The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Pribovo (part of 5)

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Preface. In the following sections, events in PribOVO on the eve of 22.06.41 will be reviewed. You will be presented with the author’s version, which cannot be fully documented.

In previous installments, events were reviewed that showed that Soviet intelligence reports included a large amount of misinformation. Intelligence could not reveal the directions of the main strikes of the German troops, their real number in the directions and the timely departure of the German troops to the initial lines for an attack on the USSR. It is unlikely that any other intelligence in the world would be able to correctly assess the events taking place on the eve of the war. The reference to the prediction of this war by the intelligence of England is incorrect because Hess leaked the correct information to them before the beginning of the war, having received it from Berlin.



Disinformation was massively "palmed off" by the top officials of Germany and its dissemination was carefully controlled by the special services, diplomatic workers and hired specialists. The redeployment of troops was masked at the first stage by overstating the actual number of divisions located at the Soviet-German border. In the future, there was a build-up of infantry formations to the designated level. At the final stage, the German command managed to hide the true number of formations (especially tank and motorized) and carry out the exit of the main forces to their initial positions for the attack in just one day. You can call it a "lightning-fast" movement of strike groups. The measures were carried out quickly and harmoniously, like all subsequent methods of waging maneuver warfare, which were used by the German troops. The Soviet military at that time was not ready to act as quickly and harmoniously, even with uninterrupted communications.

The management of NGOs and specialists of the General Staff of the Spacecraft incorrectly estimated the number of German divisions necessary for a full-scale war between Germany and the USSR. They incorrectly assessed the capabilities of the German troops in the conduct of a maneuverable war in breaking through fortified defense zones, their interaction, the massive use of illegal agents and reconnaissance and sabotage groups. They could not imagine that it was possible to continue the offensive by mechanized units, leaving in the rear huge masses of enemy troops. This is not the fault of these comrades. Repressions affecting even the members of the families of the enemies of the people, eradicated the initiative of the leadership and any criticism of the adopted policy. Therefore, in order not to justify the guidance of the spacecraft - there was no one to point out incorrect positions.

It was previously shown that since the leadership of the spacecraft did not believe in a full-scale war with Germany on 22.06.41 (it expected only provocation by the German troops), there could not have been a GS Directive of 18.06.41/25.04.41/95. The RU provided information to the country's leadership and NPOs on the number of German divisions on the western border somewhat overestimated. It was believed that as of 100 there were up to 47-15.05.41 divisions on the border (in fact there were 114). As of May 119, 71 - 15.06.41-120 divisions (there were 122), as of June 84, 16 - 2-24 (25.06). The redeployment of SK KOVO (from the Okrug’s reserves) was associated with an increase in the number of German divisions, the expectation of the arrival of new formations to the border, and the replacement of the reserve formations of the HE reserve by divisions of the 1.07.41th Army. There was an increase in the grouping of the XNUMXnd echelon of cover armies. The departure of the transported aircrafts to deployment points was expected from XNUMX-XNUMX to XNUMX. The air defense units and formations were not in combat readiness. Aviation, mk and sd of the 1st echelon did not rise (except Pribovo). Units of the 1st echelon needed to reach positions at the state border from 3 hours to 19 hours (in OdVO - even up to 70 hours).

The leadership of the NKO and the General Staff was not prepared for the transfer of Directive No. 1 on the night from 21 to 22 on June 20 to Western HE and did not assume responsibility for communicating and clarifying the provisions of this extensive Directive to the Military Councils of HE using other lines of communication by removing the responsibility for subsequent events. The VO leadership, “intimidated” by these leaders, found itself in a very difficult situation. When hostilities began, an order to open fire on the enemy had to be taken by the commanders of divisions (regiments, battalions) or opened late after receiving the relevant instructions from HE.

In this and subsequent articles, the following abbreviations will be used: ABTU - Armored Directorate, AK - Army Corps, Ap - Artillery Regiment, Bap - Bomber Aviation Regiment, VNOS - Air Surveillance, Alert and Communications, IN - Military District, General Staff - General Staff, CCD - combat magazine, ass - anti-aircraft artillery division, fighter air regiment, SC - Red Army, CP - cavalry regiment, MK - mechanized corps, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), NKO - people's defense commissariat , NS - on chief of staff, front (pp) - infantry division (regiment), rap - reconnaissance air regiment, RO - reconnaissance department of the district, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the KA, garden - mixed air division, sk (cd or c) - infantry unit (division or regiment ), NWF - North-Western Front, UR - fortified area, etc. (TP or TB) - tank division (regiment or battalion), ChVS - member of the Military Council, cap - assault air regiment, SHO - encryption department (department), SH cipher telegram


11.07.40 created the Baltic IN (with 17.08.40 - PribOVO) and appointed the first commanders: the commander of the troops - Colonel-General A.D. Loktionov, NS - Lt. Gen. P.S. Klenov, ChVS - corps commissioner I.Z. Susaykov.

In December, 1940, it was recognized that the management of PribOVO is not able to cope with its duties. HELL. Loktionov was removed from his post and directed at the disposal of NGOs, and I.Z. Susaykova is transferred to the post of deputy chief of the main ABTU (for political purposes). P.S. Maples remains the only warlord from the initial composition of the VO. At a meeting of the top management of the Red Army, passing 23-31 December 1940, AD Loktionov and I.Z. Susakov still listed in the list of those present, as the commander of the troops and ChVS PribOVO.

Peter Semenovich Klenov. In 1915 - graduated from the Vladimir Military School. Headquarters captain. In the Red Army with 1918 g, with 1919, served as division commander. In 1923, he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses. In 1930, he graduated from KUVNAS at the Frunze Military Academy. With 01.1934 - the head of tactics (with 04.1934 - the head of the general tactics department) of the Frunze Military Academy, with 06.1935 - the head of the faculty’s chief. Since 01.1936 - Deputy NS of the Volga Region of the VO, and from 03.1938 - NSH of the Military District. Then he worked as the head of the tactics department of the Frunze Military Academy. In 1939, he graduated from the Academy of General Staff of the Red Army. In 1941, he was awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner.

In December 1940 of the year, in PribOVO, a new commander of the troops, F.I. Kuznetsov (at the meeting is noted as the commander of the North Caucasus IN) and the new FWM PA Dibrova.

Fedor Isidorovich Kuznetsov - participant of 1 World War II, ensign. In the Red Army with 1918 year. In 1926 he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy, in 1930 year - KUVNAS. With 05.1935 - the head (with 03.1936 - the senior head) of the general tactics department of the Frunze Military Academy, and with 07.1937 - the head of the faculty of the academy. With 07.1938 - Deputy Commander of the Belarusian VO. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. With 07.1940 - Head of the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. From 08.1940, Commander of the North Caucasian Military District. 22.02.41 awarded the rank of colonel-general.

In December, P.N. Maples and F.I. Kuznetsov, who together graduated from KUVNAS in 1940, and worked together for some time at the department of general tactics. At the same time, Peter Semenovich held a higher position. In contrast to the People's Commissar of Defense and the chief of the General Staff KA, F.I. Kuznetsov and P.S. Klenov had an academic military education, experience in teaching tactics, which could allow them to use theoretical knowledge in planning a larger amount of work.

The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Pribovo (part of 5)


P.A. Dibrova. In connection with the unsuccessful hostilities of the NWF, the leadership of the front was withdrawn in June 1941. From August to November 1941, Dibrova - Commissioner 30-st. From 18.12.41 to 16.06.42 - FWS of the 59 Army. From 17.06.42 to 5.12.42 - FWS of the 2 st shock army. In August 1943 of the year - deputy commander for the political affairs of the 15-th reserve rifle brigade. From December 1943 - Major General of the Quartermaster Service. In April, 1944 was appointed commander of 145 SD. Sharp drops in career growth indicate that this is an uncomplicated, short-sighted person who blindly observes the instructions of the party and leadership.

In December, 1940, at the meeting of the senior management of the Red Army GK. Zhukov made a presentation on the “Character of the modern offensive operation” (some of the provisions of this report are discussed in part 3). PS reported on this report. Klenov, who said that he also developed the theme of a modern offensive operation. He was worried, repeated ... Former headquarters captain interrogated by investigators of the NKVD about the testimony against him by the former commanders of the Red Army. For PS Maple stretched train "wrong" friends and commanders. He survived the removal of the leadership of the VO. Such a person could not say anything superfluous and did not correspond to the accepted position of the leadership of the Red Army ...

The author took the responsibility to edit the speech of PS Klenova: "... a rooted look that motorized and machinery ... you can enter [breakthrough] immediately after the first echelons overcame the tactical defense ... The experience of the war in the West and in Poland showed that the mechanized forces went on their own to break through the fortified bands ...

Comrade Zhukov took the example of the operation regardless of the period of the war ... I would like to dwell on a very important issue ... on special offensive operations ... The initial period of the war will be the most responsible from the point of view of the enemy’s influence on not allowing it to be carried out systematically
[strategic deployment] ... This is the impact of large aeronautical and mechanized forces ... on its mobilization, concentration and deployment in order to derail them, bring the concentration deep into the territory, delay time. Need to [preempt] the enemy is ready to carry out aviation operations and mechanized forces ... Organization and conduct of such operations will ensure air supremacy ... "

The speaker once mentions the influence of the enemy at the initial period of the war on the planned conduct of strategic deployment. [Red Army], and further speaks only of special offensive operations against the enemy. It is impossible to exclude the possibility that PS Maples in 1941, the year continued to study the issue of "On Special Offensive Operations." Perhaps, together with F.I. Kuznetsov. Currently, it is not known about this work, the drafts of which could have been seized upon arrest. In PribOVO, two like-minded people appeared, which were later joined by some other VO commanders. Unfortunately, Dibrova was not among them, because of which many events had to be held semi-legally. The ChVS Dibrova sent messages to higher authorities for inappropriate (from his point of view) actions taken by NS Pribovo.

According to the author, the initiator of the well-known measures for the preparation of district troops for the German attack was PS. Maples. Why it could not be F.I. Kuznetsov? 14.08.41 F.I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 51-th separate army. According to Internet sources, he is considered to be the main culprit in the inadequate preparation of the defense of the Crimean isthmuses, with the result that the troops of the Wehrmacht 11 Army were able to break into the territory of the peninsula.

In Crimea, the situation was somewhat similar to the situation in Priborovo before the war. The northern direction covered 276 sd (Chongar and Arbat arrow), 156 sd (Perekop) and 106 sd (70 km of the Sivash coast). 40, 42 and 48 cd, as well as 271 sd had the task of antiamphibious defense of the coast of Crimea. Four more divisions were in the formation stage (172, 184, 320 and 321 sd). Most of the compounds were scattered across the peninsula. Again, the dislocation of troops to the army command was imposed by the higher command — the Supreme Command Headquarters.

12.09.41 advanced German units came to the isthmuses, and from September 16 began fighting for the Crimea. 20.10.41 were broken Ishun positions. In the steppe part of the Crimea there were no prepared lines for defense. Unlike PribOVO in the Crimea, F.I. Kuznetsov did not take the initiative in preparing army troops for the defense of the isthmuses: to redeploy formations or their parts, to prepare reserves for 276 and 156 sd, to redistribute weapons inside the army, to create reserve and rear lines of defense, to strengthen the air defense of these divisions due to other connections (he already had experience of war in the Baltic States, when German planes dominated the air with a small number of Soviet aircraft and air defense systems).

In accordance with the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in PribOVO, new “Cover Plans ...” are being developed, which will not be approved by the beginning of the war. The new “Cover Plans ...” are purely defensive in the initial period of the war and provide for the retreat of Soviet troops to a greater depth, the evacuation of industrial enterprises, the destruction of infrastructure in the area left, the widespread use of engineering barriers using mines and explosives.

In the unapproved "Cover Plans ...", an estimate of the number of German divisions against the HE troops: “The railway network with a total capacity of up to 300 pairs of trains per day, of which up to 200 can be used for operational traffic, provides, on the 12 day of mobilization, concentration to 40 of reinforced traffic, and the developed network of dirt roads and the presence of a highway allow for the transfer of motorized and mechanized troops, the number of which against Pribovo can be determined up to 6 td and 2-3 md ... " Total 48-49 German divisions (of which up to 8-9 td and md).

According to the RU against the troops, PribOVO had: as of 15.05.41 through 1.06.41 24, German divisions (of which 5 etc. and md), and by 22 June - 29 divisions (of which 5 etc. and md).

By 22 June, the number of German divisions “discovered” by the GS GS of KA increased by 15% in comparison with the number of 21 in May, but the number of md and md did not change. Up to the estimated number of 48-49 divisions needed for the war, there were still twenty more units.

It should be noted that the RU GSH KA, among others, received information for drawing up intelligence reports from the border guards of the NKVD. The information included airborne reconnaissance of the border strip from reconnaissance aircraft of the 10-th separate air squadron of the Belarusian border district. P-10 reconnaissance aircraft daily circled over the entire western border within KOVO, ZOVOVO and PribOVO. The German command was aware of these daily flights of Soviet aircraft and took appropriate measures. That is why a significant part of the German moto-mechanized troops was not detected until 22 June 1941 of the year.

Intelligence No.1 / 660724 RU GSH KA on 20-00 22.6.1941 "... The total number of enemy groups is determined by:
a) on the North-Western Front - 29 divisions, of which 4-5 td and 5 md ... "
Head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Golikov


We see that in the first day’s report 29 divisions are indicated - the same number as in the pre-war report. However, the number of md and md increased from 5 to 9-10. Thus, the Soviet intelligence was unable to "reveal" the strengthening of the German mechanized forces before the war.

1953 year. Former Deputy Head of the Regional Office Pribovo, Lieutenant-General K.N. Derevianko: “The grouping of the fascist German troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suvalk region, especially in the border areas, in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters in sufficient detail and in large parts. To verify this, it is enough to familiarize yourself with the latest pre-war final reconnaissance of the RO from 19 or 20.6.41 of the year (I do not remember the exact date)

In the period from 20 to 29.6.41, I, as one of the deputy heads of the RO, had to perform the tasks of the NS district (front) ... It must be added that the former NSH General Klenov demanded only personal reports from the RO chief ... I had the conviction that the command of the district underestimated the approaching threats and to many of the data treated with some distrust ... "


Let's see what RO PribOVO contributed to the last pre-war report.

SURVEY No.02 20-00 21.6.41 STAFF PribOVO

"...Siauliai direction

a) The data of our intelligence confirmed and established the following deployment:

In Klaipeda: headquarters 291-rd, 504-th, 505-th and 506-th pp, 291-th ap, 291-th TB, 291-th sapper battalion, 291-th communications battalion, 7-th coast defense regiment as part of the artillery battalion and two infantry battalions, heavy an, tb 20 th TD; detachment of attack aircraft in the composition of the three companies.

At Prikkula: a spare battalion of the 348-n pp 217-rd.

In Silute: 161-md at full strength, TB 20-th TD.

In Tilsit: 7 headquarters AK, 1 headquarters, 216, 43, 45 th pp, 213 th battalion, 21 th light ap, 22 th heavy ap, 101 th TB. Headquarters 8-th MD, 202, 204, 227-th MP, 505-th motorized heavy an. The headquarters of the 290-th PD, 501-th, 502-th and 503-th pp, 290-th up. Headquarters 20 th TD ... Headquarters 1 th Cavalry Brigade, 1 th and 2 th CP, 1 th Artillery Division. Aviation group to 63 aircraft.

In Neukirch: headquarters 217 th DD, 348 th p…

In Koenigsberg: 1 Army Headquarters, 8 AK Headquarters, 4 Headquarters and 43 Headquarters, 3 Headquarters AK ... 21, 207, 201 and 210, 25 th MP, 4 th and 19 th, TP, headquarters 1-th air district; on aerodromes königsberg to 300 aircraft of unidentified types.

In Pillau: 215-th regiment of naval anti-aircraft artillery, heavy an, air unit to 100 seaplanes and to 50 U-87.

In Tapilau: 205 headquarters…

In Nattishkken and Koadiuten: tb 20-th TD and the artillery division of the 511-th heavy an;

b) according to the 105 border guard detachment in Klaipeda, the headquarters of the 61 subdivision is marked in the forest ... - to the infantry battalion and cavalry squadron, in the forest ... - to the battalion of tanks with artillery, in the forest ... - to two battalions of tanks ... (data require verification).

Note. The data of our intelligence headquarters 61 th PD in Klaipeda was not observed.

Kaunas-Vilnius direction

a) Continuation of the German units directly to the state border. In the area of ​​the Sudavske flooded up to the infantry battalion with 6 cannons advanced from Vizhayna;

b) in the area of ​​Bryzgol, Lyas-Podsersky - parts of the 5-th front.

Note. Previously, according to our data, 5-I PD was observed in the Silute area, we did not notice the departure from the Silute area;

c) the data of our intelligence confirmed and installed on the direction of Kaunas, Vilnius, the next location.

In Insterburg: 12 headquarters AK, 16 headquarters, 22 headquarters… 27, 29, 69, 10, 43, infantry reserve battalions, 61, 206 an, 4-th anti-tank guns, 206-th CP, 25-th TB, 337-th convoy battalion. 16-I aviation group - up to 170 aircraft.

In Gumbinen: headquarters 120 th p…, 222, 203, 204 th pp, 317 th artillery air defense division, 494 th infantry battalion.

In Stallupenen: The headquarters of the 405-th pp (1-th, 2-th and 3-th battalion of the 405-th pp are located near the border in the Eidtkunen region).

Conclusions

1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border.
2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions.... »
NS PribOVO Lt. Gen. Maples
Deputy Chief of the Regional Office of the PribOVO Headquarters, Colonel Kashnikov


In accordance with the summary of the RO on 20-00 21, June, the VO command might have assumed that there was a border near before 18 German divisions (from them to 4 td and md) and before the 583 aircraft (the aircraft were not located on airfields near the border). This indicates that the group remains in the former areas. Separate tank battalions are stationed at the border - perhaps these were reconnaissance battalions reinforced by tanks. Large groups of tanks (regiments or divisions, not to mention the MK) were not found near the border. In reality same against troops PribOVO to 22.06.41 were deployed 40 divisions Army groups “Sever” and “Tsentr” (24 pd, 6 td, 6 md, 4 security divisions) and about 820 aircraft (excluding the 8th air corps 2 air fleet).

As can be seen, it is difficult to conclude from the presented intelligence about the start of the war in 8-9 hours - in the morning of June 22 ... How else should the leadership of VO refer to the information provided by the RO if the atmosphere of the approaching war is clearly felt on the border, and the German forces ( especially mechanized) intelligence found very little. The article “Repetition of the past” mentions the secrecy in advancing the German troops to the initial positions of June 22. (https://topwar.ru/123513-povtorenie-proydennogo.html).

Without accurate information on the number of German divisions, the command of PribOVO could not properly respond to the situation at the border. Example. Below is the PC from the 11 Army Headquarters to the headquarters of the All-Ukrainian Union, addressed to the NSH, sent to 23-46 20 in June and decoded in 9-00 in 21 in June.



The resolution “This is a lie” on encryption is left by Commander F.I. Kuznetsov (in the bottom of the picture from another source of information are the signatures of all the leaders of PribOVO). Why exactly such a resolution? The commander did not fit in the head that the infantry was stationed in 1,5 hours of walking from the border, artillery already in positions, but there are no large tank units! Of course, at that time they were not. When the defector crossed the border, the tank and motorized units were located in 20-25 km behind the infantry and infantrymen could not be aware of their presence. And the second underscore: "50% soldiers are opposed to war." The commander also knew that it was a lie or misinformation. Even at a meeting of senior officers in December 1940, G. Zhukov said that artillery should be put into position a day before the start of the operation. Perhaps that is why NS sent the encryption for consideration by the district commander ...

From May 1941, special events of the NKVD organs against generals of the Air Force KA begin to take place In mid-May, Tymoshenko imposed on the certificate submitted by the NKVD a resolution authorizing “the further development of A.P. Ionov "(a few days after his appointment to the post of Commander of the Air Force PribOVO). Since May 1941, arrests of Air Force generals begin. Repressions also affected relatives of commanders who were arrested. Under these conditions, the place of personal initiative (without specifying from above) of the commanders of the flight formations was reduced to a minimum.

At the beginning of June 1941, inspections of parts of PribOVO are conducted. One of the latest known verification acts is dated 12 number: "On the basis of the order of the Commander of the military unit 9443 [12 th mk] by me, Lieutenant Colonel Lebedenko during 11 and 12 in June 1941. checked X / H 9850 [23 st separate ass]... »

An order was prepared at VO headquarters, which included a vision of the VO command (in the 1 line of Kuznetsov and Klenov) on measures to prepare the troops for military operations.

ORDER TO TROOPS PribOVA No. 0052 s / s 15 June 1941

“The check of the combat readiness of the district showed ... The results of the inspection of the parts revealed major flaws ... The commanders of units and subunits of their areas of action did not study ... There is criminal negligence and levity of senior commanders ... Interaction of combat arms and control is ugly low ... The command personnel cannot navigate the terrain. .. Does not know how to manage ... Does not know how to organize monitoring of the battlefield ... Especially poorly organized and reconnaissance. Defense in the presence of parts of the DOTS and DZOTov in areas is poorly developed. Units do not know how to cover the bunkers and bunkers from being captured by the enemy. Field guards and secrets at night in the area of ​​location of anti-tank obstacles and wire not sent. The link with the DZOT garrisons is not established and no one directs their actions ...

I ORDER

1. Army commander personally with the commanders of the divisions to conduct a lesson in the area to implement my directive. By June 22, each division commander must work out a decision on the ground, which he will approve to the army commander and communicate for each division.

2. Corps Commanders to carry out an exercise on the ground with each regiment commander on the implementation of the decision taken by the division commander, to 24.6.41

3. Division commanders to carry out an exercise on the ground with each battalion commander, division to 28.6.41

4. Do not use 3-4 people in groups, not showing civilians and military servicemen the objectives of the exercises. The task of the exercise is, according to the worked out decision of the senior commander, to occupy the area for stubborn defense. Home - to destroy the enemy infantry, to cover its troops from the enemy aircraft, tanks and artillery fire.

5. The installation of anti-tank mines and wire fences in front of the front edge of the reinforced strip is prepared in such a way that within three hours the minefield was established for which: in each regiment, to conduct demonstration classes with commanders and Red Army personnel of engineer platoons and to envisage engaging, as necessary, engineer battalions operating in the fortified areas zone according to the plan approved by the army commander.

6. Wire fence start installing immediately, first of all, in front of the front edge of the division line, and at the end, develop the installation of wire obstacles in the depth of the division band The army commander personally decide on the cover of the joint.

7. Prepare staging of the obstructions according to the plan of the army commander, for which purpose plan the trees, the direction of their laying, prepare the wire for tying up obstructions, prepare anti-tank and anti-personnel mines for laying them ahead of the debris, between the debris and their trenches.

8. The division commander develop a plan for the defense of his line, for which:
a) prepare two firing positions for each gun, mortar and machine gun - the main and spare, first the main;

b) plan the trenches for infantry;

c) identify communication lines and establish the exact location of command posts to the battalion - division inclusive - the main and reserve ones;

d) pay special attention to the organization of artillery fire. The main law - in any direction where it is necessary to expect the appearance of enemy tanks, must be given a mass fire of guns. To do this, prepare a maneuver wheels and maneuver fire;

e) moving the firing positions of corps, divisional, regimental and battalion artillery, moving the firing position of each gun, each machine gun, each mortar to a new position quickly along the previously explored and prepared route both day and night;

e) each gun, each mortar and machine gun to prepare for firing day and night;

g) approve firing positions for each battery of artillery and mortars division commander with the intention of massaging the fire, where it will be needed according to the situation. Commanders of battalions, divisions and companies should each know their position.

The firing positions of machine guns and mortars to target battalion commanders. Regiment commanders approve them and prepare the necessary funds for the device of these positions. The commanders of battalions, battalions, companies, batteries must know exactly their positions and the ways of secretive approach to them. The study carried out secretly under the guidance of regimental commanders ...

10. Carefully develop an air defense plan.
First, it is necessary to shelter your troops in any situation from the impact of enemy aviation. On the march, with each part in place, always be ready for rapid dispersal, disguise and cover yourself with fire. Secondly, when taking a position, always have false firing points aside from the current ...

12. Considering that an aerial bomb could deprive immediately a regiment of fire-fighting equipment for the whole day, cartridges, projectiles, fuel in the ground ...

15. All commanders should be firmly aware of the method that the adversary can use in order to disorganize the control of our troops. What will this method consist of? It is necessary to take into account that poorly checked people work at communications centers, among which there may be spies working for the enemy, therefore from the first day of the division’s release (which will be done only by my special order) all communication centers in the division’s area - The corps must be occupied by the signalmen of the military units of the division - the corps. In Belgium German officers and in general the participants of the 5 column were dressed in the form of French and English officers, and penetrating the rear of the French and English parts, gave French and English units and formations orders that radically violated the plan of the French and English command.

16. In order to avoid such a situation, it is necessary to firmly establish the identification signal of the senior officer for the junior and the junior for the senior. Only the direct and immediate superior has the right to give oral orders. No verbal orders do not give open text on the phone. Written orders should be written briefly - what, where, who, when should execute ...

17. Airplanes at aerodromes should be dispersed and disguised in forests and shrubs, not allowing them to be built in a line, but at the same time retaining full readiness for departure. Parks of tank units and artillery to disperse, to place in the forests, to carefully disguise, while maintaining the opportunity in a timely manner to gather on alert ...

19. Order to fully know the commanding personnel to the division commander, inclusive. In the development of this order no orders to be given to anyone... »

Commander-in-Chief PribOVO Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov
Member of the District Military Council Corps Commissar P.Dibrova
Chief of Staff of the District Lieutenant-General P. Klenov


Since June 15, a group of like-minded people, taking advantage of the need to issue an order on identified deficiencies in conducting inspections, prepared an order on preparing PribOVO for military operations. In all subsequent activities, they will be guided by this decision. In accordance with the listing of 19, within the framework of this order, you can issue any verbal orders for preparing the district troops for an attack.

The order elaborated the main issues of the organization of field defense and strict control of the command of all levels over the preparation of defensive positions. During the Great Patriotic War, not so many cases were recorded when the regiment commander claimed the positions of machine guns and mortars, and the division commander claimed positions for each artillery or mortar battery. An instruction was given to install wire barriers and tight deadlines for the installation of mine barriers were defined. Particular attention is paid to the responsibility of the army commander for the joint. The commanders were to assign the same responsibility for the joints of the units, units and subunits to the corresponding commanders. The basic provisions for maneuvering with fire are prescribed; the division commander is responsible for having a spare position for each weapon (mortar).

Provides guidance on the dispersal of aircraft, tanks and artillery. An attempt is being made to organize opposition to spies and enemy saboteurs. Of course, many provisions are reflected in the Charter ... But how often were its provisions guided in the first days and weeks of the war? The established deadlines for the fulfillment of orders of the military council of Military District until 28 of June show that the district leadership did not expect a full-scale 22 war of June. The order noted the main provisions on which the Germans will "catch" the Soviet command in the initial period. We are not aware of similar orders in other Western HE. Attempts to link this order with measures to bring troops into combat readiness in other higher education institutions are necessarily associated with the presence of certain classified documents. It's just that it's easier to build versions ...

I wonder: why there are no orders on the dispersal of aviation in other military institutions? There was an instruction of noncommercial organizations and the General Staff of the Spacecraft about the dispersal of aviation, which was not carried out in any VO. In the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 from 19.06.41, this is mentioned, the terms for carrying out work on masking airfields and airfield facilities by July 1 are set. In the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) No. 1711-724c from 19 June the terms of repainting the aircraft and disguising runways change to July 20, the masking of airfield facilities to July 30, the masking of tents to July 1. The next day, in the new order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0043, new terms are set: disguise tents and aerodrome facilities by 1 July, runways and concrete taxiways by July 10, and aircraft repaint by 20 July. What kind of expectation of the 22 June war by the country's leadership and the spacecraft may be if even the 19 of June establishes the deadlines for the implementation of activities that end in a month, and the timing of the dispersal of aviation, their camouflage, responsible for execution (who controls) are simply absent. (Orders and ordinance can be viewed in the 2 part.)

18 June 1941, a new order has been prepared at PribOVO headquarters.

ORDER TO TROOPS PribOVO No. 00229 / SS 18 June 1941

“In order to quickly bring the theater of military operations of the district to combat readiness, I ORDER:

1. To the commander of the air defense zone, by the end of 19 June 1941, to bring in full combat readiness the entire air defense of the district, for which:

a) organize round-the-clock duty at all VNOS posts and provide them with continuous communication;

b) to make all anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, assigning round-the-clock duty on batteries, arranging their uninterrupted communication with posts, carefully preparing them in engineering terms and providing them with fire-fighting equipment;

c) to organize the interaction of fighter aircraft with anti-aircraft units;

d) organize uninterrupted communication between the airborne combat positions and fighter aviation aerodromes ... 19.6.41. Report on the procedure for covering large railway and dirt bridges, artillery depots and most important objects from dive bombers.

Before 21.6.41, together with the local air defense, organize: blackout cities: Riga, Kaunas, Vilnius, Dvinsk, Mitava, Libava, Šiauliai, fire fighting in them, medical assistance to the victims and to identify premises that can be used as bomb shelters ...

4. The commander of the 8 and 11 armies:

a) determine the locations of field depots of anti-tank mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers in the area of ​​each army to establish certain barriers provided for by the plan. The specified property is concentrated in organized warehouses for 21.6.41 g .;

b) for setting minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where they should be allocated from and their plan of work. All this through the chiefs of the engineering division border service ...

e) to create mobile teams of mine-anti-tank combat on Telšiai, Šiauliai, Kaunas and Kalvarij directions. For this purpose, have stocks of anti-tank mines transported by road. The staff of these detachments, which are formed at the expense of the sapper units and the vehicles allocated by the head of the ABTU, develop and report to me 19.6.41 in the city. Readiness of the detachments of the 21.6.41;

f) Commanders of the search for 8 and 11 armies with a chain of destruction of the most important bridges in the lane: state border and rear line - Siauliai, Kaunas, Neman river, reconnoiter these bridges, determine the number of explosives for each of them, teams of bombers and in the nearest points from them to concentrate all means to undermine. The plan for the destruction of bridges to approve the military councils of the armies. Deadline 21.6.41 g ...

5. To the chief of the ABTU district for 21.6.41, withdraw all foreign-made tanks and armored vehicles from 22, 24 and 29 sk. Together with the Chief of the Artillery Directorate of the District, arm them with small-caliber anti-tank artillery (where they don’t have it) and transfer 45 tanks and 4 8 and 11 armies to the anti-tank defense forces in anti-tank areas, and armored vehicles - for the defense of army command points.

6. NSh districts develop a service staff for stationary tank batteries and armored vehicles and, after it is approved by me, form the necessary teams.

7. The Chief of the Artillery Directorate of the District, together with the commanders of the armies, should reconnoiter the areas of location of the above-mentioned batteries and the points of their deployment.

8. Revise the repair plan for the whole autotrack technique and maximally force its implementation. This is done not only in relation to the district, but also all military workshops ...

District Commander Colonel General Kuznetsov
Member of the District Military Council Corps Commissar Dibrova
District Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Maples


On the same day for the air defense units a clarifying order is given:"... the Commander ordered:

1. The air defense units of the zone, the VNOS battalions and the air defense systems of military formations and units accept readiness No. XXUMX (enhanced combat readiness) ...

3. Air defense units located in the camps, including military ones, immediately return to the points of permanent deployment ...

6. Availability time 18-00 19 June 1941. Execution bring 20-00 19 June 1941. "

NS PribOVO Lieutenant-General Klyonov


The connections and parts of KOVO and ZOVOVO air defense systems are put on alert only in the first hours of the coming 22 of June. The air defense units located in the camps, including military units in the said districts, did not return to the points of permanent deployment or to the reserve areas to cover their troops. Only a few exceptions are known. Interestingly, other districts ignore the GSH Directive of 18 June 1941, as if it does not exist. Anarchy probably reigns in these districts ...



On the basis of the order of the headquarters of PribOVO, on June 20, the Decree on the darkening of Riga was issued. Information comes to Moscow. The next day, the reaction of GSH follows: “You, without the approval of the People's Commissar, issued an order for air defense to put into effect provision No. XXUMX - this means to black out the Baltic States, which would damage the industry. Such actions can be carried out only by the decision of the government. Now your order causes a variety of rumors and unnerves the public. I demand to immediately cancel the illegally issued order and give an explanation for the report to the Commissar. Chief of General Staff, Army General Zhukov "

The PribOVO leadership improvises “on the move”: obeying the requirements of the Chief of the General Staff, the blackout is canceled, however, the readiness No. 2 is not removed from the air defense units. Very reminiscent of bringing the troops on alert without announcing a combat alarm ... On the same day, the district command, on its own initiative, in an orderly manner enters a blackout in military garrisons, facilities and places of deployment of troops.



Interestingly, the PC about the cancellation of the blackout (signed by the deputy chief of the operational department of the district headquarters, Colonel Kinosyan) and entering the blackout for military facilities and troops does not sign the District High School.
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  1. +32
    19 September 2017
    Thanks author, again unusual.
    1. +30
      19 September 2017
      My very favorite topic ... the state of the Red Army before the immediate start of the attack of GERMANY on the USSR.

      When you read the documents of those years, you feel the spirit of that time and the feeling of a military catastrophe ... as if it were yesterday ... what
      1. +4
        19 September 2017
        Repression, even affecting family members of the enemies of the people, uprooted the initiative of the leadership and any criticism of the adopted policy. - from article

        I am skeptical about articles by aKtoR. A mixture of everything, now even the defense of Crimea, which in my opinion is superfluous.
        The author claims, “Repressions, even affecting family members of the enemies of the people, eradicated the leadership’s initiative” and immediately gives examples and writes about the initiative of the command of the PribVO, and only PribVO, about bringing troops into combat readiness, and even about dimming Riga, for which followed by a "cry" from Moscow Zhukov to cancel the introduced dimming.
        The purpose of all the articles of the author is to show that the leadership of the USSR, the Red Army did not know about the impending German offensive on June 22, 1941, that they did not expect a “sudden” war. But this is not so.
        I will not cite numerous data from various intelligence agencies confirming the fact of the outbreak of war in the coming days of June 22, 1941. I will cite only the data from this article.
        Pay attention to the cipher 11 of army No. 133 of June 20, 1941, cited by the author, it is addressed to the "Chief of Staff of the Front", not FRONT, which means the leadership of the Army and the state has already transferred the military structure of the districts to military names. It’s just not done like that. This is done in anticipation of the coming war.
        The same cipher indicates the German defector with reports of the outbreak of war. There were several such defectors before the war.
        In addition, regular daily reconnaissance flights of aviation, which "circled the entire western border within the KOVO, ZAPOVO and PribOVO," and naturally could not help but note the concentration of German troops. The fact that there were no mechanized and armored forces there was regular and well known, they were advanced in the very last turn hours before the attack, and the leadership of the Red Army knew about this.
        Citing an example of a combat journal of the 10th Air Defense Brigade, which notes the implementation of the General Directive of June 18, 1941, the author ironically says: “It is interesting that other districts ignore the General Directive of June 18, 1941, as if it does not exist. Most likely, these districts reign anarchy ... ", and it represents everything as an" initiative "of only the leadership of the Baltic Military District.
        A strange initiative ONLY the command of the Volga Military District is not it? An initiative by which you can get a hat, as received a reprimand from Zhukov for dimming Riga. But for the Orders of June 15 and 18, 1941 to bring the entrusted troops into a combat situation, there were no reprimands from Moscow, although a whole military district was raised and put into combat position. Isn't it strange, Author?
        And does this not confirm that there was such a GS Directive? Only now it was not carried out in other districts due to negligence, crime, and maybe betrayal, which is not at all impossible.
      2. VS
        0
        19 September 2017
        be sure to read the two-volume S. Chekunov on the full answers of the commanders of the summer of 41 - to Pokrovsky’s questions - "" I write exclusively from memory ... "" .. There is already one in sales .. there is one volume - under 1400 rubles, but it's worth it ...
  2. +2
    19 September 2017
    And another inaccuracies, strange conclusions. Here is the army encryption received by the SHO of the Okrug on June 20.06, and decrypted on June 21.06?! And what not on June 22.06?! And what is the front headquarters on June 20, 1941 ?! The report on air defense mobilization 21.06?! What a fright ?! And who allowed ?! (In the directive 1 and that is indicated, without raising the composition).
    If the air defense of the district was ready 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, then why the raid took place almost suddenly?
    1. VS
      -6
      19 September 2017
      "" If the air defense of the district was ready 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, then why the raid took place almost suddenly ?! ""

      - Air defense led to increased B.G. from June 18 but 21 bg began to be canceled locally .. Without orders from Moscow ..
  3. -1
    19 September 2017
    Quote: vladimirZ
    Repression, even affecting family members of the enemies of the people, uprooted the initiative of the leadership and any criticism of the adopted policy. - from article

    I am skeptical about articles by aKtoR. A mixture of everything, now even the defense of Crimea, which in my opinion is superfluous.
    The author claims, “Repressions, even affecting family members of the enemies of the people, eradicated the leadership’s initiative” and immediately gives examples and writes about the initiative of the command of the PribVO, and only PribVO, about bringing troops into combat readiness, and even about dimming Riga, for which followed by a "cry" from Moscow Zhukov to cancel the introduced dimming.
    The purpose of all the articles of the author is to show that the leadership of the USSR, the Red Army did not know about the impending German offensive on June 22, 1941, that they did not expect a “sudden” war. But this is not so.
    I will not cite numerous data from various intelligence agencies confirming the fact of the outbreak of war in the coming days of June 22, 1941. I will cite only the data from this article.
    Pay attention to the cipher 11 of army No. 133 of June 20, 1941, cited by the author, it is addressed to the "Chief of Staff of the Front", not FRONT, which means the leadership of the Army and the state has already transferred the military structure of the districts to military names. It’s just not done like that. This is done in anticipation of the coming war.
    The same cipher indicates the German defector with reports of the outbreak of war. There were several such defectors before the war.
    In addition, regular daily reconnaissance flights of aviation, which "circled the entire western border within the KOVO, ZAPOVO and PribOVO," and naturally could not help but note the concentration of German troops. The fact that there were no mechanized and armored forces there was regular and well known, they were advanced in the very last turn hours before the attack, and the leadership of the Red Army knew about this.
    Citing an example of a combat journal of the 10th Air Defense Brigade, which notes the implementation of the General Directive of June 18, 1941, the author ironically says: “It is interesting that other districts ignore the General Directive of June 18, 1941, as if it does not exist. Most likely, these districts reign anarchy ... ", and it represents everything as an" initiative "of only the leadership of the Baltic Military District.
    A strange initiative ONLY the command of the Volga Military District is not it? An initiative by which you can get a hat, as received a reprimand from Zhukov for dimming Riga. But for the Orders of June 15 and 18, 1941 to bring the entrusted troops into a combat situation, there were no reprimands from Moscow, although a whole military district was raised and put into combat position. Isn't it strange, Author?
    And does this not confirm that there was such a GS Directive? Only now it was not carried out in other districts due to negligence, crime, and maybe betrayal, which is not at all impossible.

    They didn’t carry out any actions without the district’s orders, and there wasn’t any initiative at all! There were sabotage of GKO and General Staff orders, either by dumbness (not real), or by waiting to not substitute (this is quite out of place). Indeed, the orders of NCOs and the General Staff were to keep the troops in a BATTLE position (but not deployed, since mobilization was not announced and there were no funds for this). In the line of the NKVD, it was generally ordered to intensify in full action to combat saboteurs, unreliable with the allocation of military units for this.
    From the beginning of June 1941 they demanded that the second echelons be put forward to deployment places according to the cover plan, and the MK to the waiting places, the KP should be brought as close as possible to the troops ...... and what was done?! They started - who on June 17-18, and who generally ignored ....
    And before that, what were you doing ?! If even for the divisions of the first echelon did not prepare field defense ?! And the peacetime army got involved in oncoming battles with mobilized troops in compact groups ?!
    And (excuse me) where did you see the encryption with the printed text, with errors (departure time, later than receipt time) ?! And on the TsAMO letterhead ?!
    1. VS
      -6
      19 September 2017
      where did you see the encryption with printed text, with errors (time of departure, later than the time of receipt) ?! And on the TSAMO form ?! ""

      - why on the TsAMO form ??? !!)))

      About typos - anything happens)))))
  4. +12
    19 September 2017
    And where can I read the 1st, 3rd and 4th parts?
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. +24
        19 September 2017
        But it’s not only Mark Solonin in the military-industrial complex to read ... request
        1. VS
          -1
          20 September 2017
          He is not published there already ..)) His friend Khodarenok left and Markush stopped printing there)))

          Buy and read the full answers of the divisional commanders - two-volume S. Chekunov- "I write exclusively from memory"))))

          (Could Kozinkin’s two-volume on THESE answers be advised but with detailed comments and analysis - from 2016 more - but it will be immodest))))
          1. +4
            20 September 2017
            Thank! I myself noticed that Mark stopped printing. It’s clear why Korotchenko was replaced, but under Khodarenok the newspaper was quite decent (why dismiss him?). And now there are U-turns with large color photos of poor quality, as if there was nothing to write about ...
            1. VS
              -1
              20 September 2017
              Maybe Khodarenok himself left ((I do not know ((
              The main thing is that they stopped printing Solonin - stupidities to duplicate and spoil the brains of readers and curious ones))) .-- .. similar to the fact that HERE is sometimes treated from anonymous ladies who do not want to accept criticism at all)) By the way - Solonin is exactly the same - AT ALL, he does not accept criticism to their pearls)) BANIT right there anyone who dares to criticize him on his website)))
  5. VS
    -3
    19 September 2017
    “A version of the author is presented that cannot be fully documented.”

    - So if there is no documentary evidence then maybe the wonderful version is not worth the fuss? Maybe you should look for a better texture?
    For example, to read the two-volume “I write exclusively from memory” - according to the full answers of the commanders of the Red Army of the summer of the 41st ..

    “Soviet intelligence reports included a large amount of misinformation. . ”

    - Intelligence ALWAYS gives and disu including.

    "Intelligence could not reveal the directions of the main attacks of the German troops, their real number in the directions and the timely exit of German troops to the starting lines for an attack on the USSR"

    - and here it is stupid and mean VLIE ...
    . Well, you can’t be so stubborn in your stupidity and ignorance on the topic of where you’re getting smart ... - and write such stupidity repeating the stories of marshals ...

    "The prediction of this war by the British intelligence is incorrect because Hess" leaked "the correct information to him before the war, having received it from Berlin."

    - In general, EVERYTHING that we knew in London was known in the Kremlin - from the "Cambridge Five" ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. VS
        -2
        19 September 2017
        “Earlier it was shown that since the leadership of the spacecraft did not believe in a full-scale war with Germany on 22.06.41 (it expected only provocation by the German troops), there could not have been a GS Directive of 18.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. "

        - Yes, you finally study the CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS JUNE - WHAT DIRECTIVES who sent to whom and what was done on them.
        On June 18 there were DIFFERENT directives - but - WHAT, according to the author, WASN'T - what ???

        “The exit of the transported sk to the deployment points was expected from 24-25.06 to 1.07.41.”

        - explained to the ignoramuses - THIS IS NOT MORE THAN THE TIME for the end of the withdrawal of the SECOND echelons which are NEVER RELATED to the expected date of the German attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic. FROM SAPSEM !!!

        “The air defense units and formations were not on alert. Aviation, mk and SD 1st tier did not rise (except Pribovo). "

        - LIE author! Before you lie so stupidly, you MUST FIRST study the FACTS and they are FAMOUS AND LONG TIME !!!
        Air Defense, Air Force, Fleet - received their orders SEPARATE - for Bringing in g. No. 2 - in the INCREASED Combat Readiness - from June 16-18.
        MECHKORPUSA received their orders on putting them on combat alertness and on withdrawing concentration in raltsny according to Cover Plans - from June 16-18 !! PTBR - also led to increased B.G. since June 18th.
        But they gave the border command a command - to start withdrawing into the raoins according to Cover Plans - that AUTOMATOMATO requires them to be put on combat alert, and FOR THIS DOES NOT NEED ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS to the commanders - from June 18 !!!
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. VS
            -3
            19 September 2017
            “About the presence of up to 18 German divisions near the border (of which up to 4 TD and MD) and up to 583 aircraft (the aircraft were not at airfields near the border). "

            - Well, they said to the author - ONLY border guards track THAT SIDE - UP TO 400 km, and the fact that while there are no ALL German troops on the border doesn’t mean that they didn’t know about them at all - DEPTH is more than a border strip ...

            “It didn’t occur to the commander that the infantry was deployed 1,5 hours walk from the border, the artillery was already in position, and there were no large tank units! "

            - WHY DO YOU THINK FOR THE COMMANDER - WHAT HAS IT HAPPENED IN HIS ???

            Escho times - the TANKS were withdrawn by the Germans in a couple of days, but the headquarters of these units themselves were identified BEFORE and even more so if the reconnaissance tracks the TU side up to 400 km - then it does NOT matter if there are tanks already on the border or not yet ,,,,

            IF you read that his subordinates Pokrovsky wrote about Kuznetsov, you probably would have understood what the commander wrote about here ...
            About the answer Derevianko ..
            In general, he clearly showed that they knew perfectly well about the date of the attack and even the time. And for the Air Force commanders, one of Pokrovsky’s questions was posed - "" Was the Air Force command ___ aware of the possible attack by Nazi Germany in the morning of June 22 ""
            1. VS
              -4
              19 September 2017
              Two like-minded people appeared in PribOVO, to which some other military commanders subsequently joined. Unfortunately, Dibrova was not included in their number, because of which many events had to be carried out semi-legally. PMC Dibrova sent messages to higher authorities on the wrong (from his point of view) actions taken by NS PribOV ""

              - what the WITCH .. KLENOV was shot with ACCUSATION - "manifestation of INACTIVITY in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT" !!!

              As for Kuznetsov’s resolution on the defector ..

              IF you read Sobenikov’s answer, you’ll see- ON JUNE 18, KUZNETSOV sets the task of withdrawing the army according to the Cover Plan to the border! And the defector is lying that the attack will be in 8-10 days - already on the 20th !!!

              Madame - try to compose your fantasies, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MAXIMUM of information that has long been known and available, and not just the one that caught your eye in the past "couple of months")))))
              1. VS
                -5
                19 September 2017
                “What kind of expectation of war on June 22 can be discussed by the leadership of the country and the spacecraft, even if June 19 sets deadlines for the implementation of activities that end in a month, and the timing of the dispersal of aircraft, their disguises, which are responsible for the execution (who exercises control) in the orders is simply absent. "

                - Well, then LIE then)))

                If you personally do not understand what specific instructions mean in orders - this does not mean that since YOU want them and indicated)))

                Firstly - deer. From the 19th this directive is about - read "CONTENTS: On the disguise of airfields, military units and important military installations of districts."

                Read on letters - ABOUT MASKING ALL military objects in the districts and not just in the Air Force. Those. - there should not be anything about the dispersal of aircraft !!))

                But at the same time, in the order part there is quite “the timing of the dispersal of aviation” - in these units. NCOs - which are registered SO:

                "3. Strongly forbid the linear and crowded layout of aircraft; the dispersed and camouflaged arrangement of aircraft to ensure their complete unobservability from the air. "

                For the ignoramus and I will give you, I explain - if there is NO specific deadline for execution in the order part, then this means - EXECUTE - IMMEDIATELY !!!)))

                It is said - “3. Strongly forbid the linear and crowded layout of aircraft; " ---- it means that GARDEN divisions MUST immediately rush to pull the planes through the bushes at the airdromes themselves IMMEDIATELY !!! And you can - and PERSONALLY do this !!)))

                And then comes the clarification - “the dispersed and masked location of the aircraft to ensure their complete unobservability from the air.”

                In the Deere. 0043 there is once again an order:

                "5. At the camp airdromes, planes should be located scattered under natural and artificial shelters along the outskirts of the airfield, not allowing them to be placed in straight lines. ”

                This is a SUPPLEMENT to deer. 0042 - and this item should be executed MUST IMMEDIATELY !!!
                1. VS
                  -5
                  19 September 2017
                  “In accordance with the instructions of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the KA in PribOVo, new“ Cover Plans ... ”are being developed, which will not be approved by the beginning of the war.”

                  - Yes, you have no idea - WHY they were not approved by the NPO and the General Staff and why they were NOT even known about them BELOW the armies in the districts)))

                  "The new" Cover Plans ... "are purely defensive in the initial period of the war and provide for the retreat of Soviet troops to great depths"

                  - Well, cho for nonsense and lies))))
                2. +11
                  23 September 2017
                  By the way - PribOV 22.06.41. suffered the LEAST losses in aviation at aerodromes compared to ZAPOVO and KOVO. This despite the fact that there were more German agents in it than anyone else. The fact is that the Germans stormed only those airfields where our planes were - 31 out of 70, and did not even fly up to the spare ones and to those where the runway was under construction - 32 out of 70. Moreover, the construction was supervised by the local construction departments of the local republican NKVD. This says a lot, about the local personnel of the NKVD, too. In the future, too, the Germans beat only 100% at the "working" airfields, and did not beat at non-working. But in a week they are our very good. weak air defense and 50-60% of aviation at airfields skillfully zadolbali, and about a third shot down in the air. Like when trying to bomb Tilsit, Koenigsberg, crossings (they did bomb!), Etc. For the Germans, the missile defense system was already clearly working with radars and poise, and even the airborne airborne landing posts without radios and communications generally sat and were silent - and in general they were in the ZF and SWF by 22.06. not created. Pribovo and NWF with errors, but fought fiercely from day one. More than 50% of the PribOVO troops fought in the main strikes of the Germans, and in ZapOVO (ZF) and KOVO (SWF) - only 10-15%, the rest "quickly maneuvered" and "relocated plannedly" to Minsk, then to Smolensk, and Kiev, further everywhere. First of all, aviation (remnants) was so "relocated". There were big complaints on all the headquarters of the fronts, and the top and bottom, and the NWF, too, were hacked hard to the headquarters. In many ways - to the cause!
          2. 0
            19 September 2017
            Oleg! Be calm! And do not get involved in polemics ..... I know that you know!
            And what didn’t answer me ?!
            1. VS
              0
              20 September 2017
              Maybe he didn’t notice in the bustle?))) What did you want to ask?)))
            2. VS
              -5
              20 September 2017
              enraged envy))) But - if they are not slowed down, then like the others - reading the authors' nonsense - will they know what was real?)))

              By the way - an example with the defectors who on the 20th reports that the attack will be in 9 days - this is a good example of how the Germans drove the desu - and most likely they themselves sent clearly such “defectors” who could later infiltrate our intelligence or counterintelligence agents) )))
              And it may well be that Kuznetsov had already given instructions on the withdrawal of border divisions by software and sent "to hell with this source" with that unsubscribe)))
        2. VS
          -4
          20 September 2017
          “Earlier it was shown that since the leadership of the spacecraft did not believe in a full-scale war with Germany on 22.06.41 (it expected only provocation by the German troops), there could not have been a GS Directive of 18.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. "

          - Yes, you finally study the CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS JUNE - WHAT DIRECTIVES who sent to whom and what was done on them.
          On June 18 there were DIFFERENT directives - but - WHAT, according to the author, WASN'T - what ???

          “The exit of the transported sk to the deployment points was expected from 24-25.06 to 1.07.41.”

          - explained to the geniuses)))) - THIS IS NOT MORE THAN THE TIME for the end of the withdrawal of the SECOND echelons which are NOT connected with the expected date of the German attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic. FROM SAPSEM !!!

          “The air defense units and formations were not on alert. Aviation, mk and SD 1st tier did not rise (except Pribovo). "

          - DARAGUE AUTHOR - AGAIN, YOU WILL NOT SPEAK TRUTH AGAIN - i.e. lie)))!!!
          Before LIE is so stupid, IT MUST BE FIRST TO STUDY FACTS and they are FAMOUS AND LONG TIME !!!
          Air Defense, Air Force, Fleet - received their orders SEPARATE - for Bringing in g. No. 2 - in the INCREASED Combat Readiness - from June 16-18.
          MECHKORPUSA received their orders on putting them on combat alert and on withdrawal to concentration areas according to Cover Plans - from June 16-18 !!
          PTBR - also led to increased B.G. since June 18th.
          But the border divisions were given the command - to begin withdrawal to the districts according to Cover Plans - that AUTOMATICALLY requires them to be put on combat alert, and for this, NO SPECIAL DIRECTIONS are to be given to the commanders - from June 18 !!!

          “The units of the 1st echelon needed to reach positions at the state border from 3 hours to 19 hours (in OdVO - even up to 70 hours).”

          - HERE, FOR THESE, these divisions began to withdraw in terms of software from June 18 !! And those divisions that were deployed far from the border began to be withdrawn altogether from June 11-14 in their military districts according to BCP - according to the directives of the General Staff from June 11-12 !!!
          1. VS
            -4
            20 September 2017
            “The leadership of NPOs and the General Staff was not prepared for the transfer of Directive No. 1 on the night of June 21st to June 22nd in western military organizations”

            - for genius ??? !!!
            The General Staff did not have equipment for the distribution of deers. B / N in the district or something ????
            KOLI THE AUTHOR HUMANLY (with stubbornness worthy of better application) HAS the directive of NCOs and the General Staff from 22.20 on June 21 - ON Bring = TRANSFER OF ALL troops, air force, air defense and fleets to FULL bg. "Directive No. 1" - the author should not nevertheless climb into the topic in which she is not damn ... NOT AT ALL IN THE TOPIC)))). - does not understand !!!

            “Did not assume responsibility for bringing and explaining the provisions of this lengthy Directive to the Military Councils of the HE in other lines of communication, thereby relieving themselves of responsibility for subsequent events.”

            - Well, enough to SPEAK THE WRONG - i.e. lying is so stupid and ugly !! AUTO - YOU have already shown us an example of KOVO - HOW they brought to the KOVO VS the provisions of this directive in the absence of cryptographers in Ternopol !!!

            STRAIGHTY in ignorance i.e. Ignorance - a terrible vesch, ...

            “The VO leadership“ intimidated ”by these leaders turned out to be in a very difficult situation.”

            - cho for stupidity ??? !!! WHO SOMETHING AND WHAT IT AFTER ??

            “The beginning of hostilities, the order to open fire on the enemy had to be taken by the division commanders (regiments, battalions) or opened belatedly after receiving the corresponding instruction from the military forces.”

            - you don’t understand anything about this - why this happened ... who forbade the divisional commander and how and why ...

            “The following abbreviations will be used for this and in subsequent articles: ABTU - armored command, AK - army corps,”

            - that is, our remarkable in his obstinacy author obscured by abbreviations and type knows everything about the topic ....
            Damn .. and where do our beauties and clever women come from then .. Climb and climb there in which they understand nothing ...
    2. VS
      -3
      20 September 2017
      “The redeployment of troops was masked at the first stage due to the overestimation of the actual number of divisions located near the Soviet-German border”

      --- AND
      WHAT IS IT LIKE???. WHO AND HOW DOES THIS ?? To whom and who reported - to our scouts - that the parts of the Wehrmacht located on our granzia are EXCEEDED ???
      The author of these things HOW IT REPRESENTS - HOW IT AND WHO DOED ???

      “At the final stage, the German command was able to hide the true number of formations (especially tank and motorized) and carry out the withdrawal of the main forces to their original positions for the attack in just one day. "

      - DARAGUE AUTHOR - you can “hide” the withdrawal of the TANKS themselves, which were actually brought to the border in a couple of days. Until June 22nd.
      BUT!! The headquarters of these compounds were deployed on the border or in the border zone with the Soviet Socialist Republic for a long time until June 22. And THEY ARE ALREADY DECLARED constantly !! STUDY documents before nonsense to ignorant and stupid.

      “The leadership of NPOs and specialists from the General Staff of the Spacecraft did not correctly assess the number of German divisions needed for a full-scale war between Germany and the USSR. "

      - Nonsense and stupidity. On what basis did the author conceive this stupidity? Showing his inability to understand what the military wrote in documents in case of war with Germany.
      FOR GENIUS AUTHORS - NOT IN OUR PLANS anything about this - about who and how evaluated the divisive forces of the Germans for the war with the Soviet Socialist Republic. The plans were rough estimates - HOW MUCH MAXIMUM CAN FORME Germany for the war and not - the number of German divisions needed for a full-scale war between Germany and the USSR.
      These are DIFFERENT things ...

      “They could not imagine that it was possible to continue the offensive with motorized units, leaving behind the rear a huge mass of enemy troops. "

      - Nonsense and stupidity and lies !!!. NOBODY SO NCO and GSH did not count !!! And if the author does not agree - GIVE A LINK to either memoirs or better to documents WHERE and WHO SO thought for the Germans.

      “The repression, even affecting family members of the enemies of the people, has eradicated leadership initiative and any criticism of the adopted policy. Therefore, in order not to justify the leadership of the spacecraft, there was no one to point to incorrect provisions. ”-

      - the author seems to have finally TRUE for herself))) - I finally read the ravings from the "Lights" of the time of Gorbi ...
      1. +11
        23 September 2017
        About the family of officers - an indicative story. They were the first to start on 18.06. send border guards, etc. NKVDeshniki. June 19-20.06. began to send the headquarters of the first line. They put wives and children on passenger trains. And suddenly! ... Personal orders 20.06. Tymoshenko and Mehlis - return the family immediately back to the unit! This provokes the Germans! The NKVD troops were ordered to remove the wives and children of the Red Army officers from trains and escorted back to units ... This order was strictly enforced even on the night of June 21-22. As a result, many families died during the “staging” of buses on roads that already had German bombing and attack at stations where their NKVD patrols dropped off trains. At the commander-11 of the NWF Morozov, the daughter died on June 22.06.41, 4.00. And his army was already fighting at 51. What do you think, what could he think of such commissars, emergency situations and headquarters? What words? Another would be Klenov and / or someone else personally shot for this! So there is truth in the author and in the "Lights" in this part. And Crimean affairs at Perekop (Commander-XNUMX of the same Kuznetsov)
        1. +11
          23 September 2017
          There is a separate conversation outside Crimea, but since they have switched over to personalities - about the commanders of the North-Western Federal District Kuznetsov and Klenov. Where and in what condition was their second echelon, the 27th army? Read Lelyushenko’s memoirs again - in detail, about June 1941. For such a collapse of the 2nd echelon of the front-line district, who should I ask? Is it only from Moscow. Further - what is ONE ammunition issued to the troops of the first line? (It’s good that at least ONE was issued, in other districts they sent out a guard kit of 15 rounds per rifle and 16 rounds per tank). Do you not know that ONE ammunition load, even for ONE day of battle, may not be enough? Who will be responsible for the mass of vehicles at the ammunition depots in the morning of 22.06.41. Which the Germans bombed with Yu-87 whistles? And bombed in bulk?
      2. +2
        29 September 2017
        From the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. I. Eremenko [1]:
        “What did I find in the 43rd Army? The army commander, Lieutenant General Golubev, instead of taking care of the troops, was engaged in providing his person. He kept for personal allowance one and sometimes two cows (for the production of fresh milk and butter), three to five sheep (for barbecue), a couple of pigs (for sausages and ham) and several chickens. This was done in full view, and the front knew about it.
        KP Golubev, as a cowardly man, is located 25-30 km from the front edge and is a fortified site with an area of ​​1-2 hectares, surrounded in two rows by barbed wire. In the middle - a brand new chopped-up, with a Russian carving five-walled, just like a boyar tower. The house has four rooms, decorated in the latest fashion, and a dungeon of two rooms, so there is enough space for adjutants and for those serving the commander. In addition, a house was built for liaisons, orderlies, kitchens and security. The dungeon and the passage into it are finished better than the Moscow metro. A small smoking plant was built. Golubev loves smoked meats: sausages, ham, and especially fish, he holds for this person who knows the craft of smoking well. Member of the military council of the army Shabalov did not lag behind the commander.
        A lot of effort and money was spent on this construction, two engineering battalions worked for almost a month to build such a control post. This was done at a time when there was an acute shortage of sapper parts for engineering work at the forefront. A stroke vividly characterizes these grief-leaders. Shabalov, by order, must deal with the rear, but he has no time, and the rear is neglected, the roads look especially bad ... In this army ... from commander to unit commanders, each has his own kitchen and a large number of people seconded for service ... Many families of commandos came to the officers - people began to rebuild in a peaceful manner. This had a very bad effect on the combat effectiveness of the troops. ” This is about the commander of Golubev, 22.06.41. who commanded the 10th Army of the ZF in Białystok, which the border guards who later left the encirclement accidentally discovered on a deaf farm together with the Air Force 10 army head and removed them from the encirclement. After which Golubev was appointed to command the 13th army,
        1. VS
          -3
          29 September 2017
          and when they were put against the wall - they became innocent victims))))
      3. 0
        October 18 2017
        Quote: V.S.
        - the author seems to have finally TRUE for herself))) - I finally read the ravings from the "Lights" of the time of Gorbi ...

        Thank you, your answers to the author of the opus, which is much more informative than the opus and the "facts" invented by the author of this opus. good
  6. +2
    19 September 2017
    Quote: rruvim
    But it’s not only Mark Solonin in the military-industrial complex to read ... request

    Read Kozinkin ... useful!
    1. +13
      19 September 2017
      Read. Not inspired ...
      Under the influence of books N.V. Starikova, A.V. Isaeva, I.V. Pykhalova, Yu.I. Mukhina, A.B. Martirosyana Kozinkin began writing articles on the Internet on historical topics related to the issue of the June 22 tragedy.
      1. VS
        -3
        20 September 2017
        articles are junk)) They were written in haste — then the “run-in” was on them - in the form of framers at historical forums - and then books were already published - with corrections of errors if necessary)))
  7. +9
    20 September 2017
    The original sounds something like this: "... The enemy will be defeated - on its territory."
  8. VS
    0
    20 September 2017
    Kuznetsov with his pen highlighted the paragraph - TOP and BOTTOM - and wrote “This is a lie” and the paragraph reads:

    “The defector has shown that the German units at the border do not dig trenches, having seen the transition to the offensive. According to the defector, military operations will begin in 8-10 days. For 2 months now, officers have been agitating soldiers, telling them that the USSR is Germany’s main enemy. Sodates 50% are opposed to the war ""


    This is an example of this defector who reports on the 20th that the attack will take place in 9 days - this is a good example of how the Germans drove the desu - and most likely they themselves sent clearly such “defectors” who could later infiltrate our intelligence or counterintelligence agents)) )
    And it may well be that Kuznetsov had already given instructions on the withdrawal of border divisions of the 18th by software and sent "to hell with this source" with that unsubscribe)))
  9. +14
    21 September 2017
    According to the documents - the competent work of the headquarters, despite the muddy intelligence of the RO, the time of the outbreak of the war was almost accurately calculated and, as far as possible, they were made, all the services on alert. Why is it cool that Zhukov from the General Staff personally interferes with this, although he may have been talking about dimming big cities of rights, Moscow had to decide before the war. The steepness of this issue is why? The district is special, coastal Baltic, ships and fleet bases in ports. The approaches to them from the sea and air are open, or rather, almost not covered. And what is Narcomflot? Another Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union? Where does this information about 100 seaplanes in Pilau come from? This is a wild amount! What if they are all torpedo bombers ?! Why did neither the district nor the fleet double-check this? - This is a clear sign of a prepared strike at the ports and shore! And who monitors the sea and why is there no information about this in the documents? Where is the interaction with the fleet, its artillery and aircraft? This is strange and for good reason. There are comparatively many about the airspace test and aviation posts, even about medicine — and not a letter about the fleet? As if there is no connection with him - is it in Riga? But in any way - quite a military work is already going on, there is a difference from ZAPOVO and KOVO, especially from the Odessa district, where in general there are only 56 tanks and a resort holiday party on all beaches and embankments. And on PribOVO in all three republics that night, the NKVD Separate Division already cleans up the remnants of the "subversive contingent" (about 20 thousand deported to each republic, the last echelons are loaded ... And the NKVD also catches families of officers of the Red Army with children in trains and lands them to be transported back to the border units on orders from Moscow, for quick death under shelling and bombing ... And there is no expectation at the district headquarters that they will cut all the wired connection tomorrow, even the poles with air lines will explode, that the local territorial divisions are already on 80% are ready to kill the Soviet command staff and go into the woods to meet German saboteurs just “at the junction of fronts and associations.” Although in Moscow Zhukov will be setting offensive military tasks for these local troops for another week ... Moscow has always been somewhere on the moon! Mehlisov etc. only sent punishment ...
  10. 0
    21 September 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    He is not published there already ..)) His friend Khodarenok left and Markush stopped printing there)))

    Buy and read the full answers of the divisional commanders - two-volume S. Chekunov- "I write exclusively from memory"))))

    (Could Kozinkin’s two-volume on THESE answers be advised but with detailed comments and analysis - from 2016 more - but it will be immodest))))

    Well Oleg! You won’t die of modesty!
    1. VS
      0
      22 September 2017
      "" You will not die of modesty! ""

      modesty of the city takes)) As they said in my cadet years)))
  11. 0
    21 September 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    Maybe he didn’t notice in the bustle?))) What did you want to ask?)))

    Watch the mail!
    1. VS
      0
      22 September 2017
      email mail or what? It seems there hasn’t been anything from you in recent days ... (((duplicate ..
  12. +3
    21 September 2017
    I don’t remember, but some lump around the 18th circled the border with intelligence at P5. according to his recollections, everything from the air was extremely clear and understandable. He could not say where the tank was disguised and how many divisions, but he saw that the preparation and concentration of forces on the roads were ongoing, not hiding, but comparing the scale of logistic activity, he immediately suggested that the forces were at least XNUMX-XNUMX times higher than that the Red Army has. Not everything falls into the documents, but only confirmed information. Much has been sounded in private messages and by telephone. So do not underestimate the awareness of border commanders.
    1. +3
      21 September 2017
      https://topwar.ru/123513-povtorenie-proydennogo.h
      tml
      If interested, see the article by this link.
      It contains only the opinion of the author, without any references.
      1. -3
        December 7 2017
        The new "Cover Plans ..." are purely defensive at the initial stage of the war and provide for the retreat of Soviet troops to great depths, the evacuation of industrial enterprises, the destruction of infrastructure in the abandoned territory, the widespread use of engineering barriers using explosive devices

        Absolutely wrong conclusion on the essence of cover plans, because cover plans do not provide for a retreat at all and the fate of cover regiments is a foregone conclusion - they must die at the border, destroying the enemy who has broken through, but not move from the position. That is why the cover divisions provide a 15-day supply of food and material supplies, and the command staff of the regiments consists of the most trained officers. It is at the cost of the life of the personnel of the cover units that the deployment of the remaining parts of the okrug is ensured and time appears for the arrival of echelons from the inner okrugs. So the "retreat" in the PP is the fruit of the lack of military knowledge from the author of the article.
      2. +1
        October 17 2018
        PribOVO 22.06.41. suffered the smallest losses in aviation at airfields in comparison with ZAPOVO and KOVO. This despite the fact that there were more German agents in it. The fact is that the Germans stormed only those airfields where our planes were - 31 out of 70, and did not even fly up to the spare ones and those where the runway was being built - 32 out of 70. Moreover, this construction was supervised by the local construction departments of the local republican NKVD. This says a lot, about the local personnel of the NKVD too. And in the future, too, the Germans hit only 100% on "working" airfields, and did not hit on non-working ones. But in a week they are our very good. weak air defense and 50-60% of aviation at the airfields were skillfully zadolbali, and about a third was shot down in the air. Like when trying to bomb Tilsit, Konigsberg, crossings (they bombed!), Etc. For the Germans, the missile defense system was already clearly working with radars and PUAZO, and in our country even the VNOS posts without radios and communications were generally silent - and at the ZF and SWF they were generally at 22.06. did not create. PribOVO and NWF with mistakes, but fought hard from the first day. More than 50% of the PribOVO troops fought in the main strikes of the Germans, and in the ZapOVO (ZF) and KOVO (SWF) - only 10-15%, the rest "quickly maneuvered" and "redeployed as planned" to Minsk, then to Smolensk, and Kiev, further everywhere. First of all, aviation (remnants) were "redeployed" in this way. There were great complaints about all the headquarters of the fronts, both from above and below, and the NWF, too, was turned on firmly. In many ways - for the cause! Beginning Air Force NWF Ionov punished for what? See Zhukov (in the draft speech at the plenum of the Central Committee on Stalin) - "Stalin intervened personally in the attempt to unblock Libava on 23-26.6., Began to personally command the troops of the North-West Front." Apparently, he ordered something to Klenov and Ionov, but they did not fulfill it. 27.6. ran to the Germans early. General Trukhin of the operational department of the NWF headquarters, with the documents, and the entire operation of the NWF at Libava tragically failed. PERSONALLY Stalin was put to shame. And Ionov was also arrested - a little later. This is despite the fact that before the war, he had an average flight time per pilot several times more in the aviation units of the district (15 hours in May) than in KOVO (4 hours) and ZAPOVO (6 hours). He conducted aerial reconnaissance daily! But - then his air regiments were defeated, and part of them scrambled without an order to the airfield in Pskov. I had to answer for everything ... The commission of the Central Committee, the investigation of the Red Army and the NKVD, and the tribunal were sorted out.
      3. 0
        November 18, 2018
        The headquarters of the PribOVO was close to the correct AMUSED use of worn-out tanks. This is indicated by the order of the commander - other districts did not even consider this: "6. The NSh of the district to develop a staff for servicing stationary tank batteries and armored vehicles and, after my approval, form the necessary teams." But, apparently, someone from Moscow suppressed this initiative of the district. Most likely Tymoshenko.
      4. 0
        November 25, 2018
        In the documents of the headquarters of the 8th air division, the report of the commander of the 86th air base (it was she who served the airfield in Alytus), Lieutenant Colonel Morozov was found (TsAMO, f. 200045, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 19-21). "... In the period from about 14 to 16 hours on 22.6.41 from the command post they observed the movement of a column of tanks in the direction of Alytus. without hindrance across the bridge, entered the town of the motorized regiment, into the rear of the left flank of the airbase and the airfield. There was no communication with the units. At 3:30 (as the text obviously means 15-30, that is, "half past four in the evening" - MS) June 22, having received a report from the soldiers of construction battalion No. 181, who were fleeing from machine-gun fire, as well as from the sergeant of the Belousov base, that enemy tanks appeared in the town of the motorized rifle regiment [5th Panzer Division], immediately proceeded to evacuation of vehicles, ammunition and classified documents. The GAZ-AA car, on which the wounded were sent to the Medical Battalion No. 5, went missing. The GAZ-AA car was set on fire by the tank fire at the moment of leaving the encirclement at the Alytus-Kaunas road intersection enemy. On this machine, 59.280 cartridges of various systems exploded and burned. In Kaunas, the base was concentrated at 19-00 22.6.41 ...

        The personnel are available as of 28.6.41.

        - average command staff 15, missing 19

        - junior command personnel 13, missing 13

        - rank and file 38, 210 missing

        Killed - 1, wounded - 3 "From other sources it is known that the tanks of the 5th TD on the eve of 22.6.41. Were delivered to 2 outposts at 2 bridges in Alytus on the eastern, high bank of the Neman. The bridges were mined, but the wires to The charges were cut by local spies-Nazis. On these bridges from the border troops of the 126th division and border guards were supposed to withdraw from the border, but they were surrounded by the Germans already at 9.00 22.6., About which they managed to report. 3 air raids were made on Alytus in the morning, the city was on fire By 13.30 German tank columns 7th TD and 20th TD approached Alytus and launched reconnaissance in the western part of the city and across the bridges.Our tank ambushes missed the reconnaissance of the Germans on motorcycles (destroyed in the depth of the defense 4-5 km from the bridges from ambushes of the 2nd lines), and on the tank companies that had crossed, they opened devastating fire, burned 12 tanks, including 4 "heavy" T-4s. The Germans then buried about 100 l / s in those places. Until 23.00 22.6. (until dark) 5 TD held positions on the eastern bank of the Nemunas, preventing the crossing of bridges, etc. hiding an organized withdrawal of its troops, and retreated on orders to Kaunas, leaving and "finishing off" its damaged equipment on the battlefield and along the way, in view of the need to accelerate the movement and lack of fuel for towing. It is also known that 7 TD Germans lost a third of their tanks in the first month of fighting in the USSR.
      5. 0
        December 17 2018
        For these "Considerations of 1941" in PribOVO, in particular, already 18.6.41. it was ordered to prepare a counterstrike tank fist. Focused by 20.6.41. (according to Vasilevsky-Vatutin's plan ?! or Timoshenko-Zhukov ?!) of the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps in the woods (night crossings!) in a square of 90 km along the front and 50 km in depth, with the rear in the former PPD near Libava and Riga (where the approaches were exposed!) And spare parts warehouses in Dvinsk, almost 300 km away. At the same time, 23 rifle divisions were also taken away from Dvinsk. strategically exposed the crossings across the West. Dvina. Counterattack with a "tank fist" 23.6.41. (!) ordered on the front 90 km and to a depth of 180 km (!) in the direction of Taurage-Tilsit. As a result, the Germans 23.6. took Shauliai, 24.6. Kaunas, 25.6. Vilnius, 26.6. blocked Libau, 27.6. took Dvinsk, 29.6. Riga. All tank and air formations of the NWF by 30.6. were defeated. For details on tank vehicles, see here:
        Report of the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps about the fighting of the corps in the period from June 22 to August 1, 1941
        site analysis Joomla
        transfer site to joomla 2.5
        DB for August 1941
        Views: 2136
    2. VS
      -1
      22 September 2017
      "" Do not underestimate the awareness of border commanders. ""

      if you read the full answers of the divisors in the collection "I am writing exclusively from memory"! you will see - almost all the divisional commanders showed - they knew well who was standing in front of them and what forces they stood .... Well, it’s not just that the border guards are crammed into the charters - to track the depth of that side up to 400 km))) And even what happens in the next country they track)))
  13. +4
    22 September 2017
    The strangest orders of June 15 and 18. Almost every item is somewhat absurd.
    For example:
    8. The division commander develop a plan for the defense of his line, for which:
    a) prepare two firing positions for each gun, mortar and machine gun - the main and spare, first the main;
    ...
    The commanders of battalions, divisions and companies must each know their position.

    Firing positions of machine guns and mortars to outline the battalion commanders. Regiment commanders approve them and prepare the necessary funds for the device of these positions.

    That is, if the commanders of battalions, divisions and companies hadn’t been ordered by this order, would they have thought that they did not need to know “their position”? But doesn’t this need for higher commanders? The battalion commanders and even regiments (who do not need to know their position) have no other business but to “outline” the position of each machine gun and allocate a sapper shovel for digging a trench for it? The division commander must “prepare” two firing positions for each weapon, and he needs to be explained that he must first “prepare” the main, and only then the reserve (otherwise he will confuse again, you never mind!).
    For some reason, tanks of foreign brands must suddenly, in the last days before the war, be "removed" from combat units, but armed with "small-caliber anti-tank artillery (where they do not have it)" (But they were not armed? And what does it mean "there "? Is it easy to rearm a tank or an armored car from one type of gun or machine gun to another - will it not take months to work a small factory or a large workshop plus any tests that may be unsuccessful), and send them to defend the headquarters (and without them the headquarters were not protected?). Headquarters can be protected only by foreign brands? The airspace monitoring and control posts should be equipped with communication ... (mother of God, but before these posts had no connection?) belay
    1. VS
      -3
      22 September 2017
      "" The strangest orders of June 15 and 18. Almost every item is somewhat absurd.
      For example:
      ..................
      That is, if the commanders of battalions, divisions and companies hadn’t been ordered by this order, would they have thought that they did not need to know “their position”? But doesn’t this need for higher commanders?
      ""
      -)) Many Veschi civilians in military orders seem strange)))

      Everything is simple - constant chewing and driving into the head the obvious "some things - there is a norm in the army - so that later the junior commander does not drink .... lsa - they say I did not understand the orders correctly)))
      By the way, the same Pavlov at the trial so broke off - “misunderstood the orders of the people's commissar”)))

      "" The commanders of battalions and even regiments (who do not need to know their position) have no other business but to "outline" the position of each machine gun and allocate a sapper blade for digging a trench for it? ""

      - this is - personal control))) .. the army ... it is so ....)))

      "" The division commander must "prepare" two firing positions for each gun, and he needs to be explained that he must first "prepare" the main, and only then the reserve (otherwise he will confuse again, who knows!). ""

      alas .. and after all they "confused" ... when they put it to the wall - for disrupting the execution of the order and even more so for their duties - they turned on the idiot - we got it wrong and didn’t understand what to do)))

      "" For some reason, tanks of foreign brands must suddenly, in the last days before the war, be "removed" from combat units, but armed with "small-caliber anti-tank artillery (where they do not have it)" (And they were not armed? And what does it mean? "there"? Is it easy to rearm a tank or an armored car from one type of cannon or machine gun to another - will it not take a month ""

      -))) Well, I’m saying - sometimes it’s hard for civilians to understand what the military writes about orders - without chewing in any way)))

      but - everything is simple ...

      Tanks of foreign cars seized those orders in the national corps which were in the depths of PribOVO and would have been needed elsewhere - to protect the headquarters or somewhere else))
      in PribOVO there were not many tanks — they hadn’t put them yet — and so they began to take tanks of the local armies — from national corps which would run away one devil)))
      But the PTO guns began to be delivered to the mechanized corps - not to the tower of the tanks, but INSTEAD of the missing tanks in these mk.))) The tank should have 1100 tanks in the mechanized corps, but there really are only half of them available))) And the tasks for mk no one will cancel)))
      So - Instead of tanks, they tried to equip them with guns in June in mk ....

      "" The air support stations should be equipped with communications ... (mother of God, didn’t these communications posts exist before?) Belay ""

      stupid duplication - that later the clever people didn’t say in the cellars of CheKi - you didn’t tell us that it is necessary to provide the communications with the airspace)))

      To understand the full depth of our depths - it is necessary to serve however))))
      1. +6
        22 September 2017
        About tanks of foreign manufacture - is understandable. THX. Although, why not do it in advance, and not at the last moment. About the "need to serve" - ​​we, civilians, are also not done with a finger. If com. the district treats the division commander as a fool, and publicly indicates to him that first he needs, they say, the main position, and only then the reserve position, then the commander will not be motivated to show professionalism, initiative and responsibility. He may "turn on the fool", even if he was not, will begin to literally do everything, i.e. in this case, place each gun and machine gun, and not control the regiments. As a result, he will fill up everything, and then explain that "I just obeyed the orders." And the district commander, after all, was not engaged in his own business, instructing the divisional commanders how to set their guns. He needs to set up armies and appoint commanders, establish supplies, and not teach the division commanders their craft.
        1. +6
          23 September 2017
          There is a comrade above in the comments, as always hot ...
          The Directive literally says VNOS as follows:
          "1. To the commander of the air defense zone, by the end of 19 in June 1941, bring into full combat readiness the entire air defense of the district, for which:
          a) organize round-the-clock duty at all VNOS posts and ensure their continuous communication;
          b) manufacture all anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, assigning round-the-clock duty on batteries, having organized their uninterrupted communication with posts, carefully preparing in engineering and providing fireproof equipment;
          ... d) organize uninterrupted communication of VNOS posts with fighter aircraft aerodromes ... "

          The fact is that the communication of air-defense and defense posts with air defense units and formations, air force units to perform tasks in the interests of air defense, and the units of the National Air Defense Force of the NKVD should be carried out via the communications lines of the People's Commissariat of Communications. The Directive deals with the organization of uninterrupted or uninterrupted communications - laying somewhere of the army communication lines, somewhere carrying out the duty of the military at the communications centers of the NCC to provide a priority queue for negotiations to these air defense services. At present, there are no lists on the Internet resources (of the period under review) of granting (for negotiations on the NCC lines) priority to different services.
  14. +6
    23 September 2017
    Quote: Predator

    And (excuse me) where did you see the encryption with the printed text, with errors (departure time, later than receipt time) ?! And on the TsAMO letterhead ?!

    When a person is nervous - he often makes mistakes)))
    Blank TSA MO RF. This is a simple operation: when scanning a document and post-processing, an image of the brand name is superimposed. You do not resent when watching a movie on the site, it happens that the logo of a TV channel is present in the corner.
    Time. Just PC had a lot to see. And not only ... On the form there is a standard error in secret clerical work. Its essence is very simple: when a person signs a document indicating the date, he involuntarily (the frequency of this event depends on several factors) can put the date, which is already present on the sheet or at the signature. If you look carefully once again on the PCS form you can see: the number "20.06 ..." is just above the wrong date
    You should also pay for the time "5-30". The SHO attendant was stupid from work or awake. To exclude such a situation, there is a very simple and effective way, but these workers are not taught this even at the present time.
    1. +7
      23 September 2017
      Clinging erality. You don’t react to small pickers, you write about major mistakes. In the army there is still such a rule: fulfilled - report, did not fulfill - report 2 times. He ordered verbally - in writing prove that he ordered and checked. Did not check - order in writing twice.
      1. +4
        23 September 2017
        I believe that everyone should be responsible for their actions and words.
        Especially the writer. If he writes that he understands better than a specialist, he must prove it. And he tells a lie. Opponent asked four questions to which he can answer or admit that he lied. Next, I am ready to continue the discussion. Unfortunately, my time on my site is limited to 2-2,5 for weeks. Opponent writes that he has "drugany" podpolkan FSB cipher and Colonel GRU signalman. Questions are simple, if such friends have to answer. But I do not believe.
        If you are deceived in the area in which no one understands better (at least on the site), how can you believe him in the area where we are comparable?
        There are several dozen readers who put asterisks to the article and to the messages. I think I have to report to them. Many people write in lichku (not only on the VO website) - and we communicate there. I think that I responded to your comment and therefore I do not have to answer the following ...
    2. -2
      December 6 2017
      Quote: aKtoR
      On the form there is a standard error in secret office work. Its essence is very simple: when a person signs a document with a date, he unwittingly (the frequency of this event depends on several factors) can set a date that is already on the sheet or at the signature. If you look carefully at the CT form again, you can see: the date "20.06 ..." is just above the erroneous date
      You should also pay for the time "5-30". The SHO attendant was stupid from work or awake. To exclude such a situation, there is a very simple and effective way, but these workers are not taught this even at the present time.

      I think that the point is not in the dumb attendant, but in the fact that the cipher telegram was processed first in a draft, and when reprinting the cipher’s form on duty, the officer on duty didn’t put it on June 21.06.41, 20.06.41, but June XNUMX, XNUMX. If you drew attention to the length of the decryption, then you would have guessed that either the cipherorgan was overwhelmed with work, or the ciphertext had to work for a long time due to erroneous groups, and the second number, separated by a comma, says that it was transmitted most likely twice.
  15. +7
    23 September 2017
    Everything was fine and right with us. it's the enemies who write about failures. We successfully sent troops deep into our territory, and when lured, we inflicted a crushing defeat on them.
    The worst of many comments is that everything was fine with us and our party could not allow defeat in 41. It was either betrayal or slander. I know from the documents of the initial period on the example of 61 RPM on the SF. We did not draw conclusions from the events of 41 of the year. Again preemptive strikes, etc.
  16. 0
    October 5 2017
    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  17. 0
    October 5 2017
    Quote: captain
    Everything was fine and right with us. it's the enemies who write about failures. We successfully sent troops deep into our territory, and when lured, we inflicted a crushing defeat on them.

    In wagon terms, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was 25126 and in 1942, 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses were at 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

    Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western border districts and were either directly in the troops, or in garrison and district depots located near the state border. During the retreat of our troops, part of the stockpiles of shots was evacuated, some were given to the military units, but most of them were destroyed or captured by the enemy.

    It is not possible to determine exactly how much ammunition was destroyed or captured by the enemy in 1941, because in the first half of the year the fronts did not report any losses. The identification of actual ammunition losses is also complicated by the fact that in reports delivered to the GAU, the loss of ammunition in many cases was shown as a military expenditure. Severe penalties were imposed for the loss of ammunition due to the lack of order of certain bosses, and in order to avoid it, the losses were often masked by military expenditure. It was impossible to verify such reports under conditions of troop retreat; therefore, in 1941 and partially in the summer of 1942, ammunition left or detonated during the withdrawal also fell into the information about the expenditure. In this regard, the quantitative characteristics of the losses given in Table 4 should be considered as the minimum values, since the actual loss of ammunition was undoubtedly large. It is also impossible to consider the data in Table 4 as completely irretrievable losses because some of the ammunition left to the enemy was subsequently repulsed during the attack of our troops and the fighting of the partisans and used to provide them.

    Taking into account the combat expenditures of the active army, expenditures on practice and testing, supply of ammunition to the Navy, the NKVD and air defense forces of the country, partisan detachments and other consumers not included in the Ground Forces of the Red Army, the total loss of ammunition in the first half of the war was excessive and exceeded 52 million shells and mines, or 60% of their pre-war resource (for ammunition for small arms - 42%),
  18. 0
    October 7 2017
    Quote: V.S.
    - Air defense led to increased B.G. from June 18 but 21 bg began to be canceled locally .. Without orders from Moscow.

    They worked on this - from Moscow Tymoshenko (personally-orally-by phone), and in the places like Dibrova, and in the center of Mehlis. In particular, they canceled orders to send families of officers from the border area and ordered them to be REMOVED FROM TRAINS and forcibly returned by patrols of the NKVD troops. The non-delivery of ammunition from stockpiles and the surrender to stockpiles previously issued were also extended. Party showdowns "about provocative alarmism" have already begun. It was forbidden to squeeze artillery from the warehouses of the artillery armament of the mobile reserve.
  19. 0
    October 9 2017
    From the document on the orders and actions received by the 10th air defense brigade in Riga, PribOVO, it follows that the brigade took up combat positions in a timely manner, received reinforcement from the air defense assets of the Latvian territorial divisions, received ammunition, and conducted round-the-clock readiness to monitor the air situation, in full readiness to reflect an attack on protected objects from the air on June 21.06.41, 21.06., and what exactly is June 1918. in Latvia OPENING ON RADIO announced the mobilization of draft age from 1905 to 9 Cancel city dimming - in this case, technical clarification of the readiness mode Although this AMAZING oddity came with encryption from Moscow signed by Zhukov. But in this particular case, SHE DID NOT DECIDE ANYTHING, since the first 6.00 German bombers appeared in the sky of Riga already in the full light of the morning and tried to attack the cruiser "Kirov", standing at the mouth of the Daugava, as well as the military airfield near Riga. They were fired hard, they dropped their bombs aimlessly, the targets weren’t hit, and they went "towards the sea." That is, in Riga and in the USSR as a whole at 22.06.41:6.00 on 22.06.41/30/50. it became clear that the war with Germany had begun, all the more so since it was OFFICIALLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY announced on the Berlin and London radio in the morning news broadcasts. Those. All fortune telling and doubts about "when the war begins" are in the past. The war has begun. Military districts became fronts, the shyabs opened the notorious "red packets" with combat plans for each front, each army, corps, division, regiment. And here the conceptual "moonlight" of the general and particular plans, launched and specified from Moscow, became clear to many. The first-line troops were prescribed a series of BATTLES, the unreality and even suicidalness of which was already clear by XNUMX:XNUMX a.m. XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX., Two hours after the start of POWERFUL German artillery bombardment in areas of state border breakthrough. With defense sections of XNUMX-XNUMX km, the first-line rifle division could not set tasks not only on counterattacks, but even on maintaining defensive positions! With such a density of troops of the first line, they were all doomed to dismemberment and encirclement after the first day of the German invasion. It was possible to count only on a separate focal TIME resistance, but not the retention of the front line.
  20. 0
    October 9 2017
    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
    From the document on the orders and actions received by the 10th air defense brigade in Riga, PribOVO, it follows that the brigade took up combat positions in a timely manner, received reinforcement from the air defense assets of the Latvian territorial divisions, received ammunition, and conducted round-the-clock readiness to monitor the air situation, in full readiness to reflect an attack on protected objects from the air on June 21.06.41, 21.06., and what exactly is June 1918. in Latvia OPENING ON RADIO announced the mobilization of draft age from 1905 to 9 Cancel city dimming - in this case, technical clarification of the readiness mode Although this AMAZING oddity came with encryption from Moscow signed by Zhukov. But in this particular case, SHE DID NOT DECIDE ANYTHING, since the first 6.00 German bombers appeared in the sky of Riga already in the full light of the morning and tried to attack the cruiser "Kirov", standing at the mouth of the Daugava, as well as the military airfield near Riga. They were fired hard, they dropped their bombs aimlessly, the targets weren’t hit, and they went "towards the sea." That is, in Riga and in the USSR as a whole at 22.06.41:6.00 on 22.06.41/30/50. it became clear that the war with Germany had begun, all the more so since it was OFFICIALLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY announced on the Berlin and London radio in the morning news broadcasts. Those. All fortune telling and doubts about "when the war begins" are in the past. The war has begun. Military districts became fronts, the shyabs opened the notorious "red packets" with combat plans for each front, each army, corps, division, regiment. And here the conceptual "moonlight" of the general and particular plans, launched and specified from Moscow, became clear to many. The first-line troops were prescribed a series of BATTLES, the unreality and even suicidalness of which was already clear by XNUMX:XNUMX a.m. XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX., Two hours after the start of POWERFUL German artillery bombardment in areas of state border breakthrough. With defense sections of XNUMX-XNUMX km, the first-line rifle division could not set tasks not only on counterattacks, but even on maintaining defensive positions! With such a density of troops of the first line, they were all doomed to dismemberment and encirclement after the first day of the German invasion. It was possible to count only on a separate focal TIME resistance, but not the retention of the front line.
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  22. -1
    October 18 2017
    Quote: captain
    We successfully sent troops deep into our territory, and when lured, we inflicted a crushing defeat on them.

    Military-historical site \ Archive \ The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    The composition of the artillery and mortar park in the military districts of the western direction
    as of June 1-15, 1941
    ATTENTION! When using the data in this table, a link to it is required!
    Samples of artillery systems Military districts
    LVO Appr.
    Field guns
    45 mm battalion gun arr 1932 and arr. 1937 1 068 1 059 2 154 2 276 963 7 520
    76,2 mm regiment gun arr 1927 354 311 657 678 296 2 296
    76,2 mm division gun mod 1902 52 30 12 16 8 118
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1902/30 95 220 278 440 131 1 164
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1933 8? ? ? ? 8 ?
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1936 209 396 629 810 256 2 300
    76,2 mm division gun arr 1939 10 72 107 67 - 256
    106,7 mm gun arr 1910/30 and arr 1939 30 62 102 227 53 474
    121,9 mm gun arr 1931 101 60 168 187 67 583
    152 mm gun arr 1910/30 24 - 33 38 25 120
    Mountain guns
    76,2 mm mountain gun mod 1904? - - 6? 6?
    76,2 mm mountain cannon arr 1938 4 - 6 192 32 234
    Field howitzers
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1910/30 341 475 719 848 369 2 752
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1909/37 94 15 48 123 28 308
    121,9 mm howitzer arr 1938 77 194 260 431 71 1
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1909/30 183 153 400 298 128 1 162
    152,4 mm howitzer arr 1938 101 108 178 314 72 773
    152,4 mm Vickers howitzer? - 67 - - 67?
    High powered field howitzers and howitzers
    152,4 mm howitzer gun arr 1937 179 332 494 612 213 1 830
    203 mm howitzer arr 1931 61 59 119 192 86 517
    280 mm mortar arr 1914/15 - - - 11 6 17
    280 mm mortar arr 1939 3 - 6 24 6 39
    Anti-aircraft guns
    37 mm and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns 127 116 212 292 70 817
    76,2 mm anti-aircraft gun arr 1931 and arr 1938 489 232 526 561 275 2 083
    Bofors 80 mm anti-aircraft gun - - 4 - - 4
    85 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1939 612 156 396 1 368 84 2 616
    Mortars
    50 mm mortar 2 198 2 081 3 875 4 373 2 138 14 665
    82-mm mortar 1 102 620 2 031 2 092 1 005 6 850
    107 mm Stokes mortar 107 50 91 114 46 408
    120 mm mortar 280 218 613 393 171 1 675
    Note: The table is based on district reports.

    June 1-15, 1941 (RGVA, RGAE)

    The table is first published in electronic version. So - more than half of this artillery, our troops left the enemy during the "successful retreat." Then, from the majority of these guns and mortars, adopted by the Wehrmacht for service, the Germans smashed us further to Moscow. They began to produce 122 mm ammunition for OUR cannons and howitzers themselves - in 1941-43. fired more than 1 million shots, and this MILLION was expended, firing at our troops and cities. I’m afraid, captain, it’s hard for you to imagine the destructive and destructive power of so many 122 mm shells. This is only one caliber ...
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  28. 0
    25 September 2018
    Quote: Kars
    Information on the losses of materiel of the 23th Panzer Division for the period from 22.6 to 13.7.41 of the year.
    Explanatory note

    Cars left in winter apartments:

    15 T-26 tanks: 3 vehicles of the 45 tank regiment and 12 vehicles of the 144 tank regiment.

    All of the above machines were awaiting average repairs, including 3 machines requiring major repairs.

    Tank repairs were started, all parts and assemblies that were available in the division were replaced, the delay was due to the lack of engines, piston group, final drive bearings, final drive oil seals, cardan joint bearings, heating chambers and a number of other details, which were not available.

    Part of the above parts and assemblies were sent from warehouse No. 942, but by the time of the performance they had not been received by the division.

    Before the occupation of Telskaya, the 12 tanks of the 144 tank regiment were concentrated on Art. Telsai to be sent for overhaul to industrial plants. It was possible to load only the 3 of the tank, as Komkov, the senior command of the military technician of the 1 rank, was ordered to finish loading and leave Telsai with the recommended representative of the District Military Council - the battalion commissar [227].

    4 tractors SKhTZ and 1 ChTZ-60 required major repairs, the district planned for July to be sent to industrial plants.

    From 12 ZiS-5 8 machines [overhaul] were required, 4 medium, overhauls were received from UABTV [228] Districts for overhaul, 4 cars required average repair, but due to lack of machine parts they were not on go in anticipation of an average repair.

    3 pontoon ZiS-5, 1 M-1 remained in winter apartments due to lack of rubber.

    3 all-terrain vehicle ZiS-5 - not on the move in anticipation of an average [repair] - change of rear axles, which the division did not have.

    16 pieces of motorcycles were waiting for repairs, the lack of parts delayed timely recovery.

    Of the total number of wheeled vehicles, 13 machines were repaired in the RBW, some had the chassis repaired, engine blocks were bored, that is, everything was prepared for the assembly of the machines, but due to the lack of a number of machine parts, they were not assembled at the time of the RBW’s performance with Quarters

    Losses of cars due to technical malfunctions, from artillery fire and aircraft:

    T-26 18 cars: 9 cars spoiling engines, 3 cars gasoline pump bodies burst, 1 spoiled, 2 spoiled chassis, 1 gas tank rupture, 1 ignition damage, 1 stuck in a cuvette during the retreat of our parts.

    Of the total number of 18 machines, 9 vehicles were sent to SPAM, some of the machines were disassembled for repair, but the threat of being cut off forced them to destroy the tanks, frequent movement of the division, the rapid advance of the enemy and the lack of evacuation facilities did not allow the tanks to be repaired or evacuated.

    The rest of the 9 vehicles were left to cover the departure of our units, as a rule, tanks from the rear marching outpost remained. Lost tanks with artillery fire from unoccupied territory by the enemy, as a rule, were towed out of the battlefield, when marching, lined tanks were also towed by tanks, but when they entered the battle they were left behind and in most cases were cut off by the enemy, and especially during the march in front of the enemy’s front.

    When marching from under Madona, 15 T-26 tanks were towed in tow, which reduced the speed of the column by 2-3 times, and also led to severe overheating of the towing vehicles.

    The continuous operation of the tanks in the absence of spare parts led to the fact that most of the remaining vehicles required engine rebuilding due to falling out of the saddles of the cylinders, because of the remaining 44 12 machines were not underway, the rest worked on 2-3 cylinders, and when towing such vehicles towing tanks due to excessive overheating, they usually light up.

    If there were tractors in the towing division, all tanks that were pulled out of the battlefield and failed for technical reasons on the way would be evacuated to the rear and restored, which would reduce the total losses in the tanks by 30 – 40%.

    14 STZ-5 tractors were lost from enemy artillery fire while encircling and leaving the 3 battery and 23 park battery of howitzer artillery regiment, in the same battle 10 trucks, 1 M-1 and 14 park battery trailers were lost. The remaining transport vehicles are lost from enemy fire in the period from 22.6 to 13.7.41 of the year.

    Transferred to other parts:

    2 battalion of tanks in the number of 87 vehicles T-26, 1 "Vickers" from the 144 tank regiment, by order of the commander of the 8 army, were transferred to the 10 rifle corps. 3 of the T-26 tank transferred to the headquarters of the 12 mechanized corps. 136 trucks, 1 M-1 vehicles, 2 ZiS-5 tanks were transferred according to the order of the UABTV of the North-Western Front to form the 202 motorized rifle regiment. 45 ZiS-5 trucks were removed from the TEP in the Telshai region by order of a member of the Military Council of the North-Western Front for the transport of shells. The 1 ZiS-6 vehicle was taken on the road to the 463 infantry regiment, Colonel Zhivykh, recommended by the representative of the 8 army headquarters.

    25 trucks and 1 tractor were taken in transit under the threat of weapons, including: 5 vehicles by the NKVD detachment of Riga, 1 tractor in the Telsai area of ​​the guard detachment commanders, 2 vehicles of the artillery regiment commanders, other vehicles were picked up by various persons.

    207 trucks, 2 tractors STZ-5, 4 tractors T-20, 1 passenger M-1, workshop "A" GAZ-AAA, tank ZiS-5, radio station 5-AK GAZ-AAA, sanitary GAZ-AAA before motorized rifle regiment in the 23 infantry corps, 10 infantry division and 90 motorized infantry division.

    If we add to this picture of the state of the NWF technology almost complete lack of communication, enemy attacks from the air, armed gangs and sabotage groups on the roads, then it should be considered a miracle that the fact that the troops and staffs of the 11th and 8th armies were withdrawn from the encirclement. At the same time, the actions of the headquarters of the front 22-30.6.41. can be considered a failure - namely, the headquarters of the front, led by its chief and commander of the front, the Military Council of the front as a whole. Which was soon done by the Bet.
  29. 0
    October 15 2018
    Pts. I recommend the author to highlight the directive of Timoshenko and Zhukov dated May 14, 1941, No. 503920 / SS / OS / in PribOVO and similar directives in other border districts. The content is set out in the book by V. Krasnov "Unknown Zhukov". M. 2000, ed. OLMA-Press, add. edition 2002, 575 pages, on page 179. This directive set specific goals and objectives, such as "destroy the port of Memel", designated specific railway junctions for strikes, etc. - upon receiving a command to start hostilities. After the report to Stalin and his harsh warning, the chief executives of the NKO and the General Staff were forced to cancel these directives. But the deployment of troops remained the same - "counterblow".
  30. 0
    October 17 2018
    Timoshenko and Zhukov knew the true situation with the readiness of the troops for defense, which is noted in the order for the PribOVO, in all border districts: "ORDER TO THE PribOVO Troops No. 0052 ov / ss on June 15, 1941.

    “The check of the combat readiness of the district units showed ... Major deficiencies were found as a result of the check of the units ... The commanders of the units and subunits did not study their areas of operation ... The criminal negligence and frivolity of the senior commanders is evident ... The interaction of the combat arms and management is hideously low ... The command staff does not know how to navigate the terrain. .. Does not know how to control ... Does not know how to organize observation of the battlefield ... Especially badly organized and conducted reconnaissance. The defense in the presence of parts of bunkers and bunkers in the regions is poorly worked out. Units do not know how to cover pillboxes and pillboxes from being captured by the enemy. Field guards and secrets are not sent to the area where anti-tank obstacles and wire are located at night. Communication with the garrisons of bunkers is not established and no one controls their actions ... "Some of these shortcomings could have been partially overcome at least around large cities and military bases until 22.06.41., But both chiefs aimed the troops at a deliberately failed" counter-strike "option, oh which the enemy knew in advance everything, or almost everything, although a simple knowledge of the adopted principle of counter-attack actions was enough to overturn counter-attacks and defeat the ineptly counterattacking troops of the Red Army.

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