“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” “This day will remain an eternal monument to the courage and excellent courage of Russian soldiers”

The night after the Battle of Borodino turned out to be dark and damp. Napoleon slept poorly. His valet Constant tells:

“I spent the night next to the emperor, and his sleep was very restless, or, most likely, he did not sleep at all, constantly changing the position of his head on the pillow, repeating again and again: “What a day!” What a day!”

The day after the Moscow battle, I was with the emperor in his tent, which stood on the battlefield. Absolute silence surrounded us. The Emperor seemed to be in the grip of immense fatigue. From time to time he squeezed the knees of his crossed legs with his palms and repeated, accompanying the words with convulsive movements: “Moscow! Moscow!". Several times he sent me out of the tent to find out what was going on outside, then got up and followed me, peering over my shoulder. The noise that arose from the fact that the sentry was taking his gun on guard alerted me every time that the emperor was following me.”

Really, the behavior of Napoleon described here is not at all similar to the behavior of the winner that he would later declare himself to be. It rather speaks of Napoleon’s moral shock at the outcome of the Battle of Borodino, which did not live up to his hopes, and Moscow, which seemed to be very close, now suddenly moved away and began to seem like an unattainable dream. And this look from over his valet’s shoulder seems to already be afraid of meeting fate.

In the morning, an alarm arose in the French camp caused by a Cossack raid, which spread all the way to Napoleon’s tent. The old guard rushed to arms. The French officer Combe says:

“The morning that came after this memorable day (of Borodinsky) was very bloody. Our regiment had to take turns occupying the head of the column... At first dawn, our outposts were attacked, and we went to support them; but we had to deal with a large rearguard: thirty cannons met us with grapeshot, we took several of them, but they were recaptured from us.”

Our rearguard remained at the Borodino position until 10 a.m. and then slowly moved after the army, not even being bothered by the enemy. The alarm he raised in the French camp clearly proved that the Russian army was far from being overwhelmed by the previous battle; her disappearance from the Borodino position only left the enemy in bewilderment. Kolachkovsky writes:

«The Russian army did not suffer a shameful defeat and, without losing a single field gun, disappeared from our eyes (underlined - the memoirist's italics) under the cover of light cavalry, leaving Napoleon in complete uncertainty, where did it go - to Kaluga or to Moscow? Therefore, instead of joy, our army felt bewilderment.”

“At that time, a large fire was burning in front of Napoleon’s tent, around which the officers on duty were warming themselves. Marshals Ney and Murat soon came here and, after greeting each other, started a conversation. Murat:

– Yesterday was a hot day, I have never seen a battle with such artillery fire. At Eylau they fired no less from cannons, but there were cannonballs, and yesterday both armies stood so close to each other that they fired grapeshot almost all the time.
“We didn’t break the eggs,” Ney objected. – The enemy’s losses must be enormous, and morally he must be terribly shocked. We must pursue him and take advantage of the victory.
“He, however, retreated in perfect order,” noted Murat.
“I just can’t believe it,” Ney objected. - How could this be after such a blow?
Here this interesting conversation was interrupted, as the emperor called Marshal Ney to him.”

Until noon the French army remained in place, collecting their wounded and "restoring order in buildings" The battlefield presented a terrible picture. Kolachkovsky says:

“Walking from the right wing to the center, I found in the place occupied by the 8th Westphalian Corps, traces of yesterday’s failures. There were many corpses of Westphalians of various regiments lying in the bushes. When I entered that part of the field where three earthen trenches marked the middle of the Russian army, my astonished eyes were presented with a sight, the horror of which exceeded all my expectations. For some 1500 fathoms, both along and across, the corpses of killed people and horses, ammunition boxes and weapons lay, and they lay as densely as I had never seen again, even in the Battle of Leipzig. Here death literally mowed down people. The French and Russians were mixed up here. Fresh wounds, mainly inflicted by grenades in different parts of the body, terrified every living person who had not yet been hardened by such pictures. Near the upper trenches and the large round battery, to the left of Borodin, traces of the fiercest battle were also clearly visible. All the ditches were literally filled to the brim with corpses, and the approaches to the ditches were strewn with corpses so that one could judge from them the direction of the advance. Around the Borodino battery, the slopes of which were dug up by bullets and grenades and trampled by the hooves of the advancing cavalry, lay in a ring the corpses of French, Saxon and Polish cuirassiers, who took these trenches after an unheard-of stories cavalry attack...

According to information collected on the spot, and not from the false XVIII bulletin, French losses reached 40 people killed and wounded...”

Our losses at Borodino were also considerable, but, in the opinion of our soldiers, they were still less than those of the French. Non-commissioned officer Tikhonov speaks about it this way:

“There weren’t many of him (the enemy) left, we knocked him down with passion: he stood very densely, so our guns could fire cleverly; Our reserves were lost much less than the French ones, and we were stationed less often. He knocked down a lot of people in the afternoon, but it’s not like how many we are with him.”

However, the loss figures in the historical literature still do not find agreement.

Around noon, Murat received orders to move with the vanguard after the Russian army and, having passed Mozhaisk, settle down 7 versts beyond this city. From this we can conclude that Napoleon believed or convinced himself that the Russian army was retreating because it was overwhelmed by the battle. He himself undertook a survey of the battlefield to personally witness its results. He began his survey from the left Russian flank, towards which his main attack was directed. The battlefield was completely covered with dead bodies of men and horses, broken and abandoned weapons, knocked out cannons and broken charging boxes, and as abundantly showered with cannonballs and grapeshot, like hail after a strong storm. Everything he saw bore traces of a terrible massacre and some simply unimaginable bitterness, in which he did not find any traces of the superiority of his troops, rather, on the contrary, their inability to break the resistance of the Russians. Going around the battlefield, he ordered the bodies of the dead to be turned over to see from what blows they had fallen. Almost all were killed by buckshot. Segur writes:

“During this sad inspection, the emperor tried in vain to find peace for himself, ordering a count of the remaining prisoners and picking up some broken cannons: 700 or 800 prisoners and about 20 broken guns were the only trophies of this inconclusive victory.”

Napoleon was gloomy. The cloudy sky echoed his mood. It was raining lightly, a sharp gusty wind was blowing, and heavy dark clouds covered the sky. Gloomy despondency reigned everywhere. In this mood, Napoleon returned to his tent. At about three o'clock in the afternoon the French army moved after its vanguard.

Napoleon expected to move his main apartment to Mozhaisk by evening, but the Russian rearguard prevented this, repulsing all attempts by the French to occupy the city. The convoy of Napoleon's main apartment was forced to return back.

“This event, apparently of little significance, had a great influence on the consequences of the actions,”

writes Chambray. It proved that the Russian army was not at all affected by the battle and retained its combat effectiveness. Just as gloomy and silent, Napoleon was forced to spend the night in the village of Krivushino, located in our rear of the Borodino position. The reconnaissance plan of the fortifications that have remained on the Borodino field since 1812 shows a system of fortifications surrounding the village of Krivushino, and, based on the circumstances presented, we have every reason to consider these fortifications to be French, assigned to defend Napoleon’s headquarters on the night of August 27-28. And if so, then these fortifications are documentary evidence that Napoleon did not have any victory at Borodino (or even “at the Moscow River”), and, moreover, he himself did not recognize himself as a winner, for the victor does not protect himself from fortifications defeated enemy, whom "all hope is gone", and which

“I fought, retreating, for the sake of salvation, and not for victory.”

Thus ended the Battle of Borodino, and with it ended for Napoleon everything that he had deluded himself with when starting the “Russian campaign.” He himself does not yet realize this. He goes to Moscow, drawn there by the retreat of the Russian army, and does not notice that the strategic initiative has already settled on Kutuzov’s side. And here he is in Moscow, in which “hoped to achieve all the results of the war" But what did Moscow turn out for him? No, not the crown of his campaign, not a trophy or reward, but a pile of ashes that the Russians left him and in which they buried all his hopes of success. It was later, already on the island of St. Helena, that Napoleon would claim:

“In Moscow, the whole world was already preparing to recognize my superiority: the elements resolved this issue.”

But these are just words. After all, it was enough for the Russian army not to recognize this imaginary superiority of Napoleon so that “the whole world” would not recognize it. The “Elements” refused Napoleon recognition only later, in the last place. It was in Moscow that the real result of the Battle of Borodino was revealed - for Napoleon it turned out to be a battle with a delayed end. Why? Because he failed to defeat the Russian army, and now this army, which surrounded him in the ashes of Moscow, made it clear to him that the war, which he intended to end in Moscow, was just beginning for the Russians. Moscow exhausted Napoleon's entire strategic resource and upset all his calculations. After Moscow, Napoleon’s “Russian campaign” no longer had a military solution. This is where only Napoleon could fully understand the treachery of Kutuzov, who lost Moscow to him, and this is where Kutuzov had already strategically outplayed Napoleon - in Moscow! However, for a whole month (more precisely, 39 days), Napoleon “out of stubbornness” (Kutuzov’s expression) sits in burned Moscow, trying to present himself as a winner. In vain! This fools no one, except perhaps his hapless allies.

In September 1812, while Napoleon sat in burning Moscow, the Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg shared his concerns with the Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich:

“Will the genius of Napoleon, the weakness of the character of Emperor Alexander, the lack of unity in Russian plans and their execution quickly lead to an unfavorable peace for Russia? Or, if Alexander holds strong, if the very victories gradually exhaust the strength of France, if her troops, drawn into distant countries in inclement times of the year, feel a lack of food, are surrounded by a large people for whom the war will be national - the genius of Napoleon will not Will he turn out to be insolvent, and will the huge hordes that he has at his disposal finally fail and be wasted?

And I received the following response from my Austrian colleague:

“In the inadequacy of the first Russian plan, in the abandonment of the defensive system, in the forced retreat from the best and richest provinces of the empire, in the unheard-of devastation of Moscow, I see only signs and evidence of incoherence and weakness. A sovereign who would calmly weigh the results of the plans presented to him by his ministers, who would do everything to prevent misfortunes or to turn them against the enemy, such a sovereign would represent a strong point of support for me. I do not find it in the fruitless sacrifices, in the destruction of so many vast plans of many great predecessors; I see here only the loss of Russia’s European existence and, unfortunately, in this loss a terrible intensification of the weight weighing us down. I do not count on any firmness on the part of Emperor Alexander, on any coherence in the present and future plans of his cabinet, on any decisive results in his favor due to the climate, the approach of winter; I deny the possibility that the same people who put the state on the brink of destruction could lead it out of this situation.”

These prophecies, as we know, were not destined to come true.

It is not known how long Napoleon would have sat in burned-out Moscow, but on October 6, the Russians defeated Murat’s vanguard at Tarutin, clearly demonstrating who really was the master of the situation in the theater of war. Napoleon realized that upon entering Moscow, he was trapped! That sitting in it, he was just wasting his time! But he always knew:

“The loss of time in war is irreplaceable.”

He rushes out of Moscow, driven by a premonition of an impending catastrophe... but the game is already done. At Maloyaroslavets, where the Russian army blocks his way, Napoleon no longer finds himself capable of fighting.

“This devil Kutuzov will not get a new battle from me!”

- he throws out in anger and for the first and only time in his life he avoids battle. From now on, he seeks salvation in flight. Alas,

“The quickness of his feet doesn't help him. The long journey leads to despair.”

He finds salvation for himself personally, but his entire army was defeated on the return journey from Russia.

“Barely the tenth person / The fatal stigma has passed,”

- F.I. Tyutchev noted with a poetic line the ending of this mournful “Russian campaign” for Napoleon.

What did Napoleon achieve by starting a war with Russia? He didn't hide it; in his appeal to the troops on the eve of the invasion of Russia, he directly stated that he intended

"to put an end to fifty years of arrogant Russian influence in European affairs."

Essentially, it was an anti-Petrine project, which had the goal of returning Russia to its pre-Petrine state, ousting it from the European political and cultural space and, moreover, subordinating it to the dictates of the political system created by Napoleon. As such, this project is in line with the historical rejection of Russia by Europe, which we observe today. None of this worked out for Napoleon. He himself explained the reason for his failure as follows:

“In this entire war I was under the influence of a bad genius, which at decisive moments created obstacles that could not have been foreseen.”

Where did this “bad genius” get mixed up in Napoleon’s plans, and what could he be? Indeed, until Napoleon’s entry into Moscow, we do not find anything in the circumstances of the military campaign that could not have been foreseen or expected by the conqueror. We will not classify the enemy’s resistance, even the most desperate, as a surprise! But there were two moments in that war that really “could not have been foreseen” by Napoleon - the Battle of Borodino, which was fruitless for Napoleon in its result, and the fire of Moscow, which made the results of Napoleon’s campaign as a whole fruitless. And now we can even call this “bad genius” Napoleon - it was the patriotism of the Russian people and the valor of the Russian army led by Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov.

* * *
Centuries have passed. Borodino Field has become a memorable place. On Borodin Day it can be very crowded and noisy here. But the best thing about Borodin Day is the silence that reigns here on ordinary days. Obelisks stand here and there in solemn repose, preserving the memory of the Russian troops who fought here in 1812. The wind blows across the entire vast field, like a watchman, and the bell ringing of the Spaso-Borodinsky Monastery performs its funeral rite. Everything calls to your memory and duty of heart. We will remember:

“How many brilliant deeds perished in this chaos of blood and murder! These martyrs of love for the fatherland paid back their homelands; they redeemed them at the cost of their own lives, and left to those who survived them the sacred duty to honor their memory as much as the generosity with which they all condemned themselves to death deserves.”

On August 26, 1813, Bishop of Dmitrov and Vicar of Moscow Augustine, during the annual commemoration of the soldiers who laid down their lives for the faith and fatherland at the Battle of Borodino, said wonderful words:

“Domestic land! Keep in your depths the dear remains of the champions and saviors of the fatherland; do not burden their ashes; Instead of dew and rain, the grateful tears of the sons of Russia will sprinkle you. Be green and bloom until that great and enlightened day, when the dawn of eternity will shine, when the sun of righteousness will revive all that exists in the tombs. - Amen."

And we would like to complete our story about the Battle of Borodino with words from Kutuzov’s report, which are forever inscribed in the annals of Russian history:

“This day will remain an eternal monument to the courage and excellent bravery of Russian soldiers, where all the infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. Everyone’s desire was to die on the spot and not yield to the enemy. The French army, led by Napoleon himself, being in superior strength, did not overcome the fortitude of the Russian soldier, who cheerfully sacrificed his life for his fatherland.”

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Comments

[Ravik]

Great job.
I looked forward to each new part.
Thank you for your work.

[Lewww]

“The Russian army did not suffer a shameful defeat

Absolutely right, it simply suffered defeat - without shame.

Our losses at Borodino were also considerable, but, in the opinion of our soldiers, they were still less than those of the French.

The issue is controversial, but its resolution does not affect the outcome of the battle

From this we can conclude that Napoleon believed or convinced himself that the Russian army was retreating because it was overwhelmed by the battle.

There is nothing to assure us of - this was obvious.
If it had not been hit (had not suffered significant losses), then why would Kutuzov have given the order to retreat?

And if so, then these fortifications are documentary evidence that Napoleon did not have any victory at Borodino (and even “at the Moscow River”)

A conclusion like if the trees are shaking, it means there is a stream nearby.
Who won the battle is determined not by the location of the fortifications, but by the what tasks the commanders set on the eve of the battle and to what extent they were completed in the end.
The author picked up a bunch of quotes from sources, but is not able to draw correct conclusions from the course and outcome of the battle, and follows the lead of various memoirists

He goes to Moscow, drawn there by the retreat of the Russian army, and does not notice that the strategic initiative has already settled on Kutuzov’s side.

The conclusion is purely speculative.
Napoleon led his troops to Moscow, driven by the fulfillment of the main goal that he had set on the eve of the war.
The author should read Clausewitz instead of a dozen memoirs

It was in Moscow that the real result of the Battle of Borodino was revealed - for Napoleon it turned out to be a battle with a delayed end.

For the author, one absurdity reinforces another absurdity, and this is not an accident, but a system.
The result of the Battle of Borodino was revealed with the onset of darkness when Kutuzov decided to end the battle and gave the order to the troops to retreat from the defended positions.
And in Moscow it was discovered that Napoleon chose the wrong main goal of the war, which ultimately led to the failure of the campaign he started

[Sergey Valov]

Speaking of Clausewitz. It is no secret that he took part in the Battle of Borodino and left memoirs about the war of 1812. In the Battle of Borodino, he took part in Uvarov’s raid and wrote how carelessly Uvarov carried it out. Clausewitz also writes that the Russian army definitely lost many more people than the French.
And one very subtle question. The author provides an extensive list of references used. Honor and praise to him for this. Having been interested in this topic for more than 50 years, I didn’t even know about some of the books, although I went through Lenin thoroughly. And here questions arise:
1. Napoleon Bonaparte. Egyptian campaign. – St. Petersburg, 2000 - why is this book mentioned here?
2. Radozhitsky I.T.] Field notes of an artilleryman. – M., 1835. - with such a deep immersion in the topic, doesn’t the author know about the publication of these memoirs in 2018?
3. Tolstoy L.N. War and Peace. T. 3. Part 2. - with all due respect to the literary talent of Lev Nikolaevich, to refer to a work of art, especially to this…. No words!
4. Why didn’t the author use (not mentioned) the magnificent 7-volume “Patriotic War and Russian Society” M. 1912?
I could continue the questions, but I think that’s enough.

[Lewww]

And here questions arise:

I believe that the author listed the sources given at the end of some historical work, cat. he used it.
For earlier he referred to both Clausewitz and Ermolov, but they are not on the list

[Sergey Valov]

It’s quite easy to find out what kind of literature the author used; just check the quotes with the original sources, fortunately there are few of them. The author's text is minimized to the level of a university textbook and could even be written based on some memoirs. Clausewitz is on the list, but the author most likely did not use it, because Clausewitz wrote, well, let’s say, looking at events somewhat differently than the author. As for Ermolov, excerpts from his upbringing are in various collections. The following design also suggests some thoughts - “[Radozhitsky I.T.] Field notes of an artilleryman. - M., 1835." - this is a clear use of the Internet, rather than working with primary sources. And there are plenty of such examples on the list.

[UAT]

And in Moscow it was discovered that Napoleon chose the wrong main goal of the war, which ultimately led to the failure of the campaign he started

It is obvious that at first Napoleon pursued one goal - the defeat of the Russian army. At the same time, he neglected the possibility of capturing the capital. The occupation of Moscow, which has not been the capital for a hundred years, cannot be interpreted as achieving the main goal of the campaign, since at the same time Russia retains both the capital and the army. That is why Napoleon lost the war with Russia. And the main point, after which Napoleon’s defeat became inevitable, was his non-victory on the Borodino field, since he could not defeat the Russian army. Thus, Kutuzov achieved his goals in the battle, but Napoleon did not. Therefore, the answer to the question about the winner is absolutely clear.

[Vagabung]

If I could give you a plus for every point....

[Timofey Charuta]

Friends, gentlemen, comrades! Get ready to scold me terribly...
Everything in the article is correct and wonderful. Like, hurray, the bullet is stupid, but the bayonet is great, etc. and so on.

But when they compare Napoleon’s army with the armies of his opponents, especially with the Russian one, we bashfully hide such an important detail from the general puzzle of Napoleonic wars.
Read me quickly, perhaps the publication will now be removed from the site...

In Napoleon's army, corporal punishment was prohibited from the word “completely”!

Their own soldiers were beaten to death with sticks (spritspturens) in the Russian army, and in the Prussian, and in the Austrian, enlightened lovers of all kinds of human rights, the arrogant Saxons, selflessly flogged their own, etc. and so on. And the kind grandfather Kutuzov, I believe, ruined a sufficient number of his “soldiers, bravo, boys.”

True, Suvorov was rightly proud: “I don’t drive my soldiers into battle with sticks, they go on their own...”. Such exceptions, which only confirm the general rule, could be found in other armies.

For Napoleon, an offense for which a soldier of other armies could receive a hundred or two blows with a stick, was punishable by execution in the French army. Leaving an assigned post and disobedience to a superior in a combat situation were punishable by death.

“Other discipline” referred to omissions in the details of service, compliance with dress codes and internal regulations. There was such tolerance and gentleness here that would have been unthinkable, for example, in the Prussian troops. “In some armies, strictness is taken to the extreme in details that in the eyes of reason seem insignificant,” wrote Marshal Marmont. - If it is a matter of trifles of uniform or temporary lack of immobility in the ranks, too severe a punishment is wrong... In the French army, only appropriate praise or blame and noble competition are often enough. After all, punishments and distinctions based on the opinions of comrades have a wonderful ability to vary endlessly and powerfully influence noble hearts.”

“If a soldier is caught for minor offenses,” noted the author of “Notes on the French Army of Recent Times,” “they will shame him, reprimand him, affect his pride, imprisonment for him is already a severe punishment, non-dismissal from the yard, arrest are the highest punishments.” ; being brought into service in a hat when others are wearing shakos, following in the rear of a unit, holding a gun with the butt up - these are the punishments most often used.”

We are returning to Russia. Leo Tolstoy's textbook story "After the Ball" - if you forgot, re-read it - everything is described in detail by the classic. They even made a movie about it...

Russian soldier's song:
"I defend the Fatherland - my back is beaten with sticks..."

Another thing is that among Napoleonic soldiers, especially in captured Moscow, robbery and looting became the main motivation for the entire Russian campaign. And Napoleon himself and the marshals profited well in Belokamennaya...

It’s interesting, but if you look further - if Napoleon had abolished serfdom in Russia, if he had incited the serfs against his landowners - how would it all have ended?
True, in Spain the French tried to do something similar - but it all ended in guerrilla violence, the Spanish men did not want to part with the Inquisition they loved, with the feudal duties dear to their hearts...

Below are drawings from life in the barracks of Taras Shevchenko, who was given up as a soldier.

[Timofey Charuta]

The main motivation of Napoleonic soldiers in Moscow is well depicted in painting.
But, again, in what army of that time did such scenes not take place?...

PS From the popular Soviet film "Cain XVIII":
"What am I going to feed this horde of soldiers with?
- And only soldiers without guns need to be fed. Soldiers with guns will feed themselves!"

...

[KVU-NSVD]

Thanks to the author. If the series were published, I would definitely buy it. When publishing, I would add illustrations, portraits and maps with explanations, otherwise when reading, it is sometimes difficult to keep in mind the mutual maneuvers of the regiments. Such a publication would also be nice for a schoolchild to read further. Once again, I strongly advise the author to think about publishing the series and thanks again

[The popuas]

Glory to Russian weapons! Thank you for the article!

[cast iron]

I liked the article. I didn’t like the popular popular ideology, which was no different from the primitive school interpretations. Here there is defeat without defeat. And someone read Napoleonic thoughts :) And also these unscientific statements that the losses of the Battle of Borodino are still unknown. Known. Everything has been calculated a long time ago.

[UAT]

In my opinion, this is not a “hurray ideology”, but the main reason for the success of the Russian army in this battle. The author voluminously showed the mood of our troops and the implementation of this mood throughout the incredible battle. Bow to our soldiers and many thanks to the author.

[cast iron]

Is anyone begging for the merits or spirit of the Russian troops in the Battle of Borodino? The problem with many historians is that they interpret events taking into account modern ideological attitudes in the country, forgetting that history is a science. If the Battle of Borodino is a draw, then the two victories of Pyrrhus of Epirus over the Romans are also a “draw”. But for some reason no one names these episodes. They are called the victory of Pyrrhus, but with features that later led to defeat in the military campaign. Borodino from the same series. Napoleon won a "Pyrrhic victory", which led to the collapse of the war.

[Sergey Valov]

“which led to the collapse of the war” - what led to the collapse of the war was not the result of the Battle of Borodino, but Napoleon’s combination of two functions in one person - commander and politician. As a commander, he understood perfectly well that even Smolensk was too far from the border, he had to go back. But as a politician, he could not allow even a draw result for the company of 1812; he needed a clear victory. The politician has gained the upper hand, the result is obvious. After all, even if we imagine the introduction of the guard into battle at Borodino and the subsequent defeat of the Russian army, then by and large this would not change anything. Even if a third of the Russian army were preserved, then everything would have gone as in reality. They would have surrendered Moscow, they would not have agreed to peace, they would have accumulated more strength, and then the inglorious retreat of the French, at best, to Poland, and most likely to Prussia, with the same result.

[Lewww]

If the Battle of Borodino is a draw

In principle, there could not be a draw there in any scenario.

If Kutuzov had not withdrawn the troops from their positions, the outcome of the battle would have been decided on the second day.
Although if we approach the consideration of the issue corrosively, we can conclude that the battle lasted TWO DAYS, not one.
The first day - battles of the main forces; the second - battles between part of the French forces and the rearguard of the Russian army.
And the results of the battle should have been summed up at the end of the second day.

[Lewww]

And also these unscientific statements that the losses of the Battle of Borodino are still unknown. Known. Everything has been calculated a long time ago.

You don't understand what you are writing.
Even regarding the losses of the Red Army during the Second World War, disputes do not subside, i.e. There is no absolutely reliable information about losses.
And for Borodino it is generally impossible to collect them, even for those killed, there are only subjective assessments, because no one walked around the battlefield after the battle with bills in their hands

[cast iron]

It’s people like you who are still debating. And historians have different methods of calculation and they are officially published. Therefore, choose the calculation method you like, or rely on the opinion of authorities or the community, and have peace of mind with the information. In any case, the order of losses plus or minus is known. And in terms of the greater number of works, the losses of the Russian army exceeded those of the French under Borodino. No one walked around with bills. Even then, meticulous document flow was carried out about the wounded, killed, deserters, etc. About the number of people in the units before and after the battle. All this has already been carried out at a fairly high level.

[Lewww]

And in terms of the greater number of works, the losses of the Russian army exceeded those of the French under Borodino. No one walked around with bills. Even then, meticulous paperwork was carried out

And in what DOCUMENT did you see the exact number of losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino (killed, wounded, missing)?
Compiled by whom, signed by, date of signing?
Can you provide a link to the document?

[cast iron]

Are you a historian or what? Do you work in archives with primary sources? Contact the RGVIA archive for help. They will find you a selection, if of course you have access. At least read Wikipedia first. The works of various authors and sources are described in sufficient detail there.

[Lewww]

My dear, are you a demagogue?
I asked you a clear question: in which DOCUMENT did you see the exact number of losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino (killed, wounded, missing)?

Your finger is numb and that's why you can't Can you honestly say that you have never seen such a document?
As far as I know, such a document does not exist, losses in the battle of Borodino are purely speculative mainly based on memoirs, which is what I wrote about above.
If one exists, name it, and don’t send me to Wikipedia

[cast iron]

For example, Troitsky N.A. (Soviet historian, specialist in the Patriotic War of 1812), citing data from the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff, gives a figure of 45,6 thousand people. And then look for the documents you want and argue until you lose your pulse that they didn’t count anyone, and that they counted them is all a lie. You can argue until you lose your pulse, especially if you are not a historian, but a person who believes in everything.

[Sergey Valov]

“no one walked across the battlefield after the battle with scores in their hands” is a profound mistake. After any battle, the corpses of the dead were buried, and it was the same after Borodin. Many years ago I came across a report on the burial of bodies on the Borodino field, separately people and horses.

[UAT]

After any battle, the corpses of the dead were buried, the same thing happened after Borodin

. This is a deep misconception. On the Borodino field, ALL (except one) burials were carried out without separating the remains according to their belonging to the Russian and French armies, because the armies left the battlefield immediately, and the burials were carried out as sanitary cleaning much later, when the separation of the remains of the dead was no longer physically possible.

[Lewww]

“no one walked across the battlefield after the battle with scores in their hands” is a deep mistake. After any battle, the corpses of the dead were buried, and it was the same after Borodin.

I am depressing by the lack of logic among those posting on VO.
The fact that corpses are buried does not mean that they are accurately counted.
A striking example is the burial near Dubosekovo (near the village of Nelidovo): initially it was indicated in the documents that 28 people were buried, then when 6 of those buried turned out to be alive, they were transferred to 22.
How much is actually unknown
There are many mass graves from the Second World War where the total number of those buried is not even known

[Sergey Valov]

On the Borodino field, local residents were involved in burying corpses, whom the French paid by setting a fee for a certain number of buried bodies. These payments were documented and the papers were preserved.

[Sergey Valov]

By the way, I checked what percentage of the Napoleonic army under Borodin were French units. If we discard the guard, which did not take part in the battle, then it turns out to be approximately 50%, both for infantry and cavalry. I have never seen any mention that the Allied contingents fought worse than the French in battle. What does the leader's halo mean?

[BMP-2]

“The loss of time in war is irreplaceable,” these are golden words, no matter who they belong to.

[Lewww]

[quote=UAT][quote]And in Moscow it was discovered that Napoleon chose the wrong main goal of the war, which ultimately led to the failure of the campaign he started[/quote]

[quote]It is obvious that at first Napoleon pursued one goal - the defeat of the Russian army. At the same time, he neglected the possibility of capturing the capital. The occupation of Moscow, which has not been the capital for a hundred years, cannot be interpreted as achieving the main goal of the campaign, since at the same time Russia remains capable of both the capital and the army.[/quote]

But personally, this is not at all obvious to me; it is rather obvious that Napoleon’s army was marching specifically towards Moscow, and not towards St. Petersburg.
As I understand it, Napoleon set 2 main goals before the Battle of Borodino:
1. Knock down Russian troops from their positions in order to then continue moving towards Moscow with the goal of capturing the city.
2. If possible, defeat the Russian army.

The first was achieved completely, the second partially.
At least, as far as I remember, this is how Clausewitz assessed his actions, when, using his example, he showed how sometimes a commander, due to an incorrectly chosen main goal of a campaign, ended up losing the war.
But Hitler tried not to repeat this mistake.

And it is also completely obvious to me that the author did not make even the slightest attempt to analyze the outcome of the Battle of Borodino from the perspective of military science

[UAT]

Quote: Lewww

But personally, this is not at all obvious to me; it is rather obvious that Napoleon’s army was marching specifically towards Moscow, and not towards St. Petersburg.

I always considered the generally accepted point of view that Napoleon sought first of all to defeat the Russian forces, preferably separately, which was in principle possible before Smolensk. As for Moscow as the main goal, it is completely unclear what the advantages of taking Moscow are for Napoleon over taking St. Petersburg, the current capital.

But Hitler tried not to repeat this mistake.

Those. Didn’t Hitler’s troops rush towards Moscow until their offensive potential was so completely exhausted that, having received a stupidly organized counterattack, they suffered their first defeat and rolled back a hundred kilometers?

[Lewww]

The generally accepted point of view is not always the most correct.
Clausewitz:

Under these conditions, Bonaparte could, of course, fear that he would not have enough strength left to march on Moscow. But only the latter was the point from which; everything seemed to depend. Such a victory that he won gave him almost complete confidence that he would be able to occupy this capital, since it seemed extremely unlikely that the Russians would be able to give a second battle within the next week.
In Moscow he hoped to find peace. True, the defeat of the Russian army would have ensured this peace to a much greater extent, but the first condition was still to reach Moscow, i.e. to reach with such strength as to appear before the capital, and through it, before the entire state and government as a ruler.

Those. According to Clausewitz, the occupation of Moscow seemed to Napoleon the main goal from the implementation of the cat. the outcome of the war depended

Well, his assessment of success in the battle:

Hence, one should not, however, classify this case as one where the situation as a whole deprives the commander of the opportunity to carry out even the first pursuit after the victory. Victory was decided by 4 pm, [195] but the Russians still held most of the battlefield in their hands and did not yet want to clear it; they would have put up stubborn resistance when the attack was resumed, which, although undoubtedly would end in their complete defeat, but it would have cost the enemy a lot more blood. Thus, Borodino should be counted among those battles that, like Bautzen, did not receive full development.

I love reading Clausewitz - his work allows you to correctly capture and correctly understand the essence of wars

[UAT]

You cite Clausewitz's opinion on Napoleon's actions after Borodin. I have no objections. Only 100 km. before second the capital, the capture of which is, of course, better than nothing, but this cannot literally decide the outcome of the campaign, and Napoleon hoped for it out of desperation. The Russians retained a functioning capital and a combat-ready army. Perhaps the Russian army at the end of the battle would not have been able to resist the French, but there was no defeat, combat effectiveness was preserved. In other words, the occupation of Moscow in no way refutes the thesis that before Borodin, Napoleon pursued one goal - the defeat of the Russian army and thus forcing the enemy to peace on French terms. This failed and we had to be content with the prize we managed to reach - the capture of the second capital and joyful robbery. If Napoleon could count on the defeat of the Russians in a new general battle, he would strive for it. But in his subsequent actions there is no hint of such a desire.
You rely on Clausewitz's opinion

Victory was decided by 4 pm, [195]

, however, Napoleon’s opinion on this matter, expressed in his actions, is completely different. Clausewitz, of course, is a major and very authoritative military theorist, but Napoleon is the greatest practitioner.
PS What about

But Hitler tried not to repeat this mistake.

?

[Lewww]

Those. Hitler’s troops did not rush towards Moscow until their offensive potential was so completely exhausted that they received a stupidly organized counterattack

You lack the ability to understand the precise conclusions I have written.
Once again: Hitler never set the main goal of capturing Moscow, which is well known. And for this he was subsequently reproached by many German commanders.
For if he had set this goal, then after the capture of Smolensk he would have sent the main forces to Moscow. And the capital would be surrounded in October.
But he had other (what he considered) more important priorities.

As for Moscow as the main goal, it is completely unclear what the advantages of taking Moscow are for Napoleon over taking St. Petersburg, the current capital.

and I don't understand

?

Do not repeat Napoleon's mistake with the wrong choice of the main goal of the war

[Lewww]

Today I posted several quotes from Clausewitz’s work with his assessment of the results of the Battle of Borodino and the opinion that Napoleon’s main goal was the capture of Moscow, but now for some reason this post is not there.
It’s unclear who deleted it
I won’t post a second time