the mechanized corps were unbalanced is already a disaster for the organization. While finding the right organizational form, two years have passed. By the way, the Germans also. The first German TDs had 400 tanks each. After France, it was decided to liquidate the 2nd Panzer Brigade in Panzerdivisia. Poor handling and redundancy of tanks. The number of tanks was reduced to 180. Tank divisions became more mobile and better controlled.
  14. +1
    July 12 2017
    Why did the surprise of the attack become possible?

    You can not talk about the complete surprise of the attack.
    should be divided into surprise tactical and strategic. Strategically, no one doubted that there would be a war. Any granny in the market talked about the war. The question was the timing.
    But tactically, the timing of the attack is not so important, the combat readiness is important. for example, border guards, the Black Sea Fleet were fully equipped, and many others were sky-ready. These are different things, and we must talk about it.
  15. +5
    July 13 2017
    BakhtFirstly, on the southern face they struck (almost) the defense not because they were on the defensive, but because they pulled the troops in a line more or less evenly - in the old manner.
    German offensive, yes you are right. I wrote that "inept and unsecured counter-attacks" led to large, even huge losses without results. The problem is that our military studied for a long time ....
    1. +2
      July 13 2017
      Quote: aKtoR
      on the southern front they broke through (almost) the defense not because they were on the defensive, but because they pulled the troops in line more or less evenly - in the old fashioned way.

      And what will be new? Rokossovsky in the north had less accessible tanks, however, he didn’t guess. Goth had half an order of magnitude more options. Vatutin therefore jumped from impatience because he himself wanted to strike first, because I realized that to catch the strike of Hausser's tank fist on the strongest section of the front was simply unrealistic.
      1. 0
        July 13 2017
        In addition. Zamulin "Kursk break". Very instructive study.
        And further. What stopped the German attack on Kursk? Defense or counterattacks?
        The model stopped its offensive because the Soviet troops went on the offensive on Oryol. That is, they beat him on the flank. Manstein wanted to continue the offensive, but then Soviet troops also hit him on the flank from the south. That is, the very defense of the Soviet troops did not scare him. But kotrudar on the flank was fatal.
        He himself was a master of flanking counterattacks. So he returned Kharkov and also planned defensive operations in Ukraine. But he was prevented by a corporal who ordered him to sit on the defensive.
        1. +2
          July 13 2017
          Quote: Bakht
          But he was prevented by a corporal who ordered him to sit on the defensive.

          I was always surprised by the references in the memoirs of German commanders to the decisions of the Führer, which did not lead to the planned success. But no one practically mentions his “stop order” in January of the 42, when the Wehrmacht literally fell apart on the move near Moscow. And the festoons are the merit of the former corporal. The name of Manstein’s memoirs “Lost Victories” is from “that opera”.
          1. 0
            July 13 2017
            Of course, any memoirs should be taken with a share of skepticism. But after all, the “corporal” ordered a tough defense. This is a fact. What we are discussing now. And lost. The same Manstein writes that he still could not stop the advance of the Soviet troops. But he wanted to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy and achieve a draw. Clever generals did not even think of victory after Stalingrad.
            So which way was right? Rigid defense or flexible with counterattacks? By the way, without going over to the counteroffensive :-). It seems to me that Manstein’s plan was more realistic.
            1. 0
              October 1 2017
              The history of the 27th army of PribOVO is instructive, for the formation of which in Riga the order of NGOs and the General Staff was given only on 25.05.41. With the task of anti-landing defense of the entire Baltic coast from the western border to the Leningrad region, as well as the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. And what did she have armored until the fall of 1941? Here is a reference for you: The combat personnel of the ABTV 27 of the NWF Army:

              Date Front Composition BTMV army
              I formation
              on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX there were no armored troops in the NWF
              on 01.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX there were no armored troops in the NWF
              on 10.07.1941/21/42 SZF 46 microns (185, 11 TD, 84 md, XNUMX mcp), XNUMX md
              on 01.08.1941/21/42 NWF 46 MK (185, 80 TD, 5 MD) This is the corps (!!!) Lelyushenko, from the Moscow Military District, which, having been formed since March (!!!), received its initial tanks (no more than 34 units in total, all sorts used BT + 105 machine-gun amphibious + ONE T-45) and 24.06 250mm anti-tank guns only 400. and was moved to Dvinsk to beat the vanguard tank division of the SS "Dead Head", on the opposite order, stormed the city, rake to the fullest, had the remnants of the dead crews in their tank divisions - in one apprx. 185, in another ca. 2300 fighters, in 70 motor rifle divisions - 45 bayonets, and approx. 15 not yet broken 30.06.41 mm anti-tank guns and approx. 27 tanks that miraculously left the battle for the entire hull (data as of XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.). After that, he was subordinated to the XNUMXth Army of the NWF. At the same time, the Germans continued to push him and finish him off. And Moscow suddenly abolished all the corps in August and disbanded their administrations.
              on 01.09.1941/27/XNUMX there were no armored troops in XNUMXA of the NWF. And what is an army without armored vehicles in general? Question?
    2. 0
      July 13 2017
      To blame, I did not know that the author is a woman. :-)
      There was a benefit from counterattacks. They slowed down the German offensive. For example, Poppel’s strike stopped 1 TGr of Kleist. Beat gr. Boldin, unfortunately, did not give results. Poor organization and the Soviet mechanized corps stuck in the German infantry.
      Organizing a counterattack is much more difficult than conducting an offensive operation. You are always in time trouble and do not know where the enemy will turn. In South-West, 3 anti-tank brigades waited on the defensive for the Germans to turn south, while they passed by and headed for Kiev. And almost 600 artillery barrels sitting on the defensive were mixed with land by dive-bombers. Out....
      Defense is death. Almost always.
      1. 0
        October 1 2017
        Subsequently, the 11th Army retreats, trying to join the struggle to keep the cities. But to keep them this army fails. The retreat continues. The army is losing contact with both the front headquarters and Moscow. Moscow for some time does not know whether this very 11th army exists. But the army exists. And, more or less understanding the operational situation, the army headquarters gropes for the enemy’s weak spot - the poorly covered flanks of the tank wedge moving towards Pskov. It falls on these flanks, cuts off the road, and stops the enemy offensive for a few days. Subsequently, the 11th Army is retained as a military association. Participates in the winter 1941-42 offensive of the Red Army.

        Thus, both armies of the North-Western Front, which fell under the crushing power of the first blow of the Germans, were neither crushed nor broken by this blow. And they continued to fight. Moreover, not unsuccessfully. There is no information about any mass surrender of soldiers of these armies. The soldiers do not show their unwillingness to fight for the Soviet Motherland. Officers quite correctly assess the capabilities of warfare. Where to retreat, so as not to be bypassed, where to take up defense, and where to put a dangerous counterattack.

        4th Army of the Western Front. She came under attack from the enemy through Brest. Two divisions of this army, which neither the command of the Belarusian military district, nor their own commander gave the order to leave the city to summer camps, were shot by German artillery right in the barracks in the city of Brest. Nevertheless, the army entered the fighting, participated in a counterattack by the forces of its mechanized corps, and retreated, clinging abroad. One of the divisions of this army, having left for Mozyr UR on the old border, kept it for a month. Scattered detachments of encirclement made their way to this division, which remained far in the west. And here the headquarters of the defeated 3rd Army made their way. On the basis of this headquarters, the numerous detachments of the encirclement and the only organized combat formation - the 4th Army division, the 3rd Army was recreated. New, replacing the disappeared. However, the division itself by that time had ceased to be a division of the 4th Army, and was reassigned to the 21st Army. But it is important for us to track her fate. After all, this is a division among those who entered the battle on June 22 in the direction of the main attack. This division not only survived, but at its base a larger military association was revived - the army. Which will already have a long military fate.

        And what about the rest of the 4th Army. Her story ends on July 24, 1941. But not by reason of defeat and captivity. Before the disbandment, she conducts offensive battles in order to help the 13th Army withdraw from the encirclement. To no avail. At night, the 4th Army infantry knocks the enemy out of towns and villages, and during the day they are forced to surrender the same towns - due to the presence of tanks, artillery, and aircraft in the enemy. The front is not moving. But to break the gap for the encirclement does not work. In the end, the four divisions available at that time as part of the 4th Army were transferred to the 13th Army, in which, apart from command and control of the army and one rifle corps, there was nothing more. And the headquarters of the 4th Army remaining without troops becomes the headquarters of the new Central Front.

        The troops of the army, which took upon itself the brunt of the Germans most powerful strike through Brest, defending themselves on one of the most important highways leading to Moscow - on the Warsaw Highway - were not just not defeated and captured, but fought in offensive battles to assist the encircled forces. And these troops became an organized war core around which two armies were revived. And the army headquarters became the headquarters of a whole new front. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the 4th Army Sandalov will actually lead the most successful 20th Army in the Moscow counterattack (Commander Vlasov, who is absent from the army during this period, is being treated for some kind of illness) and will participate in the successful Pogorel-Gorodishchensky operation in August 1942, in Operation Mars from November-December 1942 onwards.

        The 5th Army of the Southwestern Front received a strike at the junction with the 6th Army. And in fact, she had to retreat, turning the front to the south. The mechanized corps of this army participated in a counterattack in the area of ​​Novograd-Volynsky. At the front of this army, the Germans were forced to stop for a week on the river Sluch. Subsequently, when the breakthrough of the enemy tank wedge to Kiev between the 5th and 6th armies became a reality, the 5th army, whose front, facing south, stretched 300 km, launched a series of crushing attacks on the flank of the Kiev wedge, intercepted the Kiev highway - and thereby stopped the attack on Kiev. The German tank division approached the Kiev fortified area, which there was literally no one to defend, and stopped. Primitively left without shells - due to communications intercepted by the 5th Army.

        Against the 5th army, which clung to the Korostensky fortified area on the old border, the Germans were forced to deploy 11 divisions. They had 190 divisions on the entire Soviet front. So, every 1/17 of the entire Wehrmacht was turned against the only 5th army at the same time that Soviet armies with numbers 19, 20, 21, ... 37, 38 ... arrived at the front from the depths of the country ... For 35 days the army delivered 150 blows to the Germans. Army troops secretly and quickly maneuvered in the Pripyat forests, appeared in unexpected places, smashed the enemy, and then slipped away from the Germans. Artillery also acted successfully. She, too, covertly maneuvered and delivered unexpectedly sensitive blows to clusters of enemy troops, to stations and to convoys of vehicles that supplied enemy troops. There were ammunition.

        The fortified area, which the army is hooked on to, is not only the pillboxes, which essentially lost their value in conditions of maneuver warfare. Fortified area is, first of all, warehouses of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, uniforms, spare parts. The artillery of the 5th army did not experience difficulties with shells. And therefore, the enemy was very tight. Later, already in 1943-44, during the offensive operations of the Red Army, it was revealed that 2/3 of the corpses of German soldiers had traces of defeat precisely by artillery fire. So these were soldiers in the trenches. And the artillery of the 5th army, acting according to intelligence and sabotage groups, inflicted blows on troop concentrations.

        Accordingly, in the directives of the German command, the destruction of the 5th army was set as a task of equal importance to the capture of Leningrad, the occupation of Donbass. It was the 5th Army, which took the battle on June 22, that became the cause of the so-called. the Pripyat crisis, which forced the Germans to stop the attack on Moscow and turn the Guderian tank group south - against the Kiev group. This army inflicted crushing blows on communications even when the Germans launched a large-scale offensive against it - after August 5. With this German offensive itself, a joke came out. It began on August 5 instead of the 4th for a curious reason. The 5th Army reconnaissance and sabotage group intercepted a package with the German directive on the beginning of the offensive. The directive did not reach the troops. The army was not defeated. She faded in battle. Commander-5 General Potapov asked the front for marching replenishment - and practically did not receive it. And the army continued to torment 11 full-fledged German divisions with unexpected and successful strikes, remaining on the 300-kilometer front with only 2400 active bayonets.

        Remark. The staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people. 11 divisions - that's 150 thousand. And they are held by the army, which in terms of the number of active bayonets is inferior to the regular strength of these troops by 20 (!) Times. Digest this number. 20 times inferior in the number of bayonets to the opposing enemy, the army conducts offensive battles, which become the headache of the German General Staff.

        So. The armies that suffered the severity of the blow of the German army were not defeated by this blow. Moreover, they demonstrated survivability, activity and the ability to competently retreat, and then also to smash the many times superior enemy. - Not by number, but by skill. In addition to the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, it should be noted the actions of not the whole army, but of the right-flank 99 of the Red Banner Division of the 26 Army under Przemysl. This division successfully fought with two or even three German divisions advancing in this place. Threw them over the San River. And the Germans could not do anything with it. Despite the power of the blow, despite all the German organization and air superiority. There was no offensive against the other divisions of this army in the early days of the war. "- I quoted a fragment of an article about the heroes and traitors in the armies of the first echelon of the Red Army in 1941, it seems, general Pokrovsky. The facts about Ponedelin and Vlasov are interesting, but I think , someone in Moscow knew even more about them.I disagree with a number of Pokrovsky’s positions, but I quite share his conclusions about conspiracies and treason on the Western Federal District and the Southern Federal District.
    3. 0
      July 14 2017
      ....Ha!!! After the Finnish company, Khalkhin-Gola, ....- studied for a long time? ..... What? !!!! ... Now, sit down and think - what should be learned by "our military" ..... From whom? .... From whose experience? .... - The answers will be .... - Well, .. uncomfortable
    4. +1
      October 1 2017
      On the eve of the war, more than half of the divisions of these two divisions - 10 of 18 rifle battalions, 3 of 4 artillery regiments, one of two divisions of the anti-aircraft defense and air defense, reconnaissance battalions, and some other units - were withdrawn to the training camps from the Brest Fortress on the eve of the war. On the morning of June 22, 1941, in the fortress were:

      - 84th Rifle Regiment without two battalions

      - 125th rifle regiment without a battalion and sapper company

      - 333th rifle regiment without a battalion and sapper company

      - 44th Rifle Regiment without two battalions

      - 455th rifle regiment without a battalion and sapper company

      ------------------

      according to the state, this should have amounted to 10.074 personnel, in battalions 16 anti-tank guns and 120 mortars, in regiments of 50 guns and anti-tank guns, 20 mortars.

      - 131st artillery regiment

      - 98th anti-tank defense division

      - 393rd Anti-aircraft Artillery Division

      - 75th reconnaissance battalion

      - 37th battalion of communications

      - 31st autobaht

      - 158st autobaht

      ------------------

      in the state - 2.169 personnel, 42 artillery barrels, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles.

      - rear units of the 33rd Engineer Regiment and the 22nd Panzer Division

      - 132nd convoy battalion of the NKVD troops

      - 3rd border commandant of the 17th detachment

      - 9th frontier post (in the Citadel - the central part of the fortress)

      - District Hospital (on the South Island. Most of the staff and patients were captured in the first hours of the war).

      The states of the NKVD battalion, border guards and the hospital are unknown to me. Of course, the available number of units was significantly lower than the regular ones. But actually in the morning of June 22, 1941, in the Brest Fortress there was a total incomplete division - without 1 infantry battalion, 3 combat engineer companies and howitzer regiments. Plus the NKVD battalion and border guards. On average, in the divisions of the Special ZapVO by June 22, 1941 there were actually about 9.300 personnel, 63% of the state.

      Thus, we can assume that there were more than 22 thousand soldiers and commanders in the Brest Fortress on the morning of June 8, not counting the staff and patients of the hospital.
    5. +1
      October 1 2017
      And again about the "surprise" (documents of the 11th Army June 20 and 21, 1941) - ADDED SCANS

      In the German military archive, in the intelligence fund of the headquarters of the 3rd Wehrmacht Tank Group (RH 21-3 / 437), two “captured” (from the Germans' point of view) documents were found. In the early days of the war, the 3rd TGr attacked in the band of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front (Baltic Special Military District). Accordingly, the captured documents were compiled at the headquarters of the 11th Army. There is nothing sensational in their content - the usual routine of war: to occupy the line of defense, conduct reconnaissance, identify the enemy’s grouping ...

      Only numbers and dates of signing documents deserve close attention:



      Army Headquarters

      Oper. the Department

      November 20.6.1941, XNUMX

      No. 005 / op



      Commander 128 SD

      Commander 374 joint venture

      Howitzer regiment commander

      100.000 card





      By the morning of 21.6, take the following defense position:

      1. Put one GAP division (howitzer artillery regiment) at a position in the region of height of 147,9 (south-west of Calvaria). Kalwaria is a village on the border of Lithuania and the East. Prussia

      The task is to support the battalions of 126 SD (Rifle Division) in the event of an enemy offensive.

      2. Withdraw a 374 joint venture battalion to the Zelenka grove area (2452) (further crossed out: “where to organize the defense”)

      The end of classes is only on my instructions.



      11th Army Commander

      lieutenant general (Morozov)

      Member of the Military Council

      Brigadier Commissioner (Zuev)

      Army Chief of Staff

      Major General (Shlemin)



      *************************************************
      ********



      Army Headquarters

      Art. the Department

      November 21.6.1941, XNUMX

      № 05

      Battle Order No. 01 Headquarters Nachartm 11, Kaunas

      21.6.1941 14-00

      100.000 card



      1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same.

      2. Conduct reconnaissance by all means of artillery instrumental reconnaissance and ground observation with the task of identifying the grouping of artillery, OP and NP areas

      a) NAK-16 (chief of artillery of the 16th Rifle Corps) conduct reconnaissance in the strip: on the right - p. Neman, on the left - Vidgira, Pelyany, Poyava, Lake Pobondze

      Particular attention Lazenen, Shillenen, Shirvindt, Aydkunen, Vishtynets

      b) NAD-126 (chief of artillery of the 126th Infantry Division) conduct reconnaissance in the strip: on the right: fl. Karklins, Piekalne, Lepolaty, Camion; left: Krasna, Pogrudy, fl. Polunets, Voitoke.

      Particular attention to the direction of Suwalki

      c) NAD-128 (chief of artillery of the 128th Rifle Division) conduct reconnaissance in the strip: on the right: Podzishki, Zelenka, Buraki, oz. Saves; left: Druskeniki, Koptsevo, Budniece, Sernetka

      Particular attention: Seyny, Gib

      3. Information about intelligence should be displayed in detail in intelligence reports and submitted to Nachararma by 3, 10 and 15 hours daily.



      Major of the Army Artillery 11th Major (Svettsov)

      Pom. Chief of Staff for Intelligence Art. lieutenant (Belostotsky)
    6. 0
      October 3 2017
      You are not a strategist - and miss important meanings. In PribOVO Klenov placed the main warehouses of spare parts for armored vehicles in Dvinsk (Daugavpils), approx. 200 cars. Measure HUNDREDS of kilometers to the location of 3 and 12mk yourself - and answer for yourself how a competent district chief of staff, who fought as an officer in the Imperialist, then in the Civil, could have made this ERROR? Knowing the quality of our armored vehicles at the border? Two armored divisions of 12 mk in them (Kuznetsova and Klenova) stood on June 18-20.06.41, 8. Where? One from Liepaja, and the second from Riga. Then they moved northwest of Šiauliai, covering the direction towards it and further to Kaunas, where there were ammunition depots not of their 11th, but 0,5th army. Liepaja, the KBF base and their own base were left without cover, they spent motor resources, raked faults (repairs and spare parts are already needed), spent fuel and lubricants. And they were shining orders for a counterattack on Tilsit! according to the project of Zhukov! And they had it started from some kind of forest! Without any practical contact (delegates of communication with written orders were already fired and caught by German and Lithuanian saboteurs on the roads, many of our staff officers went missing or scoured the forests in search of our TANK DIVISIONS who wandered through the forests without intelligence, who were already late) . I would also understand the meaning of transferring ONE tank division from Riga to Liepaja, but to drive TWO into some intermediate forests where the tanks have no maneuver, with ONE ammunition and 1 refueling, with 2-12 days of food stuffing was a crime. But did someone in Moscow allow this, or perhaps put it in the plan? What is the only plan? It is impossible to evaluate the actions of the front (resp. Com. Kuznetsov) without organizing the rear services (responsible. NSH NWF Klenov). Kuznetsov, of course, was also responsible for his NS - well, so he passed it to Dibrova. NS was also primarily responsible for poor intelligence and communications. And 1000 the mechanized corps did not save either Liepaja, or Riga, nor Šiauliai, nor Kaunas. The Germans repaid his weak flank strike in an hour or two with their anti-tank flank barriers and aircraft. Housing of approx. XNUMX tanks managed to knock out no more than a tank battalion (not to burn, but to knock out! Mainly) and crush a couple of batteries of light anti-tank missiles. Well, another couple of convoys to defeat ... And almost all of our tanks had to be left in these forests, because even it was impossible to return them to Riga, we wouldn’t have reached their technical condition. And in Liepaja, warehouses, batteries and even repaired ships, including submarines, had to be blown up, because the Germans drove tanks at them.
  16. +2
    July 13 2017
    "The attache of the Yugoslav trade agency showed the stamps of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Prepared by the Germans. In Krakow, General Wojciechowski forms the Slavic anti-Bolshevik regiment."
    If you do not know that this is a reconnaissance report of the time, you might think that these are today's events. The attitude of the West towards Russia has never been peaceful and neighborly. It is necessary to draw conclusions, moreover, yesterday.
  17. 0
    July 14 2017
    Only where Hitler could tell exactly where and when he would advance to Stalin love But he said nothing, bastard feel
    1. 0
      July 14 2017
      Nah ... I do not idealize the Führer, but .... he was a little peculiar
      War is pure mathematics, not even algebra .... But looking at the political situation and leaning on the fake data of Zanz Kanaris .... Yes .... The Führer was thoughtful ..... And he realized that he was provided with a shindets ... and competently went all-in ..... It is a pity stupid tortured German electorate
      1. +1
        October 1 2017
        As for war and pure mathematics, I give the composition of troops of the 11th Army of the NWF. From Wikipedia - found there. And I wondered how my father remained alive? He is at the headquarters of the army of this beginning. there was a supply department (quartermaster 2 ranks), and out of the environment from the border. Monthly army combat strength
        Date (as part of the front) Emblema(tank).gif
        Rifle and cavalry formations Emblema (art).gif
        Artillery and mortar formations Emblema (tank1).gif
        Tank and mechanized formations Emblema (avia).gif
        Aviation Emblema (sap).gif
        Engineering and sapper units
        22.06.1941
        (North-Western Front) 16 sk (5, 33, 188 sd), 29 sk (179, 184 sd), 23, 126, 128 sd, 42 (Shauliai), 46 (Telshai), 45 UR 10 art. PTO brigade, 270, 448, 615 cap, 110 gap b / m and 429 gap RGK, 19, 247 ozad 3 microns (2 TD, 5 md, 84 mtsp) - 5 ob -
        01.07.1941
        (North-Western Front) 16 sk (5, 33, 188 sd), 41 sk (111, 118, 235 sd), 90, 126, 128 sd, 42 UR 10 art. PTO brigade, 448 cap, 110 gap b / m, 429 gap RGK, 19 ozad 1 MK (3 td, 163 md, 5 mtsp), 202 md - 38 oib -
        10.07.1941
        (North-Western Front) 16 sk (70, 237 sd), 41 sk (111, 118, 235 sd), 22 sk (180, 182 sd), 183 sd 9 art. VET brigade, 614 cap, 698 ap VET 1 MK (3 td, 163 md, 5 mtsp) - 4 and 30 pmp -
        01.08.1941
        (North-Western Front) 22 sk (180, 182, 254 sd), 24 sk (181, 183 sd), 398 cn (118 sd), 21 and 28 msp 264, 613, 614 cap, 698 ap PTO, dep. ap VET (major Bogdanov), 111 ozad 202, 163 md, 5 mcp, 41 wrestling - 28, 38 bob -
        01.09.1941
        (North-Western Front) 180, 182, 183, 202, 254 sd, 21 sd 9 art. VET brigade, 614 cap, 698 ap VET, 11, 23 ozad 87, 110 otb 7 garden 28, 38 deb, 202 osb -
        01.10.1941
        (North-Western Front) 180, 182, 183, 202, 254 sd, 21 sd 9 art. VET brigade, 614 cap, 698 ap VET, 11, 23 ozad 87, 110 otb
  18. +4
    20 September 2017
    The IVS probably also had PERSONAL intelligence channels. Bulgaria and Dimitrov - 100%. Yugoslavia and Tito - 100%. Turkey, Iran, Iraq - Armenians, Georgians - 100%. Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Greece, Italy - 100%. France and Poland - 100%. USA, Britain, Canada - 100%. Even in German, there were sharp “independent” characters such as Olga Chekhova (and not one). Litvinov could also be asked for info. Anastas Mikoyan also had her own info. So besides the “Corsicans” and “elders,” it would be nice to remember someone now, even forgetting about the eastern residencies. Further, the author, using the example of PribOVO, shows documents and facts about the NORMAL pre-war deployment of troops from June 16, 1941, and he himself notes a sharp braking intervention in the process of the chief commanders and the NKVD officers, as well as MARSHALOV KULIK AND TYMOSHENKO from June 19 to 21. And it would be nice to dig up the initiators of the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the settlement of farms on the eve of the war. There the real conspiracy is ripe!
  19. +1
    October 1 2017
    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
    Order on the rear of the headquarters 11 A

    The period from 22.06.1941/22.06.1941/848 to 1/1/1 TsAMO Archive, Fund XNUMX, Inventory XNUMX, Case XNUMX, Document XNUMX

    The order was signed in Fort No. 6 of Kaunas, where from 22.06.41. on the streets and in houses, Lithuanian fascists were already killing Russians and Jews, firing round the corner at Soviet army vehicles, "supply and ammunition flies." It is clear from the order that the 11th army was mainly based on stationary warehouses in Kaunas and Vilnius, which was also on the verge of a sabotage ARMED political coup, supported by TWO Lithuanian "territorial" divisions, which in Moscow were considered "cleared and
    combat-ready "and took into account, in particular Zhukov, when calculating" counterattacks. "It was a profound mistake, if not a projectile insanity. There they had already dealt with the Soviet command staff and at best massively deserted with weapons, and at worst - blocked the supply routes of Soviet troops, cut off communications, killed single communications delegates, prepared to land German RDGs from the Brandenburg sabotage elite regiment. Under these conditions, the 11th army, being surrounded since June 23, was able to fight and leave the encirclement in the fall near Demyansk, carrying banners and documents, removing several thousand people, refugees and the wounded, and even part of the property from the warehouses! Without any communication and assistance from the headquarters of the North-West Fleet, which already recorded the headquarters of the 26.06th army in the captured, captured or dead already on June 11! 11 armies!
  20. 0
    October 3 2017
    Quantitative estimates are just the most misleading - the General Staff of the Red Army burned on them in 1941. What was the use of considering our old tanks as almost balanced German? The 20-mm cannon of the old German Panzer-2 pierced the armor of any of our armored vehicles (except heavy KV, even took the T-34 in the stern and board) from 500-700 m, while our tank guns, including the divisional 76 mm on KV, could penetrate thin but resistant hardened armor of German tanks only from distances of 350-450 m?
    1. +1
      October 3 2017
      Our "old tanks"? .... Details in the hall .... Pz-1 and Pz-2 against our "old tanks"? ... Do not tell me about ar ... w ... BT and AM were inferior. ..? Even a 6-fold advantage? ..Well, I'm stupid, of course, and a dropout in math
      1. 0
        November 13, 2017
        Panzer-1 is no longer there, but Panzer-2 is still yes, it beat our T-26 and BT easily, even at a 6-fold advantage. The preponderance here almost does not play a role - in a duel situation on 1 km of the tank battle front. ! 0 German Panzer-2 with a 20-mm automatic gun per 1 km of battle could burn 100 of our tanks! even without the help of their artillery and aircraft, which was many times more effective than ours. Each volley from 700 m to 300 m theoretically set on fire 10 of ours, and would have beaten them all 100, while they turned and approached 300 m, Elementary, Watson, this is a tank battle, not arithmetic, here the rate of fire and armor penetration are decisive qualities of a gun not caliber!
  21. 0
    October 5 2017
    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  22. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: aszzz888
    I think it is useful to read and know at least the main numbers and dates ... article +

    State of the mechanized corps of the southwestern front
    REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE AUTO-ARMORED DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH-WEST FRONT TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN AUTO-ARMORED DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY ON THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF THE MATERIAL OF THE MECHANIZED FRAME OF JULY 15, 1941
    Ow. top secret
    Head of the Main Armored Directorate

    Red Army Lieutenant General of Tank Forces

    comrade Fedorenko

    REPORT ON THE STATE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE MATERIAL
    OF MECHANIZED BODIES OF THE SOUTH-WEST FRONT
    AS OF 15.7.41
    The 9,19th and 22nd mechanized corps are part of the 5th army and are continuously in battles east of Novograd Volynsky.
    On the basis of Directive No. ORG / 955 of 10.7.41, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, mechanized corps begin to withdraw from the front crews and commanding personnel, which do not have combat materiel, to the 10th reserve tank regiment in the Kobyzhch district.
    The presence of material in these buildings:
    9th mechanized corps - BT - 7; T-26 - 25, armored vehicles - 30.
    19th Mechanized Corps - KV - 4; T-34 - 7; T-26 - 22; armored vehicles - 2.
    22nd Mechanized Corps - BT-2; T-26 - 28; armored vehicles - 17.
    On 15.7.41, the remaining material part of the buildings passed under their own power more than 1000 km and, as a rule, did not have a single day for inspection and repair, which led to its premature failure.
    The 4th and 16th mechanized corps, which are part of the 6th Army, operate in the Berdichev area.
    The 16th Mechanized Corps on 9.7.41 was transferred to the Mazyr region, but due to the changed situation, it was detained and put into battle near Berdichev. Data on the condition of the material part of the 16th mechanized corps are being specified.
    The 4th mechanized corps, on the basis of the directive No. org / 955, began to withdraw its units to the area of ​​Priluki.
    The presence of the material part of the 4th mechanized corps: KV-6, T-34 - 39, BT-23, armored vehicles - 36.
    The material part of the 4th mechanized corps on 15.7.41 passed under its own power over 1200 km.
    The 24th Mechanized Corps, which is part of the 12th Army, acts essentially as a rifle corps, defending a site north of Letichev.
    The presence of the remaining material in the case is being specified.
    The 8th and 15th mechanized corps are withdrawn from the battlefield. The 8th mechanized corps - Nizhyn, the 15th mechanized corps - Piryatin.
    A large number of long marches in difficult terrain, under the influence of aircraft, anti-tank guns and enemy artillery, without technical inspections and the possibility of recovery for reasons of permanent withdrawal, led to a large percentage of tank losses.
    The lack of appropriate evacuation means in the corps and armies led to the fact that an exceptionally large number of tanks and armored vehicles wrecked and disabled for technical reasons were left on the battlefield and along the roads.
    Until now, the armored armored units of the armies have remained the same, which leads to the fact that these departments do not cover the control of mechanized corps and do not direct the activities of armored units in rifle corps.
    The Armored Front Command still does not have a plan for replenishing mechanized corps with material parts, and thus it is impossible to say when the allotted and withdrawn 4th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps can be put into operation.
    Based on the foregoing, I ask:
    Create evacuation facilities in corps and armies according to my proposal made in my report to you dated July 3 of this year under No. E-1/0025.
    The armored armies departments should be strengthened so that they could cover the activities of mechanized and rifle corps with their leadership.
    It is possible in the shortest possible time to launch a plan to replenish the material part of mechanized corps.
    Head of the Armored Directorate of the South-Western Front

    Major General of the Tank Forces Morgunov
  23. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: KOLAaps
    ....Ha!!! After the Finnish company, Khalkhin-Gola, ....- studied for a long time? ..... What? !!!! ... Now, sit down and think - what should be learned by "our military" ..... From whom? .... From whose experience? .... - The answers will be .... - Well, .. uncomfortable

    The cost of certain types of Soviet tanks by years
    ATTENTION! When using the materials in this table, a link to it is required!
    Wartime tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
    T-34 (Plant No. 183*) 596 373 429 256 249 256 165 810 141 822 140 996 136 380
    T-34 (Plant No. 183**) - 510 - 000 166 300 136
    T-34 (Plant No. 112) - - - 209 700 179 300
    T-34 (Plant No. 174) - - - 3 127 000 2
    T-34 (UZTM) - - - 273800 190800 179400 -
    KV-1s (ChKZ) - - - 300 200 246 000 - -
    IS-2 (ChKZ) - - - - 347 900 264
    IS-3 (CHKZ) - - - - - - 267200
    Notes:
    * - figures from the plant report
    ** - figures from the report of the People’s Commissariat
    Self-propelled artillery mounts
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1942 1943 1944 1945
    2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y 1 p/y 2 p/y
    SU-122 203 900 175 - - - -
    SU-85 - - 201 000 175 - -
    SU-100 - - - - 176 500 176
    Pre-war tanks
    Type (manufacturer) Years
    1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
    BT-2 (KhPZ) 93 313 - - - - - - -
    BT-5 (KhPZ) - - 66 830 - - - - - -
    BT-7 (KhPZ) - - - 91 309 96 453 95 326 104 168 101 094 -
    BT-7M (KhPZ) - - - - - - - 168 196 177 609
    The tables are compiled according to the NKTP reports in 1940-1945. (RGAE)
  24. 0
    October 8 2017
    Quote: aKtoR
    12 March 1942 alone on the plane And 16 fought against a pair of German fighters Messerschmitt Bf.109. In a short battle both Germans were shot down.

    A pair of downed ignoramuses or stupid people - this is not an indicator. An unflown, inexperienced couple was caught, or their weapons fluttered in the cold, or something else - or luck, or they were from a hangover, and he was in courage - there could be anything. This superiority of the I-16 over Messer did not prove, especially since there could be Messers and the old model such as Spanish battles. Lucky ours - no luck Germans. But they shot down ours before 1945 more.
  25. +1
    October 19 2017
    Quote: aszzz888
    Our newest trick: we are planning a peace conference with the participation of Russia.

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  26. 0
    October 19 2017
    Quote: glory1974
    You can not talk about the complete surprise of the attack.

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  27. 0
    October 19 2017
    Quote: chenia
    The Germans began to create a group for the offensive at the very last moment, and that was the balance of forces (in the western districts).

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  28. 0
    October 19 2017
    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version
  29. 0
    October 19 2017
    Quote: gla172
    As for the ability to fight, which supposedly needed to learn

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version

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