“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” On the eve of the battle
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Kutuzov
However, Kutuzov seemed to concede to Barclay the honor of conquering Napoleon. Having received Barclay's letter in Zubtsovo on the same day, he immediately, at 16 o'clock in the evening, answered him:
“My dear sir, Mikhailo Bogdanovich!
The rainy season is preventing me from arriving at the army tomorrow for lunch; but as soon as with a small dawn it becomes possible to continue my journey, then I hope from the 17th to the 18th to be by all means in the Main Apartment. This, however, my delay in no way prevents Your Excellency from carrying out the plan you have undertaken before my arrival.
With perfect respect and devotion, I have the honor to be Your Excellency's humble servant
Prince Mikhail G[olenishchev]-Kutuzov.
The rainy season is preventing me from arriving at the army tomorrow for lunch; but as soon as with a small dawn it becomes possible to continue my journey, then I hope from the 17th to the 18th to be by all means in the Main Apartment. This, however, my delay in no way prevents Your Excellency from carrying out the plan you have undertaken before my arrival.
With perfect respect and devotion, I have the honor to be Your Excellency's humble servant
Prince Mikhail G[olenishchev]-Kutuzov.
Alas, fate was unkind to Barclay, and by the time Kutuzov arrived at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, the battle had not yet begun; the army only settled into position and erected fortifications.
Rumor about the arrival of Kutuzov immediately spread throughout the troops. Quartermaster of the 1st Army, ensign A. A. Shcherbinin, says:
“But suddenly they announce the arrival of Kutuzov in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. This was at 3 pm on the 17th of August. The day was cloudy, but our hearts cleared up.
He is echoed by the lieutenant of the 3rd light artillery company I. T. Radozhitsky:
“Suddenly, the news of the arrival of the new commander-in-chief, Prince Kutuzov, ran electrically through the army. The moment of joy was inexplicable; the name of this commander produced a general resurrection of the spirit in the troops, from soldier to general. Everyone who could, flew to meet the venerable leader to accept from him the hope of saving the Fatherland.
The officers cheerfully congratulated each other on the happy change of circumstances. Even the soldiers walking with boilers for water, as usual sluggishly and lazily, hearing about the arrival of their beloved commander, shouting "Hurrah!" They ran to the river, imagining that they were already chasing the enemies.
Immediately they had a saying: "Kutuzov has arrived to beat the French!"
In a word, “it reached the point of enthusiasm.”
The officers cheerfully congratulated each other on the happy change of circumstances. Even the soldiers walking with boilers for water, as usual sluggishly and lazily, hearing about the arrival of their beloved commander, shouting "Hurrah!" They ran to the river, imagining that they were already chasing the enemies.
Immediately they had a saying: "Kutuzov has arrived to beat the French!"
In a word, “it reached the point of enthusiasm.”
However, contrary to the common historiographical tradition, which describes Kutuzov’s arrival in Tsarevo-Zaimishche as a solemn meeting - with the formation of an honor guard of Preobrazhensky soldiers, to whom Kutuzov throws: “Is it possible to retreat with such fellows?”; then bypassing Kutuzov’s troops and hovering an eagle over his head - the troops in Tsarevo-Zaimishche Kutuzov never saw.
On the contrary, the new commander-in-chief tried to signify his presence in the army on that day as little as possible. Only a few of the officers noticed that in the evening of that day “Kutuzov drove around on a droshky (“wide covered droshky” that allowed Kutuzov to remain unnoticed) all the lines of location of our troops,” and Barclay claims that Kutuzov “found the position advantageous and ordered to speed up the work of the fortifications” .
The next day, Kutuzov "announced to the army that he would review at 8 o'clock in the morning, but did not arrive at the appointed hour," and at 12 o'clock the troops were ordered to march. So:
“The first order of Prince Kutuzov was to retreat in the direction of Gzhatsk. It explained the need to attach reinforcements coming to the army.
Thus begins another, already "Kutuz" period of the war of 1812. Outwardly, it seems similar to the one that took place under the leadership of Barclay - the same retreat, the same concern for preserving the army, but this similarity is still only external. Barclay's retreat is always impulsive, always due to "unfavorable circumstances that do not depend on the 1st Army, forcing it to this retreat," and always contradicts Barclay's constant desire to go on the offensive, while Kutuzov's retreat is always calculated in advance and tactically verified.
There is no doubt that Kutuzov already assumed his retreat and even the loss of Moscow in St. Petersburg, where he received a message from a courier who arrived from the army (Emperor Alexander was no longer in the capital at that time - he went to Abo to meet with the Crown Prince of Sweden Bernadotte) that Smolensk was abandoned by our troops.
In confirmation - a quote from Kutuzov's report to the sovereign after the Russian army left Moscow:
"The loss of Moscow is inseparably linked with the loss of Smolensk",
i.e. Kutuzov speaks of the impossibility of defending Moscow after the fall of Smolensk.
This national understanding of the significance of Smolensk as "the key to Moscow" was alien to Barclay, which deprived his strategy of the necessary clarity regarding the tactical limits of a retreat that would save the army, and which, in turn, indicates that the national factor in the art of generalship after all has the meaning.
As for Kutuzov's strategic thought, it is quite readable in his letter to the Moscow commander-in-chief Rostopchin dated August 17 from Gzhatsk, written literally on the eve of Kutuzov's arrival to the army. Here's the thought:
“The question has not yet been decided whether to lose the army or lose Moscow.”
And although Kutuzov immediately hurries to assure Rostopchin that, in his opinion, “the loss of Russia is connected with the loss of Moscow,” the very setting of such a dilemma quite definitely reveals the logic of his thought and makes his conclusion obvious - the most important thing is to save the army.
After all, there is no doubt that with the loss of the army, Moscow will also be lost. And therefore, Russia? But here's the thing, it's not "therefore". And that is why this question remains for Kutuzov "not yet resolved." And this “unsettledness”, more than anything else, tells us that, according to Kutuzov, Moscow is not all of Russia, that Russia, that is, not only in Moscow, and that, therefore, with the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost. , but with the loss of the army, both Moscow and Russia can really be lost.
Another thing is that understanding the importance of saving the army did not save Kutuzov from the inevitability of a general battle, because it was impossible to think that Moscow could be ceded to the enemy without a fight.
However, to believe, as Clausewitz believes, that Kutuzov “looked at this battle as a necessary evil,” means to judge too lightly, means not to understand the price that this battle had in the eyes of Kutuzov and the entire Russian army - the fate of the army lay on the scales of this battle, Moscow and Russia itself.
After Borodin, Kutuzov no longer needed a greater sacrifice that he could make to save the Fatherland. Even Moscow’s concession to the enemy, with all its pain for national feeling, could not be compared with the consequences of a possible failure of the battle.
Therefore, Kutuzov approaches the inevitability of a general battle very carefully and considers it possible to “surrender to the mercy of the battle” not before all the reinforcements coming to it join the army, and not otherwise than “with all the caution that the importance of the circumstances may require.” In the same letter to Rostopchin dated August 17, Kutuzov directly writes about his steps preceding the general battle:
“Now I am turning all my attention to the growth of the army, and the first reinforcement for it will be the troops of General Miloradovich, consisting of about fifteen thousand. Then Irakli Ivanovich Markov informs me that eleven regiments of the Moscow military militia have already set out for different points.”
This is the guideline of time and conditions that Kutuzov set for himself in order to decide on a general battle.
On August 18, the army stopped at Ivashkov, 4 km east of Gzhatsk. Here she was joined by the troops brought by Miloradovich - 14 infantry and 587 cavalry; the total number of the army reached, according to combat reports, 1 people. Looking ahead, we note that it no longer increased due to the influx of regular troops all the way to Borodino. From Ivashkovo, Kutuzov asks Count Markov, the head of the Moscow militia, to send his regiments as they are ready for Mozhaisk.
Kutuzov also counted on joining the army near Moscow with reserve regiments formed by Kleinmikhel and Lobanov-Rostovsky, but this calculation did not materialize due to the "unpreparedness of the regiments", which Kutuzov became aware of after the Battle of Borodino, on August 30, and which, of course, also could not but influence his decision to leave Moscow without a fight.
At dawn on August 20, the army set out in the direction of Mozhaisk and stopped at Durykino, 25 km east of Ivashkovo. Before the performance, Kutuzov wrote to his daughter A. M. Khitrovo that “the circumstances are very difficult,” but:
"I firmly believe that with the help of God, who has never left me, I will correct things to the honor of Russia."
This confidence of Kutuzov in the final triumph over the enemy seemed to be transferred to the troops, and it is noteworthy that from the moment he took command, the army ceased to grumble about the retreat - its trust in its commander was so great.
“We all had full confidence in the stewardship of the wise commander, gray in battle,”
- writes I. T. Radozhitsky.
On August 20, in the afternoon, the vanguard units of the French army entered Gzhatsk, already in flames. Here Napoleon learned about the change of commander in chief in the Russian army. Caulaincourt describes Napoleon's reaction to this news:
“Having learned about the arrival of Kutuzov, he (Napoleon. - Approx. Aut.) immediately concluded with a satisfied look from this that Kutuzov could not come in order to continue the retreat; he will probably give us a fight, lose it and surrender Moscow, because he is too close to this capital to save it; he said that he was grateful to Emperor Alexander for this change at the present moment, since it came in handy. He praised Kutuzov's mind, he said that with a weakened, demoralized army, he could not stop the emperor's campaign against Moscow.
Kutuzov will give battle to please the nobility, and in two weeks Emperor Alexander will find himself without a capital and without an army; this army will indeed have the honor of not losing its ancient capital without a fight; this is probably what Emperor Alexander wanted when he agreed to the change; he will now be able to make peace, avoiding reproaches and censures from the Russian nobles, whose protege is Kutuzov, and he will now be able to hold Kutuzov responsible for the consequences of the failures that he will suffer; no doubt that was his aim when he made a concession to his nobility.”
Kutuzov will give battle to please the nobility, and in two weeks Emperor Alexander will find himself without a capital and without an army; this army will indeed have the honor of not losing its ancient capital without a fight; this is probably what Emperor Alexander wanted when he agreed to the change; he will now be able to make peace, avoiding reproaches and censures from the Russian nobles, whose protege is Kutuzov, and he will now be able to hold Kutuzov responsible for the consequences of the failures that he will suffer; no doubt that was his aim when he made a concession to his nobility.”
Could it have been more wrong? And is it not already becoming clear how thoughtlessly Napoleon invaded Russia!
In view of the upcoming battle, Napoleon stopped the army in Gzhatsk, where it was also on August 21 and 22, in order to concentrate forces and rest the cavalry. The roll call, held on the 21st at 3 pm, showed the following size of the Grand Army: 103 infantry, 30 cavalry and 587 guns.
In addition, two more divisions were behind on the march: the Guards Laborde and the Italian Pino, numbering at least 13 people. So the numerical superiority of Napoleon's army over the Russian army on the eve of the general battle was about 000 thousand.
At dawn on August 21, the Russian army was supposed to move from Durykino to Borodino, but suddenly Kutuzov changes his mind and sends the army to the Kolotsky Monastery, where, as he writes to Rostopchin, "the position seemed to be the best." However, in the evening of the same day, Kutuzov again wrote to Rostopchin:
“To this day I retreat back in order to choose an advantageous position. Today's numbers, although quite good, are too large for our army and could weaken one flank. As soon as I choose the best, then with the assistance of the troops supplied by Your Excellency, and in your personal presence, I will use them, although not yet sufficiently trained, for the glory of our Fatherland.”
So Borodino was far from being either the “best” position or the position pre-selected by Kutuzov for a general battle. Before speaking to Borodino, Kutuzov asks the head of the Moscow militia, Mr. I. I. Markov, who informed him of his arrival in Mozhaisk, sent regiments of warriors to meet the army.
Borodino
Kutuzov arrived in Borodino on the morning of August 22, "ahead of the army," as A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky writes. His first impression was not in favor of the Borodino position: too large, cut by ravines, too vulnerable from the left flank, and besides, it was also located obliquely in relation to the retreat route. Quartermaster General of the Russian Army g.-m. M. S. Vistitsky writes:
"The location cannot be said to be perfect for battle, and at first Kutuzov was not happy with it either."
However, as usual, Kutuzov did what the circumstances required - he gave the order to strengthen the position.
The same was done at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, at Ivashkovo, at Kolotsky, i.e., in those positions that the Russian army had already left under the control of Kutuzov, and, therefore, this order in itself did not yet mean that the battle here really will take place. Borodino is Kutuzov's long reflection, his gradual consent to battle, his cautious, very cautious choice, which was influenced by many circumstances, including, not least, the very shortcomings of the position.
The Russian army was located at the Borodino position along the Kolocha River from the Maslovsky forest on the right flank to the Shevardinsky forest on the left, with the front to the northwest. Barclay writes that the position “was advantageous in the center and right flank; but the left wing, in a straight line with the center, was completely unsupported by anything and was surrounded by bushes at a distance of a rifle shot.
Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army Mr.-m. Saint-Prix elaborates:
"The enemy could easily bypass this position, moving through Yelnya along the old Smolensk road to Utitsa, and then through the forests could approach Semyonovka for a close cannon shot."
Researchers have long noted that the position was occupied by Russian troops "not quite in accordance with its individual sections: its most important section, the left, was most weakly occupied." Indeed, the 1st Army, the most numerous, occupied a section of the position provided by the conditions of the terrain itself - from the Maslovsky forest to the Ognik stream, the center of the position. The 2nd Army, which was twice as large as the 1st, was assigned a position site, the least convenient and most vulnerable - from the left flank of the 1st Army to the Shevardino forest.
This section was cut by ravines (Kamenka and Semenovsky), which made it difficult to communicate between the troops, and was bypassed along the Old Smolensk road. On the very first day, Bennigsen drew Kutuzov's attention to the length of our position, proposing to reduce it, "but there were no changes in the position we had taken, and work on the arrangement of batteries continued as before," he writes. Moreover, first and foremost, fortifications began to be erected precisely on the right flank of our position, the most secure in terms of terrain.
According to the quartermaster of the 6th Infantry Corps, Lieutenant I.P. Liprandi, “all the engineering units of the 1st Army” were sent to the right flank of the position as early as “on the evening of August 22 for the construction of many fortifications” and “communication devices at different places of the position in the rear in case of retreat.” This is what Kutuzov was concerned about in the first place upon entering the Borodino position - ensuring the safety of the army and its retreat path.
For this purpose, the regiments of the 2nd Army, located, let us recall, in the weakest part of the position, were then ordered to transfer to the 1st Army “in general, all their tools, including axes.” This decision, indicating Kutuzov’s initial lack of intention to fight at Borodino, was justified by circumstances: from the right flank of the Borodino position there ran the Great or New Smolensk Road, a strategically important route of our retreat, and if Napoleon, more than likely (and nothing incredible in relation to Napoleon could not be allowed), would have attacked our right flank and driven us from there, our army, deprived of the ability to maneuver (for the Old Smolensk Road could not ensure the maneuver of the entire army), would have found itself in extremely difficult conditions, fraught with its death. So strengthening the right flank of the position was simply necessary, even as a preventive measure, preceding Kutuzov’s decision on the possibility of a general battle at Borodino.
The change in Kutuzov’s attitude to the Borodino position, and hence to the possibility of a battle on it, takes place on August 23, after he re-examines the Borodino position, which was also facilitated by the arrival of regiments of the Moscow military force at the Borodino position.
23 of August
Kutuzov began reviewing the position from the right flank. At a height, near the already razed village of Gorki, a field fortification for 3 guns was erected; 150 sazhens below and across the Bolshaya Smolenskaya Road - another fortification for 9 guns; the sole of the height was surrounded by a trench under the protection of the infantry.
Ahead, the village of Borodino, occupied by advanced troops, was connected to the position by a bridge across the Kolocha River; 40 paces downstream was another floating bridge; the village of Borodino itself was brought into a defensive state: “trenches for infantry, barricades of the entrances to the village and fences” were arranged there, as well as “ambushes in the houses of the village”.
250 fathoms in front (west) of the village of Borodino, on the right side of the Great Smolensk road, the most advanced fortification of the Borodino position was built, which is hardly mentioned in the descriptions of the battle, but which is noted on the French plan taken after the battle - a pentagonal redoubt for 4 guns , covered from the north by a lodgement for infantry.
Such an arrangement of the fortification advanced and remote from the main position was intended to prevent Napoleon's attack from the Bolshaya Smolensk road, to make it more viscous. In addition, the strengthening of this section of the position partly countered the weakness of our left flank, creating here the threat of an attack from our side and forcing Napoleon to keep a significant part of his forces in this section of the position.
To the right of Gorki, along the steep, in some places impregnable, banks of the Kolocha, our right flank stretched, on which work was in full swing on the construction of many fortifications.
“In these works, the militia of the Smolensk province was mainly used, which followed the army from Smolensk itself,”
- writes F. Glinka. The batteries erected here "were masked by trees stuck into the ground."
The tip of the right flank went to the valley of the Moskva River near the village of Maslovo, and here, on the edge of the Maslovsky forest, the most powerful fortification of the Borodino position was erected - three lunettes connected to each other by curtains, or the so-called "chain fortification", which provided protection for the flank and rear of our positions. The Maslovsky forest itself was surrounded by fences.
To the left of Gorki, the center of the position was marked by a height dominating the entire surrounding area. It was located 250 meters ahead of the line of troops, at the junction of the 1st and 2nd armies, and in front of it an open field stretched for a grape shot, crossed by a wide and deep ravine, the approaches to which, on the opposite side, were hidden by a "very frequent forest" .
Kutuzov ordered to place a battery company of 12 guns from the 2nd Army at this height. It was the same Central Battery, better known as Raevsky's battery, whose infantry covered it on the day of the battle.
“The terrain all the way to Semenovsky favored us,” writes Prince Eugene of Württemberg, who participated in the review of the position, “but starting from here, the hollow in which the Semenovsky stream flows becomes more accessible and its left bank, gradually rising, begins to dominate the right” .
For this reason, it was decided to build several fortifications on the heights of the left bank of the Semenovsky ravine - they were called Semenovsky, or Bagration flushes.
Further, in the direction of the left flank, our position deteriorated markedly. The narrow defile between the upper reaches of the Kamenka ravine and the forest, which covered this flank from the left side and from the rear, deprived the troops stationed here of proper support and, in the opinion of many, made the occupation of this part of the position unnecessary and even dangerous. Bagration could not fail to notice to Kutuzov that in the present situation his army was in the greatest danger. He drew attention to the fact that to the south of his position the Old Smolensk road goes around, along which the enemy could easily go to his rear.
Kutuzov replied, and in this he was supported by Bennigsen, that “this road could easily be defended by non-combatant troops.” To strengthen “in some way” the left flank, Kutuzov ordered the construction of a redoubt at a height south of the village of Shevardino. It was decided that in the event of an enemy attack, this flank would retreat to the Semenov flushes.
“I did not understand why this movement had to be carried out after the attack of the enemy, and not in advance,”
Barclay writes. Hardly any of those present at the review of the position of the persons found the location of our army on it satisfactory, and the orders made by Kutuzov were sufficient.
“Borodin’s position made it possible for quite decisive movements, they even talked about it; but the thought remained unfulfilled,
writes Prince Eugene of Württemberg.
“On the 23rd, even when going around the position, it was unmistakable to foresee that the main efforts (of the enemy. - Approx. Aut.) would be turned against our left flank, which did not present natural obstacles on the ground, and, most importantly, because the Old Smolensk road ran near him,” writes P. Kh. Grabbe, Yermolov’s adjutant. “Despite the fact that it was not transferred to the 2nd Army from the first part of the entrenching tool and other construction tools, uselessly used to strengthen the right flank, which was already almost inaccessible.”
Finally, Clausewitz expresses an idea that can serve as an expression of the general impression from the review of the Borodino position:
“The situation as a whole attracted the French too much to the left flank, and the right flank could not divert their forces. Thus, the occupation of this part of the position was only a useless dispersion of forces; it would be much better if the right wing ended at Kolocha in the Gorki region, and the rest of the space up to the Moskva River would only be observed or defiantly occupied.
And here we come close to understanding the idea of Kutuzov under Borodin.
Here is what he wrote to Emperor Alexander at the same time, on August 23, after reviewing the position:
“The position in which I stopped at the village of Borodino, 12 versts ahead of Mozhaisk, is one of the best that can be found only on flat places. The weak point of this position, which is located on the left flank, I will try to correct with art. I wish the enemy to attack us in this position, then I have great hope for victory.
Kutuzov is cunning - the position was not at all the best, but he already found in it that feature that determined his choice - this is the very "weak point of this position, which is located on the left flank" and which he intended to "correct with art" .
What was this "art"?
It was the art of deception, that is, the very thing to which Kutuzov was especially inclined in his confrontation with Napoleon, and in which he was generally very gifted.
Kutuzov's idea was to draw Napoleon's blow precisely to his left flank, designed for a flexible retreat; the fortifications created here, going in a ledge one after another: the Shevardinsky redoubt, the battery supporting it from the east, the Semenov flushes - were designed to "force the enemy to attack us, as far as possible, with a greater loss for him" and strengthened the attractiveness for Napoleon to bypass the left flank of the Russian position along Old Smolensk road.
Note that Kutuzov did not seriously bother to prevent the enemy from advancing along this road, because the irregular troops (essentially, sentinel troops) stationed here were clearly an insufficient barrier to this. Kutuzov truly cherished this chance - to evade the battle.
This is what he writes further in his report to Emperor Alexander:
“But if he (the enemy - Author's note), finding my position strong, begins to maneuver along other roads leading to Moscow, then I can’t guarantee that he might have to go and stand behind Mozhaisk, where all these roads converge, and how be that as it may, Moscow must be defended.”
Here it is - Kutuzov’s innermost thought under Borodin - to preserve the army at all costs as a guarantee of saving the Fatherland. True, Kutuzov, apparently, did not expect that the battle would last for three days, and that after the Shevardin battle he would be forced to change the initial location of his army, but the fact that he nevertheless remained in the Borodino position tells us that Kutuzov was convinced of the reliability of his position.
On the same day, August 23, a disposition was issued for tomorrow, with which Kutuzov confirmed his readiness for a general battle:
“The armies, having attached to themselves all the reinforcements that arrived from Kaluga and Moscow, are expecting an enemy offensive near the village of Borodino, where they will give him a battle.”
The disposition fixes a rectilinear, along the Kolocha, the disposition of troops; calls the “left flank” the position of the 7th Infantry Corps and the 27th Infantry Division, that is, the location of the entire 2nd Army of Bagration, which stood from the Central Battery to Shevardino, where the 27th Infantry Division of Neverovsky was located; and Kutuzov declares in it that it is precisely in this battle formation that he intends to attract enemy forces and act in accordance with his movements.
We specifically draw attention to this in order to emphasize once again that the Shevardinsky position was not a section separated from the main position, but was the tip of the left flank of the original position of the Russian army at Borodino. The left flank, according to the disposition, was under the command of Mr.-l. A.I. Gorchakov 2nd.
On this day, work was already in full swing in the entire location of the Russian army: fortifications were erected with the help of the militias, bridges and descents were built for better communication between the troops, clearings and notches were cut in the forest on the flanks of the position.
“An unusual revival appeared, as it were, before a big holiday in all branches of the military,” writes a participant in the battle. - In the infantry they cleaned guns, updated flints; in the cavalry horses were groomed, girths inspected, sabers sharpened; in artillery, the same grooming of horses, updating lines, lubricating wheels, inspecting guns, pickling fuses, receiving shells - everything heralded the end of the long-standing expectations of the army!
Every now and then, distant shots were heard in the rearguard, which announced that Napoleon's two-day respite in Gzhatsk was over, and he again set off in pursuit of the Russian army.
The Moscow militia, which arrived at the Borodino position that day, especially enlivened the situation.
“This army had two fundamental accessories: a beard and a gray caftan and the third - a cross on the cap of warriors,” writes Fyodor Glinka. - With the officers came Russian wagons, wagons, dissolutions with bells, clockwork horses, serf servants. At another time, one might have thought that these were landowners, who had gathered in a friendly crowd, with grooms and visiting people, in a field that was leaving for a distant field. Instead of a banner, banners flew over the ranks of the militia. On many wagons fastened grandfather's folds with the image of saints on copper and enamel.
The Moscow militia arrived at the Borodino position during August 23–24, and some of its units even on the very day of the battle; its number at the beginning of the battle was approximately 15 people. The fighting qualities of this militia can be judged by the characteristics given to it by the historiographer of the Patriotic War of 500 and its participant A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky:
“The militias of Smolensk and Moscow, whose regiments have not yet joined the army, had almost no firearms. weapons. In general, they hardly had a semblance of a military device. For a month, taken from the plow ... although they burned with zeal to fight, it was still impossible to lead them into the right battle with the experienced regiments of Napoleon.
As for the Smolensk militia, it was formed even faster - within two weeks. Yermolov speaks of him like this: “... the gathered crowds of peasants, without any raid of their attention, poorly equipped with clothes, not at all armed” ... To give them at least a somewhat combat appearance, “the unusable guns selected from the cavalry [were] turned to the militia.” Therefore, Kutuzov saw the main benefit from the militia in the possibility of maintaining the number of regular troops in the ranks by replacing militiamen with military personnel in the performance of non-combat duties. He wrote about this intention to Emperor Alexander on the eve of the Battle of Borodino:
“I intend to use the Smolensk militia that is now with the army and part of the Moscow one, which has come to readiness, in such a way that I will attach them to the regular troops, not so that they can be recruited with them, but so that they can be used there sometimes to be formed there with pikes the third rank or use it to save guns after the dead, to make redoubts and other field work, and most of all to replace the necessary places with wagon trains, so that not a single soldier needs to be kept there.
In view of the foregoing, one can hardly recognize as fair the tendency to increase the combat strength of the Russian army at Borodino at the expense of the militia. “A general analysis of the size and quality of the armies does not allow us to doubt the clear superiority of the enemy forces,” says a modern study. Nevertheless, in the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov used part of the militia (7 from Moscow and 000 from Smolensk) as a reserve force on the Old Smolensk road.
Of the last orders of Kutuzov on the 23rd, his order, given at half past ten in the evening, is noteworthy - to send to the rearguard to Konovnitsyn "an officer who knows the way from the Kolotsk monastery to this camp, and which the 2nd army followed", which definitely indicates Kutuzov's intention to direct the enemy to his left flank, that is, to Shevardino.
And at the same time, his other order follows: “Tomorrow, send all state and particular carts 6 miles beyond Mozhaisk along the high road to Moscow, where they will be established from each army by Wagenburg” - which, as researchers have long noted, already provided for the possibility of an army retreat. And on the same day, Kutuzov wrote another letter - to the Chairman of the State Council, Count N. I. Saltykov:
“For God's sake, dear sir, Count Nikolai Ivanovich, try to get the second-line recruiting depots closer to Moscow in order to keep the army in some complete set. If my shelves are complete, then, by God, I’m not afraid of anyone!”
Here is Kutuzov's main concern on the eve of the battle - "to keep the army in a certain kit", then everything else is decided.
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