Military Review

Fritz plan and Lossberg designs. The viciousness and adventurism of the principles of the war plan against the USSR

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Fritz plan and Lossberg designs. The viciousness and adventurism of the principles of the war plan against the USSR

In July, 1940, the Wehrmacht’s ground forces general staff was already developing a war plan with the USSR. 21 July Hitler categorically stated: "The Russian problem will be resolved by the offensive." 22 July Halder received a task from the commander-in-chief of the land forces to comprehensively think through various options “concerning the operation against Russia”.

Fritz Plan

Initially, the development of a war plan with the USSR was entrusted to the chief of 18 Army General E. Marx, who had the special trust of Adolf Hitler. In planning, Erich Marx proceeded from the instructions of Halder, who introduced his course of military-political attitudes regarding the impending war in the East.

General Tippelskirch noted: “The beginning of military preparations can be traced from the summer of 1940. At the end of July, before an order was given for an air attack on England, Jodl informed one of his closest employees that Hitler had decided to prepare a war against the Soviet Union. This war should have begun in all circumstances, and then it would be better to wage it within the framework of the ongoing war; in any case, it is necessary to prepare for it. Initially, they even discussed the possibility of starting a new war in the coming fall (i.e., in the 1940 year). However, this would have to face insurmountable difficulties associated with strategic concentration, and this idea was soon abandoned. ”

On July 31, 1940, at a meeting with the Wehrmacht’s top command, Hitler formulated the general strategic idea of ​​a war against the USSR: “The operation falls into: 1st strike: Kiev, access to the Dnieper; aviation destroys the crossing. Odessa. 2nd strike: through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a bilateral strike - from the north and south; later - a private operation to seize Baku. ”

On August 5, the initial version of the war plan with the USSR, the Fritz plan, was prepared by General Marx. At the beginning of the plan, it was noted that "The campaign’s goal is to defeat the Russian armed forces and make Russia incapable of opposing Germany in the foreseeable time." That is, Berlin went on direct aggression, there was no threat from the USSR. And the Germans knew this: "The Russians will not render us services by attacking us."

It was planned that the main blow would be struck by the Wehrmacht on Moscow from Northern Poland and East Prussia. In general, the German troops were supposed to reach the line of Arkhangelsk, Gorky and Rostov-on-Don. On the Polish and East Prussian bridgeheads, it was planned to deploy the main strike force grouping - Army Group North, consisting of three armies, a total of 68 divisions (of which 15 tank and 2 motorized). Army Group North was to defeat the Russian forces in the western direction, capture the northern part of the Soviet Union and take Moscow. The decisive importance was assigned to the capture of Moscow, which would lead, Marx pointed out, to "an end to Soviet resistance." In the future, it was planned to turn the front to the south and, in cooperation with the southern group, seize southern Russia.

The second strike was to be delivered to the south of the Pripyat marshes by forces of Army Group South, consisting of two armies, all 35 divisions (including 5 tank and 7 motorized). Its purpose was the defeat of the Soviet troops in Ukraine, the seizure of Kiev and the crossing of the Dnieper in the middle course. In reserve, the main command remained 44 divisions, which were located the second echelon of the Army Group "North".

Thus, the plan envisaged an offensive operation in two strategic directions, a deep dissection of the strategic front of the Red Army and, after forcing the Dnieper, the Soviet forces reached the central regions in giant ticks. It was emphasized that the outcome of the war will largely depend on effective and rapid actions of tank and motorized formations. That is, just like during the First World War, the German generals dreamed of gigantic "Cannes" - the reach, encirclement and defeat of the main enemy forces, which led to a decisive success in the entire campaign. Taking into account the qualitative growth of the mechanization of the ground forces, the appearance of the shock armored "kulaks" and the development of the role of aviation, now the German army had every chance of success of such an operation. For the defeat of the Red Army and the victorious conclusion of the war, 9 weeks were allotted, with the worst case scenario 17 weeks. Marx’s plan was based on the idea of ​​a “blitzkrieg”.

In terms of the war against the USSR, developed by General E. Marx, the foundations were laid for the future defeat of the Third Reich: the underestimation of the military-economic power of the Soviet Union, which in recent years has risen to a much higher level; reassessment of the Wehrmacht’s ability to achieve a quick and crushing victory. Examples of the quick defeat of the powerful armies of Poland and France "spoiled" the Germans, they believed that any enemy could be crushed in a quick campaign. They did not take into account the factor of moral unity and perseverance of the Soviet people, ready for any sacrifice in order to preserve freedom and to achieve victory. They were mistaken in the assessment of the Soviet leadership; Stalin and the Soviet military-political leadership did not intend to flee or capitulate. The emphasis was placed on the weakness and inability of the Soviet leadership to cope with the enormous difficulties caused by the sudden invasion of the enemy, and his inability to prevent in the face of chaos and panic, the collapse of the state and political system, to mobilize the country's resources to resist the enemy.

The German leadership did not take into account at all that the USSR of the sample 1940-1941. differs sharply from Soviet Russia 1920 - early 1930's. The Red Empire was a “monolith”: with a single people and elite, with a leader who was not going to “surrender” the country; with educated in the spirit of patriotism, the priority of the ideal, the people over the material and personal population; with a powerful economy and military-industrial complex, which produced all types of weapons and equipment, and some weapons was the foremost and best in the world. The Fifth Column (Trotskyist internationalists), which was counted on in Berlin, was largely destroyed or driven underground. Therefore, the “1917 g.” Scenario, when the “elite” of the Russian Empire practically destroyed the autocracy itself and sentenced Russia to defeat in the war, was impossible to implement in the USSR. Such a country and people could not be won in the “quick war”.

The viciousness and adventurism of the principles underlying the original plan of war against the USSR were not overcome in the course of further planning. For example, in Berlin, it was believed that the rejection of the western border regions of the USSR would lead to a complete collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex. That is, the enemy did not find or did not attach serious importance to the fact that Moscow created the second industrial base in the eastern regions of the country and duplicated the main enterprises, creating a huge safety margin for the entire economy as a whole and the military-industrial complex in particular.

Therefore, the German military-political leadership made wrong conclusions. Like, the Red Army, in order to preserve industry, will take a decisive counter-offensive in the border areas. This will allow the Wehrmacht to crush the main forces of the USSR ground forces in the shortest possible time. Moreover, the possibility of restoring Soviet military power after a defeat in a border battle was excluded. It was believed that the German troops would be in the ensuing chaos, as in 1918, with a quiet march and small forces moving along the main communications deep into the East. The main emphasis was on the fact that the USSR was a “colossus on clay feet,” which would collapse during a strong blow. Then you can push the weak, poorly organized resistance of individual centers, groups, and calmly occupy vast Russian territories. The German leadership also counted on the mass support of the Soviet people, national and religious minorities "oppressed by the Bolshevik regime." Mass heroism, a large-scale guerrilla movement and a fierce rebuff of the majority of the population was a big surprise for the Nazis.

From the very beginning, the moment was missed that if the Soviet government and the army did not falter and organize stubborn resistance in the western regions, weakening the Wehrmacht’s strike power, then Moscow would gain time for the transfer of troops from other regions of the country, the evacuation of the defense industry to the East of the country, so that relying on the huge raw materials and energy resources of the Urals and Siberia, to restore the economic potential, as well as to mobilize all the human reserves of Soviet civilization to fight. In this way, the enemy seriously underestimated the organizational skills of the Soviet military-political leadership and the internal stability of the Red Empire. “Subhumans”, according to “true Aryans,” were simply incapable of such a high level of organization and discipline.

It was a real failure of German intelligence, which was unable to correctly determine the defenses of the USSR, its spiritual, moral, political, military, economic potentials, could not make a real forecast of the development of events of the war in the East. It made huge miscalculations on many important issues, in particular, in estimating the number of Soviet troops in peacetime and in wartime, the prospects for its increase after mobilization, in estimating the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the material part of our armored forces and air forces. For example, German intelligence did not know about the real annual production of aircraft and tanks in the USSR. On the technical characteristics of the tank T-34 in Germany did not know. An unpleasant surprise for the Germans was a heavy KV tank.

It is worth noting that it is believed that this failure of German intelligence was conscious. The German military-political leadership was simply misinformed. To Germany attacked the USSR without hesitation, and Berlin did not dare to go into a strategic alliance with Moscow. The axis Berlin - Moscow was a terrible dream for England and the USA. Given that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of German intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr), apparently worked for Britain, this version has a right to exist. In addition, she explains the reasons for the "failure" of German intelligence and the "blindness" of the German leadership.

In captivity of the illusions about the weakness of the USSR, not only was the headquarters of the ground forces, but also the entire military-political leadership of Nazi Germany. The idea of ​​a “blitzkrieg” war against the USSR, absolute confidence in its feasibility, was the basis of the military-economic preparation of the Russian campaign. So, 17 August 1940, at a meeting at the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) devoted to this issue, Field Marshal Keitel called "the crime of trying to create such production facilities at the present time that will have an effect only after 1941. Invest it is possible only in such enterprises that are necessary to achieve the goal and will have the corresponding effect. ” In this way, Germany was preparing for a “quick war” in the East and was not ready for a long and exhausting campaign when the country mobilized all the forces and resources to achieve victory.


General Erich Marx

In the summer and fall of 1940, the German Wehrmacht High Command began to forcefully send its troops to Poland, closer to the Soviet borders. To this end, the railway network in Poland was improved, old lines were repaired and new roads were laid, communication lines were installed.

Immediately after the defeat of France, three German armies of the von Boc group - 4-I, 12-I and 18-I, consisting of up to 30 divisions, were sent to the East, in the region of Poznan. Of the 24 formations that were part of the 16 and 9 armies of Group A, which were intended to strike at England under the Sea Lion plan, 17 was transferred to the East. In Poland, the headquarters of the 18 Army was deployed, which united all German forces in the East. Between July 16 and August 14, more than 20 German divisions were redeployed. The troops moved from Central France to the coast of the English Channel and Pas-de-Calais, and then through Belgium and Holland to Germany and further to Poland, to the borders of the Soviet Union. These strange marches pursued a single goal: to cover up Germany’s preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.

By September 20 1940 from France to the borders of the USSR, in East Prussia, Poland, Upper Silesia, was transferred around 30 divisions. Since for Germany since the autumn of 1940, the preparation of the war against the Soviet Union was decisive, 12 of October 1940 was ordered to cease all measures to prepare the Sea Lion plan until the spring of 1941. Tank, motorized and infantry divisions intended for a landing to England, at the end of summer and in the fall of 1940 were loaded into cars and directed to the Soviet borders.

Only time constraints - the Germans did not have time to make a strategic concentration for aggression against the USSR - kept them from attacking the Soviet Union in the 1940 year. General Got wrote: “At that time, Hitler, who was going to launch an offensive against Russia in the fall (1940 in the fall), reported that it would take from four to six weeks to concentrate and deploy troops along the eastern border ... On July 31, Hitler outlined his intentions specifically, he said that he would have most willingly launched an offensive against Russia this year. But this cannot be done, since hostilities will take over the winter, and the pause is dangerous; the operation only makes sense if we defeat the Russian state with one blow. ”

Developments F. Paulus. Lossberg plan

Further work on the plan for a war against the USSR was continued by General F. Paulus, who was appointed to the post of chief chief of office - assistant chief of the general staff of the ground forces. In order to expand the scope of work on the plan of war against the USSR, Hitler connected generals to it, who were to lead the headquarters of army groups on the Eastern Front. They were invited to independently investigate the problem of going to the East.

General Paulus was entrusted with the task, based on the Fritz plan, to develop considerations regarding the grouping of troops for waging war against the USSR, the order of their strategic concentration and deployment. 17 September this work was completed and Paulus was tasked to summarize all the results of preliminary operational and strategic planning. October 29 was prepared by a memorandum by Paulus “On the main plan of the operation against Russia”. It emphasized that in order to ensure a decisive superiority in forces and means over Soviet troops, it was necessary to achieve a surprise invasion, for which it was necessary to carry out a set of measures to mislead the enemy. It was also pointed out the need for the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet troops in the border area in order to prevent them from retreating into the interior of the country.

The headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command also developed a plan for war with the USSR. Under the direction of General Jodl, the head of the ground forces group of the operational division of the OKW, Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg, was engaged in it. By 15 September 1940 they presented their own version of the plan of war with the USSR. Many of his ideas were embodied in the final plan of the war against the USSR. The purpose of the war was determined by the following: “By swift actions to destroy a mass of ground forces in Western Russia, prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space, and then cut off the western part of Russia from the seas, break through to a line that, on the one hand, would secure us the most important areas Russia, on the other hand, could serve as a convenient barrier from its Asian part. At the same time, the operational space of Russia, where combat operations take place at the first stage, is divided into two parts by the Pripyat marshes, so that the ulnar communication between the groups of troops operating north and south of the marshes can only be established during the pursuit. ” Further, the idea is expressed that "with the superiority of the forces possessed by the German army, combat operations should be conducted simultaneously in both operational spaces."

The Lossberg plan envisaged the deployment of offensive operations by troops of three army groups in three strategic directions, and not two as in Marx, in Leningrad (northern), Moscow (central) and Kiev (southern). Army Group North was hitting from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad. The main blow was delivered not by the north, as in Marx, but by the central group, Army Group Center. She was advancing along the Minsk – Smolensk – Moscow line. Here they planned to use the bulk of armored formations. After the capture of Smolensk, the continuation of the offensive in the central direction was made dependent on the situation in the band of the Army Group North. In the event of a delay in its attack on the Leningrad direction, it was supposed to suspend the advancement of the “Center” group on Moscow and send part of its forces to help the northern army group.

Army Group "South" had the task of covering the Red Army from both sides in the area from the Pripyat marshes to the Black Sea, destroying them, seizing Ukrainian territory during the pursuit, forcing the Dnieper and establishing connection with the northern strategic flank. It was planned to involve Finland and Romania in the war with the Soviet Union. German and Finnish troops were to form a separate task force for the main forces to attack Leningrad and part of the forces on Murmansk.

Thus, the Lossberg plan provided for the application of powerful dissecting blows, encirclement and destruction of large groups of the Red Army. The final frontier of the advancement of the German troops was determined by whether an internal catastrophe occurs in Russia after the first decisive successes of the Wehrmacht, and if it does, when it happens. It was believed that having lost Western Russia and access to the seas, Russia is unlikely to retain its combat capability, and even taking into account the possibilities of Russian industry in the Urals, Russia will no longer be able to wage war. Much attention was paid to surprise attacks. Lossberg repeatedly returned to this problem: “It is important to achieve that Russia ... does not suspect of imminent danger and would not have grounds for taking countermeasures ...”



To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
1941 Campaign

How defeated Yugoslavia and Greece
Yugoslav operation
Greek operation
Operation Mercury
How German paratroopers stormed Crete
Hitler was only a tool to crush the USSR
Red Empire on the eve of the great battle
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  1. Cartalon
    Cartalon 28 June 2016 06: 22
    +2
    The plan was better than execution, the idea of ​​stopping the offensive in the center and solving problems on the flanks was correct, but the generals wanted to storm Moscow.
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 28 June 2016 07: 46
    +4
    Adolf Alozievich, before going to Russia, through mediums he would have talked with Napoleon, with Charles XII ... But he had neglected ...
  3. Internal combustion engine
    Internal combustion engine 28 June 2016 08: 09
    +11
    The Germans were in a hurry. The USSR was rapidly building up its power. Therefore, either the attack is now or never. Hence the adventurism and rounding of corners when planning. And the "investors" from overseas insisted on an immediate solution to the "Bolshevik question."
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 28 June 2016 10: 22
      -4
      Declare war on the United States, did Hitler sponsors order? Having defeated Britain, the Germans could organize an attack on the USSR along the entire perimeter of the borders, the attack was stupid and that’s all.
      1. Internal combustion engine
        Internal combustion engine 28 June 2016 11: 17
        -1
        Germany did not declare war on the United States.
        1. Cartalon
          Cartalon 28 June 2016 11: 44
          -2
          Why, you read something on the topic, at least some old Soviet publication for starters, otherwise you started right away with conspiracy therapists, this is harmful.
        2. Operator
          Operator 28 June 2016 12: 05
          +7
          7 November 1941 year after the attack on the Hawaiian Islands (Pearl Harbor) America declared war on Japan, 11 December 1941 year, the allies of Japan Germany and Italy declared war on America.
        3. troyan
          troyan 28 June 2016 17: 48
          0
          Quote: ICE
          Germany did not declare war on the United States.

          Hmm ... Immediately read the history of those years.
        4. Alf
          Alf 28 June 2016 19: 40
          +1
          Quote: ICE
          Germany did not declare war on the United States.

          11.12.41/XNUMX/XNUMX - Germany and Italy declared war on the United States (approx. On the same day, the United States declared war on Germany).
    2. Idiot
      Idiot 29 June 2016 11: 15
      -1
      Quote: ICE
      The Germans were in a hurry. The USSR was rapidly building up its power. Therefore, either an attack now or never.


      Not the Germans in a hurry. The Angles of the Germans were in a hurry: we are Alsace and Lorraine, Czechoslovakia, Austria; forgiven pampering in Denmark, Belgium, Norway, France. They brought Poland to you on a silver platter so that there was a place to turn around - but are you scratching yourself ?! Let's quickly end with the Balkans and that by the summer of the forty-first began! And then we will hang Hess and you, Adolf, we will not accept in the European Union ...
  4. timyr
    timyr 28 June 2016 10: 13
    +7
    Correctly said Molotov. Hitler is smart, but. In intelligence, the goblin has the fact that the Nazis really believed in their propaganda and believed that the Russians were subhuman. Jews rule Russia and even Stalin is married to Rosa Kaganovich. When captured they were very surprised, everyone was looking for the liquid Bolsheviks. When they were told that Stalin was unmarried and in general Kaganovich had no sister, they did not believe.
  5. Basil50
    Basil50 28 June 2016 10: 26
    +6
    That’s the more details that pop up, the more respect for OUR FATHER-GRANDFATES and of course IN STALIN, who have broken the backbone of European evil. The details of what the Germans conceived and did and their accomplices are disgusting, but today these plans are being revised and refined. In Europe today there are those who want to * re-fight * but already officially together with the Germans, and there are more and more of them every year. The zones of occupation of RUSSIA are already being distributed. They even determined the number of RUSSIAN PEOPLE who will be left to serve the owners, and all the rest will be destroyed.
    For Europe * democratic values ​​* are determined by the presence of an American military base and mandatory subordination to masters overseas. But I want my own slaves so much and claims to RUSSIA are already voiced, and about the * inferiority * of the RUSSIANS they also begin to reason. Limitrophs and other recently created peoples are especially trying. The abomination is that in RUSSIA there are figures serving the interests of others.
  6. yehat
    yehat 28 June 2016 12: 22
    +1
    some cliches in the article. The question of the real thoughts and motives of the Germans when planning the attack was not solved.
    And without this, it will not be possible to understand the adoption of the Barbarossa plan.
    For example, Guderian writes that he was ordered to report on the number of tanks in the Red Army. There was no direct and complete intelligence, the Germans were forced to rely on estimates. Guderian writes that knowing the daily production of BT tanks and other old types at factories and simply multiplying by time, he received an estimate of 28 thousand, wild by the standards of the Germans (I can be a little mistaken - I write from memory!). He writes with bitterness that these numbers would simply be perceived as fiction and would not be considered corny, so in his note he divided in half and wrote 14000 tanks (I must say, this almost coincided with the real materiel concentrated along the western border), which, by the way, they didn't believe it either. These are the descriptions of the situation that will ultimately make it possible to understand what the Germans were coming from! As I understand it, the Germans, in their estimates, considered the approximate total volume of industry and calculated a rough proportion of their own production. At the same time, for some reason they ignored the experience of Ford and others in conveyor production. From these estimates, the enemy's potential was calculated. Without opening the question, you will not understand where exactly the Germans were mistaken! I believe they were mistaken in their bias towards information, generally unprofessional approach to this. I think, not because they were stupid or stupid or arrogant - just the influence of their industrialists and propaganda on government officials was very great both in decision-making and in the field of "beliefs", axioms and other things that make you not think critically.
  7. sergo1914
    sergo1914 28 June 2016 12: 31
    +7
    It is also worth noting that the plans were developed based on the availability of a developed road network in the USSR. Canaris told Hitler this. Where the Abwehr found roads in the USSR, and even developed ones, is one of the mysteries of that war. And when the Wehrmacht cheerfully, with a whoop and whistle, tried to advance along these roads ... In the photographs of that time, tank columns travel PARALLEL to the road. On the field. And then autumn came. With rains and sleet. With horses drowned in a rut. And with questions to Canaris - these are ROADS ?! Is there even worse ?! And with the understanding that "THIS" in the USSR is considered a good road. And Russians ride them. And there are bad (by Russian standards) roads. But they ride on them too. It's nice to read about this topic in German memoirs.
    1. Alf
      Alf 28 June 2016 19: 43
      0
      Quote: sergo1914
      It is also worth noting that the plans were developed based on the availability of a developed road network in the USSR. Canaris told Hitler this. Where the Abwehr found roads in the USSR, and even developed ones, is one of the mysteries of that war. And when the Wehrmacht cheerfully, with a whoop and whistle, tried to advance along these roads ... In the photographs of that time, tank columns travel PARALLEL to the road. On the field. And then autumn came. With rains and sleet. With horses drowned in a rut. And with questions to Canaris - these are ROADS ?! Is there even worse ?! And with the understanding that "THIS" in the USSR is considered a good road. And Russians ride them. And there are bad (by Russian standards) roads. But they ride on them too. It's nice to read about this topic in German memoirs.

      It is not in vain that Guderian is credited with the phrase “There are no roads in Russia, there are directions in Russia.”
    2. Parsec
      Parsec 28 June 2016 22: 35
      +7
      Tanks go parallel to the road either to save the road for the parts following them, or to raise less dust.

      The road network in the USSR was developed, the question of which roads?
      Between two towns a dirt road can lie and it is quite possible to provide horse-drawn and rare automobile traffic in any weather.
      Then, after a rain, a thousand pieces of equipment are rolled over it with an axle load of three tons, and, having become crap, they begin to whine about the directions of Russia as well.

      The most terrible pictures of dirt and drowning Germans and Americans took in Belgium.

      There are also column roads - this is a route selected off-road and equipped for troop movement. And the dumb ones consider it expensive and are surprised.
  8. Operator
    Operator 28 June 2016 12: 35
    +7
    The mystery of the plans "Fritz" and "Barbarossa" is only in one thing - from what hangover did the German General Staff decide that the mobilization potential of the 200-million-strong USSR is limited to the 3-5 million contingent of the Red Army stationed in the western military districts of the Soviet Union?

    You don’t have to be Canaris, Marx or Paulus to calculate the correct answer arithmetically.

    If you close your eyes to this moronic mistake, the rest of the calculation was true - to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the border battle using the technology of lightning war (in-depth operation according to Soviet terminology), worked out in the Polish and French campaigns.

    In reality, the Wehrmacht completely solved the task set by the General Staff, but then a surprise came - the Germans faced first the second echelon of the Red Army, and then the third, about which nothing was written in the "brilliant" plans of Marx and Paulus. I had to improvise on the go, and since the Germans were not intended for this from the word at all, their improvisation ended in defeat near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and then everywhere.
  9. Bashibuzuk
    Bashibuzuk 28 June 2016 15: 12
    +7
    The guys just started playing war games.
    After Poland, Denmark, Holland, France, they decided that their brave gamekeepers are able to cope with anyone. Whenever. And whatever.
    That the Russian mentality is not very different from the French. Or Luxembourg. Or Dutch.
    That roads in Russia may not be autobahns, as in Germany, but on the whole it’s quite ... good.
    But even in such conditions, they clearly knew that they could do only BLITZKRIG. To full-krig, langekrig, a long war - their industry was simply not developed.
    They are with the West fought in peacetime.
    Like Munchausen - "... from 08:00 to 17:00 - war with ... (England, France ... substitute yourself). From 12:00 to 13:30 lunch with relaxation."
    ...
    Naive.
    Russia practically does not come out of wars. When she is not in contact with an external enemy, she has fun with herself, she is busy with internal disassemblies.
    But it is worth interfering with someone from the outside - those who have just enthusiastically slaughtered each other suddenly unite - and by cabbage soup, by cabbage soup. By the tinsel.
    Unbelievable but true.
    .
    Now, the 21st century, it’s worth moving off the road for a kilometer, for 10 meters, and so you can sit down, and the K-700 will not pull out.
    Who does not know the saying - "the steeper the jeep, the farther you will see behind the tractor."
    It is now.
    And in the 40s what happened ...
    .
    You can defeat Russia only from within.
    Unfortunately.
    Unfortunately, because the most prokhendeye prokhendei in the world, arrogant Saxons perfectly understood this.
    .
    And the Germans ... that the Germans.
    They valiantly purged two world wars. In the 20th century. Academics, blinnnnnn.
    Now they don’t even rock the boat.
    But the mind, unfortunately, has not been acquired. And the one that was in the GDR, mind .... we helped him to fool.
    Regrettably.
  10. tiaman.76
    tiaman.76 28 June 2016 20: 14
    +1
    Well, here at the expense of intelligence, the Abwehr crap crap and in assessing the number and condition of the armed forces of the USSR and at the expense of the military-economic condition of the country as well as mobilization abilities .. in general in everything .. well, thank God .. it's just interesting but really knew would all this be at least 70-80 percent what moves would be
    1. Bashibuzuk
      Bashibuzuk 28 June 2016 23: 04
      +2
      Yes, there would be no special moves.
      They would rather conclude another Mol_Rib pact ... they say, help us to steal England, it owes us more from Jutland .. and we will not touch you.
      From the word in general.
      For the time being.
      ...
      Well, Nuremberg would have been like that in 1959.
      Well, we would have captured Berlin, otherwise, you look at Paris .... or Lisbon ... in 1955.
      .
      Figures who like to talk about the fact that Russia came to Berlin in 1945 "gasping for breath" ... and the amers, they say, had super-duper planes ... with radars and other wunderwaves ...
      remember the history, and how the concept of "bistro" appeared in France. In 1814.
      .
      It is impossible to defeat Russia OUTSIDE.
      Any invader OUTSIDE ... will inevitably end up in ... OUT.
      I see, huh?
      ...
      So here we are .... living in Russia.
  11. Vladislav 73
    Vladislav 73 28 June 2016 23: 43
    +1
    Quote: Operator
    The mystery of the plans "Fritz" and "Barbarossa" is only in one thing - from what hangover did the German General Staff decide that the mobilization potential of the 200-million-strong USSR is limited to the 3-5 million contingent of the Red Army stationed in the western military districts of the Soviet Union?

    Yes, it’s very strange! In general, many of the prerequisites (or initial tasks) of the German plans raise a lot of questions ... Or, here’s an interesting European feature, the war was lost with the fall of the capital ... Why did the Germans decide that the capture of Moscow would be crucial for the whole war? requestWell, okay with the European mentality, we were "subhuman" for them. Okay, a miscalculation with the 5th column ... But here's a miscalculation with the real economic potential of the USSR, in my opinion, one of the most fatal mistakes of German planning. Although, of course, they are planned a blitzkrieg, and believed that the USSR simply would not have time to deploy all its might! request
    1. Arkady Kharitonov
      Arkady Kharitonov 25 February 2018 14: 06
      0
      why did you decide for the Germans that for them everything was decided by the capture of the capital. It was about the capture of the whole country to the Volga. The Germans expected to conquer Ukraine along with Moscow. But they received the first blow at Rostov and even then their plans began to crumble. I think it was a trip to Moscow for the winter that was a fatal mistake of the German generals. They did not take either Ukraine or Moscow. Without a trip to Moscow, the Wehrmacht would calmly go to the Volga. Then, by the spring of 1942, the USSR would be in a hopeless situation.
  12. Nikita Orlov
    Nikita Orlov 29 June 2016 01: 21
    +1
    They’ll zamusut right now, but I won’t be silent here either .. Comrades!

    Naive.
    Russia practically does not come out of wars.

    Russia does not come out of * experience

    because:
    You can defeat Russia only from within.
    Unfortunately.
    Unfortunately, because the most prokhendeye prokhendei in the world, arrogant Saxons perfectly understood this.


    We must understand that war is a tactic, "cheating" is a strategy.

    While the USSR defeated (lousy) Europe, the SSH defeated the worldhow much time has passed before agreeing to trade in bucks? 15 years? As Stalin was killed, so the Bretton Woods joined, quietly, without noise, but took the side strategic winner
    And then the Jewish wives and Kaganovich (who lived until 1991) continued to further "cut" the Stalinist legacy ..

    Russia always wins "bang-bang" (the lot of the sandbox) and geopolitically we will not get out of it. And then we are sincerely surprised that they do not perceive us in any other way ..
  13. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 29 June 2016 06: 33
    +2
    The article states that in the Paulus memorandum, and then in the Lossberg plan most importantly, special attention should be paid to the surprise of the attack.
    To attack the USSR, the Reich command concentrated more than 190 divisions on the border, namely 5,5 million soldiers and officers, 4300 tanks, almost 5000 aircraft, 47200 barrels of guns and mortars, deployed about a thousand headquarters of units and formations, built several dozen field airfields , arranged several thousand command and observation posts, laid hundreds of kilometers of military communications lines, laid and equipped hundreds of kilometers of military tracks, arranged and equipped thousands of temporary depots for ammunition-shells-explosives, fuels and lubricants, weapons, property. Moreover, more than 200 ships of the Reich Navy were put on alert.
    Similar preparations were made by Finland, Romania, Hungary, of course, of smaller volume, but several dozen divisions were set up.
    Ensure surprise attacks at this scale IMPOSSIBLE.
    This cannot be hidden, and naturally, the Soviet Government became aware of this case.
    After additional sounding on June 14, 1941, with the help of TASS, the Soviet leadership declared combat readiness on troops of border districts on June 18, 1941.
    However, 9 hours before the war, namely on June 21 from 18-00 combat readiness was canceled in all border districts. The troops switched to a peacetime service. Fuel from military vehicles, aircraft merged. Ammunition, ammunition, shells handed over to warehouses. The equipment is partially put on repair. The commanders of the units and units handed over the raised cards to the special units. The barracks for the commanders were canceled; everyone was allowed to rest outside the deployment of units and subunits. Units on duty remained in units and subunits in the amount corresponding to the peacetime service regime.
    And this was done throughout the western border of the USSR, i.e. from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. This is noted in his memoirs of the famous Ponochechny FM (on the evening of June 21 we watched a movie, played volleyball with the whole battery, and then, taking a rifle with a friend, I went hunting for partridges) Kulakov wrote in a similar memoir in his memoirs of the Black Sea Fleet's FAC (“That Saturday night, the crew of the ships were given rest.” Sevastopol shone with lights, residents and sailors laid off on the shore filled the boulevards, a concert of the Moscow stage in the Fleet House).
    And this, according to the memoirs of the participants of the Second World War, was in the troops along the entire border line.
    Leaving the Wehrmacht leadership knew and was sure that surprise attack will be provided at 100%.
    1. Arkady Kharitonov
      Arkady Kharitonov 25 February 2018 14: 15
      0
      one hundred percent surprise I think the Wehrmacht needed and was not. The Germans planned the maximum encirclement of the Red Army at the border. Accordingly, the pulling up of the Red Army troops was suitable for the Germans. It was important not to let the Red Army fully unfold. But I think the only reasonable solution for the USSR, after the deployment of the Wehrmacht began at the end of April 1941, was the withdrawal of troops from the Bialystok ledge. It was possible to withdraw troops to a marshland and gain a foothold there on small roads that are difficult to get around. A couple of HF on the road and try to break through. And so the encirclement of the ZAPOVO troops had to be thrown all their forces into closing the hole.
  14. sergo1914
    sergo1914 29 June 2016 10: 33
    0
    Quote: Parsec
    Tanks go parallel to the road either to save the road for the parts following them, or to raise less dust.

    The road network in the USSR was developed, the question of which roads?
    Between two towns a dirt road can lie and it is quite possible to provide horse-drawn and rare automobile traffic in any weather.
    Then, after a rain, a thousand pieces of equipment are rolled over it with an axle load of three tons, and, having become crap, they begin to whine about the directions of Russia as well.

    The most terrible pictures of dirt and drowning Germans and Americans took in Belgium.

    There are also column roads - this is a route selected off-road and equipped for troop movement. And the dumb ones consider it expensive and are surprised.


    As it looked in practice, we find in the Halder record of July 20:

    “The 11th Panzer Division is moving to Uman in three mobile echelons: 1) tracked vehicles with infantry planted on them; 2) horse-drawn carts with infantry that follow the tracked vehicles; 3) wheeled vehicles that cannot move on broken and muddy roads and therefore are forced to remain in place ”[
  15. Arkady Kharitonov
    Arkady Kharitonov 25 February 2018 13: 53
    0
    Fritz’s plan created by Marx and Shaposhnikov’s considerations were created at about the same time. Fritz has a major blow to the Baltic states. Shaposhnikov also proceeded from the fact that the main blow will be through the Baltic states. The considerations and the plan do not say why the main blow should be from Prussia towards the Baltic states. I have to guess and think out for the authors. But there is apparently inertia. While the Baltic was independent and there were only small contingents of the Red Army, it was extremely easy prey for the German troops. At the time of writing the thoughts of Shaposhnikov, the Baltic was only annexed to the USSR and militarily little mastered. There were no fortifications yet. In the scheme of Marx, the Baltic republics are still shown separately. To plan a blow from Prussia to the Baltic states, Shaposhnikov planned a blow to Prussia from the Bialystok ledge. The main strike group of the Red Army was to be located there. But by the time of writing Zhukov’s considerations, there were already enough Red Army troops in the Baltic states and fortifications were being built on the border with Germany. The Baltic states were no longer such a passage yard for the Wehrmacht. Accordingly, Zhukov decided that the Germans would not deal the main blow there. The second most important object for the Wehrmacht Shaposhnikov still considered Ukraine. With the strengthening of the USSR in the Baltic, Zhukov believed that the Germans' interest would shift completely to Ukraine. But Barbaross’s plan didn’t already take the seizure of territories as a basis. The main thing in the plan was the environment of the maximum number of Red Army compounds at the border. And here, the extreme vulnerability of the Bialystok ledge came out on top in importance. Practically the Germans were able to create two encirclement there. The ledge itself was cut off and surrounded by German infantry, and the tank units created an encirclement ring already narrower to Minsk. This environment included both the frontier and the deep ZAPOV corps. The fact that Zhukov deployed more troops in the Kiev district was a great happiness for the USSR. If the main troops, as suggested by Shaposhnikov, were placed on the Bialystok ledge, the rout of the first days of the war would have been irreparable.