Armored decked lightning. Cruiser II rank "Novik". Under the command of V.K. Witgefta
The June 10th exit was very significant for the 1st Pacific Squadron: its main forces went to sea in full force, having the task of defeating the Japanese the fleet. With the filing of the governor E.I. Alekseeva, squadron commander, Rear Admiral V.K. Witgeft, was convinced that the Japanese suffered heavy losses on mines and were greatly weakened, which could make it easy prey for his ships. However, for Novik this exit was just another routine campaign.
The first on the external raid of Port Arthur in the morning on the 10 of June was the “Novik”, but not the cruiser, but the steamer — he had to place training mines with caps along the ragged section, so that they would point the way of other squadron ships. The Novik steamer departed Port Arthur approximately 6 miles, but then one of the Japanese destroyer detachments that were observed on the horizon began to approach it, and the Russian ships that could cover the Novik had not yet left the inner harbor, so the steamer eventually came back.
The Novik cruiser entered the outer raid as the second (and first of the warships) on 04.30 in the morning and began to determine the deviation, which he did before 05.15 - this was important, since the Novik had to go ahead of the squadron, and on its other ships it was impossible to vouch for the accuracy of the indications of the compasses. By 08.00, all the squadron ships that were supposed to lead the battle entered the raid, only Pallas was delayed, as it had a steering malfunction and managed to hook the telephone cable with an anchor - as a result, it was able to join other ships only in 10.50. But even before the "Retvizan" left the internal pool, mine quest-master-master Akim Gurko arrived at the "Tsarevich", reporting that "Diana", "Askold" and "Novik" stood right on the mine bank, which the Japanese destroyers left in the night from 9 to 10 Jun. By order of the admiral, the outer raid was razed again, along the ships anchored on it — about 10 mines were found, of which 4 were not far from the “Tsarevich”, and one was found in 60 fathoms from “Diana”.
Finally, at 14.00, the flagship signal began to be removed from the anchor. The first was the main caravan - three pairs of dredgers and behind them the Novik and Yingkou steamers - with trawls. They were followed by two pairs of destroyers of the 2 squadron - and also with trawls, and the Rider and Gaydamak mine cruisers moved along the sides of the main caravan. Behind the sweeping caravan was his direct cover - the 7 destroyers of the 1 squadron. Behind them were Novik, Askold, and, for some reason, Diana, then the battleships, and closed the column Bayan and Pallas.
At this time, the Chin-Yen, the Matsushima cruiser, and also “about 12 destroyers” were in direct view of the Russian squadron: (1, 4, fighter squadrons and 14 destroyer squad) went ahead, so that prevent the caravan of Russians from doing their work. Then the 7 destroyers of the 1 squadron advanced to meet them, passing a caravan of trawls. The battle between them began in 14.10 from the 30 cable course, which quickly declined to 25, from the Japanese, 4 squadron fighters and 14 destroyers took part in it, while being supported by Matsushima. I must say that the Japanese in the official historiography confirm the battle of the destroyers, but they do not say anything about the friendly cruisers supporting them with fire. However, this battle clash is described so briefly that support could simply not be mentioned, due to its insignificance: the Japanese do not claim any success in this battle. At the same time, the domestic official story contains a description of a strong explosion under the destroyer “Immovable”, which caused a knock on the left screw, and the destroyer had to stop the car, however temporarily, and in the future it could develop 18 nodes. However, it later emerged that the propeller blade was bent at the destroyer and the shponka jumped out - it is doubtful that the Japanese destroyer’s 75-mm projectile could cause a similar effect, so most likely there was fire assistance from the Japanese cruiser.
Understanding that the destroyers of the 1 squad were salty, the 14.20 "Novik" increased the speed, went around the trawling caravan on the left and opened fire on the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat to the "Chin-Yen". After 10 minutes from the 50 cable range, the Novik cables supported the Diana cannons, and the Japanese destroyers were forced to retreat, and shooting at 14.45 stopped. At the same time, the Novik did not return to its place, but continued to move to the left of the sweeping caravan, and soon two Japanese armored and four armored cruisers were found from it. Then, on 16.40, Novik handed the admiral's order to the ships of the main caravan: to return to Port Arthur. In 16.50, the squadron was reconstructed - now 6 battleships headed by the flagship Tsesarevich were ahead, followed by cruisers, with Novik being the final one, and the cruisers and destroyers were on the right side of the squadron.
As you know, V.K.Witgeft led his squadron at sea - he intended to conduct reconnaissance at Elliot and give battle to the weakest Japanese forces, if any were found there. However, the information of the governor about the losses of the United Fleet turned out to be excessively exaggerated, and at the beginning of the sixth hour the Russian commander saw the main forces of the Japanese. VC. Whitgeft attempted to gain a vantage point for battle until the Japanese forces were determined and appeared to be smaller than they actually were, but his ships lacked speed. Then it turned out that the Japanese are much stronger than expected. All this prompted V.K. Vitgefta to the decision to retreat, which he did: at 18.50 the squadron turned 16 points (180 degrees) and went to the raid. At 19.15, the cruisers were ordered to move to the right flank of the squadron.
It was getting dark, and the Japanese commander sent attackers on the attack. In 20.27, a detachment of Japanese ships of this class attempted to attack the Pallas, but was driven away by fire. Then, in the 20.45, the destroyers were discovered by the Novik and the small cruiser opened fire on them - as a result, the enemy detachment turned it off before reaching the Russian ships with the 30 cable. In 21.40, on Novik, we heard a cry from “Poltava”: “Man overboard!” And conducted an exemplary rescue operation. A sailor who fell into the sea was discovered with the help of a cruiser searchlight, then the boat was lowered, which returned him to the Poltava.
In 22.30, Novik anchored between the Cesarevich and Askold and opened fire on Japanese destroyers several times a night. In total, 10 and on the night of June 11 the cruiser used up 3 segment and 109 high-explosive 120-mm projectiles, as well as 6 * 47-mm “steel grenades” and 400 rifle cartridges - the latter were used to shoot surfaced mines. Apparently, the Novik's gunners did not hit anyone, but the cruiser itself was not damaged, although its decks were showered with splinters, and one of the crew members, the quartermaster, Peremokov, was contused by one of them. In addition, in the course of these events, Novik saved three people - we already wrote about the sailor from Poltava, but when Sevastopol exploded on a mine when anchoring, some people on the battleship panicked - two sailors board, were caught by "Novik".
The next day, 11 Jun “Novik” was the last to enter the internal raid - it happened in 14.00.
The next exit of the cruiser took place in a day, June 13: I must say, the author of this article does not leave the feeling that on this day the Russian imperial fleet could have won a significant victory if VK. Witgeft acted more decisively.
The fact is that on this day the left wing of the Japanese 3 army was to conduct an offensive in order to capture the heights they needed. For this, the army asked for the help of the fleet, and it, of course, was given this help, but how?
The main forces of Kh. Togo remained on the "flying" base of Fr. Elliot, from where they, of course, could not have approached Port Arthur all at once. For the shelling of the coast, the cruisers “Asama”, “Itsukushima”, two auxiliary gunboats of an unidentified type, as well as the 2 th fighter squad, 6 th, 10 th and 21 th destroyer detachments were allocated. In addition, Port Arthur's reconnaissance and patrols were carried out by the 6 th combat squadron (Izumi, Suma, Akitsushima, Chiyoda), the 4 th and 5 th fighter squad. As far as can be understood from the Japanese official historiography, Port Arthur did not have other Japanese ships 13 of June.
It is difficult to say what the Japanese were guided by, highlighting such an outfit of forces: most likely, the feeling of complete impunity with which their naval forces acted at Port Arthur played a role. However, even in this case, questions remain to the detachment to bombard the coast: the fact is that numbered Japanese destroyers were included in it.
The most modern ships were the 10 Squad, which included the 4 destroyer No. 40-43 with a displacement of up to 110 t, armed with 2 * 47-mm cannons and 3 * 356-mm torpedo tubes, their maximum speed was 26. At the 21 squad, things were worse - the destroyers №№44; 47; 48; 49 had a displacement of 89 t, armament 1 * 47-mm torpedo tubes and speed 3 knots. And it seems quite strange to send an 356 squad consisting of destroyers No. 24-6 - ships with a displacement of 56 t, armament from 49 * 52-mm, 1 * 47-mm torpedo tubes and speed of 2 nodes!
There was practically no benefit from the 47-mm fluff during the shelling of the coast. But the above maximum speed of the destroyers could hardly be reached by them in combat conditions - apparently, the ships of the 6 squad and, most likely, the 21 th could not escape from Bayan, Askold and Novik in should the latter have come to pursue them. The same applied to the two unidentified Japanese gunboats - the Japanese did not mention their names, and from the Russian ships they were generally mistaken for steamboats (which, by the way, they could well be, the Japanese could simply re-equip civilian vessels), but it is extremely doubtful that they would develop speed over 10-13 units, which is typical for small Japanese ships of this class.
In other words, part of the Japanese forces, due to their small speed, could not have escaped from Russian high-speed ships, and only one armored cruiser “Asama” could cover their departure. The sixth combat detachment, when meeting with Russian high-speed cruisers, should have run away without thinking, hoping that the Chiyoda vehicles would sustain this race. As we said earlier, formally the full turn "Chiyoda" was 19 knots. But this - when forcing mechanisms, while "Bayan" could well go on the natural thrust of 20 nodes. But in fact, in the battle with Varyag, the old Japanese cruiser could not even hold 15 units for a long time: until 12.18 he followed Asama, but then he was forced to slow down to 4-7 units and left the battlefield. Of course, if “Asama” and “Itsukushima” joined the Japanese military detachment 6, then together they would be stronger than the Russian squad of cruisers, but who prevented the Russian commander from bringing heavier ships into the sea?
If V.K. Witgeft, having received information about the activity of the Japanese, ventured to withdraw into the sea a detachment of sufficient strength and then acted decisively, the Japanese were in a very unpleasant situation: they could not fight with chances of success, or avoid fighting. In fact, they could only run by those ships that had enough speed to do so, leaving the rest to be devoured by the 1 Pacific squadron. But in order to realize such an option, it was necessary to launch the Peresvet or Victory, in addition to a detachment of cruisers and all combat-capable destroyers, or, better, both of these ships at once.
In fact, the risk of such an exit was minimal - the “place of action” was not far from Port Arthur, these “battleships-cruisers” were noticeably faster than squadrons like “Sevastopol” and, although they were inferior in speed to the Japanese battleships, they could have keep a steady move at a level of at least 15 nodes. This was quite enough to have time to retreat to Port Arthur even if our detachment found the main forces of X. Togo in full force - the latter simply would not have time to get close to the effective range of fire until the moment Peresvet and Victory "did not depart under the cover of coastal batteries, and there the Japanese did not like to meddle too much. In addition, it would be possible to bring other battleships of the squadron to the outer raid, even without using them directly, but only as a cover just in case.
Alas, expect a similar from VK. Witgefta was completely impossible. Interestingly, in this case it is impossible to refer even to the governor EI. Alekseeva: the fact is that the courage and determination of the latter grew in direct proportion to the distance between him and Port Arthur. That is, the farther away this statesman was from Port-Arthur (and from responsibility, in case of the defeat of the 1-nd Pacific Squadron), the more he advocated active actions: at some point in time, for example, he strongly recommended V.K. Witgeft to take a raid "Peresvet" and destroyers to the Elliott Islands. In essence, E.I. Alekseev gave V.K. Witgeft is very contradictory instructions - on the one hand, “take care and not risk”, that is, his instructions explicitly indicated the need to maintain the strength of the squadron for a decisive battle, without wasting them. On the other hand, E.I. Alekseev demanded from V.K. Vitgefta decisive action: it is obvious that in this position, the governor was “covered” from all sides. If V.K. Vitgeft will not listen to the requirements of the governor to conduct an active naval war, because it is the fault of V.K. Vitgefta, not the governor, and if Wilhelm Karlovich would still have risked, but suffered significant losses, the governor, again, would not be to blame - he also ordered V.K. Witgeft not to risk in vain!
In the current situation, everything depended only on the personality of the commander - there is no doubt that if Wilhelm Karlovich had been replaced by a man of the warehouse S.O. Makarova, the 1 Pacific would be much more active. But V.K. Vitgeft did not feel like a naval commander, did not see the strength to lead the fleet to victory. This is all the more insulting because as an admiral he was not at all bad, and he proved it in the July 28 battle at Shantung by several simple but effective maneuvers by neutralizing Kheihatiro’s “dances” in the first phase of the battle.
In general, in a situation where VK. Witgeft should attack and try to destroy the enemy forces operating from the sea on the flank of our position; he could only decide to drive away the Japanese ships and bombard the advancing enemy ground forces. And, oddly enough, it sounds, did not dare to allocate enough strength even for such a limited-purpose operation.
Our ground forces, in the person of Lieutenant Colonel Kilenkin, asked for support for 13 June at 08.35, but back in 07.30 the Novik and gunboats Bobr and Brave were given the order to breed couples. The first were the gunboats, which went directly after the trawling caravan, followed by the Novik, who left the internal raid on 09.20, and the 14 of the destroyers of both squads followed them. This, strictly speaking, was all — one small cruiser that could fight on equal terms only with the weakest Japanese ships of the same class, the cannon ships and the destroyers. No, V.K. Witgeft has provided further cover, but what? To support the detachment, he brought the Diana and Pallas armored cruisers to the outer raid - I think it’s not necessary to say that of all the Port Arthur cruisers, these two “goddesses” who had the 17,5-18 parade course were the least suitable for to quickly support the ships that need it. Moreover, it is no less obvious that the firepower of these cruisers was absolutely insufficient to defeat the enemy. By June 13 it was already quite obvious that the Japanese cruisers prefer to operate the units on the 4 ship. Even combining with Novik, Pallas and Diana would have an 10 * 152-mm and 4 * 120-mm guns in the side salvo, and even the Japanese 6-second combat squad, with its frankly weak Izumi, " Suma, Akashi, and Chiyoda had 6 * 152-mm and 15 * 120-mm guns. And if suddenly "dogs" were found? Of course, the large sizes of the “goddesses” would play their role, the “six thousand meters” would not easily inflict critical damage with 120-152-mm caliber guns, and, in any case, these two cruisers, suffering damage from superior forces, could ensure a return. Novika "and destroyers (less confidence about gunboats). But what is the point of “asking for it” and taking the battle at a disadvantageous balance of forces, when 6 squadron battleships and 2 high-speed cruisers stand two steps away in the internal raid?
Not only did “Pallas” and “Diana” not fit for cover in their performance characteristics, they also lingered a long way down. As we have said, the Novik was released on 09.20 and he had to catch up with gunboats. But “Pallas” entered the external raid only in 11.50, and “Diana” in general in 14.00! And this despite the fact that the Japanese cruisers came to light almost immediately after entering the outer raid - Chiyoda and Itsukushima were seen in the interval between 09.20 and 09.40.
And so it turned out that having overwhelming superiority in forces - 6 battleships, an armored cruiser and 4 armored against two armored Japanese cruisers (if you count that Chiyoda, which had a small armor belt on the waterline) and four armored, the Russian involved only a small part forces available to them. As a result, Novik, cannon ships and destroyers had to act in conditions of Japanese superiority, which entailed the need for a certain caution.
In 09.40, Novik discovered Japanese ships that were identified as 2 steamer and 16 destroyers - apparently, they were 4 and 5, fighter units and 6, destroyer squad. The Novik immediately opened fire on them from a 40 cable distance, and after 5 minutes it was supported by the gunboat “Brave”, launching an 4-mm projectile at enemy ships 152 *. The 5 Squad was the first to come under fire, but the Russian volleys went undershoot, and the fighters retreated, with no losses or damage. At this the shootout was interrupted. At 11.00, the main caravan was released to Port Arthur, and an hour later the Russian ships anchored in Tahe Bay - the fact was that the order Belohr was handed over to the ship "Beaver". Witgefta do not go on Tahe.
For an hour and twenty minutes the detachment stood, doing nothing. Then V.K. himself arrived on the Vigilant destroyer. Vitgeft, after which the Russian ships weighed anchor at 13.40 and followed him. At this time on the horizon was clearly visible "Itsukushima", a two-pipe steamer and destroyers. The latter decided to approach in order to lure the Russian destroyers into the sea: from the Novik they were seen as 8 large and 4 small, but, most likely, there was a mistake. Most likely, there really were 12 destroyers, but only the 4th fighter squadron and the 6th destroyer squadron, that is, 4 large and 4 small destroyers, went to Tahe Bay, from where the Russians were leaving. VC. Vitgeft ordered to fire at the ground positions of the Japanese, so that at 13.45:XNUMX the detachment opened fire, while the Novik fired at the coast and at the Japanese destroyers at the same time, and gunboats - only along the coast. There were no hits on the Japanese ships, but the fire of the Russian cruiser forced them to retreat.
Russian ships fired on the ground forces of the Japanese .... Here, alas, these documents vary greatly. According to the report of the commander of the "Novik", the fire was stopped at 14.00, that is, they shot just 15 minutes, but official history reports that they shot before the 14.45, and the commander of the gunner boat "Brave" reported in the report that he had finished fire at 15.00! Comparing the data reports, we can assume a trivial slip in the report MF. von Schulz, the commander of the "Novik", and, perhaps, this is a typographical error of the typesetter of the collection of documents. Most likely it was that they actually fired before three o'clock and that the rear admiral ordered a cease-fire at about 14.45, and Novik (where the order was sent, most likely, a semaphore) was executed first, and the canlods were closer to 15.00, when on Novik they picked up and raised the signal with the admiral's order.
During the shelling on the Russian ships, the “main forces” of the Japanese were noticed, identified as “Assam”, “Itsukushima”, “Chiyoda” (which was right), and two cruisers of the “Takasago” type - the last was a mistake, these were previously mentioned cruisers 6-th combat detachment. The time of the discovery of the Japanese is also unclear: M.F. von Schulz reports that the enemy was spotted after shelling, when the detachment was returning to Tahe Bay. But the commander of the "Brave" claims that he saw the Japanese cruisers around 14.15, that is, long before the cessation of shooting. The only thing that can probably be argued for sure is that the cessation of the shelling is in no way connected with the appearance of superior Japanese forces - this follows from further events.
Most likely, V.K. Vitgeft suggested that the shelling of the ground positions of the Japanese reached his goal - but he did not lead his squad back to Port Arthur, but ordered to return to Tahe Bay, where the Russian ships moved around 15.00. But after only 20 minutes VK Vitgeft ordered to return and renew the shelling: from the shore, the “Imperious” was told that the Japanese had launched a new attack. At 15.40, the Russian ships again opened fire, and the Novik, like the last time, fired at land targets and nearby Japanese destroyers at the same time. However, already in 15.50 on Novik we saw the approach of 4 of large enemy warships - from Japanese official historiography we now know that they were the cruisers of the 6 battle group.
Fight them with the available forces. Vitgeft, of course, could not, and was forced to retreat. In 16.00, the ships stopped fire and returned to Tahe Bay, from where they immediately went to Port Arthur, leaving only the 4 destroyer to be on duty. Novik arrived in Port Arthur without incident, and entered 17.30 in the inner harbor. In total, the 13 * 137-mm and 120 * 1-mm projectile were used up by the cruiser for June 47.
What conclusions can be drawn from this combat episode? As we said earlier, due to the excessive caution of V.K. Witgefta 1 th Pacific Squadron missed the opportunity to sink several Japanese ships, even small ones. But in no case can we blame Wilhelm Karlovich for the lack of personal courage. Everyone admires S.O. Makarov, rushed to the rescue of the “guarding” on the small cruiser “Novik”, but in this episode, V.K. Witgeft took direct control of the detachment in the face of the superior forces of the enemy, raising his flag on the destroyer! Without a doubt, the squadron commander was a brave man, but ... as has been said repeatedly, the courage of a soldier and the courage of a commander are two different things. The first V.K. Witgeft was fully endowed, but with the second ... alas, there were problems.
Certainly, the exit of the Russian detachment disrupted the artillery support of the advancing Japanese troops, and the ships that carried it out were driven off. Moreover, the Russian ships opened fire precisely when our ground units particularly needed it - with the 13.00 the Japanese stormed the key elevation of the position, Mount Huinsan, and the shelling that lasted from 13.45 to 15.00 was most welcome. But alas, the effectiveness of the Russian naval artillery was not enough - in 15.30, the mountain was still occupied by Japanese troops.
Again, it is difficult to blame V.K. Witgefta: the strength of the three Russian gunboats, destroyers and Novik was not enough, of course, to smash the Japanese naval forces, but for a successful shelling of the coast, according to the views of that time, it was quite enough. In other words, failure here is most likely justified by the meager experience of the operation of the fleet against the coast, and not by the miscalculation of command. But it is noteworthy that the Japanese took the mountain half an hour after the Russians stopped the fire - who knows, if VK Vitgeft would go out to sea "in the grip of the grave" and continued shelling, not returning to Tahe, perhaps the Japanese would not have seized this elevation.
The next day, Novik again went to the sea to Tahe Bay and Luvantan, but this time there was nothing interesting - A.M. Stoessel already in the evening of June 13 sent a telegram to VK. Witgeftu asking for re-firing. Accordingly, 14 June in 06.30 “Novik”, three gunboats and 4 destroyers, having entered the external raid, again went to the position, however, in 07.40 AM Stoessel said that he no longer needed the help of the fleet, but he asked “until the situation was cleared up” to leave the ships in Tahe Bay for the time being. This was done, and the detachment joined the 4 Russian destroyers, left on patrol last day.
The weather was very bad, the visibility was minimal, but later the gunboats from 16.40 to 17.50 fired at the positions of the Japanese. They saw the Japanese destroyers and cruisers, but the matter did not come to a skirmish, and after completing their work, the detachment returned to Port Arthur. This time Novik did not open fire.
The next exits of Novik took place on 20, 21 and 22 of June, the cruiser went out for three days in a row, during the so-called battles for the Green Mountains, which began with General R.I. Kondratenko, on his own initiative, counterattacked the Japanese positions, which forced General Fock to send troops to storm the previously captured Mount Huinsan. As a result, fierce battles took place on the land front, and R.I. Kondratenko, noticing the appearance of Japanese destroyers, asked for support of the fleet.
June 20 in 10 hours came a detachment in the "Novik", three Kanlodok and 12 torpedo boats, an hour later they anchored in Tahe Bay. This time they were covered by the entire squad of cruisers, and not just the “Diana” and “Pallas”. “Novik” with two shots drove the destroyers that were spinning nearby, with which, according to M.F. von Schulz, there were two gunboats, but that was the end of it. Despite the fact that the ground forces sent their representative, Lieutenant Solovyov, and the detachment in 12.30 came to Luvantan, there were already Russian positions everywhere, so the shelling did not take place. The squad returned to Port Arthur at 18.40.
On June 21, everything happened again - on the 10.20, Novik launched an external raid, from where, accompanied by three canlods and 8, the destroyers went to Tahe Bay. A representative of the ground forces arrived again, and in the 16.00 the Novik and the gunners Gremyashchy and Brave were fired at the height of the 150, while the cruiser was firing crossover and the cannon-guns that had advanced forward were aimed. However, the fire was quickly “crushed”, because its inefficiency became clear - even the presence of a land-corrector officer, alas, did not improve the situation. Despite the fact that Novik this time spent only 5 * 120-mm shells, and the gunboats, apparently a little more, a few ship-based shells, as it turned out, became the location of the Russian troops. Alas, but at that time the fleet did not know how to interact with the coast: however, at least, the Russian ships, regularly leaving the Tahe Bay, prevented the Japanese from supporting their coastal flank with fire.
The most interesting events took place 22 June. In 05.00 Novik, the four gunners and the 8 destroyers again went to Tahe Bay in order to fire the 150 altitude again, and this time they were covered from the outside of the raid by all the other Port Arthur cruisers. In 06.50, on the approach to Tahe, Novik found 4 enemy destroyers and drove them away with artillery fire. The detachment went out to Luvantan, and Novik opened throw-over fire at the “150 altitude”, as aimed shooting was impossible due to fog. Then he was cleared, and Novik's gunners saw on the top a stone blindage, as well as the movement of the Japanese. Now 120-mm guns could shoot sighting, accuracy naturally increased, and movement at the “150 altitude” stopped. Having fired at the dugout, Novik also tried to crush the battery, which, according to intelligence, the Japanese had placed there, and since the latter had to be behind the parapet at the very top, they used segmental shells, setting the tubes for 12-second delay, in order to cover the Japanese guns splinters from above. Then the cruiser moved the fire to other heights, where Japanese troops were seen from the cruiser. High-explosive shells were used to fire on them; during firing, they were transferred to segmental ones.
The canlods also took part in the shelling, and at the “Beaver” the 229-mm and then the 152-mm gun failed first, and the ship was sent back to Port Arthur. The Japanese destroyers were visible, but they did not come closer to Russian ships than on 5-6 miles.
By 09.00 "Novik" already shot 274 projectile, the squad finished shelling and went to Tahe Bay, so that by necessity again to support our troops with fire. Such a need soon arose - R.I. Kondratenko again asked to fire at “150 altitude” and “80 altitude”, and shelling resumed in 14.25. However, now only gunboats "worked" along the coast, and the Novik and the destroyers covered them from the nearby Japanese ships, the destroyers and gunners, but the latter did not look for a fight. However, in 15.30, 2 of a larger Japanese ship appeared on the horizon, appearing to be Chin-Yen and Matsusima, which approached the Russian squadron. Soon the distance to the Chin-Yen was reduced to 7 miles, then on Novik they raised the signal to return to Port Arthur. The Japanese continued to converge, and when the distance was reduced to 16.05 cables in 65, Chin-Yen opened fire on Novik from 305-mm guns. The shells went into undershoots, and no cable was recorded on Novik as a drop in the 2. In 16.30 squad returned to the external raid.
On this day, Novik used 184 high-explosive and 91 segment 120-mm projectiles, as well as 10 * 47-mm "steel grenades". And, as we said earlier, one can only regret the indecisiveness of V.K. Witgefta, who did not dare to bring heavy ships to the outer raid - as a result, the Russian detachment, which had the important task of supporting ground forces, was driven away by the pre-ancient Japanese (more precisely, requisitioned Chinese) battleship.
If the same “Peresvet” and “Victory” were assigned to the “Novik” distant cover, in addition to the cruiser squadron, and they were allowed to act decisively, then with high probability 22 June would have lost the Chin-Yen battleship, and a fair share of their insolence.
Продолжение следует ...
The first on the external raid of Port Arthur in the morning on the 10 of June was the “Novik”, but not the cruiser, but the steamer — he had to place training mines with caps along the ragged section, so that they would point the way of other squadron ships. The Novik steamer departed Port Arthur approximately 6 miles, but then one of the Japanese destroyer detachments that were observed on the horizon began to approach it, and the Russian ships that could cover the Novik had not yet left the inner harbor, so the steamer eventually came back.
The Novik cruiser entered the outer raid as the second (and first of the warships) on 04.30 in the morning and began to determine the deviation, which he did before 05.15 - this was important, since the Novik had to go ahead of the squadron, and on its other ships it was impossible to vouch for the accuracy of the indications of the compasses. By 08.00, all the squadron ships that were supposed to lead the battle entered the raid, only Pallas was delayed, as it had a steering malfunction and managed to hook the telephone cable with an anchor - as a result, it was able to join other ships only in 10.50. But even before the "Retvizan" left the internal pool, mine quest-master-master Akim Gurko arrived at the "Tsarevich", reporting that "Diana", "Askold" and "Novik" stood right on the mine bank, which the Japanese destroyers left in the night from 9 to 10 Jun. By order of the admiral, the outer raid was razed again, along the ships anchored on it — about 10 mines were found, of which 4 were not far from the “Tsarevich”, and one was found in 60 fathoms from “Diana”.
Finally, at 14.00, the flagship signal began to be removed from the anchor. The first was the main caravan - three pairs of dredgers and behind them the Novik and Yingkou steamers - with trawls. They were followed by two pairs of destroyers of the 2 squadron - and also with trawls, and the Rider and Gaydamak mine cruisers moved along the sides of the main caravan. Behind the sweeping caravan was his direct cover - the 7 destroyers of the 1 squadron. Behind them were Novik, Askold, and, for some reason, Diana, then the battleships, and closed the column Bayan and Pallas.
At this time, the Chin-Yen, the Matsushima cruiser, and also “about 12 destroyers” were in direct view of the Russian squadron: (1, 4, fighter squadrons and 14 destroyer squad) went ahead, so that prevent the caravan of Russians from doing their work. Then the 7 destroyers of the 1 squadron advanced to meet them, passing a caravan of trawls. The battle between them began in 14.10 from the 30 cable course, which quickly declined to 25, from the Japanese, 4 squadron fighters and 14 destroyers took part in it, while being supported by Matsushima. I must say that the Japanese in the official historiography confirm the battle of the destroyers, but they do not say anything about the friendly cruisers supporting them with fire. However, this battle clash is described so briefly that support could simply not be mentioned, due to its insignificance: the Japanese do not claim any success in this battle. At the same time, the domestic official story contains a description of a strong explosion under the destroyer “Immovable”, which caused a knock on the left screw, and the destroyer had to stop the car, however temporarily, and in the future it could develop 18 nodes. However, it later emerged that the propeller blade was bent at the destroyer and the shponka jumped out - it is doubtful that the Japanese destroyer’s 75-mm projectile could cause a similar effect, so most likely there was fire assistance from the Japanese cruiser.
Understanding that the destroyers of the 1 squad were salty, the 14.20 "Novik" increased the speed, went around the trawling caravan on the left and opened fire on the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat to the "Chin-Yen". After 10 minutes from the 50 cable range, the Novik cables supported the Diana cannons, and the Japanese destroyers were forced to retreat, and shooting at 14.45 stopped. At the same time, the Novik did not return to its place, but continued to move to the left of the sweeping caravan, and soon two Japanese armored and four armored cruisers were found from it. Then, on 16.40, Novik handed the admiral's order to the ships of the main caravan: to return to Port Arthur. In 16.50, the squadron was reconstructed - now 6 battleships headed by the flagship Tsesarevich were ahead, followed by cruisers, with Novik being the final one, and the cruisers and destroyers were on the right side of the squadron.
As you know, V.K.Witgeft led his squadron at sea - he intended to conduct reconnaissance at Elliot and give battle to the weakest Japanese forces, if any were found there. However, the information of the governor about the losses of the United Fleet turned out to be excessively exaggerated, and at the beginning of the sixth hour the Russian commander saw the main forces of the Japanese. VC. Whitgeft attempted to gain a vantage point for battle until the Japanese forces were determined and appeared to be smaller than they actually were, but his ships lacked speed. Then it turned out that the Japanese are much stronger than expected. All this prompted V.K. Vitgefta to the decision to retreat, which he did: at 18.50 the squadron turned 16 points (180 degrees) and went to the raid. At 19.15, the cruisers were ordered to move to the right flank of the squadron.
It was getting dark, and the Japanese commander sent attackers on the attack. In 20.27, a detachment of Japanese ships of this class attempted to attack the Pallas, but was driven away by fire. Then, in the 20.45, the destroyers were discovered by the Novik and the small cruiser opened fire on them - as a result, the enemy detachment turned it off before reaching the Russian ships with the 30 cable. In 21.40, on Novik, we heard a cry from “Poltava”: “Man overboard!” And conducted an exemplary rescue operation. A sailor who fell into the sea was discovered with the help of a cruiser searchlight, then the boat was lowered, which returned him to the Poltava.
In 22.30, Novik anchored between the Cesarevich and Askold and opened fire on Japanese destroyers several times a night. In total, 10 and on the night of June 11 the cruiser used up 3 segment and 109 high-explosive 120-mm projectiles, as well as 6 * 47-mm “steel grenades” and 400 rifle cartridges - the latter were used to shoot surfaced mines. Apparently, the Novik's gunners did not hit anyone, but the cruiser itself was not damaged, although its decks were showered with splinters, and one of the crew members, the quartermaster, Peremokov, was contused by one of them. In addition, in the course of these events, Novik saved three people - we already wrote about the sailor from Poltava, but when Sevastopol exploded on a mine when anchoring, some people on the battleship panicked - two sailors board, were caught by "Novik".
The next day, 11 Jun “Novik” was the last to enter the internal raid - it happened in 14.00.
The next exit of the cruiser took place in a day, June 13: I must say, the author of this article does not leave the feeling that on this day the Russian imperial fleet could have won a significant victory if VK. Witgeft acted more decisively.
The fact is that on this day the left wing of the Japanese 3 army was to conduct an offensive in order to capture the heights they needed. For this, the army asked for the help of the fleet, and it, of course, was given this help, but how?
The main forces of Kh. Togo remained on the "flying" base of Fr. Elliot, from where they, of course, could not have approached Port Arthur all at once. For the shelling of the coast, the cruisers “Asama”, “Itsukushima”, two auxiliary gunboats of an unidentified type, as well as the 2 th fighter squad, 6 th, 10 th and 21 th destroyer detachments were allocated. In addition, Port Arthur's reconnaissance and patrols were carried out by the 6 th combat squadron (Izumi, Suma, Akitsushima, Chiyoda), the 4 th and 5 th fighter squad. As far as can be understood from the Japanese official historiography, Port Arthur did not have other Japanese ships 13 of June.
It is difficult to say what the Japanese were guided by, highlighting such an outfit of forces: most likely, the feeling of complete impunity with which their naval forces acted at Port Arthur played a role. However, even in this case, questions remain to the detachment to bombard the coast: the fact is that numbered Japanese destroyers were included in it.
The most modern ships were the 10 Squad, which included the 4 destroyer No. 40-43 with a displacement of up to 110 t, armed with 2 * 47-mm cannons and 3 * 356-mm torpedo tubes, their maximum speed was 26. At the 21 squad, things were worse - the destroyers №№44; 47; 48; 49 had a displacement of 89 t, armament 1 * 47-mm torpedo tubes and speed 3 knots. And it seems quite strange to send an 356 squad consisting of destroyers No. 24-6 - ships with a displacement of 56 t, armament from 49 * 52-mm, 1 * 47-mm torpedo tubes and speed of 2 nodes!
There was practically no benefit from the 47-mm fluff during the shelling of the coast. But the above maximum speed of the destroyers could hardly be reached by them in combat conditions - apparently, the ships of the 6 squad and, most likely, the 21 th could not escape from Bayan, Askold and Novik in should the latter have come to pursue them. The same applied to the two unidentified Japanese gunboats - the Japanese did not mention their names, and from the Russian ships they were generally mistaken for steamboats (which, by the way, they could well be, the Japanese could simply re-equip civilian vessels), but it is extremely doubtful that they would develop speed over 10-13 units, which is typical for small Japanese ships of this class.
In other words, part of the Japanese forces, due to their small speed, could not have escaped from Russian high-speed ships, and only one armored cruiser “Asama” could cover their departure. The sixth combat detachment, when meeting with Russian high-speed cruisers, should have run away without thinking, hoping that the Chiyoda vehicles would sustain this race. As we said earlier, formally the full turn "Chiyoda" was 19 knots. But this - when forcing mechanisms, while "Bayan" could well go on the natural thrust of 20 nodes. But in fact, in the battle with Varyag, the old Japanese cruiser could not even hold 15 units for a long time: until 12.18 he followed Asama, but then he was forced to slow down to 4-7 units and left the battlefield. Of course, if “Asama” and “Itsukushima” joined the Japanese military detachment 6, then together they would be stronger than the Russian squad of cruisers, but who prevented the Russian commander from bringing heavier ships into the sea?
If V.K. Witgeft, having received information about the activity of the Japanese, ventured to withdraw into the sea a detachment of sufficient strength and then acted decisively, the Japanese were in a very unpleasant situation: they could not fight with chances of success, or avoid fighting. In fact, they could only run by those ships that had enough speed to do so, leaving the rest to be devoured by the 1 Pacific squadron. But in order to realize such an option, it was necessary to launch the Peresvet or Victory, in addition to a detachment of cruisers and all combat-capable destroyers, or, better, both of these ships at once.
In fact, the risk of such an exit was minimal - the “place of action” was not far from Port Arthur, these “battleships-cruisers” were noticeably faster than squadrons like “Sevastopol” and, although they were inferior in speed to the Japanese battleships, they could have keep a steady move at a level of at least 15 nodes. This was quite enough to have time to retreat to Port Arthur even if our detachment found the main forces of X. Togo in full force - the latter simply would not have time to get close to the effective range of fire until the moment Peresvet and Victory "did not depart under the cover of coastal batteries, and there the Japanese did not like to meddle too much. In addition, it would be possible to bring other battleships of the squadron to the outer raid, even without using them directly, but only as a cover just in case.
Alas, expect a similar from VK. Witgefta was completely impossible. Interestingly, in this case it is impossible to refer even to the governor EI. Alekseeva: the fact is that the courage and determination of the latter grew in direct proportion to the distance between him and Port Arthur. That is, the farther away this statesman was from Port-Arthur (and from responsibility, in case of the defeat of the 1-nd Pacific Squadron), the more he advocated active actions: at some point in time, for example, he strongly recommended V.K. Witgeft to take a raid "Peresvet" and destroyers to the Elliott Islands. In essence, E.I. Alekseev gave V.K. Witgeft is very contradictory instructions - on the one hand, “take care and not risk”, that is, his instructions explicitly indicated the need to maintain the strength of the squadron for a decisive battle, without wasting them. On the other hand, E.I. Alekseev demanded from V.K. Vitgefta decisive action: it is obvious that in this position, the governor was “covered” from all sides. If V.K. Vitgeft will not listen to the requirements of the governor to conduct an active naval war, because it is the fault of V.K. Vitgefta, not the governor, and if Wilhelm Karlovich would still have risked, but suffered significant losses, the governor, again, would not be to blame - he also ordered V.K. Witgeft not to risk in vain!
In the current situation, everything depended only on the personality of the commander - there is no doubt that if Wilhelm Karlovich had been replaced by a man of the warehouse S.O. Makarova, the 1 Pacific would be much more active. But V.K. Vitgeft did not feel like a naval commander, did not see the strength to lead the fleet to victory. This is all the more insulting because as an admiral he was not at all bad, and he proved it in the July 28 battle at Shantung by several simple but effective maneuvers by neutralizing Kheihatiro’s “dances” in the first phase of the battle.
In general, in a situation where VK. Witgeft should attack and try to destroy the enemy forces operating from the sea on the flank of our position; he could only decide to drive away the Japanese ships and bombard the advancing enemy ground forces. And, oddly enough, it sounds, did not dare to allocate enough strength even for such a limited-purpose operation.
Our ground forces, in the person of Lieutenant Colonel Kilenkin, asked for support for 13 June at 08.35, but back in 07.30 the Novik and gunboats Bobr and Brave were given the order to breed couples. The first were the gunboats, which went directly after the trawling caravan, followed by the Novik, who left the internal raid on 09.20, and the 14 of the destroyers of both squads followed them. This, strictly speaking, was all — one small cruiser that could fight on equal terms only with the weakest Japanese ships of the same class, the cannon ships and the destroyers. No, V.K. Witgeft has provided further cover, but what? To support the detachment, he brought the Diana and Pallas armored cruisers to the outer raid - I think it’s not necessary to say that of all the Port Arthur cruisers, these two “goddesses” who had the 17,5-18 parade course were the least suitable for to quickly support the ships that need it. Moreover, it is no less obvious that the firepower of these cruisers was absolutely insufficient to defeat the enemy. By June 13 it was already quite obvious that the Japanese cruisers prefer to operate the units on the 4 ship. Even combining with Novik, Pallas and Diana would have an 10 * 152-mm and 4 * 120-mm guns in the side salvo, and even the Japanese 6-second combat squad, with its frankly weak Izumi, " Suma, Akashi, and Chiyoda had 6 * 152-mm and 15 * 120-mm guns. And if suddenly "dogs" were found? Of course, the large sizes of the “goddesses” would play their role, the “six thousand meters” would not easily inflict critical damage with 120-152-mm caliber guns, and, in any case, these two cruisers, suffering damage from superior forces, could ensure a return. Novika "and destroyers (less confidence about gunboats). But what is the point of “asking for it” and taking the battle at a disadvantageous balance of forces, when 6 squadron battleships and 2 high-speed cruisers stand two steps away in the internal raid?
Not only did “Pallas” and “Diana” not fit for cover in their performance characteristics, they also lingered a long way down. As we have said, the Novik was released on 09.20 and he had to catch up with gunboats. But “Pallas” entered the external raid only in 11.50, and “Diana” in general in 14.00! And this despite the fact that the Japanese cruisers came to light almost immediately after entering the outer raid - Chiyoda and Itsukushima were seen in the interval between 09.20 and 09.40.
And so it turned out that having overwhelming superiority in forces - 6 battleships, an armored cruiser and 4 armored against two armored Japanese cruisers (if you count that Chiyoda, which had a small armor belt on the waterline) and four armored, the Russian involved only a small part forces available to them. As a result, Novik, cannon ships and destroyers had to act in conditions of Japanese superiority, which entailed the need for a certain caution.
In 09.40, Novik discovered Japanese ships that were identified as 2 steamer and 16 destroyers - apparently, they were 4 and 5, fighter units and 6, destroyer squad. The Novik immediately opened fire on them from a 40 cable distance, and after 5 minutes it was supported by the gunboat “Brave”, launching an 4-mm projectile at enemy ships 152 *. The 5 Squad was the first to come under fire, but the Russian volleys went undershoot, and the fighters retreated, with no losses or damage. At this the shootout was interrupted. At 11.00, the main caravan was released to Port Arthur, and an hour later the Russian ships anchored in Tahe Bay - the fact was that the order Belohr was handed over to the ship "Beaver". Witgefta do not go on Tahe.
Gunboat "Beaver"
For an hour and twenty minutes the detachment stood, doing nothing. Then V.K. himself arrived on the Vigilant destroyer. Vitgeft, after which the Russian ships weighed anchor at 13.40 and followed him. At this time on the horizon was clearly visible "Itsukushima", a two-pipe steamer and destroyers. The latter decided to approach in order to lure the Russian destroyers into the sea: from the Novik they were seen as 8 large and 4 small, but, most likely, there was a mistake. Most likely, there really were 12 destroyers, but only the 4th fighter squadron and the 6th destroyer squadron, that is, 4 large and 4 small destroyers, went to Tahe Bay, from where the Russians were leaving. VC. Vitgeft ordered to fire at the ground positions of the Japanese, so that at 13.45:XNUMX the detachment opened fire, while the Novik fired at the coast and at the Japanese destroyers at the same time, and gunboats - only along the coast. There were no hits on the Japanese ships, but the fire of the Russian cruiser forced them to retreat.
Russian ships fired on the ground forces of the Japanese .... Here, alas, these documents vary greatly. According to the report of the commander of the "Novik", the fire was stopped at 14.00, that is, they shot just 15 minutes, but official history reports that they shot before the 14.45, and the commander of the gunner boat "Brave" reported in the report that he had finished fire at 15.00! Comparing the data reports, we can assume a trivial slip in the report MF. von Schulz, the commander of the "Novik", and, perhaps, this is a typographical error of the typesetter of the collection of documents. Most likely it was that they actually fired before three o'clock and that the rear admiral ordered a cease-fire at about 14.45, and Novik (where the order was sent, most likely, a semaphore) was executed first, and the canlods were closer to 15.00, when on Novik they picked up and raised the signal with the admiral's order.
During the shelling on the Russian ships, the “main forces” of the Japanese were noticed, identified as “Assam”, “Itsukushima”, “Chiyoda” (which was right), and two cruisers of the “Takasago” type - the last was a mistake, these were previously mentioned cruisers 6-th combat detachment. The time of the discovery of the Japanese is also unclear: M.F. von Schulz reports that the enemy was spotted after shelling, when the detachment was returning to Tahe Bay. But the commander of the "Brave" claims that he saw the Japanese cruisers around 14.15, that is, long before the cessation of shooting. The only thing that can probably be argued for sure is that the cessation of the shelling is in no way connected with the appearance of superior Japanese forces - this follows from further events.
Most likely, V.K. Vitgeft suggested that the shelling of the ground positions of the Japanese reached his goal - but he did not lead his squad back to Port Arthur, but ordered to return to Tahe Bay, where the Russian ships moved around 15.00. But after only 20 minutes VK Vitgeft ordered to return and renew the shelling: from the shore, the “Imperious” was told that the Japanese had launched a new attack. At 15.40, the Russian ships again opened fire, and the Novik, like the last time, fired at land targets and nearby Japanese destroyers at the same time. However, already in 15.50 on Novik we saw the approach of 4 of large enemy warships - from Japanese official historiography we now know that they were the cruisers of the 6 battle group.
Fight them with the available forces. Vitgeft, of course, could not, and was forced to retreat. In 16.00, the ships stopped fire and returned to Tahe Bay, from where they immediately went to Port Arthur, leaving only the 4 destroyer to be on duty. Novik arrived in Port Arthur without incident, and entered 17.30 in the inner harbor. In total, the 13 * 137-mm and 120 * 1-mm projectile were used up by the cruiser for June 47.
What conclusions can be drawn from this combat episode? As we said earlier, due to the excessive caution of V.K. Witgefta 1 th Pacific Squadron missed the opportunity to sink several Japanese ships, even small ones. But in no case can we blame Wilhelm Karlovich for the lack of personal courage. Everyone admires S.O. Makarov, rushed to the rescue of the “guarding” on the small cruiser “Novik”, but in this episode, V.K. Witgeft took direct control of the detachment in the face of the superior forces of the enemy, raising his flag on the destroyer! Without a doubt, the squadron commander was a brave man, but ... as has been said repeatedly, the courage of a soldier and the courage of a commander are two different things. The first V.K. Witgeft was fully endowed, but with the second ... alas, there were problems.
Certainly, the exit of the Russian detachment disrupted the artillery support of the advancing Japanese troops, and the ships that carried it out were driven off. Moreover, the Russian ships opened fire precisely when our ground units particularly needed it - with the 13.00 the Japanese stormed the key elevation of the position, Mount Huinsan, and the shelling that lasted from 13.45 to 15.00 was most welcome. But alas, the effectiveness of the Russian naval artillery was not enough - in 15.30, the mountain was still occupied by Japanese troops.
Again, it is difficult to blame V.K. Witgefta: the strength of the three Russian gunboats, destroyers and Novik was not enough, of course, to smash the Japanese naval forces, but for a successful shelling of the coast, according to the views of that time, it was quite enough. In other words, failure here is most likely justified by the meager experience of the operation of the fleet against the coast, and not by the miscalculation of command. But it is noteworthy that the Japanese took the mountain half an hour after the Russians stopped the fire - who knows, if VK Vitgeft would go out to sea "in the grip of the grave" and continued shelling, not returning to Tahe, perhaps the Japanese would not have seized this elevation.
The next day, Novik again went to the sea to Tahe Bay and Luvantan, but this time there was nothing interesting - A.M. Stoessel already in the evening of June 13 sent a telegram to VK. Witgeftu asking for re-firing. Accordingly, 14 June in 06.30 “Novik”, three gunboats and 4 destroyers, having entered the external raid, again went to the position, however, in 07.40 AM Stoessel said that he no longer needed the help of the fleet, but he asked “until the situation was cleared up” to leave the ships in Tahe Bay for the time being. This was done, and the detachment joined the 4 Russian destroyers, left on patrol last day.
The weather was very bad, the visibility was minimal, but later the gunboats from 16.40 to 17.50 fired at the positions of the Japanese. They saw the Japanese destroyers and cruisers, but the matter did not come to a skirmish, and after completing their work, the detachment returned to Port Arthur. This time Novik did not open fire.
The next exits of Novik took place on 20, 21 and 22 of June, the cruiser went out for three days in a row, during the so-called battles for the Green Mountains, which began with General R.I. Kondratenko, on his own initiative, counterattacked the Japanese positions, which forced General Fock to send troops to storm the previously captured Mount Huinsan. As a result, fierce battles took place on the land front, and R.I. Kondratenko, noticing the appearance of Japanese destroyers, asked for support of the fleet.
June 20 in 10 hours came a detachment in the "Novik", three Kanlodok and 12 torpedo boats, an hour later they anchored in Tahe Bay. This time they were covered by the entire squad of cruisers, and not just the “Diana” and “Pallas”. “Novik” with two shots drove the destroyers that were spinning nearby, with which, according to M.F. von Schulz, there were two gunboats, but that was the end of it. Despite the fact that the ground forces sent their representative, Lieutenant Solovyov, and the detachment in 12.30 came to Luvantan, there were already Russian positions everywhere, so the shelling did not take place. The squad returned to Port Arthur at 18.40.
On June 21, everything happened again - on the 10.20, Novik launched an external raid, from where, accompanied by three canlods and 8, the destroyers went to Tahe Bay. A representative of the ground forces arrived again, and in the 16.00 the Novik and the gunners Gremyashchy and Brave were fired at the height of the 150, while the cruiser was firing crossover and the cannon-guns that had advanced forward were aimed. However, the fire was quickly “crushed”, because its inefficiency became clear - even the presence of a land-corrector officer, alas, did not improve the situation. Despite the fact that Novik this time spent only 5 * 120-mm shells, and the gunboats, apparently a little more, a few ship-based shells, as it turned out, became the location of the Russian troops. Alas, but at that time the fleet did not know how to interact with the coast: however, at least, the Russian ships, regularly leaving the Tahe Bay, prevented the Japanese from supporting their coastal flank with fire.
The most interesting events took place 22 June. In 05.00 Novik, the four gunners and the 8 destroyers again went to Tahe Bay in order to fire the 150 altitude again, and this time they were covered from the outside of the raid by all the other Port Arthur cruisers. In 06.50, on the approach to Tahe, Novik found 4 enemy destroyers and drove them away with artillery fire. The detachment went out to Luvantan, and Novik opened throw-over fire at the “150 altitude”, as aimed shooting was impossible due to fog. Then he was cleared, and Novik's gunners saw on the top a stone blindage, as well as the movement of the Japanese. Now 120-mm guns could shoot sighting, accuracy naturally increased, and movement at the “150 altitude” stopped. Having fired at the dugout, Novik also tried to crush the battery, which, according to intelligence, the Japanese had placed there, and since the latter had to be behind the parapet at the very top, they used segmental shells, setting the tubes for 12-second delay, in order to cover the Japanese guns splinters from above. Then the cruiser moved the fire to other heights, where Japanese troops were seen from the cruiser. High-explosive shells were used to fire on them; during firing, they were transferred to segmental ones.
The canlods also took part in the shelling, and at the “Beaver” the 229-mm and then the 152-mm gun failed first, and the ship was sent back to Port Arthur. The Japanese destroyers were visible, but they did not come closer to Russian ships than on 5-6 miles.
By 09.00 "Novik" already shot 274 projectile, the squad finished shelling and went to Tahe Bay, so that by necessity again to support our troops with fire. Such a need soon arose - R.I. Kondratenko again asked to fire at “150 altitude” and “80 altitude”, and shelling resumed in 14.25. However, now only gunboats "worked" along the coast, and the Novik and the destroyers covered them from the nearby Japanese ships, the destroyers and gunners, but the latter did not look for a fight. However, in 15.30, 2 of a larger Japanese ship appeared on the horizon, appearing to be Chin-Yen and Matsusima, which approached the Russian squadron. Soon the distance to the Chin-Yen was reduced to 7 miles, then on Novik they raised the signal to return to Port Arthur. The Japanese continued to converge, and when the distance was reduced to 16.05 cables in 65, Chin-Yen opened fire on Novik from 305-mm guns. The shells went into undershoots, and no cable was recorded on Novik as a drop in the 2. In 16.30 squad returned to the external raid.
On this day, Novik used 184 high-explosive and 91 segment 120-mm projectiles, as well as 10 * 47-mm "steel grenades". And, as we said earlier, one can only regret the indecisiveness of V.K. Witgefta, who did not dare to bring heavy ships to the outer raid - as a result, the Russian detachment, which had the important task of supporting ground forces, was driven away by the pre-ancient Japanese (more precisely, requisitioned Chinese) battleship.
Chin-Yen
If the same “Peresvet” and “Victory” were assigned to the “Novik” distant cover, in addition to the cruiser squadron, and they were allowed to act decisively, then with high probability 22 June would have lost the Chin-Yen battleship, and a fair share of their insolence.
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