“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Kurgan battery

28 September 2023 2

A. Averyanov. General Kostenetsky on the Borodino field. 1993

Having failed to overturn the left flank of the Russian army, Napoleon allowed his artillery to operate here, and decided to direct the main blow against our center, where the Russians now stood as a prominent wedge behind the Great Redoubt, as the French called the Kurgan Battery, which continued to bring its destructive fire into the ranks of the French troops . This was already an effort of despair on Napoleon’s part, because, in essence, it did not solve anything. By this time, the 4th Infantry Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy was already behind the center of our position, which allowed the 2nd Brigade of the Eugene Württemberg Division (Kremenchug and Minsk Infantry Regiments) to go to the extreme left flank, to the Old Smolensk Road, where Baggovut was impatiently waiting for it .

Feng writes:

“The moment has come to break through the enemy center. The Emperor sent orders to the King of Naples. Friant's division, standing unwaveringly near the village of Semenovsky, occupied the place that was supposed to serve as a turning point for the decisive maneuver. The Young Guard was already moving towards him when suddenly cries of “Hurray!” were heard from the left flank. Next to the high road, where the Imperial apartment had been in previous days, a mass of carts and carts appeared, traveling in the greatest disorder. This indicated a strong attack on the position of the viceroy at Borodin.

In this regard, the emperor stopped the movement of the guard and advanced the Claperade division from Prince Eugene. Soon news arrived that the Russians had descended from the heights near Gorki. They bypassed our left flank, and Ornano’s too weak division had to retreat to Borodino, which had already been bypassed by the Cossacks. Delzon's surrounded division formed a square, and the Viceroy himself, taken by surprise, had to take refuge in the ranks of the 84th regiment."

Liprandi writes:

“The turmoil on the hill from Borodino towards the Kolotsky Monastery was clearly visible from Gorki, and with what haste many tents were taken down!”

What alarmed Napoleon so much and forced him to stop the attack that had been launched on our center was the attack of Uvarov’s 1st Cavalry Corps and Platov’s Cossacks on the flank and rear of the left wing of Napoleon’s army. It passed in sight of our troops, and one of its witnesses, artilleryman Radozhitsky, describes it:

“We watched with pleasure as our cavalry on the other side of the river moved forward in long lines of red, blue hussars and lancers, then struck the French cavalry and drove it far beyond Borodino; there she attacked the batteries, and the Elisavetgrad Hussar Regiment took away two cannons. But four regiments of enemy infantry, having formed a square from Borodino, went towards our cavalry; she alternately attacked each square and, being unable to break a single one, retreated... Soon after that we saw two Don Cossack regiments, quite skillfully passing forward under the cannonballs, without any damage; Then they got together and attacked the French together.”

Such a sudden appearance of Russian cavalry on the left flank and even in the rear of his position seriously alarmed Napoleon and forced him to move and head to his left flank to personally understand the situation. He was convinced that Uvarov’s attack, not supported by infantry, did not pose a serious threat to him, but the situation in his rear, behind the forest, from where his transporters were fleeing in disarray, kept him in suspense for some time before he was finally convinced that it was nothing more than a demonstration intended to entertain his forces.

“However, this circumstance delayed us in inaction for more than an hour,” writes Jomini, “and the enemy took advantage of this time to establish himself in his new position; this stop greatly contributed to the failure of the battle.”

The Cossacks were to blame for this, writes Liprandi:

“Platov did not bring all the Cossacks out into the open, and this caution could have been considered criminal, due to some circumstances at that time, if it had not turned completely in our favor, deceiving the observing general, who was usually appointed to the French on the day of the general battle. He, the Viceroy and Napoleon himself believed, instead of the Cossacks, our infantry in significant numbers was in the bushes and behind the hills, waiting for an opportunity to push the enemy’s left flank off the road between the Kolotsky Monastery and Borodino.”

The headquarters officer of the 6th Infantry Corps, Bologovsky, evaluates Platov’s actions in the same way:

“General Platov, making his debut from a defile that hid the insignificance of his forces, was afraid of compromising himself with a decisive attack of the enemy; already opposing him to the battery. He considered it more useful to threaten him with a situation that would leave him in doubt about his real strength, and in the end he decided to disturb him only in parts.”

And this assessment finds support from one of the first researchers of the Battle of Borodino N.A. Okunev, who writes:

“This movement of the cavalry did not have all the success expected (i.e., expected. - V.Kh.) from him in his enterprise; but it produced at least some indecision in the offensive action of the enemy center, which the Russians took advantage of to bring the tired troops into order. I know this from a general who commanded one of the infantry divisions that very actively participated in this glorious battle. He assured me that there was a very noticeable weakening in Napoleon’s offensive movement, for which at first they did not know the true reason; but later it became known that this weakening of the center was due to fear aroused by the lateral movement of General Uvarov.”

And in the same spirit Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky writes:

“Those who were in the Battle of Borodino, of course, remember that moment when the tenacity of attacks along the entire enemy line decreased, the fire apparently became weaker, and we, as someone rightly remarked then, “were able to breathe more freely.”

Nevertheless, Kutuzov obviously expected more from this sabotage. Or he did not rate it highly enough in terms of the dedication of the troops who fought at Borodino, because both of its performers, Uvarov and Platov, turned out to be the only generals who did not receive awards for Borodino. The basis for such an assumption is also given by the opinion of Barclay, who writes that

“If this attack had been carried out with greater firmness, not limited to simply exhausting the enemy, then its consequences would have been brilliant.”

Regarding this sabotage, Tol writes that it took place “about two o'clock in the afternoon" And Kutuzov’s letter to the Moscow Governor-General Count Rostopchin dates back to the same time, which usually escapes the attention of those writing about the Battle of Borodino. However, it is so revealing that we cannot help but quote it:

"August 26, 1812
Borodino village
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon
My dear sir, Count Fyodor Vasilyevich!
I ask you, for God’s sake, Count Fyodor Vasilyevich, order us to immediately send from the arsenal complete charges for 500 guns, more than battery ones.
With complete respect I remain Your Excellency, my gracious sovereign, humble servant
Prince Kutuzov."

And then follows Kutuzov’s handwritten note:

“The battle is the bloodiest, we will hold it; So far it’s going well.”

This letter is a real revelation! What does it say? First of all, that Kutuzov no longer doubts that the outcome of the battle will be favorable for us, despite the fact that the battle is still ongoing! After all, sending this letter to Moscow in the middle of a fierce battle, Kutuzov, therefore, is confident that he has not only the time for delivery of the letter to the addressee, but also the time for delivery of a response to his letter, that is, delivery to the army of the requested 500 sets of charges for guns, which, of course, However, it takes at least several days. The possibility of Kutuzov losing the battle is not even considered here!

And now, for comparison, we present a fragment from Napoleon’s 18th bulletin, which refers exactly to the indicated time of the Battle of Borodino:

“Two hours in the afternoon: all hope left the enemy; the battle was over, the gunfire was still going on; the enemy fought, retreating for the sake of salvation, and not for victory.”

There is hardly any need to comment on such a monstrous discrepancy with the reality of the Napoleonic bulletin. But in it we have an example of the “reliability” on which the French historiography rests not only of the Battle of Borodino (“Battle of the Moscow River” in the French version), but also of the “Russian campaign” as a whole, for which Napoleon’s bulletins served as a documentary basis. .

All the time while the sabotage of Platov and Uvarov was taking place, “The cannonade on both sides continued in its own order", writes Mitarevsky. His battery stood to the right of the lunette, and he sees how

“opposite our lunette and from it, in the direction of Borodino, enemy artillery arrives in huge numbers, forms and begins to fire.”

The line of enemy guns extended to the right towards Borodino and the end of it was visible, but the end to the left was not visible behind the lunette.

“All that was heard from there was the roar of gunfire, so strong that neither gunshots, nor the screams of those fighting, nor the groans of the wounded could be heard. The command also could not be heard, and in order to order anything at the guns, one had to shout; everything merged into one roar... At the time when the guns and boxes were breaking, no crack was heard - it was as if some invisible hand was breaking them.”

Lieutenant Grabbe, who witnessed the fight for Raevsky’s battery, writes:

“The center and left flank of our army were surrounded by a continuous chain of enemy guns, battle fire and cross-fire. This was preparation for a decisive attack on the center. It was about four o'clock when masses of infantry and cavalry moved towards us. Then the battle began, general, fierce, disorderly, where everything was mixed up, infantry, cavalry and artillery. They fought as if each one was defending victory.”

The French advanced on a broad front. The commander of the 1st Jaeger Regiment, Colonel Karpenko, recalls:

“About four o’clock in the afternoon, the French columns rushed again across the river, already fording, and rushed to the position I occupied; at a distance of a pistol shot I met the enemies with murderous rapid fire. Both they and we withstood it with undaunted fortitude for about a quarter of an hour. The enemy again did not celebrate victory. The damage was great, and both sides, as if on command, stopped firing and retreated from each other. The name of the brave regiment from the commander-in-chief, Prince Kutuzov, served as a flattering reward for both officers and lower ranks.”

The center of our position, let me remind you, was already secured by this time by the arrival of the corps of Osterman-Tolstoy and Korf, transferred here from the right flank. Osterman-Tolstoy's 4th Corps stood in the first line, between the mound and Semenovsky, in place of Raevsky's corps, which had gone into reserve. Behind were the guards regiments Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky; behind them are the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps; in the last line are the Cavalry Guard and Life Guards Cavalry regiments. Dokhturov and his troops were adjacent to Semenovsky with their right flank, and with their left flank to the forest near the Old Smolensk road. The Kurgan battery was occupied by Likhachev's 24th division, Kaptsevich's 7th division stood to the right of it.

From Kutuzov’s report:

“Napoleon, seeing the failure of all his enterprises and all his attempts on our left flank destroyed, turned all his attention to our center, against which, having gathered large forces in many columns of infantry and cavalry, he attacked the Kurgan Battery; the battle was the most bloody, several columns of the enemy were victims of such a daring enterprise, but despite this, having multiplied his forces, he captured the battery, with which, however, Lieutenant General Raevsky managed to bring down several guns. In this case, Major General Likhachev was seriously wounded and captured.”

This battle for the Kurgan battery is seen by artilleryman Radozhitsky, who, unfortunately, remained an idle spectator in the Battle of Borodino, since his battery (light No. 3 company of the 3rd brigade of the 11th infantry division of the 4th corps) was never used in the battle ; he's writing:

“At noon, when the Viceroy of Italy made his last attack on our mound lunette, battery and rifle fire thrown from it in all directions, likened this mound to a fire-breathing vent; Moreover, the shine of sabers, broadswords, bayonets, helmets and armor from the bright rays of the setting sun - all together presented a terrible and majestic picture. We are from the village. Gorki witnessed this bloody attack. Our cavalry interfered with the enemy's in a brutal battle: they shot, hacked and stabbed each other from all sides. The French had already approached the very lunette, and our guns fell silent after the final salvo. A dull cry made it clear that the enemies had broken into the rampart, and work with bayonets began. The French general Caulaincourt was the first to break into the redoubt from the rear, and the first was killed; His cuirassiers, met outside the trench by our infantry, were bombarded with bullets and driven away with great damage. Meanwhile, the enemy infantry climbed the rampart from all sides and was driven by Russian bayonets into the ditch, which was filled with the corpses of the dead; but fresh columns took the place of the broken ones, and with new fury they climbed to die; ours met them with equal ferocity, and they themselves fell along with the enemies. Finally, the French furiously burst into the lunette and stabbed everyone they came across; The artillerymen, who acted with deadly force on the battery, suffered especially. Then the mound lunette remained in the hands of the enemies. This was the last trophy of their exhausted strength. Piles of bodies lay inside and outside the trench; almost all its brave defenders fell. The battle was so fierce."

Having captured the Kurgan battery, the enemy, hoping to build on their success, threw their cavalry at our infantry regiments, which were in its reinforcement. Barclay writes:

“The enemy cavalry, cuirassiers and lancers launched an attack on the infantry of the 4th corps, but this brave infantry met it with amazing firmness, allowed it to take 60 steps, and then opened fire with such active fire that the enemy was completely overthrown and, in great frustration, sought salvation his on the run. At the same time, the Pernovskaya Infantry and 34th Jaeger Regiments especially distinguished themselves, to which they assigned 3 insignia to each company. The Sumy and Mariupol hussars and behind them the Irkutsk and Siberian dragoon regiments pursued and drove the enemy to their very reserves, but being received here by strong cannon and rifle fire, they were forced to retreat. The enemy cavalry, having received reinforcements from their reserves, pursued ours and, breaking through the intervals of our infantry guards, went completely to the rear of the 7th and 11th infantry divisions, but this incomparable infantry, without being upset at all, received the enemy with strong and active fire, and the enemy was upset. Meanwhile, our cavalry gathered again, and the enemy was completely driven out from this point and retreated behind his infantry, so we completely lost sight of him.”

Eugene of Württemberg adds that during this attack of the enemy cavalry on the infantry of the 4th, 7th and 11th divisions “not a single battalion was broken through" The French cavalry even reached the guards regiments of Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, which were in reserve. From the report of Mr.-L. Lavrova:

“At 4 o’clock in the afternoon, the enemy cavalry, having broken through, reached the columns of Major General Baron Rosen, who, with the beating of drums, led them forward and met the enemy cavalry with bayonets, of which several were cut down, and the rest were put to flight.”

Having retreated, the enemy cavalry gathered again and rushed to our positions, but were met by the Horse Guards and Cavalry Guard regiments, which were joined by the Pskov Dragoon and other regiments of the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps.

“And then a fierce cavalry battle continued,” writes Barclay, “which ended with the enemy cavalry being completely overthrown by 5 o’clock and retreating completely out of our sight, and our troops held their places, with the exception of Kurgan, which remained in the hands of the enemy.”

Our artillery, which General Miloradovich set up for grapeshot against the Kurgan Battery and with its fire destroyed the French cavalry and infantry, greatly contributed to repelling the attacks. Here our artillerymen, under the command of the strongman General Kostenetsky, even had to fight off the attack of the Polish lancers with banners. Having driven away the cavalry, our batteries opened such brutal fire that they forced the enemy infantry to seek shelter in the ditches of the Kurgan battery, ruts and behind the slope of the hill facing Kolocha, allowing them to experience the futility of possessing this place. The enemy himself had so little confidence in the possession of the heights he had captured that he did not dare to install his guns here. Subsequently, only artillery operated on both sides, and rifle fire continued on the left flank of the 4th Corps and the Guards Division.

* * *
At the same time, when the assault on the Kurgan Battery began, Poniatovsky resumed his attack on the Old Smolensk Road. Kolachkovsky writes:

“Finally, at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Prince Poniatowski, who was being hurried by the emperor with his orders, decided to resume his attack with all his forces. Having formed both divisions in close columns, he personally led them to Mamelon and, thanks to the support of the cavalry from the flank, with a swift onslaught he took it a second time and placed his artillery on the ridge. General Baggovut, who took command after Tuchkov, tried in vain to take possession of the lost position. In addition, he was forced to retreat by the beginning of the withdrawal of the entire main army. He retreated in perfect order, although without much pressure from our infantry, and took up a new position at a distance of two gun shots from the previous one.”

Baggovut did indeed retreat, but not due to “the beginning of the withdrawal of the entire main army", but due to the danger of its position, which turned out to be too forward in relation to the location of our left flank. Evgeny of Württemberg, in particular, writes about this, who by this time had united with Baggovut with the Kremenchug and Minsk regiments:

“The main battle has already died down; but on the left flank near Baggovut, whose position protruded further than all other parts of the army, a new deal with the enemy began in the bushes. One Westphalian column broke through here again into the gap between us and the rest of the army... Then, convinced of the danger of his position, Baggovut retreated to a hill in front of Psarev, and stopped here almost at the same height with the front of the left wing of the rest of the army.”

Here, on the left flank of our army, the last act of the Battle of Borodino took place. Artilleryman Lyubenkov talks about him:

“It was getting dark, the shots were dying down, rest became necessary, the armies seemed to have shed all their blood, there were no more casualties, the air cleared, the smoke was quietly rising and thinning...”

Lyubenkov sees a great deal on the enemy’s side, “more than a hundred people", a horse procession that surveys our position; the artillerymen assume that it is Napoleon and his retinue; they shield the guns so that the enemy cannot see how they are aimed, and when the procession approaches within grapeshot, the guns fire.

“The magnificent train was dismantled, it was scattered in all directions, half of it was destroyed. But after that we withstood the vengeance of our enemies, we withstood it incredibly. A quarter of an hour later, a dense column of French grenadiers, up to five thousand with red banners flying, music and drumming, like a black thunder cloud, rushed straight towards us; It seemed that she was ordered to die to the last or take our battery. Our loss was significant; The brave brigade of the Brest and Ryazan regiments, rushing to the bayonet several times during the day, upset itself. General Count Ivelich, who commanded it, was wounded, but did not leave his place. The courageous Lithuanian Lancer Regiment suffered no less from continuous attacks; we were left to die. The undaunted Count Sivers encouraged us, we decided to go to death. The artillery officers were killed, leaving only me and Lieutenant Tishinin (now an artillery colonel). We hugged him and calmly waited for the enemies, not wanting to give them a single shot for nothing, and confidently announced to the cover that he would have half of this column, hugged, said goodbye again, and got to business. We were the first to meet the uninvited guests... They approached with a wild cry, we met them with grapeshot, and the terrible column wavered. Their bosses shouted: “Allons! Advance! ("Go ahead!"). The ranks were instantly replaced, they lined up over their corpses and moved smoothly, majestically. They sprayed more buckshot. A new defeat, the column became confused, but the shouts of the commanders did not stop, and it, again slender, moved. To inflict a decisive defeat and slow it down on the move, we began to act in volleys from half-batteries, the shots were successful, this terrible cloud thinned out, the musicians and drums fell silent, but the enemies marched boldly again. This column was like the continuous ebb and flow of the sea, it either moved back, then came closer, at some moments its movements from the action of our battery were in one place, it hesitated, and suddenly came closer. The squadrons of the Uhlan regiment rushed into the attack, but due to the small number of people they could not withstand it; the column opened murderous battle fire, our cavalry was repulsed and returned. Count Sievers, whose fearlessness on that day was beyond all description, seeing that we had no more charges left, ordered to be taken to the limbers, and covered our retreat with rangers.

We fired a final farewell salvo from the entire battery. The French were completely confused, but again lined up almost in front of the battery; then the Ryazan and Brest regiments burst out “Hurray!” and rushed at bayonets. There is no means here to convey all the ferocity with which our soldiers rushed; This is a fight of ferocious tigers, not people, and since both sides decided to lie down on the spot, they did not stop the broken guns, they fought with butts and cutlasses; The hand-to-hand combat was terrible, the killing lasted for half an hour. Both columns were not moving, they were towering, piled on top of dead bodies. Our small last reserve with a thunderous “Hurray!” rushed to the tormenting columns, there was no one else left - and the gloomy murderous column of French grenadiers was overturned, scattered and exterminated. The combat of the columns was like a massacre, our carriages were shot through, people and horses were killed; the latter, by some instinct, stood all day long, sadly bowing their heads, they quietly moved their feet, shuddering from time to time from the cannonballs and grenades that burst on the batteries.”

«Small last reserve”, which Lyubenkov is talking about here, is the Wilmanstrand infantry regiment and 500 warriors of the Moscow militia, sent by Baggovut to reinforce the Ivelic brigade, who decided this last matter on our left flank. The enemy also recorded the participation of our warriors in this battle, although with the exaggeration and demonization of the “Russian peasant” characteristic of the French. French officer Venturini writes:

“Suddenly the tall forest came to life and howled like a storm. Seven thousand Russian beards poured out of the ambush. With a terrible cry, with homemade lances and homemade axes, they rush at the enemy, as if into the thicket of a forest, and chop people down like firewood.”

Of course, we do not urge you to believe these French horrors, but we can note the fact of the very insignificant combat use of the militia, which stood “under arms.”

“The evening stopped the killing, a handful of victors returned to their own,” Lyubenkov concludes his story; - we were all bloodied, our clothes were torn... our faces were covered in dust, smoky with gunpowder smoke, our lips were dry; but we hugged each other and honored the memory of the dead with a tear of compassion, which dulled and disappeared as the day went on. We felt that we were worthy of the trust of the Fatherland and the Sovereign.”