Armored decked lightning. Cruiser II rank "Novik". After the death of Stepan Osipovich
As we said earlier, 31 in March, on the day when Stepan Osipovich last time took the squadron ships out to sea, there were no losses on the Novik. But three of his officers - the commander of the cruiser MF. von Schulz, midshipmen S.P. Burachek and K.N. Knorring lost their brothers who died in Petropavlovsk.
And then, after the death of S.O. Makarov in the squadron came a period of almost complete passivity and apathy: in April 1904, the ships almost did not go out to sea, with the exception of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, the description of the actions of which lies outside this cycle of articles. At the same time, the Japanese continued to be active - they fired Russian ships in the harbor with throw-fire, tried once again to bar the exit from the internal raid on the external and, most importantly - on April 21, the news came about the landing of the Japanese troops in Bitszyo. The next day the deputy went urgently to Mukden, leaving the squadron command to Rear-Admiral V.K. Witgefta.
After the ill-fated release of 31 in March, when Petropavlovsk exploded, Novik stood for more than a month in the internal roadstead and did not participate in any affairs. Only 2 in May 1904 r he in 14.35 still went to the external raid in order to cover, in which case, returning after the attack of the Japanese 16 destroyer ships. These are the ships of the 1-th and 2-th detachment, which VK. Vitgeft sent into the sea after it became clear that two battleships of the Japanese detachment, "Yashima" and "Hatsuse", were blown up on the barrage exposed by the Amur mine layer. We will not describe this case in detail, since the participation of Novik in it is minimal - his participation in this operation was limited to entering the external raid. However, if I may say so, this aimless, in general, the output marked the beginning of an extremely intensive exploitation of the cruiser.
The next day, 3 March, V.K. Vitgeft was going to give an order to Amur to place a barrage at Melanche Bay, and cruisers and destroyers, including Novik, were supposed to cover it. But the mines were not ready, 11 of Japanese destroyers and 4 of large ships were noticed on the horizon, so the barrage was canceled: nevertheless, Novik and two destroyers, Silent and Fearless, were ordered to “go to the raid to practice personal composition. "
The meaning of this order, alas, is unclear to this day - Novik and its accompanying destroyers left for 13.00, traveled 8 miles, returned, and returned to 15.15 in the internal pool, the enemy was not noticed. Such, completely aimless movements along the raid, in the conditions of the existence of a mine threat, with which, despite all efforts, could not “win” completely, seem to be an absolutely unnecessary risk. It’s one thing if the ships went out to carry out a combat mission, or at least advanced into the sea for reconnaissance or training - and so ... The official Russian historiography notes: "This exit, which did not bring any benefit to us, at the same time witnessed to the Japanese the failure of the barrier the entrance by the firewalls. " True, in the latter it is difficult to agree - “Novik” went to the external raid and 2 of May, here, probably, the Japanese observers couldn’t say anything new to the Japanese observers.
But on May 5 an interesting thing took place. VC. Witgeft nevertheless sent Amur, who had 50 ready mines by that time, to set up a barrage at Melanche Bay where the minelayer had entered the 13.35, accompanied by the 4 destroyers and the Novik cruiser. Commander of “Amur”, captain of 2 rank Ivanov, commanded this detachment. In addition to the ships listed above, the “Askold” was also involved in the operation, which carried out, if I may say so, a distant cover, because it did not come out with the detachment, but was ready to go to its rescue.
Ships lined up. The destroyers went ahead, used as “anti-mine vessels”: they towed the trawls in pairs, followed by Amur, and after it the Novik. At first, they kept the course at 6 nodes, but then they increased it to 8-10 nodes — the trawls held up well.
But, without reaching 2 for miles to Sikao Bay, from “Amur” they saw enemy ships, which were later identified as 9 large and 8 small destroyers. As we know today, the 4 th and 5 th fighter squads met with the Russians, as well as the 10 th and 16 th detachments of the destroyers - unfortunately, the Japanese official historiography does not specify how many ships were at that time. By state, they should have been 8 large and 8 small destroyers - on the 4 ship in each detachment, but there may be different. Some ships could get damaged or have a breakdown and did not go on a march, and vice versa - sometimes the Japanese could rank another destroyer or fighter in the squad. But in any case, it can be argued that if the Russian sailors were mistaken, then not much, it was unlikely there were fewer 14-16 fighters and destroyers.
Kavtorang Ivanov immediately developed a very hectic activity. He ordered the destroyers to remove the trawls and sent Novik to reconnoitre, telling him "Not to approach the enemy and be careful." Then he called on the radio “Askold”, which, however, could not come instantly, because the “Amur” with the ships accompanying him had already departed from Port Arthur by about 16 miles. Nevertheless, at first, Ivanov found it necessary to continue the operation, because he divided the destroyers, sending "Domineering" and "Attentive" to the aid of "Novik", and "Watchtower" and "Rastenny" left at the minelayer, and with them he continued to move in the direction of the bay Melanhe.
I must say that the commander of Novik, von Schulz, saw all these events a little differently - with his words Novik went into the sea after Amur, but not in 13.35, but in 14.00, and after an hour and a half, 15.30, saw several destroyers. Then the cruiser received an order to reconnoiter and went at low speed to the enemy. This was dictated by the desire to get as close as possible to the Japanese, since the cruiser was poorly visible against the backdrop of the coast, but if he had made a big move, the smoke would surely give out. “Novik” “sneaked up” to 16.00 when the Japanese discovered it all the same, and, having divided into 2 groups, tried to get close and attack the cruiser.
In response, the Novik commander ordered the 22 to be given a node, turned astern to the enemy destroyers, and from the 45 distance the cables opened fire, taking the battle at the departure. This, of course, was extremely beneficial for the cruiser, since the fastest Japanese destroyers, even moving at full speed, would have taken more than half an hour to get closer to the torpedo shot - and all this time they would slowly approach each other. 120 mm guns.
Of course, the 22 node could not be dialed all at once, and some time was spent on the turn, so the Japanese managed to get close to the cruiser on the 35 cable. But already the first shots of the Novik from this distance lay down quite well, besides, the cruiser gained momentum, so the Japanese considered it best to retreat, hoping to carry the Russian ship with them. “Novik” “got carried away”, as it turned around and pursued the Japanese for some time, but then, seeing that it couldn’t catch up with them, turned back to “Cupid”. At this time, Ivanov decided to complete the operation and raised the signal to return to Port Arthur.
Such a decision may seem strange and even “overly cautious,” but it is absolutely correct. The fact is that the minefield is good when it is set up in secret, and here “Amur” ran into many Japanese destroyers. It’s not a fact that they could all be dispersed, all the more so that according to observations from Amur the destroyers pursued by Novikom were divided into squadron 2, which went in different directions. “Novik”, with all its advantages, could not guarantee that the Japanese, knowing that the Russians had gone somewhere, would not begin to follow our detachment. Even being driven away, they could easily appear on the horizon during a mine setting, thus reducing its value to zero. And the mines in Port Arthur already had not so much to be thrown by them in vain.
So, Novik, having stopped the pursuit of the Japanese troops, turned back and saw a signal from Amur, canceling the operation. But then the Japanese destroyers really split up and the five big fighters again went after the Novik. Mf von Schulz ordered him to slow down in order to get the enemy closer, and then, in 16.45, from a distance 40, the cable or so opened fire again. As soon as the Japanese came under fire, they immediately turned around and left.
At this moment, the Askold approached the scene of action — they noticed Novik first, since they saw how the cruiser fired the 2-3 shot, but from Novik they noticed the Askold only after the shooting was completed. At this adventures of the Russian squad ended, and he returned to Port Arthur. During the battle, Novik used only 28 shells with an 120-mm caliber, which speaks of it rather as a short skirmish.
I would also like to note that the very modest consumption of shells contradicts the very colorful description of this battle in the memoirs of Lieutenant Novik, A.P. Shter:
It would be quite possible to agree with the conclusion of the lieutenant, since we see that the Japanese destroyers fled every time the cruiser opened fire on them, but the description of the battle was highly embellished - including because the reports of other eyewitnesses (the commander of “Amur "Ivanov, commander of" Novik "von Schulz) does not contain descriptions of" tripartite attacks ". As for losses, as far as it can be understood, neither the Japanese nor the Russians received any combat damage in this battle.
The next time "Novik" with the destroyers went into the sea on the morning of March 13, searching for the enemy in the area of Tahe Bay. Having not found the enemy, according to the order, they stood at anchor in the bay itself until 17.00 in the evening and then returned to Port Arthur without incident.
The next day, March 14, the output of “Cupid” was repeated. The differences were that this time it was decided to mine the Tahe Bay, and instead of the 4 destroyers with Amur and Novikom, Gaydamak and Horseman cruisers sailed. This time, the Japanese were not met, and 49 mines were successfully delivered, and another mine due to heavy rolls was thrown upside down with a tripod, causing it to get some kind of damage (probably the cap was broken) and the mine exploded after 1-2 minutes after falling into the water. Fortunately, no one was hurt.
16 May “Noviku” in 18.30 was ordered to breed pairs and in 19.25 he went to the outer raid. Japanese destroyers appeared, but since the sunset on that day took place at 19.15, around 20.00 the cruiser was ordered to return to the inner harbor. Why was it sent at all?
General Fok insistently demanded that two Japanese gunboats be driven away from Hexi Bay, and 20 in May V.K. Vitgeft ordered the Bayan, Askold, Novik cruisers, two gunboats and 8 destroyers to be ready to leave. But in 05.00, General Stoessel responded to the request to send ships “no need,” and in 09.00 he changed his mind. VC. Vitgeft was originally going to send the Novik, along with gunboats and destroyers, to Pigeon Bay, from which the destroyers, if there was a fog, had to go to Inchends and attack there they would meet. Novik and the gunboats were supposed to remain in Pigeon Bay until they received orders, but all ended with the expulsion of the destroyers alone. "Novik" and other cruisers stood under pairs futilely.
May 22 “Novik” again escorted “Amur” - this time they put 80 mines at Pigeon Bay. Everything went without incident, except for the fact that this time the caravan came across a lot of mines and all three large trawls were torn, which in the end had to follow the light trawl stretched between two sixes. I must say that this route (along the coast) ordered VK to go. Vitgeft, but the commander of “Amur” considered him to be extremely dangerous, and his suspicions, alas, were “brilliantly” confirmed. But, fortunately, there was no loss.
Interestingly, May 28, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft sent two destroyer detachments (4 and 8 ships) to reconnoiter the islands of Cap, Reef, Iron, and Miao-Tao. The first detachment of the destroyers left in the morning, the second - in the evening, and in such an operation “Novik” could well be useful to them, since it was a decisive “argument” when meeting with Japanese destroyers. However, the destroyers operated independently, and the Novik remained in the harbor.
Quite another thing - 1 June 1904, when "Novik" almost used to solve its inherent problems. The bottom line was this - the generals asked to fire at Japanese positions from Melanche Bay, and at the same time, Japanese destroyers were found in the number of 14 units in Longvantan Bay, one of which went straight to the bay and fired at it. VC. Witgeft decided to counteract this and sent a detachment consisting of Novik and 10 destroyers, of which 7 were the 1 squad, and 3 - 2 th, into the sea. In 10.45, the destroyers of the 1 squad detached from mooring lines and went to the outer raid, where they connected with the ships of the 2 squad, then made a small course on the Cross Mountain in order to allow Novik to catch up with the destroyers. At this time, 11 of enemy destroyers near the bay of Longvantan was observed from the Russian ships, of which 7 was large.
Further, the reports of the commanders of Novik von Schulz and the destroyer squad Eliseyev are somewhat different. Most likely, the situation was like this: in 11.30, Novik went on an external raid, but did not connect with the destroyers (Eliseev writes that Novik approached them), and moved after them. Seeing this, the commander of the destroyer detachment ordered to increase their travel to 16 nodes, and the Russian ships went under the coast.
In 11.50 (according to the report of Eliseev) or in 12.00 (according to the report of von Schulz), Novik opened fire from a distance of approximately 40 cables and almost simultaneously struck Russian destroyers from their 75-mm cannons. At last, it was assumed that the distance to the enemy was 25 cables, which suggests that at the beginning of the battle Novik was behind its destroyers by 1,5 miles. At the same time, on Novik, 11 and 16 destroyers were observed, although the large ones were also 7, as Eliseev pointed out in his report. According to Japanese records, these were the 1 and 3 units of the fighters and the 10 and 14 units of the destroyers, so the enemy was probably counted more accurately, this is not surprising, since the review from the cruiser is better than from the destroyer. As for the ten-minute time difference of the beginning of the battle, it must be borne in mind that Russian logbooks were usually filled in after the battle, and not during it, therefore such deviations, alas, are quite expected.
Simultaneously with the discovery of fire, Novik increased the speed to 20 nodes, but the destroyers continued to go on 16 nodes for some time, perhaps not trying to approach the Japanese too quickly, until Novik caught up with them. When the cruiser began to overtake the destroyers on the left side, they brought the speed to the 21 node.
At first, the Japanese destroyers continued to move towards the Russian ships, responding with their 75-mm guns, but apparently under the influence of the Novik 120-mm cannons were forced to turn away and retreat. At the same time, the Russian destroyers noticed that three Japanese ships were lagging behind the others, so that Eliseev had a desire to cut them off and destroy them, so 7 of the most high-speed destroyers of the 1 squadron in 12.30 turned to 4 rumba and went in pursuit.
But the Novik and 3 destroyer 2 units didn’t follow them - instead, they continued their way to Melanche Bay, where they arrived at 12.50, and then proceeded to inspect the Japanese positions. At this time, a group of enemy destroyers again attempted to approach the "Novik", and, at the same time, Japanese trenches were discovered. The Novik opened fire, firing from the left side at the Japanese ground positions located at a distance of approximately 3,5 miles, and the starboard at the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat, so that they completely disappeared from view in 13.15. In 13.20, Novik, having fired at all targets visible on the shore, finally threw several 120-mm shells across the mountains, according to the intended location of the Japanese forces, and proceeded to destroy the deviation. The destroyers of the 2 squadron also fired at coastal targets, but, as far as can be understood, they did not shoot at the Japanese destroyers, most likely because the distance to the latter was too great.
On the destroyers of the 1 squadron, with 12.30 pursuing the enemy, 13.00 found that even the lagging Japanese ships could not catch up - the speeds turned out to be about the same. Shooting 75 mm guns proved ineffective, although Eliseev believed that “hits, apparently, were” - however, the distance, which at the beginning of the chase 25 cable, did not decrease. In the end, Yeliseyev ordered to stop the persecution, and by 13.30 he returned to Melanche Bay. There, having waited for Novik, the Russian detachment went to Port Arthur, where it arrived without any special adventures. In 15.15, Novik entered the internal pool and anchored there.
In this combat episode, Novik spent 95 shells of 120-mm caliber, of which 30 was fired on the shore, and 65 on Japanese destroyers, and in addition, 11 * 47-mm and 10 of rifle cartridges. Shooting on the coast, apparently, proved to be quite effective, disrupting the Japanese attack on the right flank of our ground position, but shooting enemy destroyers was again unsuccessful - the Japanese ships (like the Russians) did not receive any hits. So the only naval target suffered as a result of our ships leaving was a domestic mine, which was torn down from the anchor, and which was shot by Novik when the detachment returned to Port Arthur.
Novik’s actions in this battle may raise some questions, the main of which is why the cruiser did not lead the first detachment 7 destroyers and did not go after the Japanese. After all, even holding onto the 25 cable from the lagging Japanese ships, he could well expect to hit at least one of them with his 120-mm guns, make him lose his course and drown. But, judging by the available documents, the situation was such that Novik did not receive an order to fight the Japanese destroyers, but had an unequivocal order to bombard the coast, and that’s what he did. In other words, on Novik, they apparently believed that they were going to the rescue of our ground forces and considered it their duty to support them with fire as quickly as possible, while the enemy destroyers were regarded as nothing more than an annoying obstacle to the main task.
A day later, on June 3, Novik again went to sea, for the last time escorting the Amur mine transport. On the way to the future mine position, Amur, moving along the coast in a dangerous area, touched the ground, resulting in underwater holes, and flooding 5 between bottom bottoms and 3 coal pits. The minelayer was forced to interrupt the march and, entering the Pigeon Bay, proceed to patching and repairing damage, and Novik and three accompanying destroyers anchored in anticipation of the repair results - the fourth destroyer, “Stormy,” went to reconnaissance about. Reeff. Soon an officer from the land communications post arrived at the ships, reporting that Japanese destroyers were visible at sea. At this time, "Stormy" found a commercial steamer, and rushed in pursuit: all this was noticed on the ships of the detachment and "Novik", with two destroyers, leaving the Amur under the supervision of one "Fearless", he rushed to intercept. Soon, the Japanese destroyers 11 were discovered on Novik, but they didn’t make any attempt to get close and join the battle: the ship was stopped and turned out to be Norwegian Heimdall, which was moving from Kobe to Newchung for cargo for Japan. Therefore, von Schulz sent an officer and four sailors to him and ordered him to follow the Novik. The cruiser, destroyers and the captured ship returned to the Amur, which by that time was able to start a plaster, after which the detachment returned to Port Arthur.
At this, the actions of the minelayer "Amur" ceased. He received quite serious damage, which the artisans of Port Arthur had no strength to cope with, as they were loaded with repairs of other warships. In addition, there are almost no mines left in Port Arthur, so even if Amur were in perfect order, it would be impossible to use it anyway. Therefore, the ship remained without repair until the end of the siege.
A day later, on June 5, the cruiser’s adventures continued. This time V.K. Witgeft, at the request of the ground command, sent a detachment consisting of Novik, gunners “Gremyashchy” and “Brave” and 8 destroyers to attack the Japanese positions, which were supposed to be produced from Sikao and Melanhe bays. The detachment was commanded by Rear Admiral MF. Loschinsky, who held the flag on the brave cannon “Brave”. It must be said that this exit was rather risky, since large Japanese ships were visible on the horizon to avoid meeting with them, V.K. Vitgeft ordered to go under the coast, for the trawls.
At about 09.30 in the morning, the ships went to their destination, following in this order: in front of them were two pairs of destroyers with trawls, followed by both gunboats, then Novik with the rest of 4 destroyers. At the same time, 11 Japanese destroyers were seen on the horizon already at the time of entering the outer raid, but there were no cruisers, and the march continued. Already in 09.45, the first mine exploded in the trawls, and then, just in 2, the cable from this place was another, so both pairs of the destroyers, although they did not suffer, but lost trawls. The reserve trawl was one, on the gunboat "Brave", but M.F. Loschinsky did not consider it possible to go further under just one trawl, and sent one of the destroyers, the Watchdog, after another to Port Arthur, and the rest of the detachment's ships anchored in anticipation of his return. Approximately at 10.30, the Japanese destroyers left - right, there was nothing interesting in observing the standing Russian ships. Only in 13.00 the squad resumed movement, but already in 13.20 another trawl burst, catching something at the bottom, and then the Russian ships followed one trawl.
14.00 Japanese destroyers were spotted in 6, but they are gone. Almost immediately, 3 junks were found under sail, which were examined by destroyers, but nothing reprehensible was found on them.
Finally, at the beginning of the 3-hour of his detachment approached the observation post Luvantan, with him a rather vague message was sent to the ships that the Japanese had retreated and no one was there. Mf Loschinsky radioed V.K. Vitgeftu: “Colonel Kilenkin reports that the Japanese have left, there is no one to shoot, I ask permission to return,” but V.K. Witgeft insisted on carrying out the shelling. There is a persistent feeling that the squadron commander, who had repeatedly had problems with land leadership because of his refusals to send ships to bomb the enemy, was at least formally fulfilling the request. His instruction “You have a milestone map of the Kwantung Peninsula, by which you can find out the area that can be fired,” is hardly possible to explain.
As a result, the "shelling" still took place - "Brave" spent 2 * 229-m and 7 * 152-mm projectiles, and "Thundering" - 1 * 229-mm and 2 * 152-mm projectile. They were shooting “somewhere in the wrong direction” because there was no one to direct and correct fire from the shore, since a post was not organized on the shore and, although an artilleryman and an officer from the post Luvantan arrived on the ships, he did not help could
Events developed as follows: 15.50 on the Russian ships found 11 destroyers and three two-pipe and two-mast cruisers of the Japanese, they were going to connect to another single-tower and one-pipe ship, which was visible earlier. In 16.10, the candolls opened fire, in 16.25, the shooting was stopped due to its complete invalidity and went full speed to Port Arthur. The Russian detachment was "accompanied" by a small Japanese squadron of 4 cruisers, 6 large and 7 small destroyers: on our ships, the cruisers were identified as "Kasagi", "Chitose", "Azumi" and "Matsushima". This Japanese unit moved beyond our unit to Port Arthur at a distance of 6-7 miles from the coast, but the matter did not come to a clash.
As for the Japanese squadron, it is, as can be understood from the official stories, consisted of "Chin Yen", "Matsushima", "Kasagi" and "Takasago", which went on reconnaissance, attracted by the sound of shots. Moreover, the pursuit of the Russian detachment turned out to be accidental - it was discovered on Japanese ships already when the ships of M.F. Loschinsky already entered the outer raid of Port Arthur.
In general, the operation, perhaps, has become the standard of how not to fire the enemy ground forces from the sea. Sending ships under the coast was justified in terms of camouflage, but led to a great risk of detonation by mines. At the same time, if the Japanese understood in time what was going on, they would have had the opportunity to attack our squad with superior forces, and if Novik and the destroyers could easily have come off at the expense of high speed, then two low-speed gunboats, of course, could not. Of course, there is no war without risk, but it was worth the risk to achieve some goal, while firing positions without adjustment from the shore turned out to be completely pointless. It must be said that naval officers were very poorly guided by land maps, since the rugged terrain from the sea was poorly viewed, and it was extremely difficult to understand where the Japanese positions are. Alas, when the land officers began to take them to the ships, the land officers did not cope better with this orientation: the view from the sea and from a viewpoint unknown to them has its own characteristics, so even those who, being on land, saw the Japanese positions, having arrived on ships , could not always pinpoint them from the sea.
The next time Novik left Port Arthur 10 June, when, finally, all previously damaged squadron battleships, including Retvisan and Tsesarevich, were repaired and technically ready for battle. Thus, it was no longer meaningful to stand still further in the inner harbor of Port Arthur and, pushed by telegrams, instructions and orders of the viceroy E.I. Alekseeva, commander of the 1 Pacific squadron Rear-Admiral V.К. Witgeft decided to take her out to sea.
To be continued ...
And then, after the death of S.O. Makarov in the squadron came a period of almost complete passivity and apathy: in April 1904, the ships almost did not go out to sea, with the exception of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, the description of the actions of which lies outside this cycle of articles. At the same time, the Japanese continued to be active - they fired Russian ships in the harbor with throw-fire, tried once again to bar the exit from the internal raid on the external and, most importantly - on April 21, the news came about the landing of the Japanese troops in Bitszyo. The next day the deputy went urgently to Mukden, leaving the squadron command to Rear-Admiral V.K. Witgefta.
After the ill-fated release of 31 in March, when Petropavlovsk exploded, Novik stood for more than a month in the internal roadstead and did not participate in any affairs. Only 2 in May 1904 r he in 14.35 still went to the external raid in order to cover, in which case, returning after the attack of the Japanese 16 destroyer ships. These are the ships of the 1-th and 2-th detachment, which VK. Vitgeft sent into the sea after it became clear that two battleships of the Japanese detachment, "Yashima" and "Hatsuse", were blown up on the barrage exposed by the Amur mine layer. We will not describe this case in detail, since the participation of Novik in it is minimal - his participation in this operation was limited to entering the external raid. However, if I may say so, this aimless, in general, the output marked the beginning of an extremely intensive exploitation of the cruiser.
The next day, 3 March, V.K. Vitgeft was going to give an order to Amur to place a barrage at Melanche Bay, and cruisers and destroyers, including Novik, were supposed to cover it. But the mines were not ready, 11 of Japanese destroyers and 4 of large ships were noticed on the horizon, so the barrage was canceled: nevertheless, Novik and two destroyers, Silent and Fearless, were ordered to “go to the raid to practice personal composition. "
The meaning of this order, alas, is unclear to this day - Novik and its accompanying destroyers left for 13.00, traveled 8 miles, returned, and returned to 15.15 in the internal pool, the enemy was not noticed. Such, completely aimless movements along the raid, in the conditions of the existence of a mine threat, with which, despite all efforts, could not “win” completely, seem to be an absolutely unnecessary risk. It’s one thing if the ships went out to carry out a combat mission, or at least advanced into the sea for reconnaissance or training - and so ... The official Russian historiography notes: "This exit, which did not bring any benefit to us, at the same time witnessed to the Japanese the failure of the barrier the entrance by the firewalls. " True, in the latter it is difficult to agree - “Novik” went to the external raid and 2 of May, here, probably, the Japanese observers couldn’t say anything new to the Japanese observers.
But on May 5 an interesting thing took place. VC. Witgeft nevertheless sent Amur, who had 50 ready mines by that time, to set up a barrage at Melanche Bay where the minelayer had entered the 13.35, accompanied by the 4 destroyers and the Novik cruiser. Commander of “Amur”, captain of 2 rank Ivanov, commanded this detachment. In addition to the ships listed above, the “Askold” was also involved in the operation, which carried out, if I may say so, a distant cover, because it did not come out with the detachment, but was ready to go to its rescue.
Ships lined up. The destroyers went ahead, used as “anti-mine vessels”: they towed the trawls in pairs, followed by Amur, and after it the Novik. At first, they kept the course at 6 nodes, but then they increased it to 8-10 nodes — the trawls held up well.
But, without reaching 2 for miles to Sikao Bay, from “Amur” they saw enemy ships, which were later identified as 9 large and 8 small destroyers. As we know today, the 4 th and 5 th fighter squads met with the Russians, as well as the 10 th and 16 th detachments of the destroyers - unfortunately, the Japanese official historiography does not specify how many ships were at that time. By state, they should have been 8 large and 8 small destroyers - on the 4 ship in each detachment, but there may be different. Some ships could get damaged or have a breakdown and did not go on a march, and vice versa - sometimes the Japanese could rank another destroyer or fighter in the squad. But in any case, it can be argued that if the Russian sailors were mistaken, then not much, it was unlikely there were fewer 14-16 fighters and destroyers.
Kavtorang Ivanov immediately developed a very hectic activity. He ordered the destroyers to remove the trawls and sent Novik to reconnoitre, telling him "Not to approach the enemy and be careful." Then he called on the radio “Askold”, which, however, could not come instantly, because the “Amur” with the ships accompanying him had already departed from Port Arthur by about 16 miles. Nevertheless, at first, Ivanov found it necessary to continue the operation, because he divided the destroyers, sending "Domineering" and "Attentive" to the aid of "Novik", and "Watchtower" and "Rastenny" left at the minelayer, and with them he continued to move in the direction of the bay Melanhe.
I must say that the commander of Novik, von Schulz, saw all these events a little differently - with his words Novik went into the sea after Amur, but not in 13.35, but in 14.00, and after an hour and a half, 15.30, saw several destroyers. Then the cruiser received an order to reconnoiter and went at low speed to the enemy. This was dictated by the desire to get as close as possible to the Japanese, since the cruiser was poorly visible against the backdrop of the coast, but if he had made a big move, the smoke would surely give out. “Novik” “sneaked up” to 16.00 when the Japanese discovered it all the same, and, having divided into 2 groups, tried to get close and attack the cruiser.
In response, the Novik commander ordered the 22 to be given a node, turned astern to the enemy destroyers, and from the 45 distance the cables opened fire, taking the battle at the departure. This, of course, was extremely beneficial for the cruiser, since the fastest Japanese destroyers, even moving at full speed, would have taken more than half an hour to get closer to the torpedo shot - and all this time they would slowly approach each other. 120 mm guns.
Nose gun "Novika"
Of course, the 22 node could not be dialed all at once, and some time was spent on the turn, so the Japanese managed to get close to the cruiser on the 35 cable. But already the first shots of the Novik from this distance lay down quite well, besides, the cruiser gained momentum, so the Japanese considered it best to retreat, hoping to carry the Russian ship with them. “Novik” “got carried away”, as it turned around and pursued the Japanese for some time, but then, seeing that it couldn’t catch up with them, turned back to “Cupid”. At this time, Ivanov decided to complete the operation and raised the signal to return to Port Arthur.
Such a decision may seem strange and even “overly cautious,” but it is absolutely correct. The fact is that the minefield is good when it is set up in secret, and here “Amur” ran into many Japanese destroyers. It’s not a fact that they could all be dispersed, all the more so that according to observations from Amur the destroyers pursued by Novikom were divided into squadron 2, which went in different directions. “Novik”, with all its advantages, could not guarantee that the Japanese, knowing that the Russians had gone somewhere, would not begin to follow our detachment. Even being driven away, they could easily appear on the horizon during a mine setting, thus reducing its value to zero. And the mines in Port Arthur already had not so much to be thrown by them in vain.
So, Novik, having stopped the pursuit of the Japanese troops, turned back and saw a signal from Amur, canceling the operation. But then the Japanese destroyers really split up and the five big fighters again went after the Novik. Mf von Schulz ordered him to slow down in order to get the enemy closer, and then, in 16.45, from a distance 40, the cable or so opened fire again. As soon as the Japanese came under fire, they immediately turned around and left.
At this moment, the Askold approached the scene of action — they noticed Novik first, since they saw how the cruiser fired the 2-3 shot, but from Novik they noticed the Askold only after the shooting was completed. At this adventures of the Russian squad ended, and he returned to Port Arthur. During the battle, Novik used only 28 shells with an 120-mm caliber, which speaks of it rather as a short skirmish.
I would also like to note that the very modest consumption of shells contradicts the very colorful description of this battle in the memoirs of Lieutenant Novik, A.P. Shter:
“Once we had to deal with 17 destroyers; several times they tried to attack us with a common force, but, possessing a large stroke, we kept them at a distance from our guns, not allowing them to converge, which made them split into three groups that tried to attack us from three sides, but also they did not succeed, since we met with fire in turn all three detachments, not allowing them to act simultaneously. It was a competition in speed and in the art of maneuvering, from which Novik emerged victorious. The Japanese retired, having received, in all likelihood, damage, since the shooting was sustained and calculated, the sea was calm, which made it possible to correct distances and directions, and also to see the fall of the shells, which lay down in the majority perfectly. The collision showed that such a cruiser as the Novik had no control over any number of destroyers with good governance. ”
It would be quite possible to agree with the conclusion of the lieutenant, since we see that the Japanese destroyers fled every time the cruiser opened fire on them, but the description of the battle was highly embellished - including because the reports of other eyewitnesses (the commander of “Amur "Ivanov, commander of" Novik "von Schulz) does not contain descriptions of" tripartite attacks ". As for losses, as far as it can be understood, neither the Japanese nor the Russians received any combat damage in this battle.
The next time "Novik" with the destroyers went into the sea on the morning of March 13, searching for the enemy in the area of Tahe Bay. Having not found the enemy, according to the order, they stood at anchor in the bay itself until 17.00 in the evening and then returned to Port Arthur without incident.
The next day, March 14, the output of “Cupid” was repeated. The differences were that this time it was decided to mine the Tahe Bay, and instead of the 4 destroyers with Amur and Novikom, Gaydamak and Horseman cruisers sailed. This time, the Japanese were not met, and 49 mines were successfully delivered, and another mine due to heavy rolls was thrown upside down with a tripod, causing it to get some kind of damage (probably the cap was broken) and the mine exploded after 1-2 minutes after falling into the water. Fortunately, no one was hurt.
16 May “Noviku” in 18.30 was ordered to breed pairs and in 19.25 he went to the outer raid. Japanese destroyers appeared, but since the sunset on that day took place at 19.15, around 20.00 the cruiser was ordered to return to the inner harbor. Why was it sent at all?
General Fok insistently demanded that two Japanese gunboats be driven away from Hexi Bay, and 20 in May V.K. Vitgeft ordered the Bayan, Askold, Novik cruisers, two gunboats and 8 destroyers to be ready to leave. But in 05.00, General Stoessel responded to the request to send ships “no need,” and in 09.00 he changed his mind. VC. Vitgeft was originally going to send the Novik, along with gunboats and destroyers, to Pigeon Bay, from which the destroyers, if there was a fog, had to go to Inchends and attack there they would meet. Novik and the gunboats were supposed to remain in Pigeon Bay until they received orders, but all ended with the expulsion of the destroyers alone. "Novik" and other cruisers stood under pairs futilely.
May 22 “Novik” again escorted “Amur” - this time they put 80 mines at Pigeon Bay. Everything went without incident, except for the fact that this time the caravan came across a lot of mines and all three large trawls were torn, which in the end had to follow the light trawl stretched between two sixes. I must say that this route (along the coast) ordered VK to go. Vitgeft, but the commander of “Amur” considered him to be extremely dangerous, and his suspicions, alas, were “brilliantly” confirmed. But, fortunately, there was no loss.
Interestingly, May 28, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft sent two destroyer detachments (4 and 8 ships) to reconnoiter the islands of Cap, Reef, Iron, and Miao-Tao. The first detachment of the destroyers left in the morning, the second - in the evening, and in such an operation “Novik” could well be useful to them, since it was a decisive “argument” when meeting with Japanese destroyers. However, the destroyers operated independently, and the Novik remained in the harbor.
Quite another thing - 1 June 1904, when "Novik" almost used to solve its inherent problems. The bottom line was this - the generals asked to fire at Japanese positions from Melanche Bay, and at the same time, Japanese destroyers were found in the number of 14 units in Longvantan Bay, one of which went straight to the bay and fired at it. VC. Witgeft decided to counteract this and sent a detachment consisting of Novik and 10 destroyers, of which 7 were the 1 squad, and 3 - 2 th, into the sea. In 10.45, the destroyers of the 1 squad detached from mooring lines and went to the outer raid, where they connected with the ships of the 2 squad, then made a small course on the Cross Mountain in order to allow Novik to catch up with the destroyers. At this time, 11 of enemy destroyers near the bay of Longvantan was observed from the Russian ships, of which 7 was large.
Further, the reports of the commanders of Novik von Schulz and the destroyer squad Eliseyev are somewhat different. Most likely, the situation was like this: in 11.30, Novik went on an external raid, but did not connect with the destroyers (Eliseev writes that Novik approached them), and moved after them. Seeing this, the commander of the destroyer detachment ordered to increase their travel to 16 nodes, and the Russian ships went under the coast.
In 11.50 (according to the report of Eliseev) or in 12.00 (according to the report of von Schulz), Novik opened fire from a distance of approximately 40 cables and almost simultaneously struck Russian destroyers from their 75-mm cannons. At last, it was assumed that the distance to the enemy was 25 cables, which suggests that at the beginning of the battle Novik was behind its destroyers by 1,5 miles. At the same time, on Novik, 11 and 16 destroyers were observed, although the large ones were also 7, as Eliseev pointed out in his report. According to Japanese records, these were the 1 and 3 units of the fighters and the 10 and 14 units of the destroyers, so the enemy was probably counted more accurately, this is not surprising, since the review from the cruiser is better than from the destroyer. As for the ten-minute time difference of the beginning of the battle, it must be borne in mind that Russian logbooks were usually filled in after the battle, and not during it, therefore such deviations, alas, are quite expected.
Simultaneously with the discovery of fire, Novik increased the speed to 20 nodes, but the destroyers continued to go on 16 nodes for some time, perhaps not trying to approach the Japanese too quickly, until Novik caught up with them. When the cruiser began to overtake the destroyers on the left side, they brought the speed to the 21 node.
At first, the Japanese destroyers continued to move towards the Russian ships, responding with their 75-mm guns, but apparently under the influence of the Novik 120-mm cannons were forced to turn away and retreat. At the same time, the Russian destroyers noticed that three Japanese ships were lagging behind the others, so that Eliseev had a desire to cut them off and destroy them, so 7 of the most high-speed destroyers of the 1 squadron in 12.30 turned to 4 rumba and went in pursuit.
But the Novik and 3 destroyer 2 units didn’t follow them - instead, they continued their way to Melanche Bay, where they arrived at 12.50, and then proceeded to inspect the Japanese positions. At this time, a group of enemy destroyers again attempted to approach the "Novik", and, at the same time, Japanese trenches were discovered. The Novik opened fire, firing from the left side at the Japanese ground positions located at a distance of approximately 3,5 miles, and the starboard at the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat, so that they completely disappeared from view in 13.15. In 13.20, Novik, having fired at all targets visible on the shore, finally threw several 120-mm shells across the mountains, according to the intended location of the Japanese forces, and proceeded to destroy the deviation. The destroyers of the 2 squadron also fired at coastal targets, but, as far as can be understood, they did not shoot at the Japanese destroyers, most likely because the distance to the latter was too great.
On the destroyers of the 1 squadron, with 12.30 pursuing the enemy, 13.00 found that even the lagging Japanese ships could not catch up - the speeds turned out to be about the same. Shooting 75 mm guns proved ineffective, although Eliseev believed that “hits, apparently, were” - however, the distance, which at the beginning of the chase 25 cable, did not decrease. In the end, Yeliseyev ordered to stop the persecution, and by 13.30 he returned to Melanche Bay. There, having waited for Novik, the Russian detachment went to Port Arthur, where it arrived without any special adventures. In 15.15, Novik entered the internal pool and anchored there.
Novik in the Port Arthur East Basin
In this combat episode, Novik spent 95 shells of 120-mm caliber, of which 30 was fired on the shore, and 65 on Japanese destroyers, and in addition, 11 * 47-mm and 10 of rifle cartridges. Shooting on the coast, apparently, proved to be quite effective, disrupting the Japanese attack on the right flank of our ground position, but shooting enemy destroyers was again unsuccessful - the Japanese ships (like the Russians) did not receive any hits. So the only naval target suffered as a result of our ships leaving was a domestic mine, which was torn down from the anchor, and which was shot by Novik when the detachment returned to Port Arthur.
Novik’s actions in this battle may raise some questions, the main of which is why the cruiser did not lead the first detachment 7 destroyers and did not go after the Japanese. After all, even holding onto the 25 cable from the lagging Japanese ships, he could well expect to hit at least one of them with his 120-mm guns, make him lose his course and drown. But, judging by the available documents, the situation was such that Novik did not receive an order to fight the Japanese destroyers, but had an unequivocal order to bombard the coast, and that’s what he did. In other words, on Novik, they apparently believed that they were going to the rescue of our ground forces and considered it their duty to support them with fire as quickly as possible, while the enemy destroyers were regarded as nothing more than an annoying obstacle to the main task.
A day later, on June 3, Novik again went to sea, for the last time escorting the Amur mine transport. On the way to the future mine position, Amur, moving along the coast in a dangerous area, touched the ground, resulting in underwater holes, and flooding 5 between bottom bottoms and 3 coal pits. The minelayer was forced to interrupt the march and, entering the Pigeon Bay, proceed to patching and repairing damage, and Novik and three accompanying destroyers anchored in anticipation of the repair results - the fourth destroyer, “Stormy,” went to reconnaissance about. Reeff. Soon an officer from the land communications post arrived at the ships, reporting that Japanese destroyers were visible at sea. At this time, "Stormy" found a commercial steamer, and rushed in pursuit: all this was noticed on the ships of the detachment and "Novik", with two destroyers, leaving the Amur under the supervision of one "Fearless", he rushed to intercept. Soon, the Japanese destroyers 11 were discovered on Novik, but they didn’t make any attempt to get close and join the battle: the ship was stopped and turned out to be Norwegian Heimdall, which was moving from Kobe to Newchung for cargo for Japan. Therefore, von Schulz sent an officer and four sailors to him and ordered him to follow the Novik. The cruiser, destroyers and the captured ship returned to the Amur, which by that time was able to start a plaster, after which the detachment returned to Port Arthur.
At this, the actions of the minelayer "Amur" ceased. He received quite serious damage, which the artisans of Port Arthur had no strength to cope with, as they were loaded with repairs of other warships. In addition, there are almost no mines left in Port Arthur, so even if Amur were in perfect order, it would be impossible to use it anyway. Therefore, the ship remained without repair until the end of the siege.
A day later, on June 5, the cruiser’s adventures continued. This time V.K. Witgeft, at the request of the ground command, sent a detachment consisting of Novik, gunners “Gremyashchy” and “Brave” and 8 destroyers to attack the Japanese positions, which were supposed to be produced from Sikao and Melanhe bays. The detachment was commanded by Rear Admiral MF. Loschinsky, who held the flag on the brave cannon “Brave”. It must be said that this exit was rather risky, since large Japanese ships were visible on the horizon to avoid meeting with them, V.K. Vitgeft ordered to go under the coast, for the trawls.
At about 09.30 in the morning, the ships went to their destination, following in this order: in front of them were two pairs of destroyers with trawls, followed by both gunboats, then Novik with the rest of 4 destroyers. At the same time, 11 Japanese destroyers were seen on the horizon already at the time of entering the outer raid, but there were no cruisers, and the march continued. Already in 09.45, the first mine exploded in the trawls, and then, just in 2, the cable from this place was another, so both pairs of the destroyers, although they did not suffer, but lost trawls. The reserve trawl was one, on the gunboat "Brave", but M.F. Loschinsky did not consider it possible to go further under just one trawl, and sent one of the destroyers, the Watchdog, after another to Port Arthur, and the rest of the detachment's ships anchored in anticipation of his return. Approximately at 10.30, the Japanese destroyers left - right, there was nothing interesting in observing the standing Russian ships. Only in 13.00 the squad resumed movement, but already in 13.20 another trawl burst, catching something at the bottom, and then the Russian ships followed one trawl.
14.00 Japanese destroyers were spotted in 6, but they are gone. Almost immediately, 3 junks were found under sail, which were examined by destroyers, but nothing reprehensible was found on them.
Finally, at the beginning of the 3-hour of his detachment approached the observation post Luvantan, with him a rather vague message was sent to the ships that the Japanese had retreated and no one was there. Mf Loschinsky radioed V.K. Vitgeftu: “Colonel Kilenkin reports that the Japanese have left, there is no one to shoot, I ask permission to return,” but V.K. Witgeft insisted on carrying out the shelling. There is a persistent feeling that the squadron commander, who had repeatedly had problems with land leadership because of his refusals to send ships to bomb the enemy, was at least formally fulfilling the request. His instruction “You have a milestone map of the Kwantung Peninsula, by which you can find out the area that can be fired,” is hardly possible to explain.
As a result, the "shelling" still took place - "Brave" spent 2 * 229-m and 7 * 152-mm projectiles, and "Thundering" - 1 * 229-mm and 2 * 152-mm projectile. They were shooting “somewhere in the wrong direction” because there was no one to direct and correct fire from the shore, since a post was not organized on the shore and, although an artilleryman and an officer from the post Luvantan arrived on the ships, he did not help could
Events developed as follows: 15.50 on the Russian ships found 11 destroyers and three two-pipe and two-mast cruisers of the Japanese, they were going to connect to another single-tower and one-pipe ship, which was visible earlier. In 16.10, the candolls opened fire, in 16.25, the shooting was stopped due to its complete invalidity and went full speed to Port Arthur. The Russian detachment was "accompanied" by a small Japanese squadron of 4 cruisers, 6 large and 7 small destroyers: on our ships, the cruisers were identified as "Kasagi", "Chitose", "Azumi" and "Matsushima". This Japanese unit moved beyond our unit to Port Arthur at a distance of 6-7 miles from the coast, but the matter did not come to a clash.
As for the Japanese squadron, it is, as can be understood from the official stories, consisted of "Chin Yen", "Matsushima", "Kasagi" and "Takasago", which went on reconnaissance, attracted by the sound of shots. Moreover, the pursuit of the Russian detachment turned out to be accidental - it was discovered on Japanese ships already when the ships of M.F. Loschinsky already entered the outer raid of Port Arthur.
In general, the operation, perhaps, has become the standard of how not to fire the enemy ground forces from the sea. Sending ships under the coast was justified in terms of camouflage, but led to a great risk of detonation by mines. At the same time, if the Japanese understood in time what was going on, they would have had the opportunity to attack our squad with superior forces, and if Novik and the destroyers could easily have come off at the expense of high speed, then two low-speed gunboats, of course, could not. Of course, there is no war without risk, but it was worth the risk to achieve some goal, while firing positions without adjustment from the shore turned out to be completely pointless. It must be said that naval officers were very poorly guided by land maps, since the rugged terrain from the sea was poorly viewed, and it was extremely difficult to understand where the Japanese positions are. Alas, when the land officers began to take them to the ships, the land officers did not cope better with this orientation: the view from the sea and from a viewpoint unknown to them has its own characteristics, so even those who, being on land, saw the Japanese positions, having arrived on ships , could not always pinpoint them from the sea.
The next time Novik left Port Arthur 10 June, when, finally, all previously damaged squadron battleships, including Retvisan and Tsesarevich, were repaired and technically ready for battle. Thus, it was no longer meaningful to stand still further in the inner harbor of Port Arthur and, pushed by telegrams, instructions and orders of the viceroy E.I. Alekseeva, commander of the 1 Pacific squadron Rear-Admiral V.К. Witgeft decided to take her out to sea.
To be continued ...
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