The catastrophe of the Red Army near Vyazma and Bryansk
Battle of Vyazma
The German offensive on Moscow began on September 30, 1941 with a strike from the right wing of Army Group Center (2nd tank Guderian group and Weichs 2nd Field Army) on the left flank of the Bryansk Front. The main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive on October 2, attacking the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. The battle for Moscow has begun.
Violent battles flared up on the distant approaches to the Soviet capital. Soviet soldiers fought bravely. However, great superiority in the direction of the main attacks, especially in armored vehicles, allowed the Germans to break through the Soviet defenses and immediately achieve major successes. For example, the German 9 Army and 3 Tank Group had 3 tank, 2 motorized and 18 infantry divisions. The operational construction was in one echelon, which made it possible to achieve a high density of troops - one division per 3,2 km. The German 4 Army and 4 Tank Group had 5 Tank, 2 Motorized and 15 Infantry Divisions. Operational construction - in two echelons. All tank and motorized divisions, 56 infantry divisions were concentrated in the direction of the main strike with a width of 10 km, which allowed us to achieve a high density of troops in this direction - one division per 3,3 km. For comparison, the operational density of the troops of the first echelon of the Western Front was: for one division - 15 km; the operational density of the troops of the Reserve Front was: per one rifle division - 11,2 km of front. In addition, the defense of the Soviet troops on both fronts was mainly focal, was shallow (15 — 20 km) and poorly trained in engineering. The army needed to be replenished, there was a lack of ammunition. Not surprisingly, the Germans quickly broke through.
As a result, the 3rd tank group of Gotha, advancing from the Dukhovshchina region, wedged into the location of Soviet troops at the junction of the 19th and 30th armies and quickly moved forward. Operating from the area of Roslavl, the 4th Göpner Panzer Group broke through on the left flank of the 43rd Army. On other sections of the Western and Reserve Fronts, enemy attacks were repelled. Thus, on the first day of the operation, the enemy managed to break through the defenses of Soviet troops in the Dukhovshchinsky and Roslavl directions and wedge to a depth of 15 to 30 km. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 4th Panzer Group had already struck the second echelon of the Reserve Front - the 33rd Army. German aviation inflicted two air strikes on the headquarters of the Western Front, which led to a partial loss of command and control.
October 3 1941, the depth of advance of the German troops in the Western Front was up to 50 km, Reserve - up to 80 km. The commanders of the Western and Reserve fronts, in order to restore the situation in the breakthrough sectors, brought their reserves into battle, which, with the support of the existing air forces, tried to stop the enemy. Thus, the command of the Western Front to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough in the 30 Army zone created an operational group of I. V. Boldin, which included the reserves of the front (152-I Rifle Division, 101-I Motorized Rifle Division, 126-I, 128- I, 143-I and 147-I tank brigades, 10-y GMP.
During October 3-4 fierce battles were fought. Task Force Lieutenant General Boldin repelled several enemy attacks. The fighters and commanders of the Boldin group showed the highest stamina and heroism. So, the 101-th Infantry Division and the 128-I tank tank brigade, despite the great advantage of the enemy, defended the town of Kholm-Zhirkovsky (60 km north-west of Vyazma). In the course of stubborn fighting, Kholm-Zhirkovsky twice passed from hand to hand. For more than a day, Soviet fighters held out near Kholm-Zhirkovsky. They knocked down and burned 59 German tanks, destroyed a lot of guns and machine guns.
However, despite all the efforts of the command and troops of the Western and Reserve fronts, it was not possible to restore the situation in the breakthrough sectors. The troops of the 30, 19, and 43 armies, who were threatened with deep flanking and encirclement, had to retreat to new positions. October 4 The 4-I tank group, continuing to develop success, captured the cities of Spask-Demensk and Kirov. October 5 the Germans captured Yukhnov and Mosalsk. “Operation Typhoon develops almost classically,” wrote the Wehrmacht Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Land Forces, October 9, in his diary, Franz Halder. “... The enemy continues to hold unattacked sectors of the front everywhere, as a result of which, in perspective, a deep environment of these enemy groups is planned.”
German tanks near Rzhev, 1941 year
Thus, the German troops broke through at the junction of the Western and Reserve fronts in the direction of Yukhnovo and deeply penetrated into the location of our troops in the center of the Western Front. The flanks of the main forces of the Western Front were captured by the enemy and our troops fought in a semi-circle environment. The commanders of the Western Front decided to withdraw their troops to the Vyazma frontier in order to organize stubborn defense on it. The stakes approved this decision, transferring the 31 and 32 of the Reserve Front Army to the Western Front.
The Commander of the Reserve Front Budyonny on October 5 reported to Bid: “... The situation on the left flank of the Reserve Front has been created extremely serious. The resulting break along the Moscow Highway has nothing to close ... The front cannot, with its own forces, delay the enemy's offensive in the directions of Spask-Demensk, Vstroky, Vyazma, Yukhnov and Medyn. ” The commander asked to strengthen the air strikes against the enemy’s mobile units that had broken through and to push forward the High Command reserves to the direction of the breakthrough.
October 5 The headquarters allowed the Reserve Front to withdraw to the Vederniki line (25 km east of Vyazma) - Mosalsk - Zhizdra. The withdrawal of the Western and Reserve Fronts was scheduled to begin on the night of October 6. Covering the withdrawal of the main forces should have been the forces of the 31 Army and the Boldin group. During the withdrawal to the new line of defense, the troops of the Western Front were to make a partial regrouping: the 30 Army transferred its section of the 31 Army, the army command was transferred to the front reserve; The 16 Army transferred its units to the 20 Army, the army was assigned to the Vyazma region to unite all the troops fighting in the region and to organize defense in the Vyazma fortified area. However, the headquarters of the Reserve Front lost contact with their armies and could not organize a planned withdrawal of troops to a new line of defense. The control of the troops of the Western Front was also violated, which created extreme difficulties in organizing the withdrawal.
During 6 - 7 of October, the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts by separate groups resisted in the areas of Vyazma-Gzhatsk-Sychevka and at Sukhinichi. The 22 and 29 armies retreated in the direction of Rzhev and Staritsa; The 49 and 43 armies to Kaluga and Medyn. Some units were surrounded and fought at the previously occupied frontiers. The units of the 31 Army and the Boldin Task Force, which covered the withdrawal of the main forces, were drawn into protracted battles with the opposing enemy and lost contact with the rest of the armies and front headquarters. Therefore, from October 8, the withdrawal of troops from the Western Front was supposed to cover the 32 Army of Vishnevsky. Commander Vishnevsky was supposed to unite the retreating troops and bring them to the line of Novo-Dugino - Veshki (30 km southeast of Vyazma) and organize a solid defense.
However, in the conditions of the collapse of the defense, poor communication and the rapid advance of the mobile German units, this was not possible. October 8 motorized corps 3 th and 4 th German tank groups, went to the rear of the Vyazma group of Soviet troops, cut off the withdrawal path of the troops 19 th, 20 th, 24 th and 32 th armies. Soon the units of the 4 and 9 of the German field armies approached and sealed the encirclement ring. Was formed Vyazemsky "boiler". The remaining armies of the Western and Reserve fronts, covered from the flanks by the German armored units of the 3 and 4-th tank groups and pulled from the front by the troops of the 4 and 9-th field armies, with heavy fighting retreated to the Volga, in the south-west of Kalinin , on Mozhaisk line of defense.
The crisis situation arose already to the west of Moscow. On October 5, the air reconnaissance reported that enemy tanks and motorized infantry were already in 15-20 km from Yukhnov. The position of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts at this time for the General Staff and Headquarters remained vague. The command of the Moscow Military District was ordered to hold the enemy at the turn of the Mozhaisk line for 5-7 days until the reserves of the Stakes were suitable. On the same day, the Germans occupied Yukhnov, and the scattered units of the Reserve Front rolled back to Maloyaroslavets. The Western and Reserve fronts had no reserves for the restoration of the front. It seemed that the road to Moscow was open.
The Soviet medium tank T-34-76 crushed the German field howitzer leFH.18. He could not continue moving and was captured by the Germans. Yukhnov district
Thus, the German troops with powerful blows of tank groups broke through the Soviet defense, quickly developed the offensive and, with the assistance of the army corps in the area west of Vyazma, surrounded the troops of the 16, 19 and 20 armies and the Boldin operational group of the Western Front, 32 and 34-y armies of the Reserve front. Control units of the 19, 20, 24 and 32 armies (control of the 16 army, transferring troops to the 19 army, managed to get out of the encirclement), 19 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades were in the entourage. There was a threat of a breakthrough of the German troops to Moscow along the Minsk highway through Mozhaisk and along the Warsaw highway through Maloyaroslavets.
However, even in the terrible conditions of the environment, the Soviet soldiers did not lay down weapons and continued weekly resistance. Soviet troops bound the enemy's 28 divisions. They gave Moscow a week to organize a new defense. Until October 11, surrounded troops attempted to break through, only October 12 managed to briefly break through the German ring, which was soon closed again. Thus, part of the troops and the control of the 20-th Army Ershakov came out of the encirclement.
By the decision of the Stavka, the command of the surrounded units north of Vyazma was entrusted to the commander of the 19 Army, Lieutenant General Lukin. When leaving the 14 environment in October 1941, commander M. F. Lukin was seriously wounded and unconsciously captured. In captivity, his leg was amputated (released 1945 in May). The remnants of the 32 Army of October 12 left the encirclement, and Major General Vishnevsky was sent to the post of commander of the 19 Army encircled, but did not take office - could not get to her command and October 22 was sick (with frostbite kicked) captured. He was held captive until victory in 1945. The commander of the 24 Army, Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin, died while trying to withdraw his troops from the 7 environs of October 1941.
In his memoirs, G. K. Zhukov noted: “Thanks to the persistence and perseverance that our troops showed, fighting in the environs in the Vyazma region, we won precious time for organizing defense on the Mozhaysk line. The blood and casualties suffered by the troops of the encircled grouping were not in vain. ”
October 10 troops of the Western and Reserve fronts, not included in the environment, were merged into one Western Front. The Army Commander Georgy Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front, and I. S. Konev became his deputy. Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky was appointed Chief of Staff. In essence, a new defensive front was created.
As a result of the Vyazma operation, the Wehrmacht broke through the front of the Red Army for the entire operational depth and, surrounding and destroying part of the forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts, German troops reached the Mozhaisk line of defense of Moscow, creating conditions for a further attack on Moscow.
Oryol-Bryansk operation
The situation in the Bryansk area did not develop any better. On the very first day of the offensive, the 2-I tank group of Guderian, with the support of aviation, broke through the weak defense of Gorodnyansky's 13 Army and rushed towards Sevsk and Komarichi (40 km northeast of Sevsk). October 1 was broken through and the defense of Petrov's 50 Army. The headquarters demanded to destroy the broken through enemy and restore the situation. However, all attempts of the Soviet troops to reject the enemy were not crowned with success. As a result, an extremely dangerous situation has developed on both flanks of the Bryansk Front. The situation was especially difficult in the 13-th army band, where Guderian’s tanks were rushing forward. The front had no reserves and the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Orel and Bryansk arose.
The troops of the task force under the command of A. N. Yermakov, who were assigned the task of launching a counterstrike against the broken mobile units of the enemy, were themselves forced to repel numerous attacks by the German 48 motorized corps. 2-I Guderian tank group to the end of 2 October reached the distant approaches to the Eagle. October 3 Germans entered the Eagle.
Trapped and abandoned Soviet tank KV-1 on the street of a village in the Orel region
The headquarters took emergency measures to assist the Bryansk Front. On October 1, the 49 Army of the Reserve Front was ordered to advance to the Oryol-Tula sector. To cover the same direction in the area of Orel - Mtsensk, they decided to deploy the emerging 1 th Guards Rifle Corps of General D. D. Lelyushenko (4-I and 11-I tank brigades, 6-I Guards Rifle Division, 34-I regiment of internal troops, Guards mortar division - "Katyusha"). Stalin set Lelyushenko to stop the troops of Guderian. Lelyushenko realized that for the 1-2 of the day allotted by the Stake for the nomination of the corps he simply would not have time to organize the defense of the Eagle. General Lelushenko decides to leave the Eagle without a fight and organize the defense south of Mtsensk by the forces of the 36 Motorcycle Regiment, which is in reserve and the Tula Artillery School. Stalin approved this decision. An aviation group was also created as part of the 5 aviation divisions, which was tasked with bombing a German armored group that had broken through to the rear of the Bryansk Front. Soon, the Stavka also sent the 5 airborne corps to the Oryol area, in the Mtsensk area.
However, events developed so quickly that most of the decisions simply did not have time to perform. October 3 around 10 o'clock in the morning Guderian approached the southern outskirts of Orel. In order to gain time for the organization of defense near Mtsensk, the landing of the 201 airborne brigade (around 500 fighters) was landed at the airfield of Orel. On October 3, a total of 1358 people were transferred to the Orel region. There were practically no troops in Oryol itself - the KGB officers from the 146 local separate convoy battalion of the NKVD internal troops under the command of Captain A. A. Lobachev took the battle with the Germans. As a result, the Germans could not immediately take the Eagle from the south-west direction and entered it only in the evening, beating around the other side. The resistance of the paratroopers and security officers in Orel allowed Lelyushenko to organize defense on the outskirts of Mtsensk.
In the 50 Army band on the same day, the Germans eased some pressure from the front to bypass Soviet troops from the north in the direction of Zhizdra. The army headquarters, which was attacked by enemy aircraft, lost contact with the front command and could not inform the front headquarters about the situation on the right flank of the Bryansk Front, where a dangerous situation developed as a result of the German tanks breaking through in the 43 Army of the reserve front. To cover the joint of the Reserve and Bryansk fronts. The October 3 headquarters changed the task of the 49 army. Instead of the Oryol-Kursk direction, she was ordered to take the Sukhinichi-Belev line, where her units had already left.
On October 5, the commander-in-chief Eremenko appealed to GHQ for permission to take the 50 army to the second line of defense west of Bryansk, the 3 army to the Desna line and the 13 army to the Kokorevka line (20 km west of Lokot) - Dmitriyev-Lgovsky. The headquarters approved the decision of the front, pointing to the need to keep Bryansk and Karachev.
German troops enter the Eagle
The 24 units of the Guderian 2 Tank Army's motorized corps (from October 5) continued to burst along the Orel – Tula highway. The Germans believed that the road to Moscow was open, there were no more serious Soviet forces ahead. However, near the city of Mtsensk, Guderian’s tanks were closed by Soviet tanks. There were not many of them - the advanced units of the 1-th Guards Rifle Corps - 4-I and 11-I tank brigades. Short but strong counterattacks of the shock group of the 4-th tank brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov suspended the victorious march of German tanks. Our troops with ambush actions inflicted powerful fire strikes on the enemy's mechanized columns, forcing them to first stop and then turn into battle formations.
Thus, information was kept about the operation of one of our tank crews. Lieutenant Kukarin’s thirty-four enemy fire was hit. Gunner I. T. Lyubushkin was wounded, clothing caught fire on Lieutenant Kukarin, tank mechanic Fedorov was also wounded and stunned, gunner-gunner Duvanov was wounded in the leg, but the crew continued the battle, and set fire to five enemy tanks. In total, in this battle, the crew of the combat vehicle killed nine enemy tanks. About the feat of the tankman told the front leaflet "Tank duel": "The tank of senior sergeant I. T. Lyubushkina from the first minutes of the battle was hit by an enemy projectile and could not move. But he took the fight and began shelling enemy tanks. An extraordinary tank duel broke out on a wide field. At a distance of 1300 meters, a courageous commander shot five enemy vehicles one after the other. But the German heavy tank driver came to the rescue and hit the Lyubushkin car. He wounded the crew and interrupted the speed switch-on mechanism; the driver of the tank immediately began repairing it. After some time, the car had the opportunity to back up, and the tank Lyubushkina managed to connect with its column. "
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 10 of October 1941, "for exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the German fascist aggressors and for showing courage and heroism" senior sergeant Lyubushkin Ivan Timofeevich was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The hero was just 23.
Hero of the Soviet Union I. T. Lyubushkin
Our tankers were actively supported by aviation and "Katyushas" (rocket artillery), which increased the effectiveness of tank counterattacks. Not having a clear idea of the Soviet forces and suffering losses, the Germans turned some of the forces back and began flanking roundabout maneuvers with others. October 10 our tank group was surrounded. On October 11, the brigade secretly left the encirclement to join the 26 Army units through the railway bridge across the Zusha River north of Mtsensk. Until October 16, the brigade was in the army reserve.
As a result of the action of the 1 units of the Guards Rifle Corps, the 4 and 11 tank brigades braked the enemy's advance in this sector for 7 days and caused him serious damage in manpower and equipment. According to Soviet data, parts of the 4 tank tank brigade destroyed 133 tanks, 49 guns, 6 mortars, 8 airplanes, 15 tractors with ammunition and up to an infantry regiment. The brigade’s own losses were 23 tanks, 24 vehicles, 555 people killed, wounded and missing. German 4-I tank division was greatly weakened.
General D. D. Lelushenko wrote in his memoirs: “For nine days, the soldiers of the 1 Special Guards Rifle Corps fought on the fields of the Orlov region. Four times they changed the line, leading a mobile defense, exhausting the enemy in fierce battles. On the fifth frontier on the River Zusha, they stopped the enemy and held their positions until October 24. ”
As Guderian himself noted: “To the south of Mtsensk, the 4-I tank division was attacked by Russian tanks, and it had to endure a difficult moment. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks was manifested in a sharp form. The division suffered significant losses. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed for the time being. ... Especially disappointing were the reports we received about the actions of Russian tanks, and most importantly, about their new tactics. ... Russian infantry attacked from the front, and the tanks inflicted massive strikes on our flanks. They have already learned something. ” Guderian acknowledged that "the prospects for quick and continuous success have disappeared."
The report of the commander of the 4 Tank Division of Langerman from 22 in October 1941 noted that "for the first time during the Eastern campaign, the absolute superiority of Russian 26-ton and 52-ton tanks over our Pz.III and Pz.IV was revealed" and as urgent measures It was proposed to "immediately begin its own production of the Russian 26-ton tank."
In November, an investigation commission arrived to investigate the causes of the 24 th motorized corps under Mtsensk, which was tasked with “collecting materials to study Russian tanks and design new German tanks and more powerful anti-tank weapons on the basis of this”. The commission, which arrived in the 2 Tank Army, included well-known designers: Professor Porsche (Nibelungen), engineer Oswald (MAN) and Dr. Aders (Henschel). The commission conducted detailed technical studies of heavy tanks KV-1, KV-2 and medium T-34. The results obtained by the commission contributed to the acceleration of the work of German designers on the new medium tank PzKpfw V "Panther".
Delaying the enemy at Mtsensk improved our position in the Tula area. However, the overall situation was still critical. On October 6, Guderian’s tanks, having routed Karachev and Bryansk from the east, captured them, cutting off the withdrawal paths of the Soviet troops. Thus, the troops of the Bryansk Front were divided into two parts, and the withdrawal paths were cut. Part of the front troops was surrounded. On the same day, the Soviet Headquarters issued an order to withdraw the troops of the Bryansk Front to the Mtsensk-Ponyri-Fatezh-Lgov line, the front was supposed to cover the directions to Voronezh and Tambov. Since the Stavka’s communication with the front headquarters and the front was broken, this order did not reach the addressees. Then on October 7 the order was repeated through the commander of the 50 army, Major General Mikhail Petrov. The troops received an order to "make their way east" to the line of Lgov - Ponyri. The commander-in-chief Yeremenko, who was at that time in the location of the 3 Army headquarters, ordered the front troops at nightfall on October 8 to begin withdrawing to the specified line and to carry it out within 5 days. On the night of October 8, the 3, 13, and 50 armies began to make their way eastward, linking the troops of the Guderian and Weihs armies in these battles.
Our troops suffered serious losses in these battles. Among the dead was Mikhail Petrovich, commander of the 50 Army. The commander of the Eremenko 13 of October was seriously injured and evacuated to Moscow by a specially sent plane. By October 23, all three armies, although they had suffered heavy losses, were able to break out of encirclement and occupied defenses on the indicated lines: The 50 Army was entrenched at the Oka River near Beleva, covering the Tula area; 13-I army - at the turn of Fatezh, Makarovka, covering the Kursk direction; 3-I army at the turn of Fatezh, Kromy.
Thus, the German troops broke through the defenses of the Bryansk Front, quickly developed an offensive to the rear of our troops, and were able to surround the main forces of the Soviet armies. However, the Stavka took emergency measures and in the Mtsensk area the Red Army stopped the enemy’s tanks that were rushing to Tula. And surrounded by the main forces of the Bryansk Front found the strength to break out of the "boiler". As a result, the stubborn defense of the troops of the Bryansk Front disrupted the pace of the Wehrmacht offensive in the Oryol-Tula direction and held down large enemy forces during the 17 day. This made it possible to prepare the defense lines in the Tula region and the Mozhaisk line of defense, which ultimately disrupted the plan for deep coverage of Moscow from the rear.
The former commander of the Bryansk front assessed this battle: “As a result of the resistance of the troops of the Bryansk front, which bound the main forces of the 2 tank and 2 of the enemy field armies, the offensive of the enemy forces on Tula was delayed for 17 days. The troops of the Bryansk Front defeated the strike force of the Nazi troops, aimed at Moscow from the south-west (through Bryansk, Orel, Tula). The enemy group had squandered part of their forces to fight with the troops of the front, lost their penetrating power and could not overcome the defenses of the 50 Army that had left for Tula. ”
Soviet tank KV-1 4 of the tank tank brigade, destroyed by 10 of October 1941 of the year by German artillery in Mtsensk
Summary of the first stage of the operation "Typhoon"
Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, on the same day the enemy broke through the defenses of three Soviet fronts, and its mobile units advanced 1 — 40 km in the directions of Orel, Yukhnov and Vyazma. Attempts by the fronts to inflict counter-attacks with weak reserves did not produce results. October 50, advanced units of the 3 Tank Group took the 2 th and 3 th armies of the Bryansk Front and retreated into Orel by the end of the day. In the area of Mtsensk, Soviet troops with strong counterattacks were able to stop the movement of Guderian’s tanks to Tula. October 13 main forces of the Bryansk Front were surrounded. However, the encirclement was not tight, our troops were actively making their way, suffered serious losses, but by October 6 could break through and reach a new line of defense.
Having broken through the defenses of the Western and Reserve fronts, the enemy created a dangerous situation in the Vyazma sector. On October 4, the enemy captured Spas-Demensk and Kirov, on October 5, Yukhnov and entered the Vyazma region. In the area of Vyazma, the compounds of the 19, 20, 24 and 32 armies were surrounded. Stubbornly resisting, the encircled troops pinned down significant enemy forces. Part of the forces in mid-October managed to break out of the encirclement.
The unfavorable development of hostilities in the Vyazma and Bryansk region created the threat of an enemy’s exit to Moscow itself. The capital suddenly found itself under the direct blow of the enemy. By the time the enemy troops broke through the Vyazma line throughout the entire space up to the Mozhaisk line there were no intermediate defensive lines or serious forces that could stop the movement of German tank groups. At the beginning of October there was a small number of troops on the Mozhaisk line. They could only resist the advance forces of the enemy, but not the main forces of the tank groups. Under these conditions, the Soviet military-political leadership took emergency measures to strengthen the Mozhaisk line of defense, where troops were urgently sent from the reserve, from the Far East, Central Asia and from other fronts. But they were still at a considerable distance.
German tank PzKpfw.III, shot down by Guderian’s 2 tank group, in a Soviet village
To be continued ...
The German offensive on Moscow began on September 30, 1941 with a strike from the right wing of Army Group Center (2nd tank Guderian group and Weichs 2nd Field Army) on the left flank of the Bryansk Front. The main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive on October 2, attacking the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. The battle for Moscow has begun.
Violent battles flared up on the distant approaches to the Soviet capital. Soviet soldiers fought bravely. However, great superiority in the direction of the main attacks, especially in armored vehicles, allowed the Germans to break through the Soviet defenses and immediately achieve major successes. For example, the German 9 Army and 3 Tank Group had 3 tank, 2 motorized and 18 infantry divisions. The operational construction was in one echelon, which made it possible to achieve a high density of troops - one division per 3,2 km. The German 4 Army and 4 Tank Group had 5 Tank, 2 Motorized and 15 Infantry Divisions. Operational construction - in two echelons. All tank and motorized divisions, 56 infantry divisions were concentrated in the direction of the main strike with a width of 10 km, which allowed us to achieve a high density of troops in this direction - one division per 3,3 km. For comparison, the operational density of the troops of the first echelon of the Western Front was: for one division - 15 km; the operational density of the troops of the Reserve Front was: per one rifle division - 11,2 km of front. In addition, the defense of the Soviet troops on both fronts was mainly focal, was shallow (15 — 20 km) and poorly trained in engineering. The army needed to be replenished, there was a lack of ammunition. Not surprisingly, the Germans quickly broke through.
As a result, the 3rd tank group of Gotha, advancing from the Dukhovshchina region, wedged into the location of Soviet troops at the junction of the 19th and 30th armies and quickly moved forward. Operating from the area of Roslavl, the 4th Göpner Panzer Group broke through on the left flank of the 43rd Army. On other sections of the Western and Reserve Fronts, enemy attacks were repelled. Thus, on the first day of the operation, the enemy managed to break through the defenses of Soviet troops in the Dukhovshchinsky and Roslavl directions and wedge to a depth of 15 to 30 km. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 4th Panzer Group had already struck the second echelon of the Reserve Front - the 33rd Army. German aviation inflicted two air strikes on the headquarters of the Western Front, which led to a partial loss of command and control.
October 3 1941, the depth of advance of the German troops in the Western Front was up to 50 km, Reserve - up to 80 km. The commanders of the Western and Reserve fronts, in order to restore the situation in the breakthrough sectors, brought their reserves into battle, which, with the support of the existing air forces, tried to stop the enemy. Thus, the command of the Western Front to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough in the 30 Army zone created an operational group of I. V. Boldin, which included the reserves of the front (152-I Rifle Division, 101-I Motorized Rifle Division, 126-I, 128- I, 143-I and 147-I tank brigades, 10-y GMP.
During October 3-4 fierce battles were fought. Task Force Lieutenant General Boldin repelled several enemy attacks. The fighters and commanders of the Boldin group showed the highest stamina and heroism. So, the 101-th Infantry Division and the 128-I tank tank brigade, despite the great advantage of the enemy, defended the town of Kholm-Zhirkovsky (60 km north-west of Vyazma). In the course of stubborn fighting, Kholm-Zhirkovsky twice passed from hand to hand. For more than a day, Soviet fighters held out near Kholm-Zhirkovsky. They knocked down and burned 59 German tanks, destroyed a lot of guns and machine guns.
However, despite all the efforts of the command and troops of the Western and Reserve fronts, it was not possible to restore the situation in the breakthrough sectors. The troops of the 30, 19, and 43 armies, who were threatened with deep flanking and encirclement, had to retreat to new positions. October 4 The 4-I tank group, continuing to develop success, captured the cities of Spask-Demensk and Kirov. October 5 the Germans captured Yukhnov and Mosalsk. “Operation Typhoon develops almost classically,” wrote the Wehrmacht Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Land Forces, October 9, in his diary, Franz Halder. “... The enemy continues to hold unattacked sectors of the front everywhere, as a result of which, in perspective, a deep environment of these enemy groups is planned.”
German tanks near Rzhev, 1941 year
Thus, the German troops broke through at the junction of the Western and Reserve fronts in the direction of Yukhnovo and deeply penetrated into the location of our troops in the center of the Western Front. The flanks of the main forces of the Western Front were captured by the enemy and our troops fought in a semi-circle environment. The commanders of the Western Front decided to withdraw their troops to the Vyazma frontier in order to organize stubborn defense on it. The stakes approved this decision, transferring the 31 and 32 of the Reserve Front Army to the Western Front.
The Commander of the Reserve Front Budyonny on October 5 reported to Bid: “... The situation on the left flank of the Reserve Front has been created extremely serious. The resulting break along the Moscow Highway has nothing to close ... The front cannot, with its own forces, delay the enemy's offensive in the directions of Spask-Demensk, Vstroky, Vyazma, Yukhnov and Medyn. ” The commander asked to strengthen the air strikes against the enemy’s mobile units that had broken through and to push forward the High Command reserves to the direction of the breakthrough.
October 5 The headquarters allowed the Reserve Front to withdraw to the Vederniki line (25 km east of Vyazma) - Mosalsk - Zhizdra. The withdrawal of the Western and Reserve Fronts was scheduled to begin on the night of October 6. Covering the withdrawal of the main forces should have been the forces of the 31 Army and the Boldin group. During the withdrawal to the new line of defense, the troops of the Western Front were to make a partial regrouping: the 30 Army transferred its section of the 31 Army, the army command was transferred to the front reserve; The 16 Army transferred its units to the 20 Army, the army was assigned to the Vyazma region to unite all the troops fighting in the region and to organize defense in the Vyazma fortified area. However, the headquarters of the Reserve Front lost contact with their armies and could not organize a planned withdrawal of troops to a new line of defense. The control of the troops of the Western Front was also violated, which created extreme difficulties in organizing the withdrawal.
During 6 - 7 of October, the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts by separate groups resisted in the areas of Vyazma-Gzhatsk-Sychevka and at Sukhinichi. The 22 and 29 armies retreated in the direction of Rzhev and Staritsa; The 49 and 43 armies to Kaluga and Medyn. Some units were surrounded and fought at the previously occupied frontiers. The units of the 31 Army and the Boldin Task Force, which covered the withdrawal of the main forces, were drawn into protracted battles with the opposing enemy and lost contact with the rest of the armies and front headquarters. Therefore, from October 8, the withdrawal of troops from the Western Front was supposed to cover the 32 Army of Vishnevsky. Commander Vishnevsky was supposed to unite the retreating troops and bring them to the line of Novo-Dugino - Veshki (30 km southeast of Vyazma) and organize a solid defense.
However, in the conditions of the collapse of the defense, poor communication and the rapid advance of the mobile German units, this was not possible. October 8 motorized corps 3 th and 4 th German tank groups, went to the rear of the Vyazma group of Soviet troops, cut off the withdrawal path of the troops 19 th, 20 th, 24 th and 32 th armies. Soon the units of the 4 and 9 of the German field armies approached and sealed the encirclement ring. Was formed Vyazemsky "boiler". The remaining armies of the Western and Reserve fronts, covered from the flanks by the German armored units of the 3 and 4-th tank groups and pulled from the front by the troops of the 4 and 9-th field armies, with heavy fighting retreated to the Volga, in the south-west of Kalinin , on Mozhaisk line of defense.
The crisis situation arose already to the west of Moscow. On October 5, the air reconnaissance reported that enemy tanks and motorized infantry were already in 15-20 km from Yukhnov. The position of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts at this time for the General Staff and Headquarters remained vague. The command of the Moscow Military District was ordered to hold the enemy at the turn of the Mozhaisk line for 5-7 days until the reserves of the Stakes were suitable. On the same day, the Germans occupied Yukhnov, and the scattered units of the Reserve Front rolled back to Maloyaroslavets. The Western and Reserve fronts had no reserves for the restoration of the front. It seemed that the road to Moscow was open.
The Soviet medium tank T-34-76 crushed the German field howitzer leFH.18. He could not continue moving and was captured by the Germans. Yukhnov district
Thus, the German troops with powerful blows of tank groups broke through the Soviet defense, quickly developed the offensive and, with the assistance of the army corps in the area west of Vyazma, surrounded the troops of the 16, 19 and 20 armies and the Boldin operational group of the Western Front, 32 and 34-y armies of the Reserve front. Control units of the 19, 20, 24 and 32 armies (control of the 16 army, transferring troops to the 19 army, managed to get out of the encirclement), 19 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades were in the entourage. There was a threat of a breakthrough of the German troops to Moscow along the Minsk highway through Mozhaisk and along the Warsaw highway through Maloyaroslavets.
However, even in the terrible conditions of the environment, the Soviet soldiers did not lay down weapons and continued weekly resistance. Soviet troops bound the enemy's 28 divisions. They gave Moscow a week to organize a new defense. Until October 11, surrounded troops attempted to break through, only October 12 managed to briefly break through the German ring, which was soon closed again. Thus, part of the troops and the control of the 20-th Army Ershakov came out of the encirclement.
By the decision of the Stavka, the command of the surrounded units north of Vyazma was entrusted to the commander of the 19 Army, Lieutenant General Lukin. When leaving the 14 environment in October 1941, commander M. F. Lukin was seriously wounded and unconsciously captured. In captivity, his leg was amputated (released 1945 in May). The remnants of the 32 Army of October 12 left the encirclement, and Major General Vishnevsky was sent to the post of commander of the 19 Army encircled, but did not take office - could not get to her command and October 22 was sick (with frostbite kicked) captured. He was held captive until victory in 1945. The commander of the 24 Army, Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin, died while trying to withdraw his troops from the 7 environs of October 1941.
In his memoirs, G. K. Zhukov noted: “Thanks to the persistence and perseverance that our troops showed, fighting in the environs in the Vyazma region, we won precious time for organizing defense on the Mozhaysk line. The blood and casualties suffered by the troops of the encircled grouping were not in vain. ”
October 10 troops of the Western and Reserve fronts, not included in the environment, were merged into one Western Front. The Army Commander Georgy Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front, and I. S. Konev became his deputy. Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky was appointed Chief of Staff. In essence, a new defensive front was created.
As a result of the Vyazma operation, the Wehrmacht broke through the front of the Red Army for the entire operational depth and, surrounding and destroying part of the forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts, German troops reached the Mozhaisk line of defense of Moscow, creating conditions for a further attack on Moscow.
Oryol-Bryansk operation
The situation in the Bryansk area did not develop any better. On the very first day of the offensive, the 2-I tank group of Guderian, with the support of aviation, broke through the weak defense of Gorodnyansky's 13 Army and rushed towards Sevsk and Komarichi (40 km northeast of Sevsk). October 1 was broken through and the defense of Petrov's 50 Army. The headquarters demanded to destroy the broken through enemy and restore the situation. However, all attempts of the Soviet troops to reject the enemy were not crowned with success. As a result, an extremely dangerous situation has developed on both flanks of the Bryansk Front. The situation was especially difficult in the 13-th army band, where Guderian’s tanks were rushing forward. The front had no reserves and the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Orel and Bryansk arose.
The troops of the task force under the command of A. N. Yermakov, who were assigned the task of launching a counterstrike against the broken mobile units of the enemy, were themselves forced to repel numerous attacks by the German 48 motorized corps. 2-I Guderian tank group to the end of 2 October reached the distant approaches to the Eagle. October 3 Germans entered the Eagle.
Trapped and abandoned Soviet tank KV-1 on the street of a village in the Orel region
The headquarters took emergency measures to assist the Bryansk Front. On October 1, the 49 Army of the Reserve Front was ordered to advance to the Oryol-Tula sector. To cover the same direction in the area of Orel - Mtsensk, they decided to deploy the emerging 1 th Guards Rifle Corps of General D. D. Lelyushenko (4-I and 11-I tank brigades, 6-I Guards Rifle Division, 34-I regiment of internal troops, Guards mortar division - "Katyusha"). Stalin set Lelyushenko to stop the troops of Guderian. Lelyushenko realized that for the 1-2 of the day allotted by the Stake for the nomination of the corps he simply would not have time to organize the defense of the Eagle. General Lelushenko decides to leave the Eagle without a fight and organize the defense south of Mtsensk by the forces of the 36 Motorcycle Regiment, which is in reserve and the Tula Artillery School. Stalin approved this decision. An aviation group was also created as part of the 5 aviation divisions, which was tasked with bombing a German armored group that had broken through to the rear of the Bryansk Front. Soon, the Stavka also sent the 5 airborne corps to the Oryol area, in the Mtsensk area.
However, events developed so quickly that most of the decisions simply did not have time to perform. October 3 around 10 o'clock in the morning Guderian approached the southern outskirts of Orel. In order to gain time for the organization of defense near Mtsensk, the landing of the 201 airborne brigade (around 500 fighters) was landed at the airfield of Orel. On October 3, a total of 1358 people were transferred to the Orel region. There were practically no troops in Oryol itself - the KGB officers from the 146 local separate convoy battalion of the NKVD internal troops under the command of Captain A. A. Lobachev took the battle with the Germans. As a result, the Germans could not immediately take the Eagle from the south-west direction and entered it only in the evening, beating around the other side. The resistance of the paratroopers and security officers in Orel allowed Lelyushenko to organize defense on the outskirts of Mtsensk.
In the 50 Army band on the same day, the Germans eased some pressure from the front to bypass Soviet troops from the north in the direction of Zhizdra. The army headquarters, which was attacked by enemy aircraft, lost contact with the front command and could not inform the front headquarters about the situation on the right flank of the Bryansk Front, where a dangerous situation developed as a result of the German tanks breaking through in the 43 Army of the reserve front. To cover the joint of the Reserve and Bryansk fronts. The October 3 headquarters changed the task of the 49 army. Instead of the Oryol-Kursk direction, she was ordered to take the Sukhinichi-Belev line, where her units had already left.
On October 5, the commander-in-chief Eremenko appealed to GHQ for permission to take the 50 army to the second line of defense west of Bryansk, the 3 army to the Desna line and the 13 army to the Kokorevka line (20 km west of Lokot) - Dmitriyev-Lgovsky. The headquarters approved the decision of the front, pointing to the need to keep Bryansk and Karachev.
German troops enter the Eagle
The 24 units of the Guderian 2 Tank Army's motorized corps (from October 5) continued to burst along the Orel – Tula highway. The Germans believed that the road to Moscow was open, there were no more serious Soviet forces ahead. However, near the city of Mtsensk, Guderian’s tanks were closed by Soviet tanks. There were not many of them - the advanced units of the 1-th Guards Rifle Corps - 4-I and 11-I tank brigades. Short but strong counterattacks of the shock group of the 4-th tank brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov suspended the victorious march of German tanks. Our troops with ambush actions inflicted powerful fire strikes on the enemy's mechanized columns, forcing them to first stop and then turn into battle formations.
Thus, information was kept about the operation of one of our tank crews. Lieutenant Kukarin’s thirty-four enemy fire was hit. Gunner I. T. Lyubushkin was wounded, clothing caught fire on Lieutenant Kukarin, tank mechanic Fedorov was also wounded and stunned, gunner-gunner Duvanov was wounded in the leg, but the crew continued the battle, and set fire to five enemy tanks. In total, in this battle, the crew of the combat vehicle killed nine enemy tanks. About the feat of the tankman told the front leaflet "Tank duel": "The tank of senior sergeant I. T. Lyubushkina from the first minutes of the battle was hit by an enemy projectile and could not move. But he took the fight and began shelling enemy tanks. An extraordinary tank duel broke out on a wide field. At a distance of 1300 meters, a courageous commander shot five enemy vehicles one after the other. But the German heavy tank driver came to the rescue and hit the Lyubushkin car. He wounded the crew and interrupted the speed switch-on mechanism; the driver of the tank immediately began repairing it. After some time, the car had the opportunity to back up, and the tank Lyubushkina managed to connect with its column. "
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 10 of October 1941, "for exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the German fascist aggressors and for showing courage and heroism" senior sergeant Lyubushkin Ivan Timofeevich was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The hero was just 23.
Hero of the Soviet Union I. T. Lyubushkin
Our tankers were actively supported by aviation and "Katyushas" (rocket artillery), which increased the effectiveness of tank counterattacks. Not having a clear idea of the Soviet forces and suffering losses, the Germans turned some of the forces back and began flanking roundabout maneuvers with others. October 10 our tank group was surrounded. On October 11, the brigade secretly left the encirclement to join the 26 Army units through the railway bridge across the Zusha River north of Mtsensk. Until October 16, the brigade was in the army reserve.
As a result of the action of the 1 units of the Guards Rifle Corps, the 4 and 11 tank brigades braked the enemy's advance in this sector for 7 days and caused him serious damage in manpower and equipment. According to Soviet data, parts of the 4 tank tank brigade destroyed 133 tanks, 49 guns, 6 mortars, 8 airplanes, 15 tractors with ammunition and up to an infantry regiment. The brigade’s own losses were 23 tanks, 24 vehicles, 555 people killed, wounded and missing. German 4-I tank division was greatly weakened.
General D. D. Lelushenko wrote in his memoirs: “For nine days, the soldiers of the 1 Special Guards Rifle Corps fought on the fields of the Orlov region. Four times they changed the line, leading a mobile defense, exhausting the enemy in fierce battles. On the fifth frontier on the River Zusha, they stopped the enemy and held their positions until October 24. ”
As Guderian himself noted: “To the south of Mtsensk, the 4-I tank division was attacked by Russian tanks, and it had to endure a difficult moment. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks was manifested in a sharp form. The division suffered significant losses. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed for the time being. ... Especially disappointing were the reports we received about the actions of Russian tanks, and most importantly, about their new tactics. ... Russian infantry attacked from the front, and the tanks inflicted massive strikes on our flanks. They have already learned something. ” Guderian acknowledged that "the prospects for quick and continuous success have disappeared."
The report of the commander of the 4 Tank Division of Langerman from 22 in October 1941 noted that "for the first time during the Eastern campaign, the absolute superiority of Russian 26-ton and 52-ton tanks over our Pz.III and Pz.IV was revealed" and as urgent measures It was proposed to "immediately begin its own production of the Russian 26-ton tank."
In November, an investigation commission arrived to investigate the causes of the 24 th motorized corps under Mtsensk, which was tasked with “collecting materials to study Russian tanks and design new German tanks and more powerful anti-tank weapons on the basis of this”. The commission, which arrived in the 2 Tank Army, included well-known designers: Professor Porsche (Nibelungen), engineer Oswald (MAN) and Dr. Aders (Henschel). The commission conducted detailed technical studies of heavy tanks KV-1, KV-2 and medium T-34. The results obtained by the commission contributed to the acceleration of the work of German designers on the new medium tank PzKpfw V "Panther".
Delaying the enemy at Mtsensk improved our position in the Tula area. However, the overall situation was still critical. On October 6, Guderian’s tanks, having routed Karachev and Bryansk from the east, captured them, cutting off the withdrawal paths of the Soviet troops. Thus, the troops of the Bryansk Front were divided into two parts, and the withdrawal paths were cut. Part of the front troops was surrounded. On the same day, the Soviet Headquarters issued an order to withdraw the troops of the Bryansk Front to the Mtsensk-Ponyri-Fatezh-Lgov line, the front was supposed to cover the directions to Voronezh and Tambov. Since the Stavka’s communication with the front headquarters and the front was broken, this order did not reach the addressees. Then on October 7 the order was repeated through the commander of the 50 army, Major General Mikhail Petrov. The troops received an order to "make their way east" to the line of Lgov - Ponyri. The commander-in-chief Yeremenko, who was at that time in the location of the 3 Army headquarters, ordered the front troops at nightfall on October 8 to begin withdrawing to the specified line and to carry it out within 5 days. On the night of October 8, the 3, 13, and 50 armies began to make their way eastward, linking the troops of the Guderian and Weihs armies in these battles.
Our troops suffered serious losses in these battles. Among the dead was Mikhail Petrovich, commander of the 50 Army. The commander of the Eremenko 13 of October was seriously injured and evacuated to Moscow by a specially sent plane. By October 23, all three armies, although they had suffered heavy losses, were able to break out of encirclement and occupied defenses on the indicated lines: The 50 Army was entrenched at the Oka River near Beleva, covering the Tula area; 13-I army - at the turn of Fatezh, Makarovka, covering the Kursk direction; 3-I army at the turn of Fatezh, Kromy.
Thus, the German troops broke through the defenses of the Bryansk Front, quickly developed an offensive to the rear of our troops, and were able to surround the main forces of the Soviet armies. However, the Stavka took emergency measures and in the Mtsensk area the Red Army stopped the enemy’s tanks that were rushing to Tula. And surrounded by the main forces of the Bryansk Front found the strength to break out of the "boiler". As a result, the stubborn defense of the troops of the Bryansk Front disrupted the pace of the Wehrmacht offensive in the Oryol-Tula direction and held down large enemy forces during the 17 day. This made it possible to prepare the defense lines in the Tula region and the Mozhaisk line of defense, which ultimately disrupted the plan for deep coverage of Moscow from the rear.
The former commander of the Bryansk front assessed this battle: “As a result of the resistance of the troops of the Bryansk front, which bound the main forces of the 2 tank and 2 of the enemy field armies, the offensive of the enemy forces on Tula was delayed for 17 days. The troops of the Bryansk Front defeated the strike force of the Nazi troops, aimed at Moscow from the south-west (through Bryansk, Orel, Tula). The enemy group had squandered part of their forces to fight with the troops of the front, lost their penetrating power and could not overcome the defenses of the 50 Army that had left for Tula. ”
Soviet tank KV-1 4 of the tank tank brigade, destroyed by 10 of October 1941 of the year by German artillery in Mtsensk
Summary of the first stage of the operation "Typhoon"
Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, on the same day the enemy broke through the defenses of three Soviet fronts, and its mobile units advanced 1 — 40 km in the directions of Orel, Yukhnov and Vyazma. Attempts by the fronts to inflict counter-attacks with weak reserves did not produce results. October 50, advanced units of the 3 Tank Group took the 2 th and 3 th armies of the Bryansk Front and retreated into Orel by the end of the day. In the area of Mtsensk, Soviet troops with strong counterattacks were able to stop the movement of Guderian’s tanks to Tula. October 13 main forces of the Bryansk Front were surrounded. However, the encirclement was not tight, our troops were actively making their way, suffered serious losses, but by October 6 could break through and reach a new line of defense.
Having broken through the defenses of the Western and Reserve fronts, the enemy created a dangerous situation in the Vyazma sector. On October 4, the enemy captured Spas-Demensk and Kirov, on October 5, Yukhnov and entered the Vyazma region. In the area of Vyazma, the compounds of the 19, 20, 24 and 32 armies were surrounded. Stubbornly resisting, the encircled troops pinned down significant enemy forces. Part of the forces in mid-October managed to break out of the encirclement.
The unfavorable development of hostilities in the Vyazma and Bryansk region created the threat of an enemy’s exit to Moscow itself. The capital suddenly found itself under the direct blow of the enemy. By the time the enemy troops broke through the Vyazma line throughout the entire space up to the Mozhaisk line there were no intermediate defensive lines or serious forces that could stop the movement of German tank groups. At the beginning of October there was a small number of troops on the Mozhaisk line. They could only resist the advance forces of the enemy, but not the main forces of the tank groups. Under these conditions, the Soviet military-political leadership took emergency measures to strengthen the Mozhaisk line of defense, where troops were urgently sent from the reserve, from the Far East, Central Asia and from other fronts. But they were still at a considerable distance.
German tank PzKpfw.III, shot down by Guderian’s 2 tank group, in a Soviet village
To be continued ...
Information