There is a people's war. How to save Moscow from the Nazis

106
Future plans of the German command

After the first stage of the operation "Typhoon" was carried out, the Nazis were going to pursue the remnants of the defeated troops to Moscow, and then take the Soviet capital. Hitler and his generals planned to level Moscow and Leningrad, which led to the destruction of the majority of the population of the largest Soviet cities.



October 6, 1941, when the 3rd and 4th tank the groups united east of Vyazma, taking large forces of the Red Army into the encirclement ring, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of Germany, General Field Marshal Brauchich, Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Halder and Chief of the Operations Division of this headquarters, arrived in Orsha in the Army Group Center to its commander von Bock Heusinger. The German command coordinated the further actions of the troops.

October 7 1941 of the year Brauchitsch gave the order: “To chase in the direction of Moscow”. Guderian's 2 Panzer Army moved toward Tula, Weish's 2 Army was to destroy the surrounded Soviet troops, Kluge's 4 Army and Göpner's 4 Panzer Group attacked the Mozhaisk direction, Strauss's 9 Army with the 3-th tank group on the Kalinin direction. Thus, the 2-I and 3-I tank groups were to cover Moscow from the south and north, and the 4-group came from the front.

The Nazis did not doubt the success. On October 12, the Army Ground Forces Command gave an indication to Army Group Center about the procedure for capturing Moscow and dealing with its population. "The Fuhrer again decided," said this directive, "that Moscow’s surrender should not be accepted, even if it is offered by the enemy." It was further stated: "Anyone who tries to leave the city and go through our positions must be fired upon and driven back." It was allowed to leave only small passages for the care of the population in internal Russia. “And for other cities, the rule should be that to capture them, they should be smashed by shelling and air raids, and the population should be put to flight. It would be completely irresponsible to risk the lives of German soldiers to save Russian cities from fires or to feed their population at the expense of Germany. The more the population of Soviet cities rush into internal Russia, the greater the chaos in Russia will increase and the easier it will be to manage the occupied eastern regions and use them. This instruction of the Fuhrer should have been brought to the attention of all commanders. ”

Nazi propaganda trumped victory in Germany and broadcast it to the whole world. The newspaper Felkischer Beobachter of October 13 reported: “The advancing German units are marching and rolling eastward on an extensive front. There are no words to describe the size of the Soviet defeat! ”Goebbels declared that the war in the East had been won, and the Red Army had been virtually destroyed. Many German generals were also set up. General G. Blumentrit (Chief of Staff of the 4 Army) subsequently wrote: “It seemed that Moscow was about to fall. In the Army Group "Center" all became great optimists. From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that we would soon march through the streets of the Russian capital. Hitler even created a special demining team that was supposed to destroy the Kremlin. ”

On October 14, the command of the Army Group “Center” issued an order to continue operations against Moscow, in which it was noted: “The enemy in front of the army group was defeated. Remains retreat, going over to counterattacks. An army group is chasing the enemy. ” The 4 Army, together with its subordinate 4 tank group, was to strike in the direction of Moscow without delay, in order to smash the Soviet forces opposing it and tightly surround the capital of the USSR from the south, west and north. 2-th tank army ordered, developing an offensive, to cover Moscow from the southeast, and later from the east. "The ring of the encirclement of the city must ultimately be narrowed to the District Railway." The 2 th field army was supposed to be the main force to attack Elets and Bogoroditsk, covering the southern flank of the 2 th tank army. The 9-I field army and the 3-I tank group attacked bypassing Moscow from the north. Thus, the German command planned to complete the Moscow operation in October, finally breaking the resistance of the Red Army.

There is a people's war. How to save Moscow from the Nazis



The actions of the Soviet command. Front recovery

In the meantime, the Supreme Headquarters took emergency measures to restore the front and save the capital. First of all, it was necessary to close the gap in the south-western approaches to Moscow and to do this, form a new grouping of troops.

The enemy could only be stopped on the Mozhaisk line. It was supposed to be the main line of defense of the Western Front. October 6 Bid Mozhaisk line led to alert status. From that day, troops from the Reserve Headquarters, as well as from the North-Western and South-Western fronts, began to move there. The first to arrive were three rifle divisions - 316-I, 32-I and 312-I. At the same time, there was an urgent mobilization of all the forces that could be thrown in to cover the most important areas and roads leading to Moscow. For this, military schools, institutes, academies, NKVD troops, parts of the garrison, located in the capital and the Moscow region, were raised, and fighter battalions were formed. On alert, the infantry and artillery schools of Podolsk, the Moscow Lenin Military Academy and the Military Political Academy were raised, receiving orders to take up defense under Maloyaroslavets and Mozhaisk. The combined regiment of the military school named after the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, raised on alert at Solnechnogorsk, as a part of 1, thousand cadets with 4 guns went out to Volokolamsky fortified area. It was only a part of the forward detachments, which in the most critical days advanced to the most dangerous directions and took upon themselves the blow of the enemy.

So, October 5 around 2 thousand artillery cadets and 1,5 thousand cadets of Podolsk infantry schools were removed from classes, alerted and directed to the defense of Maloyaroslavets. In the same direction, a detachment of Major I. G. Starchak, the chief of the paratrooper service of the Western Front, was holding the defense. It was formed from border guards and prepared to fight in the rear of the enemy. The combined squad of cadets was assigned the task of blocking the path of the Germans at the Ilinsky combat site on 5 - 7 days, until the reserves from the depths of the country were suitable. October 6 cadets arrived at the Ilinsky combat area and occupied the defense along the rivers Luzha and Vypryka from the village of Lukyanovo to Malaya Shubinka. For several days, the cadets held back the German offensive. As a result of the fierce battles, few heroes survived, but with their heroic self-sacrifice they thwarted the plan to quickly capture Maloyaroslavets and won the time for organizing the defense on the approaches to Moscow. October 16 German troops captured the defensive lines on the Ilinsky combat sector, and almost all the cadets who held the defense in this sector, were killed. October 20 surviving cadets began to withdraw by order of command.


Monument to Podolsk cadets in the city of Podolsk

On the basis of the existing fortified areas, combat areas were formed, for the management of which the commander of the Moscow Military District formed the operational group of the district headquarters headed by Major General A.I. Kudryashov. October 9 Stake created the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense, which directly subordinated Stake. The front commander was Lieutenant-General P. A. Artemyev, head of the Moscow Military District, divisional commissar KF Telegin became a member of the Military Council. As part of the front, the 5 Army was formed, led by Major General D. D. Lelyushenko. At the same time, the 26 Army under the command of Major-General Tank troops A.V. Kurkin was deployed in the Oryol sector. The core of the army was the 1 Guards Corps. The army was directly subordinate to the headquarters.

In order to unite the efforts of the troops that covered Moscow from the west and restore order to the retreating troops, the State Defense Committee (STT) and Headquarters transferred the Reserve Front troops to the Western Front on October 10. The front was headed by G. K. Zhukov. Colonel-General I. S. Konev (former head of the Western Front) became his deputy, Lieutenant-General V. D. Sokolovsky was appointed Chief of Staff, and N. A. Bulganin was a member of the Military Council. “It was necessary,” noted Zhukov, “to urgently create a solid defense at the Volokolamsk – Mozhaisk – Maloyaroslavets – Kaluga line; develop defense in depth; to create second echelons and reserves of the front, so that they can be maneuvered to strengthen the vulnerable parts of the front ". Continuing to build up the power of the Western Front, the October 12 headquarters transferred the Mozhaisk defense line to its structure.

Thus, not yielding to panic and retaining the will and determination to fight to the end, the Soviet military and political leadership created a new front of defense at the Mozhaysk border during the week. Of course, he was not yet sufficiently organized and united, not all the troops had yet arrived, but the Red Army could already engage the enemy in a decisive battle for Moscow.

The surrounding forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts played a major role in this. So, the three armies of the Bryansk Front (3-I, 13-I and 50-I) at the time broke through to the east, tying down the troops of the Weish and Guderian armies. By October 23 they broke from the environment and took new positions. The 19-th, 20-th, 24-th and 32-th troops of the Western and Reserve fronts also did not fold weapons and fought, trying to get through to their own. These armies were bled to death and for the most part died, but won precious time — a week. As Zhukov recalled: “Thanks to the perseverance and resilience that our troops displayed, who fought in the surroundings in the Vyazma region, we won precious time for organizing defense on the Mozhaysk line. The blood and casualties suffered by the troops of the encircled grouping were not in vain. ” The main forces of the tank and field German armies were shackled by heavy fighting near Vyazma, while separate corps and armies sought to continue the offensive. This allowed the Soviet command and army to organize a new line of defense, to tighten up reserves and troops from other directions.

At this time, the Headquarters threw troops from the reserve and neighboring fronts to the Mozhaisk line. 11 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades, more than 40 artillery regiments and other units were transferred here. Here came the parts that escaped from the environment. The 16-th, 5-th 43-th and 49-th army were re-formed. In total, in the middle of October, Moscow was covered by about 90 thousand people. Of course, to create a solid powerful defense of these troops was not enough. Therefore, all these forces were used to cover the most important areas: Volokolamsk, Mozhaysk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. The main artillery and anti-tank weapons were focused on these areas.

By October 13, the troops of the Western Front turned to fight the enemy. The 16 Army under the command of Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky was located in the Volokolamsk fortified area, in Mozhaisky - the 5 Army I, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko (after his injury, from October 18, Major General L. A. Govorov). The 43-I army of Lieutenant-General Major-General S. D. Akimov stood in the Maloyaroslavets direction (from October 30 Major-General KD Golubev), and in Kaluga there was Lieutenant-General IG Zakharkin. M. G. Yefremov's 49 army was transferred to the Naro-Fominsk region. On October 33, the Western Front Military Council ordered these armies to go over to stubborn defense and prevent the enemy forces from breaking through to the east. At the same time, in the rear of the troops of the first echelon of the Western Front, extensive engineering work was carried out to create defense in depth, anti-tank barriers were built. On the main directions reserves.

Given the length of the front, as well as the difficulties encountered in managing the troops of the Kalinin grouping, on October 17, the headquarters formed the Kalinin front. It consists of 22-I, 29-I, 31-I and 30-I armies. The front was led by Colonel-General I. S. Konev. The Kalinin Front was supposed to cover Moscow from the northwest.

In general, the situation was extremely difficult. It was necessary at any cost to stop the enemy, who rushed to Moscow. Bring down the pace of its occurrence and gain time to deploy reserves Reserves. It was necessary to solve this problem in an extremely difficult situation. There was no solid front line. Our troops covered only the main directions. The enemy’s tank groups, penetrating deep into our defenses, forced our troops to retreat to new frontiers. The enemy had superiority in the air (except for the Moscow region). Together with the army, many thousands of civilians went to the east. People, animals, carts, cars moved in a continuous stream along the roads. This complicated the work of the rear and interfered with the maneuver of the Soviet troops.




Moscow turns into a fortress

At the same time they were preparing the defense of Moscow itself. October 15 The USSR State Defense Committee decided to evacuate Moscow. The next day, evacuation from Moscow (to Kuibyshev, Saratov, Molotov and other cities) of the offices of the General Staff, military academies, people's commissariats and other institutions, as well as foreign embassies began. Mining plants, power plants, bridges and other major objects were mined. Removed especially important state values.

The enemy’s approach to Moscow allowed the Germans to raid the city day and night and cover the bombers with fighters. Therefore, for the air defense of the capital in the Moscow region, additional fighter forces were concentrated aviation and anti-aircraft artillery units. Thousands of citizens actively trained in air defense and incendiary bombs were no longer dangerous for Muscovites. In addition, the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Moscow itself forced to attract anti-aircraft artillery units and air defense forces in the fight against enemy ground forces. In an order to the Headquarters, the troops of the 1st Air Defense Corps said: “To all anti-aircraft batteries of the Moscow Air Defense Corps located to the west, south-west and south of Moscow, in addition to the main task of repelling an air enemy, be prepared to repel and destroy the bursting tank units and live enemy forces. " Later, in the battles on the near approaches to the capital, the air defense forces rendered great assistance to the ground forces in repelling German attacks.



October 16 in Moscow broke out a panic. However, she quickly coped with and put things in order with the capital. Every serious breach of discipline and looting attempts was decisively suppressed. October 20 in Moscow and adjacent areas of the GKO decree was introduced a state of siege. Most of the Muscovites, feeling the will and determination of the leadership to stand up to the end, joined the defense of the capital. In the summer, the 12 national militia divisions were formed. In response to the party’s call, many thousands of Communists and Komsomol members went to the front as political workers, by their example raising the fighting spirit of the fighters. Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites daily worked on the construction of defensive lines. Only on the internal defense belt in October - November 1941 worked up to 250 thousand people, mostly women and teenagers. With their own hands, these people took out more than 3 million cubic meters of land, erecting many kilometers of anti-tank ditches, trenches, communication lines, etc.

In order to strengthen the near approaches to Moscow, the GKO 12 of October decided to build a third defensive line, which included a support line and two defense lines — the main and the city line. The support strip was supposed to run parallel to the rear line of the Mozhaisk line from the Moscow-Volga canal in the north to the Oka river near Serpukhov in the south. The main defensive line was planned to be built in the shape of a semicircle, which would encircle Moscow within a radius of 15-20 km. This milestone was divided into three sectors: the north-west, the west and the south-west, the sectors were divided into combat sectors. The city frontier consisted of three lanes: the first lane passed along the ring railway, the second - along the Garden Ring, the third - along the boulevard ring. The entire defense system at the close approaches was called the Moscow Defense Zone. The command was entrusted to the leadership of the Moscow VO. At his disposal were the troops of the Moscow garrison, the fighter battalions of the city (they were formed in the summer and used to maintain order in the city).

Also accelerated the formation of spare parts and working battalions of Muscovites. In the evening of October 13, party meetings were held in all primary organizations at which the situation was discussed and the communists of enterprises and institutions of the capital declared their readiness to take up arms in order to ruthlessly fight the enemy. Immediately began to record volunteers in the communist companies and battalions. This impulse was supported by non-partisan workers and employees. In just three days, about 12 thousand volunteers were assembled, who brought separate companies and battalions into 25. Having received the task of covering the main thoroughfares leading to the city, in the morning of October 17, volunteers began to occupy combat sites at the nearest approaches to the capital and its outskirts.

At the same time, the State Defense Committee instructed the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, together with the city party committee and the Moscow Council, to speed up the construction of fortifications at the approaches to the capital, to take measures to maintain order in the city and to ensure the normal operation of industry, transport, communications and trade in Moscow.

Workers and engineers worked valiantly and selflessly at the enterprises that remained in Moscow (they evacuated a lot). There were not enough people, but the rest were able to adjust the output of military products in the shortest possible time. Due to the lack of qualified specialists for work in the workplace, women and adolescents were increasingly attracted. At the Moscow Automobile Plant organized the production of Shpagin submachine guns (PPSH). At the Second Watch Factory, fuses for mines were produced. The trolleybus park of the Leningrad region made grenades. "Sickle and Hammer" and "Red Proletarian" repaired tanks. Ammunition was also produced there. Car fleets restored fighting vehicles. Confectionery factory "Rot-Front" produced food concentrates. Small businesses made grenades and fuses.

Thus, Moscow became the arsenal of the Western Front, its strong rear frontier, fortress and base, which supported the advanced units with human reserves, equipment, weapons and ammunition. The unanimity with which the citizens supported the Red Army became a powerful moral factor (there is nowhere to retreat — behind Moscow! ”).



To be continued ...
106 comments
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  1. +4
    6 October 2016 07: 33
    The feat of our grandfathers, great-grandfathers is immortal ..
  2. +5
    6 October 2016 07: 34
    I wonder if there are people on the site who recognize
    from this material, something new for yourself?
    1. +7
      6 October 2016 14: 01
      Those who are deeply interested in this topic, of course not. But does everyone who visits the site know this. Therefore, recalling once again does not hurt. Especially in light of the fact that in school history textbooks, only a few pages are devoted to the Great Patriotic War.
      Because many young people don’t even know who fought with whom and who attacked whom, they confuse the Patriotic War of the 12th year from 41-45, because Stirlitz was dancing at the ball with Natasha Rostova.
      But now they "know" that Kolchak is "the savior of Russia."
      So knowledge of the Great Patriotic War and the feat of our fathers, grandfathers, mothers. sisters, CANNOT be redundant, like articles on these topics.
      On the contrary, I believe that after the oblivion and lies in the nineties, there are very few of them to try to rectify the situation for the better.
      Of course, we know with you, but is this enough for the whole country ?.
      1. hip
        0
        7 October 2016 17: 51
        dear maybe you bot ?? I don’t know whose, but you have a problem with elementary Russian
    2. +3
      6 October 2016 21: 25
      Quote: Cartalon
      I wonder if there are people on the site who recognize
      from this material, something new for yourself?

      Well, no need to spread out dear! Intelligence must be shown in another. In this article, I personally was struck by the intensity of the warring parties, which the author expertly displayed. As if plunged into that atmosphere. This is the quality of the material, which is displayed even with artistic notes. Alexander, thanks for the article.
  3. +4
    6 October 2016 07: 43
    whatever they say, they won the war on the heroism of the people, on patriotism ... the heroic generation. There are fewer and fewer of them.
    1. +10
      6 October 2016 08: 17
      I have no doubt about the heroism of the people, but still without the work of the rear, without sensible leaders and skilled commanders, on pure heroism and patriotism we would have won
    2. 0
      7 October 2016 02: 12
      the rear won the war. that amount of weapons that gave the rear surpassed all that was produced by all of Europe. these weapons and won.
      only you can believe that in crowds you can fill up a machine gun, or you can stop a tank with tops.
      heroism? Yes! but in the rear.
    3. +4
      8 October 2016 08: 56
      Quote: potapych
      whatever they say, they won the war on the heroism of the people, on patriotism ... the heroic generation. There are fewer and fewer of them.

      Again, the old song, as well as the favorite song of the enemies of Russia and the liberals that they allegedly won the war on one heroism, and threw enemies with meat, because our people are selfless and invincible! And stupid communists, led by Stalin, on the contrary, undermined defensive capabilities, shot all sensible commanders, because otherwise Hitler would not have reached Moscow, and might even not have decided on a war!

      To such gentlemen, I would like to answer that this heroism, popular still had to be organized by someone else, just as it was then that they could skillfully lead these heroes. On bare heroism, a well-organized German cannot be defeated! As the tragedy of 1941 showed.
      To win on the battlefield, you also need a skillful command (our generals still outplayed the German), the organization of rear services, as well as the emergency deployment of military plants in the Volga and Siberia. Without competent and strong-willed leadership, all this cannot be achieved.
  4. +2
    6 October 2016 07: 55
    Border guards, NKVD units, cadets, militia divisions. And where did the Army go? Or are we rewriting history again? Zhukov who was there commanding in the defense of Moscow, border guards or what?
    1. +2
      6 October 2016 08: 19
      There was no cadre army by that time, there were mobilized recruits and reserve personnel, there was no coherence of units, so in fact it was also a militia with only heavy weapons
      1. +5
        6 October 2016 08: 35
        You are talking nonsense.
        The personnel army was. I fought in the boilers, out of the environment.
        I’ll tell you a secret - in peacetime, the army is cropped by more than half. In the event of hostilities (or their planning) mobilization begins. This is a call of just demobilized soldiers and officers for military service and their staffing of military units to a full level.
        Recruits are also called up, but strangely, the cruel and bloody USSR did not send them immediately to the front, but sent them to study. Yes, accelerated, but all the same, training sessions were held.
        1. +5
          6 October 2016 08: 43
          He he he he !!!! You recall from what year the USSR switched to the draft? And how many storerooms did we have? In the boilers, the remnants of the personnel troops fought, from which when leaving the remnants of the army it was impossible even to create a division due to lack of personnel and weapons. During the battle of Moscow, it wasn’t time for training, if you think for training a week allotted to receive the mat parts, this does not mean the coherence of the units. And do not confuse the cadre with the cropped part; these are two different things.
          1. +3
            6 October 2016 09: 43
            Quote: Nehist
            You recall from what year the USSR switched to the draft?

            And with what?
            Quote: Nehist
            In the boilers, the remnants of the personnel troops fought, from which when leaving the remnants of the army it was impossible even to create a division due to lack of personnel and weapons.

            Yes, come on, but I thought they drank tea there ... * sarcasm *
            But here, for example, take the Dovator’s corps of corpses that left the encirclement and immediately poured into the 16th army without any challenge for reorganization or reserve
            Quote: Nehist
            During the battle of Moscow, there was no time for training

            The first Moscow militia of 1 was formed until August-September, the second already at the end of October, which went into operation in November-December and only one division took part in the battles
            Quote: Nehist
            And do not confuse the cadre with the cropped part; these are two different things.

            And I don’t confuse. There is something that doesn’t converge in your thesis.
            Considering that on June 22, 1941 on the Western Front, the most full-blooded division was in the Leningrad Region (approx. 11k people), while the rest on the whole front barely reached almost half with a staff of 14000 at that time. The question is, where should people come from?
            According to your thesis, if a person is not in the army, but wants to take part in hostilities, then he is a militia. Armed with a heavy (VET or something? Light bayonet then?) Gun. Or am I wrong somewhere?
            1. +4
              6 October 2016 10: 48
              On May 21, 1940, by Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee No. 16/158, it was decided to maintain the rifle divisions of the western districts in peacetime in the following numbers: 98 divisions — 12 or more thousand people each, and only 3 divisions — 9 thousand each. And in May - June 1941, 802 thousand people were mobilized during training camps. At the same time, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts with a staff number of 14 was brought up: 483 divisions - up to 21 thousand people. 14 divisions - up to 72 thousand people and 12 rifle divisions - up to 6 thousand people. Not completeness was only in auto transport and horses in support units, but in terms of the number of L / C divisions were fully provided on June 11, 22
          2. +3
            6 October 2016 10: 10
            You're wrong! The division of General Panfilov underwent 3-month training in Kazakhstan. Even German generals noted the preparation of their reports and diaries!
        2. +5
          6 October 2016 10: 32
          The article is good already because there are no gritty expressions like “Moscow and Leningrad were saved by militias who died in the thousands with one rifle for three.”
          As a rule, all the "militia" divisions near Moscow were already trained, staffed and reorganized into ordinary rifle divisions when they entered the battle.
          The situation with Leningrad is different - there were such “bison” and “mammoths” of the revolutionary proletariat at the factories that regular military units sometimes didn’t even stand close in training and fighting spirit. And they defended their homes (often with their factory weapons).
          Now about training, as the consequences of the introduction of the "Law on General Military Duty."
          Does anyone know what the previous law on military service was called?
          LAW ON MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE dated 13.08.1930 (and similar laws were adopted in 25 and 28 years).
          And what is written in it is simply amazing.
          Quote:

          Moscow Kremlin.
          13 1930 of August
          No. 42 / 253b ... ..

          3. In order to educate the military affairs of the working people and staffing the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, a general obligatory military service of male workers is established.
          Mandatory military service consists of:
          a) pre-conscription training;
          b) active military service;
          c) stock status.


          Here in one of the states all male working people USSR and should have been from 19 years to 60.
          And then it is specifically explained how compulsory military service occurs (with rare exceptions).

          a) Pre-training training:

          20. During the passage of compulsory military service, all military personnel and those liable for military service are either in the ranks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, or outside its ranks.
          The following are considered in the ranks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army:
          a) pre-conscripts - during training camps;
          ....
          e) ordinary military personnel serving in the non-military order during training camps;
          f) ordinary soldiers of the military-production service - during military training;
          g) ordinary military personnel undergoing higher non-military training - during training camps;


          Simply put, 2 years (from 19 years old) all workers must undergo army training and attend training camps, as I understand it.

          b) The actual military service of ordinary and junior command personnel:
          10. The active military service of ordinary soldiers in peacetime lasts five years.
          Workers are called up for active military service upon reaching twenty-one years by January 1 of the year of conscription.
          The drafted person is considered to be on active duty from the day he is received by the draft board.
          The term of active military service is calculated from January 1 of the year following the year of conscription.

          Remember our films of the 20s - “Deja Vu” and “Golden Calf” - the heroes constantly fall on exercises and maneuvers. But for some reason, healthy young men are not participating there - either children, or the "other contingent."
          And real fighters at this time study at training camps - as part of units and subunits.
          So - in the bottom line - everyone is studying, and someone else has been serving in the army for 5 years (almost a professional).
          The same law clearly defines the "non-working" - and sends them to the "rear militia":

          In the rear militia, according to Section XVI, citizens are also enrolled:
          a) convicted under Art. 2-14, 16-17.1, 20-27 provisions on state crimes;
          b) convicted for crimes other than state crimes with the defeat of political rights;
          c) exiled and deported in a judicial or administrative manner;
          d) cleared from service in the first category.


          So I believe that there were few good, competent trained commanders - among the general mass, but I do not believe that the country did not have a huge trained reserve.
          And after the year 39, everything real began to serve.
          1. 0
            6 October 2016 11: 12
            That’s exactly what the trained one didn’t have, since the concept of battle itself changed, there was a lot of equipment and only 10 percent of l / s could use it
            1. +5
              6 October 2016 12: 03
              TRAINED people were used in the divisions of the militia, in parts, on technology. From the number of those who, after the reformation, from the number of healed, from the artillery called up from the reserve, tankers, communications.
              http://westfront.su/opolchenie/dno_form.htm
              or, for comparison
              http://forum.vgd.ru/108/31255
              Specifically about 21 BOTTOM
              http://smol1941.narod.ru/divnaropolh.htm
              Infantry, yes, manning came from all categories, however, inferior to the Germans technically, these divisions did the main thing - they DIDN’T let Moscow take it.

              All the others trawled, like Hapfrey, into the firebox, as the next version of solononyrezunatina not worthy of attention.
            2. +2
              6 October 2016 12: 07
              Three-line, DP, Maxim, F-1 - is this a new technique?
              60-70 percent of rifle divisions were engaged in rear and combat support.
              These are a lot of different not complicated specialties - a clerk, messengers, business executives, horsemen, cattlemen (each division was supposed to have a fur), etc.
              Of course there were also qualified people - and very much - art calculators, radio operators, cryptographers, etc. - but very, very little.
              But for the rifle companies and reconnaissance battalion (the most warring), trained people were usually enough.
              So all this is very foggy. The Wehrmacht at first owned a strategic initiative and was mobilized.
              Then we began to have a dramatic effect on the loss of people, equipment and weapons.
              And then the Germans still got up !!!
          2. +1
            6 October 2016 11: 50
            As a rule, all the "militia" divisions near Moscow were already trained

            Suppose a person was called in September, the Germans approached Moscow in October.
            On all matters - a month. How could they be trained?
            1. +3
              6 October 2016 11: 56
              Judging by your complete inability to learn, three years on the parade ground will not help you.
              But for the militia, a month was enough
              http://allrefs.net/c13/4dv72/p2/
              Study.
            2. +2
              6 October 2016 12: 15
              You can teach to shoot and dig, but this is not a full-fledged combat training
            3. +1
              6 October 2016 17: 26
              In a month, an infantryman can be taught the basics. She will not look like a ram at a rifle and a grenade and will learn to shoot and dig in.
              But of course there will be no experience of participating in maneuvers and combat experience.
            4. 0
              6 October 2016 18: 32
              month- digging in, throwing a grenade shoot.
              No matter how they prove to us here, he will not make a serious enemy to the Germans.
              but it’s half the story, it’s worse that the junior command staff (obviously not a month's training) was not much better.
          3. 0
            6 October 2016 17: 09
            Quote: Nikkola Mac
            So I believe that there were few good, competent trained commanders among the general mass, but I do not believe that the country did not have a huge trained reserve.

            Do not believe in vain.
            Here is the division of the infantry units of the Red Army for 1935:
            Personnel formations had a shortened cadre of command and Red Army personnel and were replenished during mobilization to wartime states by recruiting trained contingents from the reserve. The number of personnel in personnel formations and units ranged from 40-75% percent of the wartime staff. Personnel divisions, as a rule, were located directly on the borders of the USSR in the first echelon of border districts.
            Territorial units contained only a minimal shot of the middle and junior command staff (10-20% of the full staff). The rank-and-file staff and part of the command staff were variables and were called only for short-term training camps from 1 to 3 months during the year. During the mobilization, the acquisition of territorial troops by the rest of the personnel up to the wartime states was carried out by the recruiting of those liable for military training, assigned to them according to the territorial principle, trained by these formations and units. Basically, the territorial corps and divisions were in the internal districts of the country or in the third tier of the border districts.
            Mixed formations were personnel divisions in which one or two regiments were kept on a territorial basis. Their numbers ranged from 15-30%. All of them were distributed between the western border districts, making up the second tier, and, as a rule, were deployed near large settlements, which made it possible to accelerate the mobilization of military men.

            The trained reserve was trained en masse only in personnel units. Not in territorial or militia with collective farms (yes, there were some), but in personnel. Because every year the territorials had the same picture: after arriving at the training camp, it turned out that the division was not capable of combat. The frame for the time that has passed since the last training camp, has already forgotten everything, focusing on the economic activities of the unit, and the assigned personnel in the civilian world had enough of their occupations. As a result, the territories rose above the "satisfactory" mark only after 2-3 months of training, no different from the "ordinary untrained".
            Remaining personnel parts. On 01.01.1935/20/01.01.1937 in the Red Army there were 44 personnel rifle divisions. Twenty! To the whole USSR! On XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX - XNUMX (forty-four).
            And now, from the reserve created by 20-50 peacetime divisions, we will deploy two hundred pre-war SDs, and in the war we will form another one and a half hundred. belay
            1. +1
              7 October 2016 10: 23
              As a result, the territories rose above the "satisfactory" mark only after 2-3 months of training, no different from the "ordinary untrained".


              The topic is extremely complex!

              But what you mean is usually called “uniting up.”
              As Clausewitz said, “Warfare is simple and accessible to the sound mind of a person, but it’s difficult to fight.”
              In my understanding, it’s enough to teach a person to shoot from a machine gun, a machine gun, dig trenches, and attack. And further - the level of the company, battalion, regiment, division.
              This is far from the sum of units. This is a qualitatively different level of interaction.
              It’s not fighting weapons and not technology, and not even people - fighting structures that connect them.
              And the enemy who opposes you is doing the same thing - with about the same weapons and equipment.
              For example, a company took up a certain area. Fixed. Dug trenches. The first counterattack with tanks with art support - they kick her out of there.
              And now another picture - the company has consolidated, anti-tank units have pulled themselves up, sappers have installed mines, established cooperation with howitzer artillery regiment, there is a connection with aviation, the command is also in operational communication.
              A counterattack began, tanks fell under artillery fire and mines, artillery came under attack from our counter-battery artillery, and aircraft fell under our attack. The situation commander quickly threw reserves.
              So the combined arms battle began, about which Clausewitz said - "it's hard to fight."
              When moving to the level of a battalion, regiment, or division, the situation becomes complicated many times over.
              And when it comes to the corps, the army and the fronts - it goes to an even higher level.

              And in my opinion, a huge number of “figures” in the prewar years thought - train the fighters, give them weapons, equipment, put them in the field - this is the division for you.
              Collect 4-8 divisions - here’s your army.

              Nothing like this!

              If you have a motor, a body, a gearbox, wheels, electrical wiring - this does not mean that you have a car on which you can ride and carry goods.
              And if you take into account that it was necessary to assemble the car to a large extent with the outbreak of war, then they didn’t bring gas, then the bolts got stuck on the road, then the driver didn’t get there on time.
              Everything seems to be there! - but no car!

              A separate difficult issue is the training of team personnel.
              Quote:
              Military science, centuries-old experience of all countries clearly says - an ordinary soldier of medium quality can be trained in two or three years, a company commander in 8-12 years. A combat-ready regiment must be put together from such soldiers and officers for another two years. But generals are piece goods. The talent from the general is required more than from the artist. If the artist’s reckoning for mediocrity is whistles in the hall, then the general’s mediocrity reckoning is thousands of lost lives.

              This is on the one hand, and on the other, it is impossible to maintain a draft army in peacetime in peacetime, even one third of the officers. Impossibly it is for any economy in principle.
              Look how many times Hitler fired and called back the highest generals! And they practically did not die.
              The situation with officers at the middle and lower levels was generally disastrous.

              There were only a few experienced pilots - like the Japanese (I had to prepare kamikaze). But the Americans and we did not have such a problem - there were few aces, and good pilots were enough.

              As a result, a double-edged sword - no matter how much you argue.
      2. 0
        8 March 2017 19: 59
        = Nehist "There was no cadre army by then."
        I do not agree. Here offhand. In the autumn of 41 alone near Moscow, there were 32: 53 rifle divisions of the Far Eastern Military District, 93-rifle divisions, 82rd rifle divisions and 31nd motor-rifle divisions from Transbaikalia .XNUMX rifle divisions from Transcaucasia. I think that there were still units of the personnel army. Another thing is that many personnel units suffered serious losses and were staffed before, but also parts of the newly formed divisions suffered losses and were also replenished and re-formed, etc. I consider it unfounded to speak about the destruction of the entire personnel army unfairly.
    2. +2
      6 October 2016 19: 12
      Quote: Aposlya
      Border guards, NKVD units, cadets, militia divisions. And where did the Army go?

      Really ignorant?
      In fierce battles "the army itself" (that is, a very significant part of the pre-war cadre army) died or was captured near Minsk (irrecoverable losses from the Belarusian operation about 350 thousand), in Western Ukraine and near Uman (over 300 thousand) , Kiev (over 600 thousand), in defensive battles in the Baltics and near Leningrad (about 300 thousand), near Smolensk (over 400 thousand) and Vyazma (over 600 thousand), etc., etc.
      And in total in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 about 2 million 850 thousand irrevocable and 1 million 150 thousand sanitary, only about 4 million soldiers and officers ...
      So during the war it was necessary to create a virtually new army, although, of course, not from scratch.
      Personnel remained, educational institutions, parts, mob. system, rear too.
      The base was strong, which allowed, in particular, to defend Moscow.
  5. +4
    6 October 2016 08: 14
    I would like to add that for example
    The 16th Army, under the command of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, was located in the Volokolamsk fortified area

    going with the world on a thread. For example, the corps of Dovator, as well as the headquarters of the 16th army together with Konstantin Konstantinovich, left the encirclement.
    But what is most interesting is the 316th Infantry Division under the command of I.V. Panfilov and Commissioner S. A. Egrov. (yes, yes, this is the division that supposedly was not) which has actually become the core of the 16th army since was the most staffed and she held the front length of 41 km. At the same time, the line of defense was only marked and made increasingly by the efforts of fighters (according to the memoirs of K.K.Rokossovsky)
    1. +1
      6 October 2016 09: 59
      There is nothing surprising in this, the troops really gathered a thread from the world and brought into battle everything at hand ... There were practically no full-fledged formations at the command's disposal at that moment, with rare exceptions ...
      In 1945, the situation was similar only with respect to Germany - hastily formed Volkssturm divisions (the same militias), parts of the marines, from sailors decommissioned from the Kriegsmarine ships, cadets of various military schools and combined combat groups were thrown at the defense of Berlin.
      1. 0
        6 October 2016 12: 24
        Siberian divisions ... And is there data on them? Are the division numbers known? Or is it a sort of collective meme?
        1. +2
          6 October 2016 12: 35
          http://angarochka.ru/65-/2261-2011-12-02-04-43-04
          Not really.
          In addition to the actual units from beyond the Urals, there were also units formed in Middle Asia, which, however, does not at all plead with the feat of the Siberians.
          Here
          http://waralbum.ru/bb/viewtopic.php?id=10
          more extensively about parts, equipment, forum.
          1. 0
            6 October 2016 16: 16
            Thanks for the info!
        2. +2
          6 October 2016 14: 56
          We will not go far. Next to Panfilov’s division and later arrived cavalry divisions from Kazakhstan, the 78th Beloborodov’s division from Siberia bravely fought
          1. 0
            6 October 2016 16: 15
            What was the cavalry? Hmm ... How was cavalry used in that war in the winter? How is the infantry on horseback?
            1. 0
              6 October 2016 16: 18
              In that war, cavalry was used in 90% of cases as infantry, mobile infantry.
              And in 10%, just like cavalry for raids on the rear or a breakthrough in enemy communications.
            2. +3
              6 October 2016 16: 44
              Used. But then the 17th, 20th, 24th and 44th cavalry divisions (3k people each) were not used and taken to the army reserve. Horses were not reforged by winter.
              At the same time, the third cavalry corps of Dovator (who left the encirclement earlier and at the same time and during the battles in Volokolamsk more than once was surrounded and again came out (EPT, horses mixed up, people as it was written by one author)).
              Or the cavalrymen of the 2nd Belov’s cavalry corps (later the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) made fun of Guderian’s tanks near Tula. If it’s a front-line battle, then on foot together with the infantry, or breaking out and cutting out unprotected rear lines using its high mobility (even in winter you can find horseback riding in the forest from bark to grass under snow).
              However, the Bloodthirster very accurately noted.
            3. 0
              8 March 2017 17: 00
              Aposlya))) In fact, at that time in the hands of the Soviet command of the cavalry corps were the only mobile units and in service they had not only small arms. As you can see, there were more than a hundred guns in the hulls. Of course, the cavalry corps were different and the amount of heavy weapons was different.
              From the wiki .. "By the beginning of the war in the Red Army there were four cavalry corps of 2-3 cavalry (mountain cavalry) divisions in each. The state corps had:
              "Personnel
              over 19 people
              Equestrian
              16 horses
              Main armament and equipment
              128 light tanks
              44 armored vehicles
              64 field, 32 anti-tank and 40 anti-aircraft guns
              128 mortars
              During the war, the combat structure of the cavalry corps was significantly strengthened, it began to include:
              three cavalry divisions
              self-propelled artillery, fighter anti-tank artillery and anti-aircraft artillery regiments
              guards mortar regiment rocket artillery
              mortar and separate anti-tank fighter divisions.
              Since 1943, part of the cavalry corps operated as part of horse-mechanized groups. "
              And to the Siberian divisions belonged everything that came from beyond the Urals. Far Eastern connections for example. There were enough of them. In addition, the command was transferring divisions from other directions; they were also not small. for example, from under Peter. Yes, and the body of Belov, hell knows where pulled up, if I'm not mistaken from under Belgorod.))) He did not stand near Moscow all the time. So that not one Siberia saved Moscow.)))
  6. +5
    6 October 2016 08: 49
    Then the people defended their homeland, and what belonged to them. And those "mini-oligarchs" and grabbers who took out the grabbed goods from Moscow were stopped themselves together with the police.
    But now they will protect? If behind not only houses and families, but also oligarch factories, thieves' boutiques and supermarkets, palaces on Rublevka and well-fed Hari bureaucrats? And enemy propaganda will only increase people's hatred of internal enemies. And then what will happen? ..
    1. +2
      6 October 2016 09: 00
      Quote: erased
      And then what will happen? ..

      Kirdyk power will come out.
      1. +5
        6 October 2016 11: 58
        Kirdyk power will come out

        Exactly. Our ancestors were not fools of you. With these thoughts, they reached Moscow.
        It turned out that the Germans were not as white and fluffy as before rumors circulated.
        The German worker and peasant was in no hurry to rise up behind Hitler as they wrote in the newspapers before.
        So I had to fight for real.
        1. +1
          6 October 2016 12: 04
          Quote: Hupfri
          Our ancestors were not fools of you. With these thoughts, they reached Moscow.

          Do not confuse the 1941th year and the USSR of that time with the current state of things.
    2. avt
      +3
      6 October 2016 09: 42
      Quote: erased
      Then the people defended their homeland, and what belonged to them. And those "mini-oligarchs" and grabbers who took out the grabbed goods from Moscow were stopped themselves together with the police.

      Well, not ourselves, but quite specific patrols and detachments of the NKVD on the roads. They checked the documents and if something went wrong - it was junk in the ditch, the car was turned around, and with the runners - how lucky. If you are lucky - under arrest with further proceedings. The deceased father found everything in Moscow - they ran with the guys to the Vladimirsky Trakt, saw a panic in the city, told exactly how the cattle had been driven through Moscow, so one day the wind was in Moscow for sure. But then somehow it’s all right for an adult and, well, oooh specifically with martial law, horse and foot patrols, and actually with the execution of points of that martial law. . Well, the late aunt was older and the trenches were digging.
  7. +3
    6 October 2016 10: 18
    We must take into account the main thing that it was in the battles of the Moscow clan that the Soviet Guard was born! And the division of General Panfilov became the 8th Guards Division, and it should also be added that it was then that Alexander Bek began to write the book "Volokolamsk Highway". The book read by people like Fidel Castro and Che, but for. a soldier of the Jewish army became like a bible ...
    1. avt
      +3
      6 October 2016 10: 48
      Quote: Duysenbai Sbankulov
      We must take into account the main thing, that it was precisely in the battles that the Moscow clan was born the Soviet Guard!

      Yeah !? And then what was near Yelnya from August to September? And where did they go from the western direction 1, 2, 5,6 guards ???
    2. +2
      6 October 2016 14: 46
      no, it’s understandable that every sandpiper praises ... but so what for?
    3. 0
      8 March 2017 20: 18
      I already wrote this, but here again.
      “It would be wrong to think that the Germans in the battles on the Volokolamsk direction were met only by the heroic 316th division. And only the infantrymen with grenades stopped the enemy. Without detracting from the merits of the 316th Panfilov’s division, it should be said that ... due to the pause between the occupation of the Mozhaisk border and the start of battles on the 316th rifle division received at its disposal quite large artillery forces: four cannon artillery regiments of the RGVK, three anti-tank artillery regiments.
      Together with the regular artillery regiment of the compound (sixteen 76,2 mm guns, eight 122 mm howitzers), the defending artillery had 207 (two hundred seven) guns: four 25 mm anti-aircraft guns, thirty-two 45 mm anti-tank guns, fourteen 76,2 -mm regimental guns, seventy-nine (!) 76-mm guns, sixteen 85-mm guns, eight 122 mm howitzers, twenty-four 122-mm guns, thirty 152-mm howitzers-guns. There was no such powerful artillery fist in either the Mozhaisk or Maloyaroslavets directions. "P. 253
      “It is well known that following the results of the battles in the Volokolamsk direction, I. Panfilov’s division received the rank of 8th Guards, but few people know that at the same time 1 and 2 anti-tank artillery regiments received the rank of 289st and 296nd Guards. The role of artillery in this case is difficult to overestimate: unlike many battles of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, the REDUCTION of the battle formations of the 316th Infantry Division was compensated by strong artillery support, both of 76-mm and 85-mm direct-fire guns, and mounted fire heavy guns "STR, 256 Isaev A.V. Five circles of hell. The Red Army in the "Cauldrons" .- M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008-400s.
      200 guns are not for you khukh-mukhras))) According to statistics, the tanks were knocked out mainly by artillery. Of course, this does not detract from the feat of Panfilov’s. But, and do not bend to the other side.)))
  8. +1
    6 October 2016 11: 33
    Quote: Nehist
    There was no cadre army by that time, there were mobilized recruits and reserve personnel, there was no coherence of units, so in fact it was also a militia with only heavy weapons


    Being late in deployment, I had to throw formations without sufficient combat coordination in battle, and this is the main success of the Germans. Divisions died but won time.
    And by October, we began to have formations with at least 2 months of training (Panfilovskaya for example) and they were all personnel. They began to sharply "slow down" the Germans (for example, 316sd (8gv.sd) - twice being in the direction of the main attack, the Germans could not "flash"). And from that moment "another" war started. Siberian divisions (and they had 2-3 months to work together - this is their main strength) in the offensive and broke the Germans.

    After that, the war went differently. After all, 42 is the year of unsuccessful (until November) of our active actions -offensives (Leningrad, Rzhev, Crimea, and near Kharkov too).
    And the failures of 1942 are already other secondary factors (and if there had been no losses of 1941 everything would have been different).
  9. 0
    6 October 2016 12: 10
    Bloodsucker,
    Interesting!!! You are positioning yourself as an Armamentist !!! How will you train l / s in a month? Part is created from scratch. Yes, all this time you will be accepting weapons and military equipment by allocating limited resources for training, teach a lot? From that and such a big loss. Here the cropped battalion while deploying seven pots in peacetime will come off ....
    1. 0
      6 October 2016 12: 26
      Sir, if you are a warrant officer, and even from the rear, then do you have to speculate how to PREPARE A SOLDIER for battle?
      Behind almost 30 years of service, to teach a soldier to shoot, disguise, apply bayonet techniques, tactical methods on the battlefield as part of a squad, platoon, company, can be for a MONTH, if you do not sit with your mouth open and count the raven, namely, engage in military training - among those who organized these formations there were no stupid people.
      Expand the battalion of the frame to the full-blooded part, the time of the MONTH, for everything about everything. Yes, sweat and blood will be spoiled a lot, but the part will be created and will fulfill its purpose.
      Learn
      http://www.compancommand.com/index/principy_mobil
      izacionnoj_raboty / 0-1782
      to heap
      http://www.kalitva.ru/123621-referat-boevaja-goto
      vnost-podrazdelenijj-i.html
      According to the realities of that time
      http://www.rkka.ru/docs/real/mob/mobrabota.htm
      Excerpts from ...
      "ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE KHARKOV MILITARY DISTRICT No. 00653 dated August 16, 1944, Kharkov"
      Contents: On the formation of 18, 19 and 20 separate assault rifle battalions.

      In order to provide the commanding and commanding staff, which had been in the territory occupied by the enemy for a long time and did not take part in partisan detachments, the opportunity with arms to prove their allegiance to the Motherland, in accordance with the telegram of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army No. org / 2 / 668 from 13.08.44

      1. By September 10, 1944, form three separate assault rifle battalions, state No. 04/ 331, without a machine-gun platoon, numbering 924 military personnel each:
      a) the 18th separate assault rifle battalion field post No. 13424, the deployment of the city of Stalino;
      b) the 19th separate assault rifle battalion field post No. 13428, the deployment of the city of Stalino;
      c) The 20th Separate Assault Rifle Battalion Field Post No. 13441, located in Kharkov.
      ........
      10. To the head of the counterintelligence department of SMERSH district by September 1, 1944. to complete the necessary work to check the special contingent of the NKVD camps No. 240 and No. 258 transferred to the staffing of assault rifle battalions.

      11. To the commanders of the 18th, 19th and 20th separate assault rifle battalions, finish the combat staking of the battalions and prepare them for combat work by September 10, 1944.

      What is not clear about the MONTH for preparation?
      1. +1
        6 October 2016 12: 43
        I am a respected Techie. By the year 44, it was already easier there. And the fact that they write on paper is not always used in reality. And what are you pulling phrases out of context? It was not realistic to prepare a full-fledged shooter precisely in the fall of 41 because of any arsenal of military equipment, but they received basic training, but they are far from full-fledged combat units, is that what I’m talking about or is it incomprehensible?
        P.S. How to deploy a cropped ARDS on my own skin experienced so that links past hi
        1. +2
          6 October 2016 12: 56
          You give the data how they armed DivNO?
          Yes, there were enough problems, but they did it.
          You give the data how armed personnel were divisions from Siberia?
          Yes, there were problems, managed.
          But the vaunted REICH with a similar image of the Volkssturm formations failed.

          You will tell me, as a former commander of the Orbv, what is the deployment of a unit? Not worth it. Or as an officer in the division, army, tell me how and what is being deployed?

          The infantryman shooter, subject to practicing with him, and not a bully, is perfectly prepared for a month, tested by practice.
          The mechanic drive of an infantry fighting vehicle, tank, base vehicle, driver of an armored personnel carrier, a car for a month, practical driving is well prepared, it is more difficult with technical training, but in this case too, standards and exercises drive skills through your arms and legs, will you challenge it?

          What is written on paper is the fruit of PRACTICE, you should know this before touching on mobilization issues in the context of parts and above — did you have access to mobilization documents?
          1. +1
            6 October 2016 13: 36
            They had some kind of business with ZAS, here you are again not attentive, you are talking about one thing about the other, in the absence of the regular number of arms and military equipment it is not possible to fully prepare all, limited yes, that's what I’m talking about .... Problems with armament of divisions in the state there were rifle formations .. Actually, all the formed units and divisions had similar problems in manning, in September-October 1941, the DNDs were no exception. hi
            1. +1
              6 October 2016 15: 43
              About the p145 station on the Ga66 chassis, decided that he had access to something on the basis of the fact that he served only as a transmitter?
              What are you talking about right now?
              There is mob need. There is a supply of mobresource in part, there is STAT, and there is a list, there is the concept of staffing and understaffing, so what are you talking about now?
              There was a problem with armaments, and so what? What do you want to say about?
              You can’t understand at all that, even in those conditions, for example, a GAZ-AA driver, you couldn’t appoint a coachman as a coach driver — do you really think that was possible at that time?
              Are you really sure that a plumber, and not a tractor driver, will be appointed to the position of tank mechanic?
              You are really sure that a reindeer breeder from Chukotka, who has never seen a telephone in his life, will be appointed to a post, for example, a communications commander of communications?
              Why do you so cheaply value your fellow citizens who were then in service and their commanders?
          2. BAI
            +1
            6 October 2016 13: 54
            "A shooter, an infantryman, on condition of training with him, and not battering, prepares well in a month, has been tested by practice.
            The mechanic of an infantry fighting vehicle, a tank, a base vehicle, a driver of an armored personnel carrier, a car — in a month, practical driving — he prepares well, with technical training is more difficult, but in this case, standards and exercises through arms and legs drive skills — will you challenge?
            We will.
            Currently, conscripts who already know how to control equipment are sent to driver mechanics (In Soviet times, after DOSAAF courses). You can train them in a month. In 1939-41 in the army there were conscripts who overwhelmingly saw the tractor and the car only from afar, or even did not see at all. Quite often they were generally illiterate. Conscripts from Central Asia could not speak Russian. And in a month they will become qualified driver mechanics? How will they read instructions and labels on devices to start?
            1. 0
              6 October 2016 15: 35
              Well, let's dispute, only without liberal kookies and civil nagging, because of complete ignorance of the training system in the troops.
              Quote: BAI
              Currently, conscripts who already know how to control equipment are sent to driver mechanics (In Soviet times, after DOSAAF courses).

              Well?

              Quote: BAI
              In 1939-41 in the army there were conscripts who overwhelmingly saw the tractor and the car only from afar, or even did not see at all. Quite often they were generally illiterate.

              And in 1941-1945, therefore, they were so stupid in the army that they put behind the wheel, steering wheel, reindeer herder levers without the slightest education on a tank, plane, car? You yourself came up with this or you were prompted by such ridiculous statements
              Quote: BAI

              Conscripts from Central Asia could not speak Russian. And in a month they will become qualified driver mechanics? How will they read instructions and labels on devices to start?

              Well, if you are only able to read the inscriptions on the fence, then this is your misfortune, but what does this have to do with the issue of manning military, tank and artillery armies? It’s not clear where you get such, so to speak, stupid judgments?
              But in fact, for a MONTH, from any conscript from Middle Asia, even poorly fluent in Russian, they made a soldier in the GSVG, for example, though this does not apply to you, you would hardly become a good soldier in terms of reasoning and for a month by virtue of a complete lack of understanding of how a soldier is trained.
              My ZKV in the GSVG, senior st. Tazhgaliev Askerbek Serikkalievich, would have laughed at your reasoning for a very long time.
          3. +1
            6 October 2016 18: 56
            Quote: The Bloodthirster
            The infantryman shooter, subject to practicing with him, and not a bully, is perfectly prepared for a month, tested by practice.
            The mechanic drive of an infantry fighting vehicle, tank, base vehicle, driver of an armored personnel carrier, a car for a month, practical driving is well prepared, it is more difficult with technical training, but in this case too, standards and exercises drive skills through your arms and legs, will you challenge it?

            How many times have they said - it is impossible to mechanically transfer the experience of the late SA and the army of the Russian Federation to the Red Army. It is impossible!
            Could you again give statistics on the education of the command personnel of the BTV? Not privates - commanders! Or filling the staff of rifle units in terms of junior command personnel? Remember the same Kurochkin and his "Iron Rain" - what golden mountains the commander promised if the main character remains on long-term service. A conscript with 7-8 grades of education was torn off with his hands - from the same artillerymen he immediately went to courses and in the future he was given command of the battery.

            In short, you can learn the arrow in a month. BUT: you need a competent command staff level sergeant-lieutenant. He was in the SA. He was not in the Red Army.
            1. +2
              6 October 2016 19: 05
              Quote: Alexey RA
              need a competent commanding staff level sergeant-lieutenant. He was in the SA. He was not in the Red Army.

              Yeah, that wasn’t all .. it’s strange who then lathered the withers to selected graduates of the Prussian military school?
              The sergeant, like the lieutenant, is taught, but in battle, those who fought know how to learn very quickly, or they don’t learn anything, because they are dead.
              Of course, in your words, there is a grain of truth, but the truth is that all the trained and much trained Nazi army is defeated, the battle losses of us and the enemy are practically the same.
      2. BAI
        +1
        6 October 2016 14: 57
        My father is a front-line soldier (at the front from 1942 to 1945, the commander of a mortar platoon) said: "A good commander differs from a bad one in that he does not give impracticable orders."
        Here is the order. What's next? Was it done? What have you formed as a result? What contingent? Surgeons, prisoners (for what were they imprisoned, with or without military service experience? Etc.). conscripts from liberated villages? The order can be given, as in 41: "With a decisive blow to defeat the enemy, go to the border with Poland and wait for instructions." So what, did they follow this order and others like him?
        By the way, military memoirists note that, as a rule, obviously impracticable orders were given, on the basis that they would fulfill the part that was required, because if you give an exact order, it is underfulfilled.
        This would seem to contradict the above statement. Not at all. Overfulfillment was overwhelmed by enormous excess blood, loss of equipment, and if territorially go further than necessary - by the environment, followed by destruction.
        A striking example of the fulfillment of such an order is in MARCH 1945 "Panfilov's division was surrounded during an offensive on the Latvian city of Saldus. As a result, almost all of its personnel died, and only 300 people were able to break through the enemy ring."
        1. +1
          6 October 2016 15: 28
          Quote: BAI
          A striking example of the fulfillment of such an order is in MARCH 1945 "Panfilov's division was surrounded during an offensive on the Latvian city of Saldus. As a result, almost all of its personnel died, and only 300 people were able to break through the enemy ring."

          Before throwing such "facts", give a link, where did you get this rubbish. What was the operational situation there, who opposed our troops, why did it happen, or do you consider the Germans to be the ultimate boobies that they forgot how to fight by 44-45?
          In order to prevent dirty insinuations from being thrown into society, here’s a reference to what really happened when the Kurland group of Nazis was surrounded and defeated. Look at the composition of forces and means, and at the same time, turn on your mind for at least a second, realizing the severity of those fights
          http://alchevskpravoslavniy.ru/forum/viewtopic.ph
          p? p = 7959
          I can also offer you to read about the fighting in April 45, in the Magdeburg region, where the Polish divisions were drafting worse than 39, having abandoned their Red Army artillery units. What will you write then?

          Quote: BAI
          Here is the order. What's next? Was it done? What formed as a result? What contingent? Oruzhnitsy, prisoners (for which they sat, with or without military experience? Etc.). conscripts from liberated villages?

          Completed. Task COMPLETED. The composition of the formation is from hospitals, from the reserve, from fines who have justified themselves, what are you unhappy with?
          Quote: BAI
          By the way, military memoirists note that, as a rule, obviously impracticable orders were given, on the basis that they would fulfill the part that was required, because if you give an exact order, it is underfulfilled.

          What are these "military memoirists, gave such assessments-rezun, corned beef and the like?
          Quote: BAI
          My father is a front-line soldier (at the front from 1942 to 1945, the commander of a mortar platoon) said: "A good commander differs from a bad one in that he does not give impracticable orders."


          And your father did not tell you that the commander’s platoon from his comfrey does not have the right to discuss the ORDER of the commander, even if it seems to him that the Order is not fulfilled?
          Well, you’re in a bursa, to study the battles for KIEV — two bridgeheads, two directions, only one was false for the enemy, the second is real — so those who fought in the false direction of the strike FULFILLED an impossible (read criminal, as you think) order?
    2. +1
      6 October 2016 15: 04
      Quote: Nehist
      Here the cropped battalion while deploying seven pots in peacetime will come off ....


      I wanted to add something, but the Bloodthirster was already ahead.
      Just add.
      Reduced compound type "A" (M15). Artillery.
      There is only a staff officer in the battery. (The remaining supply. True KOs and gunners really served in these positions. Even on other systems, the military commissariat is obliged to give).

      After two weeks of vocational school, the unit performs tasks.

      Naturally, we still have to grind it, but the basic techniques have already been mastered, and besides KO, nobody served as gunners in the artillery (well, Otjagi can also be considered as prepared).

      True, the team is not there yet, it still takes time (in the third week (Division exercises), the crystallization of the unit begins (fighters begin be slovenly - i.e. begin to master completely). And that’s where the deployment ends.

      And if a month and a half, they would not be inferior to the best batteries from the GSVG.
      1. 0
        6 October 2016 17: 06
        With the full availability of weapons and military equipment? I won’t even argue! And when is less than 50 percent available? Will it work out? That's what I'm talking about!
      2. 0
        6 October 2016 19: 06
        Quote: chenia
        There is only a staff officer in the battery. (The remaining supply. True KOs and gunners really served in these positions. Even on other systems, the military commissariat is obliged to give).

        After two weeks of vocational school, the unit performs tasks.

        "In parts of the 97th rifle division, rifles manufactured in 1940, which were on hand for no more than 4 months, up to 29% are reduced to the state of rust traces in the barrel bore, machine guns" DP "manufactured in 1939 to 14% also have a deterioration in the barrel bores."

        139 cn: The commanding staff does not dare to carry out a complete disassembly of the rifles to remove dirt and rust, as the battle of the rifles has changed.
        496 cap: Does not know the purpose of the cutouts at the blade of a screwdriver, does not know in what cases and how alkali is used. The schedule does not provide for the study of small arms.
        41 sd :. The command staff of the unit does not know the purpose of the paint at the ends of the bullets, does not know the rules for stuffing cartridges into ribbons and magazines, does not know the device device for stuffing ribbons and, due to the inability to handle it, does not use it when stuffing cartridges.
        253 cn: Doesn't know a self-loading rifle and PPD. He does not know the rules of cleaning and the purpose of cutouts at the blade of a screwdriver.
        10 cn: Gunners claim that alkali is not used when cleaning small arms.
        97th RD: The commanding staff of the units does not know the optical sight for the Maxim machine gun, the optical sight for the sniper rifle and other types of new types of weapons. Some of the company commanders do not know how to remove the bayonet from the rifle arr 1891/30.
        The knowledge of the junior commanding staff is weak, but nevertheless, the weapons in the unit know better than the commanding staff.
        The knowledge of ordinary cadets is low.
        They do not know automatic weapons at all and are only able to carry rifles and pull the trigger. Extremely poor knowledge of the materiel of small arms and besides the gunners do not know the names of the parts of the machine gun "DP" and the revolver. The machine gunners do not know the name of the parts and rules for disassembling the rifle. To great shame, and chagrin, cadet regiment schools have lesser knowledge of small arms than the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.
        There is no need to talk about the rules, cleaning weapons, and their inspection by younger commanders.
        This situation should be, as the commander, without knowledge of small arms, cannot transfer them to his subordinates and demand knowledge from them when he himself does not know him.
        97 s. Personnel. From the "first hundred". And the command staff, which is just supposed to teach recruits. laughing

        And in one of the SDs, when checking with a lieutenant, they found an unclean gun with shells from firing six months ago (this, by the way, is about the frequency of combat training).

        This is on the one hand. And on the other hand - how to prepare l / s, if in tank units for the year it is planned to use 6 shells per barrel. Six!
        1. +2
          6 October 2016 19: 12
          And then some people here screech out that they did poorly when Tukhachevsky was unscrewed with his accomplices?
          But such a state of affairs is his legacy.
          But again, this is not in all parts, so it is impossible to draw a conclusion on the basis of one part.
        2. 0
          6 October 2016 20: 17
          Quote: Alexey RA
          This situation should be, since the commander, having no knowledge of small arms, cannot transfer them to his subordinates and demand knowledge from them when he himself does not know him. 97 SD Personnel. From the "first hundred". And the command staff, which is just supposed to teach recruits.


          It is natural to compare 70-80 with 40 mi a little incorrectly, but nevertheless - training materiel and tactical methods (action of a soldier, detachment, platoon) is not particularly difficult for that time.

          Well then there was no complicated technique in this link.
          Another question is that with a significant increase in the Red Army, it was necessary to engage in purely economic affairs (primitive arrangement), to the detriment of PS.

          But when the war began, then comfort is sideways, and I think the training was in full swing. Here's the talk about it.
          1. +1
            7 October 2016 10: 00
            Quote: chenia
            It is natural to compare 70-80 with 40 mi a little incorrectly, but nevertheless - training materiel and tactical methods (action of a soldier, detachment, platoon) is not particularly difficult for that time.

            15 TD 8 MK. The body is from the "first eight", one of the best. And what do we see?
            In the 2nd battalion of the 29th tank regiment, classes on the subject “A fighter in an offensive battle” were conducted by Art. Sergeant D. No one instructed him on this topic. Abstract is poorly compiled. D. himself can not use a shovel. The soldiers do not know the technique for lying down trenches, they do not know how to use a shovel, and they choose unsuccessfully places for shooting. The dashboard technique is poorly developed, and weapons for shooting are not manufactured. Senior sergeant D. explained the combat mission clumsily. Example: "The squad take possession of the farm and defeat the enemy."
            A lesson on the topic “Observation outside the tank from an observation post” was conducted by ml. lieutenant K. No observation point planned. No change of observers was made. There were no binoculars in the classroom. In general, the lesson was poorly organized.
            A lesson on “Observation from a tank from a place” was conducted by Lieutenant G. Observation was carried out only in the driver’s sector ... The tank commander and the tower gunner did not observe in their sectors and the target situation in their sectors was not organized. Personnel cannot observe the results of the observation ... Of the entire platoon, only two noticed one target. The platoon commander explained the task non-specifically and took 20 minutes to do it ...

            And here is the "second wave" of MK:
            The division is equipped with a junior command staff by 21%. Incomplete - 1910 people. The cover of the incomplete OU KOVO was dressed up, and the division received the rank and file of corporals from 10 and 15 tanks. divisions. The quality of the sent corporals is very low, the latter cannot fulfill the positions of junior command personnel both in their development and in training. Among the corporals sent: 211 non-Russian nationality poorly speaking the Russian language ... illiterate 7 people., illiterate 70 people ... unfit for military service 20 people. All the corporals sent are now being used as junior officers, but they are of little use. ordinary soldiers of the 1940 draft are better prepared than they are today
            © Katukov
            These were those who were supposed to teach. And here is the situation with what you had to learn:
            For the successful implementation of the order of NCO No. 30 on combat training, it is imperative to have at least a minimum number of training aids, such as split units, adjustment engines, training simulators, split rifles and machine guns, as well as instructions on small arms, tank and fire

            Education and visual aids, keys, head phones are not provided ... In the batteries of the 15th artillery regiment, in the absence of keys and telephones, the training of radio operators on hearing and key transmission is not carried out ... During the first period, the 30th Tank Regiment did not have a single walkie-talkie 71-TC for training (all were mothballed). Radio operators of the first year of service have just started hearing lessons, radio operators of the second year on radios do not work, they can’t transmit and receive on the key ...
  10. BAI
    +1
    6 October 2016 13: 47
    Nikkola Mac,
    We can add that there is a photograph of the parade on November 7, 1941, where the soldiers go with Lewis machine guns - from the weapons depots of the Civil War (http://funik.ru/post/85041-mastera-fotografii-ve
    likaya-otechestvennaya-voyna-v-ob-ektive-ustinova
    ), the cannons that took part in the First World War were also used. (I am silent about the fleet specially. One cruiser "Aurora" is worth something)).
    1. 0
      7 October 2016 13: 19
      Quote: BAI
      used the same guns that took part in the first world

      1. You confuse the year of development and the year of the creation of the gun.
      For instance. Guns 76,2mm arr. 1902 took part in the WWI. with a barrel length of 30 calibers.
      Guns of the same caliber, under the same ammunition, but modernized, model 1902/30 with a barrel length of 40 calibers took part in WWII. And at that time they were not much in the majority.
      The same applies to other artillery, the original version of which was developed before the WWII.

      2. Such a picture was not specific to the USSR, as some particularly talented or simply not knowing the subject try to lie.
      For example, in France, the basis of the division artillery at the beginning of WWII was 75 mm guns arr. 1897 (!!!) - modernized, of course. Other French artillery, for the most part, was also from artillery systems developed before the WWII and modernized during the interwar period.
      It was similar to the British - however, they introduced a new 25-pound caliber, a howitzer gun of this caliber became the basis of the English division artillery. The 60-pound hull gun (127mm) was deeply modernized: the caliber was reduced to 114mm with the same projectile weight, which dramatically improved ballistics. Vickers' 152-mm howitzer was converted to a lighter shell with the aim of increasing range and rate of fire. But, in general, artillery systems from the time of the WWII and there were at the heart of the WWII armament.
      In Japan, very promising artillery systems were developed before WWII, but they were released in very small numbers - the most massive guns of the Japanese were type 38, i.e. Sample 1905 (!!!) in their modernized version.

      Germany was very atypical in this regard because after the WWII their heavy weapons were almost completely confiscated, and the production of new ones was prohibited and was not carried out until 1933, when Hitler refused to comply with the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty.
      Nevertheless: all the guns that survived from the WWII, for example, the 150 mm howitzer, model 1913, were also used by the Germans in WWII.

      Quote: BAI
      one cruiser "Aurora" is worth something)).
      And what about the cruiser Aurora? It was already very outdated at the time of its creation. He has not performed any tasks worthy of his class since the Russo-Japanese War.
  11. +4
    6 October 2016 14: 49
    Many thanks to Samsonov for the article. Near Moscow, the fascists were defeated, and at the same time, near Leningrad, during these days of December, the fascists and Finns were crushed. My mother and I were evacuated in Siberia, and my father created heavy railroad artillery and smashed the Nazis on the Leningrad front. Tikhvin was released on December 8. This is also a contribution to the victory near Moscow. I wrote an article about my father's activities in creating artillery in "VO" "Unpublished Letters". How is it possible, after such articles, which describe the feat of the peoples of the USSR, to open memorial plaques to the fascists in St. Petersburg and distort the history of our people. I have the honor.
    1. 0
      6 October 2016 21: 23
      Not defeated, but driven away. The first major defeat with the environment was near Stalingrad.
  12. +1
    6 October 2016 16: 27
    Nehist,
    quote = Nehist] You can teach shooting and digging in, but this is not a full-fledged combat training [/ quote]
    Do not write nonsense.
    However .. and why not, push the speech-what and how, in your understanding = full-fledged training of the infantryman of the beginning of the 4th year. Do not forget to add to your speech you were instructed to teach the soldier how to shoot, disguise, use the techniques of bayonet fighting, tactics on the battlefield as part of a detachment, platoon, company, it is possible for a MONTH if you don’t sit with your mouth open and count the raven, namely, do military training — there were no stupid people among those who organized these formations.

    And so, start your story and show what you had to do.
  13. +1
    6 October 2016 16: 58
    Bloodsucker,
    And do you see ZAS equipment other than 145 is not known? And the concepts of tropospheric, cross, too? And what is it wired and wireless, permanent and temporary durability? !!! It seems that at least they reached the colonel’s .... And you also don’t know such a concept as a reception center for personnel
    1. +1
      6 October 2016 17: 06
      What is the relation of р145 ARDS to tropospheric and other types of communication?
      What relation do you, ensign, have to things and documents that you do not have in rank, in position, in admission, or in understanding, are simply not available?
      Talk about the types of communication, hoping that in this way you ate your opponent, childish stupidity.
      I don’t need about the reception points for personnel in which you, at best, ran around with the phone and installed telephones; I saw and deployed this in my service in abundance.

      Where's the answer?

      Nehist,
      quote = Nehist] You can teach shooting and digging in, but this is not a full-fledged combat training [/ quote]
      Do not write nonsense.
      However .. and why not, push the speech-what and how, in your understanding = full-fledged training of the infantryman of the beginning of the 4th year. Do not forget to add to your speech you were instructed to teach the soldier how to shoot, disguise, use the techniques of bayonet fighting, tactics on the battlefield as part of a detachment, platoon, company, it is possible for a MONTH if you don’t sit with your mouth open and count the raven, namely, do military training — there were no stupid people among those who organized these formations.

      And so, start your story and show what you had to do.
      1. +1
        6 October 2016 17: 29
        The p145 is not at all what it is with standard means of communication, only in the building past them there is still a lot of things that had to be repaired, serviced and configured, as well as performing functions that were not peculiar to me. Even the head of the L / S reception point had to be due to the total shortage of officers who already performed two or three posts
  14. +1
    6 October 2016 16: 58
    Quote: Nehist
    On May 21, 1940, by Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee No. 16/158, it was decided to maintain the rifle divisions of the western districts in peacetime in the following numbers: 98 divisions — 12 or more thousand people each, and only 3 divisions — 9 thousand each. And in May - June 1941, 802 thousand people were mobilized during training camps. At the same time, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts with a staff number of 14 was brought up: 483 divisions - up to 21 thousand people. 14 divisions - up to 72 thousand people and 12 rifle divisions - up to 6 thousand people. Not completeness was only in auto transport and horses in support units, but in terms of the number of L / C divisions were fully provided on June 11, 22

    And how does the equipment for regular recruiting? The fact that covert mobilization and preparation was carried out is already known. But these comrades who were called up for the exercises (by the way, why don’t you note that after the exercises they were dismissed from their homes?), Weren’t recruited from the beds.
    For that matter, I'll tell you. The draft was established in 1926 in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, in 1939 (mine) adjustments were made. Here with those who were discharged after the 35th year and exercises were held.
    1. +1
      6 October 2016 19: 11
      Quote: ShadowCat
      The fact that covert mobilization and preparation was carried out is already known.

      There was no hidden mobilization in 1941. With covert mobilization (BUS), equipment is mobilized and framed units are brought to the state - including the rear services are fully deployed. None of this happened in 1941: half of those called up for training ended up in the "second set" in the 6000 division, in addition to the existing soldiers - for retraining (but the rear of these divisions remained cropped). Transport and traction generally mobilized a meager amount.

      Here's what a real hidden mobilization looks like:
      A total of 22 infantry, 5 cavalry and 3 tank corps, 98 rifle and 14 cavalry divisions, 28 tank, 3 motorized rifle and machine gun and 1 airborne brigades took part in the BUS. 2 people were called up (see table 610), who were September 136, 26 by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the order of the people's commissar of defense? 22 of September 1939 were declared mobilized "until further notice." Troops also received 634 thousand horses, 117 cars and 300 tractors.
  15. Cat
    +8
    6 October 2016 19: 53
    Nehist,
    My grandfather served in the NKVD troops in Moscow in the fall and winter of 1941. In his words, the first divisions of the people's service were involved in the preparation of the echeloned defense of the capital. In parallel, they were engaged in combat training for at least 4 hours a day. He considered it a big mistake to see them as "intellectuals with glasses"; in his minds, the "militias" were mainly workers "strong Bolsheviks" who had "war and revolution" behind them. He spoke warmly about these people and always set their example. I especially remembered the commissar who, being chronically ill with bronchitis, was with his people everywhere from digging trenches to drill exercises. With a grin he recalled that Lewis had taught the machine guns issued from the depots to disassemble and assemble the commissar. He especially emphasized that for the first time their charges were involved at the front, during the winter offensive near Moscow, but already as a rifle division.
    The intelligentsia, he said, fled from Moscow "Like rats." In October and November, schools, hospitals, various offices and many state institutions were practically closed. The NKVD troops and the police were exhausted in the fight against the alarmists. There have been cases of lynching of "deserters" and "lawyers". Part of the government structures moved to Kubyshev. He had the opinion that it was precisely the will of Stalin and his firmness that allowed him to defend the capital.
    1. +3
      6 October 2016 20: 00
      Thank you for the memory of his grandfather and his testimony.
      1. Cat
        +4
        6 October 2016 20: 49
        At my wedding in 2000, my good friend and senior comrade after talking with my grandfather said the following words - "Slava, talk to your grandfather, write down his stories. This is a real archive source. This is your dissertation." I was young and stupid, I listened to my ear, I was always in a hurry somewhere, in a hurry. And now, when the fortieth day is approaching, and my grandfather is no longer 10 years old, I sincerely regret that at some point I didn’t stop again, I didn’t talk once again, I just didn’t listen to him once again.
        Sorry if off topic.
    2. 0
      7 October 2016 09: 12
      And to me, why did you write all this? Can you read? Where in my words is the belittling of the bottom? The fact that there is simply a statement of the fact of insufficient preparation annoys you so much? And my statements that it was better to prepare it was simply impossible too? Well, you have to admit the obvious ....
      1. Cat
        +1
        7 October 2016 13: 48
        All were "insufficiently" prepared for the Second World War. From private to generals inclusive. But unlike the present generation, people who knew how to hold a rifle in their hands, who had experience of the Civil War and the First World War, were the first to come to the DNO. And we do not need to paint a militia "in the form of a bespectacled intellectual." I draw your attention to the fact that everyone who joined the militia had a tough ileological motivation, the overwhelming majority were communists. In addition, DNOs passed the minimum level of combat training, increased technical support and weapons, received an average initial staff. Of the 12 DNOs of the Moscow militia, only 4 took part in the Second World War ka militia. The rest took part in the hostilities as rifle divisions. This also applies to other voluntary divisions and corps from the Kuban to the Urals. In all cases, even if the units started out as a militia, after 1-2 months they were reorganized into combat units.
        In the worst situation, paradoxically, there were ordinary mobilized conscripts, in the course of "permanent mobilization" they were put under arms in 1-1,5 months. Militia divisions, especially at the initial stage of the war, on average took part in hostilities within 2-2,5 months from the moment of formation.
        1. 0
          7 October 2016 15: 00
          Wow how famously !!! I didn’t recognize anything new ... And you, apparently, also don’t know how to read !!! By the way, the experience of the civilian played a cruel joke ... Those other divisions, supposedly as personnel infantry, had the same not a complete set of small arms !!! And maybe enough? !!! Who here periyeizhit heroism of their ancestors? !!! Do you even read what they forgot to write about?
    3. 0
      8 October 2016 22: 06
      Quote: Kotischa
      There have been cases of lynching of "deserters" and "lawyers".

      It seems that in the 41st there was a decree in Moscow on the execution on the spot of looters, alarmists, provocateurs, etc. local patrols ...
      So it turns out this is not lynching, but a clear implementation of the order?
  16. +2
    6 October 2016 20: 34
    Strange komenti! Enough for a month or not, experience shows an individual soldier can be trained in a week, 14 hours a day, but part of the level of a battalion, regiment, division is not really newly created especially. even more so. Time is only enough for the squad-platoon level, maximum company, i.e. what the commander sees and can influence immediately. The art will by itself and work at its own discretion, and not for the benefit of the entire unit, since it can’t shoot except direct fire, and the HR personnel did not work from closed positions, especially according to the spotters from the front lines (and were they there ?!) And it’s worth considering such a thing as a moral factor. A rookie, as you don’t prepare him, does not represent any special value in the first fight - he’ll get confused anyway, and he’ll even enter into a stupor, and if there are 80% of them and the commanders are the same ?! That was what the Wehrmacht was distinguished for: co-ordination, interaction of all kinds, shelling and experience, and from June 22.06.1941, XNUMX. typed. .
    1. 0
      6 October 2016 20: 57
      Quote: Predator
      Some strange comments! Enough for a month or not, experience shows an individual soldier can be prepared in a week, 14 hours a day, but part of the level is a battalion, regiment, division


      And the battalion, regiment, division is the commander’s level. But the fighter and the junior command staff does nothing new, everything is familiar to him - listen to the command and follow it. All this he took place on the training fields and shooting ranges.

      And commanders - so after school 2 years - a platoon.
    2. Cat
      +4
      6 October 2016 21: 04
      My second grandfather fought in the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps gunner 152mm howitzer guns. According to him, in the 43rd of their original composition was no more than 1/3, but this third became the backbone of the subdivision that went through the whole war.
      Yes, permanent mobilization, this is the scourge of the Second World War. But it was she who saved our country from enslavement. Yes, our grandfathers and great-grandfathers met with a mobilized army that captured half of Europe, but it was they who broke the ridge of the fascist reptile. Honor and praise be to them for their feat.
    3. +1
      6 October 2016 21: 26
      When I needed to, tactically prepared in minutes.
    4. hip
      0
      7 October 2016 18: 01
      I will ask one blank question - do you know what it means to be under fire?
  17. 2-0
    +3
    6 October 2016 20: 51
    There are interesting moments. For some reason, the Germans did not bomb the Volkhov hydroelectric power station near Leningrad, why - it is not clear ...
    It is not clear where the electricity came from to Moscow in the fall and winter of 41 ... It seems that the Germans are everywhere, but there was current. I dealt with this issue, a lot of incomprehensible and even mysterious things (by type - all the frontier depots of the Red Army were seized, and the Germans froze and collected warm clothes in Germany).
    1. +2
      6 October 2016 21: 27
      It was well disguised.
    2. hip
      0
      7 October 2016 18: 14
      Well, the chances were not really stupid people, why do you need a city where nothing works. But what mysterious did they find in the warehouses (by type - there were no pants in Germany)?
  18. +2
    7 October 2016 02: 37
    Stas57,
    when you talk about poorly trained ..... try to personally explain to yourself - how these "poorly" trained defeated the Germans, who have complete air superiority, who have not only their own equipment and weapons, but also captured, who have experienced a huge number of military operations (and this is much more important than any training)?
    and no need to fill in about bad weather. our "poorly" trained people fought in the same conditions.
    and if you recall the German pedantry and genius, then they were better prepared for any difficulties and problems.
    in short, when you start repeating the lies of liars twisting history - you lose the ability to think logically ..
    1. 0
      7 October 2016 10: 22
      Quote: Yegor village
      when you talk about poorly trained ..... try to personally explain to yourself - how these "poorly" trained defeated the Germans, who have complete air superiority, who have not only their own equipment and weapons, but also captured, who have experienced a huge number of military operations (and this is much more important than any training)?

      Big blood, comrade, big blood - paying her for all the flaws of pre-war training. The Germans were met by the "hundredth" divisions at the border, and the "two hundredth" and "three hundredth" already drove them back. The same mechanized corps of the border districts grinded to zero in the first weeks of the war.

      War is the best teacher. Survivors learn fast and what is needed in a real battle. But the price of such training is too high - the complete use of the mobile reserve by 1945.
      1. +2
        7 October 2016 10: 37
        Colleague, yes, war is the best teacher .. agrees.
        And now let's see why in the liberal press. In the assessments of, so to say, not particularly admirers of Stalin, the figure of Pavlov and his actions before the war, during its beginning, are somehow mixed and there is only a cry, innocently injured, oh, how insidious Stalin ?
        The question is, WHY in ZAPOVO, then the Western Front, ABSOLUTELY not fulfilled the requirements of the Directive of June 18?
        In the Baltic States, they fulfilled. In the KOVO, in a certain part, in the Far Eastern Military District, they fulfilled, in the Navy, they fulfilled, but in the most important direction, failure? Moreover, a catastrophic failure, which then led to a catastrophe in the Kiev direction.
        This is treason, part of the highest generals, this is a racket, what is it called?
        From the testimonies collected after the war from the surviving commanders of ZAPOVO, the picture emerged not at all joyful — from examples of removing weapons from aircraft, to sending mechanic artillery units 300 km from the RPM, taking away sights from anti-aircraft guns and panoramas from the ratilists, under the pretext of verification, not a conclusion parts in the field. not fulfilling the tasks of mining and disguising what it is ...
        It’s not the very thing that caused the arrest of Tukhkachevsky and his kodla, and they simply did not manage to pull out the roots to the base, because the first defeats, as on the thumb, correspond to what Tukhachevsky wrote in his testimony.
        1. The comment was deleted.
  19. 0
    7 October 2016 08: 12
    And the battalion, regiment, division is the commander’s level. But the fighter and the junior command staff does nothing new, everything is familiar to him - listen to the command and follow it. All this he took place on the training fields and shooting ranges.

    And the commanders - so after school 2 years - a platoon. [/ Quote]
    That’s what the talk is about, the sense of your individual training of fighters, if the unit does not work in concert. In the same battalion, one company withdrew by itself and substituted 2 others, the same for the regiment and division. Without coordination of units to the level of division and absence a clear command, there’s nothing to ask from the rank and file. The Vyazemsky cauldron, everything was weapons and ammunition, food, could be kept free for 2-3 months both in the boiler (Paulus example-6A) and the Germans couldn’t freely go to Moscow, nevertheless, there are 800 thousand groupings in the rear, but how does it smell in the rear ?!
    1. 0
      7 October 2016 09: 16
      Respect !!! What I tried to explain here without really painting
      1. 0
        7 October 2016 11: 00
        [quote = Nehist] Without coordinating units to the level of a division and the absence of a clear command, there is nothing to ask from privates. [/ quote

        You don’t understand what. ask - I will explain.

        The fact that the command training desired the best agree.
        BUT.

        After 4 months, we began to fight better (while losing a lot of platoon-battalion unit commanders) - why? (during this time it is impossible to qualitatively train commanders, though experience has been added).

        Because it was precisely the fighters who became more prepared.

        No matter how brilliant the commander is, no matter how wonderful the plan of the operation is, the low preparation of the rank and file will bring everything to zero.
        1. 0
          7 October 2016 21: 10
          About how everything that I wrote above is brief and clear! Well, I'm not a writer, unfortunately (
  20. +1
    7 October 2016 16: 35
    [quote = chenia] [quote = Nehist] Without coordinating units to the level of a division and the absence of a clear command, there is nothing to ask from privates. [/ quote

    You don’t understand what. ask - I will explain.

    The fact that the command training desired the best agree.
    BUT.

    After 4 months, we began to fight better (while losing a lot of platoon-battalion unit commanders) - why? (during this time it is impossible to qualitatively train commanders, though experience has been added).

    Because it was precisely the fighters who became more prepared.

    No matter how brilliant the commander is, no matter how marvelous the plan of the operation is, the low preparation of the privates will reduce everything to zero. [/ Quote]
    You do not seem to understand this. Wehrmacht would have withstood your entire Ukrainian and DNR army and would not have frowned. You still don’t have divisions such as divisions and large-scale operations. ?!
    And you I had ...... and I saw and participated, and I had losses .......
    1. 0
      7 October 2016 16: 48
      After 4 months, we began to fight better (while losing a lot of platoon-battalion unit commanders) - why? (during this time it is impossible to qualitatively train commanders, though experience has been added).

      Everything is much simpler. The boys were killed. 21-23 years were completely cleaned out.
      Experience could be gained only by people who won or at least survived after surviving defeats. Those who died immediately or were captured immediately did not have time to gain any experience. In the 41st three members of the army were replaced, 14 million were called up

      Then 30-year-olds joined the army.
      By the 43rd, it was the turn of forty. Those who were not brought up by the Komsomol, but who went to church and believed in God. Then Victory really became a reality.
    2. +1
      7 October 2016 18: 17
      Quote: Predator
      This, apparently, you don’t understand. The Wehrmacht would have carried out your entire Ukrainian and DNR army and would not have frowned. Even now you have no units such as divisions and large-scale operations.


      What are you talking about? I took my harness a few decades ago.

      About the organization of BP in the SA (Red Army) you are not aware of. Otherwise, they would not say nonsense (especially, as you put it about ARTU, never judge what you don't know).

      Individual training of a fighter cannot be in isolation from the squad, platoon. - this time.
      There are no new tricks at any of the BTU, PTU and higher stages, either for separation or for a fighter, these are two. Follow the command of the commander and you will be honored and glory.

      And interaction is units and types of troops (according to tasks. Place. Time) not a fighter and separation is a matter.

      Amplification means (requiring some other control signals) at least at the platoon level.

      All this is the level of command training.



      Quote: Hupfri
      Then 30-year-olds joined the army.
      By the 43rd, it was the turn of forty.


      I agree that thirty-forty-year-olds are wiser.
      But only not because their Komsomol did not raise them, and they went to church.
      1. 0
        7 October 2016 21: 15
        Pancake!!! Another comment is correct! Well, I don’t know how to explain it, I analyzed it a bit, and here some of the couple didn’t peck ....
  21. hip
    0
    7 October 2016 19: 09
    respected military review, BUT BOTTS IT'S ALREADY FUNNY, not counting your content
  22. 0
    8 October 2016 03: 31
    BROWN !!! YOU ARE YOUR NICK JUSTIFYING !!! Apparently you were far from L / C! That's because of such managers as you have to show heroism !!!
    I have the honor !!!! hi
  23. +1
    10 October 2016 11: 10
    Quote: Hupfri
    Those who were not brought up by the Komsomol, but who went to church and believed in God.

    Sure sure. It’s familiar. Such clever men in 1903 proved that we will defeat the Japanese easily, because everywhere we are taught the law of God, and the Japanese have no such subject at all in schools laughing

    After this passage of yours, you explain to me why the Orthodox polls of the Russian army were so shamefully, in almost all the battles in a row, blown up the REV to the Japanese, who taught much more useful things in schools than God's law.
    Why did the godless atheistic USSR inflate the Japanese even twice - in 1939 and 1945, without ever turning to God's law for this purpose.

    Well, it would not hurt your unsubstantiated inventions about the statistics of military losses by age, backed up with some more respected sources than your Personal Very Authoritative Opinion laughing