The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 1)
Dedicated to S.
Preface. Quite a lot of people in our huge country can competently talk about the events of the Great Patriotic War. The last decade, interest in military technology and the events of the Great Patriotic War has increased even more, in contrast to the civilized countries of Europe, in which they try to forget their history and "step on the rake again." The peoples of these countries are forced to "dance to the American tune" ...
In the article “How Europe went to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, the author tried to show the role of the true perpetrators of the tragedy in Europe - England and the USA, who “behind the scenes” ruled other countries. 30's events are reminiscent of current times. As Churchill said then, "Hitler betrayed an anti-communist ... cause." It turns out that for the sake of the “Great” goal - the destruction of Bolshevism - you can “surrender” your allies and the “Great” goal should be set higher than the interests of the peoples of many countries. Now in Russia there is no power of the communist regime, but "Great "target - Anti-Russian - unites Europe. If you look closely, the United States and Britain are still somewhat isolated from other countries and are ready to act against Russia. Perhaps they are still under the control of the backstage Puppeteers ...
Since 22 June 1941, we were told about the unexpected attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR. We read a lot and heard about the Soviet intelligence reports, which revealed the plans of the fascists.
To us, the present generation, everything is clear about preparing Germany for war, and Stalin all "overslept". Once at the time, we would immediately “open the eyes” of the ruling clique! Stalin did not believe intelligence reports, because he believed Hitler and, by virtue of the non-aggression pact, he tried to delay the war, which he feared, without giving Germany a reason to attack. Or, maybe, I.V. Stalin simply trusted the specialists and therefore the Germans "beat" him?
The decision on the war with the USSR and the overall plan of the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the supreme military command of 31.07.40. December 18 1940 years after making clarifications Hitler signed directive №21 Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), which received the name "Barbarossa".
The German Armed Forces (AF) were tasked with defeating Soviet Russia in the course of a short-term campaign. For which it was intended to use all ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupational functions in Europe and the North African coast, as well as about two thirds of the Air Force and part of the Navy. The start of the invasion was scheduled for 15 on May 1941 of the year. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was according to the plan 4 — 5 months.
On the night of 5 on 6 on April (Sunday), German troops launched air strikes and invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. November 30.04.41, XNUMX at a meeting of senior military leadership Hitler called new date of the attack on the USSR — 22 June 1941 yearwhich he wrote on his copy of the plan.
Preparing Germany for war with the USSR was carried out in the framework of unprecedented measures to ensure secrecy. To conceal the military plans of Germany against the USSR, on the orders of Hitler, at the initial stage, misinformation measures were developed. Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and some other cabinet members closest to the Führer knew about them. The thesis of Hitler that the war against the USSR is possible only after the "reasonable agreement with England" was reached by the German special services was adopted to mislead the USSR leadership regarding the timing of the attack.
In the dissemination of misinformation information participated:
- The top officials of the German leadership (Hitler, the ministers of foreign affairs and foreign trade), German ambassadors, diplomats, and military attaches;
- employees of the political and military intelligence of Germany, who operated in European countries and in the Far East;
- members of the German government and trade and economic delegations who visited Moscow and the capitals of other European states;
- German media.
As an example, I will cite only one indication of the headquarters of the OKV to the Abwehr’s leadership about the disinformation activities of the Soviet military command 6.09.40 of
"... In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the east will increase significantly ... From these our rearrangements in Russia ... there should not be an impression that we are preparing an offensive to the east ... Russia must understand that in the General Government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate there are strong and efficient German troops, and conclude from this that we are ready at any moment and with sufficiently powerful forces to defend our interests in the Balkans against Russian intervention.
For the operation of one’s own intelligence, as well as for possible answers to Russian intelligence requests, one should be guided by the following basic principles.
1. To disguise the total number of German troops in the east as much as possible by spreading rumors and news about the allegedly intensive replacement of military units taking place in the area. Movement of troops to justify their transfer to training camps, re-formation, etc.
2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.
3. To exaggerate the state and level of armament of formations, especially tank divisions.
4. Spread appropriately selected information to create the impression that after the end of the western march anti-aircraft defense in the east seriously increased due to the captured French technology.
5. The work on improving the network of highways, railways and airfields is explained by the need to develop the newly conquered eastern regions, while referring to the fact that they are conducted at a normal pace and serve mainly economic goals.
To what extent are the individual authentic data, for example, the regiment numbering, the number of garrisons, etc.? can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes - decides the General Command of the Army.
Earlier, Soviet intelligence did not meet with such large-scale actions to cover the attack. Read more in the article.
(http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=10646886%40cmsArticle).
Let me draw attention to just one fact hidden in the OKW instruction: from the autumn of 1940, the number of German Armed Forces on the border with the USSR should have been overestimated. The USSR should have concluded that Germany is ready to defend our interests in the Balkans against Russian intervention [invasion] by powerful forces. Prepared "soil" for the "addiction" of the leadership of the USSR to such a concentration of troops.
For example, the Red Army Intelligence Agency (RU) estimated the number of divisions on the western border: 1.10.40 - 89 (in fact, it was 30); 1.11.40 - 88 divisions (32); 4.04.41 - 84 Divisions (47).
In Berlin, the resident foreign intelligence NKGB was Kobulov. Working in Berlin, Kobulov sent to Moscow valuable information obtained by Soviet intelligence officers.
In May 1947 of the year, German intelligence major Muller showed during interrogation: “In August 1940 of the year Kobulov was substituted by Berlinka’s intelligence agent (“ Lyceist ”), who for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials. Information from conversations with Kobulov ... was reported to Hitler and Ribbentrop. At meetings with the "Lyceum" Kobulov informed his "agent" that he sent his information personally to Stalin and Molotov.
14.12.40/XNUMX/XNUMX Mr. Kobulov reported to Moscow: “... According to the Lyceum’s reports, Germany’s foreign policy is based on the following basic principles ... The only enemy of our country [Germany] is England ... They see their tasks in Germany as ... avoiding a two-way war front. At the same time, it is important to ensure good relations between the Germans and Russia ... ”In a note to the report, it was reported that“ Lyceumist ”received information about the upcoming German landing in England from the senior lieutenant. This is indirectly confirmed by the changed nature of German raids. aviation to London. " For "the senior lieutenant", which Kobulov mentioned in the report, Corporal Hitler, who led the work of the "Lyceum", gave himself out.
In June 1991, an article was published by the former head of the GRU, General P.I. Ivashutin. The article, in particular, noted: “The reactionary circles of Western countries waited for the German attack on the USSR, but by that time their own existence depended on the ability of the Soviet Union to stand and win. Data on the reconnaissance channels of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the NKVD and the NKID since the 1938 have been reported on the maturing of military danger for the USSR. They concerned the buildup of the military and economic potential of Germany, the strategic concentration and operational deployment of the troops of the Hitler coalition near the western Soviet border, the creation of strike groups, and the directions of their actions. The main content of the “Barbarossa” plan was known 11 days after its approval by Hitler. During the period from December 27 1940 to June 22, 1941 received more than a dozen reliable sources about the possible dates of an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, which also indicated such dates as the middle of June, 15 – 20 of June and 22 – 25 hours of 3 June 4. However, the country's leadership, the military commander, even having information on the timing of the attack, did not take appropriate measures to repel the aggressor in a timely manner ... ”
The foreign intelligence services of the NKGB and military intelligence were created to obtain the information necessary to ensure the effective protection of the territory, the political and economic interests of the USSR.
There were five categories of information:
1 category - reports from Soviet ambassadors from Germany and other European countries;
2 - reports of residents of foreign intelligence NKGB;
3 - reports of military attaches, residents of military intelligence and intelligence of the Navy;
4 - special communications and intelligence reports prepared by the NKGB and the Space Agency;
5 - reports of intelligence agents.
The 1937 – 39 cleaning struck a severe blow to the spacecraft. Experienced intelligence officers were recalled from overseas business trips, dismissed from work or subjected to repression, the agent network was actually destroyed not only in Germany, but also in other Western European countries. The Soviet political leadership made an unwarranted mistake.
In 1940, the Republic of Uzbekistan began to treat residents' reports as extremely important information about the imminent threat of war. Similarly, the reports of the military intelligence included the leadership of the General Staff (GS), which, from December 1940, began to pay serious attention to the preparation of the military intelligence system for military operations.
14 December 1940, the head of the General Staff, General Meretskov, approved the new significantly increased staff of the RU. At the same time, the new Regulations on Military Intelligence were approved, emphasizing that the GS GSA is the central body of operational-strategic intelligence. The RU’s sphere of responsibility was defined quite widely - it was supposed to direct the work of foreign intelligence apparatus, the intelligence divisions of the headquarters of military districts (VO), radio intelligence units and other structures.
Between January 25 and February 21, the 1941 of the Republic of Uzbekistan organized and carried out the training of the heads of the intelligence departments of the HE staffs. Other measures were also taken related to the organization of the transition of military intelligence to work in emergency conditions. Under extraordinary conditions in the Republic of Uzbekistan was understood only one thing - war. According to General M. Milstein, who after the war was head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Staff Academy, military intelligence, despite the losses suffered during the years of repression, before the war "not only restored its previous connections, but also became one of the most powerful ... military intelligence in the world".
P.Ivashutin noted: "... The texts of almost all documents and radio telegrams relating to German military preparations and the timing of the attack were reported regularly on the following list: Stalin (2 copy), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff."
Sending two copies of the documents to Stalin testifies to the fact that he was rather painstakingly trying to work with these documents.
G. Zhukov: “... The information that emanated from General F. Golikov [head of the Republic of Uzbekistan] was immediately reported to us by I.Stalin. However, I don’t know what the intelligence was reported to Stalin Golikov personally, bypassing the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff ... ”
Why same surprise attack possible?
First, Soviet intelligence was inconclusive.
Secondly, the Soviet leadership was aware of Germany’s preparation for an attack on the USSR, believed that this clash could occur, but hoped to prevent it or move it back in time in order to gain more time to prepare the country to repel the aggression.
Thirdly, the Soviet leadership did not have the necessary experience in analyzing the complex military and political situation that had developed on the eve of the German attack on the USSR. Which of these causes are close to reality?
Let's return to the events in Europe during the conclusion of the Treaty 23.08.39.
First, Stalin was then able to prevent the creation of the Anglo-Franco-German alliance.
Secondly, by concluding an agreement with Germany, Stalin prevented the possibility of a war with Japan, which was already an ally of Germany.
Third, the western borders of the USSR were pushed aside, which created a strategic territorial barrier covering the USSR from the west.
Fourthly, the Soviet leadership won the time needed to strengthen the country's defense and increase the combat capability of the spacecraft.
It turns out that The Soviet leadership had the experience of analyzing a complex military-political situation and at that time trusted information from intelligence..
We do not even know what effort our intelligence was worth in preventing England from uniting with Germany. Why do we think that management did not trust Soviet intelligence in 1941?
29.12.40, the Soviet military attache in Berlin, General V.Tupikov ("Arnold") reported to Moscow that Hitler had ordered to prepare for war with the USSR. The war will be declared in March 1941. Moscow demanded clarification of information.
4.01.41 from Berlin received confirmation of the accuracy of the information based onnot rumored, and on the special order of Hitler, which is highly secret and which is known to very few people ... The preparation of the offensive against the USSR began much earlier, but at one time was somewhat suspended, because the Germans miscalculated with the resistance of England. In the spring the Germans expect England to put on their knees and free their hands in the east. ” Mention was made of the new start of the war - the spring of the year 1941.
Information about the timing of the start of the war after the withdrawal of England from it, as we already know, was disinformation. Intelligence received information about a certain decision about the war of Hitler, but the exact description of it, the scale of the action and the timeframe remained unknown.
7.01.41 G. General V. Tupikov learned that "most of the sources available in Germany do not have significant possibilities for obtaining documentary data on the German Armed Forces».
In the second half of March 1941, V.Tupikov sent to Moscow the “Report on the military and numerical strength of the deployed German army and its grouping as of 15.3.41”. The report contained more than 100 typewritten sheets, 30 layouts of organizational structures of units of the German Armed Forces, a diagram of the grouping of troops, a scheme of organization of the German army corps, summary tables of the combat strength of the Wehrmacht artillery units, etc.
In Moscow, the report of V.Tulikov was immediately processed. On its basis, in April 1941, a “Intelligence report on Germany” was prepared and sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and the commander of the Western military districts.
In the second half of April, another report was received from Tupikov on the “German Army Grouping as of 25.4.41”.
Analyzing the state of Soviet-German political relations against the background of a visit to Moscow by the Japanese Foreign Minister, V. Tupikov reports that question of the collision of Germany and the CCCR [it] "question deadlines and terms not so remote"Because the German leadership, which initiated an open anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, cannot" plan for a long period the stability of German-Soviet relations on an anti-Soviet basis. "
Evaluating the preparation of the Wehrmacht for the war against the USSR, Tupikov drew the attention of the head of the RU to the fact that “the grouping of the German army from the autumn of 1940 has invariably shifted to the east. Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118 – 120 divisions. The qualitative condition of the Armed Forces ... is now at its zenith and it’s not likely that it will hold out at this level for a long time, the Reich leaders have no reason, as it’s already felt that even the slightest complications hinting at a possible delay in the war cause acute nervousness among the general population ” .
Of particular value was the graphic "Scheme of possible options for Germany's actions against the USSR", which Tupikov himself executed and sent to the RU. One of the three options presented by Tupikov of the German forces reflected the plan of the German command to attack the USSR.
On the basis of the information at his disposal, V. Tupikov came to conclusions, which he informed the head of military intelligence:
“1. In the German plans of the USSR appears as another opponent.
2. The start of the collision is as short as possible and, of course, within the current year. ”
9 May 1941, General V.Tupikov reported to the People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko and the Head of the General Staff Zhukov about the plan of possible actions of the German army against the USSR. The report indicated that Germans are planning to defeat the spacecraft in 1 – 1,5 of the month with access to the Moscow meridian. [Naturally, senior military leaders could not even imagine that it was possible to fight like that and considered all this to be disinformation or nonsense.]
From January to March 1941, data on the preparation of a German attack on the USSR, on building up a group of German troops along the Soviet borders were received by the Center from military intelligence officers from Hungary, Romania, Germany, France, Iran and Japan.
20 March 1940 year the head of the RU GS GS prepared Report to the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, to the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) “Sayings ... and options for combat operations of the German army against the USSR”
“Most of the intelligence data relating to the possibilities of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 comes from Anglo-American sources, whose task today ... is the desire to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany. At the same time, ... a brief summary of all the available intelligence data for the period July July 1940 — March 1941 deserve in some part of serious attention ... Of all the statements we received at different times, the following deserve attention:
1. Goring allegedly agreed to make peace with England and oppose the USSR.
2. The Japanese military BAT [military attache] reports that Hitler allegedly stated that after a quick victory in the west he began an offensive against the USSR.
3. In Berlin, they talk about some major disagreement between Germany and the USSR. In this regard, the German embassy said that after England and France will come the turn of the USSR ...
... 14. A clash between Germany and the USSR should be expected in May 1941 g ... No one responds approvingly to these plans. It is believed that the spread of war on the USSR will only bring the end of the national socialist regime closer. This opinion is expressed by the nephew of Brauchitsch ...
Of the most likely options for action against the USSR, the following deserve attention:
1. Option No. 1 according to an anonymous letter received by our plenipotentiary in Berlin from 15.12.40 g.: “... the main direction of the blow: a) from Lublin in Pripyat to Kiev; b) from Romania between Iasi and Bukovina in the direction of Teterev, and c) from East Prussia to Memel, Willing, Berezina and further along the Dnieper to Kiev ”; [very similar to German misinformation];
2. Option No. 2 according to KOVO’s data from December 1940: “... Three main directions of impact: a) from East Prussia in the direction of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia ...; b) through Galicia and Volyn ... A group of troops of the 2 and 3 directions is surrounded by enemy troops in MaloPolshe. In the rest of the area, auxiliary blows are inflicted in the frontal direction in order to clear the rest of the territory ... "
3. Option No. 3, according to our intelligence report for February 1941: “... Three army groups are being set up for an offensive on the USSR: the 1-group under the command of General Marshal Bock strikes in the direction of Petrograd, the 2-group under the command of Field Marshal Runstudt - in the direction of Moscow and the 3-group under the command of General Field Marshal Leeb - in the direction of Kiev. The beginning of the offensive against the USSR is approximately May 20. ”
In addition to these documents, according to other sources, it is known that the plan of an offensive against the USSR will be as follows:
a) after the victory over England, Germany, advancing against the USSR, intends to strike from two flanks: coverage from the north (meaning Finland) and from the Balkan Peninsula;
b) the commercial director of the German company Trencha Mine, the limited said that the attack on the USSR would take place through Romania ...;
e) according to our BAT report from Berlin, according to a quite authoritative source, the beginning of military operations against the USSR should be expected between May 15 and June 15, 1941.
Hack and predictor Aviator:
1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible time limit start action against CCCP will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany.
2. Gossip and documents that speak of the inevitability of this spring in the war against the USSR must be regarded as misinformationcoming from the English and even, perhaps, German intelligence. " For more information visit http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1004944/66/Martirosyan_Arsen_-_Tragediya_1941_goda.html)
Maybe someone would have tried from the Report to choose from several “fantastic” one real version of the war between Germany and the USSR, having improved the available information. But GSH thought in other categories and this information "the price was worthless." In addition, the messages "were illuminated by the sworn friends" of the USSR. Therefore, intelligence did not particularly believe.
As General V.Tupikov correctly noted: “the sources in Germany ... do not have ... the possibilities of obtaining documentary data about the German Armed Forces." Quite right, we do not see in the report materials either the option of encircling the Zapov troops, nor the lightning actions of the moto-armored formations, nor the distribution of German troops in directions with the definition of the main directions of strikes. The attacks on Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev are too abstract.
Calling the approximate time of the German attack “somewhere in May-June”, did the “Great Secret” of Hitler come out, having learned that the USSR would win right away? Unlikely. Maybe in other reports there is more detailed information?
In the second half of June, the 1941 of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence of the NKGB prepared two documents. Their content greatly expands the current understanding of what information the preparation of Germany for the attack on the USSR was possible to obtain by Soviet intelligence on the eve of World War II.
The first document prepared by the NKGB is called “The calendar reports of agents of the Berlin residency NKGB USSR ... for the period from September 1940 to 16 June 1941 of the year. " "Calendar ...", judging by the date available on it, was compiled on June 20, that is, approximately 40 hours before the German attack on the USSR.
The second document is entitled “List military intelligence reports on Germany’s preparation for war against the USSR (January – June 1941). ” On the "List ..." there is no date of its execution, but it can be assumed that it was developed at the end of June.
The form and content of the "Calendar ..." and "List ..." are somewhat similar to each other, and at the same time different. "Calendar ..." is built according to the type of contradictions of intelligence reports and reflects the position of Beria. The “List ...” is built according to the type of the Golikov report from 20.03.41, and contains only those messages that speak of the possibility of a war between Germany and the USSR. Since there are no interim messages, it is difficult to judge whether these messages were the same inconsistency, which is noted in the "Calendar ...". Probably, both documents were prepared for one task, and the customer could be the head to which the NKGB and the RU were subordinate. Such a person was I.Stalin.
«A calendar of messages from agents of the Berlin Rezindentura of the NKGB USSR "Corsican" and "Senior Saints" about preparing Germany for war for the period from September 6 1940 to June 16 and 1941 June»20.06.1941
The article only reports from the beginning of the 1941 year. Removed non-relevant text from intelligence messages. More information about the "Calendar ..." can be found at: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1012019.
07.01.41 G. "Corsican"- In the circles grouped around Herren Club, there is an increasing opinion that Germany will lose the war in this connection you need to negotiate with England and America in order to turn weapon to the East.
[Dangerous enough news - against the three powers of the USSR was not to stand. It was necessary again, as in 1939 of the USSR, to "tack", without making mistakes.]
07.01.41 G. "Foreman"- The headquarters of the German aviation instructed to begin reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory in order to photograph the entire border strip. Leningrad is also included in the field of reconnaissance flights. Goering's position is increasingly inclined to conclude an agreement with America and England...
09.01.41 G. "Corsican"- The Military Economic Department of the Imperial Statistical Office received an order from the OKW to draw up industry maps of the USSR.
04.02.41 G. "Corsican"- A German offensive in the Balkans is ahead, which has already been prepared. In connection with the Balkan campaign, relations between Germany and the Soviet Union will escalate.
06.02.41 G. "Foreman"- Aviation Headquarters decided to launch a Balkan campaign in March. Over the past three weeks, German troops are being transferred to Bulgaria.
From the diary of Gebelss: "22 February 1941 (Sat)" The mood in the United States is developing in the direction of war. Now they talk about it openly, even in the highest circles ... "
01.03.41 G. "Corsican"- The Committee completed the calculation of the economic effect of the anti-Soviet [war] action, with negative conclusions. The order for the development of calculations does not come from the OKW, but from Ribbentrop or even Hitler. All calculations must be completed by May 1.
March 1941Foreman"- German aviation operations on aerial photography of the Soviet territory are in full swing. German aircraft operate from airfields in Bucharest, Königsberg and from Northern Norway - Kirkenes. The shooting is made from a height of 6000 m. In particular, the Germans photographed Kronstadt. Goering is the main driving force in the design and preparation of war against the Soviet Union.
[And Hitler, then for the war or against?]
March 1941Corsican"- The question of a military intervention against the Soviet Union in the spring of this year was resolved with the expectation that the Russians would not be able to set green bread on fire during the retreat and the Germans would take advantage of this harvest ... Speech is scheduled for May 1. Germany’s military intervention against the USSR is already a matter of concern. Urals, according to their calculations, maybe reached within 25 days. [The advancement of German troops in 25 days to the Urals — after such a message has been examined by military specialists of the General Staff — the reports of this source should be checked.].
20.03.41 G. "Corsican"- Work on the calculation of the economic efficiency of the anti-Soviet action continues ... In Belgium, in addition to the occupation troops, there is only one active division, which confirms that military action against the British Isles has been postponed ...
24.03.41 G. "Foreman"- aviation headquarters conducts intensive training against the USSR. Plans are made for the bombing of the most important objects. A plan for the bombing of Leningrad, Vyborg, Kiev. Aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of cities and industrial facilities. The German aviation attache in Moscow finds out the location of the Soviet power stations, personally drives around the areas where the power stations are located. In the general staff of aviation among the officers there is an opinion that the German military action against the USSR is timed to the end of April or the beginning of May ... There is only a 50% chance that this gig will happen, it may all be a bluff..
28.03.41 G. "Foreman"- The German command is preparing a pincer-like strike from the south - from Romania, on the one hand, and through the Baltic states, and possibly through Finland - on the other. This maneuver will be undertaken in order to cut off the Soviet Army, as it was done in its time in France.
02.04.41 G. "Foreman"- The headquarters of the German aviation fully developed and prepared a plan of attack on the Soviet Union. Aviation concentrates its attack on the railway hubs of the central and western parts of the USSR, the power stations of the Donetsk basin, and the aviation industry enterprises of Moscow. Air bases near Krakow are the main starting point for an attack on the USSR. Created two army groups that are scheduled for operations against the USSR. Goering takes a clear course on the war against the USSR, and messages that indicate the riskiness and inexpediency of this adventure are undesirable for him. Goering at the last meeting with Antonescu demanded 20 divisions to participate in the anti-Soviet action. In Romania, German troops are concentrated on the Soviet border. Germans consider weak point Soviet defense ground service of aviation, and therefore hope by intensive bombing of airfields immediately disrupt its actions. The second imperfect defense link consider the communications service of the Red Army Aviation because of its heaviness, excessive radiosity and complexity of keys. The air force is preparing an attack on Yugoslavia, which is to follow shortly. To this end, the aviation headquarters from the Russian question temporarily switched to Yugoslavia, thereby causing the fear that the moment of the action against the USSR might be lost.
02.04.41 G. "Corsican"- ...The question of armed intervention against the USSR resolved. April 10 will be issued a decree on the termination of private deliveries by rail. The anti-Soviet campaign will begin on April 15.
07.04.41 G. "Corsican"- The Germans evacuated Memel. Poznan and the cities of Silesia are declared zones of military danger of the first stage. From the Governor-General ends the evacuation of women and children.
14.04.41 G. "Foreman"- Military training is conducted by Germany deliberately noticeable in order to demonstrate their military power. Hitler is the initiator of the plan of attack on the Soviet Union, believing that a preventive war with the Union is necessary in order not to face a stronger enemy. The outbreak of hostilities must precede ultimatum Soviet Union with the proposal to accede to the Covenant of three. The beginning of the implementation of the plan is tied to the end of the war with Yugoslavia and Greece ... To make England more compliant, it is necessary to reject Ukraine from the Soviet Union. The seizure of Ukraine will force England to make concessions.
If necessary, it is possible to conclude peace with England, even at the cost of sacrificing Nazism, and in case of failure in the war with the USSR, even Hitler himself, in order to “eliminate” the obstacles to the unification of the civilized world against Bolshevism. Japan and Italy are allegedly not devoted to these anti-Soviet plans.
17.04.41 G. "Foreman"- In connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Libya, African victories are at the center of attention. The mood of the circles fighting for the attack on the Soviet Union, somewhat subsided, as they received new hopes to win the war with England. However, GSH with the same intensity conducts preparatory work for operations against the USSR, which are expressed in a detailed definition of the objects of bombardment. In the Army General Staff, some of the generals are the instigators and supporters of the anti-Soviet action. The latter also includes Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch's nephew said that it's time to end the struggle between the peoples of Europe and it is necessary to unite efforts against the Soviet Union. Similar ideas come from Brauchitsch and borrowed from him by his young relative. Main figureth, driving the anti-Soviet plans of the German military and part of the bourgeoisie, is goering. Ribbentrop is opposed to these plans in opposition to him.. The differences between Goering and Ribbentrop went so far as to escalate into personal dislike between them.
[It was misinformation, the dissemination of which is intended to create an opinion among the leadership of the USSR about disagreements among the German leaders on the issue of war with the USSR.]
24.04.41 G. "Foreman"- German intelligence has established that the production of artillery ammunition is mainly concentrated in the Leningrad region. Currently, the aviation headquarters has almost completely ceased the development of Russian facilities and is intensively preparing for an action directed against Turkey, Syria and Iraq, in the first place. The rally against the USSR seems to be pushed to the rearn, the General Staff no longer receives photographs of Soviet territory taken from German aircraft.
30.04.41 G. "Foreman"- The question of Germany’s action against the Soviet Union is finally decidedand the beginning should be expected from day to day.
Ribbentrop, who is still not a supporter of his campaign against the USSR, knowing Hitler’s firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR. Confirms the message "Gregor" that the question of speaking out against the Soviet Union is considered resolved. In the aviation headquarters, increased cooperation between the German and Finnish GS in the development of operational plans against the USSR. The Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian headquarters turned to the Germans with a request for the urgent delivery of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, which they needed in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.
May 1941Corsican"- At the meeting of responsible referents of the Ministry of Economy, press assistant Krol stated in the report:" ...From the USSR will be required to speak out against England on the side of the Axis powers. As a guarantee, Ukraine will be occupied, and possibly the Baltic States. ”
May 1941Foreman"- It is necessary to seriously warn Moscow about all the data indicating that the issue of an attack on the Soviet Union is resolved, the speech is scheduled for the near future, and the Germans want to solve the issue of" fascism or socialism "and, of course, prepare the maximum possible forces and funds. At the headquarters of the German aviation, the preparation of an operation against the USSR is carried out at the highest rate. All data suggests that the performance is scheduled for the near future. In conversations among staff officers, the date is often called 20 May as the start date of the war. Others believe that the speech is scheduled for June. In the beginning, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding wider exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda. As a guarantee of these requirements, German commissioners should be sent to industrial areas and economic centers and enterprises of Ukraine, and some Ukrainian regions should be occupied by the German army. The ultimatum will be preceded by a “war of nerves” in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.. Recently, the preparation of war with the USSR, the Germans are trying to keep completely secret ... Despite the note of the Soviet government, German aircraft continue to fly to the Soviet side for the purpose of aerial photography. Now photography is taking place from a height of 11 thousand m ... Antonescu sent a memorandum to Hitler and Goering, in which he proves the necessity of the German attack on the USSR in the spring of this year.
11.05.41 G. "Foreman"- Fleet number 1 of German aviation is designed to act against the USSR as the main unit. It is still on paper, with the exception of night fighter connections, anti-aircraft artillery and detachments training specifically in “shaving flights”. However, this does not mean that he is not ready to speak, since everything is clear according to the plan - the organization is prepared, planes can be deployed as soon as possible. Until now, the center of the 1st Air fleet was Berlin ...
14.05.41 G. "Foreman"- Plans for the Soviet Union are delayed., German authorities are taking measures to keep their subsequent development in complete secrecy. German military attaches abroad, as well as ambassadors, were instructed to refute rumors of a military confrontation between Germany and the USSR. Reports coming from Sweden and Finland constantly state that Swedish industry circles interested in Soviet orders all the time influence the Swedish and Finnish policies in favor of maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. An aviation order dated May 7 was published at the aviation headquarters. The order states that the strategic plans and preliminary intelligence activities have become known to the enemy.
May 1941Corsican"- In the Ministry of Economy, the OKW order is associated with the anti-Soviet plans of Germany, which became known to the Russians.
May 1941Foreman"- Slowing down the fulfillment of the anti-Soviet plans of Germany at the aviation headquarters is explained by difficulties and losses in the war with the British on the African front and the sea. The circles of authoritative officers believe that simultaneous operations against the British and against the USSR are hardly possible. Along with this, preparatory work against the USSR in the aviation headquarters continues.
From the diary of Gebelss: "31 May." Operation Barbarossa is developing. We are starting a great disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things. I have to send the entire ministry along the wrong path, risking my prestige in case of failure ... 14 divisions heading west.Slowly expand the topic of the invasion [meaning to England]. I ordered to write a song about the invasion, a new motive, strengthen the use of English radio programs, instructing the mouths of propaganda in England, etc. two weeks...
7 June. “We force the invasion theme. Not yet seen a real success. Everyone is silent ... "
09.06.41 G. "Foreman"- Next week the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of war will be finally resolved. Germany will present the USSR with a request to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and to use the Soviet navy against England. All preparatory military activities, mapping the location of Soviet airfields, focusing on the Balkan airfields of German aviation should be completed by mid-June. All the chiefs of the airfields in the Governor-General and East Prussia were assigned to prepare for the take-off of the aircraft. Hastily equipped with a large airfield in Insterburg. Formed the future administrative management of the occupied territory of the USSR, headed by Rosenberg.
11.06.41 G. "Foreman"- In leading circles of the German Ministry of Aviation and at the aviation headquarters, they claim that the issue of an attack on the Soviet Union finally resolved. The main headquarters of Goering is transferred from Berlin, presumably to Romania. 18 Jun Goering should go to a new headquarters.
June 1941Corsican"- The appointment of the heads of the military-economic departments of the future districts of the occupied territory of the USSR was made: for the Caucasus, Ammon, one of the leaders of the NSDAP in Dusseldorf; for Kiev - Burandt, a former employee of the Ministry of Economy; for Moscow - Burger, head of the Chamber of Commerce in Stuttgart. All these persons left for Dresden, which is a rallying point. For the overall management of the economic management of the "occupied territories of the USSR", Schlotterer, the head of the foreign department of the Ministry of Economy, was appointed. The territory to be occupied should be divided into three parts, of which the governor Kaufman should fill one. The Ministry of Economy says that at a meeting of business executives appointed for the “occupied territory of the USSR,” Rosenberg also spoke, who said that “the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from a geographical map.”
Of Gebelss's diary: “A big sensation. British radio stations claim that our action against Russia is just a bluff, for which we are trying to hide our preparations for the invasion of England. That was the purpose of the maneuver ... The Russians, it seems, still do not anticipate anything. In any case, they are deployed in such a way that they completely meet our desires: densely mass forces are easy prey for captivity ... I give Winkelkemper a secret order to transmit English opinion on the invasion [to England] on radio in foreign languages and unexpectedly in the middle to interrupt transfer. It’s as if censorship scissors interfered in the transfer. "On Friday, June 13, Goebbels’s article on the invasion appears in Felkischer Beobachter." Everything is on schedule: at night the newspaper’s number is confiscated.
Of Gebelss's diary 15 June 1941 of the Year: ... The refutation of TASS, according to the Fuhrer, is only the result of fear. Stalin trembles before the upcoming events. His fake game will be over. We use the raw materials of this rich country. Hope of the British to destroy us through the blockade thereby completely failed to materialize, and after that only the real underwater war will begin. Italy and Japan will now receive reports that in the beginning of July we intend to present Russia with certain ultimatum demands. This will be talked about everywhere. Then again at our disposal will be a few days. The duce has not yet been fully informed about the entire breadth of the intended operation. Antonescu knows a little more. Romania and Finland stand together with us ... I must now prepare everything very carefully. It is necessary, in spite of everything, to continue spreading rumors: peace with Moscow, Stalin is going to Berlin, the invasion of England is coming soon, in order to veil the whole situation, what it really is. "
16.06.41 G. "Foreman"- All the military measures of Germany in preparation for an armed uprising against the USSR are completely over, and a strike can be expected at any time. Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on the Hungarian airfields.
Clear enough Stalin's sharp resolution on the message "Senior", after numerous conflicting reports: "T-shu Merkulov. You can send your" source "from the headquarters of German aviation ... This is not a" source ", but a" disinformer "I.St"
P. Fitin [former intelligence chief of the NKGB] talked about a call to Stalin 16.06.41 about this report: "... In the office, Stalin was alone. When we entered [with Merkulov], he immediately turned to me: “Chief of intelligence, there is no need to retell a special message, I read it carefully. Report that the sources report this, where they work, their reliability and what opportunities they have for obtaining such secret information. I spoke in detail about the sources of information. Stalin walked around the office and asked various clarifying questions ... Stalin walked for a long time. Then he said: "Go, clarify everything, double-check this information and report back to me." This episode also shows that Stalin was trying to understand the events mentioned in the intelligence reports. In addition, the description of events does not mention the spacing of Merkulov or Fitin. Probably, Stalin expressed his attitude only in the resolution.
From the diary of Gebelss: “17 June. Disguise against Russia has reached a climax. We filled the world with a flood of rumors, so it’s very difficult to figure it out ... Our newest trick: we schedule a peace conference with the participation of Russia. "
«Military Intelligence Reporting List (January-June 1941 g. "
Different messages have the same date. Probably, the date of receipt of messages to the Center. More details in the article (http://istmat.info/node/11581).
«AG»February 1941 of the year - the USSR will be fully prepared for the war in 1942, and Germany may be exhausted by this time.
«Khlopov»
08.01.41 - Assistant American BAT in Germany, in a conversation with our assistant BAT, said: “We now have information from very reliable sources that Germany is preparing to start a war against the USSR. The exact date is not specified, but it is emphasized that the information is reliable. ”
13.03.41 - Saying BAT Sweden. The danger of a German attack on the USSR is growing: The transfer of German troops to the border of the USSR continues. In Germany, propaganda against the USSR is intensifying. The contradictions between Germany and the USSR on the Balkan issue are intensifying.
«Sawa"(Colonel Yakovlev)
26.02.41 - German troops in Romania are designed to act against the USSR ... The flow of "tourists" to Finland and military transports to Slovakia and Galicia has increased. Basically transferred mechanized parts.
22.03.41 - According to the workers of the Ministry of Commerce, on March 20 the Germans issued a secret order to suspend the execution of orders for the USSR by the Protectorate industry. The attache of the Yugoslav Trade Agency showed the stamps of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. prepared by the Germans. In Krakow, General Wojciechowski forms a Slavic anti-Bolshevik regiment.
24.03.41 - According to unverified information Deadline against the USSR - April 15. The termination of our orders in Protectorate is confirmed.
«Arnold"- 27.03.41 - Romanians conveyed to Yugoslav that Germany would oppose the USSR, if not in May, then in August 1941.
«Maro»
04.03.41 - This year Germany will oppose the USSR.
27.03.41 - The grouping of troops in the Balkans created by the Germans is directed mainly against Ukraine, which should become the food and oil base of Germany in case of a protracted war with England.
21.06.41 - According to reliable data Germany's attack on the USSR is scheduled for 22 June 1941 of the year.
Allegedly, Stalin’s resolution preserved on the report form: “This information is an English provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation, and punish him. ” The resolution is unsigned and executed in red ink. I.Stalin, put the resolution with colored pencils. This is probably Beria’s resolution.
«Mars"(Colonel N. Lyakhterov)
01.03.41 - Speech by the Germans against the USSR at the moment is considered all unthinkable before the defeat of England. The military attaches of America, Turkey and Yugoslavia emphasize that the German army in Romania is intended primarily against the British invasion of the Balkans and as a countermeasure if Turkey and the USSR perform. After the defeat of England, the Germans will oppose the USSR.
04.03.41 - A major Hungarian official heard from German officers that this year Germany will oppose the USSR.
13.03.41 - BAT in Budapest was invited to the Hungarian Defense Ministry, where he was informed that false rumors were spreading among the diplomatic corps about preparations by Germany, Hungary and Romania to attack the USSR, to mobilize in Hungary and send large numbers of troops to the Soviet Hungarian border. The Hungarian representative said that these rumors were being spread by British intelligence, and suggested that the Soviet BAT be personally convinced of the inconsistency of these data and make a trip to the region of the Carpathian Ukraine. BAT sent a report to Moscow in which it outlined the content of the talks ... It notified the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan that he had agreed with the military ministry about going to Carpathian Ukraine from 17 to March 20. On a journey, BAT went along with his assistant. [Since there are no other clarifications in the "List ...", then the information was not confirmed.]
«Dixen"- 02.03.41 - The envoy in Belgrade at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Nazi party and the army agreed on the expediency to launch an offensive against the USSR soon. The envoy assesses German propaganda fabricated for the Balkan governments.
"Sofokl" (Col. A. Samokhin) - 09.03.41 - It is known from the Minister of the Court in Belgrade that the German General Staff refused to attack the British Isles. The immediate task set - the seizure of Ukraine and Baku. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing for this.
«Bart"- 24.03.41 - They openly talk about war with the USSR. Called go to our border. One of these days people are called up to the age of 50. New parts arrive from the West in Königsberg.
«Tomáš»
24.03.41 - Over the past week and a half masters do not give a passage, pursuing brazenly. An order was received to delay the shipment of equipment on orders of the USSR. Before 15 April, the question of the German campaign to the East should be finally decided.
26.03.41 - Termination of all cargoes to Przemysl, with the exception of equipment, food and fodder. They confirmed from another source the preparation of the German campaign to the East.
«Jury"- 25.03.41 - The German offensive against England may fail ... There is a second plan for an attack on the Middle East." With the USSR, Germany will not be considered, since The KA has demonstrated its weakness in Poland and Finland.
«Doge"- 17.01.41 - In military and diplomatic circles, they say that after the defeat of England or the conclusion of peace with her, the USSR will be the closest enemy of Germany. The attack - March 1941 of the year.
The first half of March 1941 of the year - Hitler justifies the plan to seize Ukraine with the following motives: the creation of the 50-million Ukrainian state would solve the problem of providing power to Europe. This plan is supported by supporters of Hitler ... The military does not approve of such a plan.because This will lead to a bloody war, which is not known what will end. Some certainty of the existence of such a plan is confirmed by the support of the Ukrainians in the General Government.
«Yeshchenko"(Colonel G. Eremin)
12.03.41 - It was planned to transfer the Germans to Bulgaria 27-28 in February 1941, but there was an order from Berlin to part of the troops that were scheduled for transfer to Bulgaria, to be sent to Moldova. In Moldova and Bukovina, a large accumulation of Germans. In German circles they say: "We will defend Romania and Bulgaria from England and the USSR."
15.03.41 - Lawyer Sakar said that the Germans allegedly completely change their plan and are going to attack against the USSR. We, the Germans say, will take bread, coal, and oil from the USSR. The headquarters of the Romanian army, together with the Germans, is developing a plan of war against the USSR. Offensive through 2-3 of the month.
24.03.41 - ABC data [scout call]: when Antonescu met with Goering, they discussed the role of Romania in the upcoming war with the USSR. In Berlin, widespread rumors about the inevitability of war. Here it is argued that the SC is weak, that the invasion of Moscow and the Urals will not be difficult for the Germans. If there is a war, England will not help the USSR. At present, an enormous amount of weapons is being transferred from France to the border with the USSR.
24.03.41 - During the meeting of Antonescu with Goring in Vienna, the question of the role of Romania in the forthcoming war of Germany against the USSR was discussed. Goering gave Antonescu a series of instructions for coordinating the plan for the mobilization of the Romanian armies with the plans for the mobilization of the German army, bearing in mind the general plan of the war with the USSR. It is believed that the war should start in May 1941.
24-25 March Antonescu had a meeting at which the latter offered his services to fight against the USSR. German officer Herbert said: “The Reds are dogs. Soon we will have a settlement with them. We will take Ukraine away from them. ”
25.03.41 - "Hoffman said that he had a conversation with Antonescu a few days ago, who said that back in January of this year he was initiated into a war plan for Germany against the USSR."
25.03.41 - USSR is the backstage enemy of Germany. The USSR is trying with all its might to prolong the war, and there is a danger that the advance of the German armies to the south-east will be subjected to a flank attack by the spacecraft. The food crisis makes Ukraine take away. The main reason for the war is a possible transition of the USSR to the side of England.
26.03.41 - The Romanian General Staff has accurate information that 80 divisions are being prepared in the territory of East Prussia and Poland for an offensive against Ukraine. Romanians intend to participate in the war against the USSR together with the Germans in order to get Bessarabia.
26.03.41 - There are rumors of an upcoming conflict between Germany and the USSR. Antonescu when visiting Berlin 1.01.41 was dedicated to the plan of the war of Germany against the USSR. And there was a detailed conversation about this when Antonescu met with Goering in Vienna.
26.03.41 - Germany is expected to speak in Ukraine through 2-3 of the month, at the same time the Baltic countries will perform, where the Germans are expecting an uprising against the USSR.
End of 1 part
Information